THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA
In discussing the relations of the Austrians and Hungarians with their
south Slavic subjects, and the rivalries of races in Macedonia the
general causes behind the hostile attitude of Austria-Hungary to the
development of Servia have been explained. Specific treatment of the
Servian attitude towards the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
reserved for this chapter, because the events of the summer of 1914 are
the direct sequence of the events of the winter of 1908-1909.
On October 3, 1908, Marquis Pallavicini, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at
Constantinople, notified verbally the Sublime Porte that
Austria-Hungary had annexed the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, whose administration was entrusted to her by the Treaty of
Berlin just thirty years before. Austria-Hungary was willing to
renounce the right given her by the Treaty of Berlin to the military
occupation of the _sandjak_ of Novi Bazar (a strip of Turkish territory
between Servia and Montenegro), if Turkey would renounce her
sovereignty of the annexed provinces.
{369}
This violation of the Treaty of Berlin by Austria-Hungary aroused a
strong protest not only in Servia and in Turkey, but also among the
other Powers who had signed at Berlin the conditions of the maintenance
of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The protest was especially
strong in London and Petrograd. But Austria-Hungary had the backing of
Germany, whose Ambassador at Petrograd, Count de Pourtales, did not
hesitate several times during the winter to exercise pressure _that
went almost to the point of being a threat_ upon the Russian Foreign
Office to refrain from encouraging the intractable attitude of Servia
towards the annexation.
With Germany's support, Austria-Hungary did not have much difficulty in
silencing the protests of all the Great Powers. She had a free hand,
thanks to Germany, in forcing Turkey and Servia to accept the _fait
accompli_ of the annexation.
Turkish protests took the form of the boycott of which we have spoken
elsewhere. On November 22d, Austria-Hungary threatened to put the
whole status of European Turkey into question by convoking the European
congress to revise the Treaty of Berlin. This is exactly what
Austria-Hungary herself did not want. But neither did Turkey. Both
governments had a common interest in preventing outside intervention in
the Balkan Peninsula. The boycott, as evidencing anti-Austrian
feeling, was rather a sop to public opinion of Young Turkey, and a
blind to the Powers to hide the perfect accord that existed between
Germany and Turkey at the moment, than the expression of hostility to
Austria-Hungary. {370} After several months of _pourparlers_ an
agreement was made between Constantinople and Vienna on February 26,
1909. Turkey agreed to recognize the annexation in return for
financial compensation. The negotiations at Constantinople concerning
Bosnia and Herzegovina are a monument to the diplomatic finesse and
skill of the late Baron Marschall von Bieberstein and of Marquis
Pallavicini.
To lose something that you know you can no longer keep is far different
from losing the hope of possession. It is always more cruel to be
deprived of an anticipation than of a reality. Turkey gave up Bosnia
and Herzegovina with her usual fatalistic indifference. Her
sovereignty had been only a fiction after all. But Servia saw in the
action of Austria-Hungary a fatal blow to her national aspirations.
The inhabitants of the two Turkish provinces on her west were Servian:
Bosnia-Herzegovina formed the centre of the Servian race. Montenegro
on the south was Servian. Dalmatia on the west was Servian. Croatia
on the north was Servian. Everything was Servian to the Adriatic Sea.
And yet Servia was land-locked. The Servians determined they would not
accept this annexation. They appealed to the signatory Powers of
Berlin, and succeeded in arousing a sentiment in Europe favourable to a
European conference. They threatened to make Austrian and Hungarian
sovereignty intolerable, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also
in Croatia and Dalmatia.
Austria-Hungary was more than irritated; she was alarmed. She appealed
to her ally, and pictured {371} the danger to the _Drang nach Osten_.
The powerful intervention of the German ambassadors in the various
European capitals succeeded in isolating Belgrade. Russian support of
Servia would have meant a European war. Rather than risk this, France
begged Russia to yield. Russia, not yet recovered from the Manchurian
disaster, ordered Servia to yield. Austria-Hungary was allowed to
force Servia into submission.
Friendless in the face of her too powerful adversary, Servia directed
her Minister at Vienna on March 31, 1909, to make the following formal
declaration to the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
"Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the
situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt
herself to the decisions at which the Powers are going to arrive in
reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the councils
of the Powers, Servia binds herself to cease the attitude of protest
and resistance which she has assumed since last October, relative to
the annexation, and she binds herself further to change the direction
of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to
live with the latter in friendly and neighbourly relations."
The crisis passed. Servia's humiliation was the price of European
peace. Germany had shown her determination to stand squarely behind
Austria-Hungary in her dealings with Servia. It was a lesson for the
future. Five years later history repeated itself--except that Russia
did not back down!
{372}
We have already told the story of Austria-Hungary's dealings with
Servia after the first victorious month of the Balkan War with Turkey:
how Servia was compelled, owing to lack of support from Russia, to give
satisfaction to Austria-Hungary in the Prochaska incident, to withdraw
her troops from Durazzo and from before Scutari; and how the Powers
saved the peace of Europe in May, 1913, by compelling Montenegro to
abandon Scutari.
Ever since the Treaty of Bukarest, Austria-Hungary watched Servia
keenly for an opportunity to pick a quarrel with her. It is marvellous
how the Servians, elated as they naturally were by their military
successes against Turkey and Bulgaria, avoided knocking the chip off
the shoulder of their jealous and purposely sensitive neighbour.
It was one thing to be able to keep a perfectly correct official
attitude towards the Austro-Hungarian Government. This the Servian
Government had promised to do in the note wrung from it on March 31,
1909. This it _did_ do. But it was a totally different thing to
expect the authorities at Belgrade to stifle the national aspirations
of twelve million Servians, the majority of whom were outside of her
jurisdiction. Even if it had been the wiser course for her to
pursue--and this is doubtful,--could Servia have been able to repress
the thoroughly awakened and triumphant nationalism of her own subjects
who had borne so successfully and so heroically the sufferings and
sacrifices of two wars within one year?
Individual Servians, living within the kingdom of {373} Servia, were
irredentists, but without official sanction. They were undoubtedly in
connection with the revolutionaries created by Austrian and Hungarian
methods in the Servian provinces of the Dual Monarchy. There was
undoubtedly a dream of Greater Servia, and a strong hope in the hearts
of nationalists on both sides of the frontiers that the day would dawn
_by their efforts_ when Greater Servia would be a reality. No
government could have continued to exist in Servia which tried to
suppress the _Narodna Obrana_. I make this statement without
hesitation. King Peter did not intend to become another Charles Albert.
Ought the Vienna and Berlin statesmen to have expected Servia to do so?
What answer would Switzerland or Holland or Belgium or Brazil receive,
were their ministers to present a note at Wilhelmstrasse or Ballplatz,
calling attention to the menace to their independence of the
Pan-Germanic movement, citing speeches delivered by eminent professors
in universities, books written by officials of the imperial
Governments, and asking that certain societies be suppressed and
certain geographies be removed from use in German schools? Their cause
would have been as just, and their right as clear, _for exactly the
same reasons_, as that of the Austrian Government in its attitude
towards Servia. The only difference between Pan-Servianism and
Pan-Germanism--and you must remember that the latter is not only
encouraged, but also subsidized, by the Berlin and Vienna
governments--is that the former is the aspiration of twelve millions
while the latter {374} is the aspiration of ninety millions. Is not
the answer the old Bismarckian formula that might makes right?
During the winter following the Treaty of Bukarest the Austro-Hungarian
agents and police continued their careful surveillance of the _Narodna
Obrana_, and followed all its dealings with Servians of
Austro-Hungarian nationality. But it could find no _casus belli_. The
attitude of the Servian Government was perfectly correct at all times.
Traps were laid, but Servian officials did not fall into them. The
occasion for striking Servia came in a most tragic way.
It seems like tempting Providence to have sent the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand and his wife to Sarajevo on the anniversary of the battle of
Kossova. Things had been going from bad to worse in Bosnia. Flags of
the Dual Monarchy had been burned in Sarajevo and Mostar, and the
garrisons called upon to intervene to restore order. The Constitution
of 1910 had been modified in 1912, so that the military Governor was
invested with civil power. The local Bosnian Diet had been twice
prorogued. In May, 1913, the constitution was suspended, and a state
of siege declared in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Throughout the winter of
1913-1914, incipient rebellions had to be checked by force in many
places. It was known to the police that Servian secret societies were
active, and that the provinces were in a state of danger and
insecurity. The Servian Government was apprehensive concerning the
announced visit of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. In fact,
so greatly was it feared that some attempt {375} might be made against
the life of Franz Ferdinand, and that this would be used as an excuse
for an attack upon Servia, that the Servian Minister at Vienna, a week
before the date announced for the visit, informed the Government that
there was reason to fear a plot to assassinate the Archduke.
On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, the
Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated in the streets of Sarajevo.
Austria-Hungary realized that her moment had come. Germany was
sounded, and found to be ready to prevent outside interference in
whatever measures Vienna might see fit to take with Belgrade.
In the spring of 1914, the Pasitch Cabinet had almost succumbed in the
struggle between civil and military elements. Premier Pasitch retained
his power by agreeing to a dissolution of Parliament, and binding
himself to the necessity of following the leadership of the military
part. So far were the chiefs of the military party from being in a
mood to consider the susceptibilities of Austria-Hungary that they were
actually, according to a telegram from a well-informed source in Agram
on June 26, 1914, debating the means of uniting Servia and Montenegro.
The difficult question of dynasties was in the way of being solved,
and, despite Premier Pasitch's misgivings, the _ballon d'essai_ of the
project of union had been launched in Europe. It was at this critical
and delicate moment for the Belgrade Cabinet that the storm broke.
I was surprised by the spirit of optimism which seemed to pervade the
French press during the {376} period immediately following the
assassination of Franz Ferdinand. For three weeks the telegrams from
Vienna repeated over and over again the statement that the ultimatum
which Austria-Hungary intended to present at Belgrade as a result of
the Sarajevo assassination would be so worded that Russia could not
take offence. This optimistic opinion, which seems to have been given
almost official sanction by the Ballplatz, was shared by the French
Government. France is a country in which the inmost thoughts of her
statesmen are voiced freely in the daily newspapers of Paris. If there
had been any serious misgivings, the protocol for the visit of
President Poincaré to Petrograd and to the Scandinavian capitals would
certainly have been modified.
The President of France sailed for the Baltic on July 15th. At six
o'clock in the evening of the 23d, the note of the Austro-Hungarian
Government concerning the events of the assassination of Sarajevo was
given to the Servian Government. It commenced by reproducing the text
of the Servian declaration of March 31, 1909, which we have quoted
above. Servia was accused of not having fulfilled the promise made in
this declaration, and of permitting the Pan-Servian propaganda in the
newspapers and public schools of the kingdom. The assassination of the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand was stated to be the direct result of Servian
failure to live up to her declaration of March 31, 1909.
Austria-Hungary claimed that the assassination of the heir to her
throne had been investigated, and that ample proof had been found of
the connivance of two Servians, {377} one an army officer and the other
a functionary who belonged to the _Narodna Obrana_; that the assassins
had received their arms and their bombs from these two men, and had
been knowingly allowed to pass into Bosnia by the Servian authorities
on the Serbo-Bosnian frontier. Being unable to endure longer the
Pan-Servian agitation, of which Belgrade was the _foyer_ and the crime
of Sarajevo a direct result, the Austro-Hungarian Government found
itself compelled to demand of the Servian Government the formal
assurance that it condemned this propaganda, which was dangerous to the
existence of the Dual Monarchy, because its final end was to detach
from Austria-Hungary large portions of her territory and attach them to
Servia.
After this preamble, the note went on to demand that on the first page
of the _Journal Officiel_ of July 26th the Servian Government publish a
new declaration, the text of which is so important that we quote it in
full.
"The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed against
Austria-Hungary, _i.e._, the entirety of those machinations whose aim
it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories
belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences
of these criminal actions.
"The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian officers and
officials have participated in the propaganda cited above, and have
thus threatened the friendly and neighbourly relations which the Royal
Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March
31, 1909.
"The Royal Government, which disapproves and {378} rejects every
thought or every attempt at influencing the destinies of the
inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to
call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and officials,
and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it will hereafter
proceed with the utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar
actions, to prevent and suppress which it will make every effort."
Simultaneously with the publication in the_ Journal Officiel_,
Austria-Hungary demanded that the declaration be brought to the
knowledge of the Servian army by an order of the day of King Peter, and
be published in the official organ of the army. The Servian Government
was also asked to make ten promises:
1. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contempt
for, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and whose general tendency is
directed against the latter's territorial integrity;
2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society _Narodna
Obrana_, to confiscate its entire means of propaganda, and to proceed
in the same manner against the other societies and associations in
Servia which occupy themselves with the propaganda against
Austria-Hungary, and to take the necessary measures that the dissolved
societies may not continue their activities under another name or in
another form;
3. To eliminate without delay from the public instruction in Servia, so
far as the teaching staff as well as the curriculum is concerned,
whatever serves or may serve to foster the propaganda against
Austria-Hungary;
4. To remove from military service and public {379} office in general
all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against
Austria-Hungary and whose names, with a communication of the evidence
which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the
Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the
Royal Government;
5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of members of the official
machinery (_organes_) of the Imperial and Royal Government in the
suppression of the movement directed against Austro-Hungarian
territorial integrity;
6. To commence a judicial investigation (_enquête judiciaire_) against
the participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who are on Servian
territory--members of the official machinery (_organes_) delegated by
the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the researches
(_recherches_) relative thereto;
7. To proceed immediately to arrest Major Vorja Tankositch and a
certain Milan Ciganovitch, a functionary of the Servian State, who have
been compromised by the result of the preliminary investigation at
Sarajevo;
8. To prevent, by effective measures, the participation of the Servian
authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the
frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the functionaries at the
frontier at Shabatz and at Loznica, guilty of having aided the authors
of the crime of Sarajevo by facilitating their crossing of the frontier;
9. To give to the Austro-Hungarian Government explanations concerning
the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries, in Servia and
abroad, who, in spite of their official position have not hesitated,
after the crime of June 28th, to express themselves in interviews in a
hostile manner against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy;
{380}
10. To notify without delay to the Austro-Hungarian Government the
execution of the measures included in the preceding points.
Annexed to the note was a memorandum which declared that the
investigation of the police, after the assassination of the Archduke
and his wife, had established that the plot had been formed at Belgrade
by the assassins with the help of a commandant in the Servian army,
that the six bombs and four Browning pistols with their ammunition had
been given at Belgrade to the assassins by the Servian functionary and
the Servian army officer whose names were cited in the note, that the
bombs were hand grenades which came from the Servian army headquarters
at Kragujevac, that the assassins were given instruction in the use of
the arms by Servian officers, and that the introduction into Bosnia and
Herzegovina of the assassins and their arms was facilitated by the
connivance of three frontier captains and a customs official.
The wording of this note seemed to have been entirely unexpected. The
intention of the ultimatum was clear. It was understood that Russia
would not accept an attack upon the integrity of Servia. Six years had
passed since 1908, and two since 1912. Russia had recuperated from the
Japanese War, and her Persian accord with Great Britain had borne much
fruit. She was sure of France. Was this not a deliberate provocation
to Russia?
Forty-eight hours had been given to Servia to respond. Russia and
France had both counselled {381} Servia to give an answer that would be
a _general_ acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. Neither
France nor Russia wanted war. So anxious were they to avoid giving
Austria-Hungary the opportunity to precipitate the crisis before they
were ready for it that _for the third time in six years_ Servia was
asked to swallow her pride and submit. On the night of July 24th, a
memorable council was held in Belgrade. The Premier and the leaders of
the opposition, together with some members of the _Narodna Obrana_ were
shown clearly what course they must follow, if they expected the loyal
support of Russia. The answer to the ultimatum must be worded in such
a way that Austria-Hungary would have no ground upon which to stand in
forcing immediately the war. Servia must once more "eat humble pie."
But this time the promise of Russian support was given _to defend the
territorial integrity and the independence of Servia_.
The Servian answer was far more conciliatory than was expected. The
allegations of the Austro-Hungarian preamble were denied, but the
publication of the declaration in the _Journal Officiel_ and in the
army bulletin, and its incorporation in an order of the day to the
army, were promised. But there were to be two changes in the text of
the declaration. Instead of "the Royal Servian Government condemns
_the propaganda against_ Austria-Hungary," the Servians agreed to
declare that "the Royal Servian Government condemns _every propaganda
which should be directed against_ Austria-Hungary," and instead of "the
Royal Government regrets _that Servian officers {382} and officials_
... have participated in the propaganda cited above," the Servian King
could say no more than "the Royal Government regrets _that according to
a communication of the Imperial and Royal Government certain officers
and functionaries ... etc._"
The German _White Book_ makes a special point of the bad faith of
Servia in altering the text of the declaration in this way. But what
government could be expected to admit what was only a supposition, and
what king worthy of the name would denounce as a regicide openly before
his army one of his officers upon the unsupported statement of a
political document? The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum had given no proof
of its charges against the man named in its note, and forty-eight hours
was too short a time for the Servian Government to investigate the
charges to its own satisfaction.
In order to make clear just what was the nature of the demands which
Austria-Hungary made upon Servia, I have cited the ten articles in full.
One can readily see that the demands of Articles 1, 2, and 3, in their
entirety, meant the extinction of the Pan-Servian movement and Servian
nationalism. Austria-Hungary was asking of Servia something that
neither member of the Dual Monarchy had succeeded in accomplishing in
its own territories! The German _White Book_ attempts to sustain the
justice of the demands of its ally in striking at the press, the
nationalist societies, and the schools. The methods of arousing a
nationalistic spirit in the Servian people through the press, through
the formation of societies, {383} and through the teaching of
irredentism by school-books, were borrowed from Germany. But Servia
agreed to make her press laws more severe, to dissolve the _Narodna
Obrana_ and other societies; and "to eliminate from the public
instruction in Servia anything which might further the propaganda
directed against Austria-Hungary, provided the Imperial and Royal
Government furnishes actual proofs."
Article 4 was agreed to only so far as it could be actually proved that
the officers and officials in question had been "guilty of actions
against the territorial integrity of the monarchy." To promise to
remove all who were "guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary"
would have meant the disbanding of the Servian army and the Servian
Government! Is there any man with red blood in his veins who can be
prevented from having hopes and dislikes, and expressing them? Could
Servia prevent Servians from stating how they felt about the political
_status_ of their race in Croatia and in Bosnia? Did Austria-Hungary
ever make a similar request to her ally, Italy, about irredentist
literature and speeches?
Articles 5 and 6 are open to discussion. There is no doubt that the
newspapers of nations hostile to Austria-Hungary and Germany have been
unfair in their interpretation and in their translation of these two
articles. The Servian answer deliberately gives a false meaning to the
Austrian request here, and represents it as an attack upon the
independence of her courts. Servia had enough good grounds for
resistance to the ultimatum without equivocating {384} on this point.
In her answer she refused what had not been actually demanded, a
co-operation in the _enquête judiciaire_ of Austro-Hungarian _organes_.
What Austria-Hungary demanded was the co-operation of her police
officials in the _recherches_.
Articles 7 to 10 were accepted by Servia _in toto_. As a proof of her
good faith, the Servian answer declared that Major Tankositch had been
arrested on the evening of the day on which the ultimatum was received.
In conclusion, Servia offered, if her response to the ultimatum were
found insufficient, to place her case in the hands of the Hague
Tribunal and of the different Powers at whose suggestion she had signed
the declaration of March 31, 1909, after the excitement over the
Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The answer to the ultimatum was taken by Premier Pasitch in person to
the Minister of Austria-Hungary at Belgrade before six o'clock on the
evening of July 25th. Without referring the response to his
Government, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, acting on previous
instructions that _no answer other than an acceptance in every
particular of the ultimatum would be admissible_, replied that the
response was not satisfactory. At half-past six, he left Belgrade with
all members of the legation.
While the European chancelleries were trying to find some means to heal
the breach, Austria-Hungary formally declared war on Servia on the
morning of July 28th. The same evening, the bombardment of Belgrade
from Semlin and from the Danube {385} was begun. The Servian
Government retired to Nish.
Only the intervention of Germany could now prevent the European
cataclysm.
{386}