THE SOLDIER TRIED.—AMERICAN MUTINY.—FOREIGN Judgment.—ARNOLD’S
DEPREDATIONS.
Nothing new or unfamiliar to the American student can be said as to the
military operations of the British, French and American armies during
the closing year of the war for American Independence; but they may be
so grouped in their relations to Washington as a Soldier, that he may
stand forth more distinctly as both nominal and real Commander-in-Chief.
His original commission, it will be remembered, was accompanied by the
declaration of Congress that “they would maintain and assist him, and
adhere to him, with their lives and fortunes, in the cause of American
liberty.” After the Battle of Trenton, when Congress solemnly declared
that “_the very existence of Civil Liberty depended upon the right
execution of military powers_,” it invested him with dictatorial
authority, being “confident of the wisdom, vigor, and uprightness of
George Washington.” And in 1778, after the flash of the Burgoyne
campaign had spent itself, and the experiences of the American army at
Valley Forge attested the necessity for a fighting army under a fighting
soldier, Washington was again intrusted with the reorganization of the
army, both regular and militia, in respect of all elements of
enlistment, outfit, and supply.
From the date of his commission, through all his acts and
correspondence, it has been evident, that he has been perfectly frank
and consistent in his assignments of officers or troops, either to
position or command; and his judgment of men and measures has had
constant verification in realized experience.
It was very natural for European monarchs, including Louis XVI., to
behold in the very preëminent and assertive force of Washington’s
character much of the “one-man power” which was the basis of their own
asserted prerogative; and there were astute and ambitious statesmen and
soldiers of the Old World who hoped that a new empire, and a new
personal dynasty, would yet arise in the western world, to be their
associated ally against Great Britain herself. They did not measure the
American Revolution by right standards; because they could not conceive,
nor comprehend the American conception of, a “sovereign people.”
There was one foreign soldier in the American army, and of royal stock,
who must have clung to Washington and his cause, with most ardent
passion as well as obedient reverence. Nothing of sacrifice, exposure,
or vile jealousy, whether in closet, camp, or field, amid winter’s
keenest blasts or summer’s scorching fires, was beyond the life and soul
experience of Thaddeus Kosciusko. His name, and that of Pulaski, so dear
to Washington, and so true to him, should be ever dear to the American;
and in the history of their country’s fall, there should ever be
cherished a monumental recognition of ancient Poland and the Pole.
It was one of the most striking characteristics of Washington’s military
life that he recognized and trusted so many of these heroic men whose
lives had been nursed and developed in the cause of liberty and country.
Such men as these beheld in Washington a superhuman regard for _man, as
man_; and the youthful Lafayette almost worshipped, while he obeyed,
until his entire soul was penetrated by the spirit and controlled by the
example of his beloved Chief. Some of these, who survived until the
opening of the year 1781, were able to realize that its successive
months, however blessed in their ultimate fruition, were months in which
Washington passed under heavier yokes and through tougher ordeals than
were those of Valley Forge or Yorktown. For the first time during the
Revolutionary struggle, the American citizens who did the fighting might
well compare their situation under the guardianship of the American
Congress, with that of Colonial obligation under the British Parliament
and the British crown.
The fluctuations of numbers in the American army seemed very largely to
depend upon its vicinity to endangered sections. Remoteness from the
seaboard induced indifference to expenditures for the navy, because
British ships could not operate on land; and seaboard towns, which were
constantly in peril, insisted upon retaining their able-bodied militia
within easy reach, until armed vessels could be built and assigned for
their protection. The same unpatriotic principle of human nature
affected all supplies of food and clothing. It has already been noticed
that Washington was profoundly grieved that country people courted the
British markets of New York, and that British gold was of such mighty
weight in the balance of “stay-at-home comfort,” against personal
experience in some distant camp. Starvation and suffering could not fail
to arouse resistance to their constraints. The condition of the army was
one of protracted agony. Lafayette wrote home to his wife as follows:
“Human patience has its limits. No European army would suffer one-tenth
part of what the Americans suffer. It takes citizens, to support hunger,
nakedness, toil, and the total want of pay, which constitute the
condition of our soldiers,—the hardiest and most patient that are to be
found in the world.”
Marshall states the case fairly when he asserts that “it was not easy to
persuade the military, that their brethren in civil life were unable to
make greater exertions in support of the war, or, that its burdens could
not be more equally borne.”
On New Year’s Day, January 1, 1781, the Pennsylvania line (Continentals)
revolted, and Captain Billings was killed in the effort to suppress the
outbreak. Thirteen hundred men, with six guns, started for Philadelphia.
Wayne was powerless to control even his own command; and so advised
Washington. The Commander-in-Chief was at first impelled to leave New
Windsor and go in person to the camps; but knowing that he had troops
who would obey him, whatever conditions might arise, he addressed
himself to this state of affairs with a dignity, deliberation, and
sympathy, so calm and yet so impressive, that he both retained the full
prestige of his position, and secured full control of the disaffection.
He allowed passion to subside; and then resolved to execute his own
will, at all hazards. The details of his mental struggle, and the
precautionary measures taken by him to master the situation, with eager
and excited veterans at his back to enforce his will, would fill a
volume. Recognizing the neglect of State authorities to furnish their
own respective regiments with food, clothing, and money, he proudly,
sublimely, and with a dignity beyond any heroic act of the battlefield,
called upon the Governors of the Northern States to send their militia,
at once, _to take care of Clinton’s army in New York_, if they wished to
prevent the invasion and waste of their own peaceful homes. In other
words, as plainly as he could do it, he made the “stay-at-homes”
responsible for their own further immunity from battle scenes and battle
waste.
This mutiny was indeed, a natural outbreak, inevitable, irresistible! It
did not impair loyalty to country. The emergency overwhelmed every
purely military obligation in that of self-preservation—of life itself.
It did impair discipline, and did disregard authority, for the time; but
in its manifestations had many of the elements of lawful revolution. The
State _first failed in duty_ to its defenders. For such a cause, the
Revolution had its first outbreaks at Lexington and Concord. Washington
was never so great in arms, as when with calm trust and steady nerve he
faced this momentous issue. Besides his demand upon the States most
exposed to British incursions, for men, he demanded money. Massachusetts
and New Hampshire promptly gave twenty-four dollars _extra_, in specie,
to each enlisted man. Colonel Laurens was appointed as special agent to
France, to secure a loan. Eventually, he succeeded; but Count de
Vergennes, when advised of his mission, wrote on the fifteenth of
February: “Congress relies too much on France for subsidies to maintain
their army. They must absolutely refrain from such exorbitant demands.
The great expenses of the war render it impossible for France to meet
these demands, if persisted in.” Franklin, then at Paris, wrote to his
daughter, Mrs. Balche: “If you see Washington, assure him of my very
great and sincere respect, and tell him that all the old Generals here
amuse themselves in studying the accounts of his operations, and approve
highly of his conduct.” Lafayette also wrote, urging full supplies of
men and money; with most pointed assurances that the “American States
would surely realize success, and be amply able to refund all advances
which might be made by the king.”
Up to this time, the individuality of the States, in spite of
Washington’s repeated appeals for entire unity of purpose and action on
the part of all, had been jealously maintained. A partial relief was
afforded, when, on the second of March, 1781, the Articles of
Confederation finally went into effect, Maryland having yielded her
assent on the previous day. Four years and four months had elapsed since
their formal adoption and submission to the several States for
acceptance.
All the insubordination of the American army before referred to, was
well known at British headquarters in New York. That of the previous
year had disappointed both Clinton and Knyphausen, who invaded New
Jersey, it will be remembered, hoping to reap some benefits from its
expression; but now that it assumed such unmistakable signs of armed
revolt, they doubled their interest in its movements. General Clinton,
mindful of his error on a former occasion, simply watched Washington. He
received information of the general insubordination as early as
Washington, and on the morning of the twenty-third, sent messengers to
the American army with propositions looking to their return to British
allegiance. He entirely misconceived the nature of the disaffection, and
his agents were retained in custody. In writing to Lord Germaine, he
says: “General Washington has not moved a man from his army [near West
Point] as yet; and as it is probable that their demands are nearly the
same with the Pennsylvania line, it is not thought likely that he will.
I am, however, in a situation to avail myself of favorable events; but
to stir before they offer, might mar all.”
At this period, the influence of the American Commissioners—Adams,
Franklin and Jay, was proving very beneficial to the American cause with
the Governments of Spain and Holland, as well as with France; and
Colonel Laurens, upon his arrival at Paris, after release from prison,
pretty plainly assured the French Ministry that it “would be much wiser
policy to advance money to America, than to risk such an accommodation
with England as would compel America, so near her West India
possessions, to make common cause with England against France.”
Notwithstanding these negotiations, then in progress, the American army
had become reduced to an effective force of barely five thousand men;
and the French army could not be disposable for general service while
their fleets were so closely confined to the harbor of Newport. The
British fleet was wintering at Gardiner’s Bay, L.I., so as to watch all
vessels that entered or departed from Long Island Sound, and maintained
its blockade. Late in January a violent north-east storm made havoc with
the British ships. The _Culloden_, line-of-battle ship (74 guns), was
sunk. The _Bedford_ was dismasted, and the _America_ was driven to sea.
Washington seized upon this incident to make a diversion southward and
attempt, the capture of Arnold, who was in full commission as a
brigadier-general of the British army.
Arnold had left New York with sixteen hundred men, on the nineteenth of
the preceding December, for Virginia. His command consisted of the
eighteenth British (Scotch) regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Dundas, and the
Queen’s Rangers, Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe; the latter being a skilful
officer, shrewd and cool, but noted, in the heat of battle, for
characteristic ferocity in shortening fights, and thus reducing the
number of wounded prisoners to be cared for. Clinton seems not to have
fully relied upon the discretion of Arnold, since he reports, having
“detailed two officers of tried ability and experience, and possessing
the entire confidence of their commander.” As with so many naval
expeditions of that period, a gale overtook Arnold on the twenty-sixth
and twenty-seventh of December, scattering his transports, so that
without waiting for those still at sea, he landed with twelve hundred
men and moved up the James River on the fourth of January. He landed at
Westover, twenty-five miles below Richmond, and immediately marched upon
the city. On the afternoon of the fifth, he entered Richmond. The
militia, under Col. John Nichols, only two hundred in number, assembled
upon Richmond Hill, but had to retire before Simcoe’s advance. A few men
stationed on Shreve Hill, also retired. At Westham, seven miles above
Richmond, a foundry, a laboratory, and some shops were destroyed, as
well as the Auditor’s Records, which had been removed from Richmond for
safety. Arnold sent a proposition to Governor Jefferson, offering to
spare the city if no opposition were made to his vessels ascending the
river to remove tobacco and other legitimate plunder of war. Upon
rejection of this proposition, he burned so much of the city as time
allowed, and returned to Westover, without loss. He carried off seven
brass cannon, three hundred stands of arms found in the loft of the
Capitol, and a few quartermasters’ stores, as his sole trophies of war.
Upon information, however, that Baron Steuben was at Petersburg with
some militia, Arnold hastened to Portsmouth to put its defences in
better condition.