A BIRD’S-EYE VIEW OF THE THEATRE OF WAR.
As a bird’s overlook of its wide field of vision cannot comprehend all
objects within range, except in turn, so must the patient reader come
back again to stand behind Washington and look over his shoulder as he
points the glass of observation to the activities which he in turn
surveys; to catch with him their import, and so far as possible strain
the eye of faith with him, while with slowly sweeping supervision he
comprehends all that the war for American Independence has intrusted to
his care. Mountain and valley, ocean and river, marsh and morass, cave
and ravine, are representatives of the various scenes of agitation and
conflict. The entire land is in excited expectancy, and everywhere war
is waged; but beyond and over all these contending conditions he
discerns the even horizon of assured victory. And just now, immediately
at hand, under his very feet, as well as wherever partisan warfare tears
life out of sweet homes for the sprinkling of liberty’s altar, there is
indescribable pain and anguish. His heart bleeds with theirs; for he is
one with them, and they are one with him, in the willing consecration
which generations yet unborn shall forever honor.
And as the year 1780 came to its close, he drew his sword-girth tighter,
and seemed to stand many inches taller, as he embraced, in one reflected
view, the suffering South and the half-asleep North. Between the two
sections there was some restless impatience over such exacting
contributions of fathers, brothers and sons, to regions so far from
home; and just about his humble sleeping quarters, were suffering,
faithful sharers of his every need.
Tidings of the failure of Gates, with its disaster and its sacrifices of
brave legions, did not reach the Commander-in-Chief until September. But
it was impossible for him to send troops in sufficient numbers to cope
with the army of Cornwallis. The second French division, so long
expected (and never realized), was reported to be blockaded at home, and
of no possible immediate use to America. The British fleet still
blockaded Newport. Lafayette did indeed elaborate a plan for an assault
upon New York, Fort Washington, and Staten Island; but the plan was
abandoned through lack of boats for such extended water-carriage. There
were few periods of the war where more diverse and widely separated
interests required both the comprehensive and the minute consideration
of the American Commander-in-Chief.
A few illustrations represent the many. Forts Ann and George were
captured, by a mixed force of Canadians, Indians, and British regulars,
in October. Fort Edward was saved through the sagacity of Colonel
Livingston, who, having a garrison of only seventy-nine men, averted
attack by sending to the commanding officer of Fort George an
exaggerated report of his own strength, with a promise to come to his
aid. This was designed to be intercepted, and the British regulars had
actually approached Saratoga, before their return to Lake Champlain. An
excursion from Fort Niagara into the Mohawk Valley desolated the homes
of the Oneidas, who were friendly to the United States. Some leaders in
certain Vermont circles corresponded with British officials in Canada;
and such was the uneasiness which prevailed along the northern and
northwestern frontier, that three regiments had to be sent to Albany, to
compose the unrest of that single region. On the seventh of November,
Washington wrote: “The American army is experiencing almost daily want;
while the British army derives ample supplies from a trade with New
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, which has by degrees become so common
that it is hardly thought a crime.”
Early in September, a commercial treaty between Holland and the United
States came under consideration, and Colonel Laurens was sent as
commissioner to conduct the negotiations abroad; but he was taken
prisoner and locked up in the Tower of London, to stand trial on the
charge of high treason against the British crown. His papers were
seized, and on the second day of December, Great Britain declared war
against Holland.
The condition of Great Britain, at that time, was indeed one of supreme
trial; and it is well for the people of America to honor the inherent
forces of British liberty which vindicated, under such adverse ruling
conditions, the very principles for which their brethren fought in
America. It was the one solemn hour in British history when America, if
fostered as a trusted and honored child, would have spared England long
years of waste in blood and treasure. Not only were Spain and France
combined to plunder or acquire her West India possessions; but Spain was
pressing the siege of Gibraltar. Both Denmark and Sweden united with
Catharine of Russia to adopt the famous system of “Armed Neutrality,”
which declared that “free ships make free goods,” and that “neutrals
might carry any goods or supplies wherever they pleased, with complete
immunity from search or capture.” That was a deadly blow at British
commerce. Even in the East Indies, her crown was one of thorns. Hyder
Ali swept through the Province of Madras, and Warren Hastings was
contending for very life, to save British rule in India from overthrow.
France sent aid to Hyder Ali, as well as to America; and was thus, at
this very period, unexpectedly limited in her anticipated contributions
to the army of Washington.
Domestic excitements increased Britain’s burdens. Eighty thousand
volunteers had been enrolled in Ireland in view of apprehended French
invasion. A large number of her statesmen favored “peace at any price.”
The wonderful capacity of Great Britain to withstand external force and
to uncover the equally wonderful resources at her command, ought to have
convinced her rulers that on the same basis, and by a legitimate
inheritance, the American Colonies were unconquerable.
On the eleventh of November, General Sullivan, having resigned, took his
seat in Congress. On the twentieth, Washington thus addressed him:
“Congress will deceive themselves, if they imagine that the army, or a
State, that is the theatre of war, can rub through another campaign as
the last. It would be as unreasonable to suppose that because a man had
rolled a snow-ball till it had acquired the size of a horse, he might do
it until it was the size of a house. Matters may be pushed to a certain
point, beyond which we cannot move them. Ten months’ pay is now due the
army. Every department of it is so much indebted that we have not credit
for a single expense, and some of the States are harassed and oppressed
to a degree beyond bearing.... To depend, under these circumstances,
upon the resources of the country, unassisted by foreign bravery, will,
I am confident, be to lean upon a broken reed.”
At a conference held with Count Rochambeau at Hartford, Conn., it had
been proposed by General Sullivan, “that the French fleet seek Boston,
and the French army join Washington”; but this was impracticable. The
stay at Newport prevented the operations of the British blockading fleet
elsewhere along the southern Atlantic coast; and thus far, restricted
British movements generally. As early as October sixteenth, General
Leslie left New York with three thousand troops; landed at Portsmouth,
Va., and joined Cornwallis at Charleston late in December. A son of
Rochambeau left Newport on the eighteenth of October, ran the gauntlet
of the British fleet, in a gale, safely reached France, and urged
“_immediate additional aid of men, arms, and money_.” The Chevalier de
Ternay died at Newport, on the fifteenth of December, and was succeeded
by Chevalier Destouches. Colonel Fleury, who will be remembered as
distinguishing himself at Fort Mifflin and Stony Point, joined
Rochambeau. These gallant French officers, like their sovereign, were so
devoted to Washington, and entertained such absolute faith in his
capacity as patriot and soldier, that the narrative of his career during
the war would savor of ingratitude if their faithful service were not
identified with his memory. At that time, there was a design under
consideration, but never matured, for the association of Spain with
France in active operations on the American coast.
Meanwhile, Washington proposed another plan for the reconstruction of
the army, through the consolidation of battalions; thereby reducing
their numbers, but fixing a permanent military establishment. It will
appear from a letter written to Franklin on the twentieth of December,
that he had reached a point, where, even under so many embarrassments,
he felt that ultimate success was not far distant. The letter reads as
follows: “The campaign has been thus inactive, after a flattering
prospect at the opening of it and vigorous struggles to make it a
decisive one, through failure of the unexpected naval superiority which
was the pivot upon which everything turned. The movements of Lord
Cornwallis during the last month or two have been retrograde. What turn
the late reënforcements which have been sent him may give to his
affairs, remains to be known. I have reënforced our Southern army
principally with horse; but the length of the march is so much opposed
to the measure that every corps is in a greater or less degree ruined. I
am happy, however, in assuring you that a better disposition never
prevailed in the Legislatures of the several States than at this time.
The folly of temporary expedients is seen into and exploded; and
vigorous efforts will be used to obtain a permanent army, and carry on
the war systematically, if the obstinacy of Great Britain shall compel
us to continue it. We want nothing but the aid of a loan, to enable us
to put our finances into a tolerable train. The country does not want
for resources; but we want the means of drawing them forth.”
The new organization was to consist of fifty regiments of foot, four of
artillery, and other bodies of mounted men, including in all, thirty-six
thousand men, fairly apportioned among the States. But not more than
half that number were ever in the field at one time, and the full
complement never was recruited. The prejudice against a regular army of
any size was bitter; and Hildreth states the matter very truthfully when
he says, that “Congress, led by Samuel Adams, was very jealous of
military power, and of everything which tended to give a permanent
character to the army.” Mr. Adams was sound in principle, for he not
only realized that the Colonies had suffered through the employment of
the British army to enforce oppressive and unconstitutional laws, but
equally well knew that a larger army than the State needed for its
protection against invasion and the preservation of the peace, was
inimical to true liberty.
Money was still scarce. A specie tax of six millions was imposed, and
the sixth annual campaign of the war drew near its close. John Trumbull,
Jr., became Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, _vice_ Robert H.
Harrison who became Chief Justice of Maryland; and Colonel Hand became
Adjutant-General, _vice_ Scammon, resigned. Morgan was promoted, and
with General Steuben and Harry Lee’s horse, was ordered to the Southern
Department, accompanied by Kosciusko as engineer, _vice_ Du Portail,
captured at Charleston.
On the twenty-eighth of November, Washington designated the winter
quarters for the army, establishing his own at New Windsor. The
Pennsylvania Line were near Morristown; the Jersey line, at Pompton; the
Maryland horse, at Lancaster, Penn.; Sheldon’s horse, at Colchester,
Conn., and the New York regiments at Fort Schuyler, Saratoga, Albany,
Schenectady, and other exposed Northern posts. This distribution of
troops, from time to time indicated, enables the reader to understand
how a wise disposition of the army, when active operations were
practically suspended, equally enabled Washington to resume active
service upon the shortest notice.
On the eighth of October, General Greene, who had been tendered the
command of the Southern Department, _vice_ Gates, submitted to
Washington his plan of conducting the next campaign. He desired,
substantially, “a flying army”; that is, “one lightly equipped, mobile
as possible, and familiar with the country in which operations were to
be conducted.” To secure to Greene prompt support in his new command,
Washington addressed letters to Gov. Abner Nash, of North Carolina, Gov.
Thomas Jefferson, of Virginia, and Gov. Thomas S. Lee, of Maryland,
soliciting their cordial coöperation in the work of the new
Department-Commander. Greene began his journey on the twenty-ninth day
of November, attended by Baron Steuben. He stopped at each capital to
urge the necessity of immediate action, and secured the services of
Generals Smallwood and Gist, of Maryland and Delaware, for recruiting
service in those States. Upon reaching Virginia, he found that State to
be thoroughly aroused for her own defence. General Leslie, whose
departure from New York has been noticed, had fortified both Norfolk and
Portsmouth, and this increase of the British forces had very justly
alarmed the people. Washington had already sent Generals Muhlenburg and
Weedon to Virginia to organize its militia, and they were endeavoring to
confine the forces of Leslie within the range of his fortified
positions. These officers had also served under General Greene, making
their assignment eminently judicious. The matter of supplies, of all
kinds, became a matter of the greatest concern, if operations were to be
carried on effectively against Cornwallis at the South: while also
maintaining full correspondence with the troops of the centre zone, and
the North. The consolidation of regiments left many officers without
commands; but the selection of a competent Quartermaster-General became
an imperative necessity. Col. Edward Carrington was selected, and of
him, Chief Justice Marshall says: “He was eminently qualified to
undertake the task of combining and conducting the means of the
Quartermaster-General’s department; obeyed the call to the office; and
discharged it with unequalled zeal and fidelity.”
For the purposes of this narrative, it is only necessary to indicate the
general conduct of operations southward, so far as they illustrate the
wisdom of Washington in the selection of officers, and the instructions
under which he made use of their services. He concurred with Greene in
his general plan; and the initiative was undertaken with as frequent
exchange of views, through express messengers or couriers, as was then
practicable. Orders were issued for Colonel Carrington to explore the
country of the Dan, the Yadkin, and Catawba rivers, and to make himself
acquainted with the streams into which they discharged themselves.
Kosciusko, Engineer-in-Chief of Greene, was charged with selecting
proper places for defending or securing safe fording-places. A principal
storehouse and laboratory was established at Prince Edward’s
Court-House, and Baron Steuben was charged with maintaining the supply
of powder from the manufactories, and of lead from the mines of
Fincastle County. Such was the general preparation for the forthcoming
campaign.
General Greene reached Charlotte on the second of December, and relieved
Gates, who had been awaiting his arrival for the surrender of his
command. After exchange of the proper courtesies, Gates returned to his
farm. The wisdom of Washington’s choice in the assignment of General
Greene may be seen by the citation of some of Greene’s letters written
at that crisis.
To Jefferson he writes thus: “I find the troops in a most wretched
condition, destitute of every necessity, either for their comfort or
convenience, and they may be literally said to be naked. It will answer
no good purpose to send men here in such a condition.... There must be
either pride, or principle, to make a soldier. No man will think himself
bound to fight the battles of a State that leaves him to perish for want
of clothing, nor can you inspire a soldier with the sentiment of pride
while his situation renders him more an object of pity, than of envy.
The life of a soldier, in the best estate, is liable to innumerable
hardships: but when these are aggravated by the want of provisions and
clothing, his condition becomes intolerable; nor can men long contend
with such complicated difficulties and distress. Death, desertion, and
the hospital, must soon swallow up an army under such circumstances; and
if it were possible for men to maintain such a wretched existence, they
would have no spirit to face their enemies, and would invariably
disgrace themselves and their commander. It is impossible to presume
discipline, when troops are in want of everything: to attempt severity,
will only thin the ranks by more heavy desertion.”
To Marion he wrote: “I am fully sensible that your service is hard, and
your sufferings great; but how great the prize for which we contend! I
like your plan of frequently shifting your ground. It frequently
prevents surprise, and perhaps the total loss of your party. Until a
more permanent army can be collected than is in the field at present, we
must endeavor to keep up a partisan war, and preserve the tide of
sentiment among the people in our favor, as much as possible. _Spies are
the eyes of an army, and without them, a general is always groping in
the dark._”
In all these letters and the measures undertaken, Greene reflects the
principles upon which his Commander-in-Chief carried on the war, and it
was his highest pride so to act, as if under the direct gaze of
Washington. On the twentieth of December, having been detained by rains
at Charlotte, he abandoned his huts; and by the twelfth of January,
1781, was encamped on the banks of the Peedee River, awaiting the
opening of the final campaign of the war for American Independence. Col.
Christopher Greene, as well as Colonel Washington, Harry Lee, and
Morgan, had already joined him, and Washington had thus furnished to the
Southern army his ablest general and such choice details of officers and
men as had been faithful, gallant, and successful throughout the war.