But this move had come too late. The British Ambassador to Berlin

reported by telegraph to his Government on July 27, 1914, that the

Imperial German Government considered that the proposed conference

amounted practically to a court of arbitration and could not be

called except at the behest of Austria-Hungary and Russia. The

German Government therefore turned down the British proposal. But

Germany was not for provoking a war; the German Ambassador at London

informed the British Foreign Office that his Government was willing

to accept in principle the mediation of the powers between Austria

and Russia.

The question of whether the alliances between the various nations

would hold under a strain now became pointed. The Russian Government

informed the British Government on July 27, 1914, that the

impression prevailed in Berlin and Vienna that England would stand

aloof under any circumstances, differences between Russia and

Austria notwithstanding. But on the same day Sir Edward Grey,

British Minister for Foreign Affairs, dispelled these impressions in

a telegram to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. "The

impression ought to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the

First Fleet," it read in part, "which is concentrated, as it

happens, at Portland, not to disperse for maneuver leave." On July

28, 1914, the British Government was informed that France and Russia

were agreeable to having a conference called in London; the Italian

Government had already reported that it agreed to this plan, but the

refusal of Germany, mentioned above, rendered these communications

useless.

On July 28, 1914, the British Government was informed by telegram

from its Ambassador at Vienna that "Austria-Hungary cannot delay

warlike proceedings against Serbia, and would have to decline any

suggestions of negotiations on basis of Serbian reply.

"Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now

prevent conflict." This telegram, be it noted, made use of the term

"military proceedings" instead of "military preparations" and

therefore had the effect of changing Austria-Hungary's note to

Serbia into an ultimatum. Russia, on July 28, 1914, began to

mobilize troops near Odessa, Moscow, Kieff and Kazan, and on the

following day this fact was communicated officially to the

Government at Berlin.

As Austria-Hungary and Russia were about to come to grips Germany

made it plain that she would stand by her ally, Austria-Hungary. In

times of peace there may have been doubt throughout Europe as to the

strength of the bonds of the Triple Entente, but the German

Government was not disposed to rely on these doubts when the

critical moment came. The British Ambassador at Berlin was asked to

visit the German Chancellor and as a result of this visit the former

sent the following telegram to the British Foreign Office:

"Berlin, July 29, 1914. I was asked to call upon the chancellor

to-night. His excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

"He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European

conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to

Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued

efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following

strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far

as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British

policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to

be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not

the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great

Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British

Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial

acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious

in any war that might ensue.

"I questioned his excellency about the French colonies, and he said

that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As

regards Holland, however, his excellency said that, so long as

Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the

Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his Majesty's Government an

assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of

France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in

Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would be

respected if she had not sided against Germany.

"His excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been

chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to

bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these

assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so

much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between

England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment

too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality

in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce

would enable him to look forward to a realization of his desire.

"In reply to his excellency's inquiry how I thought his request

would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at

this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course

of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain

full liberty."

Here for the first time the matter of Belgian neutrality entered

into the diplomatic discussions; the danger of a Pan-European

conflict was apparent, for the diplomats from then on were less

concerned with the Austro-Hungarian dispute with Serbia than with

the possibilities that a war in western Europe might entail. On the

same day, July 29, 1914, the German Ambassador at London was

officially informed that if the European crisis involved nothing

more than disputes between Russia and Austria on the one hand, and

the military operations of Austria in Serbia on the other, England

would keep out of the trouble, but if Germany went to war with

Russia, or if France went to war, England could not stand quietly

aside. News had come that day that Austria had declared war on

Serbia the day before. The declaration read as follows:

"The Royal Government of Serbia, not having replied in a satisfactory

manner to the note remitted to it by the Austro-Hungarian Minister in

Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government finds

itself compelled to proceed to safeguard its rights and interests and

to have recourse for this purpose to force of arms.

"Austria-Hungary considers itself, therefore, from this moment in a

state of war with Serbia."

[Illustration: Poland and Its Divisions from 1772-1914.]

At the same time the Government at Vienna issued this note to the

foreign ambassadors there with the request that they forward it to

their respective governments:

"In order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating

from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the

Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has

delivered to the Royal Serbian Government a note in which a series

of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of

forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The

Royal Serbian Government not having answered this note in a

satisfactory manner, the Imperial and Royal Government are

themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and

interest, and with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

"Austria-Hungary, who has just addressed to Serbia a formal

declaration, in conformity with Article I of the convention of

October 18, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers

itself in a state of war with Serbia.

"In bringing the above notice to the powers, the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs has the honor to declare that Austria-Hungary will act

during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the

Conventions of the Hague of October 18, 1907, as also with those of

the Declaration of London of February 28, 1909, provided an

analogous procedure is adopted by Serbia."

The great question as to what Russia would do was answered by a note

issued at St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914, which stated that Russia

wished, above all, to maintain peace. But the moments during which

words alone would be availing were fast passing. Austria-Hungary was

mobilizing her armies, and not all of the mobilization was on her

southern frontier; some corps were gathered at points from which a

blow from Russia might be warded off, or offensive move against

Russia made.

On July 30, 1914, the German Government sent a short note to St.

Petersburg, in which three questions were asked. These were: the

reason for the Russian mobilization, which Berlin knew to be in

progress; whether it was directed against Austria; and on what terms

Russia might be induced to demobilize.

The Czar, on July 31, 1914, sent a note to the German Emperor in

which he said in part: "... It is technically impossible to

discontinue our military operations, which have been rendered

necessary by Austrian mobilization. We are far from wishing for war,

and so long as negotiations with Austria regarding Serbia continue,

my troops will not undertake any provocative actions." This was an

admission that Russian general mobilization was in progress.

CHAPTER XXIII

PREPARATION FOR WAR

As a matter of fact, during the last days of July, 1914, all the

Governments in Europe had their military departments busy on the

problem of preparing for the first blows in war; these included not

only the six leading powers, but also the Scandinavian countries,

Spain, Portugal, all the Balkan kingdoms, and Belgium and Holland.

The diplomatic exchanges that were meanwhile taking place were known

to all experienced statesmen to be hardly more than masks.

On August 1, 1914, the kaiser declared Germany to be "in a state of

war." This did not carry with it a declaration of war against any

power, but had the effect of putting the entire German Empire under

martial law, everything being in readiness to cope with an enemy. On

the same day the kaiser made an important speech in which he said,

"A fateful hour has fallen for Germany. Envious peoples everywhere

are compelling us to our just defense. The sword has been forced

into our hands.

"I hope that if my efforts at the last hour do not succeed in

inducing our opponents to see eye to eye with us and in maintaining

peace, we shall, with God's help, so wield the sword that we shall

restore it to its sheath again with honor." On the same day,

however--namely August 1, 1914, at five o'clock in the evening he

signed an order mobilizing the German army, and Russia and Germany

went to war two hours later. A demand made upon the French

Government by the German Government, asking the intentions of France

in case Russia went to war with Germany, received an unsatisfactory

reply on August 2, 1914, and France on the same day mobilized its

army, though it declared war on no power. On August 3, 1914, German

troops entered French territory, for Germany did not wish to be

delayed in a campaign in the west by waiting for diplomatic

exchanges to take place; war between Germany and France began at the

moment the foreign soldiers crossed into France.

It was, in theory at least, over the matter of Belgian neutrality

that England and Germany went to war. As soon the British Government

saw that hopes for peace were no longer possible Sir Edward Grey

sent to its ambassadors in Germany and France the following

telegram; "London, July 31, 1914; I still trust situation is not

irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilization in Germany it

becomes essential to his Majesty's Government, in view of existing

treaties, to ask whether French [and German] Government is prepared

to engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other

power violates it. A similar request is being addressed to the

German [and French] Government. It is important to have an early

answer."

To this telegram the French Government, on August 1, 1914, answered

that it stood ready to respect Belgian neutrality provided no other

power threatened or violated it. Germany hesitated to give a

definite reply immediately for fear of disclosing the plans of

campaign she had against France.

On August 3, 1914, German troops moved into Luxemburg, en route for

France, and it was then known that a German invasion of Belgium

would be inevitable. But before taking this step Germany tendered

certain proposals to the Belgian Government, assuring it that if

peaceful passage were given to German troops Belgium would be given

a subsidy. But the Belgian Government turned down these proposals

and the king sent this telegram to the British monarch: "Remembering

the numerous proofs of your majesty's friendship and that of your

predecessor, of the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the

proof of the friendship which she has just given us again, I make a

supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's

Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

Italy and England were now the only two important powers in Europe

which were not embroiled in war, but the moment was rapidly

approaching when the former could no longer keep out of it, if for

no other reason than to see that the balance of power in Europe was

not upset. On August 4, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said in the British

House of Commons, "The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and

the northern coasts of France are defenseless. If a foreign fleet

engaged in war against France should come down and battle against

those defenseless coasts, we could not stand aside. We felt strongly

that France was entitled to know at once whether, in the event of

attack on her unprotected coasts, she could rely on our support. I

gave the engagement to the French Ambassador last night that if the

German fleet goes into the English Channel or into the North Sea to

attack French shipping, or the French coast, the British fleet will

give all the protection in its power. That answer is subject to the

approval of Parliament. It is not a declaration of war. I understand

that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge

ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack

the northern coasts of France. That is far too narrow an

engagement." Germany had thrown down the gauntlet in showing she

intended to invade Belgium; Great Britain here threw down the

gauntlet. It could be but a question of hours before Germany and

England went to war.

Meanwhile, because war was already on between Germany and France,

the latter did not go to the trouble of issuing a declaration of

war. And on August 4, 1914, the Italian Government announced that

"The Italian Cabinet has decided that while some of the European

powers are at war Italy is at peace with all the belligerents.

Consequently the citizens and subjects of the Kingdom of Italy are

obliged to observe the duty of neutrality." This declaration of

neutrality severed the bonds that held Italy to the Triple Alliance.

On the same afternoon, August 4, 1914, the Russian Ambassador at

Berlin was handed his passports and departed; this official

statement was given to the German press: "In consequence of a

Russian attack on German territory Germany is in a state of war with

Russia.

"The French reply to Germany's note has been received in the

meantime, and is of an unsatisfactory character. In addition France

has ordered the mobilization of her army so that the outbreak of war

between Germany and France must be awaited at any moment." The

outbreak of war between France and Germany was indeed near at hand,

for, as we have already seen, Germany declared war on France August

3, 1914, and on that very day served an ultimatum on neutral Belgium

and occupied Luxemburg preparatory to an immediate invasion of

Belgium. In view of the evident long and careful preparations for

just such a sudden stroke, by which to crush France and take Paris

before the French armies could offer adequate resistance, the clumsy

attempts of the Germans on August 2, 1914, to represent the French

as the aggressors seem ridiculous, though typical of German attempts

to influence opinion at home and abroad. The German Government

declared that French airmen had flown over Nuremburg, that French

officers in German uniforms had crossed the German frontier from

Holland, that the French were already in Alsace. These stories

deceived no one.

What the neutral nations saw and understood was that the autocratic

governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary had plunged the world

into a war of incalculable magnitude, almost without warning and

with comparatively trivial pretexts. There had been only a brief

mockery of diplomatic interchanges, for the most part by telegraph

and telephone.

On August 4, 1914, the last chance for averting war between England

and Germany went by. On that date the British Foreign Office had

telegraphed to its Envoy at Brussels: "You should inform Belgian

Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce

them to depart from neutrality, his Majesty's Government expect that

they will resist by any means in their power, and that his Majesty's

Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that

his Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia

and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at

once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by

Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence

and integrity in future years."

Germany, through its Intelligence Department, was aware that this

note had been sent, but the invasion of Belgium began, nevertheless.

Then came an ultimatum from England. As soon as the British Foreign

Office had learned that German troops had crossed the border and

that the fortifications at Liege had been summoned to surrender to

the German army, this telegram was sent to the British Ambassador at

Berlin:

"London Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. We hear that Germany has

addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that

German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by

force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

"We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at

Gemmenich.

"In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany

declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France

gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin

and Paris, we must repeat that request and ask that a satisfactory

reply to it and to my telegram of this morning [which said that

England was bound to protest against violation of Belgian

neutrality] be received here by twelve o'clock to-night. If not, you

are instructed to ask for your passports and to say that his

Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to

uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to

which Germany is as much a part as ourselves."

Midnight of August 4, 1914, came and the German Government had not

yet made a reply to this note; fifteen minutes of grace were

allowed, and then the British Government formally declared war.

The next move of a world power, toward belligerency, came in the Far

East. In 1911 Japan and England had entered an offensive and

defensive alliance, which bound each to come to the other's aid

should that other become involved in war with more than one nation.

Japan readily agreed to live up to its part, and on August 16, 1914,

sent an ultimatum to Germany which read:

"Tokyo, August 16, 1914. We consider it highly important and

necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove the

causes of all disturbances of the peace in the Far East, and to

safeguard the general interests as contemplated by the agreement of

alliance between Japan and Great Britain.

"In order to secure a firm and enduring peace in eastern Asia, the

establishment of which is the aid of the said agreement, the

Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty to

give the advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the

following two propositions:

"First. To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters

German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at

once those which cannot be so withdrawn.

"Second. To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the

Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation,

the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau, with a view to the

eventual restoration of the same to China.

"The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that in

the event of its not receiving by noon on August 23, 1914, an answer

from the Imperial German Government, signifying its unconditional

acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese

Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as she may

deem necessary to meet the situation."

The time limit set for the German reply came and passed with no

official communication with Berlin. Consequently the Japanese

Government declared war in the following proclamation:

"Issued at Tokyo, August 23, 1914, at 6 p. m.

"We, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the throne

occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make

the following proclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects:

"We hereby declare war against Germany, and we command our army and

navy to carry on hostilities against that empire with all strength,

and we also command our competent authorities to make every effort,

in pursuance of their respective duties, to attain the national aim

by all means within the limits of the law of nations.

"Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous

effect of which we view with grave concern, we on our part have

entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the

maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at

length compelled Great Britain, our ally, to open hostilities

against that country, and Germany is at Kiao-chau, its leased

territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while its armed

vessels cruising the seas of eastern Asia are threatening our

commerce and that of our ally. Peace of the Far East is thus in

jeopardy.

"Accordingly, our Government and that of his Britannic Majesty,

after full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take

such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general

interests contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance, and we on our

part, being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means,

commanded our Government to offer with sincerity an advice to the

Imperial German Government. But on the last day appointed for the

purpose, however, our Government failed to receive an answer

accepting their advice. It is with profound regret that we, in spite

of our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to

declare war, especially at this early period of our reign, and while

we are still in mourning for our lamented mother.

"It is our earnest wish that by the loyalty and valor of our

faithful subjects peace may soon be restored and the glory of the

empire be enhanced."

Germany made no reply to the Japanese declaration. On August 19,

1914, the emperor had sent word to the garrison at Kiao-chau that it

was to defend itself against all attacks made by the Japanese, and

when the commander there heard of the Japanese declaration he issued

a statement in which he invited the Japanese, if they wanted the

place, to come and fight for it.

CHAPTER XXIV

TERRITORIAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL COMPARISONS

The fundamental factor in war is territory. Whether war be viewed

from the point of its relation to the racial characteristics of the

nations who are opposed, or to national rivalries, or to imperial

ambitions, the solid fact remains that war is of peoples who live

upon a certain land domain, who possess frontiers that may be

attacked and must be defended, and whose patriotism coheres with

geographical boundaries. The riches of a country depend upon

territory and the density of population. Consequently the proportion

of men able to bear arms depends upon territory, and the power of

self-maintenance under times of stress--such as a blockade--is again

a territorial question.

The Germanic nations, known as the Central Powers, which were allied

at the opening of the war were the German Empire and the

Austro-Hungarian Empire. The area of the German Empire (exclusive of

colonial possessions) in 1914 was 208,825.2 square miles. The area

of the Austrian Empire was 115,831.9, and of the kingdom of Hungary

was 125,641.2. In addition to these, the area of Bosnia and

Herzegovina was 19,767.9, making the total area of the territories

of the Central Powers the sum of 470,093.2 square miles.

The nations known as the "Allies" in popular speech, consisted, at

the opening of the war, of the British Empire, the French Republic,

and the Russian Empire. Using the same basis of comparison, the area

of the British Isles was 121,633 square miles; the area of the

Republic of France was 207,129 square miles; and the area of

European Russia, including Finland and Poland, and excluding

territory within the Arctic circle, was approximately 2,500,000

square miles. Serbia had an area of 34,000 square miles. Belgium,

although in no way responsible for the outbreak of the war--no

matter from what point of view it may be considered--became the

nation to suffer most at first and in the very earliest days of the

war was on the side of the Allies. Her area, exclusive of oversea

possessions, was 11,373 square miles. This makes a total of

2,874,135 square miles for the Allies, a preponderance of territory

which seems extraordinarily disproportionate until it is realized

that the British Isles, France, Belgium, and Serbia together were

far smaller than the combined territories of the Central Powers, and

that only a small proportion of European Russia was liable to become

a part of the actual field of conflict.

Passing on to larger figures, that is to say to the total area of

all the possessions of the nations involved, it will be seen that

the preponderance on the part of the Allies is even greater. Thus

the German Empire, inclusive of colonial possessions in Africa, in

Asia, and in the Pacific, contained 1,236,600 square miles. The

Austro-Hungarian Empire, as previously stated, was 261,239 square

miles, there being no oversea colonies. This makes a total of

1,497,839 square miles as the total territory of the Central Powers.

Balanced against this come the enormous figures of the three great

allied empires. The area of the British Empire was approximately

13,158,712 square miles, the Republic of France and her colonies

4,983,086 square miles, and the Russian Empire 8,394,018 square

miles. The three empires combined thus made a total of 26,535,816

square miles, or but very little less than one-half of the total

land area of the earth. These figures are compiled from the latest

sources before the opening of the war, but it is to be remembered

that some of the figures are approximate. For example the French

possessions in Africa, of enormous extent, have not been surveyed,

and there are vast stretches of Arctic Siberia and Arctic Canada

which are but half explored. The small territories of Belgium and

Serbia may be added to the total of the three great allied empires,

and thus practically one-half of the earth on this globe was opposed

to the million and a half square miles of the Central Powers.

Owing to Bulgaria's position in the Balkan Peninsula, and also owing

to aggrievement following the results of former Balkan wars,

Bulgaria joined the Central Powers later in the war. Turkey, also,

fearing the loss of Constantinople to the Russians as a result of

the coalition of the Allies, threw her forces on the side of

Germany. The area of Bulgaria was only 43,000 square miles, but the

Ottoman or Turkish Empire was territorially very large, containing

1,420,448 square miles, or almost as much as Germany, Austria, and

Bulgaria combined. In round numbers, and for easy remembrance, it

may be said that the territory of the Central Powers engaged in the

war was about three million square miles.

For a long time Italy maintained neutrality, but the onrush of

conditions forced her into the war, also on the side of the Allies.

The territory of European Italy was 110,623 square miles, and

inclusive of her African possessions the territory under the Italian

flag was 706,623 square miles.

The territory of the Japanese Empire, also, needs to be taken into

consideration, for the reason that Japan, while not entering the

European theater of war, declared herself on the side of the Allies

by the capture of Kiao-chau, a district leased from China by

Germany, and the very next month declared to be a German

protectorate. The territorial extent of the Japanese Empire was

254,266 square miles, inclusive of Korea. These are the principal

factors to be taken into consideration in the mere question of the

territorial extent of the opposing forces.

The geographical position of the belligerent countries, with their

corresponding advantages and disadvantages, is the next factor to be

considered. The geographical position of the Central Powers is best

expressed by the fact that they are central. They have all the

advantages of being in a united whole. When, later in the war,

Serbia was conquered, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers and Turkey

was swung into line, the same condition held true. Germany and her

allies were a homogeneous unit, geographically considered. From the

point of view of land defense very little of Germany's frontiers

bordered upon enemy territory. The small section that confronted

France on the west and the larger section facing Russia on the east

were her only open points of attack. Her sea front except for the

small section near the mouth of the Rhine, was on the Baltic, and

secure from naval attack except by the Russian fleet, and Russia has

never been a naval power. Her Mediterranean outlet, near Trieste and

Fiume, menaced by the Mediterranean fleets of the allied powers, was

comparatively safe, for the Austrian fleet was an efficient fighting

unit, especially so for defense.

As opposed to this was the openness of England, France, and Russia

to naval attack. England has but a small proportion of land to

seacoast, and France is open to the sea on three sides. Russia,

fronting the Baltic, possessed an infinitely inferior fleet, to

which the Allies could send no reenforcement as long as the

Skagerrak and Cattegat Straits were the only way into the Baltic;

moreover, by the Kiel Canal, connecting the North Sea and the

Baltic, the remodeling of which was completed in a few months before

the declarations of war, a German naval fleet would possess an

enormous advantage over an allied fleet, endeavoring to force

entrance into the Baltic. In addition to this, while the Central

Powers could work together on both fronts with great ease, thanks to

the excellent system of German railways, Great Britain and France

had no means of direct communication with their great ally in the

east of Europe. Thus, in a measure, the Central Powers were not

attacking the Allies at any one time, though it might truly be said

that they were being attacked by the Allies. In the event of any

lack of synchronization between the plans of Russia and those of the

western allies, German and Austrian troops could be massed first on

one side of the field of operations and then on the other. Such

action was impossible to the Allies. At the time of the great German

advance on Paris, Russia could give no aid. At the time of the

German advance on Riga, Britain and France could give no aid. Both

German advances were checked and the invaders driven back, not by

the armies of the Allies, but by two non-interlocking parts of the

armies of the Allies. At the same time, the susceptibility to attack

on both sides prevented the Central Powers from deflecting all their

men to either front, and thus by the mere existence of passive

menace, prevented the Central Powers from using their geographic

advantage to the full.

Their disadvantage, in the military sense of the recognition of

geographical conditions, was that the Central Powers had constantly

to bear in mind the necessity of fighting upon two fronts. Russian

activity, while important to Britain and France, was a matter with

which their policy had nothing to do; the coordination of movements

on the west front was a matter entirely outside the scope of the

operations of the Russian commanders. The German military staff, on

the other hand, had the task of constantly coordinating two separate

campaigns, to determine where the greatest number of men should be,

to avoid weakening the one side or the other at the wrong moment.

The advantages, again considered geographically, greatly outweigh

the disadvantages. The first of these was the homogeneity of the

Central Powers. A general could attend a war council in Berlin in

the evening, and one in Vienna the next morning. The influence of

Germany was an understood thing, moreover, and in Vienna there was a

readiness to accept and carry out the policies of the German

military staff. There was also a geographical homogeneity, due to

modern facility of communication. Not only in mobilization, but in

the entire conduct of the war, the geographic nearness of points in

Germany and Austria was brought about by an excellent east and west

railway system. The disadvantage of fighting on two fronts was

partly compensated by the fact that within three days enormous

masses of men could be moved from Galicia to the Rhine, or from the

Belgian frontier to the wastes of East Prussia. In all Europe there

is no stretch of land so well suited by nature for this task of

fighting upon two fronts as the area of the combined Austrian and

German Empires. This is emphasized by the topography of the Baltic

Plain, the Rhine and Danube valleys. One might say, in a measure,

that this stretch of territory has not wasted any of its natural

mountain defenses by flinging them athwart the territory. Thus the

Vosges defend against France, the Alps against Italy, the

Transylvanian Alps against Rumania--in the event of that nation

entering the war with Russia--the Carpathians behind Galicia against

Russia's southern attacks, and the marshy country east of East

Prussia against Russian northern attack. Yet it is to be added that

these very advantages of defense were also disadvantages of attack.

The march through Belgium would not have been necessitated if, for

example, the portion of Central Powers territory that confronted

France had been of the same character as that which confronted

Russia. The mountainous character of that frontier was a determining

factor in the invasion of Belgium. The invasion of Belgium was a

determining factor in the relation which Germany sustained in the

war to the allied powers, and especially to the neutral nations. The

relation of the neutral nations, in modern warfare, which requires

such immense supplies, is a factor of great importance for success

in the field. Therefore, to close the syllogism, the mountainous

character of the Vosges country was the primary factor in

determining the relation of all other countries to the Central

Powers, a factor constantly arising at every point in the Great War.

On such geographical factors does the strategy of huge campaigns

depend. One more example may be given. In the battles of the Marne

it became evident that France's strongest defense was the Argonne

Forest, in the battle of the Aisne it became clear that the

geological formation of a river bank made the German position almost

impregnable.

The topographical position of the allied powers is the next factor

to be considered. Germany's geographical resources have been touched

upon, and to them may be added the fact that, if invaded, she had,

at the Rhine, a marvelous line to fall back upon. The first factor

to be considered in France is its openness to attack. Thanks to the

Vosges and the Argonne, a line of great strength could be

established (it was so established and was so held in the teeth of

determined attack) from Belfort to Verdun. But north of Verdun the

earth-making forces have not been kind to France, in a military

sense. From Verdun to the North Sea is, geographically speaking,

open country. This is not the place to discuss the availability of

forts in open country, it is sufficient to point out that there is

no geographical defense. Between the German border and Paris there

is no topographical barrier to an invading army. The Germans found

this out in the Franco-Prussian War, and it had not been forgotten.

CHAPTER XXV

ASSEMBLING OF THE GERMAN ARMIES

"The German mobilization was the greatest movement of people that

the world has ever seen. Nearly four million people had to be

transported from every part of the empire to her borders. The manner

in which the population is distributed made the task extremely

difficult. Berlin, Rhenish Westphalia, Upper Silesia, and Saxony,

especially had to send their contingents in every direction, since

the eastern provinces are more thinly settled and had to have a

stronger guard for the borders immediately. The result was a

hurrying to and fro of thousands and hundreds of thousands of

soldiers, besides a flood of civilians who had to reach their homes

as soon as possible. Countries where the population is more

regularly distributed have an easier task than Germany, with its

predominating urban population.

"The difficulties of the gigantic undertaking were also increased by

the necessity for transporting war materials of every sort. In the

west are chiefly industrial undertakings, in the east mainly

agricultural. Horse raising is mostly confined to the provinces on

the North Sea and the Baltic, but chiefly to East Prussia, and this

province, the farthest away from France, had to send its best horses

to the western border, as did also Schleswig-Holstein and Hanover.

Coal for our warships had to go in the other direction. From the

Rhenish mines it went to the North Sea, from Upper Silesia to the

Baltic. Ammunition and heavy projectiles were transported from the

central part of the empire to its borders. And everywhere these

operations had to be carried on with haste....

"And how was it carried on? No one could have wondered if there had

been hundreds of unforeseen incidents, if military trains had

arrived at their stations with great delays, if there had resulted

in many places a wild hugger-mugger from the tremendous problems on

hand. But there was not a trace of this. ... All moved with the

regularity of clockwork. Regiments that had been ordered to

mobilize in the forenoon left in the evening for the field, fully

equipped....

[Illustration: Armies of the Contesting Nations.]

"A thing that raised the national enthusiasm still higher was the

appearance of the troops in brand-new uniforms, complete from head

to feet. The first sight of these new uniforms of modest, field

gray, faultlessly made, evoked everywhere the question: Where did

they come from? On the first day of mobilization dozens of cloth

manufacturers appeared at the War Ministry with offers of new

material. 'We don't want any' was the astonishing reply. Equal

amazement was caused by the faultless boots and shoes of the new

troops, especially in view of the recent famous 'boot speech' of the

French Senator Humbert.

"Small arms, cannon, and ammunition are so plentiful, that they have

merely to be unpacked. In view of all this, it is no wonder that the

regiments marching in were everywhere greeted with jubilation, and

that those marching out took leave of their garrisons with joyful

songs. No one thinks of death and destruction, every one of happy

victory and joyful reunion. German discipline, once so slandered,

now celebrates its triumph.

"There was still another matter in which the troops gave their

countrymen cause for rejoicing. Not one drunken man was seen during

these earnest days on the city streets. The General Staff had,

moreover, wisely ordered that during the mobilization, when every

one had money in his pockets, alcoholic drinks were not to be sold

at the railroad stations....

"The army is increased to many times its ordinary strength by the

mobilization. It draws from everywhere millions of soldiers,

workmen, horses, wagons, and other materials. The entire railway

service is at its disposal.... Not only is our great army mobilized,

but the whole folk is mobilized, and the distribution of labor, the

food question, and the care of the sick and wounded are all being

provided for. The whole German folk has become a gigantic war camp,

all are mobilized to protect kaiser, folk, and fatherland, as the

closing report of the Reichstag put it."

From this German statement of German mobilization by a German

committee of men of the utmost standing in the empire certain

things stand out very clearly. Of this the first one is that, with a

peace strength of less than a million, on the very first flush of

mobilization, every possible contingency for the mobilization of

four million men was at hand. German mobilization, therefore, was

not the devising of plans to carry out a project, but it was rather

the putting into action of a vast interacting series of preparation

that had long been made and carefully conceived for an attack upon

the powers to the westward. From every point of view, looking at the

mobilization at the opening of the war, Germany's was the most rapid

and the most complete, and, as the "Truth about Germany" states, it

was perhaps the most marvelous piece of military mobilization that

the world has ever seen.

As mobilization finally results in army corps, and is designed to

fit into a frame, the component parts of an army corps may be set

forth to show the way in which all the various units have to be

drawn together to their places on a battle front. A complete army

corps of the German scheme consists of 56,000 combatants and 12,000

men in the supply train. Of this, 63.81 per cent are infantry, 11.56

per cent cavalry, 10.99 field artillery, 4.21 per cent light

artillery, 4.21 engineer corps, etc., hospital corps 1.04, and

miscellaneous 2.02 per cent. There are 4 brigades with 24

battalions, there are 24 batteries of field artillery with 144 guns,

there are 8 squadrons of cavalry, 4 howitzer batteries with 16 heavy

howitzers, a machine-gun section, a battalion of rifles, a battalion

of engineers, a telegraph section, a bridge train, 6 provision

columns, 7 wagon-park columns, a stretcher-bearer column, a horse

depot, a field bakery, 12 field hospitals, and 8 ammunition columns.

One has but to think of the various places from which these men and

stores must come, of the thousands of horses and hundreds of wagons;

of the millions of rounds of ammunition, speeding from different

points over different railroads, and when disembarked by roads, by

lanes, even by small bypaths to the appointed place on the battle

front, to realize what a marvelous feat is mobilization of a modern

army at the time of an outbreak of war.

An insight into the manner in which this can be carried out, and

incidentally, an insight into the preparedness of Germany for the

war, is seen in an analysis of the extraordinary and otherwise

inexplicable network of railways recently erected by Germany to tap

the frontiers of Belgium and Luxemburg.

"In the southwest corner of Prussia," says Walter Littlefield,

writing on this subject, "is a rectangular piece of territory, the

western and eastern sides of which are formed respectively by the

Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers and the River Rhine.... Five years

ago, this little corner of Prussia had about 15.10 miles of railway

to every hundred square miles of territory. At the opening of the

war this had increased to 28.30. In five years, without any apparent

industrial and commercial demand for it, this traction has been

increased to nearly twice its length. Villages of less than 1,300

inhabitants have been linked up with double-track lines. For

example, Pelm is 2-3/4 miles from Gerolstein, a town principally of

comic-opera fame, and yet over this short distance, between the two

villages, there are laid down six parallel lines of rail, besides

numerous additional sidings.... Few of these lines, it is to be

noted, cross the frontier. Three of them, as late as last May (this

was written in the fall of 1914), led to blind terminals within a

day's march of it--the double line from Cologne via Stolberg to

Weiwertz, the double line from Cologne via Junkerath and Weiwertz to

St. With and the double line from Remagen via Hillesheim and Pelm to

Pronsfeld."

"Another point that is noticeable," says another observer, quoted in

the same article, "is that provision exists everywhere at these new

junctions and extensions for avoiding an upline crossing a down line

on the level, the upline is carried over the down line by a bridge,

involving long embankments on both sides (so new that as yet nothing

has had time to grow on them) at great expense, but enormously

simplifying traffic problems, when it comes to a question of full

troop trains pushing through at the rate of one every quarter of an

hour, and the empty cars returning eastward at the same rate.

"The detraining stations are of sufficient length to accommodate the

longest troop train (ten cars) easily, and they generally have at

least four sidings apart from the through up and down lines.

Moreover, at almost every station there are two lines of sidings

long enough for troop trains, so that they can be used to some

extent as detraining stations, and so that a couple of troop trains

can be held up at any time while traffic continues uninterrupted."

Such facts of railway preparedness explain, in a great measure, the

means whereby Germany was able to launch upon the Belgian,

Luxemburg, and French frontiers such a vast array of fully equipped

troops almost at the moment of the outbreak of the war. It must be

left to the reader to determine whether there is any connection

between this activity of railroad building in a district

industrially inactive on a frontier that was always held inviolate;

and the violation of that territory by means of these very

railroads. Facts remain facts, however, and the absolutely admitted

facts declare that German mobilization was directed, not at the

French frontier, but at the frontier of Luxemburg and Belgium,

especially at the great Belgian plain, commanded and dominated by

the great fortress of Liege. In the story of that siege will be

shown its topographic position. As bearing upon the subject of

mobilization, however, it is to be remembered that at this point,

Belgium, and not at France, was directed the main first mobilization

of the German army.

CHAPTER XXVI

FRENCH MOBILIZATION

French mobilization was smooth, but slow. France's great

disadvantage, making her mobilization slow, was that her regiments

were not territorially recruited, whereas the German army was

entirely based on territorial recruitment. Where it would take a

French regiment to receive its reserve men and be completed on war

footing in about four days, the German regiment could be completed

on war footing within four to five days. France in recognition of

this weakness had on her eastern borders special troops stationed

called "troops de couverture." Moreover, as has been pointed out,

all the French railways center in Paris, and the nearness of the

capital to the frontier is a gain as well as a source of danger.

Therefore, from the railways running to the frontier from Paris, and

from the strong garrison at the great Verdun to Belfort chain of

forts, France was able to bring into effect at once enough men to

present a strong face to the foe.

[Illustration: Navies of the Contesting Nations.]

Here Germany's reason for invading Belgium appeared. French

mobilization assumed the integrity of Belgium and Luxemburg. Her

mobilization was directed to the German frontier. Had Germany been

able to go through Belgium without an hour's delay the situation

would have been serious for France, for she mobilized on the wrong

front. Germany had correctly assumed that France would expect her to

abide by the treaties, and consequently by disavowing these

obligations had outguessed her Gallic neighbor. The speedy

mobilization of Belgium, and the heroic defense of that little land

by its gallant citizens, did much to alter the possible destinies of

the war, not because there was at any time any expectation that

Belgium would be able entirely to resist the passage of the armies

of the kaiser, but because the delay which her defense caused gave

the French troops time to mobilize in the direction whither the blow

was designed.

The first movement against Germany was when M. Eyschen, a member of

the cabinet of the Duchy of Luxemburg, drove in his motor car across

the great Adolf Bridge, which had been seized by Germany and

confronted the leading officer of the German advance guard with a

copy of the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of the state. The

reigning Grand Duchess Marie Adelaide blocked the way with her motor

car, she was ordered to return at once, and when General Vandyck,

commandant of Luxemburg, arrived, he was confronted with a revolver.

At the end of July, when there was evidence that the storm which had

been brewing ever since Austria sent an ultimatum to Serbia on July

23, 1914, thirteen classes of Belgian recruits were called to the

colors; but even so, at its full war strength on August 1, 1914,

the entire army numbered only 160,000 men. Owing to the small size

of the Belgian army and the small territory of that country, and

also owing to the fact that it is one of the most thoroughly

equipped countries of the world so far as railroads are concerned,

Belgian mobilization presented few difficulties for the

concentration of the few available troops.

But Belgium was in the midst of reorganization of its national

defenses and its army, and so was _de facto_ unprepared to use to

the utmost the advantages of great fortresses of Liege, Namur, and

Antwerp, which could have been made almost impregnable if the

necessary field army and artillery material had existed. The

fortresses of Liege and Namur demanded a garrison of about 250,000

men and artillery, and there were only about 30,000 men disponible.

If the organization of the national defense of Belgium had been

completed, the Belgian army would have been probably of a strength

of over 600,000 men, well trained, instead of the poorly trained

army of about 160,000 combatants equipped only for parade, and the

story of that part of the Great War would have been another.

The German cavalry entered Belgium and pushed on ahead, and a few

stray shots were fired, but the first Belgian town of Limburg, on

the road to Liege, was occupied without attack. At Verviers a weak

Belgian force was driven out by the strong advance guard of the

German cavalry. This was the "peaceful invasion of Belgian

territory" spoken of in the earliest telegrams sent to the kaiser

from the advancing army. Then the German troops suddenly found

themselves confronted by the destruction of the Trois Ponts tunnels,

and by the wrecked bridges across the Meuse. The attack upon Vise,

which had been figured by the Germans to be a matter of form, and

not requiring a body of troops of any size, was stopped by blown-up

bridges, and a detachment of German engineers, undertaking to build

a new pontoon bridge, was shot to pieces. Belgium, having thus

thrown down the gauntlet, concentrated its troops, a little over

100,000, on a line back of the forts of Liege and Namur. King Albert

himself was at the front, and not only directed, but also led the

defense.

This gallant action on the part of Belgium formed a screen behind

which the French troops could mobilize in full order and with a

clear knowledge of the intention of the enemy. Already the skies

were filled with scouting aircraft and wireless messages buzzed

incessantly from the overhead scouts of the movements of the hostile

troops rushing from Berlin, from Cologne, from every point of the

German Empire to the three frontiers of Luxemburg, Belgium, and

France. And, all the while, the band of devoted heroes at Liege held

to their ideal of independence, and Belgium grew to be a bigger

thing in the eyes of the world, as her territory grew hourly smaller

by the encroachment of the German invaders.

French mobilization, in spite of the prompt action in sending the

first half million to the front, became disorganized under the

discovery of the plans of Germany. It will be remembered that the

French railroad systems all center in Paris. Therefore, in order to

divert the troops to what was seen to be the point of attack,

brigades had to be brought back from the Verdun-Belfort district and

transshipped to the north. This, in a word, was the answer to the

question why France did not rush to the aid of Belgium and hurl her

forces at the Germans at the gates of Liege. For that mobilization

they were not ready. The neutrality of Belgium had been considered

as a true military barrier.

A glance at the railroad map of France shows how thoroughly (and

unwisely) France had trusted to this treaty, the treaty that became

famous when it was declared by Germany to be merely a "scrap of

paper," for while there are good transport facilities to the

Franco-German frontier, there were few to the Franco-Belgian

frontier. The motor busses practically saved the day, and nearly all

the French troops went to the northern front by this means of

transport. Still more difficult was the question of munitions. The

German railways brought troops at forty miles an hour, the French

lines carried munitions at forty miles per day. For her German

frontier she was ready. For this new contingency she was unprepared.

For this unpreparedness France paid dearly. Some of her richest

provinces were invaded and held all through the early part of the

war by Germany, almost solely because her transportation of troops

to the crucial point was not effective. The mere presence of the

Germans over so large a section of French territory was due solely

to the rapidity of the German mobilization, which was the result of

long years of preparation. Even behind the Belgian screen France did

not move rapidly enough to save herself, only barely rapidly enough

to save Paris. The plan of General Joffre, which entailed a gradual

retreat to let the Germans expand far from their base, while the

French concentrated between the border and Paris, was a move

determined, not by any special theory of war, nor yet by special

configuration of the country, but by the slowness of mobilization.

The initial success of Germany was a victory of thorough

preparedness, the initial defeats of the French army were the

results of military preparedness hampered by politics.

As the campaign developed, the mobilization of the Germans on the

west front was seen to have a double purpose. The armies of Von

Kluck were to hold Belgium and the north of France, while the armies

of the crown prince were to march through Luxemburg and batter down

the Verdun-Belfort line. It has been shown how the rapid

mobilization and gallant defense of Liege by the Belgians delayed

the former. Without aircraft it was more than possible that, behind

the screen of the forests of Luxemburg, France might not have known

what forces were being concentrated on that frontier, and might have

weakened the line to rush troops against Von Kluck. But the French

aviators, who are the best in the world, were able to fly over the

territory of Germany and Luxemburg where troops were mobilizing, and

the information they sent down was sufficiently alarming to keep

France from weakening the Franco-German fortress-defended line too

seriously. This, again, handicapped France from being able to go to

the support of Belgium. The dramatic plan of the crown prince's

hammering march to Paris failed absolutely and completely by the

successful defense of Verdun.

[Illustration: German-French Frontier, Fortresses of.]

CHAPTER XXVII

BRITAIN--RUSSIA--AUSTRIA

The initial mobilization of Great Britain was a matter as well

managed as that of Germany. For precision there was nothing to

choose as between them. Yet, comparing the German and British

mobilizations, one thing stands out clearly, viz., that Germany was

ready and Britain unready, while, on the other hand, Germany had to

move 4,000,000 men and England only 100,000. To offset this, Britain

had to mobilize stores and supplies, not only for her own 100,000

expeditionary force, but for a large part of the armies of France

and for all the armies of Belgium. Even the very motor busses that

carried French troops from Paris to the Belgian frontier were

largely English, two cargoes of 100 vehicles each being rushed

across the English Channel on the same day.

The food question for the Belgian army and for the French armies on

the Belgian frontier was acute at the opening of the war, France was

ready and prepared to handle any eventuality in the way of supplies

that might be needed on the Belfort-Verdun line, but she was not

prepared for the conditions in the rear of the Belgian frontier.

Britain came to the support of France and Belgium without a day's

delay. She rushed food and munitions to the front, and on one

occasion Kitchener fed two French army corps, or 80,000 troops, for

eleven days without the slightest hitch. A moment's thought will

show that this means not only the ability to send food, but also to

organize the entire mechanism of the preparing and handling of that

food.

This was made possible largely by what was known in Britain as the

motor-lorry system, unlike that of any other army, introduced in

1911. Horse transport was relegated solely to the work of

distributing, the conveyance of supplies to the areas occupied being

performed wholly by motor transport. As the daily run of a motor

lorry may be put at 100 miles, it follows that an army could advance

fifty miles from its railhead and still be easily served with food

and ammunition. Thus, for the first time in the history of war, the

British army had devised a system whereby fresh meat and bread could

be supplied daily to a distant army. If, as the Germans declared,

the British soldier thought more of his food than fight, this desire

at least had the effect of keeping the supply system to the topmost

notch. The same principle was used for ammunition columns, in no

case any of the men from the front being detailed in the work of

looking after munitions or supplies. Thus, while British

mobilization of men consisted mainly of the expeditionary force of

100,000, the British mobilization of auxiliary columns for aiding

the supply system of the Belgian and French army was of a size large

enough to look after several corps. By this means, recruits could be

constantly forwarded to the field of war, secure in the knowledge

that no matter how rapidly men were rushed to the front, the

question of supplies was already considered and the requisites were

in place awaiting the use of the new troops.

England's mobilization, especially when it is remembered that after

the first 150,000 it was all volunteers, was a marvelous thing. How

many men were sent no one could tell but Kitchener, and if ever a

man was born with a gift for telling nothing, that man is Kitchener.

How steadily recruits poured over no one knew. Officially, only

enough men were sent to fill up the losses in the 150,000, but

before the end of the year England's trained forces were immense.

The details of the mobilization of that first 100,000 men (the first

group of the expeditionary force) were marvelous. The railroads

running to the southeast were put into Government hands, trains were

scheduled at twelve minutes' distance apart, to run day and night,

every troop train was on schedule, and every one was unloaded and

out of the depot in time for the next train to pull in, every

transport was at the dock waiting, with another ready to take her

place, and the expeditionary force was in Boulogne in less than

forty-eight hours after the first mobilization order had been sent

out. It is not to be forgotten that Britain commandeered every ship

she needed from her huge mercantile marine, and thus had transports

not only for troops but also for supplies.

For a moment one may glance at a side issue, but an important one in

the mobilization, namely the mobilization of horses. The French

bought horses by the thousand in Texas. Yet English farriers

inspected them, paid for them, put them in charge of their own men

on their own ships, landed them in England or Bordeaux, fed them

into prime condition at England's own expense, and then delivered

them to the French battle line ready for service. In the first week

of the war the total output of the English rifle factories was

10,000 rifles a week (a rifle will shoot well for only 4,000

rounds), by the seventh week of the war there were eleven factories

with a weekly output of 40,000 rifles each, and more being built on

every hand. In addition to this, between August and December, 1914,

English money mobilized--it is the word--rifle orders in the United

States to the extent of $650,000,000. It is a matter of knowledge

that many of the Russian munition orders were either financed or

indorsed by British capital. In a word, while England's military

mobilization of her regular troops was rapid and efficient, and

while her recruiting of volunteers was the greatest support of the

principles of a volunteer army that could ever be imagined, the

chief importance and the chief wonder of Britain's mobilization was

her mobilization of commerce and of trade. She made it possible for

French soldiers to be used at their full power, and France's

perennial weakness--supply organization--was supplemented by that

very thing which is the British army's chief boast.

It is time, now, to turn to the eastern theatre of war, and there

the diplomatic questions underlying mobilization become excessively

intertwined. All European powers watch each other like falcons above

their prey, in the constant endeavor to discern the slightest sign

of unusual military activity. The tornado of conflicting reports at

the end of July, 1914, as to which power had begun mobilizing first,

as to whether army maneuvers were a cloak for mobilization, as to

whether activity in arsenals was not a threat or as to the

manipulation of finances, were all due to a single thing--the

knowledge that a week's advantage in mobilization might mean a huge

advantage, an advantage in position so great that thousands of

lives might be lost because of the two days' delay. It has been

shown how the conquest of France's richest northern provinces by

Germany was due to the difference in speed of mobilization. There

was a great deal of misunderstanding on the part of the American

public about this very importance of mobilization. "Supposing Russia

did mobilize first, or Austria," people said, "what about it? No one

has declared war." Mobilization is like two western desperadoes

watching each other. They do not wait until the other man has drawn

his gun and has them covered, but trouble begins at the slightest

move toward the hip pocket. Any move toward mobilization is a move

toward a nation's hip pocket.

[Illustration: German Confederation of 1815.]

Germany did not dare to let Russia mobilize. Had a large Russian

army been concentrated in Poland, had Russia been allowed to

intrench herself on the Austrian frontier, had she had the

opportunity at the beginning of the war to seize the fortress of

Thorn and to secure control of the Vistula River, there would have

been little to stop the armies of the czar from marching into

Berlin. General mobilization by one power, therefore, absolutely

compels countermobilization by another power, and unless diplomatic

agreements are speedily made and the mobilization checked, it is a

prelude to war.

The diplomatic interpretations of the discussion over mobilization

have been dealt with elsewhere, but it may be summarily said here

that Austria was the first of the great powers to begin mobilization

in the first part of July, in order to frighten Serbia into

submission in the controversy that arose from the assassination of

the Austrian Crown Prince at Sarajevo (in Bosnia, Austria) on June

28, 1914. Serbia mobilized, and it was generally believed that this

action was due to Serbia's knowledge that Russia was secretly

mobilizing. By about July 10, 1914, Germany believed herself

satisfied that Russia was actually mobilizing, and she also began

secretly to do so. France became suspicious of German military

activity, and by the end of the third week and the beginning of the

fourth week in July a general, but unadmitted, military preparation

was in progress. Actual and admitted mobilization is more or less

arbitrarily placed as of August 1, 1914, which date is now

generally regarded as the opening of the Great War.

In any consideration of Russian mobilization it will be remembered

that Russia had three armies, not one, to mobilize, i. e., the

armies of European Russia, of the Asiatic Russia, and of the

Caucasus. It is also to be remembered that, unlike the German system

in which every man has a definite place in a particular corps, the

Russian system holds its reserves as reserves solely, and organizes

them after they have been gathered together. Slow mobilization is

therefore an evil not to be avoided. For this reason one must expect

to find Russian mobilization occurring, not on the frontier, but at

a point sufficiently far therefrom to be safe from hostile attack

during the period of disorganization.

The line Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk was the main field selected,

because of its central location between the Austro-German frontiers,

and more particularly because it was well covered from attack by the

intrenched fortress and camp of Warsaw. The troops and reserves from

Little Russia, especially from the Kiev district, were readily

available on lines converging to the Austrian city of Lemberg in

Galicia, and, it was estimated, could take the front in ten days.

From this district five army corps are raised. From the Odessa

district to the south two more army corps could be counted upon, and

these could reach the scene of operations in twelve or thirteen

days. In actual speed of mobilization the Austrian army was ready

first, but the Russian army protected and covered the slow

mobilization and concentration of its forces by a dense curtain of

cavalry masses, for which task the rapidly mobilized Cossack cavalry

was especially well fitted. These cavalry engagements--for the

Russians were met by the Hungarian cavalry--effectually screened the

actual gathering of the armies, and led Austria into the error of

supposing Russia to be quite unready. But, although Austria had been

the first to begin actual mobilization, her strategic railways on

the frontier were so poor that it was not until August 10, 1914,

that she was ready to advance, and even then that single line of

railroad running from the Bug to the Vistula was deficient in

rolling stock. Austrian military organization was excellent,

Hungarian railroad organization was utterly inadequate to cope with

the sudden requirements of modern warfare.

The Austrian army advanced on Russia in force, expecting the success

of the German armies to the east. From the plans as they developed,

and particularly from railroad orders given to the lines crossing

Germany, it was expected that before Russia could be mobilized

sufficiently to do more than give a temporary check to the Austrian

army, several German army corps could be released from the western

front and sent to the Russian border to take the burden of Russian

invasion away from Austria. But the resistance of Belgium against

Von Kluck's armies, the resistance of France against the armies of

the crown prince, and the resistance of England to all naval action,

prevented any release of the German armies, and the mobilization

orders for the transference of German troops from the western

theatre to the eastern theatre of war during the first few weeks of

the struggle proved to be unavailing, for the men could not be

spared. Slowly but heavily the mobilization of Russian forces

continued. Lacking strategic railroads, lacking the motor-lorry

system of England, the heavy-footed but untiring Russian infantry

marched the scores and hundreds of miles from their homes to the

front. The Russian dirigibles and aeroplanes were more than a match

for the Austrian aircraft, and kept them back from flying over the

country to determine the number of forces opposing. Then the action

of the Russian "steam roller" began, and with more men marching in

every day, unwearied despite their long travel, the steam roller

gathered force. But, in one regard, Russia had miscalculated. She

had never contemplated the terrific wastage of ammunition that is

required for modern artillery duels, gun conflicts that are

necessary before troops can advance, and in the first few weeks of

the war her ammunition was all shot away. Without ammunition the

steam roller could not continue, and the advance of the Russians

upon Austrian territory was first halted and then driven back. Here,

again, then, was a campaign successfully begun because of a better

mobilization of men than was expected, and lost because of a lack of

mobilization of supplies.

A great deal has been said of the slowness of Russian mobilization,

and much of it is undoubtedly true. But little has been said about

the steadiness of Russian mobilization. The Russian officer, almost

always a noble, and belonging to what is probably the most polished

and most cultured class in Europe, an aristocrat to his finger tips,

possesses the power of commanding men, and understands his Slav

soldiers. He knows that no army in the world can begin to compare

with the Russian for enduring hardship, and that no troops in the

world can sustain so large a proportion of loss and still advance.

Forced marches that would kill English troops can be handled by a

Russian army without great fatigue. The principal note in the

gathering of the czar's armies was that day by day, week by week,

from every corner of the empire, men went to the front. It was not

the sudden concentration of Germany, it was not the eager formation

of France, it was not the heroic sturdiness of Belgium, it was not

the accustomedness to active service of the British regulars, it was

a gradual transition of an idealistic people from contemplation into

action.

[Illustration: German-Belgian Frontier, Strategic Railroads on.]

To the Russian, more than to any other of the peoples engaged in the

war, mobilization spells advance, advance in a thousand ways.

Germany, France, and England were practically unchanged in

temperament and viewpoint by the mere processes of mobilization, but

old Russia became new Russia almost within a month. War is the

greatest unifier of racial dissension in the world, and when the

first three months of war were over, the German Empire, the British

Empire, the Republic of France and her colonies, and above all, the

Russian Empire, were welded by the grim forces of necessity into

homogeneous units. Moreover, mobilization and the conditions of war

bring into high relief the powers and the characters of the several

nations, and as the story of the war is told, its developments

portray the changing appreciations of the national combatants for

each other, and of the neutral nations for all.

PART IV--DIPLOMATIC PAPERS RELATING TO THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR,

COLLATED FROM THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Realizing the importance of presenting its case to the neutral

world, each of the warring nations published its diplomatic

correspondence leading up to the outbreak of the war, at a period

during hostilities when the publication seemed best calculated to

serve the end in view.

THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

British White Papers, July 20 to September 1, 1914.

Belgian Gray Book, April 7, 1914, to September 30, 1914.

German White Book, July 23 to August 4, 1914.

French Yellow Book, March 17, 1913, to September 4, 1914.

Russian Orange Book, July 23 to August 6, 1914.

Serbian Blue Book, June 29 to August 4, 1914.

Austro-Hungarian Red Book, June 29 to August 24, 1914.

Official publications in the press by Great Britain, Russia,

Germany, and Italy, July 30 to December 6, 1914.

Various speeches by officers of the Governments.

It is from these official documents, cast into one form by

rearranging all letters, telegrams, proclamations, speeches, etc.,

in their chronological order, that the following history of the

diplomatic controversy is compiled.

It will be observed that, from the necessity of the case, the books

of the six principal allies against the Teutonic Powers are

threefold in number the books of those powers; and that, from choice

of their promulgators the books of the Teutonic Powers are also

disproportionately less in total volume, owing to the almost entire

absence in them of communications between Austria-Hungary and

Germany; while the correspondence between their adversaries is

presented by these with a fulness which gives the neutral reader the

impression that nothing of importance has been withheld--indeed,

that the Allies (to use for convenience the popular designation of

the anti-Teutonic powers) have laid all their cards face upward on

the table. The intelligent reader will not have to be cautioned that

this is a psychological, rather than logical, inference.

If any prevalent arguments on either side fail to be upheld by the

evidence here given, it will be because this evidence does not

appear in the official documents; the editors feel that their

functions do not warrant their inclusion of pleas or testimony

formed outside of the records mentioned above. The time will not

come until long after the close of the war when the conflicting

claims in the vast amount of propagandial literature issued by both

parties can be judicially weighed by impartial historians, and

presented at the bar of public opinion. In the meantime, however, we

can bring before this court the case as officially presented by the

contesting parties, a "perfect enumeration" of all the available.

The editor acts merely in a reporting capacity. He does not

discriminate between "Trojan and Tyrian," unless it be called

discrimination to refuse by allotment of lesser space to inflict on

the party neglecting fully to present its case a penalty beyond that

which necessarily results, in adverse effect, on the mind of the

reader from this omission.

In brief, the controversy is presented as a case in law. The

evidence is given in the correspondence between ministers of state

and the pleadings are presented in the words of responsible

statesmen, who apply this evidence to the issues in question.

Since the validity of the evidence is based not only on its inherent

motive but on the character and authority of those communicating it,

and the force of the pleadings is even more dependent upon the

character and authority of the advocates, it is necessary at the

outset to state the offices held by the chief representatives of the

parties to the controversy, and to present something of their past

records, especially in the case of the more responsible statesmen.

This will also serve to make graphic the story of the great trial

before the bar of the world; it will visualize it as a contest, man

to man, in which the distance between the combatants is eliminated,

and they seem to be in each other's presence, testifying and arguing

in behalf of their respective causes, as in a case at law. And, when

it is borne in mind that these persons are representative of the

dignity of great and sovereign peoples, the exponents and

conservators of their national and individual rights and

aspirations, their ideas and ideals of civilization, the contest

will gain rather than lose in impressiveness by the concrete form in

which it is presented. The sovereigns and statesmen of the

anti-Teutonic allies are listed first; of the Teutonic allies next,

and a few statesmen of neutral countries who were involved in the

controversy last.

LIST OF SOVEREIGNS AND DIPLOMATS

GREAT BRITAIN

George V, King of Great Britain and Ireland, Emperor of India, and

Sovereign of the entire British Empire.

Haldane, Richard Burdon (Viscount), Lord High Chancellor. Born 1856,

studied German at Göttingen, member Parliament for Haddingtonshire

1885-1911; Secretary of State for War 1905-12; Lord High Chancellor

1912. As Secretary of State for War, Haldane, introduced into his

department several innovations, the knowledge of which he had

acquired during his residence at Göttingen and in his frequent

visits to the Continent. He has been in public life since entering

Parliament in 1885, and, despite his later removal from the office

which he held at the outbreak of the war, is still recognized as one

of Great Britain's most brilliant men. Previous to the war, he was

looked on as an especially warm friend of Germany, and frequently

went to Berlin in the interests of British amity with that country.

Grey, Sir Edward: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Born April

25, 1862, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1892-95; Secretary

State for Foreign Affairs December, 1905.

Of the conduct of the British Foreign Office since 1906 Gilbert

Murray in his "Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey" ("Clarendon

Press," Oxford, 1915) says:

"In general, Grey is often supposed to represent the principle of

continuity in foreign policy, but this is not quite exact. In

certain very large issues the Liberal Government of 1906 and onward

agreed entirely with the conservative policy of Lord Salisbury

(Prime Minister), and Lord Lansdowne (Foreign Secretary), and

therefore followed their action. On other issues it differed. For

instance, it stopped indentured Chinese labor in the Transvaal, and

it granted immediate self-government to South Africa. But in Europe

the policy has been mostly continuous. The principles are

conveniently stated in the House of Commons debate of foreign policy

on November 27, 1911:

"'1. In my opinion the wise policy for this country is to expand as

little as possible.' 'I say without any hesitation that we do not

desire accessions of territory, and in saying that I am not speaking

for one small section of the House. I believe I am speaking for the

nation at large.' The first sentence comes from Sir Edward Grey, the

second from Mr. Bonar Law (leader of the opposition).

"This is made a little clearer in a latter sentence of Sir Edward

Grey's speech. 'If there are to be changes of territory brought

about by good will and negotiation between other powers, then we are

not an ambitious competing party.... And if it is wise policy not to

go in for great schemes of expansion ourselves, then I think it

would be morally and diplomatically wrong to indulge in a

dog-in-the-manger policy in regard to others.' In particular, he

explains, if Germany wishes, 'by friendly arrangement with other

powers,' to extend her territories, we do not wish to stand in her

way, or to claim 'compensations.'"

Nicholson, Sir Arthur: Permanent Under-Secretary of State for

Foreign Affairs.

Bertie, Sir Francis: Ambassador to France. Born August 17, 1844;

private secretary to Hon. R. Bourke (Under-Secretary State), 1874-80;

attached to Embassy, Berlin, 1878; Assistant Under-Secretary of State

for Foreign Affairs, 1894; Ambassador to Rome, 1903; Paris, 1905.

Buchanan, Sir George: Ambassador to Russia. Born Copenhagen November

25, 1854; entered Diplomatic Service 1875; Third Secretary, Rome,

1878; Second Secretary, Tokyo, 1879; Second Secretary, Vienna, 1882;

Berne, 1889; British Agent to Venezuela Arbitration Tribunal, 1898;

Secretary Embassy, Rome, 1900; Berlin, 1901-3; Minister

Plenipotentiary, Sofia, 1903-8; Hague, 1908-10; St. Petersburg,

1910.

Goschen, Sir Edward: Ambassador to Germany. Born July 18, 1847;

entered Diplomatic Service, 1869; Attaché, Madrid, 1870; Buenos

Aires, 1873; Second Secretary, Rio de Janeiro, 1877; Constantinople,

1881; Secretary Legation, Peking, 1885; Copenhagen, 1888; Lisbon,

1890; Secretary Embassy, Washington, 1893; St. Petersburg, 1894;

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Belgrade,

1898-1900; Copenhagen, 1900-5; Ambassador, Vienna, 1905-8; Berlin,

1908.

Rumbold, Sir Horace: Counsellor German Embassy and Chargé

d'Affaires. Born February 5, 1869; Attaché, Hague, 1888; Chargé

d'Affaires, Munich, 1908; served at Cairo, Teheran, and Athens;

Counsellor Embassy, Tokyo, 1909; learned in Arabic, Persian, and

Japanese.

De Bunsen, Sir Maurice: Ambassador in Austria. Born January 8, 1852;

entered Diplomatic Service, 1877; Secretary Legation, Tokyo, 1891;

Secretary Embassy, Constantinople, 1897-1902; Paris, 1902-5; Envoy

Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Lisbon, 1905;

Ambassador, Madrid, 1906-13; Vienna, 1913.

Beaumont, Henry Dawson: Chargé d'Affaires, Turkey. Born February 4,

1867; entered Diplomatic Service, 1892; served in Copenhagen,

Madrid, Rio de Janeiro, St. Petersburg, and Montenegro; Chargé

d'Affaires, Turkey, 1914.

Villiers, Sir Francis: Minister to Belgium. Born August 13, 1852;

entered Foreign Office, 1870; Assistant Under-Secretary State

Foreign Affairs, 1896-1905; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister

Plenipotentiary, Portugal, 1905-11; Belgium, 1911.

Des Graz, Charles Louis: Minister to Serbia. Born March 2, 1860;

entered Diplomatic Service, 1884; Constantinople, Teheran, Athens;

Counsellor Embassy, Rome, 1905; Chargé d'Affaires, Cettinje, 1906;

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Peru and Ecuador,

1908-13; Minister, Serbia, 1913.

Crackanthorpe, Dayrell Eardley Montague: First Secretary of Legation

to Serbia. Born September 9, 1871; entered Diplomatic Service, 1896;

Madrid, Washington, Brussels, Bucharest, Vienna, Belgrade, 1913.

Rodd, Sir Rennell: Ambassador to Italy. Born November 9, 1858;

entered Diplomatic Service, 1883; Berlin, Athens, Rome, Paris;

Secretary Embassy, Rome, 1901-4; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister

Plenipotentiary, Sweden, 1904-8; Ambassador, Italy, 1908.

[Illustration: Albert I, King of Belgium.]

FRANCE

Poincaré, Raymond: President of the Republic.

Viviani, René: President of the Council, a Minister of Foreign

Affairs, and Premier of the Cabinet. Had been Minister of

Instruction in the Cabinet of Gaston Doumergue, which resigned June

2, 1914; Poincaré asked him at that time to form a cabinet, but

Ambassador Paléologue intimated from St. Petersburg that the Czar

feared a Viviani ministry would modify the three years' military

service law, and therefore another was sought for this position.

After the failure of the Ribot Cabinet on June 12, 1914, he was

again called upon, and, no objections being made, he formed the

ministry acting at the outbreak of the war. After the beginning of

the hostilities he retained the position of President of the Council

without portfolio.

Jonnart, Charles Celestin: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born

December 27, 1857; Governor General Algiers and Minister of the

Interior.

Pichon, Stephen: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born August 10, 1857

Diplomatic Service in Hayti, San Domingo, Rio de Janeiro, and at

Peking during the Boxer Rebellion.

Bienvenu-Martin, Jean Baptiste: Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Born July 22, 1847; Minister Instruction, 1905; in public life since

1878.

Doumergue, Gaston: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born 1863; Minister

Colonies, 1902-5; Commerce, 1906-7; Premier, resigning, June 2,

1914.

Delcassé, Théophile: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born March 1, 1852;

started life as journalist; Counsellor General; Under-Secretary

Colonies, 1893; Colonial Minister, 1894-5; Foreign Minister,

1898-1905; Minister Marine, 1905-13; Mediator between Spain and the

United States, 1899; Ambassador, St. Petersburg, 1913; Minister

Foreign Affairs, 1913. Is one of the strong men of France; in 1904 was

the French negotiator of the Anglo-French Convention (the "Entene")

concerning Egypt and Morocco; was sacrificed to assuage German feeling

at the time of the Algeciras conference; called the "Deadly Enemy of

Germany."

Berthelot: Political Director.

Cambon, Paul; Ambassador to Great Britain. Born January 20, 1843;

Ambassador Madrid, Constantinople, and at London, 1898.

Fleuriau, M. De: Chargé d'Affaires, London.

De Manneville: Chargé d'Affaires, Germany. Born February 27, 1865;

entered Diplomatic Service at Berlin, 1893; later at London; a

Minister of the First Class in 1904.

Paléologue, Maurice: Ambassador to Russia. Born January 13, 1859;

served in Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service at Rome, Berlin,

Peking, Korea, and in Bulgaria.

Cambon, Jules: Ambassador to Germany. Born April 5, 1845; entered

Diplomatic Service, 1874; Ambassador, Washington, 1897; Madrid,

1902; Berlin, 1907.

Allizé: Minister at Munich, Germany.

Ronssin, P.: Consul General at Frankfort, Germany.

Dumaine, Chilhaud: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.

d'Apchier-le-Maugin: Consul General at Budapest.

Bompard, Maurice: Ambassador to Turkey. Born May 17, 1854; Minister,

First Class, 1898; Ambassador to Russia, 1902.

Klokowski, Antony: Minister to Belgium. Born September 23, 1855;

served at Yokohoma, Calcutta, and Bangkok.

Boppé, Jules: Minister to Serbia. Born June 26, 1862; entered

Diplomatic Service, 1890; served at Constantinople and St.

Petersburg.

Barrère, Camille: Ambassador to Italy.

Bapst, Constant: Minister to Holland.

Mollard, Armard: Minister to Luxemburg.

Chevalley: Minister to Norway.

Thiébaut, Eugene: Minister to Sweden.

Farges: Consul General at Basle, Switzerland.

RUSSIA

Nicholas II: Emperor (Czar).

Sazonof: Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Suchomlinof, Vladimir Alexandrovitch: Minister for war. In 1890 at

the age of forty-eight Suchomlinof was made a major general, and in

1904 became commander of Russia's most important military

zone--Kiev. In 1909 he was appointed to the post which he has since

relinquished, and the amazing rapidity with which Russia mobilized

her army in August, 1914, can be accredited to the methods which he

instituted. As a writer he is known as "Shpioa" (Spur), and is the

biographer of Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, and Murat.

Benckendorff, Count A.: Ambassador to Great Britain. Born in Berlin,

August 1, 1849; entered Diplomatic Service, 1869; served at Rome,

Vienna; Minister Copenhagen, 1897-1903; Ambassador London, 1903.

Isvolsky, Alexander P.: Ambassador to France; was Russian negotiator

of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 regarding Persia,

Afghanistan, and Tibet.

Swastopoulo: Chargé d'Affaires, France.

Swereiev, S. N.: Ambassador to Germany.

Broniersky, A.: Chargé d'Affaires, Germany.

Schebeko, N.: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.

Koudacheff, Prince Nicholas: Chargé d'Affaires, Austria-Hungary.

Salviatti, A.: Consul General at Fiume.

Kazansky: Acting Consul General at Prague.

Strandtman: Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia.

BELGIUM

Albert: King of the Belgians.

Davignon, M. J.: Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Elst, van der, Baron: Secretary General.

Renkin, J.: Colonial Minister.

Lalaing H. de, Count: Minister to Great Britain. Entered Foreign

Office, 1879; served Vienna, Bucharest, Berlin, Hague, London;

Minister, Brazil, 1893; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister

Plenipotentiary, Bucharest, 1898; Berne, 1899; London, 1903.

Guillaume, Baron: Minister to France.

Beyens, Baron: Minister to Germany.

De Dudzeele, Errembault, Count: Minister to Austria-Hungary.

De Welle, Michotte, Baron: Minister to Serbia.

Grenier, A., Baron: Minister to Spain.

Fallon, Baron: Minister to Holland.

SERBIA

Peter Karageorgevitch: King.

Pashitch, Nikola P.: Prime Minister. In 1878, at the age of

thirty-two, M. Pashitch entered the Serbian Parliament, and in three

years he became leader of the "Old Radicals." Always a champion of

liberty, he joined the Zayenchar Mutiny of 1883, and, of twenty-two,

he alone escaped execution by flight. Upon his return he was

appointed Mayor of Belgrade and in 1893 Minister to Russia, where he

made a lasting impression. In 1899 he was again accused of hatching

a conspiracy, but Russia served him well and intervention saved

him. To him, in no slight degree, does Serbia owe Russia's

friendship, and to his efforts has been attributed the Balkan

Alliance.

Patchou, Dr. Laza: Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign

Affairs.

Boschkovitch: Minister to Great Britain.

Vesnitch, M. R.: Minister to France.

Spalaikovitch, Dr. M.: Minister to Russia.

Yovanovitch, Dr. M.: Chargé d'Affaires in Germany.

Yovanovitch, Yov. M.: Minister to Austria-Hungary.

Georgevitch, M.: Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey.

Michailovitch, Ljub: Minister to Italy.

ITALY

Victor Emmanuel (Vittorio Emanuele) III.: King.

San Giuliano, Antonio di, Marquis: Minister Foreign Affairs. Born

Catania, December 10, 1852; Mayor Catania, 1879; member Chamber

Deputies, 1882-1904; Senate, 1904; Under-Secretary for Industry and

Commerce, 1892-3; Minister Posts and Telegraph, 1899-1900; Minister

Foreign Affairs, 1905-6; Ambassador, London, 1906-10; Minister

Foreign Affairs, 1910. His opposition to war with Austria

precipitated his downfall. Said to be the repository of more

European secrets than any European statesman since Bismarck.

D'Avarna, Duke: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.

Salandra: Premier. Appointed November 5, 1914.

Sonnino, Baron Sidney: Minister Foreign Affairs. Born March 11,

1847; entered Diplomatic Service, 1867; Parliament, 1880; Minister

Finance, 1893-4; Treasury, 1894-96; Interior, 1906 and 1909-10;

Foreign Affairs, November 5, 1914.

JAPAN

Yoshihito: Emperor.

Shigenobu Okuma, Count: Prime Minister.

Takaaki Kato, Baron: Minister Foreign Affairs.

GERMANY

William (Wilhelm) II.: Kaiser of Germany, King of Prussia.

Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. Theobald von: Imperial Chancellor. Born

November 29, 1856, at Hohenfinow, Brandenburg; entered Civil

Service, 1879; Prussian Minister Interior, 1905; Imperial Secretary

of State and Vice President of Prussian Council, 1907; Imperial

Chancellor, 1909; member of Reichstag since 1890. His actions before

the present war seemed to indicate an earnest desire for the peace

of Europe; he appeared to oppose the military party and align

himself with the moderates. His manner is frank to the point of

bluffness.

Jagow, Gottlieb von: Secretary of State. Born June 26, 1863; entered

Diplomatic Service, 1895, at Rome; Minister to Rome, 1907;

Ambassador, 1908; Minister Foreign Affairs, 1913; credited with

postponing the inevitable conflict between Italy and Austria while

at Rome.

Zimmerman, von: Under-Secretary of State. Appointed 1911; previously

Vice Consul Shanghai; Consul at Tientsin and in Diplomatic Corps.

Lichnowsky, Prince Karl Maximilian: Ambassador to Great Britain.

Born 1860; Attaché, London, 1885; Counsellor Embassy, Vienna;

Foreign Office, Berlin; Ambassador to London, 1912. Member Roman

Catholic party. Did all he could to prevent rupture between Great

Britain and Germany. Was very popular in England.

Schoen, Baron Wilhelm von: Ambassador to France. Born June 3, 1851;

entered Diplomatic Service, 1877; Madrid, Hague, Athens, Berne,

Paris, Copenhagen, St. Petersburg; Ambassador, Paris, 1910.

Pourtalès, Count Frederic: Ambassador to Russia. Born October 24,

1853; appointed St. Petersburg, 1908.

Tschirschky, Heinrich von: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary. Born

August 15, 1858; entered Diplomatic Service, 1873; Constantinople,

Vienna, St. Petersburg; Ambassador to Vienna, 1907.

Below Saleske, Konrad von: Minister to Belgium. Born April 18, 1866;

Secretary Legation, Athens; Ambassador, Constantinople, 1907.

Storck, von: Secretary Legation in Serbia.

Flotow, Hans von: Ambassador to Italy. Born September 10, 1862;

entered Diplomatic Service, 1893; Second Secretary Legation,

Washington, Hague, Paris.

Buch, von: Minister to Luxemburg.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Francis Joseph (Franz Josef): Emperor.

Berchtold, Count Leopold: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Born April 18, 1863; saw Diplomatic Service in Paris. London;

Ambassador to St. Petersburg, 1906; appointed Secretary of State,

1914; emulated his predecessor, Count d'Herenthal, the annexor of

Bosnia and Herzegovina, in strong foreign policy.

Macchio, Dr. K., Baron: Under-Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs.

Forgach, Count: Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Diplomatic Service in Belgrade and Dresden.

Tisza, Count Stephen: President of the Ministry of Hungary. Born

April 22, 1861; served as President Ministry, 1903-06.

Mensdorff, A.: Ambassador to Great Britain. Born September 5, 1861;

Diplomatic Service in Paris, London, St. Petersburg; Secretary

Ambassador, London, 1896-1904; Minister Plenipotentiary, 1903-04;

Ambassador, 1904.

Szécsen, Count Nicolaus: Ambassador to France.

Szápáry, Count Josef: Ambassador to Russia.

Czernin, Count Jaromir: Chargé d'Affaires, Russia.

Szögyény, Count Ladislaus: Ambassador to Germany.

Zehlitschka: Consul General in Turkey.

Clary, S., Count: Minister to Belgium.

Giesl von Gieslingen, Baron: Minister to Serbia.

Hoflehner: Consular Agent at Nish, Serbia.

TURKEY

Mohammed V: Sultan.

Said Halim Pasha, Prince: Grand Vizier.

Tewfik Pasha: Ambassador to Great Britain.

NEUTRAL NATIONS

Loudon: Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Eyschen, Dr.: Minister of State and President of the Government of

Luxemburg.

Gerard, James Watson: American Ambassador to Germany.

Penfield, Frederic Courtland: American Ambassador to

Austria-Hungary.

Whitlock, Brand: American Minister to Belgium.

* * * * *

It will be convenient for the reader, before entering into the

diplomatic history of the war, to have before him the dates of the

war marking diplomatic crises.

IMPORTANT DATES PRECEDING THE WAR

June 28, 1914. Assassination of Austrian hereditary Archduke Franz

Ferdinand at Sarajevo, Bosnia.

July 23, 1914. Austria-Hungary hands note to Serbia.

July 24, 1914. Russia proposes extension of time limit in note;

decides on mobilization in South Bosnia; and seeks unconditional

support of Great Britain in conflict with Austria-Hungary. Great

Britain proposes four-power intervention.

July 25, 1914. Austria-Hungary sends memorandum to powers containing

_dossier_ of evidence discovered at Sarajevo trial, and declares

dispute lies wholly between her and Serbia. Serbia replies to note,

having previously ordered mobilization. Austro-Hungarian Legation

leaves Belgrade. Germany refuses to enter mediation between

Austria-Hungary and Serbia, wishing to "localize" the conflict, and

proposes mediation of powers between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

Russia mobilizes fourteen army corps on Austro-Hungarian frontier.

Great Britain asks Austria-Hungary to extend time limit and suspend

hostilities pending four-power conference.

July 26, 1914. Russia proposes direct conversations to

Austria-Hungary. France and Italy accept four-power conference in

London.

July 27, 1914. William II returns from Norway cruise to Potsdam.

Austria-Hungary informs Russia she will respect Serbian integrity

and independence. Russia agrees to four-power conference if direct

negotiations with Austria-Hungary fail.

July 28, 1914. Austria-Hungary breaks off direct negotiations with

Russia; refuses four-power mediation; declares war on Serbia, and

mobilizes eight army corps. Russia begins partial mobilization.

Great Britain asks Germany her plan of mediation between Russia and

Austria-Hungary.

July 29, 1914. Germany attempts to secure neutrality of Great

Britain in case of Austro-Hungarian and Russian war. Great Britain

warns Germany that if France is involved in war she will support

her.

July 30, 1914. Austria-Hungary, advised by Germany, agrees to resume

negotiations with Russia, but not on basis of Serbian reply. Germany

asks Russia's explanation of her mobilization. Russia agrees to stop

mobilization if Austria-Hungary respects Serbian sovereignty. After

negotiations with Austria-Hungary, Russia orders general

mobilization of army and navy. France reminds Great Britain of her

naval agreement. Great Britain refuses Germany's proposal that she

remain neutral if French territory in Europe is respected, and

proposes that Germany occupy Belgrade and force mediation by the

powers.

July 31, 1914. Austria-Hungary accepts Anglo-German proposal for

four-power mediation on basis of temporary prosecution of military

measures against Serbia. Russia agrees to take no military action

pending negotiations. Germany refuses to press Austria-Hungary so

long as Russia mobilizes; sends ultimatum to Russia and France, and

refuses to answer about respecting neutrality of Belgium. France

agrees to respect this neutrality.

August 1, 1914. Austria orders general mobilization, but continues

discussion with Russia, and gives way on only point remaining at

issue. Germany orders general mobilization and declares war on

Russia. France orders general mobilization. Great Britain refuses

Germany's request to secure French neutrality in Russo-German war,

and to remain neutral herself if Germany respect Belgian neutrality.

Belgium declares she will uphold neutrality. Italy decides to remain

neutral.

August 2, 1914. Great Britain agrees to give naval aid to France in

event of German attack. Germany sends ultimatum to Belgium about

passage of troops. German troops enter Luxemburg.

August 3, 1914. Germany declares war on France and bids for British

neutrality by offering not to attack northern French coast nor use

Belgium and Dutch ports as bases. Great Britain refuses offer.

Belgium refuses Germany's ultimatum.

August 4, 1914. Germany sends second ultimatum to Belgium,

threatening force, and offers Great Britain not to annex Belgian

territory. Great Britain demands that Germany respect Belgian

neutrality, and in default of reply declares war on Germany.

August 5, 1914. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.

August 6, 1914. Montenegro declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 9, 1914. Serbia declares war on Germany.

August 10, 1914. France declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 12, 1914. Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 12, 1914. Montenegro declares war on Germany.

August 23, 1914. Japan declares war on Germany.

August 27, 1914. Austria-Hungary declares war on Japan.

August 28, 1914. Austria-Hungary declares war on Belgium.

November 3, 1914. Russia declares war on Turkey.

November 5, 1914. France and Great Britain declare war on Turkey.

May 23, 1915. Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary.

June 3, 1915. San Marino declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 20, 1915. Italy declares war on Turkey.

October 14, 1915. Bulgaria declares war on Serbia.

October 15, 1915. Great Britain declares war on Bulgaria.

October 19, 1915. Russia and Italy declare war on Bulgaria.

WARNINGS OF HOSTILE INTENTIONS

The first evidence presented before the court of nations was that of

France, in regard to the hostile intentions of Germany. To this

Germany has made no official answer in the form of documentary

evidence, and any inference as to the hostile intentions of France

against Germany, if there were any, must be inferred by the reader

without any help from cross-examination by the official advocates of

Germany. The value of the French evidence must be judged by later

events. Have they, or have they not, corroborated the anticipations

of France, held for a year before the war, as to an attack upon her

by Germany?

On March 17, 1913, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,

wrote to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris,

transmitting reports by French military and naval attachés in Berlin

to their respective French departments on German military affairs,

and called his attention to the importance of the documents. Delay,

he said, in the publication of the reports was due to lack of funds

wherewith to provide for these military measures. The rich classes

objected to a forced levy in times of peace, and the Federal states

to the Imperial Government adopting direct taxation which had

heretofore been reserved to them.

"However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German

army the empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event

of a possible crisis.

"The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that

country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the [French]

Republic to reestablish the three years' service, and the manly

determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in

France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals of insisting

on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military

strength; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our

own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort

which France is undertaking is but the consequence of German

initiative.

"The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic

sentiment. Every day the emperor delights to revive memories of

1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the

streets of Berlin, speeches were delivered in which the present

situation was compared to that of a hundred years ago.... It was

of course to be expected that national patriotism would be worked

up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare

the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If,

to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a

hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who

aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a

counterpart would have to be sought, since the French nation

seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force.

"Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in

both countries makes the situation grave."

The first inclosure in M. Cambon's letter was the report of

Lieutenant Colonel Serret. He speaks of a "virulent" article in the

"Kölnische Zeitung" ("Cologne Gazette") on the menace of France,

which, though immediately disavowed by the Government, cannot be

disregarded, since its sentiments have been approved by other

prominent newspapers, and it appears to express a "real feeling"

among the people, a "latent anger." It throws light on the present

German armaments.

"For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet

people who declare that the military plans of France are

extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the

Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years'

service in France, went so far as to say: 'It is a provocation;

we will not allow it.' More moderate persons, military and civil,

glibly voice the opinion that France with her 40,000,000

inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany.

"To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the

shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people

pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry

at realizing that in spite of the enormous effort made last year,

continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be

possible this time to outrun France completely.

"To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with

her, is Germany's real aim....

"At the moment when German military strength is on the point of

acquiring that final superiority which, should the occasion

arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction,

France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said:

'her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection.' The disgust

of Germany can well be understood.

"Of course the Government points to the general situation in

Europe and speaks of the 'Slav Peril.' As far as I can see,

however, public opinion really seems indifferent to this

'Peril,' and yet it has accepted with a good grace, if not with

welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws....

"To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France,

as does the 'Kölnische Zeitung,' we are in fact, and shall long

remain the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our

40,000,000 of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too

large.

"Germans wish for peace--so they keep on proclaiming, and the

emperor more than anyone--but they do not understand peace as

involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments.

They want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making

the necessary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national

vanity is wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in

the enormous superiority of its army will be favorable to an

explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation

of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless.

"It must be emphasized again that the Government is doing

everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with

éclat all the various anniversaries of 1813.

"The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more

or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should

justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first

decisive blows being struck at France."

The second inclosure in M. Cambon's letter is the report of M. de

Faramond, Naval Attaché. He says that there will be no increase in

the German fleet this year, and that the whole military effort will

be directed against France.

By October 1, 1914, the imperial army will be increased from 720,000

to 860,000 men, and proposed legislation will place the army corps

near the French frontier most nearly on a war footing, in order on

the very day of the outbreak of hostilities to attack us suddenly

with forces very much stronger than our own. It is absolutely

imperative for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very

outset of the operations....

"William II cannot allow a retreat to enter into his

calculations, although the German soldier is no longer to-day

what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die

at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last

elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that

the franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of

twenty-five, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of

young men from twenty to twenty-five, must contain in its ranks a

considerable proportion of Socialists.

"It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists

will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany

come to blows; but it will be very important that the Imperial

Government should persuade them that on the one hand we are the

aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence

in the direction of the campaign and its final result....

"And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such

an incalculable effect on the empire that we find in all the

plans worked out by the general staff proposals for a crushing

offensive movement against France.

"In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to

meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of

France that the danger seems to them greatest....

"In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a

conversation which a member of our embassy had the other evening

with the old Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to

reflect the opinions which dominate court circles.

"Referring to the new German military proposals Prince

Donnersmarck spoke as follows:

"'French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbor evil

designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular

opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on

us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion,

which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the

Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish

to protect ourselves.'"

The prince, a veteran of the French war, expressed the opinion that

Germany would again conquer France in event of another war.

"Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as

punctual as Germans in the fulfillment of their duty. In the

coming war that nation will be victorious whose servants from the

top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute

exactitude, however important or small it may be. And Prince

Donnersmarck added: 'An exactitude which played so great a rôle

forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far

greater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of

moving masses far more numerous.'

"In this way the old prince gave expression to the confidence

shared by all Germans in the superiority of their military

organization."

The attaché then discusses German finances.

He mentions particularly the large loans raised by the empire and

Prussia: 500,000,000 marks on January 29, 1912, and 350,000,000

marks on March 7, 1913. Quite an important part of these loans

must have been applied to military expenses.

"The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional

financial measures.

"According to the indications given by the semiofficial press,

the 'nonrecurring' expenditure will amount to a milliard marks,

while the 'permanent' annual expenditure resulting from the

increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks.

"It seems certain that the 'nonrecurring' expenditure will be

covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes

would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject

to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would

not be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in

accordance with their usual tactics, to reject the principle of

the military law and at the same time to pass the votes which

assure its being carried into effect."

The attaché then discusses a subject already mentioned--the

persuasion of the rich and bourgeois classes by the Government to

submit to the increased taxation by "noisy celebrations of the

centenary of the War of Independence" in order to convince them of

the necessity of sacrifice, and to remind them that France is

to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary enemy.

"If it is established that the German Government are doing their

utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be

made in full, and not by way of installment, and if, as some of

the newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before

July 1, 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us,

for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military

authorities to obtain war treasure in cash to the amount of a

milliard."

On April 2, 1913, M. Etienne, French Minister of War, wrote to M.

Jonnart, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, enclosing a German

official secret report concerning strengthening of the army. This

report is interesting in that it mentions knowledge that, as a

result of her entente with France and Russia, Great Britain was

prepared to send an expeditionary force of 100,000 to the Continent,

and confesses that Germany refrained from declaring war on France at

the time of the Agadir incident because of "the progress made by the

French army, the moral recovery of the nation, and the technical

advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns."

"Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the

active army, which would ensure Germany an honorable peace and

the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs

of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which

should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this

end....

"Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists,

nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of

the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending

_Deutschtum_ (German influence) all the world over.

"The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day

increase their population. The employment of an army of black men

in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long

time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty.

"Our new army law is only an extension of the military education

of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater

sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has

been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defense as well

as for offense. _We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of

our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and

policy of the French._ We must accustom them to think that an

offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the

provocations of our adversaries. We must act with prudence so as

not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might

injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that

under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable

sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak

(_Losschlagen_) should be considered as a relief, because after

it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We

must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is

much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the

distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which

cannot be concealed.

"We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final

result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we

must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is

a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is,

therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations,

by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt,

Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures

which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course

in case of war we should openly recognize these secret allies;

and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the

advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of

realization. The first attempt which was made some years ago

opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these

relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it

or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this

kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

"Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be

carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out

simultaneously with the destruction of the means of

communication; they must have a controlling head to be found

among the influential leaders, religious or political. The

Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose; more and

more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the

Mohammedan world.

"However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at

one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the

next European war it will also be necessary that the small states

should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain

conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly

conquered or neutralized; this would probably be the case with

Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from

gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations

against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from

Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall

provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable

of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most

unfavorable case, Denmark might be forced by Great Britain to

abandon her neutrality; but by this time the decision would

already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern

army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch

formations, would oppose a very active defense to any offensive

measures from this quarter.