THE WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY
Since the days when Mazzini, looking beyond the almost irrealizable
dream of Italian unity, said in his Paris exile, "North Africa will
belong to Italy," a new Punic conquest has been the steadfast hope of
the Italians. France had already started her conquest of Algeria when
Mazzini spoke, and was mistress of the richest portion of the southern
Mediterranean littoral before the Italian unification was completed.
Late though they were in the race, the Italians began to try to realize
their dream by sending thousands of colonists to Egypt and to Tunis.
But the events of the years 1881-1883 in these two countries,
consummated by the Convention of London in 1885, gave Egypt to England
and Tunis to France. Italy was too weak at the time to protest, and
Germany had not yet begun to develop her _Weltpolitik_.
For some years Italian colonial aspirations were directed towards
Somaliland and Abyssinia. The battle of Adowa in 1896 was a death-blow
to the hopes of founding an Italian empire of Erythrea. Ten years ago
Giolitti received a portfolio in the Zanardelli ministry, and ever
since then there has {242} been a new Cato at Rome, crying "Tripoli
must be taken." By the Franco-Italian protocol of 1901, it was agreed
that if France should ever extend her protectorate over Morocco, Italy
should have the Tripolitaine and Barca, with the Fezzan as a
_hinterland_. This "right" of Italy was recognized at the
international conference of Algeciras in 1906, and has since been
accepted in principle by the European cabinets.
During the past decade Italy quietly prepared to seize
Tripoli,--peacefully, if possible, and if not, by force. Had Italy
been ready, Turkey would have lost Tripoli in the autumn of 1908, when
Bulgaria declared her independence and Austria annexed Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Internal politics made a bold stroke impossible at that
favourable moment.
To accomplish her purpose, Italy worked along two lines. She tried to
make her economic position so strong in Tripoli that the country would
virtually belong to her and be exploited by her without any necessity
for a change in its political status, until Arabs and Berbers, choosing
between prosperity under Italy and poverty under Turkey, would of their
own accord expel the Turks. Foreseeing a possibility of failure in
this plan, she at the same time prepared for a forcible occupation of
the country.
Immediately after the Anglo-Boer War, the Italian Ministries of War and
Marine began to make a study of the question of transporting troops and
landing them under the cover of a fleet. Tourists who were in Italy
during the summer of 1904 will remember the famous dress rehearsal of
the Tenth Army Corps.
{243}
Some six thousand men, completely provided with horses, ammunition,
artillery, and provisions, were embarked in eleven hours. The convoy
put to sea, escorted by a squadron of battleships and torpedo-boats, in
two columns of five transports each. Despite a heavy swell, these
troops and all their stores were landed in the Bay of Naples in sixteen
hours. I wonder if many who were watching and applauding on that
memorable day understood why Italy was practising so assiduously
landing from transports,--and under the protection of the fleet. For
what war was she preparing in time of peace? In 1907, the Minister of
Marine announced in the _Italia Militare_ that Italy could send seventy
thousand troops upon a distant expedition oversea and one hundred and
fourteen thousand _for a short journey not exceeding two nights at sea_!
The peaceable conquest of Tripoli was cleverly conceived, and has been
faithfully tried. Branches of the Banco di Roma were established at
Tripoli and Benghazi, and, for the first time since the days of
Imperial Rome, a serious attempt was made to develop the agricultural
and commercial resources of the country. The natives were encouraged
in every enterprise, and managed in such a way that they became--in the
vicinity of the seaports and trading-posts, at least--dependent for
their livelihood upon the Banco di Roma. Italian steamship lines,
heavily subsidized, maintained regular and frequent services between
Tunis and Tripoli and Benghazi and Derna and Alexandria. The more
enterprising natives travelled for a few piastres to {244} Alexandria,
and the object-lesson of contrast was left without words to work its
effect upon them. The admirable Italian parcel post system--one of the
most successful in Europe--extended its operations into the
_hinterland_ and captured the ostrich feather trade. The Italians
began to talk of making secure the routes to Ghadames and Ghat and
Murzuk, and of establishing for the interior postal and banking
facilities that these regions could never hope to have under Turkish
administration. Railways were contemplated as soon as they could be
financed entirely by Italian capital.
The Italian schemes were working beautifully when the birth of New
Turkey in the revolution of July, 1908, changed the whole situation.
The indolent and corrupt officials of the _vilayet_ of Tripoli and
_sandjak_ of Benghazi, whose attention had been turned from Italian
activities by Italian gold pieces, were replaced by members of the
Union and Progress party. These new officials, owing to their utter
inexperience and their sense of self-esteem, may have been no better
than the old ones; probably they proved as inefficient, for executive
power is not inherent in the Turkish character. But they were men who
had passed through the fire of persecution and suffering for love of
their fatherland, and the renaissance of Turkey was the supreme thing
in their lives. Their patriotism and enthusiasm knew no bounds. Their
ambitions for Turkey may have been far in advance of their ability to
serve her. But criticism is silent before patriotism which has proved
its willingness to sacrifice Life for country.
{245}
One can imagine the feelings of the Young Turks when they saw what
Italy was doing. It is easy enough to say that they should have
immediately reformed the administration of the country and given to the
Tripolitans an efficient government. Reform does not come in a
twelvemonth, and the Young Turks had to act quickly to prevent the loss
of Tripoli. They took the only means they had. They began to thwart
and obstruct every Italian enterprise, to extend the military frontiers
of Tripoli into the Soudan, to bring all the Moslem tribes of Africa
into touch with the Constantinople khalifate.
Italy saw her hopes being destroyed as other colonial hopes had been
destroyed one after the other. Representations at Constantinople were
without effect. The more her ambassador tried, the more he realized
the hopelessness of his case. Surely it was a fruitless diplomatic
task to persuade Young Turkey that her officials in Tripoli and
Benghazi should be forbidden to hinder the onward march of Italian
"peaceable conquest." The Italian economic fabric in Tripoli, so
carefully and so patiently built, seemed to be for nothing.
Austria-Hungary had begun the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. No Power had
successfully protested, much less the helpless Turks. So Italy began
to prepare her coup.
The crisis could not be precipitated. Italian public opinion, wary of
colonial enterprises since the terrible Abyssinian disaster, and
opposed to the imposition of fresh taxes, had to be carefully prepared
to sustain the Ministry in a hostile action against Turkey.
{246}
In January, 1911, the Italian press began to publish articles on
Tripoli, dilating upon its economic value and its vital importance to
Italy, if she were to hold her place among the great Powers of Europe.
Every little Turkish persecution--and there were many of them--was made
the subject of a first-page bit of telegraphic news. The Italian
people were worked up to believe that not only in Tripoli, but
elsewhere, the Young Turks were showing their contempt for Italian
officials and for the Italian flag. An Italian sailing vessel was
seized at Hodeidah in the Red Sea; the incident was magnified. An
American archæological expedition was granted a concession in Tripoli;
a similar concession had been refused to Italian applicants. The
newspapers pretended that the Americans were really prospecting for
sulphur mines, whose development would mean disaster to the great mines
in Sicily! French troops reached the Oasis of Ghadames; the
_hinterland_ of Tripoli was threatened by the extension of French
sovereignty into the Sahara. At this moment the reopening of the
Morocco question by the Agadir incident gave Italy the incentive and
the encouragement to show her hand.
In September, the press campaign against the Turkish treatment of
Italians in Tripoli became daily and violent. Signor Giolitti
succeeded in getting all parties, except the extreme Socialists, to
promise their support.
It was not until the last moment that the Sublime Porte realized the
danger. On September 26th, the _Derna_, a transport, arrived at
Tripoli, with {247} much-needed munitions of war. There had been a
shameful neglect to keep up the garrisons in the African provinces, and
when it was too late--as is so often the case at Constantinople--there
dawned the realization that the provinces were practically without
defence.
On September 27th, the first of the series of ultimatums which have
brought all Europe into war was delivered to the Sublime Porte. Italy
gave Turkey forty-eight hours to consent to the occupation of Tripoli,
with the proviso of the Sultan's sovereignty under the Italian
protectorate, and the payment of an annual subsidy into the Ottoman
Treasury. In Italy, two classes were mobilized, General Caneva
embarked his troops upon transports that had already been prepared, and
the Italian fleet proceeded to Tripoli.
The Turks did not believe that there would be war. On the afternoon of
September 29th, the Grand Vizier, as far-seeing in his understanding of
international affairs as he was blind in grasping what was best for
Turkey's interests, told me that he was sure Italy would hesitate
before entering upon a war that would be the prelude to the greatest
catastrophe that the world has ever known. "Italy will not draw the
sword," he declared, "because she knows that if she does attack us, all
Europe will be eventually drawn into the bloodiest struggle of
history,--a struggle that has always been certain to follow the
destruction of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." Hakki pasha was
right, except in one important particular. Perhaps Italy did know what
an attack upon Turkey {248} would eventually lead to. But two hours
after my conversation with the Grand Vizier, he received a declaration
of war.
Simultaneously with the news of the declaration of war, Constantinople
learned that the first shots had already been fired. Without waiting
for any formalities, the Italian fleet had attacked and sunk Turkish
torpedo-boats off Preveza at the mouth of the Adriatic. The Turkish
fleet had just left Beirut to return to Constantinople, and for three
days it was feared that the Italians would follow up their offensive by
destroying the naval power of Turkey. They did not do so, although it
would have been an easy victory. For it was the hope of the Giolitti
Cabinet that there would be no real war.
The attack at Preveza had a double purpose of preventing the
torpedo-boats from interfering with the Italian commerce, and of
striking terror into the hearts of the Turks. The Italians did not
want to widen the breach and draw upon themselves the hatred and enmity
of Turkey by sinking her navy. Such an action would make difficult the
negotiations which they still hoped to pursue. It was not war against
the people of Turkey that they had declared; that was a mere form.
What they wanted was a pretext for seizing Tripoli. So naval and
military operations were directed not against Turkey, but against the
coveted African provinces. Considerations of international diplomacy,
also, dictated this policy.
The Italian warships opened fire upon Tripoli on September 30th. On
October 2d and 3d, the forts {249} were dismantled and the garrison
driven out of the city by the bombardment. On October 5th, Tripoli
surrendered. The expeditionary corps disembarked on the 11th. The
next transports from Italy went farther east. Derna capitulated on the
8th, but a heavy sea prevented the troops from landing until the 18th.
General Ameglio took Benghazi at the point of the bayonet on October
19th. Homs was occupied on the 21st.
The Turks and Arabs attempted to retake Tripoli on October 23d. While
the Italian soldiers were in the trenches they were fired upon from
behind by Arabs who were supposed to be non-combatants. Discovery of
the assailants was practically impossible, because many clothed
themselves like women and hid their faces by veils. The Italians had
to repress this move from the rear with ruthless severity. They did
what any other army would have done under the circumstances, for their
safety depended upon putting down the enemy that had arisen in their
rear. Failure to act quickly and severely would have encouraged a
revolution in the city and its suburbs. Horror was excited throughout
the world by the highly coloured stories of this repression. Details
of Italian cruelty were emphasized. No effort was made to explain
impartially the provocation which had led to this killing. There was
an unconscious motive in these stories to embarrass Italy in her
attempt to build a colonial empire, just exactly as there had been in
the time of the Abyssinian War in 1896. The American Consul at Tripoli
has assured me that the correspondents who were {250} guests at the
time of the Italian army did not give the facts as they were.
The French and English newspaper campaign against Italy was as violent
as it had been against Austria in 1908, at the time of the first
violation of Ottoman territorial integrity. Attempts were made to
denounce the high-handed act of piracy of which Italy had been guilty,
and to poison the public mind against the Italian army. It is
significant to note this attitude of the press of the two countries,
which are now so persuasively extending the olive branch to Italy.
Great Britain and France were alarmed over the menace to the
"equilibrium" of the Mediterranean. This is why they did not hesitate
to denounce unsparingly the successful effort of Italy to follow in
their own footsteps! The tension between France and Italy was
illustrated by the vehement newspaper protests against the Italian use
of the right of search for contraband on French ships. Italy was taken
to task for acting in exactly the same way that France has since acted
in arresting Dutch ships in August and September, 1914.
The attempt of October 23d failed, in spite of the conspiracy behind
the lines. A second attempt on the 26th was equally unsuccessful. On
November 6th, the garrison of Tripoli started to take the offensive.
But progress beyond the suburbs of the city was found to be impossible.
A decree annexing the African provinces of Turkey was approved by the
Italian Parliament on November 5th. The Italian "adventure," as those
who looked upon Italy's aggression with unfriendly eyes {251} persisted
in calling it, was now shown to be irrevocable. Turkey's opportunity
to compromise had passed.
In Tripoli, as well as in the other cities, it took the whole winter to
make the foothold on the coast secure. From November 27th to March 3d,
Enver bey made three attempts to retake Derna. From November 28th to
March 12th, six assaults of Turks and Arabs were made upon Benghazi.
The Italian positions at Homs were not secure until February 27th.
Italy was practically on the defensive everywhere.
Hakki pasha found himself compelled to resign when the war was
declared. In fact, he considered himself fortunate not to be
assassinated by army officers, who declared that he had been negligent
to the point of treason in laying Turkey open to the possibility of
being attacked where and when she was weakest. Saïd pasha became Grand
Vizier--he had held the post six times under Abdul Hamid. Five members
of the former Cabinet, including Mahmud Shevket pasha, remained in
office.
The first appearance of Saïd pasha's Cabinet before Parliament is a
scene that I shall never forget. No pains had been spared to make it a
brilliant spectacle. The Sultan was present during the reading of his
speech from the throne. Everyone expected an important pronouncement.
The speech of Saïd pasha was typically Turkish. Instead of announcing
how Turkey was to resist Italy, he gave it to be understood in vague
language that diplomacy was going to save the day once more, and that
Turkey was secure because the preservation of her territorial integrity
was necessary for Europe.
{252}
The action of Italy, however, had upset the calculations of the Young
Turks in the game they were trying to play in European diplomacy. It
was their dream--more than that, their belief--that Turkey held the
balance of power between the two great groups of European Powers. They
thought that the destinies of Europe were in their hands. I heard
Mahmud Shevket pasha say once that "the million bayonets of Turkey
would decide the fortunes of Europe." Turkey was essentially mixed up
in the European imbroglio. But it was the absence of those million
bayonets, of which Mahmud Shevket pasha boasted, that changed the
fortunes of Europe. The military weakness of the Ottoman Empire has
brought us to the present catastrophe.
The embarrassment of the Young Turks was that Italy belonged to the
Triple Alliance, and that Germany, while professing deep and loyal
friendship, stood by and saw Turkey attacked by her ally, Italy, just
as she had stood by in 1908, when the other partner of the Triple
Alliance had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those who had based their
hopes of Turkey's future upon the pan-Germanic movement had a bitter
awakening. In what sense could Wilhelm II be called "the defender of
Islam"?
I attended sessions of Parliament frequently during the five weeks
between the outbreak of the war and the passing of the decree by which
the African possessions of Turkey were annexed to the kingdom of Italy.
Before this step had been taken by Italy, there was a possibility of
saving the situation. But the Turks, instead of presenting a united
front to the {253} world, and finding ways and means of making a
successful resistance against Italy, wasted not only the precious month
of October, when there was still a way out, but also the whole winter
that followed. In November, the opposition in the House and Senate
formed a new party which they called the "Entente Liberale." The
principal discussions in Parliament were about whether the Hakki pasha
Cabinet should be tried for high treason, and whether the Chamber of
Deputies could be prorogued by the Sultan without the consent of the
Senate. The opposition grew so rapidly that the Committee of Union and
Progress induced the Sultan to dissolve Parliament on January 18, 1913.
The new elections were held at the end of March. Throughout the Empire
they were a pure farce. The functionaries of the Government saw to it
that only members of the Committee of Union and Progress were returned.
While the Young Turks were playing their game of parties, anarchy was
rife in different parts of the Empire. The "Interior Organization" had
been revived in Macedonia. The Albanians, who had been left entirely
out of the fold in the new elections, were determined to get redress.
In Arabia, the neutrality of Iman Yahia in the war with Italy was
purchased only by the granting of complete autonomy. It was the
surrender of the last vestige of Turkish authority in an important part
of Arabia. Saïd Idris, the other powerful chief in the Yemen, refused
to accept autonomy, and continued to harass the Turkish army.
The Committee of Union and Progress was not {254} allowed to enjoy long
its fraudulent victory. In the army an organization which called
itself "The Military League for the Defence of the Country" was formed,
and received so many adhesions that Mahmud Shevket pasha was compelled
to leave the Ministry of War on July 10th, and Saïd pasha the Grand
Vizirate eight days later. Ghazi Mukhtar pasha accepted the task of
forming a new Cabinet. The Unionist Parliament refused to listen to
his program. So he secured from the Sultan a second prorogation of
Parliament on August 5th. The weapon the Unionists had used was turned
against them.
While Turkey showed herself absolutely incapable of making any military
move to recover the invaded provinces or to punish the invader, Italy
had none the less a difficult problem to face. A few Turkish officers
had succeeded in organizing among the Arabs of Tripoli and Benghazi a
troublesome resistance. General Caneva went to Rome at the beginning
of February, and told the Cabinet very plainly that it would take
months to get a start in Africa, and years to complete the pacification
of the new colonies, unless the Turks consented to withdraw the support
of their military leadership and to cease their religious agitation.
The question was, how could Turkey be forced to recognize the
annexation decree of November 5th? The Italian fleet could not be kept
indefinitely, at tremendous expense and monthly depreciation of the
value of the ships, under steam. The Turkish fleet did not come out to
give battle, so the Italians were immobilized at the mouth of the
Dardanelles. Italian {255} commerce in the Black Sea and eastern
Mediterranean was at a standstill. Upon Italian imports into Turkey
had been placed a duty of one hundred per cent. Where, outside of
Tripoli, was the pressure to be exercised?
Premier San Giuliano had promised before the war started that he would
not disturb political conditions in the Balkan peninsula. The alliance
with Austria-Hungary made impossible operations in the Adriatic. But
it was clear that something must be done. Public opinion in Italy had
been getting very restless. It did not seem to the Italians that the
considerations of international diplomacy should stand in the way of
finishing the war. Were they to burden themselves with heavy taxes in
order to spare the feelings of the Great Powers? Had Russia hesitated
in the Caucasus? Had Great Britain hesitated in Egypt? Had Austria
hesitated in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
As a sop to public opinion, and also as a feeler to see how the move
would be taken by the other Powers, the Cabinet decided upon direct
action against Turkey. The fleet appeared before Beirut on February
24th, and sank two Turkish warships in the harbour. It was not exactly
a bombardment of the city, but many shells did fall on the buildings
and on the streets near the quay. Neither Turkey nor Europe paid much
attention to this demonstration. In April, Italy had come to the point
where she felt that she must cast all scruples to the winds. A direct
attack upon Turkey was decided. Italy, at this writing the only
neutral among the Great Powers of Europe, took the action {256} which
brought Balkan ambitions to a ferment, and caused the kindling of the
European conflagration. Her declaration of war on Turkey and the
annexation of Tripoli inevitably led to this. On April 18th Admiral
Viala bombarded the forts of Kum Kale at the Dardanelles, and on the
same day the port of Vathy in Samos. Four days later Italian marines
disembarked on the island of Stampali. On May 4th, Rhodes was invaded,
a battle occurred in the streets of the town, and the Turks withdrew to
the interior of the island. They were pursued, and surrendered on the
17th. Ten other islands at the mouth of the Ægean Sea were occupied.
A demonstration at Patmos for union with Greece was vigorously
repressed. Italy protested her good faith in regard to the islands.
But the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, arrested at San Stefano in
1878, had begun again.
Turkey responded to the bombardment of Kum Kale by closing the
Dardanelles, and to the occupation of Rhodes by attempting to expel
from Turkey all Italian residents. The expulsion decree, however, was
carried out with great humanity and consideration by the Turks. During
the Italian War and also the Balkan War, Turkish treatment of subjects
of hostile states living in Ottoman territory was highly praiseworthy.
The Christian nations of Europe would today do well to follow their
example!
The closing of the straits lasted for a month. It disturbed all
Europe. Never before has the question of the straits been shown to be
so vital to the world. From April 18th to May 18th, over two hundred
{257} merchant vessels of all nations were immobilized in
Constantinople. It was a sight to be witness of once in a lifetime.
For these ships were not lost in a maze of basins, docks, and piers.
They lay in the stream of the Bosphorus and at the entrance to the Sea
of Marmora. You could count them all from the Galata Tower. The loss
to shipping was tremendous. Southern Russia is the bread basket of
Europe. No European resident could remain unaffected by a closing of
the only means of egress for these billions of bushels of wheat. Angry
protests were in vain. Turkey reopened the straits only when assurance
had been given to her that the attack of the Italian fleet would not be
repeated.
Little had been gained by Italy as far as hastening peace was
concerned. She had done all that she could. Turkey still remained
passive and unresisting, because she knew well that any vital action,
such as the bombardment of Salonika or Smyrna, or the invasion of
European Turkey by way of Albania or Macedonia, would bring on a
general European war. Italy could not take this responsibility before
history. So for months longer it remained a war without battles. Many
Italian warships had not fired a single shot.
During May, June, and July, the Italians pushed on painfully to the
interior of Tripoli. There was no other way. In August, the Turkish
resistance on the side of Tunis was finished. In September, a
desperate attack of Enver bey against Derna was repulsed. The Italian
forces were in a much better position than before. But the attacks of
the Arabs {258} were of such a character that they could not be
suppressed by overwhelming numbers of trained men that the Italians
could muster. It was a guerilla warfare with the oases of the desert
as the background. The Italians felt that the Arabs, if left to
themselves, would soon tire of the conflict. For they were, after all,
traders, and were dependent upon the outlets for their caravan trade
which was now completely in the hands of Italians. It was the mere
handful of Turkish troops and Turkish officers who kept the Arabs
stirred up to fight.
As early as June, Italian and Turkish representatives met informally at
Ouchy on Lac Leman to discuss bases for a solution of the conflict
which had degenerated into an odd _impasse_. Italy was anxious to
conclude peace for several reasons. Her commerce was suffering. Her
warships needed the drydock badly. While Turkey could no longer
prevent the conquest of Tripoli and Benghazi, the absence of Turkish
direction in keeping the tribesmen of the interior stirred up, and the
cessation of the propaganda against the Italian occupation on the
ground of religion, would help greatly in the pacification of the
provinces. Since the Albanian revolution had assumed alarming
proportions, Turkey also became anxious for peace. She was uncertain
of Italy's attitude in case of an outbreak in the Balkans.
Unofficially, Italy had let it be known that there was a limit to
patience, and that the development of a hostile attitude by the Balkan
States against Turkey would find her, in spite of Europe, in alliance
with them against her. In reality, however, the Italian {259}
ministers at the Balkan courts had all along done their best to keep
Greece and Bulgaria from being carried away by the temptation to take
advantage of the situation. This had been especially true in April and
May, during the period of Italian activity in the Ægean.
Turkey knew perfectly well, before the _pourparlers_ at Ouchy, what
were the Italian terms. In March, when the five other Powers had
offered to mediate, Italy had laid down the following points: tacit
recognition of the Italian conquest and withdrawal of the Turkish army
from Africa; recognition by the Powers, if not by Turkey, of the decree
of annexation. Italy promised, if this were done, to recognize the
Sultan as Khalif in the African provinces (this meant purely religious
sovereignty); to respect the religious liberty and customs of the
Moslem populations; to accord an amnesty to the Arabs; to guarantee to
the Ottoman Public Debt the obligations for which the customs-duties of
Tripoli had been mortgaged; to buy the properties owned by the Ottoman
Government; to guarantee, in accord with the other Powers, the
(future!) "integrity of the Ottoman Empire." Turkey had refused these
terms, in spite of the pressure of the Powers at the Sublime Porte.
Then followed the loss of Rhodes and the other islands.
The first _pourparlers_ at Ouchy had been interrupted by the fall of
Saïd pasha. They were resumed on August 12th by duly accredited
delegates. After six weeks an accord was prepared, and sent to
Constantinople. The ministry, although facing a war with the Balkan
States, tried to prolong the {260} negotiations. Italy then addressed
an ultimatum on October 12th. The Sublime Porte was doing its best to
prevent war with the Balkan States. Italy was determined now to go to
any length to wring peace from her stubborn opponent. For the Balkan
storm was breaking, and she wanted to get her ambassador back to
Constantinople to take part in the councils of the Great Powers. The
continuance of a state of war with Turkey was never more clearly
against her interests. When the ultimatum arrived, Turkey yielded.
The preliminaries of Ouchy were signed on October 15th.
There were two distinct parts to the Treaty of Lausanne, as it is
generally called. In order to save the pride of Turkey, nothing was
said in the text of the treaty about a cession of territory. Turkey
was not asked to recognize the Italian conquest. The unofficial
portion of the treaty consisted of a _firman_, granting complete
autonomy to the African _vilayet_, and appointing a personal religious
representative of the Khalif, with functions purely nominal; and the
promise of amnesty and good administration to the Ægean Islands.
The text of the treaty provided for the cessation of hostilities; the
withdrawal of the Turkish army from Tripoli and Benghazi and the
withdrawal of the Italian army from the islands of the Ægean; the
resumption of commercial and diplomatic relations; and the assumption
by Italy of Tripoli's share of the Ottoman Public Debt.
Italy had no intention of fulfilling the spirit of the second clause of
this treaty, which was that the {261} islands occupied by her be
restored to Turkey. The text of the treaty provided that the recall of
the Italian troops be subordinated to the recall of the Turkish troops
from Tripoli. It was easy enough to quibble at a later time about the
meaning of "Turkish." As long as there was opposition to the Italian
pacification, the opponents could be called Turkish. Italy said that
the holding of the Dodecanese was a guarantee of Turkish good faith in
preventing the continuance secretly of armed opposition to her
subjugation of the new African colonies. As long as an Arab held the
field against the Italian army, it could still be claimed that Turkey
had not fulfilled her side of the promise in Article 2. At the moment,
Turkey was quite willing to see the Italians stay in the southern
islands of the Ægean. For otherwise they would have inevitably fallen
into the hands of the Greeks when the Balkan War broke out.
Since the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, the Italians have remained in
the Dodecanese. Not only that, but they have used their position in
Rhodes to begin a propaganda of Italian economic influence in
south-western Asia Minor. Before the present European war, Italy might
have found herself compelled to relinquish her hold on these islands.
But now her advantageous neutrality has put into her hands the cards by
which she can secure the acquiescence of Europe to the annexation of
Rhodes.
The outbreak of indignation in Turkey against Italy at the beginning of
the war was even more vehement than that against Austria-Hungary when
she had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. {262} Hussein Djahid bey,
in the _Tanine_, wrote an editorial, in which he said: "Never shall we
have any dealings with the Italians in the future. Never shall a ship
bearing their flag find trade at an Ottoman port. And we shall teach
our children, and tell them to teach their children, the reasons for
the undying hatred between Osmanli and Italian as long as history
lasts." Having read the same sort of a thing in 1908, I was interested
in seeing just how long the hatred would last. Just a year from the
day war was declared, and this editorial appeared, the Italian
ambassador returned on a warship to Constantinople, the Italian post
offices opened, and all my Italian friends began to reappear. This is
told here to illustrate the fact that cannot be too strongly
emphasized: _there is no public opinion in Turkey_.
The chief importance of the year of "the war that was no war" is not in
the loss of Tripoli. It is in the fact that the integrity of the
Ottoman Empire, secure since 1878, had been attacked _by violence_.
The example given by Italy was to be followed by the Balkan States.
What Europe had feared had come. This war was the prelude to Europe in
arms.
{263}