GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR
The balance of power in European diplomacy led inevitably to a
_rapprochement_ between France and Russia and Great Britain to offset
the Triple Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary and Italy.
The Triple Alliance, however, while purely _defensive_, was still an
alliance. It had endured or over thirty years, and the three Powers
generally sustained each other in diplomatic moves. Their military and
naval strategists were in constant communication, and ready at any time
to bring all their forces into play in a European war.
France and Russia had also entered into a defensive alliance. This had
not been accomplished without great difficulty. Were it not for the
constant menace to France from Germany, the French Parliament would not
have ratified the alliance in the first place, nor would it have stood
the strain of increasing Radicalism in French sentiment during the last
decade. While there is much intellectual and temperamental affinity
between Gaul and Slav, there is no political affinity between
democratic France and autocratic Russia.
The commercial rivalry of Great Britain and {400} Germany led to a
rivalry of armaments. The struggle of German industry for the control
of the world markets is the real cause of the creation and rapid
development of the German navy to threaten the British mastery of the
seas. It is possible that the statesmen of Great Britain, by a liberal
policy in regard to German colonial expansion in Africa and Asia and in
regard to German ambitions in Asiatic Turkey, might have diverted
German energy from bending all its efforts to destroy British commerce.
It is possible that such a policy might have enabled the German
democracy to gain the power to prevent Prussian militarism from
dominating the Confederation. But that would have been expecting too
much of human nature. Nations are like individuals. There never has
been any exception to this rule. What we have we want to keep. We
want more than we have, and we try to get it by taking it away from our
neighbour. Thus the world is in constant struggle. Until we have the
millennium, and by the millennium I mean the change of human nature
from selfishness to altruism, we shall have war. Then, too, the
British have seen in themselves so striking an illustration of the
proverb that the appetite grows with eating that they could hardly
expect anything else of the Germans, were they to allow them
voluntarily "a place in the sun."
The rapid growth of Germany along the lines similar to the development
of Great Britain has made the two nations rivals. As a result of this
rivalry, Great Britain has been forced to prepare for the eventuality
of a conflict between herself and {401} Germany by giving up the policy
of "splendid isolation," and seeking to enter into friendly
relationship with those European Powers that were the enemies of her
rival. The first decade of the twentieth century saw British diplomacy
compounding colonial rivalry with France in Africa and with Russia in
Asia. The African accord of 1904 and the Asiatic accord of 1907 marked
a new era in British foreign relations. Since their conclusion, Great
Britain has drawn gradually nearer to France and Russia.
But British statesmen have had to reckon with the development of
Radical tendencies in the British electorate. These tendencies have
become more and more marked during the very period in which British
foreign policy found that its interests coincided with those of Russia
and France. British democracy had the same antipathy to a Russian
alliance as had French democracy. But the menace of Germany, which
threw France into the arms of Russia, has not seemed as real to the
British electorate. There was also the sentiment against militarism,
which has made it difficult for the Liberal Cabinet to secure from
Parliament sufficient sums for the maintenance of an adequate naval
establishment, and has blocked every effort to provide even a modified
form of compulsory military service and military training in Great
Britain and Ireland.
When one considers all that Sir Edward Grey has had to contend with
during the years that he has held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in
the British Cabinet admiration for his achievements knows no limits.
It is never safe to make comparisons or form judgments {402} in the
appreciation of contemporary figures in history. But I cannot refrain
from stating my belief that British foreign policy has never passed
through a more trying and critical period, and British interests have
never been more ably served, than during the years since the conference
of Algeciras.
The menace of a war between Great Britain and Germany has disturbed
Europe several times during the past decade. There has not been,
however, a direct crisis, involving the interests of the two rival
nations, to make an appeal to arms inevitable, or even probable. But,
although British public sentiment might have been slow in supporting
the intervention of the Cabinet in favour of France, had Germany
attacked France in 1905, in 1908, or in 1911, to have stayed out of the
war would have been suicidal folly, and Great Britain would soon have
awakened to this fact.
The crisis over the ultimatum of Austria-Hungary to Servia became acute
after the terms of the ultimatum were known. Sir Edward Grey, seconded
by as skilful and forceful ambassadors as have ever represented British
interests on the continent of Europe, honestly tried to prevent the
outbreak of war. It was not to the interests of Great Britain that
this war should be fought. All sentimental considerations to one side,
the moment was peculiarly unfavourable on purely material grounds. The
British Parliament was facing one of the most serious problems of its
history. The confidence of the country in the wisdom of the measures
in Ireland {403} that the Government seemed determined to carry out was
severely shaken. The interest of the British public in the troubles
between Austria-Hungary and Servia was not great enough to make the war
popular. The efforts of Lord Haldane had done much to improve the
relationship between Great Britain and Germany. Sympathy with Russia
had been alienated by the increasingly reactionary policy of the Czar's
government towards the Poles, the Finns, and the Jews. The British
press was disgusted by the overthrow of the Ribot Ministry and by the
revelations of the Caillaux trial.
As there was no actual alliance between Great Britain and France, and
no understanding of any nature whatever with Russia, French public
opinion was far from being certain that British aid would be given in
the approaching war, _and British public opinion was far from being
certain as to whether it would be necessary to give this aid, or
whether it wanted to do so_. I am speaking here of the feeling among
the electorate, which, accurately represented by Parliament, is the
final court of appeal in Great Britain. There was no doubt about the
opinion of Sir Edward Grey and the majority of his colleagues in the
Cabinet, as well as of the leaders of the Opposition. There was,
however, very serious doubt as to the attitude of Parliament. Would it
sustain France and Russia over the question of Servia, at a time when
there was so serious a division in the nation concerning the Home Rule
Bill--even the open menace of civil war?
When Germany decided to declare war on Russia, {404} and it was seen
that France would be drawn into the struggle, Chancellor von
Bethmann-Hollweg declared to Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador to
Germany, that "the neutrality of Great Britain once guaranteed, every
assurance would be given to the Cabinet at London that the Imperial
Government did not have in view territorial acquisitions at the expense
of France." Sir Edward questioned the Chancellor about the French
colonies, "the portions of territories and possessions of France
situated outside of the continent of Europe." Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg answered that it was not within his power to make any
promise on that subject.
There was no hesitation or equivocation in the response of the British
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to this proposition. He said
that neutrality under such conditions was impossible, and that Great
Britain could not stand by and see France crushed, even if she were
left her European territory intact, for she would be reduced to the
position of a satellite of Germany. To make a bargain with Germany at
the expense of France would be a disgrace from which Great Britain
would never recover. It was pointed out to the Chancellor that the
only means of maintaining good relations between Great Britain and
Germany would be for the two Powers to continue to work together to
safeguard the peace of Europe. Sir Edward Grey promised that all his
personal efforts would be directed towards guaranteeing Germany and her
Allies against any aggression on the part of Russia and France, and
hoped that, if Germany showed her good faith in the present crisis,
{405} more friendly relations between Great Britain and Germany would
ensue than had been the case up to that moment.
This dignified and manly response could have left no doubt in the minds
of German statesmen as to the stand which the British Cabinet intended
to take. Did they believe that Parliament and the people would not
support Sir Edward Grey?
The position of Great Britain was explicitly put before the House of
Commons on the evening of August 3d. Because of her naval agreement
with France, by which the French navy was concentrated in the
Mediterranean in order that the British Admiralty might keep its full
forces in home waters, Great Britain was bound in honour to prevent an
attack of a hostile fleet upon the Atlantic seacoast of France. If
Germany were to make such an attack, Great Britain would be drawn into
the war without any further question. There had also been since
November, 1912, an understanding between the British and French
military and naval authorities concerning common action on land and sea
"against an enemy." But, at the time this understanding was made, it
was put in writing that it was merely a measure of prudence, and did
not bind Great Britain in any way whatever to act with France either in
a defensive or offensive war.
Great Britain was drawn into the war by the German violation of the
neutrality of Belgium.
On Sunday evening, August 2d, at seven o'clock, Germany gave the
following ultimatum to Belgium:
"The German Government has received sure news, {406} according to which
the French forces have the intention of marching on the Meuse by way of
Givet and Namur; this news leaves no doubt of the intention of France
to march against Germany by way of Belgian territory. The Imperial
German Government cannot help fearing that Belgium, in spite of its
very good will, will not be able to repulse, without help, a forward
march of French troops which promises so large a development.
"In this fact we find sufficient certitude of a threat directed against
Germany; it is an imperious duty for self-preservation for Germany to
forestall this attack of the enemy.
"The German Government would regret exceedingly should Belgium regard
as an act of hostility against it the fact that the enemies of Germany
oblige her to violate, on her side, the territory of Belgium. In order
to dissipate every misunderstanding, the German Government declares as
follows:
"1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium, if Belgium
consents, in the war which is going to commence, to adopt an attitude
of benevolent neutrality in regard to Germany. The German Government,
on its side, promises, at the moment of peace, to guarantee the kingdom
and its possessions in their entire extent. 2. Germany promises to
evacuate Belgian territory, under the condition above pronounced,
immediately peace is concluded. 3. If Belgium observes a friendly
attitude, Germany is ready, in accord with the authorities of the
Belgian Government, to buy, paying cash, all that would be necessary
for her troops, and to indemnify the losses caused to Belgium. 4. If
Belgium conducts herself in a hostile manner against the German troops
and makes in particular difficulties for their forward march by an
opposition of the fortifications of the Meuse or by the destruction of
{407} roads, railways, tunnels, or other constructions, Germany will be
obliged to consider Belgium as an enemy.
"In this case, Germany will make no promise in regard to the kingdom,
but will leave the subsequent adjustment of the relations of the two
states one toward the other to the decision of arms.
"The German Government has the hope with reason that this eventuality
will not take place, and that the Belgian Government will know how to
take the necessary measures suitable for preventing it from taking
place.
"In this case, the relations of friendship which unite the two
neighbouring states will become narrower and more lasting."
Belgium did not hesitate to respond promptly as follows:
"By its note of August 2, 1914, the German Government has made known
that according to sure news the French forces have the intention of
marching on the Meuse by way of Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in
spite of her very good will, would not be able to repulse without help
the forward march of the French troops.
"The German Government would believe itself under the obligation of
forestalling this attack and of violating the Belgian territory. In
these conditions, Germany proposes to the Government of the King to
adopt in regard to her a friendly attitude, and she promises at the
moment of the peace to guarantee the integrity of the kingdom and of
its possessions in their entire extent.
"The note adds that if Belgium makes difficulty for the forward march
of the German troops, Germany will be obliged to consider her as an
enemy but will leave the subsequent adjustment of the {408} relations
of the two states one towards the other by the decision of arms.
"This note has aroused in the Government of the King a deep and
grievous astonishment. The intentions that it attributes to France are
in contradiction with the formal declarations which have been made to
us on August 1st, in the name of the Government of the Republic.
"However, if in opposition to our expectation a violation of the
Belgian neutrality is going to be committed by France, Belgium would
fulfil all her international duties, and her army would oppose itself
to the invader with the most vigorous resistance. The treaties of
1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, make sacred the independence
and the neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers and
notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.
"Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations; she
has accomplished her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has
neglected no effort to maintain and to make respected her neutrality.
The attack upon her independence with which the German Government
menaces her would constitute a flagrant violation of international law.
"No strategic interest justifies the violation of international law.
The Belgian Government in accepting the propositions of which it has
received notice would sacrifice the honour of the nation at the same
time as it would betray its duties toward Europe. Conscious of the
rôle that Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the
civilization of the world, it does not allow itself to believe that the
independence of Belgium can be preserved only at the price of the
violation of her neutrality. If this hope is deceived, the Belgian
Government is firmly decided to repulse by every means in its power
every attack upon its rights."
[Illustration: Map--Europe in 1914]
{409}
As I record these two statements, there is before me a cartoon from a
recent issue of _Punch_. The Kaiser, with a leer on his face, is
leaning over the shoulder of King Albert, who is looking out with
folded arms upon the smoking ruins of his country, and the long defile
of refugees. The Kaiser says, "See, you have lost all." King Albert
answers, "Not my soul."
To be just to Germany, is necessary for us to quote the explanation of
this action made by Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg to the _Reichstag_,
on August 4th, when Germany had commenced to carry into execution her
threat:
"Here is the truth. We are in necessity, and necessity knows no law.
"Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and have perhaps already put their
foot upon Belgium territory.
"It is against the law of nations. The French Government has, it is
true, declared at Brussels that it would respect the neutrality of
Belgium, so long as the enemy respected it. We knew, however, that
France was ready for the aggression. France could wait; we, no. A
French attack upon our flank in the Lower Rhine might have been fatal
to us. So we have been forced to pass beyond the well-founded
protestations of Luxemburg and the Belgian Government. We shall
recompense them for the wrong that we have thus caused them as soon as
we shall have attained our military end.
"When one is as threatened as we are and when one fights for that which
is most sacred to him, one can think only of one thing, that is, to
attain his end, cost what it may."
{410}
"I repeat the words of the Emperor; 'It is with pure conscience that
Germany goes to the combat.'"
On the afternoon of August 3d, as Sir Edward Grey was leaving for
Parliament to make his _exposé_ of Great Britain's position in the
European crisis, he received from the King a telegram that had just
arrived from King Albert of Belgium:
"Remembering the numerous proofs of friendship of Your Majesty and of
Your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of Great Britain in 1870,
as well as of the new gage of friendship that she has just given me, I
address a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of Your Majesty
to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."
Sir Edward Grey read this telegram to Parliament, and explained that
the diplomatic intervention asked for had already been made both at
Paris and Berlin, for this eventuality had been foreseen. To the
questions of the British Ambassadors concerning their intentions
towards Belgium, _to respect and maintain the neutrality of which each
of these Powers was equally bound with Great Britain by the treaty of
1839_, France responded by telegraph received August 1st:
"French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium,
and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that
neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order
to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise."
Germany answered the same day through Sir E. Goschen;
{411}
"I have seen the Secretary of State, who informs me that he must
consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer."
When Sir Edward Goschen expressed the hope that the answer would not be
delayed, Herr von Jagow gave him clearly to understand that he doubted
whether he could respond, "for any response on his part would not fail,
in case of war, to have the regrettable effect of divulging a part of
the German plan of campaign!"
There was no doubt about the sentiment of Parliament. The Cabinet saw
that party lines had been obliterated, and that the country was behind
them. The following day, August 4th, Great Britain presented an
ultimatum to Germany, demanding an assurance that the neutrality of
Belgium should be respected. Germany gave no answer. Her army had
already invaded Belgium. A few hours after the reception of the
British ultimatum, the advance on Liège was ordered. After waiting
until evening, Great Britain declared war on Germany.
It is probable that Germany counted the cost before she invaded
Belgium. Whatever may have been said at Berlin, the intervention of
Great Britain was not the surprise that it has been represented to be.
In deciding to violate Belgian neutrality, in spite of the British
ultimatum, the German argument was: It is morally certain that Great
Britain will intervene if we enter Belgium. But what will this
intervention mean? She has no army worth the name. Her navy can do
practically nothing to harm {412} us while we are crushing France and
Russia. The participation of Great Britain in the war is a certainty a
few weeks later. By precipitating her intervention, we are less harmed
than we would be by refusing to avail ourselves of the advantage of
attacking France through Belgium.
In believing that the eventual participation of Great Britain was
certain, even if there were no Belgian question, Germany was right.
The violation of the neutrality of Belgium was not the cause, but the
occasion, of Great Britain's entry into the war. It was, however, a
most fortunate opportunity for the British Cabinet to secure popular
sympathy and support in declaring war upon Germany. For it is certain
that Great Britain ought not to have delayed entering the war. The
nation might have awakened too late to the fact that the triumph of
Germany in Europe would menace her national existence. There is no
room in the world for the amicable dwelling side by side of Anglo-Saxon
idealism and German militarism. One or the other must perish.
In August, 1914, the only way to have avoided the catastrophe of a
general European war would have been to allow Germany to make,
according to her own desires and ambitions, the new map of Europe.
{413}
INDEX
Abdul-Hamid deposed as Sultan, 185
Adana massacres, 190
Adrianople, invested by Bulgarians in Balkan War, 292; captured by
combined Servian and Bulgarian armies, 313; Turks reoccupy, 349
Agadir expedition reopens the Moroccan question in 1911, 78; terms of
the two treaties signed by France and Germany, 81
Agram and the Serbo-Croat movement, 147-8
Albania: hotbed of rebellions, but partial to Moslem rule, 210; a thorn
in the flesh to the chancelleries of Europe, 351; her political status
before and during the Balkan War, 353; put in the hands of the Powers
by the Treaty of London, 1913, 360; Prince William of Wied made ruler
of new kingdom, 364; his abdication, 366; now under the provisional
government of Essad pasha, 366
Algeciras, Conference of European Powers on the Moroccan question at,
73; provisions of the Convention, signed April 7, 1906, 74
Alsace-Lorraine, annexed to Germany in 1871, 1; political status in the
Empire, 6; new Constitution granted in 1911, 11; autonomy demanded, 12;
persecutions suffered from Prussian military arrogance, 15-20
Analogy between German Socialists of to-day and the Jacobins of 1793, 32
Anglo-French agreement of 1904 published, 81
Arabs in Ottoman Empire oppose Young Turk hegemony, 214-218
Armenia, Turkish and Moslem oppression in, 187; horrors of the Adana
massacres, 190
Austria-Hungary, and her south Slavs, 142-160; the Dual Monarchy's
Balkan policy and problems, 144-160; acts the bully against Servia, 156
Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia, 368-385; the direct sequence of
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908-1909, 368-371;
exciting cause: the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife at
Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, 374; Austria's note to Servia and demands
for reparation, 376; the Servian reply, 381; declared not satisfactory
by Austro-Hungarian Minister, 384; war declared on Servia, July 28,
1914, 384
_Bagdadbahn_, The, 58-70, 216; the Pan-Germanist conception of it, 62;
concession granted in 1899, and company constituted in 1903, 65;
British oppose successfully German schemes in Asiatic Turkey, 66
Balbo, Cesare, on the "Hope of Italy," 125
Balkan States: Alliance of Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and Montenegro
against Turkey, 263; Russian and Austro-Hungarian joint note to the
States, 268; war declared by Montenegro, October 8, 1912, 270; causes
of Turkish disasters, 279; story of the Thracian campaign, 283-293;
capture of Kirk Kilissé and battle of Lulé Burgas, 285-289; Bulgarians
halt at Tchatalja, 290; Servian and Greek successes, 293-300;
conditions of armistice, signed December 3d, 302; failure of first
peace conference, 308; mediation of the Great Powers accepted, 316;
terms of the Treaty of London, which ended war, 316; rupture between
the Balkan allies, 319-329; disputes over division of the spoil bring
on second Balkan War, 321-327; treachery of the Bulgarians at Salonika,
330-334; Servian and Greek successes, 333-337; Rumania intervenes
against Bulgaria, 338; Montenegro supports Servia, 341; Bulgaria
humiliated, and new map for the Balkan peninsula made by the Treaty of
Bukarest, 343-350
Banca di Roma in Tripoli, 243
Belgian neutrality violated by Germany, August 3, 1914, 397
Belgium, Germany's ultimatum to, 405; the reply, 407
Bethmann-Hollweg, von, German Chancellor, 10; his arbitrary ruling
forbidding discussion of the Polish lands question in the _Reichstag_,
rebuked, 114; his disregard for parliamentary opinion in the German
Confederation, 115; his notes to London, Paris, and Petrograd on the
Servian ultimatum, 391; tries to bargain for Great Britain's neutrality
at the expense of France, but fails, 404; his explanation in the
_Reichstag_ for Germany's violation of neutrality, 409
Bismarck, in the Congress of Berlin, 26; indifferent to the Eastern
Question, 27; concerned chiefly with internal problems, 28; inaugurates
new German colonial policy by annexations in Africa, 41; purchases
Russian neutrality in 1870, 137-8
Bosnia-Herzegovina, under the rule of Austria-Hungary, 148-155; how
their annexation was effected despite the protests of England, Russia,
Turkey, and Servia, 368-371
Bülow, von, German Chancellor, on the Moroccan situation in 1906, 74
Bulgaria, aspirations in Macedonia, 168-173, 176-8, 207; alliance with
Greece, 231, 237-8, 265; in the Balkan War, 275-293; attitude towards
Servia and Greece after the Treaty of London, 321-7; fights her former
allies, 328-40; loses Adrianople again to Turks, 349
_Bundesrath_, composition of, 7, 11
Burney, British Admiral, on the future of Albania, 363
Carol, King of Rumania, loyalty to Hohenzollerns, 134
Colonization policy of the German Government, 44; opposition against it
in Germany, 44-45
Congress of Berlin, 161; its provisions disregarded by the contracting
Powers and the Balkan States, 162, 240; its action on the Cretan
question, 222
Congress of Vienna, 97, 119
Convention of Reichstadt in 1876, 144, 166
_Coup d'état_ of January 23, 1913, in Turkey, 307
Crete: Assembly decrees the island indissolubly united to Greece, 202;
Turkey enforces the Greek commercial boycott, 203; put back under
Ottoman rule by Congress of Berlin, 222; granted autonomy by the Powers
in 1898, 224; Young Turks attempt to re-establish their authority, 228;
rise of M. Venizelos from a Cretan revolutionary to become Prime
Minister of Greece, 231; insincere and procrastinating diplomacy of the
Powers on the Cretan question leads to the first Balkan War, 230-240,
264
Danube and the Dardanelles, 131-141; how the former is subordinated to
the latter, 133; Russia's struggles for ocean waterways, 135-141
Dellbrück, Herr, Secretary of State for the Interior, sent to confer
with Alsatians concerning the new Constitution, 10
_Deutschland über Alles!_ 36
Duma, Poles in, 105-8
Durazzo, Servia forced to evacuate, 157
_Drang nach Osten_, according to Professors Haeckel and Wirth, 151;
Austro-Hungarian attitude towards, 144; birth of, 165-6
Enver bey, in training at Berlin, 67; and the _coup d'état_ of January
23, 1913, 307; attempts an offensive movement on the Gallipoli
peninsula, 310
Essad pasha, in control of northern Albania, 361; put at head of new
provisional government by Albanian Senate, 366
France: opposes German intervention in Morocco, 72; sends expeditionary
force and captures Fez, 77; patches peace with Germany by mutual
concessions, 81
Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, assassinated, with his wife, at
Sarajevo, on June 28, 1914, 374; assassinations preceding this, 153
German, connotation of word, 33
German citizenship law of 1914, 34-6
German Empire, how constituted in 1872, 6
German _White Book_, 382, 392
Germans quoted on the superiority of their race, 29-31
Germany: in Alsace and Lorraine, 1-20; annexed the land but not the
people, 2; her industrial prosperity since 1870 necessitated entering
the colonial field, 40; annexations in Africa, China, and the Pacific,
41; how her campaign for the markets of the world has been carried on,
49; historical _résumé_ of the attempts to obtain concessions in Asia
Minor and Mesopotamia, 62-70; intervenes in Morocco in 1905 and 1910,
72-83; fails to obtain a foothold in Persia, 89-95: her treatment of
the Poles, 111; forces war upon Russia and France, 386-398; backs
Austria-Hungary in her demands upon Servia, 388; diplomatic exchanges
day by day preceding the declaration of war, 392-398; violates the
neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, 397; sends ultimatum to Belgium,
405
Great Britain enters the war, 399-412; commercial rivalry with Germany
one of the causes, 399; Sir Edward Grey's efforts to prevent the
outbreak, 402; refuses to make a bargain with Germany at the expense of
France, 404; violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany the occasion
for declaring war, 405, 411
Greece: her impotence in the war of 1897, 223; drawn into the Balkan
alliance, 264; her rôle in the Balkan War, 276, 295, 299, 331, 333, 336
Greek Church, 170, 171, 196, 197
Grey, Sir Edward, supports France in resisting German claims in
Morocco, 81; makes strenuous efforts to prevent war, 393, 402, 404
Hakki pasha predicts European War, 247
Haldane, Lord, his mission to Germany in 1912, 54
_Hamidieh_, Turkish cruiser, raids the Ægean, 304 note
Herreros against Germany, 20, 44
Holepa, Pact of, 222
Hussein Hilmi pasha, characterization of Macedonians, 237
Italia Irredenta, 119-130; meaning of the term "Irredentism," 120;
Cesare Balbo on the "Hope of Italy," 125; the struggle to gain control
of the Adriatic, 128
Italy: sends ultimatum to Turkey to consent to the occupation of
Tripoli, 247; war begins September 30, 1911, 248; decree annexing the
African provinces of Turkey approved by Italian Parliament, November
5th, 250; peace secured by Treaty of Lausanne, October 15, 1912, 260,
273
Janina, surrendered to the Greeks, 311
Jews, development of business sense, 49; oppressed in Poland and
Russia, 107, 117
Kholm separated from the Kingdom of Poland in 1912, 106
Kiau-Chau, China, leased to Germany for ninety-nine years, 43; increase
of commerce of, 46
Kirk-Kilissé captured by the Bulgarians, 286
Koweit, British seize, 66
Lausanne, Treaty of, 260
Lodz, a German outpost in Poland, 97
London, Treaty of, 316
Lulé Burgas, battle of, 287
Luxemburg neutrality violated by Germany, August 2, 1914, 397
Macedonia, racial rivalries in, 161-179; fomented by Austro-Turkish
policy, 167; complicated by Russian intrigues in the Balkan States,
171; Armenian massacres of 1893-96, 174; failure of the international
"pacification" policy, 176; how the Young Turks decided to solve the
Macedonian problem, 207
Mesopotamia, British and German rivalry in, 67
Montenegro, opens first Balkan War by a memorable declaration, 270;
enters war against Bulgaria, 341
Morocco, German intervention in 1905 in, 72; Convention of Algeciras in
1906 decides the international status of, 73; question reopened by the
Agadir incident in 1911, 78; French protectorate over, agreed to by
Germany, 81-82
Mürszteg, Program of, 176
_Narodna Obrana_, Servian patriotic society organized in support of the
national aspirations for a "Greater Servia," 155, 373; its dissolution
demanded by Austria-Hungary, 378; and agreed to by Servia, 383
Nazim pasha assassinated, 308
New citizenship law enacted in Germany, January 1, 1914, 34
Nicholas, Czar, proclamation to Poles, Aug. 16, 1914, 116
Novi Bazar, Sandjak of, 144, 368, 341
Osmanlis, contrast of civilization to Roman and Byzantine, 60
Pan-Germanic movement in Germany, 55
Pan-Islamic movement, failure of, 64, 70
Paris, Congress of (1856), forbids the Black Sea to Russia, 137
Persia, Passing of, 84-95; Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, 87; terms
of the Russo-German Accord of 1911, 92
Persian Constitutionalists, weakness of, 87
Poland, and its partitioners, 96-118; its redistribution by the
Congress of Vienna, 97; the Polish revolutions of 1830 and 1863, 98;
harsh treatment of the Poles since 1864 in Russia, 99; separation of
Kholm in 1912, 106; condition of the Poles in Austria-Hungary since
1867, 108; how the Poles have fared in Germany since 1870, 111;
international aspect of the Polish question, 115-118
"Program of Mürszteg," proposed as a solution of the Macedonian
problem, 176
Radetzky, on the attitude of Russia to the Ottoman Empire, 136
_Reichsland_, Alsace-Lorraine constituted a, 6
Reichstadt, Convention of, 144
Ribot Ministry, fall of, 389, 403
Rumania: her neutrality discussed, 134; her rôle in the second Balkan
War, 338-340; and the Treaty of Bukarest, 346
Ruthenians in Galicia, 109-111
Russia: ends Asiatic rivalry with Great Britain by convention of August
31, 1907, 87; sends troops to northern Persia in 1909, 90; comes to
accord with Germany in Persia, 92; her despotic rule in Poland, 99; her
strivings after ocean waterways, 135; promises to support Servia
against Austrian aggression, 381, 394
Salonika, Austro-Hungarian dream of possessing, 144, 166; surrendered
to the Greeks, 297, 321
Sandansky, the capturer of Miss Stone, an American missionary, 328
Sarajevo, Archduke Ferdinand and his wife assassinated at, 374
Saverne, affair of, 17-18
Scutari surrendered to the Montenegrins, 315
Serbo-Croatian national aspirations repressed in southern Hungary, 146
Servia: her national aspirations for a strong independent state held in
check by Austria-Hungary, 143-149, 155-158; her rôle in the Balkan
alliance, against Turkey, 276, 293; capture of Monastir, 294; her
rupture with Bulgaria precipitates second Balkan War, 323; protests
against annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, 368;
forced into submission, 371; receives ultimatum from Austria for the
Sarajevo assassination, 376; her answer conciliatory but not
satisfactory, 381-384; war declared against her, 384
Shuster mission in Persia a failure, 91
Tchatalja, Bulgarian attack halted at, 291
Thracian campaign in the Balkan War, 276-292
Treaty of Bukarest, 343-350: terms of the protocols signed by the
allies and new map of the Balkan peninsula, 345-350
Treaty of Frankfort, 6, 21, 22
Treaty of Lausanne ends war between Italy and Turkey, 260
Treaty of London, signed May 30, 1913, 316; its terms, 318, 360
Treitschke's opinion of the British, 30
Triple Alliance, 24, 28, 122
Triple Entente, 26
Tripoli annexed by Italy, 250
Turkey, the bloodless revolution of 1908, 180; Young Turks'
constitutional _régime_, 182-219; why it failed, 185, 218; treatment of
Armenians before and after the Adana massacres, 186; the attempt to
suppress the liberties of the Orthodox Church, 194; the Cretan question
and the Greek boycott, 201; the Young Turks and the Macedonian problem,
206, the Albanian uprisings, 210; treatment of the Arabs in Asiatic
Turkey, 214; war with Italy over the occupation of Tripoli, 247, 262;
war with the Balkan States, 263-300
Venizelos, Eleutherios, Prime Minister of Crete, urges Powers to place
the island under Greek protection, 228; the diplomats temporize, 230;
becomes Prime Minister of Greece and inaugurates constitutional
reforms, 232
_Weltpolitik_ of Germany, 22-57; the factors which have given birth to
it, 29; its scope as announced by the Kaiser, 31; supported by new
citizenship law, 34; "once a German always a German," 35; led to
colonial annexations in Africa, China, and the Pacific, 41; its
development creates a strong navy and merchant marine, 52; leads to
railway concessions in Asia Minor and formation of the Bagdad Railway
Company, 64; German intrigues in the Ottoman Empire, 66
Wilhelm, Emperor, makes tactless speech at Strasbourg, 14; attacked by
Socialists in the _Reichstag_, 14-15; announces scope of the
_Weltpolitik_, 31; historic speech in Tangier, March 31, 1905, 72;
Venizelos interviews, 236
William of Wied, Prince, made Mpret of Albania, 364; abdicates after a
short reign, 366
Wolff, Herr, leader of the German Liberal party, on the attitude of the
anti-Prussian parties in the _Reichsland_, 19
Young Turks, _see under_ Albania, Crete, Italy, Macedonia, and Turkey