BATTLE OF SPRINGFIELD.—ROCHAMBEAU.—ARNOLD.—GATES.
Sir Henry Clinton returned from Charleston to New York on the
seventeenth day of June, 1780. He must have contrasted his report made
to the British War Office, of the “conquest of South Carolina,” with
that made by General Knyphausen to himself, of the recent experience of
British operations in New Jersey. But Clinton was ever a man of action,
prompt and energetic. He felt deeply the long protracted embarrassment
of his position, while holding such a vast and responsible command
without sufficient resources for pressing exigencies. He knew, and
Washington, with a soldier’s instinct, knew that Clinton knew, that
there was no safety for New York, and no possibility of effective
operations out from New York, so long as a strong, faithful American
army held the fastnesses of New Jersey, and a vigorous espionage of the
Hudson River region was maintained. The sweep of Washington’s arm was
largely shaping the future destiny of America from very humble
headquarters; but no less firmly and decisively.
[Illustration: Battle of Springfield Operations from Staten Island]
Clinton did not remain idle, nor undecided, a single day. Troops were
embarked upon transports immediately; and all suitable demonstrations
were made as if an organized movement against West Point were designed.
Washington placed his entire army in motion and advanced one division
eleven miles, toward Pompton, on the twenty-second, _en route_ for the
Hudson, to be prepared for whatever might be the scheme of his
adversary. His confidential agents in New York were always quick to
report details of British movements. Washington invariably exacted
“minute” details; and from these he interpreted the general plans of the
enemy. In this instance, the embarking of field batteries instead of
heavy guns, which could always be procured from ships, satisfied him
that his own headquarters and the destruction of his army were Clinton’s
real objectives.
He was prepared for Clinton’s choice of the alternate movements.
Although one division had been advanced in the direction of the Hudson
River, Generals Greene, Maxwell, and Stark, with Harry Lee’s cavalry,
and a strong force of militia, had been left in position near
Springfield. Few battles of the American Revolution have received less
attention, as among the decisive battles of the war, than that of
Springfield, N.J. And yet few were more strikingly illustrative of the
strategic wisdom with which Washington had planned the successful
prosecution of the war, as early as 1776.
On the morning of the twenty-third, at five o’clock, the British army,
having crossed from Staten Island in two columns, began its advance.
(See maps, “Battle of Springfield,” and, “Operations in New Jersey.”)
Its force consisted of five thousand infantry, nearly all of their
cavalry, and eighteen pieces of artillery. General Clinton, with the
right wing, advanced along the Springfield road with vigor, but
deliberately, as if this were his principal line of attack. Upon
approaching the first bridge near the Matthews House, he was obliged to
halt until his guns could gain a suitable position, since Colonel
Angel’s Rhode Island regiment, with one gun, commanded the bridge over
the Rahway, and occupied an orchard which gave good cover. At first, the
British guns were aimed too high and did little execution. By fording
the stream, which was not more than twelve yards wide, Angel’s position
was turned, so that he was crowded back to the second bridge, over a
branch of the Rahway, where Colonel Shreve resisted with equal obstinacy
and bravery. By reference to the map it will be seen that General
Greene, as well as Dickinson’s militia on a slight ridge in the rear of
Shreve, was admirably posted for reserve support. Angel lost one-fourth
of his men and was ordered to fall back, with Colonel Shreve, to the
high ground occupied by Generals Maxwell and Stark, near a mill. Colonel
Dayton’s Regiment was also distinguished for its gallant conduct.
Washington Irving refers very pleasantly to the part taken in the action
by Chaplain Caldwell, whose church had been burned on the twenty-fifth
of January and whose wife had been killed on the sixth of June, as
follows: “None showed more ardor in the fight than Caldwell the
chaplain, who distributed Watts’s psalm and hymn books among the
soldiers when they were in want of wadding, with the shout: ‘Put Watts
into them, boys!’”
The other British column had for its special objective the seizure of
the pass leading to Chatham and Morristown. Major Lee’s cavalry, and a
picket under Captain Walker, had been posted at Little’s bridge, on the
Vauxhall road, and Colonel Ogden’s Regiment covered them. General Greene
found that he could not afford to hold so extensive a front, and
concentrated his force at other positions eminently strong and capable
of vigorous defence. The remainder of Maxwell’s and Stark’s brigades
also took high ground, by the mill, with the militia force of Dickinson,
on the flanks.
General Knyphausen led this column in person. But the Vauxhall bridge
was as closely contested as had been that at Springfield. Greene shifted
his position, in view of this second attack and its pronounced
objective, to a range of hills in the rear of Byron’s tavern, where the
roads were brought so near, that succor might be readily transferred
from one to the other. The movement was admirable, scientific, and
successful. Tn his report to Washington, he says: “I was thus enabled to
reach Colonel Webb’s Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Hunton commanding, and
Colonel Jackson’s Regiment, with one piece of artillery, which entirely
checked the advance of the enemy upon the American left, and secured
that pass.”
The Battle of Springfield had been fought with coolness and unfaltering
bravery, and had been won. General Clinton burned Springfield, crossed
to Staten Island at midnight, withdrew his bridge of boats, and reached
his headquarters in safety. His loss, as reported by contemporary
journalists, was placed at about one hundred and fifty men; but
comparison of his Reports and Musters, before and after the expedition,
make the killed, wounded, and missing twice that number. The American
loss was one officer and twelve non-commissioned officers killed, five
officers and fifty-six privates wounded, and nine missing; “Captain
Davis and the militia not reporting.”
General Clinton’s report says: “I could not think of keeping the field
in New Jersey; and wished to land the troops and give a camp of rest to
an army of which many corps had had an uninterrupted campaign of
fourteen months.”
For five years, New Jersey had been a constant theatre of active war. It
was indeed the strategic centre of the war for American Independence.
The bravery of her soldiery, whose homes were constantly menaced, was
only surpassed by the heroism of her women. These, constantly exposed to
every possible desolation that attended the marching and
counter-marching of contending armies, never flagged, flinched, nor
failed, until her delivery was at last complete.
On the night of June 24, 1780, the day after the Battle of Springfield,
Washington, upon return to his headquarters, addressed another call to
Governors of States for their full quota, under new assignments, and
awaited with interest further tidings from the progress of the French
allies, then on the sea. This Battle of Springfield had vindicated his
confidence in the Continental troops; and, as in all armies, some
regiments proved invariably reliable, under whatever conditions they
fought.
On the tenth day of July, 1780, the first division of the French army
sent by Louis XVI., in aid of American Independence, consisting of six
thousand troops, landed at Newport, R.I. All were under the command of
Lieutenant-General Rochambeau, accompanied by Major-General Chastellux,
a relative of Lafayette, and escorted by seven heavy battleships, under
command of Chevalier de Ternay.
Washington immediately submitted a project for the capture of New York;
but on the thirteenth of July Admiral Graves readied that city with six
ships-of-the-line, which gave to the British such superiority of ships
and guns, that the plan was postponed to wait the arrival of the second
French division, of equal numbers, which was supposed, at the time, to
be already on its way from France. But Sir Henry Clinton was not
inactive. The time to strike was before the French could unite with
Washington and take their place in the American army. He planned a
surprise, and advanced with eight thousand troops as far as Huntington,
L.I., for a descent upon Newport; but Washington put his entire army in
readiness to advance upon New York. Clinton, having learned that
Rochambeau, advised by Washington, had gone into camp in a strong
position, and with the rapidly assembling militia would be superior in
force, recalled his troops. He converted the expedition into a naval
blockade of Newport, if possible thereby to cut off the second division
of the French army, upon its arrival within American waters.
The Count de Rochambeau, with a soldier’s exactness, soon caught the
fire of Washington’s zeal, and well comprehended the situation of
American affairs generally. So intense is his delineation of the
condition of things as he observed them, that if penned by Washington
himself, nothing could have been added. His letter to the Count de
Vergennes, dated on July sixteenth, only six days after his landing in
America, reads, in part, as follows: “Upon our arrival here, the country
was in consternation; the paper money had fallen to sixty for one.... I
spoke to the principal persons of the place, and told them, as I write
to General Washington, that this was merely the advance guard of a
greater force, and that the king was determined to support them with his
whole power. In twenty-four hours their spirits rose, and last night,
all the streets, houses, and steeples were illuminated, in the midst of
fireworks and great rejoicing.... You see, Sir, how important it is to
act with vigor.... Send us troops, ships, and money; but do not depend
upon this people, nor upon their means. They have neither money nor
credit. Their means of resistance are but momentary, and called forth
when they are attacked in their homes. Then they assemble themselves for
the moment of immediate danger, and defend themselves. Washington
sometimes commands fifteen thousand, and sometimes three thousand men.”
The restriction of the French fleet to Narragansett Bay so immediately
after its arrival, led Washington and Rochambeau to postpone operations
against New York; and it is proper to notice the fact that no news was
received of the second division of French troops until late in the fall,
when it was reported as blockaded in the home port of Brest. A
proclamation was made and published by Lafayette, with the sanction of
Washington, announcing to the Canadians that the French would aid them
to expel the British troops from their country. The object of this
proclamation was chiefly to divert the attention of the garrison of New
York from a proposed joint attack upon that city, which Washington kept
always in view. The expedition was never seriously entertained; but
General Clinton, on the thirty-first of August, as anticipated by
Washington, forwarded a copy of the paper to Lord Germaine, while at the
same time he placed before him, in confidence, a proposition of a
different kind, from which he derived a strong expectation of British
gain, through the acquisition, by purchase, of the principal Hudson
River military post, West Point itself.
Washington had advised General Arnold that he would soon be tendered an
active command. But that officer, pleading as excuse continued suffering
from his wounds, expressed a preference for the command of a military
post. After urgent solicitation of himself and his friends, he was
authorized to designate the post of his choice. As the result, on the
third of August, he was assigned to the command of “West Point and its
dependencies, in which all are included, from Fishkill to King’s Ferry.”
At the date of this assignment of Arnold to a post which was rightly
regarded by Washington as most vital to ultimate American success, a
clandestine correspondence had already passed between Generals Clinton
and Arnold, through the medium of Major John André.
The attention of the reader is naturally retrospective, as the name of
André reappears in connection with that of Arnold. He had been taken
prisoner at St. John’s; was once on parole at Montreal, and familiar
with Arnold’s habits and the outrageous abuse of his public trust with
which, there, as afterwards at Philadelphia, he had been charged. André
also knew of his gambling, his extravagance, his ambition, and his
reckless daring, generally. His own personal antecedents during the
grand ovation tendered to General Howe, upon that officer’s departure
from Philadelphia, in which he had so conspicuously figured as escort to
Miss Shippen, afterwards the wife of Arnold, acquire special interest.
He was, and long had been, a confidential member of General Clinton’s
staff. Neither Clinton nor André could conceive, for a moment, that
Arnold and his wife, formerly Miss Shippen, would betray André’s
confidence; or, if the proposition to betray West Point failed, that
André would be allowed to suffer.
On the twenty-fifth of August, General Clinton wrote to Lord Germaine as
follows: “At this new epoch of the war, when a foreign foe has already
landed, and an addition to it is expected, I owe it to my country, and I
must in justice say, to my own fame, to declare to your lordship that I
become every day more sensible of the utter impossibility of prosecuting
the war in this country without reënforcements.... We are, by some
thousands, too weak to subdue the rebellion.” On the twenty-seventh of
September, Lord Germaine wrote in reply: “Next to the destruction of
Washington’s army, the gaining over of officers of influence and
reputation among the troops would be the speediest way of subduing the
rebellion and restoring the tranquillity of America. Your commission
authorizes you to avail yourself of such opportunities, and there can be
no doubt that the expense will be cheerfully submitted to.” The British
archives, then secret, show that Lord Germaine was kept fully advised of
the whole scheme. On the thirtieth of August, Arnold solicited an
interview with some responsible party, in order definitely to settle
upon the price of surrendering West Point to Great Britain. André was
selected, as mutually agreeable to both Clinton and Arnold. On the
eighteenth of September, Arnold wrote, advising that André be sent up to
the sloop-of-war _Vulture_, then anchored in Haverstraw Bay, promising
to send a person with a flag of truce and boat to meet him. Clinton
received the note on the next day. Under the pretence of an expedition
to Chesapeake Bay, freely made public, a body of picked troops embarked
on frigates. André reached the _Vulture_ on the twentieth. On the
twenty-first he landed, met Arnold, accompanied him first to the Clove,
and then to the house of Josiah Holt Smith. (See map, “Highlands of the
Hudson.”) Smith’s antecedents were those of a royalist; but the secret
was too valuable to be intrusted to such a man; and subsequent
investigations failed to connect him with any knowledge of the
conspiracy. The terms of purchase were, in so many words: “Pay, in gold,
and a brigadier-general’s commission in the British Army.”
The terms were settled and the bargain was closed. Besides knowledge of
the plans of the post and its approaches, André was advised of the
signals to be exchanged; the disposition of the guards; and the points
of surest attack which would be within the immediate control of
disembarking grenadiers and sharp-shooters. The _Vulture_ had dropped
down the river with the tide too far to be promptly reached; so that
André crossed the river, and having proper passports attempted to save
time by returning to New York by land. While passing through Tarrytown,
he was challenged, stopped, examined, and made prisoner. On the second
of October, he was executed as a spy. America grieved over his fate, and
no one with more of pity than did Washington. His soul still felt sore
over the fate of Nathan Hale, and after a solitary hour of anguish in
spirit, he suggested to General Clinton a method of escape for André. He
offered to exchange him for Benedict Arnold. Clinton could not do this
without loss of honor to himself and Great Britain. André had to die.
Washington, with tender consideration and profound sympathy, gave to
Mrs. Arnold a safe conduct and escort to her former home in
Philadelphia, and shared the sentiment of all who knew her best, that
the wife was not the confidante of her husband’s treason. Lafayette most
tenderly announced his sympathy in her behalf.
General Greene was immediately assigned to command West Point and its
dependencies. The garrison was also entirely changed. The works were
skilfully modified and strengthened, so that any plans in the possession
of Clinton would be useless; and Washington took post, in person, at
Brakeness, near Passaic Falls, N.J.
It will be remembered that Baron De Kalb left Morristown on the
sixteenth of the previous April with reënforcements for the Southern
army. On the sixth of July, he reached Buffalo Ford and Deep River, N.C.
On the twenty-fifth, Gates, who had been assigned to command of the
Southern Department, joined him. “Away from Washington,” Baron De Kalb
experienced deeply the sentiment of unreasonable, but perhaps natural
jealousy of foreign officers which pervaded portions of the American
army; and General Caswell, in defiance of positive orders to report to
Baron De Kalb, marched directly to Camden and reported to General Gates.
It had been De Kalb’s purpose, as an experienced soldier, to advance by
Charlotte and Salisbury, where supplies could be readily obtained.
“General Gates,” says Irving, “on the twenty-seventh, put what he called
the ‘Grand Army’ on its march through a barren country which could offer
no food but lean cattle, fruit, and unripe maize.” The Battle of Camden,
or “Sanders’ Creek,” which followed, was a complete rout. Baron De Kalb
fought with the utmost confidence and bravery, but fell upon the field,
after having been eleven times wounded. Any support whatever, on the
part of Gates, would have secured victory, or a well-balanced action.
Gates overestimated his own force; refused to examine his
Adjutant-General’s statement, or to consider the advice of his officers,
who understood exactly the true condition of the crude material which he
styled his “Grand Army,” and fled from the battlefield at full speed. He
did not halt until reaching Charlotte, sixty miles away; and by the
twentieth reached Hillsborough, one hundred and eighty miles distant,
without gathering a sufficient force to form an escort. He said that he
was “carried away from the field by a torrent of flying soldiers.” His
self-conceit and presumption, like that of Lee, on account of having
once served in the British army, and his utter want of every soldierly
quality, except the negative sense of pride in having a personal
command, were exposed to the American people without delay. He claimed
to have made an attempt to rally his troops; but he had no influence
whatever. During the Burgoyne campaign, he was never under fire; and
Lee’s unheeded warning did indeed secure to his memory the wreath of
“Southern willow, in place of that of laurel” which Congress had placed
upon his brow, when the laurel had been earned by the brave and
patriotic Schuyler. The troops of Delaware and Maryland alone would have
saved the battle, if properly supported by Gates. The gallant Delaware
Battalion which fought with De Kalb, was almost destroyed. The Maryland
troops lost in killed, wounded and prisoners nearly four hundred, out of
a total of fourteen hundred; but to their perpetual honor it is to be
recorded, that of the number swept away in the final retreat of the
whole army, seven hundred non-commissioned officers and privates
reported for duty by the twenty-ninth of the month.
On the eighth of October, the Battle of King’s Mountain was fought; and
the names of Shelby, Campbell, McDowell, Sevier, and Williams are still
associated with descendants from the brave participants in that battle.
It partially offset the disaster at Camden, and was an inspiration to
Washington in the adjustment of his plans for Greene’s movements. It
compelled Cornwallis to delay his second invasion of North Carolina; and
Tarleton, in writing, says of this people, that “the counties of
Mecklenburg and Rowan were more hostile to England than any others in
America.”
Gates endeavored to gather the remnant of his army; and, before his
leaving to answer before a Court of Inquiry ordered by Congress, about
twenty-three hundred men assembled. On inspection, it was found that but
eight hundred in the whole number were properly clothed and equipped.
The Southern campaign became one of petty operations mostly. Neither
Cornwallis, Tarleton, Rawdon, nor Balfour made progress in subjugation
of the people. Sumner, although wounded at Black’s Plantation on the
twentieth of October, gained credit in several lesser expeditions. But
universal British failures disappointed the expectations of the British
Commander-in-Chief at New York. The loss of Charleston, in the opinion
of Washington and the best military critics, was not without its
compensations; and the collapse of Gates was an illustration of
Washington’s knowledge of men and his foresight as a Soldier.