LAFAYETTE IN PURSUIT OF ARNOLD.—THE END IN SIGHT.—ARNOLD IN THE BRITISH
ARMY.
The diversion of thought from Washington’s immediate surroundings will
find its compensation in the development of his plan for the capture of
Benedict Arnold. Its execution had been intrusted to General Lafayette,
who was already assembling his command at Peekskill, on the Hudson.
The superiority of the British fleet before Newport having been reduced
by the storm of January 22nd, Monsieur Destouches, successor to Admiral
de Ternay, deceased, consented to send one ship-of-the-line and two
frigates to prevent Arnold’s escape by sea. The Count de Rochambeau
deemed it unnecessary and inexpedient to send troops, because the
movement was to be so rapid in its execution. He assumed that the
Continental forces in Virginia were adequate for operations under
Lafayette. Letters from Washington, however, suggesting the detail of a
considerable land force, did not reach him until after M. de Tully had
sailed; or the entire French fleet, with a strong military contingent,
would have joined the expedition. The three ships under the command of
Monsieur de Tully sailed on the ninth of February; captured the British
frigate _Romulus_ in Linn Haven Bay, two privateers, and eight other
prizes; but upon arrival at Elizabeth River, Virginia, finding that the
depth of water would not allow the passage up the river of his larger
ships, he returned to Newport.
At this point, the beginning of the end of the war becomes apparent.
Every fortuitous change in the details of immediately succeeding
movements, and every modification of plans previously considered, seem
to occur as if the American Commander-in-Chief adjusted characters and
events with the accuracy of a master of chess who plays with a clear
anticipation of the checkmate of Clinton and Cornwallis, his two
antagonists. Each of the royal partners attempted, too late, the process
of “castle-ing”; so that New York, first, and then Yorktown, became
powerless to protect each other, or the dependent posts, garrisons, and
commanders of each. And it is still more dramatic in the result than if
Arnold had been captured; for the expedition of the French Marquis,
which was at first regarded as only a temporary absence on his part from
the immediate command of Washington, proved to be the vanguard of an
advance which, through his extraordinary tact and skilful handling,
finally inclosed Cornwallis, and made the opportunity for his capture.
Lafayette started from Peekskill immediately upon the departure of M. de
Tully’s ships, taking with him twelve hundred light infantry, made up of
New England and New Jersey troops. He reached Pompton, New Jersey, on
the twenty-fifth day of February; Philadelphia, on the second day of
March, and Head of Elk, on the next day. If the reader will imagine
Lafayette as standing upon the high ground overlooking Chesapeake Bay on
the evening of March 3, 1781, let him recall Maxwell’s visit to the same
spot accompanied by Lafayette, on the third day of September, 1777, just
before the Battle of Brandywine. On the former occasion, Lafayette slept
in a log cabin where he had been watching the British landing. At
daybreak, that cabin was within the British picket-lines. A suspicion
that it was occupied by an officer of Lafayette’s rank was certainly
beyond the conception of the Hessian Chasseurs who bivouacked close by.
In a letter written by Lafayette, to his young wife, which was ever
cherished by the late Senators Oscar and Edmond Lafayette, grandsons of
the Marquis, he humorously contrasts his condition at the two dates.
“The landing of Cornwallis, at this particular point” is noticed; then,
“my first wound, in my first battle near Birmingham Meeting House”; and
then, “my present independent command, and my hopeful expectation that
the same British General will not much longer bar the way to American
Independence.”
From this point, Lafayette sent his advance troops to Annapolis; but he
first made a personal trip, in an open canoe, to Elizabethtown, to
accelerate preparations for the capture of the traitor Arnold. He
visited Baron Steuben at Yorktown, and learned that the Baron would
undertake to raise five thousand militia for his support. He visited
Muhlenburg at Suffolk; and then made a personal reconnoissance of
Arnold’s defences at Portsmouth. The return of M. de Tully to Newport
compelled him to return to Annapolis and there await instructions from
Washington. Meanwhile, Washington, following up his own letters to
Rochambeau, visited Newport, R.I., and accompanied Rochambeau to the
French Admiral’s ship. Eleven hundred men had already embarked, awaiting
the repair of a frigate before sailing. On the eighth, four frigates and
eight battleships proceeded to sea. This was a profound surprise to the
British fleet, still anchored in Gardiner’s Bay, as well as to Clinton,
then in New York. The French fleet was actually under weigh before
Admiral Arbuthnot suspected its design. He sailed promptly in pursuit,
with an equal force, and wrote to General Clinton, to “warn Arnold of
his danger.” On the sixteenth, the British and French squadrons fought a
well-balanced battle, off the Chesapeake; but the presence of the
British fleet having thwarted the chief object of its errand, Monsieur
Destouches returned to Newport on the twenty-sixth, after an absence of
only eighteen days. The inability of the French fleet to control the
waters of the Chesapeake modified all plans.
Washington wrote to Lafayette on the fifth of April, as follows: “While
we all lament the miscarriage of an enterprise [the capture of Arnold]
which bid so fair of success, we must console ourselves in the thought
of having done everything practicable to accomplish it. I am certain
that the Chevalier Destouches exerted himself to the utmost to gain the
Chesapeake. The point upon which the whole turned, the action with
Admiral Arbuthnot, reflects honor upon the Chevalier, and upon the
marine of France. As matters have turned out, it is to be wished that
you had not gone out of the Elk; but, _I never judge of the proprieties
of measures by after results_.” This letter, so timely and wise, as well
as so characteristic of its author, also instructed Lafayette to return
to Philadelphia; but on the sixth, he was ordered to report to General
Greene.
This order had hardly been issued when Washington learned that Clinton,
acting upon Admiral Arbuthnot’s suggestion, had forwarded additional
troops to the support of Arnold, under command of General Phillips. He
at once countermanded Lafayette’s orders to report to General Greene,
and assigned him to command in Virginia, reporting, however, both to
General Greene and himself. Greene received a copy of this order March
18th, three days after the Battle of Guilford Court-House, and he dates
his reply as follows: “Ten miles from Guilford Court-House. I am happy
to hear the Marquis is coming to Virginia, though I am afraid from a
hint in one of Baron Steuben’s letters that he will think himself
injured in being superseded in command. Could the Marquis be with us at
this moment, we should have a most glorious campaign. It would put
Cornwallis and his whole army into our hands.”
Greene, at this time, knowing the condition of the army of Cornwallis at
Wilmington, believed that by the advance of Lafayette from Virginia, and
his own coöperation, just as he started in pursuit of Cornwallis, the
capture of that officer’s entire command would be assured. But in other
ways than had been anticipated, the assignment of Lafayette to command
in Virginia did enforce the ultimate surrender of the British army of
Virginia. Baron Steuben, with perfect confidence in the wisdom of
Washington, gracefully accepted the order as final, and rendered to
Lafayette prompt obedience and thoroughly hearty support.
The troops that accompanied Lafayette, however, did not like their
transfer to a warmer climate. Desertions were frequent, and a mutinous
spirit was exhibited. Lafayette hung the first deserter who was
captured. A second was arrested and brought before him for disposal. He
sent him adrift, with “permission to return to his home, or wherever he
desired to go.” He then issued an order, reciting, that “_he was setting
out upon a dangerous and difficult expedition; and he hoped the soldiers
would not abandon him_; but that whoever wished to go away, might do so
instantly.” “From that hour,” wrote Lafayette, “all desertions ceased,
and not a man would leave.”
Washington himself, at this juncture of affairs, was peculiarly
embarrassed. Congress had assured him that the new regular force of
thirty-seven thousand men would be in the field by the first of January.
Marshall, the historian, makes the following statement: “The regular
force drawn from Pennsylvania, to Georgia inclusive, at no time during
this interesting campaign amounted to three thousand effective men.” Of
the Northern troops, twelve hundred had been detached under the Marquis
de Lafayette, in the aid of Virginia. Including these in the estimate,
the States, from New Jersey to New Hampshire, had furnished only five
thousand effectives. The cavalry and artillery at no time exceeded one
thousand. During May, the total force reached seven thousand, of whom
rather more than four thousand might have been relied on for action; but
even these had been brought into camp too late to acquire that
discipline which is so essential to military service.
As early as February twentieth, when the Virginia campaign was in
prospect, General Washington begged Schuyler to accept the head of the
War Department, in these earnest words: “Our affairs are brought to an
awful crisis. Nothing will recover them but the vigorous exertion of men
of abilities who know our wants and the best means of supplying them.
These qualifications, Sir, without a compliment, I think you possess.
Why, then, the department being necessary, should you shrink from it?
The greater the chaos, the greater will be your merit in bringing forth
order.” General Schuyler replied on the twenty-fifth, and declared his
intention never to hold office under Congress, unless accompanied by a
restoration to military rank; and added that “such inconvenience would
result to themselves [members of Congress] from such a restoration, as
would necessarily give umbrage to many officers.”
Washington’s diary at this period affords a fair show of existing
conditions, and reveals his anxiety better than another can depict it.
On the first of May, his record is this: “Instead of having magazines
filled with provisions, we have a scant pittance, scattered here and
there, in different States. Instead of having our arsenals filled with
military stores, they are poorly provided, and the workmen are leaving
them.... Instead of having the regiments completed under the new
establishment, scarce any State has an eighth part of its quota in the
field, and there is little prospect of getting more than half. In a
word, instead of having everything in readiness to take the field, we
have nothing.... And instead of having the prospect of a glorious,
offensive campaign before us, we have a gloomy and bewildered prospect
of a defensive one, unless we should receive a powerful aid of ships,
land troops, and money, from our generous allies, and these are at
present too contingent to build upon.... Chimney-corner patriots abound;
venality, corruption, prostitution of office for selfish ends, abuse of
trust, perversion of funds from a national to a private use, and
speculations upon the necessities of the times, pervade all
interests.... In fact, every battle and every campaign is affected by
these elements, and the diffusion of political responsibility still
makes the United States only a loose partnership of scattered and
loosely related partners.”
At this date, May first, the British troops in Virginia consisted of
Arnold’s command of fifteen hundred and fifty-three men, and that of
Phillips, of twenty-one hundred and sixty-three men. On the twentieth of
May, including the forces of Cornwallis, the entire British force in
Virginia did not exceed five thousand effective troops. Arnold,
Phillips, and Simcoe made numerous excursions, destroying property,
burning buildings, and leaving marks of desolation upon Williamsburg,
Petersburg, Osborne, Hanover Court-House, Chesterfield Court-House, and
elsewhere.
Lafayette’s command was almost ubiquitous, harassing the enemy at every
point, so that they could hardly make an expedition without being
compelled to abandon portions of the property plundered, and return to
their fortified positions with the loss of some men and horses, every
time. So soon as Lafayette learned that Cornwallis proposed to move
northward from Wilmington to Virginia, and unite his command with those
of Phillips and Arnold, he made an effort to reach Halifax Court-House,
and cut him off; but the shorter route enabled Phillips to defeat
Lafayette’s movement.
On the eighth of May, he wrote to Washington: “There is no fighting
here, unless you have naval superiority; or, an army mounted on
race-horses. Phillips’ plan against Richmond has been defeated. He was
going to Portsmouth. Now, it appears that I have business with two
armies, and this is rather too much. Each is more than double, superior
to me. We have no boats, few militia, and no arms. I will try and do for
the best. Nothing can attract my sight from the supplies and
reënforcements destined to General Greene’s army. I have forbidden every
department to give me anything that may be thought useful to General
Greene. When General Greene becomes equal to offensive operations, this
quarter will be relieved. I have written to General Wayne [who had been
ordered to report to Lafayette, with the Pennsylvania line, ordered
south by Congress, on account of their mutiny] to hasten his march; but
unless I am hard pressed, I shall request him to go southward.”
Washington thus replied to this letter: “Your determination to avoid an
engagement, with your present force, is certainly judicious. General
Wayne has been pressed both by Congress and the Board of War, to make as
much expedition as possible.”
On the eighteenth of May, pursuant to orders of General Greene,
assigning him to sole command in Virginia, and instructing him to report
only to Washington, Lafayette established his headquarters between the
Pamunkey and Chickahominy rivers, equally covering Richmond and other
important points in the State; and sent General Nelson with militia
towards Petersburg. On the twenty-sixth of May, Cornwallis received
reënforcements under General Leslie, and notified General Clinton of his
own intention to “dislodge Lafayette from Richmond.” General Clinton’s
letter of the twentieth had contained the following postscript: “Pray
send Brigadier-General Arnold _here_, by the first opportunity, if you
should not have particular occasion for his services.” Cornwallis
replied: “I have consented to the request of General Arnold to go to New
York; he conceived that your Excellency wished him to attend you, and
his present indisposition renders him unequal to the fatigue of
service.”
In view of the great effort on the part of Washington to arrest Arnold,
it is well to consider some incidents that disclose Arnold’s true
position in the British army. In none of his expeditions in Virginia did
he face Continental troops. He attempted to open a correspondence with
Lafayette, and threatened to send any prisoners he might capture, to the
West Indies; but Lafayette never acknowledged a communication, simply
forwarding them to Washington. Among papers of General Phillips which
came to light upon his decease, was a letter from Clinton showing that
Phillips’ assignment to duty, on the eleventh of April, was “for the
security of Arnold and the troops under his command, and for no other
purpose.” The reader, familiar with the Burgoyne campaign, will remember
the brilliant and explosive burst of Arnold into the British lines, near
Bemis Heights. General Phillips, then serving under Burgoyne, was one of
the severest sufferers by that assault; and the relations of the two
officers, in Virginia, were of the most constrained character. Upon the
death of Phillips an attempt was made on the part of Arnold to conceal
the knowledge of that fact; and some direct correspondence of Arnold
with London officials had disturbed Clinton, so that he desired to have
him under his immediate control. The departure of Arnold from Virginia
resolved the Virginia campaign into a series of spirited marches,
counter-marches, skirmishes and sharp encounters, which ultimately drove
Cornwallis behind the intrenchments at Yorktown; and there he was
securely inclosed, until all things could be prepared for the presence
of the American Commander-in-Chief.
On the thirty-first of May, Washington wrote to Lafayette, and thus
closed his letter: “Your conduct upon every occasion meets my
approbation, but in none more than in your refusing to hold a
correspondence with Arnold.”