GERMANY FORCES WAR UPON RUSSIA AND FRANCE
The title of this chapter seems to indicate that I have the intention
of taking sides in what many people believe to be an open question.
But this is not the case. The German contention, that Russia caused
the war, must be clearly distinguished from the contention, that Russia
forced the war. There is a great deal of reason in the first
contention. No impartial student, who has written with sympathy
concerning Great Britain's attitude in the Crimean War, can fail to
give Germany just as strong justification for declaring war on Russia
in 1914 as Great Britain had in 1854. But, when we come down to the
narrower question of responsibility for launching the war in which
almost all of Europe is now engaged, there can be no doubt that it was
deliberately willed by the German Government, and that the chain of
circumstances which brought it about was carefully woven by the
officials of Wilhelmstrasse and Ballplatz. There may be honest
difference of opinion as to whether Germany was justified in forcing
the war. But the facts allow no difference of opinion as to whether
Germany _did_ force the war.
{387}
A war to crush France and Russia has for many years been accepted as a
necessary eventuality in the evolution of Germany's foreign policy.
That when this war came, Great Britain would take the opportunity of
joining in order to strike at German commerce, which had begun to be
looked upon by British merchants as a formidable rival in the markets
of the world, was thought probable. The leading men of Germany,
especially since the passing of Morocco and Persia, have felt that this
war was vital to the existence of the German Empire. During recent
years the questions, "Ought there to be a war?" and "Will there be a
war?" ceased to be debated in Germany. One heard only, "Under what
circumstances could _the_ war be most favourably declared?" and "How
soon will _the_ war come?"
Germany has believed that the events of the past decade have shown the
unalterable determination of Great Britain and France to make
impossible the political development of the _Weltpolitik_, without
which her commercial development would always be insecure. This
determination has been consistently revealed in the hostility of her
western rivals to her colonial expansion in Africa and Asia. The world
equilibrium, already decidedly disadvantageous to the overseas future
of Germans at the time they began their career as a united people, has
been disturbed more and more during the past forty years.
The Balkan wars, resulting as they did in the aggrandizement of Servia,
threatened the equilibrium of the Near East, where lay Germany's most
vital {388} and most promising external activities. We must remember,
when we are considering the reasons for the consistent backing given to
Austria-Hungary by Germany in her treatment of Servian aspirations, the
words of Wirth: "_To render powerful the Servian people would be the
suicide of Germany._"
Germany has had as much reason, in the development of the present
crisis, for regarding Servia as the outpost of Russia as had Great
Britain for awarding this rôle to Bulgaria in 1876. Germany has had as
much reason for declaring war on Russia to prevent the Russians from
securing the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire as had Great Britain and
France to take exactly the same step in 1854. The extension, in 1914,
of Russian influence in what was until recently European Turkey would
be just as disastrous to the interests of Germany and
Austria-Hungary--far more so--than it would have been to Great Britain
and France sixty years ago. What she has in Asia-Minor to-day is as
great a stake for Germany to fight for as what Great Britain had in
India in the middle of the nineteenth century.
There is, however, this important difference. Germany, in supporting
the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, was not responding to the overt act of
an enemy. She calculated carefully the cost, waited for a favourable
moment, and, when she decided that the favourable moment had come,
deliberately provoked the war.
Germany, looking for the opportunity to strike her two powerful
neighbours on the east and west, believed that the propitious moment
had come in the {389} summer of 1914. Her rivals were facing serious
internal crises. Russia was embarrassed by the menace of a
widely-spread industrial strike. But Russia did not count for much in
the German calculations. _It was the situation in France that induced
the German statesmen to take advantage of the assassination of Franz
Ferdinand_. The spring elections had revealed a tremendous sentiment
against the law recently voted extending military service for three
years. The French Parliament had just overthrown the admirable Ribot
Cabinet for no other reason than purely personal considerations of a
bitter party strife. An eminent Parliamentarian had exposed publicly
from the tribune the alarming unpreparedness of France for war. The
trial for murder of the wife of the former Premier Caillaux bade fair
to complicate further internal Parliamentary strife.
These were the favourable circumstances of the end of June and the
beginning of July.
But the decision had wider grounds than the advantages of the moment.
The German Government was finding it more and more difficult every year
to secure the credits necessary for the maintenance and increase of her
naval and military establishments. Socialism and anti-militarism were
making alarming progress in the German _Reichstag_. On the other hand,
the Russian military reorganization, commenced after the Japanese War,
was beginning to show surprising fruits. And was France to be allowed
time for the spending of the eight hundred and five million francs just
borrowed by her in June {390} to correct the weak spots in her
fortifications and war material, and for the application of the _loi
des trois ans_ to increase her standing army?
Furthermore, would Great Britain be able to intervene on behalf of
France and Russia? The crisis over the Home Rule Bill seemed to have
developed so seriously that civil war was feared. Sir Edward Carson,
leader of the Protestant irreconcilables in the north of Ireland, had
formed an army that was being drilled in open defiance of the
Government.
The assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess of
Hohenberg came at this advantageous moment. A _casus belli_ against
Servia, so provokingly lacking, had at last been given.
Austria-Hungary was only too ready for the chance to crush Servia. If
there were any misgivings about the risk of doing this, they were
immediately allayed by Germany, who assured Austria-Hungary that she
would not allow Russia even to mobilize. Austria-Hungary was given by
Germany _carte blanche_ in the matter of her dealings with Servia. It
is possible, as the German Ambassador at Petrograd declared to M.
Sasonow, that the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum had not been
submitted beforehand for the approval of Wilhelmstrasse. But the
general tenor of the ultimatum had certainly been agreed upon. Germany
knew well that the ultimatum would be so worded as to be a challenge to
Russia. Either Russia would accept once more the humiliation of a
diplomatic defeat and see Servia crushed, or she would intervene to
save Servia. In the latter {391} contingency, Germany could declare
war upon Russia on the ground that her ally, Austria-Hungary, had been
attacked. The Franco-Russian Alliance would then be put to the test,
as well as whatever understanding there might be between Great Britain
and France.
Subsequent events proved that Germany left no means, other than
complete submission to her will, to France and Russia for avoiding war.
Negotiations were so carried on that there would be no loop-hole for
escape either to Servia, or to the Great Powers that were her
champions. She did not even wait for Russia to attack Austria-Hungary,
or for France to aid Russia. As for Great Britain, it is not yet clear
whether Germany really thought that she was making an honest effort to
keep her out of the war.
From the very beginning of the Servian crisis, Germany associated
herself "for better or for worse with Austria-Hungary." On the day
that the ultimatum to Servia was delivered, Chancellor von
Bethmann-Hollweg wrote to the German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and
Petrograd, requesting them to call upon the Foreign Ministers of the
governments to which they were accredited and point out that the
ultimatum was necessary for the "safety and integrity" of
Austria-Hungary, and to state with special "emphasis" that "_in this
question there is concerned an affair which should be settled
absolutely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to which
it must be the earnest endeavour of the Powers to ensure_. We
anxiously desire _the localization of the conflict_, {392} because any
intercession by another Power would precipitate, on account of the
various alliances, inconceivable consequences."
The position of Germany is admirably stated in these instructions,
which I quote from Exhibit I of the German official _White Book_. To
this position, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg consistently held
throughout the last week of July. In the four words "_localization of
the conflict_" the intention of Germany was summed up. There was to be
a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. That could not be
avoided. The only thing that could be avoided was the intervention of
Russia to prevent the approaching attack of Austria-Hungary upon
Servia. If the Powers friendly to Russia did not prevail upon the Czar
to refrain from interfering, there would be, "_on account of the
various alliances, inconceivable consequences_."
The next day, July 24th, a telegram from the German Ambassador at
Petrograd to the Chancellor stated that M. Sasonow was very much
agitated, and had "declared most positively that Russia could not
permit under any circumstances that the Servo-Austrian difficulty be
settled alone between the parties concerned."
[Illustration: Map--Belgium and the Franco-German Frontier]
There was still time for Germany, warned by the attitude taken by
Russia, to counsel her ally to accept whatever conciliatory response
Servia might give. But this was not done. As we have already seen in
the previous chapter, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade,
without communicating with his Government, declared the Servian
response unsatisfactory, {393} even though it gave an opening for
further negotiations, and withdrew from Belgrade with all the members
of the legation staff.
This precipitate, and, in view of the gravity of the international
situation, unreasonable action could have been avoided, had Chancellor
von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed the word to Vienna.
Not only was the Austro-Hungarian Minister allowed to leave Belgrade in
this way, but, _after three days had elapsed_, Austria-Hungary took the
irrevocable step of declaring war on Servia.
During these three days, Sir Edward Grey requested the British
Ambassadors at Rome and Vienna and Berlin to make every possible effort
to find ground for negotiation. On the morning of July 27th, Sir
Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, submitted to Count
Berchtold the proposition of Sir Edward Grey, which was made
simultaneously at Petrograd, that the question at issue be adjusted in
a conference held at London. In the meantime, after a conversation
with Sir Rennell Rodd, the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Berlin, suggesting that
Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy mediate between
Austria-Hungary and Russia. In sharp contrast to the efforts being
made by the British Ambassadors, the German Ambassador at Paris, in an
interview with Premier Viviani, insisted upon the impossibility of a
conference of mediation, and announced categorically that _the only
possible solution of the difficulty was a common French and German
intervention at Petrograd_. In {394} other words, France could avoid
war by assisting her enemy in humiliating her ally!
On July 28th, the German position was: "That Austria-Hungary must be
left a free hand in her dealings with Servia, and that it must be
pointed out to Russia, if France and Great Britain really wanted to
save the peace of Europe, that she should not mobilize against
Austria-Hungary." Diplomatic intervention, then, could do nothing
except attempt to force Russia to refrain from interfering between
Austria-Hungary and Servia. Germany would aid the other Powers in
coercing Russia, but she would not urge herself, or aid them in urging,
upon Austria-Hungary, _who had started the trouble_, the advisability
of modifying her attitude towards Servia, and postponing hostilities
that were bound to lead to a European war.
Germany had refused all intervention at Vienna. She agreed, however,
to prove her good-will by letting it be known that Austria-Hungary was
willing to make the promise to seek no territorial aggrandizement in
her war with Servia, but to limit herself to a "punitive expedition."
_But this suggestion did not come until Russia had already committed
herself to defend Servia against invasion_.
There was another way in which the peace of Europe could have been
saved, and that was by a declaration on the part of Germany that she
would allow Russia and Austria-Hungary to fight out the question of
hegemony in south-eastern Europe. But there was no proposition from
Germany to France suggesting a mutual neutrality. On the other hand,
{395} Germany let it be known that she would stand by Austria-Hungary
if Russia attacked her, and, in the same breath, warned France against
the danger of being loyal to the Russian alliance!
On July 29th, it was announced from Petrograd that a partial
mobilization had been ordered in the south and south-east. The German
Ambassador in Petrograd, in an interview with M. Sasonow, pointed out
"very solemnly that the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by
the danger of a general European conflagration, and endeavoured to
present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger. It was
impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Servia could now be
deserted by Russia." On the same day, Ambassador von Schoen at Paris
was directed by the German Chancellor to "call the attention of the
French Government to the fact that preparation for war in France would
call forth counter-measures in Germany." An exchange of telegrams on
the 29th and 30th between the Kaiser and the Czar showed the
irreconcilability between the Russian and German points of view. The
idea of the Kaiser was that the Czar should give Austria-Hungary a free
hand. The idea of the Czar was that the attack by Austria-Hungary upon
Servia absolutely demanded a Russian mobilization "directed solely
against Austria-Hungary."
On July 31st, the German Ambassador at Petrograd was ordered to notify
Russia that mobilization against Austria-Hungary must be stopped within
twelve hours, or Germany would mobilize against Russia. At the same
time a telegram was sent to {396} the German Ambassador at Paris,
ordering him to "ask the French Government whether it intends to remain
neutral in a Russo-German war."
On August 1st, at 7.30 P.M., the German Ambassador at Petrograd handed
the following declaration of war to Russia:
"The Imperial Government has tried its best from the beginning of the
crisis to bring it to a peaceful solution. Yielding to a desire which
had been expressed to Him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, His
Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in accord with England, was engaged in
accomplishing the rôle of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and
of Petrograd, when Russia, without awaiting the result of this
mediation, proceeded to the mobilization of its forces by land and sea.
"As a result of this threatening measure, which was actuated by no
military preparation on the part of Germany, the German Empire found
itself facing a grave and imminent danger. If the Imperial Government
had failed to ward off this danger, it would compromise the security
and very existence of Germany. Consequently the German Government saw
itself forced to address itself to the Government of His Majesty, the
Emperor of all the Russias, insisting upon the cessation of the said
military acts. Russia having refused to accede, and having manifested
by this refusal that this action was directed against Germany, I have
the honour of making known to Your Excellency the following order from
my Government:
"His Majesty, the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the
Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself in the state of
war with Russia."
{397}
The same afternoon, President Poincaré ordered a general mobilization
in France. What Ambassador von Schoen tried to get from Premier
Viviani, and what he _did_ get was expressed in his telegram sent from
Paris three hours before the call to mobilization was issued:
"Upon the repeated definite enquiry whether France would remain neutral
in the case of a Russo-German War, the Premier declared that France
would do that which her interests dictated."
Germany violated the neutrality of Luxemburg on August 2d, and of
Belgium on August 3d, after vainly endeavouring to secure permission
from Belgium for the free passage of her troops to the French frontier.
On Sunday morning, August 2d, French soil was invaded. But Ambassador
von Schoen stayed in Paris until Monday evening "waiting for
instructions." Then he called at the Quai d'Orsay, and handed the
following note to Premier Viviani, who was acting also as Minister of
Foreign Affairs:
"The German civil and military authorities have reported a certain
number of definite acts of hostility committed on German territory by
French military aviators. Several of these have clearly violated the
neutrality of Belgium in flying over the territory of this country.
One of them tried to destroy structures near Wesel; others have been
seen in the region of Eiffel, another has thrown bombs on the railway
near Karlsruhe and Nürnberg.
"I am charged, and I have the honour to make known to Your Excellency
that, in the presence of these aggressions, the German Empire considers
{398} itself in state of war with France by the act of this latter
Power.
"I have at the same time the honour to bring to the knowledge of Your
Excellency that the German authorities will detain the French merchant
ships in German ports, but that they will release them if in
forty-eight hours complete reciprocity is assured.
"My diplomatic mission having come to an end, there remains to me no
more than to beg Your Excellency to be willing to give me my passports
and to take what measures you may judge necessary to assure my return
to Germany with the staff of the embassy, as well as with the staff of
the legation of Bavaria and of the German Consulate-General at Paris."
In communicating this declaration of war to the Chamber of Deputies on
the following morning, August 4th, Premier Viviani declared formally
that "at no moment has a French aviator penetrated into Belgium; no
French aviator has committed either in Bavaria or in any part of the
German Empire any act of hostility."
{399}