CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY
On November 19, 1910, the Cretan General Assembly made a stirring
appeal "to the four Great Powers who are protectors of the island, to
the two great Powers of Central Europe, to the great Republic of the
New World, to the liberal and enlightened press of two Continents, and
in general to all Christians, in favour of the rights of the Cretan
people which it represents,--rights acquired and made legal by so many
sacrifices and sufferings." The Cretans definitely included the United
States and the American press in this manifesto. They wanted the
American people to become acquainted with what was known to the
chancelleries of Europe as "the Cretan question." For one fifth of the
Cretans have members of their families in America. There are few
hamlets in the island into which the spirit and influence of "the great
Republic of the New World" has not penetrated.
A review of the relationship between Crete and the European Powers is
as necessary in trying to throw light upon the events which led up to
the war of 1914 as is the exposition of the later phases of the
Albanian question. It helps us to grasp the attitude {221} of the
Powers towards Turkey in the years immediately after the proclamation
of the constitution, the tremendous power of Hellenism under the wise
and skilful guidance of a statesman such as M. Venizelos has proved
himself to be, the importance of the Cretan question in precipitating
the Balkan Wars, and the impotence of European diplomacy to preserve
the _status quo_, and decide _ex cathedra_ the destinies of countries
like Crete and Macedonia, whose emancipated kinsfolk had acquired the
spirit of the soldiers who sang:
"As Christ died to make men holy, let us die to make men free."
A century ago, Crete was cut off from the outside world. It had been
for two hundred and fifty years under the Turks, who took a peculiar
pride in the island from the fact that it was their last great
conquest. Its Christian inhabitants, although forming the majority of
the population, lived, or rather existed, under the same hopeless
conditions as prevailed throughout Turkey. In the sea-coast towns the
Christians prospered better than the Moslems, owing to their aptitude
for commerce; but the bulk of the Christian population was in abject
slavery to the Turkish _beys_, who were the great landowners.
The Greek war of liberation was shared in by the Cretans, who lent
valuable aid to their brethren of the mainland. They endured all the
sufferings of the war, but reaped none of its rewards. It is quite
possible that they might have thrown off the Turkish yoke at that
favourable moment had it not been for {222} the astute policy of the
Turks, who, seeing the danger of losing Crete, handed it over to
Mehemet Ali in 1830 as a reward for Egyptian aid in the Greek war and
compensation for the ships destroyed at Navarino. With the downfall of
Mehemet Ali's schemes of conquest in 1840, the island reverted to
Turkey. At this time the Powers could easily have united Crete with
Greece, but deliberately sacrificed the Cretans to their commercial
rivalries.
Turkey never succeeded in gaining her former ascendancy in Crete.
Insurrection after insurrection was drowned in blood. During two
generations the Turks sent into the unhappy island successive armies,
whose orgies of cruelty and lust are better left undescribed. But the
tortures of hell could not extinguish the flames of liberty. Every few
years the Cretans would rise again and repay blood with blood until
they were overwhelmed by Anatolian soldiers, of whom Turkey possesses
an unlimited supply.
At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the Greeks pled, with much force, for
the privilege of annexing Crete. As we read them to-day, the arguments
of M. Delyannis are a prophecy. The Powers put Crete back under
Ottoman control, subject to a reformed constitution called the Pact of
Holepa, which provided a fairly good administration, if a capable and
sincere governor were chosen. Everything went well until Sultan Abdul
Hamid in 1889 practically annulled the solemn agreement he had made by
appointing a Moslem Governor-General, and reducing the representation
in the General Assembly in such a way that the Moslem minority in the
island came into {223} power again. It would be fruitless to go into
the complex history of the next seven years during which the
lawlessness of former times was revived.
Christian refugees fled to Greece and carried the tale of their
sufferings. A massacre in Canea in February, 1897, engineered by
Turkish officers fresh from similar work in Armenia, had such a
repercussion in Greece that King George would have lost his throne had
he remained deaf to the popular demand that aid be sent to the Cretans.
Greek soldiers crossed to the stricken island. This meant war with
Turkey. In a few weeks Greece was overwhelmed in Thessaly, and the
Powers were compelled to intervene. Much ridicule has been cast upon
Greece for her impotence in the war of 1897. Her defeat was a foregone
conclusion, and she was severely blamed for having jeopardized the
peace of Europe just as the Balkan States are being blamed to-day.
But there are times when a nation simply has to fight. So it was with
Greece in 1897. In exactly similar circumstances, but with conditions
less serious and an issue not so long outstanding or so vital to
national well-being, the United States a year later declared war on
Spain. There was great similarity between the Cretan situation in 1897
and that of 1912 in Crete and Macedonia. Refugees, crossing the
borders and telling unspeakable tales to their brothers of blood and
religion, were continually before the eyes of the Bulgarians and
Servians and Montenegrins and Greeks since the proclamation of the
constitution in 1908. Each nationality suffered {224} by massacres in
Macedonia which were followed by no serious punishment.
Even though defeated in 1897, Greece forced the hand of the Powers and
of Turkey. Crete was given autonomy, and placed under the protection
of Italy, Great Britain, France, and Russia, who occupied the principal
ports of the island. For a year and a half they searched for a
"neutral" governor for the Cretans. The Turkish troops, however,
remained at Candia, leaving the rest of the island to the
revolutionaries. It was not until the British were attacked in the
harbour of Candia, and their Vice-Consul murdered, that the Powers
moved. But, as at Alexandria in 1882, it was a bluff admiral and not
the diplomats who settled the status of the island. The Turkish troops
were compelled to withdraw, and the Powers were told that they would
either have to appease the Cretans by some encouragement of their
aspirations or conquer the island by force. A way out of the dilemma
was found in the appointment of Prince George of Greece as High
Commissioner of the protecting Powers in Crete.
Here is where the Powers, if they had at that time any intention of
"preserving the rights of Turkey" in Crete, made the first of their
blunders. To call the son of the King of Greece to the chief
magistracy of an island which had so long aspired to political union
with Greece was, in the eyes of the people, a direct encouragement to
their aspirations. How could they think otherwise? The Turkish
Cretans, too, regarded this step as the end of Ottoman sovereignty, for
they emigrated in so great a number that soon the {225} Moslem
population was reduced to ten per cent. Prince George's appointment,
made in December, 1898, was for three years, but really lasted eight.
In 1906 he withdrew because he had become hopelessly involved in party
politics, and had "backed the wrong horses."
Now comes the second blunder, _unless the Powers were preparing Crete
for union with Greece_. They sent a letter to the King of Greece,
asking him to appoint a successor to his son! Let me quote from the
exact wording of this letter:
"The protecting Powers, in order to manifest their desire to take into
account as far as possible the aspirations of the Cretan people, and to
recognize in a practical manner the interest which His Hellenic Majesty
must always take in the prosperity of Crete, are in accord to propose
to His Majesty that hereafter, whenever the post of High Commissioner
of Crete shall become vacant, His Majesty, after confidential
consultations with the representatives of the Powers at Athens, will
designate a candidate capable of exercising the mandate of the Powers
in this island...."
Turkey naturally protested against the change in the _status quo_ which
such a step implied, and pointed out that it was a virtual destruction
even of the _suzerainty_ of the Sultan. The Powers, however, did not
object to the publication of their note to the King of Greece in the
newspapers of Crete. M. Zaimis, a former prime minister of Greece, was
appointed High Commissioner. The island had its own flag and postage
stamps, and laws identical with those of {226} Greece. Cretan officers
in Greek uniform commanded the militia and constabulary of the island.
Turkey treated Crete as a foreign country. For this statement there is
no more conclusive proof than the records of the custom-houses at
Smyrna and Salonika which show that Cretan products were subjected to
the same duties as were applied to all foreign imports.
It would seem, then, that Crete was in practically the same position as
Eastern Roumelia in 1885, or, in fact, as Bulgaria herself. Nothing
was more natural than that the establishment of a constitutional
_régime_ in Turkey should lead to a proclamation of union with Greece.
The motives which led to this action were identical with those which
Austria-Hungary put forth as an explanation of her annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The Cretans quite justly feared that the Young Turks
would repudiate the obligations assumed by Abdul Hamid, and endeavour
to bring Crete back into the Turkish fold. At the moment Turkey was so
engrossed in the question of the Austrian annexation and the Bulgarian
declaration of independence and seizure of the railways in Eastern
Roumelia that she contented herself with a formal protest against the
action of the Cretan Assembly.
What did the Powers do? Turkey, at the moment, could have done nothing
had they recognized the union with Greece. But they did not want to go
that far. On the other hand, they did not want to offend Greece and
the Cretans. They made no threats, and took no action, although their
troops were in the island. Inaction and indecision were made worse by
{227} the following note, which was sent by the four Consuls at Candia
to the self-appointed provisional government:
"The undersigned, agents of France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia,
by order of their respective governments, have the honour of bringing
to the knowledge of the Cretan government (_sic_) that the protecting
Powers consider the union of Crete to Greece as depending upon the
assent of the Powers who have contracted obligations with Turkey.
Nevertheless they would not refuse to envisage with kindly and
sympathetic interest the discussion of this question with Turkey, if
order is maintained in the island and if the safety of the Moslem
population is secured."
That diplomatic sanction would sooner or later be given to the action
of the Cretans, if they showed their ability to preserve order in the
island and treat the Moslems well, is an altogether justifiable
interpretation of this note of the Powers. Otherwise would they not
have protested against the illegality of the provisional government,
and have forbidden the Cretan authorities to promulgate their decrees
in the name of King George? Although the High Commissioner had
disappeared, and the Cretans were running the island just as if the
annexation were an assured fact, the Powers, far from protesting,
announced their intention of withdrawing their troops of occupation!
What were their intentions concerning Crete, and what was their
understanding of the _status quo_ at the moment of withdrawal? This
question they did not {228} answer then, nor did they answer it
afterwards. They simply withdrew from the island without stating what
legal power was to succeed them. This was in the summer of 1909. M.
Venizelos, then Prime Minister of Crete, asked the Powers to state
definitely their intentions. He said that he did not wish to run
counter to the orders of the Powers, but that he would have to raise
the flag of Greece over the island when their troops left, unless they
_formally_ forbade him to do so. With admirable clearness and
irrefutable logic he pointed out to the Powers that the only other
alternative would be anarchy. But the Powers, pressed by their
ambassadors at Constantinople, were afraid to assent to annexation.
They were equally averse to taking the opposite course. So they
contented themselves with giving M. Venizelos "friendly counsels" not
to hoist the Greek flag. The result was the ludicrous spectacle of the
cutting down of the Greek flag by marines landed from eight warships.
It was like a scene from a comic opera, and M. Venizelos must have
formed then the opinion which every succeeding action of the Powers
strengthened and to which he gave expression after the Balkan War was
declared--that the Powers were "venerable old women."
Crete now began to be menaced by the insensate chauvinism of the Young
Turks, who thought they could avenge the loss of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
the Bulgarian declaration of independence by destroying the autonomy of
Crete and re-establishing the authority of the Sultan in this island
which had been repudiating the Ottoman government for eighty {229}
years. In the spring of 1910, the _Tanine_, at that time official
organ of the Committee of Union and Progress, laid down five points as
the _minimum_ which the Porte would accept in the definite and
permanent solution of the status of Crete:
"1. Formal recognition of the rights of the Sultan.
"2. The right of the Sultan to name the Governor-General of the island
among three Cretan candidates elected by the General Assembly.
"3. The right of the _sheik-ul-islam_ to name the religious chiefs of
the Cretan Moslems.
"4. Establishment in the Bay of Suda of a coaling-station for the
Ottoman fleet, and the maintenance there of a permanent _stationnaire_
like the _stationnaires_ of the embassies at Constantinople.
"5. Restriction of the rights of the Cretan government in the matter of
conclusion of treaties of commerce and agreements with foreign powers."
What the "rights of the Sultan" might be were not specified then, nor
have they been since: but articles four and five were enough to throw
the whole of Crete into a state of wildest excitement. The Turks,
after having lost the island, were trying to win it back.
Left to themselves (as they had every reason to believe) the Cretans
convoked the National Assembly for April 26, 1910. The Assembly was
opened in the name of George I., King of the Hellenes. The Moslem
deputies immediately presented a protest in which they rejected the
sovereignty of Greece over Crete. The deputies were then asked to take
the oath of allegiance in the name of King George. A second petition
was presented by the {230} Moslem deputies, declaring that, as the
Sultan of Turkey held "sovereign rights" in the island, they, in the
name of their Moslem constituents, protested against such an action.
They refused to take the oath. Should they be excluded from the
Assembly, or be allowed to sit without taking the oath?
Instead of insisting on the admission of the Moslem deputies, the
Powers again gave "friendly counsels." Once more M. Venizelos pleaded
that they speak out their mind in the matter of the legal status of the
island. The diplomats "temporized" again, and the warships reappeared
to assure to the Moslem deputies "their lawful rights." When M.
Venizelos could get no statement from the Powers as to the grounds upon
which these "lawful rights" rested, he saw that all hope of help from
the Powers was over, and that he was only wasting his time. Like
Cavour, when he turned with disgust from his efforts to interest the
Powers and had the inspiration, _Italia fara da se_, the Cretan leader
abandoned the antechamber of the chancelleries. While the Powers still
sought a _modus vivendi_ for Crete, M. Venizelos made one. From that
moment the Balkan War was a certainty.
The Young Turk Cabinet, arrogant and drunk with the success of their
boycott against Austria-Hungary, and at the same time knowing that they
must turn public attention away from the loss of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, began to press the Powers for the restoration in Crete of
the _status quo_ as it had existed before the diplomatic blunders I
have outlined above, and, in addition, for the coaling station and for
control over Crete's foreign relations. At {231} the same time, they
demanded of the Athens Cabinet that Greece renounce formally, not only
for the present _but also for the future_, any intention of annexing
Crete. The Young Turks represented that public opinion in Turkey was
so wrought up over the Cretan question that war with Greece would
certainly follow. To illustrate to the Powers and to Greece the force
of this public opinion, a widespread boycott against everything Greek
in Turkey was started. This economic warfare is described in another
chapter. In some parts of Turkey the boycott has never ceased. There
is no doubt that this boycott was one of the very most important
factors in bringing on the Balkan War. For it taught the Greeks, who
were continually being bullied and threatened with an invasion in
Thessaly, the imperative necessity of reconciliation with Bulgaria by a
compromise of rival claims in Macedonia.
Thinking that he could serve his country better in Greece than in
Crete, M. Venizelos posed his candidacy to the Greek Chamber in the
summer of 1910. Seemingly he was abandoning Crete to its fate, and he
had to bear many unjust reproaches from his fellow-countrymen. His
wonderful personality and extraordinary political genius soon brought
him to the front in Greece. The Cretan revolutionary became Prime
Minister of Greece. Steadfast in his purpose he began to negotiate
with the other Balkan States and with Russia. He was able to
accomplish the impossible. The war with Turkey is largely his personal
success. No statesman since Bismarck has had so brilliant a triumph.
{232}
In 1910, M. Venizelos took the step which was the turning point in his
career and in the history of Greece. Firmly persuaded that Crete could
be annexed to Greece only by Greece proving herself stronger than
Turkey, and not by diplomatic manoeuvres, he decided to desert Cretan
politics, and enter the larger sphere open to him at Athens. It was
easy to secure a seat in the Greek Parliament, but that was the only
easy part about it. When one considered the fickle character of the
Greek people in their politics, the selfish narrowness and bitter
prejudices of their leaders, the inefficiency of the army and navy,
whose officers had been ruined by political activity, the emptiness of
the treasury, the unpopularity of the royal family, and the general
disorder throughout the country, it seems incredible that M. Venizelos
should have been willing to assume the responsibility of government,
let alone succeed in his self-imposed task. Had you asked the leading
statesmen of Europe five years ago what country presented the most
formidable and at the same time most hopeless task tor a Premier, there
would have been unanimity in selecting Greece.
But for Eleutherios Venizelos there was no difficulty which could not
be overcome. It is the nature of the man to refuse to see failure
ahead. "If one loves to work, and works for love," he has declared,
"failure does not exist."
Called to be Prime Minister in August, 1910, M. Venezelos began to
reform everything in sight. His first step was to endow Greece with a
new constitution, whose most important changes were a Council of {233}
State, chosen for life and irremovable, to act as a Senate (Greece has
single-chamber government), legalizing the state of siege, sanctioning
the employment of foreigners in the service of the Government, fixing
twenty-four hours as the maximum delay for bringing one who had been
arrested before a magistrate, forbidding the publication of uncensored
news relative to military and naval operations in time of war,
establishing free, obligatory primary instruction, excluding from
Parliament directors in corporations, and facilitating the
expropriation of property for public purposes. I have given enough to
show the practical character of the new constitution.
Although strongly urged to do so, both by the King and by the political
leaders, M. Venizelos refused to turn his Constituent Assembly into an
ordinary Parliament, and proceed to the legislation made possible by
the new constitution. Seeing clearly that durable and effective
ministerial power could be derived only from the people and supported
only by their intelligent good-will, he balked the intrigues of the
politicians, and overcame the dynastic fears of the King. The
Constituent Assembly was dissolved. M. Venizelos went before the
people, travelling everywhere and explaining his program for the
reformation of the country. The result was a triumph such as no man
has ever received in modern Greece. In November, 1910, followers of M.
Venizelos were returned in so overwhelming a majority that he could
afford to ignore the Athenian politicians who saw in him a menace to
their personal rule, their sloth, and their "graft."
{234}
Since that day M. Venizelos has been the idol of Greece. Never has
trust in public man been more amply justified. Every administration of
the State was completely transformed within eighteen months. Even to
outline what M. Venizelos has accomplished reads like a fairy tale.
Only those who knew the Greece before his arrival and are able to
contrast it with the Greece of today can appreciate the immensity of
his labours and the radical character of the changes he has made. I
cannot dwell on the talent shown by this Cretan in matters of financial
reform. But his military and naval reforms, and his foreign policy,
have been so important in making possible the Balkan alliance and its
successes that they cannot be passed over.
M. Venizelos, when he first came to Athens, saw what was the matter
with the Greek military and naval establishments. Like Peter the Great
and the Japanese, he realized that the Greeks must learn from Europe by
submitting to European teachers. To persuade his fellow-countrymen,
who have a very exalted opinion of their own ability (the Greeks are
always sure they were born to command, without first having learned to
obey!), that they must not only call in foreign advisers, but must
submit to their authority, has been the most Herculean of the tasks
this great man set before him. Article three of the new constitution
had authorized the appointment of foreigners as officers of the
Government and given them temporarily Hellenic citizenship. From
England was asked a naval mission, from France a military mission, and
from {235} Italy officers to reorganize the _gendarmerie_. In Greece
the foreign officers were able to accomplish more in eighteen months
than the foreign "advisers" of Turkey had accomplished in many long
years. This is no assertion of personal opinion. The facts of the
Balkan War speak for themselves. Why is this? In Turkey, the foreign
teachers have never been given any real authority, and have seen every
effort they put forth nullified by the insouciance, self-sufficiency,
and cursed apathy of the Turk. The Greeks, on the contrary, "became as
little children," and lo! a miracle was wrought!
When foreigners who visited Greece within recent years read about the
successes of the Crown Prince at Salonika and Janina, the assassination
of King George, the mourning of the Greek people, and the hearty
acclamation of King Constantine, the national hero, they could think
back to less than four years ago when the Crown Prince was practically
banished from Greece, after having been dismissed from his command in
the army by a popular uprising, and when the portrait of the King was
removed from every coffee-house in Athens. What is the cause of the
complete revulsion in public feeling towards the dynasty? It is due to
the common sense of M. Venizelos. He saw that the present dynasty was
necessary for Greece, and that the Crown Prince must come back and take
command of the army. In defiance of public opinion, he insisted on
this point. This attitude was a bitter disappointment to many who
imagined that M. Venizelos would be anti-dynastic in his policy. As a
result of his {236} success in reconciling the Greeks with their
sovereign and his family, the sympathies of Russia and Germany and
Great Britain were not alienated from the Greek people, as was rapidly
becoming the case. Emperor William especially, whose sister is wife of
the new Greek King, was so delighted with the success of M. Venizelos
in rehabilitating his brother-in-law that he asked the Greek Premier to
visit him at Corfu.
This visit of the former Cretan revolutionary to the German Emperor in
April, 1912, was hardly commented upon by the European press. But
epoch-making words must have been spoken in the villa Achilleion, for
immediately after that visit the semi-official German press began to
prepare the public for the events which were to take place in the
Balkans. The eloquence and remorseless logic which had carried the day
among Cretan insurgents and Greek electors was not lost on the
"war-lord of Europe." Emperor William carried back to Berlin the
conviction that no diplomacy could outwit the Greek Premier's
determination that Turkey should disappear from Crete and Macedonia.
I do not think I am exaggerating in saying that when the Young Turks,
by their insensate chauvinism, caused M. Venizelos to despair of saving
Crete through Crete itself, they signed their own death-warrant. If
they had refrained from their boycott and let Crete alone, would M.
Venizelos have gone to Greece? I think not. It is one of those
strange coincidences of history that on the very day when Mahmud
Shevket pasha, in the Ottoman Parliament, {237} declared that if Greece
did not make a public statement to the effect that she had no intention
at any time to extend her sovereignty over Crete, a million Turkish
bayonets would gleam upon the plains of Thessaly, Eleutherios Venizelos
was quietly leaving Crete for Athens.
To bring together Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro into an
alliance which would drive the Turk out of Europe was in the mind of M.
Venizelos as far back as the summer of 1909, when he saw the
international fleet at Canea land marines to cut down the Greek flag
which he had raised. It became an obsession with him. It was
possible, because he believed it was possible. But no one else
regarded it as more than an idle dream. The rare friends to whom M.
Venizelos vaguely hinted that such an alliance was the only way of
solving the Balkan question called it the "acme of absurdity." I quote
the words of an eminent diplomat to whom this solution was mentioned.
At the opening of the Italian War, when I suggested to the Turkish
Grand Vizier that such an alliance was possible, he looked at me
pityingly, and said, "The questions you ask display your ignorance of
conditions in this part of the world. My time is too valuable to
discuss such an impossible hypothesis. Go to Hussein Hilmi pasha, and
ask him if he thinks the Greeks and Bulgarians could ever unite."
Hussein Hilmi pasha referred me to every single book that has ever been
written about the Macedonian question. "I do not care which you read,"
said the ex-Governor-General of Macedonia, "they all tell the same
story."
{238}
But M. Venizelos was not asking himself, "Can I do it?" but, "How shall
I do it?" Once more he saw clearly. The pan-Hellenic national ideal
must be given up. Greece must content herself with Epiros, the Ægean
Islands, Crete, and a slice of Macedonia west of the Vardar--possibly
including Salonika, if the army proved as victory-winning as those of
Bulgaria and Servia. Everything else must be left to Bulgaria and
Servia. When first proposed to the leaders of Greece, this proposition
seemed so preposterous that M. Venizelos was accused of being a traitor
to Hellenism. He is still denounced by the fanatics, after all that he
has accomplished. But patiently he built up his argument, using all
his magnetism and his eloquence to convince his colleagues. He showed
how Greece was being constantly humiliated and menaced by the
chauvinism of the Young Turks, how the boycott was ruining Greek
shipping, how Crete itself would gradually get to like independence
better than union with Greece, and how inevitable it was that the Slavs
should in the course of time come to possess Thrace and Macedonia.
Instead of sacrificing everything to Bulgaria, he maintained, "this is
our only chance to get any part of European Turkey. We must give up
our ideal, because it is impracticable. With Bulgaria, we can crush
Turkey. Without Bulgaria, Turkey will crush us. And if Bulgaria
helps, we must pay the price." It may be years--not until archives are
open to historians and memoirs of present actors are published--before
everything is clear concerning the formation of an alliance which was
as great a surprise {239} to Europe as it was to Turkey. But the
famous telegram which M. Gueshoff, Prime Minister of Bulgaria,
addressed to his colleagues at Athens after the first successes of the
war were won, is sufficient testimony to the essential part played by
M. Venizelos in forming the coalition.
After M. Venizelos left Crete, a last blunder made the protecting
Powers the laughing-stock of Europe. The Cretans elected deputies to
the Greek Chamber, and the warships of the Powers played hide-and-seek
with small Cretan craft in a fruitless endeavour to prevent the chosen
deputies from proceeding to Athens. This move was altogether
unnecessary, for they had not yet learned the matchless worth of their
opponent. M. Venizelos, knowing that Greece and her new allies were
not yet ready for war with Turkey, "tipped off" both the Cretans and
the leaders in the Greek Parliament that they would have to wait one or
two years longer. But, to satisfy the _hoi polloi_ on the one hand and
the diplomats on the other, a little comedy was enacted before the
Parliament House in Athens which threw wool over everybody's eyes.
As soon as he saw that war was inevitable and that his allies were
ready, M. Venizelos admitted the Cretan deputies. Europe was face to
face with a _fait accompli_. The Cretan and Macedonian questions were
settled by war. The hand of Turkey and the diplomats was forced.
Now we see the importance of the Cretan question. The Balkan War could
have been avoided by a courageous and straightforward policy of
efficient {240} protection of Christians who lived under the Ottoman
flag. It is because the Powers did not fulfil the obligations of the
Treaty of Berlin, and sacrificed Cretans and Bulgarians and Servians
and Greeks to the furthering of their commercial interests at
Constantinople, that all Europe is now stained with blood. By
flattering the Turk and condoning his crimes, the Powers succeeded in
destroying the "integrity of the Ottoman Empire," which they professed
to uphold. In trying to be the friends of the Turk they proved his
worst enemies.
The Cretan question is a commentary upon the utter futility of
insincere and procrastinating diplomacy.
{241}