THE ALBANIAN FIASCO
The world has not known just what to do with the mountainous country
which comes out in a bend on the upper western side of the Balkan
Peninsula directly opposite the heel of Italy. It caused trouble to
the Romans from the very moment that they became an extra-Italian
power. Inherited from them by the Byzantines, fought for with the
varying fortunes by the Frankish princes, the Venetians, and the Turks,
Albania has remained a country which cannot be said to have ever been
wholly subjected. Nor can it be said to have ever had a national
entity. Its present mediæval condition is due to the fact that, owing
to its high mountains and its being on the road to nowhere, it has not,
since the Roman days at least, undergone the influences of a
contemporary civilization.
Venice recognized the importance of Albania during the days of her
commercial prosperity. For the Albanian coast, with its two splendid
harbours, of Valona and Durazzo, effectively guards the entrance of the
Adriatic into the Mediterranean Sea.
But Albania did not demand attention a hundred years ago when the last
map of Europe was being {352} made by the Congress of Vienna. The
reason for this is simple. Italy was not a political whole. The head
of the Adriatic was entirely in the hands of Austria. There was no
thought at that time of our modern navies, and of the importance of
keeping open the Straits of Otranto. It was the Dalmatian coast, north
of Albania, which Austria considered essential to her commercial
supremacy. Then, too, Greece had not yet received her freedom, and the
Servians had not risen in rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. There
were no Slavic, Hellenic, and Italian questions to disturb Austria in
her peaceful possession of the Adriatic Sea.
It was not until the union of Italy had been accomplished, and the
south Slavic nationalities had formed themselves into political units,
that Albania became a "question" in the chancelleries of Europe.
Austria-Hungary determined that Italy should not get a foothold in
Albania. Italy had the same determination in regard to
Austria-Hungary. Since the last Russo-Turkish War, Austria-Hungary and
Italy have had the united determination to keep the Slavs from reaching
the Adriatic. For the past generation, feeling certain that the end of
the Ottoman Empire was at hand, Austria and Italy through their
missionaries, their schools, and their consular and commercial agents,
have struggled hard against each other to secure the ascendancy in
Albania. Their intrigues have not ceased up to this day.
When Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Young Turk
oppression of the Albanians aroused the first expression of what might
possibly {353} be called national feeling since the time of Skander
bey's resistance to the Ottoman conquest, the rival Powers, instead of
following in the line of Russia and Great Britain in Persia, and
establishing spheres of interest, agreed to support the Albanian
national movement as the best possible check upon Servian and Greek
national aspirations. This was the status of Albania in her
relationship to the Adriatic Powers, when the war of the Balkan States
against Turkey broke out. The accord between Austria and Italy had
stood the strain of Italy's war with Turkey. Largely owing to their
fear of Russia and to the pressure of Germany, it stood the strain of
the Balkan War. But both Italy and Austria let it be known to the
other Powers that if the Turkish Empire in Europe disappeared, there
must be an independent Albania.
This dictum was accepted in principle by the other four Powers, who saw
in it the only possible chance of preventing the outbreak of a conflict
between Austria and Russia which would be bound to involve all Europe
in war. No nation wanted to fight over the question of Albania.
Russia could not hope to have support from Great Britain and France to
impose upon the Triple Alliance her desire for a Slavic outlet to the
Adriatic. For neither France nor Great Britain was anxious for the
Russian to get to the Mediterranean. The accord between the Powers was
shown in the warning given to Greece and Servia that the solution of
the Albanian question must be reserved for the Powers when a treaty of
peace was signed with Turkey. The accord weathered {354} the severe
test put upon it by the bold defiance of the Montenegrin occupation of
Scutari.
We have spoken elsewhere of the policy of the Young Turks towards
Albania. This most useful and loyal corner of the Sultan's dominions
was turned into a country of perennial revolutions, which started soon
after the inauguration of the constitutional _régime_. In the winter
of 1911-1912, when the group of Albanian deputies in the Ottoman
Parliament saw their demands for reforms rejected by the Cabinet, and
even the right of discussion of their complaints refused on the floor
of Parliament, the Albanians north and south, Catholic and Moslem,
united in a resistance to the Turkish authorities that extended to
Uskub and Monastir. After the spring elections of 1912, the resistance
became a formidable revolt. For the Young Turks had rashly manoeuvred
the balloting with more than Tammany skill. The Albanians were left
without representatives in Parliament! Former deputies, such as Ismail
Kemal bey, Hassan bey, and chiefs such as Isa Boletinatz, Idris Sefer,
and Ali Riza joined in a determination to demand autonomy by force of
arms.
When, in July, the Cabinet decided to move an army against the
Albanians, there were wholesale desertions from the garrison of
Monastir, and of Albanian officers from all parts of European Turkey.
Mahmoud Shevket pasha was compelled to resign the Ministry of War, and
was followed by Saïd pasha and the whole Cabinet. The Albanians
demanded as a _sine qua non_ the dissolution of Parliament. The {355}
Mukhtar Cabinet agreed to the dissolution, and accepted almost all the
demands of the rebels in a conference at Pristina.
For the tables had now been turned. Instead of a Turkish invasion of
Albania for "pacification," as in previous summers, it was a question
now of an Albanian invasion of Turkey. In spite of the conciliatory
spirit of the new Cabinet, the agitation persisted. It was rumoured
that the Malissores and the Mirdites were planning a campaign against
Scutari and Durazzo. I was in Uskub in the early part of September.
Isa Boletinatz and his band were practically in possession of the city.
A truce for Ramazan, the Moslem fast month, had been arranged between
Turks and Albanians. But the Albanians said they would not lay down
their arms until a new and honestly constitutional election was held.
Immediately after Ramazan came the Balkan War. Albania found herself
separated from Turkey, and in a position to have more than autonomy
without having to deal further with the Turks.
During the Balkan War, the attitude of the Albanians was a tremendous
disappointment to the Turks. One marvels that loyalty to the Empire
could have been expected, even from the Moslem element, in Albania.
And yet the Turks did expect that a Pan-Islamic feeling would draw the
Albanian _beys_ to fight for the Sultan, just as they had expected a
similar phenomenon on the part of the rebellious Arabs of the Arabic
peninsula during the war with Italy.
{356}
From the very beginning the Albanians adopted an attitude of
opportunism. They did not lift a hand directly to help the Turks. Had
they so desired, they might have made impossible the investment of
Janina by the Greeks. But nowhere, save in Scutari, did the Albanians
make a stubborn stand against the military operations of the Balkan
allies. Almost from the beginning, they had understood that the Powers
would not allow the partition of Albania. They knew that the retention
of Janina was hopeless after the successes of the allies during
October. But they received encouragement from both Austria-Hungary and
Italy to fight for Scutari.
The heroic defence of Scutari, which lasted longer than that of any of
the other fortified towns in the Balkan Peninsula, cannot be regarded
as a feat of the Turkish army. During the siege, the general
commanding Scutari had been assassinated by order of Essad pasha, who
was his second in command. Essad then assumed charge of the defence as
purely Albanian in character. He refused to accept the armistice, and
continued the struggle throughout the debates in London. Scutari is at
the south end of a lake which is shared between Albania and Montenegro.
Commanding the city is a steep barren hill called Tarabosh. With their
heavy artillery on this hill, the Albanians were able to prevent
indefinitely the capture of their city. Servians and Montenegrins
found themselves confronted with the task of taking Tarabosh by
assault, if they hoped to occupy Scutari. This was a feat beyond the
strength of a Balkan army. On the {357} steep slopes of this hill were
placed miles of barbed wire. The assailants were mowed down each time
they tried to reach the batteries at the top. As Tarabosh commanded
the four corners of the horizon, its cannon could prevent an assault or
bombardment of the city from the plain. The allies were unable to
silence the batteries on the crest of this hill.
During the winter, the principal question before the concert of
European Powers was that of Scutari. Austria-Hungary was so determined
that Scutari should not fall into the hands of the Montenegrins and
Servians that she mobilized several army corps in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and on the Russian frontier of Galicia, at Christmas time, 1912. The
New Year brought with it ominous forebodings for the peace of Europe.
Diplomacy worked busily to bring about an accord between the Powers,
and pressure upon the besiegers of Scutari. In the middle of March, it
was unanimously agreed that Scutari should remain to Albania, and that
Servia should receive Prizrend, Ipek, Dibra, and Diakova as
compensation for not reaching the Adriatic, and the assurance of an
economic outlet for a railroad at some Albanian port. The European
concert then decided to demand at Belgrade and Cettinje the lifting of
the siege of Scutari.
Servia, yielding to the warning of Russia that nothing further could be
done for her, consented to withdraw her troops from before Scutari, and
to abandon the points in Albanian territory which had been allotted by
the Powers to the independent Albanian State which they intended to
create. {358} Servia had another reason for doing this. Seeing the
hopelessness of territorial aggrandizement in Albania, she decided to
denounce her treaty of partition, concluded before the war, with
Bulgaria. To realize this act of faithlessness and treachery, she had
need of the sympathetic support of the Powers in the quarrel which was
bound to ensue. We see here how the blocking of Servia's outlet to the
Adriatic led inevitably to a war between the Balkan Allies.
But with Montenegro the situation was entirely different. She had
sacrificed one-fifth of her army in the attacks upon Tarabosh, and
Scutari seemed to her the only thing that she was to get out of the war
with Turkey. Perched up in her mountains, there was little harm that
the Powers could do to her. Just as King Nicholas had precipitated the
Balkan War against the advice of the Powers the previous October, he
decided on April 1st to refuse to obey the command of the Powers to
lift the siege of Scutari. From what I have gathered myself from
conversations in the Montenegrin capital two months later, I feel that
the King of Montenegro can hardly be condemned for what the newspapers
of Europe called his "audacious folly" in refusing to give a favourable
response to the joint note presented to him by the European Ministers
at Cettinje. The Montenegrins are illiterate mountaineers, who know
nothing whatever about considerations of international diplomacy. If
their King had listened to words written on a piece of paper, and had
ordered the Montenegrin troops to withdraw from {359} before Scutari,
he would probably have lost his throne.
So the Powers were compelled to make a show of force. Little
Montenegro, with its one port, and its total population not equal to a
single _arrondissement_ of the city of Paris, received the signal
honour of an international blockade. On April 7th, an international
fleet, under the command of the British Admiral Burney, blockaded the
coast from Antivari to Durazzo. While all Europe was showing its
displeasure in the Adriatic, the Montenegrins kept on, although
deserted by the Servians, sitting in a circle around Scutari, only
twenty-five miles inland from the blockading fleet. On April 23d,
after the Balkan War was all finished, Europe was electrified by the
news that the Albanians had surrendered Scutari to Montenegro. The
worst was to be feared, for Austria announced her determination to send
her troops across the border from Bosnia into Montenegro. Such an
action would certainly have brought on a great European war. For
neither at Rome nor at Petrograd could Austrian intervention have been
tolerated.
No Power in Europe was at that moment ready for war. Largely through
pressure brought to bear at Cettinje by his son-in-law, the King of
Italy, King Nicholas decided on May 5th to deliver Scutari to the
Powers. The Montenegrins withdrew, and ten days later Scutari was
occupied by detachments of marines from the international squadron.
The blockade was lifted. The peace of Europe was saved.
{360}
The Treaty of London, signed on May 30, 1913, put Albania into the
hands of the Powers. The northern and eastern frontiers had been
arranged by the promise made to Servia in return for her withdrawal
from the siege of Scutari. But the southern frontier was still an open
question. Here Italy was as much interested as was Austria in the
north. With Corfu in the possession of Greece, Italy would not agree
that the coast of the mainland opposite should also be Hellenic. The
Greeks, on the contrary, declared that the littoral and _hinterland_,
up beyond Santi Quaranta, was part of ancient Epirus, and inhabited
principally by Greeks. It should therefore revert logically to greater
Greece. Athens lifted again the old cry, "Where there are Hellenes,
there is Hellas." The Greeks were occupying Santi Quaranta. They
claimed as far north as Argyrokastron. But they consented to withdraw
from the Adriatic, north of and opposite Corfu, if interior points
equally far to the north were left to them. An international
commission was formed to make a southern boundary for Albania. Its
task has is still open.
What was to be done with this new state, foster child of all Europe,
with indefinite boundaries, with guardians each jealous of the other,
and neighbours waiting only for a favourable moment to throw themselves
upon her and extinguish her life?
I visited Albania in July, 1913, during the second Balkan War. At
Valona, in the south, I found a provisional government,
self-constituted during the {361} previous winter, whose authority was
problematical outside of Valona itself. At the head of the government
was Ismail Kemal, whom I had known as the champion of Albanian autonomy
in the Ottoman Parliament at Constantinople. He talked passionately of
Albania, the new State in Europe, with its _united_ population and its
_national_ aspirations. He was eager to have the claims of Albania to
a generous southern frontier presented at London. He assured me that I
could write with perfect confidence in glowing terms concerning the
future of Albania, that a spirit of harmony reigned throughout the
country, and that the Albanians of all creeds, freed from Turkish
oppression, were looking eagerly to their new life as an independent
nation. When I expressed misgivings as to the rôle of Essad pasha, the
provisional president asserted that the former commander of Scutari was
wholly in accord with him, and cited as proof the fact that he had that
very day received from Essad pasha his acceptance of the portfolio of
Minister of the Interior.
But that indefinable feeling of misgiving, which one always has over
the enthusiasm of Orientals, caused me to withhold judgment as to the
liability of Albania until I had seen how things were going in other
portions of the new kingdom.
At Durazzo, the northern port of Albania, the friends of Essad pasha
were in control of the government. Things were still being done _à la
turque_, and there was a feeling of great uncertainty concerning the
future. Few had any faith whatever in the provisional government at
Valona, and it was declared {362} that the influence of Essad pasha
would decide the attitude of the Albanians in Durazzo, Tirana, and
Elbassan. Essad was chief of the Toptanis, the most influential family
in the neighbourhood of Durazzo. He had "made his career" in the
_gendarmerie_, and had risen rapidly through the approval and
admiration of Abdul Hamid. This is an indication of his character. He
was credited with the ambition of ruling Albania. To withdraw his
forces and his munitions of war intact, so that he could press these
claims, is the only explanation of his "deal" with King Nicholas of
Montenegro to surrender Scutari. Essad had sacrificed the pride and
honour of Albania to his personal ambition.
From Durazzo, I went to San Giovanni di Medua, which was occupied by
the Montenegrins, just as I had found Santi Quaranta in the south
occupied by the Greeks. Going inland from this port (one must use his
imagination in calling San Giovanni di Medua a port) by way of Alessio,
I reached Scutari, from whose citadel flew the flags of the Powers. In
every quarter of this typically and hopelessly Turkish town, one ran
across sailors from various nations. Each Power had its quarter, and
had named the streets with some curious results. The Via Garibaldi ran
into the Platz Radetzky. On the Catholic cathedral was a sign
informing you that you were in the Rue Ernest Renan.
This accidental naming of streets was a prophecy of the hopelessness of
trying to reconcile the conflicting aims and ideals of the Powers whose
bands were playing side by side in the public garden. In {363} the
dining-room of the hotel, when I saw Austrians, Italians, Germans,
British, and French officers eating together at the long tables,
instead of rejoicing at this seeming spirit of European harmony, I had
the presentiment of the inevitable result of the struggle between Slav
and Teuton, to prevent which these men were there. Just a year later,
I stood in front of the Gare du Montparnasse in Paris reading the order
for General Mobilization. There came back to me as in a dream the
public garden at Scutari, and the mingled strains of national anthems,
with officers standing rigidly in salute beside their half-filled
glasses.
In the palatial home of a British nobleman who had loved the Albanians
and had lived long in Scutari, Admiral Burney established his
headquarters. I talked with him there one afternoon concerning the
present and the future of Albania, and the relationship of the problem
which he had before him with the peace of Europe. Never have I found a
man more intelligently apprehensive of the possible outcome of the
drama in which he was playing a part, and at the same time more
determinedly hopeful to use all his ability and power to save the peace
of Europe by welding together the Albanians into a nation worthy of the
independence that has been given to them by the European concert. Such
men as Admiral Burney are more than the glory of a nation: they are the
making of a nation. The greatness of Britain is due to the men who
serve her. High ideals, self-sacrifice, ability, and energy are the
corner-stones of the British overseas Empire.
{364}
There was little, however, that Admiral Burney, or anyone in fact,
could do for Albania. No nation can exist in modern times, when
national life is in the will of the people rather than in the unifying
qualities of a ruler, if there are no common ideals and the
determination to attain them. Albania is without a national spirit and
a national past. It is, therefore, no unit, capable of being welded
into a state. The creation by the Ambassadors of the Powers in London
may have been thought by them to be a necessity. But it was really a
makeshift. If the Albanians had done their part, and had shown the
possibility of union, the makeshift might have developed into a new
European state. As things have turned out, it has stayed what it was
in the beginning,--a fiasco.
Among the many candidates put forward for the new throne, Prince
William of Wied was finally decided upon. He was a Protestant, and
could occupy a position of neutrality among his Moslem, Orthodox, and
Catholic subjects. He was a German, and could not be suspected of
Slavic sympathies. He was a relative of the King of Rumania, and could
expect powerful support in the councils of the Balkan Powers.
It would be wearisome to go into the story of Prince William's short
and unhappy reign. At Durazzo, which was chosen for the capital, he
quickly showed himself incapable of the rôle which a genius among
rulers might have failed to play successfully. Lost in a maze of
bewildering intrigues, foreign and domestic, the ruler of Albania saw
his prestige, and {365} then his dignity, disappear. He never had any
real authority. He had been forced upon the Albanians. They did not
want him. The Powers who had placed him upon the throne did not
support him. In the spring, the usual April heading, "Albania in
Arms," appeared once more in the newspapers of the world. Up to the
outbreak of the European war, when Albania was "lost in the shuffle,"
almost daily telegrams detailed the march of the insurgents upon
Durazzo, the useless and fatal heroism of the Dutch officers of the
_gendarmerie_, the incursions of the Epirote bands in the south, and
the embarrassing position of the international forces still occupying
Scutari. What the Albanians really wanted, none could guess, much less
they themselves!
The European war, in August, 1914, enabled the Powers to withdraw
gracefully from the Albanian fiasco. Their contingents hurriedly
abandoned Scutari, and sailed for home. The French did not have time
to do this, so they went to Montenegro. Since the catastrophe, to
prevent which they had created Albania, had fallen upon Europe, what
further need was there for the Powers to bother about the fortunes of
Prince William and his subjects? Italy alone was left with hands free,
and her interests were not at stake, so long as Greece kept out of the
fray. For Prince William of Wied, Italy felt no obligation whatever.
Without support and without money, there was nothing left to Prince
William but to get out. He did not have the good sense to make his
withdrawal from Albania a dignified proceeding. The palace {366} was
left under seals. The Prince issued a proclamation which would lead
the Albanians to believe that it was his intention to return. It may
be that he thought the triumph of the German and Austrian armies in the
European war would mean his re-establishment to Durazzo. But after he
was once again safely home at Neu-Wied, he did what he ought to have
done many months before. A high-sounding manifesto announced his
abdication, and wished the Albanians Godspeed in the future. After
this formality had been accomplished, the former Mpret of Albania
rejoined his regiment in the German army, and went out to fight against
the French.
With Prince William of Wied and the international corps of occupation
gone, the Albanians were left to themselves. At Durazzo, a body of
notables, calling themselves the Senate, adopted resolutions restoring
the Ottoman flag and the suzerainty of the Sultan, invited Prince
Burhaneddin effendi, a son of Abdul Hamid, to become their ruler, and
solemnly decreed that hereafter the Turkish language should be restored
to its former position as the official language of the country.
But Essad pasha thought otherwise. The psychological moment, for which
he had been waiting ever since his surrender of Scutari to the
Montenegrins, had come. In the first week of October, he hurried to
Durazzo with his followers, had himself elected head of a new
provisional government by the Albanian Senate, and announced openly
that his policy would be to look to Italy instead of to Austria for
support. After rendering homage to the Sultan as Khalif, {367} asking
the people to celebrate the happy spirit of harmony which now reigned
throughout Albania, and prophesying a new era of peace and prosperity
for Europe's latest-born independent state, the former _gendarme_ of
Abdul Hamid entered the palace, broke the seals of the international
commission, and went to sleep in the bed of Prince William of Wied.
One wonders whether the new ruler of Albania will have more restful
slumbers than his predecessor. In spite of all protests, Greece is
still secretly encouraging the Epirotes in their endeavour to push
northward the frontier of the Hellenic kingdom. Italy has two army
corps at Brindisi waiting for a favourable moment to occupy Valona.
The Montenegrins and Servians are planning once more to reach the
Adriatic through the valleys of the Boyana and Drin, after they have
driven the Austro-Hungarian armies from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only
an Austrian triumph could now save Albania from her outside enemies.
But could anything save her from her inside enemies? When I read of
Essad Pasha in Durazzo, self-chosen Moses of his people, there comes
back to me a conversation with the leading Moslem chieftain of Scutari,
whose guest I had the privilege of being, in his home in the summer of
1913. When I mentioned Essad pasha, he rose to his feet before the
fire, waved his arms, and cried out: "When I see Essad, I shall shoot
him like a dog!"
{368}