NEW YORK AND YORKTOWN THREATENED.—CORNWALLIS INCLOSED BY LAFAYETTE.
On the twenty-first day of May, 1781, which proved to have been that of
the arrival of Cornwallis at Yorktown, Washington held a conference with
Count de Rochambeau and General Chastellux at Wethersfield, Conn., as to
the details of the approaching summer campaign. As one result of this
interview, Count de Rochambeau requested Count de Grasse, then in the
West Indies, to coöperate for a while with Count de Barras, and close
the port of New York. The French fleet could not be very well spared
from the West India Station, for the reason that while coöperating with
the Americans, and on a foreign coast, it had neither accessible docks
nor other means of refitting and supply, in case of disaster. Pending
the disposition of this matter, the immediate junction of the two armies
was definitely settled.
The American army, with an effective force of a little less than
forty-six hundred men, was ordered to Peekskill-on-the-Hudson. The Count
de Rochambeau, with the Duke de Lauzun, marched from Newport and took
post at Ridgebury, Conn., near Salem, on the road to Danbury, fifteen
miles back from Long Island Sound.
Two British posts, just out of New York, one at Morrisania, where
Delancey’s Rangers had a station, and from which constant incursions
were made into Winchester county; and the other at the north end of
Manhattan Island, not far from Fort Washington, were designated as the
first objects of assault. Clinton had sent a considerable foraging force
into New Jersey, and it was supposed likely that he might regard the
posts named as not in danger of attack, or leave them lightly
garrisoned. Sheldon’s Dragoons and a division under the Duke de Lauzun
were to attempt the first of the expeditions, and General Lincoln was
intrusted with the other. Washington advised Governor Clinton of his
plan, so that he might concentrate the New York militia at the proper
moment; and signal guns, as well as beacon-fires, had been arranged to
give notice of success.
General Lincoln left Peekskill with eight hundred men, on the morning of
the first of June, proceeded to Teller’s Point; there took boats, and
with muffled oars rowed down Tappan Bay by night, hugging the eastern
shore. On the morning of the second, he reached Dobb’s Ferry, without
being discovered by the enemy. At three o’clock, on the morning of the
second, Washington started, without baggage, and leaving all tents
standing; passed through Tarrytown, reaching Valentine’s Hill, four
miles above King’s Bridge, by sunrise of the third, where he gained a
good position for the support of either expedition.
When General Lincoln crossed the Hudson, at Fort Lee, he at once noticed
that the British expedition into New Jersey had returned and reoccupied
the post near Fort Washington; and that a British man-of-war had
anchored in the stream, near the shore just below that fort. A surprise
of Fort Washington became impossible. He had, however, before leaving
Peekskill, been supplied with alternate instructions, anticipating this
very emergency. It had been Washington’s real purpose, now that the
French army was immediately within his control, to draw Clinton, if
possible, into a general engagement; and the entire French force awaited
his signal for the movement. So soon as Lincoln discovered the British
camp, he recrossed the Hudson and landed his troops just above Spuyten
Duyvil Creek, near old Fort Independence; and then moved to high ground
near King’s Bridge, so as to act in concert with the Duke de Lauzun and
cut off any detachment which might attempt to cross the Harlem to
support Delancey. Meanwhile the Duke de Lauzun had only reached East
Chester, after a hot march over very rough country, and was several
hours later than the hour designated for the assault. The troops of
Lincoln were discovered by a large foraging force of fourteen hundred
men which was sweeping over the country from right to left, in search of
cattle and other supplies, and a sharp skirmish ensued. The Duke de
Lauzun, hearing the firing, pressed forward with forced step to join in
the action. Washington also moved rapidly to the front, and at his
appearance the British fell back rapidly to New York. During the
afternoon, after carefully reconnoitering the position, Washington also
retired to Valentine’s Hill, and then to Dobb’s Ferry, as if entirely
withdrawing his troops; but, on the sixth, he was joined by Rochambeau,
and on the seventh, the American camp was fully established. Its right
rested on the Hudson, covered by earthworks, and its left crossed Saw
Mill River. (See Map, “Hudson River Highlands.”) The French army
occupied the hills still farther eastward, as far as the river Bronx.
Washington at once made an effort to force General Clinton to fight for
the possession of New York. Pickets were ostentatiously posted. Letters,
designed to fall into Clinton’s hands, were written, and as early as the
sixth, Clinton captured some of these “confidential” papers and enclosed
them to Lord Cornwallis, saying: “I am threatened with a siege. Send me
two thousand troops; the sooner they come, the better.”
The agitation in New York is described by contemporary writers as “most
intense and universal.” It was kept under all possible control; but the
coast-guards were doubled, so that no stray boats might pass
unchallenged, by night or day, and mounted couriers constantly passed
and repassed, to furnish the speediest possible information at British
headquarters of any hostile advance. The report published in slips, that
“_brick ovens were to be erected in New Jersey, opposite Staten Island,
to supply bread rations, daily, for thirty thousand men_,” was
encouraged by Washington, and was accepted as true by the country near
by, and generally at the north, New Jersey included.
When the camps were fully established, and guns were disposed for their
best effect, Washington, accompanied by Count de Rochambeau and Generals
de Boville and Du Portail, crossed to Jersey Heights, and with a small
escort of one hundred and fifty Jersey troops, examined all the New York
outposts, as far down as the ocean. Neither was this a mere sham—hollow
in substance. The projected attack upon New York was a deliberate
alternative; to compel Clinton to withhold reënforcements from the
Southern army so that Cornwallis could be overpowered and captured; or,
if he ventured to aid that officer, he must lose New York.
This reconnoissance in New Jersey was known to Sir Henry Clinton, and he
might have been very thankful to General Washington for information that
some of “his [Clinton’s] stores were inadequately guarded”; that “at
some posts the small garrisons were doing no watchful guard duty”; and
that there was “no serious difficulty whatever in seizing or destroying
all the stores on Staten Island, without material loss or risk.”
A second reconnoissance of the entire British front, from King’s Bridge
down the Hudson, and along Hell Gate channel, occurred on the evening of
July 21st. This was no feeble “_feeling of the enemy_.” Five thousand
choice troops took part in the investigation of the British position.
General Chastellux commanded one division, and General Lincoln commanded
the second. As early as the eighth of the month, Sir Henry Clinton wrote
to Lord Cornwallis, as follows: “As your lordship is now so near, it
will be unnecessary for you to send your despatches to the minister; you
will therefore be so good as to send them to me in the future.”
It is a fact that Cornwallis was encouraged by the British War Office
and the Ministry to write directly to those departments. He stood high
in esteem; and, as will appear under his name in the Index, was
subsequently honored, although captured at Yorktown. The letter of the
eighth, thus referred to, was followed by letters on the eleventh,
thirteenth, and nineteenth of June, with similar appeals for
reënforcements; and these appeals were forwarded by special couriers or
fast frigates. Then came the allied parade of the twenty-second. The
troops reached King’s Bridge at daybreak. Lauzun’s lancers in their
brilliant uniform, and Sheldon’s Light Corps, scoured the vicinity of
Morrisania, and the dragoons went as far as Throgg’s Neck. The royalist
refugees fled to islands, vessels, and the woods. This demonstration
lasted during the twenty-second and twenty-third of June. Then
Washington and Rochambeau, escorted by French dragoons, examined all
advance posts, passing directly within range of fire from both vessels
and picket posts. There was no pretence of secrecy in this inquisitive
inquiry as to the British strength and British positions. It was a bold,
deliberate challenge of the garrison to retire if they so desired, or to
fight if they preferred battle. On the twenty-third, the troops resumed
their places in the quiet camp.
On the twenty-sixth, Clinton called upon Cornwallis for “three more
regiments,” to be sent from Carolina, writing: “I shall probably want
them, as well as the troops you may be able to send me from the
Chesapeake, for such offensive and defensive operations as may offer in
this quarter.” Cornwallis had previously offered to send two of the
Hessian regiments, then in South Carolina, “as they could be spared in
the hot summer months,” and Clinton begged him to “renew that offer.”
A brief glance at the Southern Department is necessary in order fully to
measure the designs of the American Commander-in-Chief, which, on the
surface, seemed to be local in their purpose. The army of Cornwallis,
with reenforcements, numbered about seven thousand effective troops when
he entered upon his active campaign against Lafayette. It will be
remembered that Cornwallis had promised Clinton to drive Lafayette from
Richmond. When Lafayette saw that by attempting to hold Richmond he
would risk a general action, with the possible loss of Virginia and
consequent ruin to Greene’s army at the South, he permitted that city to
abide the fate of war, and marched northward to the upper Rappahannock;
to effect an union with the forces of Wayne, approaching from the north.
He decided to avoid further contest with Cornwallis, unless on terms of
his own dictation.
The Assembly of Virginia, quickened to new energy, retired to
Charlottesville May 24th. But they authorized the “issue of fifteen
millions of bills,” and also the declaration of martial law within
twenty miles of any army headquarters. That brought Richmond within the
military control of Lafayette. The Burgoyne prisoners were also removed
from Charlottesville, over the mountains, to Winchester. The details of
the pursuit of Lafayette by Cornwallis, day by day, are full of
thrilling interest, but beyond the province of this narrative.
[Illustration: Lafayette in Virginia.]
On the twenty-eighth of May, Lafayette wrote as follows to Washington:
“The enemy have been so kind as to retire before us. Twice, I gave them
a chance of fighting, taking good care not to engage them farther than I
pleased, but they continued their retrograde motions. Our numbers are, I
think, exaggerated to them, and our seeming boldness confirms the
opinion. I thought, at first, Lord Cornwallis wanted to get me as low
down as possible, and use his cavalry to advantage. His lordship had,
exclusive of the reënforcements from Portsmouth, (said to be six
hundred) four thousand men; eight hundred of whom were dragoons, or
mounted infantry. Our force is about his; but only one thousand five
hundred regulars, and fifty dragoons. One little action more
particularly marks the retreat of the enemy. From the place where he
first began to retire to Williamsburg, is upwards of one hundred miles.
The old arms at the Point of the Fork have been taken out of the water.
The cannon was thrown into the river undamaged, when they marched back
to Richmond; so that his lordship did us no harm of consequence, but
lost an immense part of his former conquests, and did not make any in
the State. General Greene only demanded of me to hold my ground, in
Virginia. I don’t know but what we shall, in our turn, become the
pursuing enemy.”
On the very next day, after this letter was despatched to the American
Commander-in-Chief, May twenty-ninth, Cornwallis did, in fact, abandon
pursuit. Tarleton, who never lost opportunity to express his
appreciation of the tact, skill, and “invariable wisdom of Lafayette’s
movements,” states, that “an American patrol was captured; and among
letters of Lafayette to Greene, Steuben, and others, was one to Governor
Jefferson, urging him to rally militia during his absence, and using
this prophetic expression: ‘The British success in Virginia resembles
the French invasion of Hanover, and is likely to have similar
consequences, if the governor and the country would exert themselves, at
the present juncture.’”
When Cornwallis halted and moved back towards his base, Tarleton was
detached with two hundred and fifty troopers, mounted on the picked
stock of the best private stables, taken at will, and attempted to
capture Governor Jefferson at Monticello. His report says: “I imagined
that a march of seventy miles in twenty-four hours, with the caution
used, might perhaps give the advantage of a surprise.” Tarleton charged
through the Riviana River, captured seven members of the Legislature and
Brigadier-General Scott, and destroyed one thousand arms and four
hundred barrels of powder; but the Governor escaped, and the Assembly
immediately convened at Staunton, beyond Tarleton’s reach. Then he
started down the Riviana to join Simcoe in an attack upon Steuben’s
depot of supplies at Elk Island. But Wayne joined Lafayette, and
Lafayette proceeded southward. They soon started in pursuit of the
retiring column of Cornwallis. The pursued had indeed become the
pursuers. Tarleton thus writes: “The Marquis Lafayette, who had
previously practised defensive measures with skill and security, being
now reënforced by Wayne and about eight hundred continentals and some
militia, followed the British as they proceeded down James River. This
design, being judiciously arranged and executed with extreme caution,
allowed opportunity for the junction of Baron Steuben; confined the
small detachments of the King’s troops; and both saved the property and
animated the drooping spirits of the Virginians.” On the thirteenth,
Tarleton reported his own movements and the waste he had accomplished.
The scouts of Lafayette intercepted the letter, and he published it to
the people before Cornwallis himself had knowledge of its contents.
Cornwallis returned to his headquarters, to find despatches fifteen days
old awaiting his attention. One contained this extraordinary
information: “The Continentals under Lafayette cannot exceed one
thousand; and the Pennsylvania Line, under Wayne, are so discontented,
that their officers are afraid to trust them with ammunition.
Postscript.—This may have, however, since altered.”
On the very day of the receipt of this despatch, Tarleton and Simcoe
were actually compelled to cover the picket-lines of Cornwallis with
their full force, to prevent Lafayette’s Continentals and the
Pennsylvania Line from capturing the supply trains of his command.
Cornwallis started for Portsmouth on the fourth. A sharp action at
Williamsburg, in which Wayne made a brilliant bayonet charge, and in
which Lafayette, having lost a horse, gallantly fought the battle on
foot, resulted in a loss of one hundred and eighteen Americans and
seventy-five British troops. From Portsmouth, Cornwallis took boats for
Yorktown, on the first of August; and on the sixth, Tarleton says: “I
threw my horses into deep water, near shore, and landed without loss,”
joining Cornwallis on the tenth. Gloucester, opposite Yorktown, was
occupied and fortified. Constant skirmishes occurred between Tarleton
and Simcoe, of its garrison, and the detachments which Lafayette kept
active in the vicinity.
On the eighth, Lafayette wrote to Washington as follows: “We shall act
agreeably to circumstances; but avoid drawing ourselves into a false
movement, which, if cavalry had command of the river, would give the
enemy the advantage of us. His lordship plays so well, that no blunder
can be hoped from him, to recover a bad step of ours. Should a fleet
come in at this moment, our affairs would take a very happy turn.” On
the thirteenth, Lafayette established his headquarters in the forks of
the Pamunkey and the Mattaponey. On the twenty-third, he wrote, in part:
“In the present state of affairs, my dear general, I hope you will come
yourself to Virginia. Lord Cornwallis must be attacked with pretty good
apparatus; but when a French fleet takes possession of the Bay, and we
form a land force superior to his, that army must sooner or later be
forced to surrender, as we may then get what reënforcements we please. I
heartily thank you for having ordered me to Virginia. It is to your
goodness that I am indebted for the most beautiful prospect which I may
ever be able to behold.”
On the thirtieth, Count de Grasse arrived in the Chesapeake with
twenty-six sail-of-the-line, besides frigates and transports. On the
third of September, Count de St. Simon landed with three thousand two
hundred French troops, and was joined by Lafayette at Green Spring on
the same day. On the fifth, the allies occupied Williamsburg, about
fifteen miles from Yorktown. The Count de Grasse had a limited period
for operations on the American coast, and united with the Count de St.
Simon to urge an immediate attack upon Yorktown, before its defences
could be completed, waiving seniority of rank, and agreeing to serve
under Lafayette.
Lafayette thus wrote to Washington: “I am not so hasty as the Count de
Grasse, and think that having so sure a game to play, it would be
madness, by the risk of an attack, to give anything to chance. Unless
matters are very different from what I think they are, my opinion is,
that we ought to be contented with preventing the enemy’s forages, with
militia; without committing our regulars. Whatever readiness the Marquis
de St. Simon has been pleased to express to Colonel Gimât respecting his
being under me, I shall do nothing without paying that deference which
is due to age, talents, and experience; but would rather incline to the
cautious line of conduct I have of late adopted. I hope you will find we
have taken the best precautions to prevent his lordship’s escape. I
hardly believe he will make the attempt. If he does, he must give up
ships, artillery, baggage, part of the horses, all the negroes; must be
certain to lose one-third of his army, and run the greatest risk of
losing the whole, without gaining that glory which he may derive from a
brilliant defence.” On the eighth, Lafayette wrote: “If you knew how
slowly things go on in this country! The governor does what he can; the
wheels of government are so rusty, that no governor whatever will be
able to set them free again. Time will prove that Governor Jefferson has
been too severely charged. We will try, if not dangerous, on so large a
scale, to form a good idea of the works; but unless I am greatly
deceived, there will be madness in attacking them now, with our force.
Marquis de St. Simon, Count de Grasse and General Du Portail agree with
me in opinion; but should Lord Cornwallis come out against such a
position as we have, everybody thinks he cannot but repent of it; and
should he beat us, he must soon prepare for another battle.”
The time had arrived for the presence of the American
Commander-in-Chief.