THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN, 1781, OUTLINED.—COWPENS.—GUILFORD
COURT-HOUSE.—EUTAW SPRINGS.
Before developing Washington’s plan for the capture of Benedict Arnold,
it is advisable to glance at the military condition of the Southern
Department in which Arnold was then serving in command of British
troops. Lafayette had been intrusted with execution of the plan. He knew
perfectly well that Arnold would not venture far from his fortified
position at Portsmouth, and thus incur risk of capture and an inevitable
death upon the gibbet.
The assignment of General Greene to the command of that department was
designed by Washington, for the purpose of initiating a vigorous
campaign against all posts occupied by British garrisons, and gradually
to clear that country of the presence of British troops. He had great
confidence in such men as Marion, Sumter, Hampton, and other partisan
leaders, who were perpetually on the alert, by night and by day, for
opportunities to repress royalist risings, and harass the enemy at every
possible point of contact. It was very natural, then, to overestimate
the British successes at Savannah and Charleston, and even to assume
that the British army would be uniformly equal to active campaign
service, and would not find it difficult to maintain supplies in the
field. In view of the condition of roads, water-courses, swamps, and the
limited agricultural improvements of those times, it is greatly to the
credit of the British officers that so much was accomplished by them, in
the face of the partisan operations above noticed.
Washington appreciated this condition fully; urged the Southern
governors to renewed activity, and furnished General Greene with
instructions respecting what he regarded as the final campaign of the
war. The _first_ element of success which he enjoined as a duty was “to
avoid battle with fresh British troops, just out of garrison, and
therefore in complete readiness for action.” The _second_ injunction
was, “so far as possible, to give a partisan or skirmish character to
engagements where inferior numbers could keep their adversaries under
constant and sleepless apprehension of attack.” The _third_ was, “to
utilize and control streams, swamps, and woods, where the bayonet and
artillery could not be successfully employed by British troops.” The
_fourth_ principle of action was characteristic of Washington’s early
experience, and was exemplified throughout the war—“never to halt, over
night, without making artificial protection against surprise; and to
surprise the enemy so far as practicable, whenever all conditions seem
to render such surprise impossible.” Cæsar’s habitual intrenchments,
upon a halt, were types of Washington’s methods; and the Crimean War
made more impressive than ever the value of slight, temporary cover for
troops in the field. The _camp-kettle_, the _powder_ and _lead_, the
_pick_ and the _spade_, were Washington’s indispensable tools.
It was therefore with great confidence in the result that he intrusted
this Southern campaign to the charge of Nathaniel Greene; and for the
same reasons he sent him his best engineer, and his best corps of rifles
and horse. General Greene, immediately upon taking command, removed all
commissary supplies from the coast, to avoid liability of their seizure,
and to maintain his food-supply. He ordered Quartermaster-General
Carrington to collect all magazines upon the Roanoke, for ready access
whenever he might need ammunition or commissary supplies. He wrote to
Baron Steuben, to “hasten forward his recruits”; to the Governors of
Virginia and North Carolina, to “fill up their quotas of regulars and
call in all the militia _that they could arm_”; to Shelby, Campbell, and
other participants in the Battle of King’s Mountain, fought on the
eighth of October, 1780, “to come forward and assist in the overthrow of
Cornwallis, and defeat his second attempt to invade North Carolina.” It
is certain from his letters to Washington, that he expected to realize
success. The battle of Cowpens immediately followed.
While awaiting response to his demands for troops, both militia and
regulars, Greene promptly detached Morgan, with Colonels Washington and
Howard, to learn the movements of Cornwallis and Tarleton, and fritter
away their strength by worrying tactics. Morgan came so near Tarleton as
to know that he could have a fight, if he wanted a fight. This he
resolved to have. Few military events on record show superior tact,
daring, and success. He placed his command in the sharp bend of Broad
River, then swollen by rains, and so deep and swift that neither boat,
horse nor man could cross it; where, as he afterwards reported, “his men
had to fight, or drown.” All that he asked of his advanced militia was,
that they would give two volleys and scamper from his front, and re-form
in his rear. He secreted Washington’s dragoons out of view, for their
opportunity. Tarleton dashed madly after the scattering militia, and
before he could rally his impetuous charge of horse and foot, was taken
in the rear, utterly routed, and barely saved himself after a sabre-cut
from Colonel Washington; leaving on the field, or as prisoners, seven
hundred and eighty of his command, two cannon, fifty-five wagons, one
hundred horses, and eight hundred muskets. Cornwallis was but
twenty-five miles distant; but the exchange of sharp words afterwards,
between himself and Tarleton, did not lessen the value and prestige of
this timely American victory. Congress and various States united in
recognition of Morgan’s gallant conduct. Broken down by rheumatism, he
was compelled to leave active service. From Quebec, in 1775, to Cowpens,
in 1780, he had been “weighed” in many battle-scales, and never “found
wanting.”
On the twenty-fifth of January, while in camp on Hicks’ Creek, a fork of
the Great Republic, Greene received the message of Morgan that he “had
many prisoners in charge, but was pressed by Cornwallis.” It was most
tantalizing, at such an hour, not to be able to improve this victory.
The Southern army, including Morgan’s force, numbered, all told,
including four hundred militia, only twenty-one hundred and three men,
of whom the artillerists were but forty-seven, and the cavalry only one
hundred and twenty. Greene wrote to Sumter, on the fifteenth of January,
two days before the Battle of Cowpens: “More than half our numbers are
in a manner naked, so much that we cannot put them on the least duty.
Indeed, there is a great number that have not a rag of clothing on them,
except a little piece of blanket, in the Indian form, about their
waists.” But Greene put this force in the best possible order; and on
the twenty-eighth, accompanied by a single guide, one aide-de-camp, and
a sergeant’s party of twenty troopers, he started to join Morgan. On the
night of the thirtieth, after a ride of one hundred and twenty-five
miles, he was with him.
The crisis was immediate. Greene wrote to Varnum, then in Congress; to
Gist, Smallwood, Rutledge, Washington, and others, appealing for five
thousand infantry and from six to eight hundred horse. It seemed as if
this very victory would only precipitate disaster. Washington thus
replied: “I wish I had it in my power to congratulate you on the
brilliant and important victory of General Morgan without the alloy
which the distresses of the department you command, and apprehensions of
posterior events, intermix.... I lament that you find it so difficult to
avoid a general action; for our misfortunes can only be completed by the
dispersion of your little army, which will be the most probable
consequence of such an event.” This letter reflects the wise policy of
Washington throughout the war; ever to reserve in hand a sufficient
force to control the time and place for battle; while incessantly
weakening that of his adversary and compelling him, finally, to flight
“against odds.”
As the mind reverts to the contentions for high command which
characterized the early years of the war; and as one officer after
another disappears from the battle record, it would seem as if the
officer who sat by the side of Morgan on the banks of the Catawba, on
the thirtieth of January, 1781, must have felt as if a new generation
had taken the place of the old comrades of 1776, and that he was simply
waiting to pass away also.
But the hazard of delay was omnipotent to force instant action. Colonel
Lee was ordered to hasten and join Greene. The report of the landing of
British forces at Wilmington, just in the rear of the small army he had
left at Hicks’ Creek, was a new source of anxious concern. The time of
service of the Virginia militia was about to expire, and according to
precedent, they would be prompt in their departure. With quick sagacity,
Greene placed General Stephens in command, anticipating the exact term
of their expiring enlistment, and sent them home, via Hillsborough, in
charge of the prisoners of Tarleton’s command. He thus relieved Morgan
of this encumbrance, and saved the detail of efficient troops for that
escort duty.
At this period, Cornwallis had abandoned Charleston as his base of
supply, and was confident of a successful invasion of North Carolina. He
certainly knew that Phillips, Arnold, and Simcoe could spare no troops
from Virginia; and through the disaster which befell Tarleton, one of
the best soldiers of that period, at Cowpens, he began to appreciate
Clinton’s disappointing experiences about New York. He unburdened his
thoughts to Clinton, in this melancholy vein: “Our hopes of success were
principally founded upon positive assurances, given by apparently
credible deputies and emissaries, that, upon the approach of a British
army in North Carolina, a great body of the inhabitants were ready to
join it, and coöperate with it in restoring his Majesty’s Government.
All inducements in my power were made use of without material effects.”
On the tenth of February, Greene had a force of only two thousand and
thirty-six men; of which, but fourteen hundred and six were regular
troops. A light corps of seven hundred men was organized under Colonels
Williams, Carrington, Howard, Washington, and Lee, to operate in
separate detachments so far as practicable, and thus keep the army of
Cornwallis constantly under exposure to attack, and compelled to make
many exhaustive marches. Kosciusko planned light earthworks, to cover
fords as the army crossed and recrossed the same; and Greene was thus
employing wise strategic methods for future action, when of his own
choice he might confront Cornwallis in battle.
Many vicissitudes of thrilling interest attended these desultory
operations; and when sudden floods, and as sudden abatement of swollen
streams, had been successfully utilized by the patriotic leaders, just
at the right moment, it is not strange that the American people, as well
as Washington, saw in these deliverances the hand of favoring
Providence.
At this juncture, Greene realized also, as well as did Cornwallis, that
he could not expect any substantial aid from Virginia. He could hardly
keep his immediate force in hand, while wear, waste, hunger and sickness
began to impair their fighting energy as well as physical capacity. He
determined to seek the first reasonable opportunity to join battle with
Cornwallis; and the Battle of Guilford Court-House, on the fifteenth of
March, realized Washington’s full anticipations of such protracted
inaction.
The light troops of both armies had skirmished daily. Cornwallis issued
a proclamation giving a limit within which the people must return to
their allegiance to the Crown. On the sixth of March a skirmish occurred
at Wetzell’s Mills, which brought nearly the entire army of Cornwallis
into action. On the eighth, Colonel Carrington and Frederick Cornwallis,
acting as commissioners for the two opposing armies, agreed upon terms
for an exchange of prisoners. Cornwallis had been in the habit of
paroling militia, wherever found, and carrying them on his list, as if
captured in battle. In the adjustment made, Greene obtained a few
officers who would have been otherwise idle during the campaign; but the
arrangement had no other immediate value.
The position of the two armies is worthy of notice, because of its
relations to succeeding events in Virginia. For several weeks Cornwallis
had made special endeavor to control all upper fords. On the
twenty-seventh of February he crossed the river Haw and fixed his camp
on the Alamance, one of its tributaries. Greene adopted a line nearly
parallel with that of his adversary, and advanced to the heights between
Reedy Fork and Troublesome Creek, having his divided headquarters near
the Speedwell Iron Works and Boyd’s Mills, on two streams. Greene had
gained the choice of position, entirely reversing the old relations of
the armies. There were no British troops in his rear, or on his eastern
flank, and none to endanger his communications with Virginia. He could
give battle; retire as he advanced, or move into Virginia, by the same
upper fords which Cornwallis had once so carefully occupied. At this
time, the army of Cornwallis was also in great need of clothing,
medicines, and all other essential supplies. The strain of so many
unequal marches and skirmishes, through woods, thickets, and swamps, and
across innumerable small streams, with no recompense in victories won,
was very severe. He therefore pitched his camp between the Haw and Deep
rivers, where the roads from Salisbury, Guilford and Hillsborough unite,
and thus controlled the road to Wilmington, his only proximate base of
supply.
Troops had already commenced reporting to General Greene, and he decided
to offer battle. The command consisted of only fourteen hundred and
ninety regular infantry, one hundred and sixty-one cavalry, and
twenty-seven hundred and fifty-four militia. The army of Cornwallis,
which on the first of January numbered three thousand two hundred and
twenty-four men, had fallen off, by March 1st, nearly one-third; and
there was reason for Greene’s hope that, in case his militia held firmly
to positions assigned them, victory might be realized. He felt the enemy
with Lee’s and Campbell’s cavalry; disposed his troops in admirable
form; and failed at last, only through the weakness of his raw troops.
For the purposes of this narrative, only the result need be stated. The
American army retired to the iron-works on Troublesome Creek, a distance
of twelve miles, to rally forces and prepare for future action. “It is
certain,” says Colonel Lee, “that if Greene had known the condition of
the British forces, he need not have retreated, and the American victory
would have been complete.” Tarleton, who was wounded in the action,
after stating that “the British army lost one-third of its number in
killed and wounded, during the two hours of battle,” said that “this
victory was the pledge of ultimate defeat.”
Greene, writing to Washington, said: “The enemy gained his cause, but is
ruined by the success of it.” Fox, in the British House of Commons,
said: “Another such victory would ruin the British army.” Pitt called it
“the precursor of ruin to British supremacy at the South.” The
casualties of the American army were, nominally, including missing,
thirteen hundred and eleven; but so many of the missing immediately
rallied, that the Virginia Brigade, after two days, reported as present
for duty, seven hundred and fifty-two; and the Maryland Brigade mustered
five hundred and fifty, showing a loss in action of only one hundred and
eighty-eight men, instead of two hundred and sixty-one, reported on the
seventeenth. Of one militia brigade, five hundred and fifty-two were
missing. The British casualties were five hundred and forty-four, and of
the general officers, only Cornwallis and Leslie escaped without wounds.
Cornwallis, after providing for the wounded as well as possible, and
leaving under a flag of truce those who could not march, immediately
crossed the deep river as if moving to Salisbury; then recrossed it,
lower down, and entered Wilmington on the seventh of April, with only
fourteen hundred and forty-five men. He wrote to Lord Rawdon, that
“Greene would probably invade South Carolina”; but the messenger failed
to get through to Charleston. Greene was delayed after the battle, to
send back to his supply-train for ammunition, lead and bullet-moulds;
but he followed so closely after, that he reached Ramsour’s Mills the
twenty-eighth, the very day on which Cornwallis had bridged the river
and pushed on to Wilmington.
The effect of this withdrawal of Cornwallis was of great value to the
American cause, and cleared away obstructions to a broader range of
operations for the army of the North. Subsequently, on the twenty-fifth
of April Greene met Rawdon, at Hobkirk Hill, in an action sometimes
called the Second Battle of Camden, as it was fought near that town, in
which the American casualties were two hundred and seventy-one, and the
British casualties were two hundred and fifty-eight. Greene, after the
action, withdrew to Rugeley’s Mills, and Rawdon to Camden. Stedman says:
“The victory at Hobkirk Hill, like that at Guilford Court-House,
produced no consequences beneficial to the British army.” On the
seventeenth of the subsequent September, Greene fought with Stewart,
Rawdon’s successor, the Battle of Eutaw Springs, the final battle at the
South. In this battle the American casualties were four hundred and
eight, and the British casualties were six hundred and ninety-three. In
dismissing these operations in the Southern Department, a single extract
from Tarleton’s history of the war is of interest: “The troops engaged
during the greater part of the time were totally destitute of bread, and
the country afforded no vegetable as a substitute. Salt at length
failed, and their only resources were water and the wild cattle which
they found in the woods. In the last expedition, fifty men perished
through mere fatigue.... We must not, however, confine the praise
entirely to the British troops. The same justice requires that the
Americans should not be deprived of their share of this fatal glory....
On the whole, the campaign terminated in their favor, General Greene
having recovered the far greater part of Georgia, and the two
Carolinas.”
This same Nathaniel Greene led the Kentish Guards to Boston on the
morning after the Battle of Lexington, in 1775, and his early
announcement of the principles upon which the war should be conducted to
ensure final success, had been verified. He had vindicated the
confidence of Washington in every line of duty, and in his Southern
campaign cleared the way for the crowning triumph of the American
Commander-in-Chief, at Yorktown.