will then have a clear idea of the whole. Had France acted towards her
colonies as you have done, you would have branded her with every epithet
of abhorrence; and had you, like her, stepped in to succor a struggling
people, all Europe must have echoed with your own applauses. But
entangled in the passion of dispute you see it not as you ought, and
form opinions thereon which suit with no interest but your own. You
wonder that America does not rise in union with you to impose on herself
a portion of your taxes and reduce herself to unconditional submission.
You are amazed that the southern powers of Europe do not assist you
in conquering a country which is afterwards to be turned against
themselves; and that the northern ones do not contribute to reinstate
you in America who already enjoy the market for naval stores by the
separation. You seem surprised that Holland does not pour in her succors
to maintain you mistress of the seas, when her own commerce is suffering
by your act of navigation; or that any country should study her own
interest while yours is on the carpet.
Such excesses of passionate folly, and unjust as well as unwise
resentment, have driven you on, like Pharaoh, to unpitied miseries, and
while the importance of the quarrel shall perpetuate your disgrace, the
flag of America will carry it round the world. The natural feelings of
every rational being will be against you, and wherever the story shall
be told, you will have neither excuse nor consolation left. With an
unsparing hand, and an insatiable mind, you have desolated the world,
to gain dominion and to lose it; and while, in a frenzy of avarice and
ambition, the east and the west are doomed to tributary bondage, you
rapidly earned destruction as the wages of a nation.
At the thoughts of a war at home, every man amongst you ought to
tremble. The prospect is far more dreadful there than in America. Here
the party that was against the measures of the continent were in general
composed of a kind of neutrals, who added strength to neither army.
There does not exist a being so devoid of sense and sentiment as to
covet "unconditional submission," and therefore no man in America could
be with you in principle. Several might from a cowardice of mind, prefer
it to the hardships and dangers of opposing it; but the same disposition
that gave them such a choice, unfitted them to act either for or against
us. But England is rent into parties, with equal shares of resolution.
The principle which produced the war divides the nation. Their
animosities are in the highest state of fermentation, and both sides, by
a call of the militia, are in arms. No human foresight can discern, no
conclusion can be formed, what turn a war might take, if once set on
foot by an invasion. She is not now in a fit disposition to make a
common cause of her own affairs, and having no conquests to hope for
abroad, and nothing but expenses arising at home, her everything is
staked upon a defensive combat, and the further she goes the worse she
is off.
There are situations that a nation may be in, in which peace or war,
abstracted from every other consideration, may be politically right or
wrong. When nothing can be lost by a war, but what must be lost without
it, war is then the policy of that country; and such was the situation
of America at the commencement of hostilities: but when no security can
be gained by a war, but what may be accomplished by a peace, the case
becomes reversed, and such now is the situation of England.
That America is beyond the reach of conquest, is a fact which experience
has shown and time confirmed, and this admitted, what, I ask, is now the
object of contention? If there be any honor in pursuing self-destruction
with inflexible passion--if national suicide be the perfection of
national glory, you may, with all the pride of criminal happiness,
expire unenvied and unrivalled. But when the tumult of war shall cease,
and the tempest of present passions be succeeded by calm reflection, or
when those, who, surviving its fury, shall inherit from you a legacy
of debts and misfortunes, when the yearly revenue scarcely be able to
discharge the interest of the one, and no possible remedy be left for
the other, ideas far different from the present will arise, and embitter
the remembrance of former follies. A mind disarmed of its rage feels no
pleasure in contemplating a frantic quarrel. Sickness of thought, the
sure consequence of conduct like yours, leaves no ability for enjoyment,
no relish for resentment; and though, like a man in a fit, you feel
not the injury of the struggle, nor distinguish between strength and
disease, the weakness will nevertheless be proportioned to the violence,
and the sense of pain increase with the recovery.
To what persons or to whose system of politics you owe your present
state of wretchedness, is a matter of total indifference to America.
They have contributed, however unwillingly, to set her above themselves,
and she, in the tranquillity of conquest, resigns the inquiry. The case
now is not so properly who began the war, as who continues it. That
there are men in all countries to whom a state of war is a mine of
wealth, is a fact never to be doubted. Characters like these naturally
breed in the putrefaction of distempered times, and after fattening
on the disease, they perish with it, or, impregnated with the stench,
retreat into obscurity.
But there are several erroneous notions to which you likewise owe a
share of your misfortunes, and which, if continued, will only increase
your trouble and your losses. An opinion hangs about the gentlemen
of the minority, that America would relish measures under their
administration, which she would not from the present cabinet. On this
rock Lord Chatham would have split had he gained the helm, and several
of his survivors are steering the same course. Such distinctions in
the infancy of the argument had some degree of foundation, but they now
serve no other purpose than to lengthen out a war, in which the limits
of a dispute, being fixed by the fate of arms, and guaranteed by
treaties, are not to be changed or altered by trivial circumstances.
The ministry, and many of the minority, sacrifice their time in
disputing on a question with which they have nothing to do, namely,
whether America shall be independent or not. Whereas the only question
that can come under their determination is, whether they will accede to
it or not. They confound a military question with a political one, and
undertake to supply by a vote what they lost by a battle. Say she shall
not be independent, and it will signify as much as if they voted
against a decree of fate, or say that she shall, and she will be no more
independent than before. Questions which, when determined, cannot be
executed, serve only to show the folly of dispute and the weakness of
disputants.
From a long habit of calling America your own, you suppose her governed
by the same prejudices and conceits which govern yourselves. Because you
have set up a particular denomination of religion to the exclusion of
all others, you imagine she must do the same, and because you, with an
unsociable narrowness of mind, have cherished enmity against France and
Spain, you suppose her alliance must be defective in friendship.
Copying her notions of the world from you, she formerly thought as you
instructed, but now feeling herself free, and the prejudice removed, she
thinks and acts upon a different system. It frequently happens that
in proportion as we are taught to dislike persons and countries, not
knowing why, we feel an ardor of esteem upon the removal of the mistake:
it seems as if something was to be made amends for, and we eagerly give
in to every office of friendship, to atone for the injury of the error.
But, perhaps, there is something in the extent of countries, which,
among the generality of people, insensibly communicates extension of the
mind. The soul of an islander, in its native state, seems bounded by
the foggy confines of the water's edge, and all beyond affords to him
matters only for profit or curiosity, not for friendship. His island
is to him his world, and fixed to that, his every thing centers in it;
while those who are inhabitants of a continent, by casting their eye
over a larger field, take in likewise a larger intellectual circuit,
and thus approaching nearer to an acquaintance with the universe, their
atmosphere of thought is extended, and their liberality fills a wider
space. In short, our minds seem to be measured by countries when we are
men, as they are by places when we are children, and until something
happens to disentangle us from the prejudice, we serve under it without
perceiving it.
In addition to this, it may be remarked, that men who study any
universal science, the principles of which are universally known, or
admitted, and applied without distinction to the common benefit of all
countries, obtain thereby a larger share of philanthropy than those
who only study national arts and improvements. Natural philosophy,
mathematics and astronomy, carry the mind from the country to the
creation, and give it a fitness suited to the extent. It was not
Newton's honor, neither could it be his pride, that he was an
Englishman, but that he was a philosopher, the heavens had liberated him
from the prejudices of an island, and science had expanded his soul as
boundless as his studies.
COMMON SENSE.
PHILADELPHIA, March, 1780.
THE CRISIS IX. (HAD AMERICA PURSUED HER ADVANTAGES)
HAD America pursued her advantages with half the spirit that she
resisted her misfortunes, she would, before now, have been a conquering
and a peaceful people; but lulled in the lap of soft tranquillity, she
rested on her hopes, and adversity only has convulsed her into action.
Whether subtlety or sincerity at the close of the last year induced the
enemy to an appearance for peace, is a point not material to know; it is
sufficient that we see the effects it has had on our politics, and that
we sternly rise to resent the delusion.
The war, on the part of America, has been a war of natural feelings.
Brave in distress; serene in conquest; drowsy while at rest; and in
every situation generously disposed to peace; a dangerous calm, and
a most heightened zeal have, as circumstances varied, succeeded each
other. Every passion but that of despair has been called to a tour
of duty; and so mistaken has been the enemy, of our abilities
and disposition, that when she supposed us conquered, we rose the
conquerors. The extensiveness of the United States, and the variety of
their resources; the universality of their cause, the quick operation of
their feelings, and the similarity of their sentiments, have, in every
trying situation, produced a something, which, favored by providence,
and pursued with ardor, has accomplished in an instant the business of
a campaign. We have never deliberately sought victory, but snatched it;
and bravely undone in an hour the blotted operations of a season.
The reported fate of Charleston, like the misfortunes of 1776, has at
last called forth a spirit, and kindled up a flame, which perhaps
no other event could have produced. If the enemy has circulated a
falsehood, they have unwisely aggravated us into life, and if they have
told us the truth, they have unintentionally done us a service. We were
returning with folded arms from the fatigues of war, and thinking and
sitting leisurely down to enjoy repose. The dependence that has been
put upon Charleston threw a drowsiness over America. We looked on the
business done--the conflict over--the matter settled--or that all which
remained unfinished would follow of itself. In this state of dangerous
relaxation, exposed to the poisonous infusions of the enemy, and having
no common danger to attract our attention, we were extinguishing, by
stages, the ardor we began with, and surrendering by piece-meal the
virtue that defended us.
Afflicting as the loss of Charleston may be, yet if it universally rouse
us from the slumber of twelve months past, and renew in us the spirit of
former days, it will produce an advantage more important than its loss.
America ever is what she thinks herself to be. Governed by sentiment,
and acting her own mind, she becomes, as she pleases, the victor or the
victim.
It is not the conquest of towns, nor the accidental capture of
garrisons, that can reduce a country so extensive as this. The
sufferings of one part can never be relieved by the exertions of
another, and there is no situation the enemy can be placed in that does
not afford to us the same advantages which he seeks himself. By dividing
his force, he leaves every post attackable. It is a mode of war that
carries with it a confession of weakness, and goes on the principle of
distress rather than conquest.
The decline of the enemy is visible, not only in their operations, but
in their plans; Charleston originally made but a secondary object in the
system of attack, and it is now become their principal one, because
they have not been able to succeed elsewhere. It would have carried a
cowardly appearance in Europe had they formed their grand expedition, in
1776, against a part of the continent where there was no army, or not
a sufficient one to oppose them; but failing year after year in their
impressions here, and to the eastward and northward, they deserted their
capital design, and prudently contenting themselves with what they can
get, give a flourish of honor to conceal disgrace.
But this piece-meal work is not conquering the continent. It is a
discredit in them to attempt it, and in us to suffer it. It is now full
time to put an end to a war of aggravations, which, on one side, has
no possible object, and on the other has every inducement which honor,
interest, safety and happiness can inspire. If we suffer them much
longer to remain among us, we shall become as bad as themselves.
An association of vice will reduce us more than the sword. A nation
hardened in the practice of iniquity knows better how to profit by it,
than a young country newly corrupted. We are not a match for them in the
line of advantageous guilt, nor they for us on the principles which we
bravely set out with. Our first days were our days of honor. They have
marked the character of America wherever the story of her wars are told;
and convinced of this, we have nothing to do but wisely and unitedly to
tread the well known track. The progress of a war is often as ruinous
to individuals, as the issue of it is to a nation; and it is not only
necessary that our forces be such that we be conquerors in the end,
but that by timely exertions we be secure in the interim. The present
campaign will afford an opportunity which has never presented itself
before, and the preparations for it are equally necessary, whether
Charleston stand or fall. Suppose the first, it is in that case only
a failure of the enemy, not a defeat. All the conquest that a besieged
town can hope for, is, not to be conquered; and compelling an enemy
to raise the siege, is to the besieged a victory. But there must be
a probability amounting almost to a certainty, that would justify a
garrison marching out to attack a retreat. Therefore should Charleston
not be taken, and the enemy abandon the siege, every other part of the
continent should prepare to meet them; and, on the contrary, should it
be taken, the same preparations are necessary to balance the loss, and
put ourselves in a position to co-operate with our allies, immediately
on their arrival.
We are not now fighting our battles alone, as we were in 1776; England,
from a malicious disposition to America, has not only not declared war
against France and Spain, but, the better to prosecute her passions
here, has afforded those powers no military object, and avoids them,
to distress us. She will suffer her West India islands to be overrun by
France, and her southern settlements to be taken by Spain, rather than
quit the object that gratifies her revenge. This conduct, on the part
of Britain, has pointed out the propriety of France sending a naval and
land force to co-operate with America on the spot. Their arrival cannot
be very distant, nor the ravages of the enemy long. The recruiting the
army, and procuring the supplies, are the two things most necessary to
be accomplished, and a capture of either of the enemy's divisions will
restore to America peace and plenty.
At a crisis, big, like the present, with expectation and events, the
whole country is called to unanimity and exertion. Not an ability ought
now to sleep, that can produce but a mite to the general good, nor even
a whisper to pass that militates against it. The necessity of the case,
and the importance of the consequences, admit no delay from a friend,
no apology from an enemy. To spare now, would be the height of
extravagance, and to consult present ease, would be to sacrifice it
perhaps forever.
America, rich in patriotism and produce, can want neither men nor
supplies, when a serious necessity calls them forth. The slow
operation of taxes, owing to the extensiveness of collection, and their
depreciated value before they arrived in the treasury, have, in many
instances, thrown a burden upon government, which has been artfully
interpreted by the enemy into a general decline throughout the
country. Yet this, inconvenient as it may at first appear, is not only
remediable, but may be turned to an immediate advantage; for it makes no
real difference, whether a certain number of men, or company of militia
(and in this country every man is a militia-man), are directed by law
to send a recruit at their own expense, or whether a tax is laid on them
for that purpose, and the man hired by government afterwards. The first,
if there is any difference, is both cheapest and best, because it saves
the expense which would attend collecting it as a tax, and brings the
man sooner into the field than the modes of recruiting formerly used;
and, on this principle, a law has been passed in this state, for
recruiting two men from each company of militia, which will add upwards
of a thousand to the force of the country.
But the flame which has broken forth in this city since the report from
New York, of the loss of Charleston, not only does honor to the place,
but, like the blaze of 1776, will kindle into action the scattered
sparks throughout America. The valor of a country may be learned by the
bravery of its soldiery, and the general cast of its inhabitants, but
confidence of success is best discovered by the active measures pursued
by men of property; and when the spirit of enterprise becomes so
universal as to act at once on all ranks of men, a war may then, and not
till then, be styled truly popular.
In 1776, the ardor of the enterprising part was considerably checked by
the real revolt of some, and the coolness of others. But in the present
case, there is a firmness in the substance and property of the country
to the public cause. An association has been entered into by
the merchants, tradesmen, and principal inhabitants of the city
[Philadelphia], to receive and support the new state money at the value
of gold and silver; a measure which, while it does them honor, will
likewise contribute to their interest, by rendering the operations of
the campaign convenient and effectual.
Nor has the spirit of exertion stopped here. A voluntary subscription is
likewise begun, to raise a fund of hard money, to be given as bounties,
to fill up the full quota of the Pennsylvania line. It has been the
remark of the enemy, that every thing in America has been done by the
force of government; but when she sees individuals throwing in their
voluntary aid, and facilitating the public measures in concert with the
established powers of the country, it will convince her that the cause
of America stands not on the will of a few but on the broad foundation
of property and popularity.
Thus aided and thus supported, disaffection will decline, and the
withered head of tyranny expire in America. The ravages of the enemy
will be short and limited, and like all their former ones, will produce
a victory over themselves.
COMMON SENSE.
PHILADELPHIA, June 9, 1780.
P. S. At the time of writing this number of the Crisis, the loss of
Charleston, though believed by some, was more confidently disbelieved
by others. But there ought to be no longer a doubt upon the matter.
Charleston is gone, and I believe for the want of a sufficient supply of
provisions. The man that does not now feel for the honor of the best
and noblest cause that ever a country engaged in, and exert himself
accordingly, is no longer worthy of a peaceable residence among a people
determined to be free.
C. S.
THE CRISIS EXTRAORDINARY
ON THE SUBJECT OF TAXATION.
IT IS impossible to sit down and think seriously on the affairs of
America, but the original principles upon which she resisted, and
the glow and ardor which they inspired, will occur like the undefaced
remembrance of a lovely scene. To trace over in imagination the purity
of the cause, the voluntary sacrifices that were made to support it,
and all the various turnings of the war in its defence, is at once both
paying and receiving respect. The principles deserve to be remembered,
and to remember them rightly is repossessing them. In this indulgence
of generous recollection, we become gainers by what we seem to give, and
the more we bestow the richer we become.
So extensively right was the ground on which America proceeded, that it
not only took in every just and liberal sentiment which could impress
the heart, but made it the direct interest of every class and order
of men to defend the country. The war, on the part of Britain, was
originally a war of covetousness. The sordid and not the splendid
passions gave it being. The fertile fields and prosperous infancy of
America appeared to her as mines for tributary wealth. She viewed the
hive, and disregarding the industry that had enriched it, thirsted for
the honey. But in the present stage of her affairs, the violence of
temper is added to the rage of avarice; and therefore, that which at
the first setting out proceeded from purity of principle and public
interest, is now heightened by all the obligations of necessity; for it
requires but little knowledge of human nature to discern what would
be the consequence, were America again reduced to the subjection of
Britain. Uncontrolled power, in the hands of an incensed, imperious, and
rapacious conqueror, is an engine of dreadful execution, and woe be to
that country over which it can be exercised. The names of Whig and Tory
would then be sunk in the general term of rebel, and the oppression,
whatever it might be, would, with very few instances of exception, light
equally on all.
Britain did not go to war with America for the sake of dominion, because
she was then in possession; neither was it for the extension of trade
and commerce, because she had monopolized the whole, and the country
had yielded to it; neither was it to extinguish what she might call
rebellion, because before she began no resistance existed. It could then
be from no other motive than avarice, or a design of establishing, in
the first instance, the same taxes in America as are paid in England
(which, as I shall presently show, are above eleven times heavier than
the taxes we now pay for the present year, 1780) or, in the second
instance, to confiscate the whole property of America, in case of
resistance and conquest of the latter, of which she had then no doubt.
I shall now proceed to show what the taxes in England are, and what
the yearly expense of the present war is to her--what the taxes of
this country amount to, and what the annual expense of defending it
effectually will be to us; and shall endeavor concisely to point out
the cause of our difficulties, and the advantages on one side, and the
consequences on the other, in case we do, or do not, put ourselves in
an effectual state of defence. I mean to be open, candid, and sincere.
I see a universal wish to expel the enemy from the country, a murmuring
because the war is not carried on with more vigor, and my intention is
to show, as shortly as possible, both the reason and the remedy.
The number of souls in England (exclusive of Scotland and Ireland) is
seven millions,* and the number of souls in America is three millions.
* This is taking the highest number that the people of England have
been, or can be rated at.