CHAPTER XIV

THE WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN STATES AND TURKEY

During the year 1911 there had been a perceptible drawing together of

the Balkan States in the effort to find a common ground for an

offensive alliance against Turkey. The path of union was very

difficult for the diplomats of the Balkan States to follow. It was

clear to them in principle that they would never be able to oppose the

policy of the Young Turks separately. They were not even sure whether

their united armies could triumph over the large forces which the

Ottoman Empire was able to put in the field, and which were reputed to

be well trained and disciplined. This reputation was sustained by the

unanimous opinion of the military _attachés_ of the Great Powers at

Constantinople. And then, there were the mutual antipathies to be

healed, and the problem of the terrible rivalry in Macedonia, of which

we have spoken before, to be solved. Most formidable of all, was the

uncertainty as to the benefit to the different Balkan nations of a

successful war against Turkey.

It is impossible to explain here all the diplomatic {264} steps leading

up to the Balkan alliance against Turkey. They have been set forth,

with much divergency of opinion, by a number of writers who were in

intimate touch with the diplomatic circles of the Balkan capitals

during the years immediately preceding the formation of the alliance.

We must confine ourselves to a statement of the general causes which

induced the Balkan States, against the better judgment of many of their

wisest leaders, to form the alliance, and to declare war upon Turkey.

Both Bulgaria and Greece had sentimental reasons; the terrible

persecution of the Christians of their own race in Macedonia seemed

cause enough for war. But while Bulgaria had long held the thesis of

Macedonian autonomy, which was sustained by the Bulgarian Macedonians

themselves, Greece was afraid that the creation of such a _régime_

would in the end prove an irrevocable blow to Hellenistic aspirations.

It was well known to the Greeks that the population of Macedonia was

not only largely Bulgarian, but aggressively so, and that its sense of

nationality had been intelligently and skilfully awakened and fostered

by the educational propaganda. Above all things Hellenism feared the

Bulgarian schools. Under an autonomous _régime_ their influence could

not be combated.

The possibility of the Balkan alliance was really in the hands of

Greece. For it was recognized that no matter how large and powerful an

army Bulgaria and Servia could raise, the co-operation of the Greek

navy, which would prevent the use of the Ægean ports of the Macedonian

littoral for disembarking {265} troops from Asia, was absolutely

essential to success. In spite of their fears for the future of

Macedonia, the Greeks were converted to the idea of an alliance with

the Slavic Balkan States to destroy the power of Turkey by the

continual bullying of the Young Turks over Crete, and by the economic

disasters from the boycott. It is not too much to say that the

attitude of the Young Turks towards the Cretan questions, and their

institution of the boycott, were two factors directly responsible for

the downfall of the Empire.

The visit of three hundred Bulgarian students to Athens in Easter week,

1911, should have been a warning to Turkey of the danger which attended

her policy of goading the Greeks to desperation. I was present on the

Acropolis at the memorable reception given by the students of Athens to

their guests from the University of Sofia, and remember well the

peculiar political significance of the speeches of welcome addressed to

them there. Later in the same year, Greece followed the example of the

other Balkan States in sending her Crown Prince to Sofia to join in the

festivities attendant upon the coming of age of Crown Prince Boris.

Bulgaria was drawn into the Balkan alliance, and reluctantly compelled

to abandon the policy of Macedonian autonomy, by the attitude of the

Young Turks toward Macedonians. The settlement of immigrants from

Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the conscription for the Turkish army, led

to reprisals on the part of Bulgarian bands. These were followed by

massacres at Ishtib and elsewhere. In the {266} first week of August,

1912, the massacre of Kotchana was for Bulgaria the last straw on the

camel's back. I was in Sofia at the end of August when the national

congress, called together wholly without the Government's co-operation,

declared that war was a necessity. Seated one evening in the public

garden at a café--if I remember rightly it was the 1st of September--I

heard from the lips of one of the influential delegates at this

congress that public opinion in Bulgaria was so wholly determined to

force war, that the King and the Cabinet would have to yield.

In Servia and Montenegro, it had long been recognized that any

opportunity to unite with Bulgaria and Greece to bring pressure to bear

upon Turkey could not but be beneficial to these two kingdoms. There

was the _sandjak_ of Novi Bazar to be divided between Montenegro and

Servia. There was the possibility of an outlet to the Adriatic. So

far as Macedonia was concerned, if we believe that she was honest and

sincere in the treaty of partition with Bulgaria, Servia was quite

content with the idea of a possible annexation of Old Servia, and the

opportunity to drive back the Moslem Albanians, who had been

established on her frontiers under the Young Turk _régime_, and were

ruthlessly destroying Slavs wherever they got the opportunity.

One does not have any hesitation in declaring that the political

leaders in power in the Balkan States at first hoped to avoid a war

with Turkey. That they did not succeed in doing so was due to the

pressure of public sentiment upon them. This public sentiment forced

them to action. Every Balkan {267} Cabinet would have fallen had the

ministries remained advocates of peace. Over against the fear of the

Turkish army, which (let me say it emphatically) was very strong among

the military authorities in each of the Balkan States, was the feeling

that the time was very favourable to act, and that chances of success

in a common war against Turkey were greater in the autumn of 1912 than

they would be later; for the Young Turks were spending tremendous sums

of money on army reorganization. At that moment, they were coming to

the end of a demoralizing war with Italy, and the Macedonian army had

suffered greatly during the summer by the Albanian uprising.

Early in September, Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and Montenegro decided

that peace could be preserved only by the actual application, under

sufficient guarantees, of sweeping reforms in Macedonia. They appealed

to the Powers to sustain them in demanding for Macedonia a provincial

assembly, a militia recruited within the limits of the province, and a

Christian Governor. The Great Powers, as usual, tried to carry water

on both shoulders. Blind to the fact that inaction and vague promises

would no longer keep in check the neighbours of Turkey, they urged the

Balkan States to refrain from "being insistent," and pointed out to

Turkey the "advisability" of making concessions. The Turks did not

believe in the reality of the union of the Balkan States. They could

not conceive upon what grounds their neighbours had succeeded in

forming an alliance. Neither the Balkan States nor Turkey had {268}

any respect for the threats or promises or offers of assistance of the

Powers.

In order to convince the Balkan States that they had better think twice

before making a direct ultimatum, the Turks organized autumn manoeuvres

north of Adrianople, in which fifty thousand of the _élite_ army corps

were to take part. The answer of the Balkan States was an order for

general mobilization issued simultaneously in the four capitals. This

was on September 30th. The next day Turkey began to mobilize. All the

Greek ships in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were seized.

Munitions of war, disembarked at Salonika for Servia, were confiscated.

It was not until then that it began to dawn upon Turkey and her

sponsors, the Great Powers, that the Balkan States meant business. The

questions of reforms in Macedonia had been so long the prerogative of

the Powers that they did not realize that the moment had come when the

little Balkan States, whom they called "troublesome," were no longer

going to be put off with promises. The absolute failure of concerted

European diplomacy to accomplish anything in the Ottoman Empire was

demonstrated from the results in Macedonia, and also in Crete.

So the Balkan States were not in the proper frame of mind to receive

the joint note on the _status quo_, which will remain famous in the

annals of European diplomacy as a demonstration of the futility of

concerted diplomatic action, when there is no genuine unity behind it.

On the morning of October 8th, the ministers of Russia and Austria,

acting in the {269} name of the six "Great Powers," handed in at Sofia,

Athens, Belgrade, and Cettinje, the following note:

"The Russian and Austro-Hungarian Governments declare to the Balkan

States:

"1. That the Powers condemn energetically every measure capable of

leading to a rupture of peace;

"2. That, supporting themselves on Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin,

they will take in hand, in the interest of the populations, the

realization of the reforms in the administration of European Turkey, on

the understanding that these reforms will not diminish the sovereignty

of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the territorial integrity of the

Ottoman Empire; this declaration reserves, also, the liberty of the

Powers for the collective and ulterior study of the reforms;

"3. That if, in spite of this note, war does break out between the

Balkan States and the Ottoman Empire, they will not admit, at the end

of the conflict, any modification in the territorial _status quo_ in

European Turkey.

"The Powers will make collectively to the Sublime Porte the steps which

the preceding declaration makes necessary."

The shades of San Stefano, Berlin, Cyprus, and Egypt, Armenian

massacres, Mitylene and Mürszteg, Bagdad railway, Bosnia-Herzegovina,

Tripoli, and Rhodes, haunted this declaration, and made it impotent,

honest effort though it was to preserve the peace of Europe. It was

thirty-six years too late.

For, one hour after it was delivered, the _chargé {270} d'affaires_ of

the Montenegrin legation at Constantinople, evidently as a result of an

anticipation of a joint note from the Powers, left at the Sublime Porte

the following memorable declaration of war:

"In conformity with the authorization of King Nicholas, I have the

honour of informing you that I shall leave Constantinople to-day. The

Government of Montenegro breaks off all relations with the Ottoman

Empire, leaving to the fortunes of arms of the Montenegrins the

recognition of their rights and of the rights scorned through centuries

of their brothers of the Ottoman Empire.

"I leave Constantinople.

"The royal government will give to the Ottoman representative at

Cettinje his passports.

"October 8, 1912. PLAMENATZ."

There could no longer be any doubt of the trend of things. Inevitable

result, this declaration of war, of the action of Italy one year

before, just as the action of Italy harked back to Russian action in

the Caucasus, British action in Egypt, Austrian action in

Bosnia-Herzegovina, and French action in Morocco. Inevitable

precursor, this declaration of war, of the European catastrophe of

1914. Who, then, is presumptuous enough to maintain that the cause is

simple, and the blame all at one door? Europe is reaping in blood-lust

what _all_ the "Great Powers" have sown in land-lust.

The chancelleries made strenuous efforts to nullify what their inspired

organs called the "blunder," or the "hasty and inconsiderate action,"

of King Nicholas. There was feverish activity in Constantinople, {271}

and a continual exchange of conferences between the embassies and the

Sublime Porte. The ambassadors gravely handed in a common note, in

which they offered to avert war by taking in hand themselves the

long-delayed reforms. Had they forgotten the institution of the

_gendarmerie_ in 1903, and Hussein Hilmi pasha at Salonika?

On this same day, the Montenegrin ex-minister at Constantinople, whose

declaration of war had been so theatrical, was reported as having said

at Bukarest on his way home, "Montenegro wants territorial

aggrandizements, and will not give back whatever conquests she makes.

We do not fear to cross the will of the Great Powers, for they do not

worry us." These words express exactly the sentiments of the other

allies, both as regards their possible conquests and their attitude

towards the _dictum_ of the Powers.

Events moved rapidly during the next ten days. On October 13th, the

Balkan States responded to the Russo-Austrian note, thanking the Powers

for their generous offices, but declaring that they had come to the end

of their patience in the matter of Turkish promises for Macedonian

reform, and were going to request of the Ottoman Government that it

accord "without delay the reforms that have been demanded, and that it

promise to apply them in six months, with the help of the Great Powers,

and of the Balkan States whose interests are involved." This response

was not only a refusal of mediation. It was an assertion, as the last

words show, that the time had come when the Balkan States felt strong

{272} enough to claim a part in the management of their own affairs.

Acting in accordance with this notification to the Powers, on October

14th, Servia, Greece, and Bulgaria demanded of Turkey the autonomy of

the European provinces, under Christian governors; the occupation of

the provinces by the allied armies while the reforms were being

applied; the payment of an indemnity for the expenses of mobilization;

the immediate demobilization of Turkey; and the promise that the

reforms would be effected within six months. The demand was in the

character of an ultimatum, and forty-eight hours were given for a

response.

It was now evident that unless the Powers could compel the Balkan

States to withdraw this sweeping claim, war would be inevitable. For

no independent state could accept such a demand, and retain its

self-respect. The representatives of Turkey at Belgrade and Athens

were quite right in refusing to receive the note and transmit it to

Constantinople.

The Sublime porte did not answer directly the ultimatum of the allies.

An effort was made to anticipate the Balkan claims, and get the Powers

to intervene, by reviving the law of reform for the _vilayets_, which

provided for the organization of communes and schools, the building of

roads, and the limitation of military service to the _vilayet_ or

recruitment. But the fact that this law had been on the statute books

since 1880, and had remained throughout the Empire a dead letter, gave

little hope that it would be seriously applied now.

{273}

On October 15th, fighting began on the Serbo-Turkish frontier. The war

had already brought about Turkish reverses at the hands of the

Montenegrins. Greece threw an additional defiance in the face of

Turkey by admitting the Cretan deputies to the Greek legislative

chamber.

To gain time, for she was unprepared, and her mobilization progressing

very slowly, Turkey made desperate efforts to delay the declaration of

war by offering to treat at Sofia, on the basis of a cessation of

Moslem immigration into Macedonia, and the suspension of enrolment of

Christians in Moslem regiments. These points, as we have already

shown, were the two principal reasons why the Bulgarians of Macedonia

had changed their policy from autonomy to independence. But Bulgaria,

feeling that cause for hesitation over a war of liberation had been

removed by her secret partition treaty with Servia, remained obdurate.

Then the Turkish diplomats turned their attention to Athens, and tried

to detach the Greeks from the alliance by agreeing to recognize the

annexation of Crete to Greece, and promising an autonomous government

for some of the Ægean Islands. This failed. But, to the very last,

the Turks believed that Greece might stay out of the war. For this

reason her representative at Athens was instructed to do all in his

power to remain at his post, even if war were declared by the Sublime

Porte on Bulgaria and Servia.

Peace was hurriedly concluded with Italy at Ouchy on October 15th. On

the 16th, when the {274} forty-eight hours of the ultimatum had

expired, and there was no answer from Turkey, every one expected a

declaration of war from the allies. None came. On the 18th, to

preserve her dignity, Turkey saw that she must be the one to act. It

was no longer possible to wait until the allies were "good and ready"!

She declared war on Bulgaria and Servia. Greece waited till afternoon

to receive a similar declaration. None came. So Greece declared war

on Turkey.

THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR

While the diplomats were still agitating and blustering, while Turkey

was procrastinating and trying to put off the evil day, and while the

larger Balkan States were quietly completing their mobilization,

Montenegro entered into action. On October 9th, the day following her

declaration of war, the Montenegrins entered the _sandjak_ of Novi

Bazar, and surrounded the frontier fortress of Berana. This was

captured after six days of fighting. On the same day, Biepolje fell.

Nearly one thousand prisoners, fourteen cannon, and a large number of

rifles and stores were captured by the Montenegrins. In the meantime,

two other Montenegrin columns had marched southward, reached San

Giovanni di Medua, at the mouth of the Boyana, and cut Scutari off from

the sea. Scutari was invested, but the Montenegrins, who had been able

to put into the field scarcely more than thirty thousand men, found

themselves mobilized for the entire winter. The {275} great fortress

of Tarabosh, a high mountain, towering over the town of Scutari and the

lower end of the lake, was too strong for their forces and for their

artillery. Inside the city of Scutari, it was the Albanians fighting

for their national life, and not the Turks, who organized and

maintained the splendid and protracted resistance.

The mobilization in the other Balkan States was not completed until the

18th, when the declaration of war was made on both sides.

Most important of the foes of Turkey were the Bulgarians, whose

military organization had for some years been attracting the admiration

of all who had been privileged to see their manoeuvres and to visit

their casernes. Bulgaria had been carefully and secretly preparing her

mobilization long before the crisis became acute. I had the privilege

of travelling in Bulgaria during the last two weeks of July, and of

spending the month of August along the frontier between Thrace and

Bulgaria. Everywhere one could see the accumulation of the soldiers of

the standing army already on war footing, and of military stores, at a

number of different places. During August and September, every detail

of the mobilization had been carefully arranged. When war was

declared, Bulgaria had four armies with a total effective of over three

hundred thousand. Three of them were quickly massed on the frontier,

fully equipped. No army has ever entered the field under better

auspices.

On the day of the declaration of war, the Czar Ferdinand issued a

proclamation to his troops which {276} clearly defined the issue. It

was to be a war of liberation, a crusade, undertaken to free the

brothers of blood and faith from the yoke of Moslem oppression. In

summing up, the Czar said: "In this struggle of the Cross against the

Crescent, of liberty against tyranny, we shall have the sympathy of all

those who love justice and progress." At the time, bitter criticism

was directed against the Czar for having used words which brought out

so sharply the religious issue. The proclamation of a _crusade_ could

bring forth on the other side the response of a _djehad_ (holy war).

This, above all things, was what the European Powers wished to avoid;

for they feared not only that it would make the war more bitter and

more cruel between the opponents in the field, but that it would awaken

a wave of fanaticism among the Moslems living under European control in

Asia and in Africa. How many lessons will it need to teach Europe that

the political menace of Pan-Islamism is a phantom, a myth!

According to the plan adopted by the allied States, the offensive

movement in Thrace, in which the bulk of the Turkish army would be met,

was to be undertaken solely by Bulgaria. Only a Bulgarian army of

secondary importance was to enter eastern Macedonia, to protect the

flank of the main Bulgarian army from a sudden eastward march of the

Turkish Macedonian army. Its objective point, though not actually

agreed upon, was to be Serres.

The rôle of Servia and Greece, who in the general mobilization were

expected to put about one hundred and fifty thousand troops each into

the field, was {277} to keep in check the Turkish army in Macedonia,

and to prevent Albanian reinforcements from reaching the Turkish army

in Thrace. In addition to this, Servia and Montenegro were expected to

prevent the possible surprise of Austrian interference, while the fleet

of Greece would perform the absolutely necessary service of preventing

the passage of Turkish forces from Asia Minor to a Macedonian port.

The allies expected a bitter struggle and, in Macedonia and Thrace at

least, the successful opposition of a Turkish offensive, rather than

the destruction of the Turkish armies.

The mobilization in Turkey was described by many newspaper men who had

come to Constantinople for the war in the most glowing terms. The

efforts of Mahmud Shevket pasha to prepare the Turkish army for war

were declared to be bearing splendid fruits in the first days of the

mobilization. Wholly inaccurate accounts were written of the wonderful

enthusiasm of the Turkish people for the war. Naturally, what even the

residents of Constantinople saw at the beginning was the best foot

front. We knew that tremendous sums had been expended for four years

in bringing the army up to a footing of efficiency. We had seen with

our own eyes the brilliant manoeuvres on the anniversary of the

Sultan's accession in May, and on the anniversary of the Constitution

in July. The work accomplished by the German mission had cast its

spell over us. We saw what we were expecting to see during the first

days of the mobilization. The "snap {278} judgments" of special

correspondents have little value, other than freshness and _naïveté_,

except to readers even less informed than they are. But the East is a

sphinx even to those who live there. After you have figured out, from

what you call your "experience," what _ought_ to happen, the chances

are even that just the opposite comes true. In spite of the misgivings

which had been awakened by a trip into the interior of Asia Minor, as

far as Konia, during the third week of September, I believed that the

Turkish army was going to give a good account of itself against the

Bulgarians, whose spirit and whose organization I had had opportunity

to see and admire during that very summer.

Every one was mistaken. There were large bodies of splendidly trained

and well-equipped troops in Thrace. Spick and span regiments did come

over from garrison towns in Asia. We saw them fill the trains at

Stambul and at San Stefano. But we over-estimated their number. The

truth of the matter is that the _trained_ and _well-equipped_ forces of

the Thracian army, officered by capable men, did not amount to more

than eighty thousand. In retrospect, after going over carefully the

position of the forces which met the Bulgarians, I feel that these

figures can be pretty accurately established. But even these eighty

thousand soldiers of the _nizam_ (active army) could have done wonders

in the Thracian campaign, if they had been allowed to go ahead to meet

the Bulgarians, and to form the first line of battle. But this was not

done.

There are three time-honoured principles that {279} cannot afford to be

neglected at the beginning of a campaign. The army used for _initial_

offensive action against the enemy should be composed _wholly_ of

soldiers in active service. The army should be concentrated to meet

the attack, or to attack one opposing army first, leaving the others

until later. Armies must be kept mobile, and not allow themselves to

be trapped in fortresses. The fortresses in the portions of territory

which may have to be abandoned temporarily to the invasion of the enemy

may easily be overstocked with defenders, but never with provisions and

munitions of war. In spite of the instructions of von der Goltz pasha,

the Turks showed no regard for the first two, at least, of these

elementary principles. The mobile army in Macedonia, outside of the

fortresses, was not recalled to Thrace, and _redifs_ (reservists) were

mixed with _nizams_ (actives) in the first line of battle. The neglect

of these principles was the direct cause of the Turkish disasters.

After the _nizams_, most of whom were already in Thrace, came the

_redifs_ from Asia Minor. They arrived at Constantinople and at San

Stefano in huge numbers, and without equipment. I saw many of them

with their feet bound in rags. There were no tents over them or other

shelter; there was no proper field equipment for them, and, even while

they were patiently waiting for days to be forwarded to the front, they

lacked (within sight of the minarets of Stambul!) bread to eat, shoes

for their feet, and blankets to cover them at night. More than that,

among them were many thousands who did {280} not know how to use the

rifles that were given to them, and who had not even a rudimentary

military education. In defensive warfare, as they proved at Adrianople

and at Tchatalja, they could fight like lions. But for an offensive

movement in the field the great majority of the _redifs_ were worse

than useless.

The Turks were absolutely sure of victory. The press of the capital,

on the day that war was declared, stated that the army of Thrace was

composed of four hundred thousand soldiers, and that it was the

intention to march direct to Sofia. Turkish officers of my

acquaintance told me that they were all taking their dress uniforms in

their baggage for this triumphal entry into Sofia, and that the

invasion of Bulgaria would commence immediately.

On the 19th of October, the Bulgarian army appeared in force at Mustafa

Pasha, the first railway station after passing the Turkish frontier on

the line from Sofia to Constantinople, and about eighteen miles

north-west of Adrianople. It was the announced intention of the

Bulgarians to attack immediately the fortress of Adrianople, whose

cannon commanded the sole railway line from Bulgaria into Thrace. Two

of the Bulgarian armies were directed upon Adrianople, and the third

army under General Dimitrieff received similar orders. In Bulgaria, as

well as in Turkey, every one expected to see an attack upon Adrianople.

Had not General Savoff declared openly that he would sacrifice fifty

thousand men, if necessary, as the Japanese had done at Fort Arthur, in

order to capture Adrianople?

{281}

A strict censorship was established in Bulgaria. No one, native or

foreigner, who by chance saw just what the armies were doing, could

have any hope of sending out the information. Postal and telegraphic

communications were in the hands of the military authorities. No one,

who happened to be in the region in which the troops were moving

forward, was allowed to leave by train, automobile, bicycle, or even on

foot. Never in history has the world been so completely in the dark as

to the operations of the army. But the attacks of the outposts of

Adrianople, and the commencement of the bombardment of the forts,

seemed to indicate the common objective of the three Bulgarian armies.

Adrianople had the reputation of being one of the strongest fortresses

in the world. This reputation was well justified.

Some miles to the east of Adrianople, guarding the mountains of the

south-eastern frontier of Bulgaria, was Kirk Kilissé, which was also

supposed to be an impregnable position. Here the Ottoman military

authorities had placed stores to form the base of supplies for the

offensive military operation against Bulgaria. Shortly before the war,

a branch railway from the sole line between Constantinople and

Adrianople, going north from Lulé Burgas, was completed. It furnished

direct means of communication between the capital and Kirk Kilissé.

The General Staff at Constantinople wisely decided to leave in

Adrianople only a sufficient garrison to defend the forts and the city.

It was their intention to send the bulk of their Thracian army {282}

north-west from Kirk Kilissé, using that fortress as a base, in order

to cut off the Bulgarians from their supplies, and throw them back

against the forts of Adrianople. In this way they intended to put the

Bulgarians between two fires and crush them. Then they would commence

the invasion of Bulgaria. The plan was excellent. If Turkey had

actually had in the field a half million men well trained and well

equipped, well officered and with a spirit of enthusiasm, and--most

important of all--properly fed, it is probable that the Bulgarians

could have been held in check. But this army did not exist. The

millions spent for equipment had disappeared--who knows where? There

were not enough horses, even with the requisitions in Constantinople,

for the artillery, and for the cavalry reserves. That meant that there

were no horses at all for the commissary department. The only means of

communication with the front was a single railway track. Roads had

never been made in Thrace since the conquest. The artillery and the

waggons had to be drawn through deep mud.

Beyond the needs of the _nizam_ (active) regiments, there were hardly

any officers. The wretched masses of _redifs_ (reservists) were

without proper leadership. Not only was this all important factor for

keeping up the _morale_ of the soldiers lacking, but, from the moment

they left Constantinople--even before that--there was insufficient

food. Nor did the soldiers know why they were fighting. There was no

enthusiasm for a cause. The great mass of the civil population, if

not, like the Christians, hostile to the army, {283} was wholly

indifferent. I do not believe there were ten thousand people in the

city of Constantinople, who really cared what happened in Thrace.

Since I have been in the midst of a mobilization in France, and have

seen how the French soldiers are equipped for war and fed, and how they

have been made to feel that every man, woman, and child in the nation

was ready to make any sacrifice--no matter how great--for "the little

soldiers of France," I feel more deeply the tragedy of the Turkish

_redifs_. My wonder is that they were able to fight as bravely as they

did. The world has no use for the government--for the "system"--which

caused them to suffer as they did, and to give their lives in a wholly

useless sacrifice.

The story of the Thracian campaign I heard from the lips of many of

those who had taken part in it, when the events were still fresh in

their memory. It is fruitless to go into all the details, to discuss

the strategy of the generals in command, and to give a technical

description of the battles, and of the retreat. Turkish and Bulgarian

officers, as well as a host of foreign correspondents, have published

books on this campaign. Most of them hide the real causes of the

defeat under a mass of unimportant detail, and seem to be written

either to emphasize the writer's claim as a "first-hand" witness, to

take to task certain generals, or to prove the superiority of French

artillery, and the faultiness of German military instruction. When all

these issues are cast to one side, the campaign can be briefly

described.

We have already anticipated the _débâcle_ of the military power of

Turkey by giving the causes. {284} This is not illogical. For these

causes existed, and led to the inevitable result, before the first gun

was fired.

On October 19th, the Bulgarians began the investment of Adrianople from

the north and west. There was no serious opposition. The Turkish

garrison naturally fell back to the protection of the forts, for the

Turks had not planned to oppose, beyond Adrianople, the Bulgarian

approach. The Ottoman advance-guard, composed of the corps of

Constantinople and Rodosto, under the command of Abdullah and Mahmud

Mukhtar pashas, was ordered to take the offensive north of Kirk

Kilissé. They were to be followed by another army. This movement was

intended to cut off the Bulgarians from their base of supplies, and

throw them back on Adrianople. The remainder of the Turkish forces in

Thrace were to wait the result of this movement. If the Bulgarians

moved down the valley of the Maritza, leaving Adrianople, they would

meet these imposing forces which covered Constantinople, and would have

behind them the garrison of Adrianople, and the army of Abdullah and

Mahmud Mukhtar threatening their communications. If they besieged

Adrianople, the second army would take the offensive and the Bulgarians

would be encircled.

The outposts of the Turkish army came into contact with the Bulgarians

on October 20th. Believing that they had to do with the left of the

army investing Adrianople, Mahmud and Abdullah decided to begin

immediately their encircling movement. On the 21st and 22d, the two

columns of the Turkish {285} army were in fact engaged with the

advance-guards of the first and second Bulgarian armies. But, in the

meantime, General Dimitrieff and the third army (which they believed

was on the extreme Bulgarian right, pressing down the Maritza to invest

the southern forts of Adrianople) had quietly crossed the frontier

almost directly north of Kirk Kilissé, and fell like a cyclone upon the

Turks. The Turkish positions were excellent, and had to be taken at

the point of the bayonet. From morning till night on October 23d, the

Bulgarian third army captured position after position, without the help

of their artillery, which was stuck in the mud some miles in the rear.

In the evening, during a terrible storm, two fresh Bulgarian columns

made an assault upon the Turkish positions. It was not until then that

the Turks realized that they were fighting another army than that

charged with the investment of Adrianople. A wild panic broke out

among the _redifs_, who were mostly without officers. They started to

retreat, and were soon followed by the remainder of the army. At

Uskubdere, they met during the night reinforcements coming to their

aid. Two regiments fired on each other, mutually mistaking the other

for Bulgarians. The reinforcements joined in the disorderly retreat,

which did not end until morning, when, exhausted and still crazed by

fear, what remained of the Turkish army had reached Eski Baba and Bunar

Hissar.

The army was saved from annihilation by the darkness and the storm.

For not only were the Bulgarians ignorant of the abandonment of Kirk

{286} Kilissé, but, along the line where they knew the enemy were

retreating, their cavalry could not advance in the darkness and mud,

nor could their artillery shell the retreating columns. On the morning

of the 24th, when General Dimitrieff was preparing to make the assault

upon Kirk Kilissé, he learned that the Turkish army had fled, and that

the fortress was undefended.

By the capture of Kirk Kilissé the Bulgarians gained enormous stores.

They had a railway line open to them towards Constantinople. The only

menace to a successful investment of Adrianople was removed. The

victory, so easily purchased, was far beyond their dreams. But it

would not have been possible had it not been for the willingness of the

Bulgarian soldiers to charge without tiring or faltering at the point

of the bayonet. The victory was earned, in spite of the Turkish panic.

For the Bulgarian steel had much to do with that panic.

As soon as he realized the extent of the victory of Kirk Kilissé,

General Savoff ordered a general advance of the three Bulgarian armies.

Only enough troops were left around Adrianople to prevent a sortie of

the garrison. Notwithstanding the unfavourable condition of the roads,

the Bulgarian armies moved with great rapidity. The cavalry in two

days made reconnaissances on the east as far as Midia, and on the south

as far as Rodosto. The main--and sole--armies of the Turks were thus

ascertained to be along the Ergene, and beyond in the direction of the

capital. On the left, the third army of General Dimitrieff, not

delaying at Kirk Kilissé, was in contact with the {287} Turks at Eski

Baba on the 28th. On the afternoon of the same day the Bulgarians

drove the Turks out of the village of Lulé Burgas, on the railway to

Constantinople, east of the point where the Dedeagatch-Salonika line

branches off.

For three days, October 29-31, the Turkish armies made a stand along

the Ergene from Bunar Hissar to Lulé Burgas. Since Gettysburg, Sadowa,

and Sedan, no battle except that of Mukden has approached the battle of

Lulé Burgas in importance, not only because of the numbers engaged, but

also of the issue at stake. Three hundred and fifty thousand soldiers

were in action, the forces being about evenly divided. For two days,

in spite of the demonstration of Kirk Kilissé, the Turks fought with

splendid courage and tenacity. Time and again the desperate charges of

the Bulgarian infantry were hurled back with heavy loss. Not until the

third day did the fighting seem to lean decisively to the advantage of

the Bulgarians. Their artillery began to show marked superiority.

From many points shells began to fall with deadly effect into the

Turkish entrenchments. The Turks were unable to silence the murderous

fire of the Bulgarian batteries. The soldiers, _because they were

starving_, did not have it in them to attempt to take the most

troublesome Bulgarian positions by assault.

The retreat began on the afternoon of the 31st. On November 1st, owing

to lack of officers and of central direction, it became a disorderly

flight, a _sauve qui peut_. Camp equipment was abandoned. The

soldiers threw away their knapsacks and rifles, {288} so that they

could run more quickly. The artillery-men cut the traces of their

gun-wagons and ammunition-wagons, and made off on horseback.

Everything was abandoned to the enemy. Nazim pasha, generalissimo, and

the general staff, who had been in headquarters at Tchorlu, without

proper telegraphic or telephonic communication with the battle front,

were drawn into the flight. The Turkish army did not stop until it had

placed itself behind the Tchatalja line of forts, which protected the

city of Constantinople.

The battle of Lulé Burgas marked more than the destruction of the

Turkish military power and the loss of European Turkey to the Empire.

It revealed the inefficiency of Turkish organization and administration

to cope with modern conditions, even when in possession of modern

instruction and modern tools. With the Turks, it is not a question of

an ignorance or a backwardness which can be remedied. Total lack of

organizing and administrative ability is a fault of their nature.

Courage alone does not win battles in the twentieth century.

The Bulgarians were without sufficient cavalry and mounted machine-guns

to follow up their victory. The defeat of the Turks, too, had not been

gained without the expenditure of every ounce of energy in the army

that had in those three days won undying fame. The problem of pursuit

was difficult. There was only a single railway track. Food and

munitions for the large army had to be brought up. The artillery

advanced painfully through roads hub-deep in mud. It took two weeks

for the Bulgarian {289} army to move from the Ergene to Tchatalja, and

prepare for the assault of the last line of Turkish defence.

An immediate offensive after Lulé Burgas would have found

Constantinople at the mercy of the victorious army. The two weeks of

respite changed the aspect of things. For in this time the forts

across the peninsula from the Sea of Marmora to the Black Sea were

hastily repaired. They were mounted with guns from the Bosphorus

defences, the Servian Creusots detained at Salonika at the beginning of

the war, and whatever artillery could be brought from Asia Minor. The

army had been reformed, the worthless, untrained elements ruthlessly

weeded out, and a hundred thousand of the best soldiers, among whom the

only _redifs_ were those who had come fresh from Asia Minor, and had

not been contaminated by the demoralization of Kirk Kilissé and Lulé

Burgas, were placed behind the forts. The Turkish cruisers whose guns

were able to be fired were recalled from the Dardanelles, and anchored

off the end of the line on either side.

On November 15th, the Bulgarians began to put their artillery in

position all along the Tchatalja line from Buyuk-Tchekmedje on the Sea

of Marmora to Derkos Lake, near the Black Sea. At the same time, they

entrenched the artillery positions by earthworks and ditches, working

with incredible rapidity. For they had to take every precaution

against a sudden sortie of the enemy. In forty-eight hours they were

ready.

The attack on the Tchatalja lines commenced {290} at six o'clock on

Sunday morning, November 17th, by machine-gun and rifle fire as well as

by artillery. The forts and the Turkish cruisers responded. In the

city and in the villages along the Bosphorus we could hear the firing

distinctly. On the 17th and 18th, the Bulgarians delivered assaults in

several places. Near Derkos they even got through the lines for a

short while. These were merely for the purpose of testing the Turkish

positions, however. Several of the assaults were repulsed. The

Bulgarians suffered heavily on the 18th, when the first and only

prisoners of the war were made. On the 19th, the artillery fire grew

less and less, and there were no further attacks. Towards evening it

was evident that the Bulgarians had abandoned their advanced lines, and

did not intend to continue the attack. No general assault had been

delivered.

It seems certain that General Savoff had in mind the capture of

Constantinople on November 17th. Turkish overtures for peace, opened

on the 15th, had been repulsed. Every preparation was made for the

attempt to pierce Tchatalja. Why was the plan abandoned before it was

actually proven impossible? Did General Savoff fear the risk of a

reverse? Was he short of ammunition? Had the Turkish defence of the

17th and 18th been more determined than he had expected? Was it fear

of a cholera epidemic among his soldiers? Or was the abandonment of

the attempt to capture Constantinople for that is what a triumph at

Tchatalja would have meant, dictated by political reasons?

Perhaps there was a shortage of ammunition. {291} But it is impossible

to believe that General Savoff ceased the attack because he feared a

failure, or because he paused before the heavy sacrifice of life it

would involve. The Bulgarians were too fresh from their sudden and

overwhelming victories to be halted by the unimportant fighting of the

17th and 18th. They were not yet aware of the terrible danger from

cholera.

At the time it was the common belief in Constantinople--I heard it

expressed in a number of intelligent circles--that the Great Powers--in

particular Russia--had informed Bulgaria that she should halt where she

was. A second San Stefano! This seems improbable. Even in the moment

of delirium over Lulé Burgas, the Bulgarians had no thought of

occupying permanently Constantinople. They knew that this would be a

task beyond their ability as a nation to undertake. If there was a

thought of entering Constantinople, it was to satisfy military pride,

and to be able to dictate more expeditiously and satisfactorily terms

of peace.

The real reason for the halt of Tchatalja, and the willingness to

conclude an armistice, must be found in the alarm awakened in Bulgaria

by the Servian and Greek successes. Greece had settled herself in

Salonika, and the King and royal family had come there to live. Is it

merely a coincidence that _on November 18th_ the Servians captured

Monastir, _foyer_ of Bulgarianism in western Macedonia, and _on the

following day_, a telegram from Sofia caused the cessation of the

Bulgarian attack upon Tchatalja?

{292}

At Adrianople, a combined Bulgarian and Servian army, under the command

of General Ivanoff, which had been hampered during the first month of

operations by the floods of the Maritza, and by daring sorties of the

garrison, after receiving experienced reinforcements on November 22d,

began a determined bombardment and narrow investment of the forts. Ten

days later, a general attack was ordered, probably to hurry the Turks

in the armistice negotiations. The investing army had made very little

progress on December 2d and 3d, when the signing of the armistice

caused a cessation of hostilities.

But while the Bulgarians were vigorously pressing the attack upon

Adrianople, they were inactive at Tchatalja.

At the beginning of the Thracian campaign, a portion of the Turkish

fleet started to attack the Bulgarian coast. The Bulgarians had only

one small cruiser and six torpedo-boats of doubtful value. But their

two ports, termini of railway lines, were well protected by forts. On

October 19th, two Turkish battleships and four torpedo-boats appeared

before Varna, and fired without effect upon the forts. Then they

bombarded the small open port of Kavarna, near the Rumanian frontier.

On the 21st, they succeeded in throwing a few shells into Varna, but

did not risk approaching near enough to do serious damage. This was

the extent of the offensive naval action against Bulgaria. A short

time later, the _Hamidieh_, which was stationed on the Thracian coast

of the Black Sea to protect the landing of _redifs_ from Samsun, was

surprised in the night by {293} Bulgarian torpedo-boats. Two torpedoes

tore holes in her bow. She was able to return to Constantinople under

her own steam, but had to spend ten weeks in dry-dock. The only

service rendered by the Turkish fleet against the Bulgarians was the

safeguarding of the transport of troops from Black Sea ports of Asiatic

Turkey, and the co-operation at the ends of the Tchatalja lines during

the Bulgarian assaults of November 17th and 18th.

The Servian campaign was a good second to the astounding successes of

the Bulgarians in Thrace. The third army entered the _sandjak_ of Novi

Bazar, so long coveted by Servia, and expelled the Turks in five days.

A portion of this army next occupied Prisrend and Diakova, descended

the valley of the Drin through the heart of northern Albania to

Alessio, where it joined on November 19th the Montenegrins, who were

already at San Giovanni di Medua. On the 28th, they occupied Durazzo.

The Servians had reached the Adriatic!

While the third army was in the _sandjak_ of Novi Bazar, the second

Servian army crossed into Old Servia, passed through the plain of

Kossova, where the Turks had destroyed the independence of Servia in

1389, and occupied Pristina on October 23d. This gave them control of

the branch railway from Uskub to the confines of the _sandjak_.

The flower of the Servian fighting strength was reserved for the first

army under the command of Crown Prince Alexander. This force,

considerably larger than the two other armies combined, mustered over

seventy thousand. Its objective point was {294} Uskub, covering which

was the strong Turkish army of Zekki pasha. Battle was joined outside

of Kumanova on October 22d. After three days of fighting, during which

the Turkish cavalry was annihilated by the Servian artillery and the

Servian infantry took the Turkish artillery positions at the point of

the bayonet, the army of Zekki Pasha evacuated Kumanova. No attempt

was made to defend Uskub, which the Servians entered on October 26th.

The Turkish army retreated to Küprülü on the Vardar, towards Salonika.

When the Servians continued their march, Zekki pasha retreated to

Prilip, where he occupied positions that could not well be shelled by

artillery. After two days of continuous fighting, the Servians'

bayonets dislodged the Turks. They withdrew to Monastir with the

Servians hot upon their heels.

Together with Kumanova, in which the bulk of Prince Alexander's forces

did not find it necessary to engage, the capture of Monastir is the

most brilliant feat of an army whose intrepidity, agility, and

intelligence deserve highest praise. Into Monastir had been thrown the

army of Tahsin pasha, pushed northward by the Greeks, as well as that

of Zekki pasha, harried southward by the Servians. The Servians did

not hesitate to approach the defences of the city on one side up to

their arm-pits in water, while on the other side they scaled the

heights dominating Monastir--heights which ought to have been defended

for weeks without great difficulty. The Turks were compelled to

withdraw, for they were at the mercy of the Servian artillery. They

tried to {295} retreat to Okrida, but the Servian left wing anticipated

this movement. Only ten thousand escaped into Epirus. Nearly forty

thousand Turks surrendered to the Servians on November 18th. Monastir

and Okrida were captured. The Turkish armies of Macedonia had ceased

to exist.

The Greeks were eager to wipe out the shame of the war of 1897.

Fifteen years had wrought a great difference in the _morale_ of the

Greek army. A new body of officers, who spent their time in learning

their profession instead of in discussing politics at _café terrasses_,

had been created. The French military mission, under General Eydoux,

had been working for several years in the complete reorganization of

the Greek army. I had the privilege at Athens of enjoying the

hospitality of Greek officers in their casernes at several successive

Easter festivals. Each year one could notice the progress. They were

always ready to show you how the transformation of their artillery, and

its equipment for mountain service as well as for field work, would

make all the difference in the world in the "approaching" war with the

Turks. The results were beyond expectations. What the Greeks had been

working for was mobility. This they demonstrated that they had

learned. They had also an _esprit de corps_ which, in fighting, made

up for what they lacked of Slavic dogged perseverance. Neither in

actual combat, nor in strategy, with the exception of Janina, were the

Greeks put to the test, or called upon to bear the burden, of the

Bulgarians and Servians. But, especially when we take into

consideration the {296} invaluable service of their fleet, there is no

reason to belittle their part in the downfall of Turkey. If the effort

had been necessary, they probably would have been equal to it.

The Greeks sent a small army into Epirus. The bulk of their forces,

following a sound military principle, were led into Thessaly by the

Crown Prince Constantine. They crossed the frontier without

resistance, fought a sharp combat at Elassona on the 19th, in which

they stood admirably under fire, and broke down the last Turkish

resistance at Servia. The army of Tahsin pasha was thrown back upon

Monastir. The battles of the next ten days were hardly more than

skirmishes, for the Turkish stand was never formidable. At Yanitza,

the only real battle of the Greek campaign was fought. The Turks fled.

The way to Salonika was open.

The battle of Yanitza (Yenidje-Vardar) was fought on November 3d. On

October 30th, a Greek torpedo-boat had succeeded, in spite of the

strong harbour fortifications, equipped with electric searchlights, and

the mined channel, in coming right up to the jetty at Salonika during

the night, and launching three torpedoes at an old Turkish cruiser

which lay at anchor there. The cruiser sank. On his way out to open

sea, the commander of the torpedo-boat did not hesitate to fire upon

the forts!

[Illustration: Map--Africa in 1914]

This daring feat, and the approach of the Greek army, threw the city

into a turmoil of excitement. The people had been fed for two weeks on

false news, and telegrams had been printed from day to day, relating

wonderful victories over the Servians, {297} Bulgarians, and Greeks.

But the coming of the refugees, fresh thousands from nearer places

every day, and the presence in the streets of the city of deserters in

uniform, gave the lie to the "official" news. When the German

_stationnaire_ arrived from Constantinople, and embarked the prisoner

of the Villa Allatini, ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, the most pessimistic

suspicions were confirmed.

Although he had thirty thousand soldiers, and plenty of munitions,

Tahsin pasha, commandant of Salonika, did not even attempt to defend

the city. He began immediately to negotiate with the advancing Greek

army. When the Crown Prince refused to accept any other than

unconditional surrender, and moved upon the city, Tahsin pasha yielded.

Not a shot was fired. On November 9th, without any opposition, the

Greek army marched into Salonika.

In other places the Turks at least fought, even if they did not fight

well. At Salonika their surrender demonstrated to what humiliation and

degradation the arrogance of the Young Turks had brought a nation whose

past was filled with glorious deeds of arms.

The Bulgarian expeditionary corps for Macedonia, under General

Theodoroff, had crossed the frontier on October 18th. Joined to it

were the notorious bands of _comitadjis_ under the command of

Sandansky, who afterwards related to me the story of this march.

General Theodoroff's mission was to engage the portion of the Turkish

Fifth Army Corps, which was stationed in the valleys of the Mesta and

Struma, {298} east of the Vardar, thus preventing it from assembling

and making a flank movement against the main Servian or Bulgarian

armies. The Bulgarians were greeted everywhere as liberators, and,

although they were not in great numbers, the Turks did not try to

oppose them. Soldiers and Moslem Macedonians together fled before them

towards Salonika.

When General Theodoroff realized the demoralization of the Turks, and

heard how the Greeks were approaching Salonika without any more serious

opposition than that which confronted him, he hurried his column

towards Salonika. The Bulgarian Princes Boris and Cyril joined him.

They were not in time to take part in the negotiations for the

surrender of the city. The cowardice of Tahsin pasha had brought

matters to a climax on November 9th. But they were able to enter

Salonika on the 10th, at the same time that Crown Prince Constantine

was making his triumphal entry. Sandansky and his _comitadjis_ hurried

to the principal ancient church of the city, for over four hundred

years the Saint Sophia of Salonika, and placed the Bulgarian flag in

the minarets before the Greeks knew they had been outwitted. On the

12th, King George of Greece arrived to make his residence in the city

that was to be his tomb.

After the capture of Monastir, the Servians pressed on to Okrida, on

November 23d, and from there into Albania to Elbassan, which they

reached five days later. It was their intention to join at Durazzo the

other column of the third Servian army, of whose march down the Drin we

have already spoken. But {299} the threatening attitude of

Austria-Hungary necessitated the recall of the bulk of the Servian

forces to Nish. This is the reason they were not able, at that stage

of the war, to give the Montenegrins effective assistance against

Scutari.

The left wing of the Thessalian Greek army, after the capture of

Monastir by the Servians, pursued towards Albania, the Turks who had

escaped from Monastir. With great skill, they managed to prevent the

Turks from turning north-west into the interior of Albania. After the

brilliant and daring storming of the heights of Tchangan, what remained

of the Turkish army was compelled to retreat into Epirus towards Janina.

On October 20th, the Greek fleet under Admiral Koundouriotis appeared

at the Dardanelles to offer battle to the Turks. Under the cover of

the protection of their fleet, the Greeks occupied Lemnos, Thasos,

Imbros, Samothrace, Nikaria, and the smaller islands. The inhabitants

of Samos had expelled the Turkish garrisons on their own initiative at

the outbreak of the war. Mitylene was captured without great

difficulty on November 2lst. The Greeks landed at Chios on the 24th.

Here the Turkish garrison of two thousand retired to the mountainous

centre of the island, and succeeded in prolonging their resistance

until January. When he saw that no help was coming from Asia Minor,

whose shores had been in sight during all the weeks of combat and

suffering, the heroic Turkish commander surrendered with one thousand

eight hundred starving men on January 3d. It was only because Italy,

{300} by a clause of the Treaty of Ouchy, still held the Dodecanese,

that all of the Ægean Islands were not "gathered into the fold" by

Greece.

There had been less than six weeks of fighting. The Balkan allies had

swept from the field all the Turkish forces in Europe. The Turkish

armies were bottled up in Constantinople, Adrianople, Janma, and

Scutari, with absolutely no hope of making successful sorties. Except

at Constantinople, they were besieged, and could expect neither

reinforcements nor food supplies. The Greek fleet was master of the

Ægean Sea, and held the Turkish navy blocked in the Dardanelles. No

new armies could come from Asiatic Turkey. This was the situation when

the armistice was signed. The Ottoman Empire in Europe had ceased to

exist. The military prestige of Turkey had received a mortal blow.

THE ARMISTICE AND THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF LONDON

The hopelessness of the outcome of the war with Italy, the

dissatisfaction over the foolish and arbitrary rule of its secret

committees had weakened the hold of the "Committee of Union and

Progress" over the army. Despite its success in the spring elections

of 1912, its position was precarious. In July, Mahmud Shevket pasha,

who was suspected of planning a military _pronunciamento_, resigned the

Ministry of War. The Grand Vizier, Saïd pasha, soon followed him into

retirement. The Sultan declared that a {301} ministry not under the

control of a political party was a necessity.

Ghazi Mukhtar pasha, after much difficulty, succeeded in forming a

ministry, in which a distinguished Armenian, Noradounghian effendi, was

given the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The Unionist majority in the

lower house of Parliament proved intractable. Its obstructionist

tactics won for the Chamber of Deputies the name of the "comic

operahouse of Fundukli." (Fundukli was the Bosphorus quarter in which

the House of Parliament was located.) With the help of the Senate, and

the moral support of the army, the Sultan dissolved Parliament on

August 5th. Only the menace of the Albanian revolution prevented the

Committee from attempting to set up a rival Parliament at Salonika.

This was the unenviable internal situation of Turkey at the opening of

the Balkan War.

The disasters of the Thracian campaign led to the resignation of the

Ghazi Mukhtar pasha Cabinet. The aged statesman of the old _régime_,

Kiamil pasha, was called for the eighth time to the Grand Vizirate. He

retained Nazim pasha, generalissimo of the Turkish army, and

Noradounghian effendi, in the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs.

The most influential of the Young Turks, who had opposed bitterly the

peace with Italy and were equally determined that no negotiations

should be undertaken with the Balkan States, were exiled. Kiamil pasha

saw clearly that peace was absolutely necessary. His long experience

allowed him to have no illusions as to the possibility of continuing

the struggle. Before {302} the Bulgarian attack upon Tchatalja, he

began _pourparlers_ with General Savoff. After the repulse of November

17th and 18th, he was just as firm in his decision that the

negotiations must be continued. He won over to his point of view the

members of the Cabinet, and notably Nazim pasha.

The conditions of the armistice, signed on December 3d, were an

acknowledgment of the complete _débâcle_ of the Turkish army. Bulgaria

forced the stipulation that her army in front of Tchatalja should be

revictualled by the railway which passed under the guns of Adrianople,

while that fortress remained without food! Greece, by an agreement

with her allies, refused to sign the armistice, but was allowed to be

represented in the peace conference. The allies felt that the state of

war on sea must continue, in order that Turkey should be prevented

during the armistice from bringing to the front her army corps from

Syria and Mesopotamia and Arabia; while Greece, in particular, was

determined to run no risk in connection with the Ægean Islands. The

peace delegates were to meet in London.

Orientals, Christian as well as Moslem, are famous for bargaining.

Nothing can be accomplished without an exchange of proposals and

counter-proposals _ad infinitum_. In the Conference of London, the

demands of the allies were the cession of all European Turkey, except

Albania, whose boundaries were not defined, of Crete, and of the

islands in the Ægean Sea. A war indemnity was also demanded. Turkey

was to be allowed to retain Constantinople, and a strip of territory

from Midia on the Black Sea to {303} Rodosto on the Sea of Marmora, and

the peninsula of the Thracian Chersonese, which formed the European

shore of the Dardanelles. The boundaries of Albania, and its future

status, were to be decided by the Powers.

I had a long conversation with the Grand Vizier, Kiamil pasha, on the

day the peace delegates left for London. He was frank and unhesitating

in the statement of his belief that Turkey could not continue the war.

He denounced unsparingly the visionaries who were clamouring for a

continuance of the struggle. "It is because of them that we are in our

present humiliating position," he said. "They cry out now that we must

not accept peace, but they know well that we cannot hope to win back

any portion of what we have lost."

There were a number of reasons why the position of Kiamil pasha was

sound. First of all, the army organization was in hopeless confusion.

Although the Bulgarians were checked at Tchatalja, the conditions on

the Constantinople side of the forts was terrible. The general

headquarters at Hademkeuy were buried in filth and mud. Although the

army was but twenty-five miles from the city, there were days on end

when not even bread arrived. Cholera was making great ravages.

Soldiers, crazed from hunger, were shot dead for disobeying the order

which forbade their eating raw vegetables. There were neither fuel,

shelter, nor blankets. Winter was at hand. At San Stefano, one of the

most beautiful suburbs of Stambul, in a concentration camp the soldiers

died by the thousands of starvation fever. {304} It was one of the

most heart-rending tragedies of history.

All the while, in the cafés of Péra, Galata, and Stambul, Turkish

officers sat the day long, sipping their coffee, and deciding that

Adrianople must not be given up. Even while the fighting was going on,

when the fate of the city hung in the balance, I saw these degenerate

officers _by the hundreds_, feasting at Péra, while their soldiers were

dying like dogs at Tchatalja and San Stefano. This is an awful

statement to make, but it is the record of fact. Notices in the

newspapers, declaring that officers found in Constantinople without

permission would be immediately taken before the Court-Martial, had

absolutely no effect.

The navy failed to give any account of itself to the Greeks, who were

waiting outside of the Dardanelles. Finally, on December 16th, after

the people of the vicinity had openly cursed and taunted them, the

fleet sailed out to fight. An action at long range did little damage

to either side. The Turkish vessels refused to go beyond the

protection of their forts. They returned in the evening to anchor.

The mastery of the sea remained to the Greeks.[1]

[1] In this connection, it would be forgetting to pay tribute to a

remarkable exploit to omit mention of the raid of the _Hamidieh_ during

the late winter. One Ottoman officer at least chafed under the

disgrace of the inaction of the Ottoman navy. With daring and skill,

Captain Reouf bey slipped out into the Ægean Sea on the American-built

cruiser, the _Hamidieh_. He evaded the Greek blockaders, bombarded

some outposts on one of the islands, and sank the auxiliary cruiser,

the _Makedonia_, in a Greek port. The _Hamidieh_ next appeared in the

Adriatic, where she sank several transports, and bombarded Greek

positions on the coast of Albania. The cruiser was next heard of at

Port Said. She passed through the Suez Canal into the Red Sea for a

couple of weeks, and then returned boldly into the Mediterranean,

although Greek torpedo-boats were lying in wait. Captain Reouf bey ran

again the gauntlet of the Greek fleet, and got back to the Dardanelles

without mishap. This venture, undertaken without permission from the

Turkish admiral, had no effect upon the war. For it came too late.

But it showed what a little enterprise and courage might have done to

prevent the Turkish débâcle, if undertaken at the beginning of the war.

{305}

If the army and the navy were powerless, how about the people of the

capital? From the very beginning of the war, the inhabitants of

Constantinople, Moslem as well as Christian, displayed the most

complete indifference concerning the fortunes of the battles. Even

when the Bulgarians were attacking Tchatalja, the city took little

interest. Buying and selling went on as usual. There were few

volunteers for national defence, but the cafés were crowded and the

theatres and dance-halls of Péra were going at full swing. The

refugees came and camped in our streets and in the cemeteries outside

of the walls. Those who did not die passed on to Asia. The wounded

arrived, and crowded our hospitals and barracks. The cholera came.

The soldiers starved to death at San Stefano. The spirit of Byzantium

was over the city still. The year 1913 began as 1453 had begun.

The Government tried to raise money by a national loan. It could get

none from Europe, unless it agreed to surrender Adrianople and make

peace practically on the terms of the allies. An appeal must be made

to the Osmanlis. For how could the war be resumed without money?

There are many wealthy pashas at Constantinople. Their palaces line

both shores of the Bosphorus. They spend money at Monte Carlo {306}

like water. They live at Nice, as they live at Constantinople, like

princes--or like American millionaires! One of the sanest and wisest

of Turkish patriots, a man whom I have known and admired, was appointed

to head a committee to wait upon these pashas, many of them married to

princesses of the imperial family, and solicit their contributions.

The scheme was that the subscribers should advance five years of taxes

on their properties for the purposes of national defence. The

committee hired a small launch, and spent a day visiting the homes of

the pashas. On their return, after paying the rental of the launch,

they had about forty pounds sterling! Was it not two million pounds

that was raised for the Prince of Wales Fund recently in London? Was

not the French loan "for national defence," issued just before the

present war, subscribed in a few hours _forty-three times _over the

large amount of thirty-two million pounds asked for?

In the face of these facts, the Young Turks were vociferous in their

demand that the war be continued. Adrianople must not be surrendered!

Kiamil pasha decided to call a "Divan," or National Assembly, of the

most important men in Turkey. They were summoned by the Sultan to meet

at the palace of Dolma-Baghtche on January 22, 1913. I went to see

what would happen there. One would expect that the whole of

Constantinople would be hanging on the words of this council, whose

decision the Cabinet had agreed to accept. A half-dozen policemen at

the palace gate, a vendor of lemonade, two street-sweepers, an Italian

cinematograph photographer, {307} and a dozen foreign newspaper

men--that was the extent of the crowd.

The Divan, after hearing the _exposés_ of the Ministers of War,

Finance, and Foreign Affairs, decided that there was nothing to

discuss. The decision was inevitable. Peace must be signed. That

night Kiamil pasha telegraphed to London to the Turkish commissioners,

directing them to consent to the reddition of Adrianople; and, the

other fortresses which were still holding out, and to make peace at the

price of ceding all the Ottoman territories in Europe beyond a line

running from Enos on the Ægean Sea, at the mouth of the Maritza River,

to Midia on the Black Sea.

On the following day, January 23d, a _coup d'état_ was successfully

carried out.

Enver bey, the former "hero of liberty," who had taken a daring and

praiseworthy part in the revolution of 1908, had been ruined afterwards

by being appointed military _attaché_ of the Ottoman Embassy at Berlin.

There was much that was admirable and winning in Enver bey, much that

was what the French call "elevation of soul." He was a sincere

patriot. But the years at Berlin, and the deadening influence of

militarism and party politics mixed together, had changed him from a

patriot to a politician. He went to Tripoli during the Italian War,

and organized a resistance in Benghazi, which he announced would be "as

long as he lived." But it was a decision _à la Turque_. The Balkan

War found him again at Constantinople--not at the front leading a

company against the enemy--but at {308} Constantinople, plotting with

the other Young Turks how they could once more get the reins of

government in their hands. The decision of the Divan was the

opportunity. Enver bey led a small band of followers into the Sublime

Porte, and shot Nazim pasha and his _aide-de-camp_ dead. The other

members of the Cabinet were imprisoned, and the telephone to the palace

cut. Enver bey was driven at full speed in an automobile to the

palace. He secured from the Sultan a _firman_ calling on Mahmud

Shevket pasha to form a new Cabinet. The Young Turks were again in

power.

The bodies of Nazim pasha and the _aide-de-camp_ were buried quickly

and secretly. For one of Enver's companions, a man of absolutely no

importance, who had been killed by defenders of Nazim, a great military

funeral was held.

Mahmud Shevket pasha, who had been living in retirement at Scutari

since the war began, accepted the position of Grand Vizier. I heard

him, on the steps of the Sublime Porte, justify the murder of Nazim

pasha, on the ground that there had been the intention to give up

Adrianople. The new Cabinet was going to redeem the country, and save

it from a shameful peace.

When the news of the _coup d'état_ reached London, it was recognized

that further negotiations were useless. The peace conference had

failed.

THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR

It is very doubtful if Mahmud Shevket, Enver, and their accomplices had

any hope whatever of {309} retrieving the fortunes of Turkish arms.

They had prepared the _coup d'état_ to get back again into office.

This could not be done without the tacit consent of the army. At the

moment of the Divan the army was stirred up over the surrender of

Adrianople. It was the moment to act. At any other time the army

would not have acquiesced in the murder of its generalissimo. The

Sultan's part in the plot was not clear. His assent was, however,

immediately given. Living in seclusion, and knowing practically

nothing of what was going on, he signed the _firmans_, accepting the

resignation of the Kiamil pasha Cabinet and charging Mahmud Shevket

with the formation of a new Cabinet, either by force or by playing upon

his fears of what might be his own fate, should the agreement to

surrender Adrianople lead to a revolution.

On January 29th, the allies denounced the armistice, and hostilities

reopened. The Bulgarians at Tchatalja had strongly entrenched

themselves, and were content to rest on the defensive. They did not

desire to capture Constantinople. But the Turks wanted to relieve

Adrianople. The offensive movement must come from them. The Young

Turks had killed Nazim pasha, they said, because they believed

Adrianople could be saved. The word was now to Mahmud Shevket and

Enver. Let them justify their action.

Enthusiastic speeches were made at Constantinople. We were told that

the army at Tchatalja had moved forward, and was going to drive the

Bulgarians out of Thrace. The Turks did advance some kilometres, but,

like their fleet at the Dardanelles, {310} not beyond the protection of

the forts! They did not dare to make a general assault upon the

Bulgarian positions. The renewal of the war, as far as Tchatalja was

concerned, was a perfect farce. Every one in Constantinople knew that

the army was not even trying to relieve Adrianople by a forward march

from Constantinople.

Enver bey, who realized that he must make some move to justify the

_coup d'état_ of January 23d, gathered two army corps on the small

boats which serve the Bosphorus villages and the Isles of Princes. It

was his intention to land on the European shore of the Dardanelles, and

take the Bulgarians in the rear. A few of his troops--the first that

were sent--disembarked at Gallipoli, and, co-operating with the

Dardanelles garrison, attempted an offensive movement against the

Bulgarian positions at Bulair, which were bottling the peninsula. The

attack failed ignominiously. For the Bulgarians, after dispersing the

first bayonet charge by their machine-guns, were not content to wait

for another attack. They scrambled over their trenches, and attacked

the Turks at the point of the bayonet. The army broke, and fled. Some

six thousand Turks were left on the field. The Bulgarian losses were

trifling. On the same day, February 8th, and the following day, the

rest of Enver bey's forces tried to land at several places on the

European shore of the Sea of Marmora. For some reason that has never

been explained, the Turkish fleet did not co-operate with Enver bey's

attempted landings. Naturally the Turks were mowed down. At Sharkeuy

it was simply slaughter. {311} Three divisions were butchered. Those

few who succeeded in getting foot on shore were driven into the sea and

bayoneted. The two corps were practically annihilated.

After this exploit, Enver bey returned to Constantinople, and received

the congratulations of the Grand Vizier whom he had created, by a

murder, _to redeem Turkey and recover Adrianople_.

The inability to advance at Tchatalja and at Bulair, and the failure to

land troops on the coasts of Thrace, entirely immobilized the Turkish

armies during the second period of the war. They were content to sit

and watch the fall of the three fortresses of Janina, Adrianople, and

Scutari. At the moment of the _coup d'état_, I telegraphed that the

whole miserable affair was nothing more than a party move of the "outs"

to oust the "ins." The events confirmed this judgment. Mahmud Shevket

pasha had no other policy than that of Kiamil pasha and Nazim pasha.

He, and the Young Turk party, did absolutely nothing to relieve the

situation. As soon as they thought they were safe from those who swore

to avenge Nazim's death, they began again negotiations for peace, and

on exactly the same terms.

In the meantime, the Greeks, who had not signed the armistice, decided

that they must take Janina by assault. The worst of the winter was not

yet over, but plans were made to increase the small Greek forces which

had been practically inactive since the siege began. Janina had never

been completely invested. When the Crown Prince arrived, he planned to

capture the most troublesome forts, and {312} from them to make

untenable the formidable hills which commanded the city. The Greeks

followed the plan with great skill and courage. Position after

position was taken until the city was at the mercy of their artillery.

During the night of March 5th, Essad pasha sent to Prince Constantino

emissaries to surrender the city, garrison, and munitions of war

without conditions.

The Crown Prince returned to Salonika in triumph. A few days later,

the assassination of King George made him King. From this time on, the

diplomatic position of Premier Venizelos, in his endeavour to keep

within bounds the military party which had the ear of the new King,

became most difficult. Even his great genius could not prevent the

rupture with Bulgaria.

After the fall of Janina, the Bulgarian general staff realized that it

was essential for them to force the capitulation of Adrianople, or to

take the city by assault. As they had to keep a large portion of their

army before Tchatalja and Bulair, it was decided that forty-five

thousand Servians, with their siege cannon, should co-operate in the

attack upon Adrianople. It was afterwards given by the Servians as an

excuse for breaking their treaty with Bulgaria, that they had helped in

the fall of Adrianople. But it must be remembered that the Bulgarian

army, by its maintenance of the positions at Tchatalja and Bulair, was

rendering service not to herself alone but to the common cause of the

allies. Greece and Servia will never be able to get away from the fact

that Bulgaria bore the brunt of the burden in the first {313} Balkan

War, and that her services in the common cause were far greater than

those of either of her allies. One cannot too strongly emphasize the

point, also, that the capture and possession of Adrianople did not mean

to Bulgaria either from the practical or from the sentimental

standpoint what Salonika meant to the Greeks and Uskub to the Servians.

The Servian contingent before Adrianople was not helping Bulgaria to do

what was to be wholly to the benefit of Bulgaria. The Servians were

co-operating in an enterprise that was to contribute to the success of

their common cause.

Adrianople had been closely invested ever since the battle of Kirk

Kilissé. No army came to the relief of the garrison after the fatal

retreat of October 24th. The Bulgarians had not made a serious effort

to capture the city during the first period of the war. The armistice

served their ends well, because each day lessened the provisions of the

besieged. Inside the city Shukri pasha had done all he could to keep

up the courage of the inhabitants. He himself was ignorant of the real

situation at Constantinople. Perhaps it was in good faith that he

assured the garrison continually that the hour of deliverance was at

hand. By wireless, the authorities at Constantinople, after the _coup

d'état_ especially, kept assuring him that the army was advancing, and

that it was a question only of days. So, in spite of starvation and of

the continual rain of shells upon the city, he managed to maintain the

_morale_ of his garrison. The allies finally decided upon a systematic

assault of the forts on all sides of the city at once. In this way,

{314} the Turks were not able to use their heavy artillery to best

advantage. Advancing with scissors, the Bulgarians and Servians cut

their way through the tangle of barbed wire. On the 24th and 25th, the

forts fell one after the other. Czar Ferdinand entered the city with

his troops on March 26th.

It was at the moment of this heroic capture, in which there was glory

enough for all, that the clouds of trouble between Bulgaria and Servia

began to appear on the horizon. Shukri pasha, following the old policy

of the Turks, which had been so successful for centuries in the Balkan

Peninsula, tried to surrender to the Servian general, who was too loyal

to discipline to fall into this trap. But the Servian newspapers began

to say that it was really the Servian army who had captured the city,

and that Shukri pasha recognized this fact when he sent to find the

Servian commander. There was an unedifying duel of newspapers between

Belgrade and Sofia, which showed that the material for conflagration

was ready.

In the second period of the war, the Servians gave substantial aid,

especially in artillery, to the Montenegrins, who had been besieging

Scutari ever since October 15th. I went over the mountain of Tarabosh

on horse with an Albanian who had been one of its defenders. He

related graphically the story of the repeated assaults of the

Montenegrins and Servians. Each time they were driven back before they

reached those batteries that dominated Scutari and made impossible the

entry to the city without their capture. The loss of life was

tremendous. The bravery of the {315} assailants could do nothing

against the miles and miles of barbed wire. No means of stopping

assault has ever proved more efficacious. The besiegers were unable to

capture Tarabosh. So they could not enter the city.

At the beginning of the war, Scutari was under the command of Hassan

Riza pasha. In February, he was assassinated by his subordinate, Essad

pasha, an Albanian of the Toptani family, who had been a favourite of

Abdul Hamid, and had had a rather questionable career in the

_gendarmerie_ during the days of despotism. After the assassination of

the Turkish commandant, it was for Albania and not for Turkey that

Essad pasha continued the resistance. In March, Austria began to

threaten the Montenegrins, and assure them that they could not keep the

city. The story of how she secured the agreement of the Great Powers

in coercing Montenegro is told in another chapter. Montenegro was

defiant, and paid no attention to an international blockade. But on

April 13th, the Servians, fearing international complications, withdrew

from the siege. It was astonishing news to the world that after this,

on April 22d, Essad pasha surrendered Scutari to the King of

Montenegro, with the stipulation that he could withdraw with his

garrison, his light artillery, and whatever munitions he might be able

to take with him.

The Ottoman flag had ceased to wave in any part of Europe except

Constantinople and the Dardanelles. The war was over, whether the

Young Turks would have it so or not. Facts are facts.

{316}

THE TREATY OF LONDON

Nazim pasha was assassinated on January 23d. The armistice was

denounced on the 29th. On February 10th, Mahmud Shevket pasha began to

sound the Great Powers for their intervention in securing peace. It

was necessary, however, now that the war had been resumed, that the

impossibility of relieving Adrianople be demonstrated, so that it might

not continue to be a stumbling-block in reopening the negotiations.

The Great Powers were willing to act as mediators, but could not make

any acceptable overture until after the fall of Janina and Adrianople.

On March 23d, they proposed the following as basis for the renewal of

the negotiations at London:

"1. A frontier line from Enos to Midia, which would follow the course

of the Maritza, and the cession to the Allies of all the territories

west of that line, with the exception of Albania, whose status and

frontiers would be decided upon by the Powers.

"2. Decision by the Powers of the question of the Ægean Islands.

"3. Abandonment of Crete by Turkey.

"4. Arrangement of all financial questions at Paris, by an

international commission, in which the representatives of Turkey and

the allies would be allowed to sit. Participation of the allies in the

Ottoman Debt, and in the financial obligations of the territories newly

acquired. No indemnity of war, in principle.

"5. End of hostilities immediately after the acceptance of this basis

of negotiations."

{317}

Turkey agreed to these stipulations. The Balkan States, however, did

not want to commit themselves to the Enos-Midia line "as definitely

agreed upon," but only as a base of _pourparlers_. They insisted that

the Ægean Islands must be ceded directly to them. They wanted to know

what the Powers had in mind in regard to the frontiers of Albania. In

the last place, they refused to relinquish the possibility of an

indemnity of war.

Notes were exchanged back and forth among the chancelleries until April

20th, when the Balkan States finally agreed to accept the mediation of

the Powers. They had practically carried all their points, however,

except that of the communication of the Albanian frontier. Hostilities

ceased. There really was not much more to fight about, at least as far

as Turkey was concerned.

It was a whole month before the second conference at London opened.

The only gleam of hope that the Turks were justified in entertaining,

when they decided to renew the war, had been the possible outbreak of a

war between the Allies. If only the quarrel over Macedonia had come,

for which they looked from week to week, they might have been able to

put pressure on Bulgaria for the return of Adrianople, and on Greece

for the return of the Ægean Islands. But the rupture between the

Allies did not take place until after they had settled with Turkey.

Why fight over the bear's skin until it was actually in their hands?

The negotiations were reopened in London on May 20th. On May 30th, the

peace preliminaries {318} were signed. The Sultan of Turkey ceded to

the Kings of the allied states his dominions in Europe beyond the

Enos-Midia line. Albania, its status and frontiers, were intrusted by

the Sultan to the sovereigns of the Great Powers. He ceded Crete to

the allied sovereigns, but left the decision as to the islands in the

Ægean Sea, and the status of Mount Athos, to the Great Powers.

The war between the allies enabled Turkey to violate this treaty. They

won back from Bulgaria, without opposition, most of Thrace, including

Adrianople and Kirk Kilissé. Later, treaties were made separately with

each of the Balkan States. But, as it seems to be a principle of

history that no territories that have once passed from the shadow of

the Crescent return, it is probable that the Treaty of London will, in

the end, represent the _minimum_ of what Turkey's former subjects have

wrested from her.

{319}