JEALOUSY AND GREED DEFEATED.—VALLEY FORGE.
The struggle for American independence and the career of the American
Commander-in-Chief very minutely foreshadowed the experience of most
successful soldiers with the political manipulations of partisans in
Congress ever since. The “On to Richmond,” and the “On to Washington”
cries of 1861, and the fluctuations of the popular pulse with the
incidents of successive campaigns in the civil war, were used by
demagogues for selfish ends. But the same spirit had shown itself in a
degree quite as repugnant to devoted sons of liberty, during the throes
which accompanied this nation’s birth.
Nothing seemed too exacting as a test of the American
Commander-in-Chief. As the war enlarged its scope, and the prospects of
success brightened for the moment, clamorous aspirants for office
multiplied. The personal bravery of the soldier was magnified at the
expense of discipline. The slow progress of the army was charged to
excessive caution. Nothing, so far as politicians were concerned, was
deemed too hard for the American militia, if only the right sort of a
quack administered their action, and led them to its tests. But the
consciousness of unselfish devotion to duty, never boldly impeached, and
ever unimpeachable, sustained Washington. Amid these clamors for office
and preferment from Congressmen and politicians, his faith in righteous
methods, in patient training, in kind and considerate treatment of all
who took part in the struggle, whatever their antecedents or rank, never
for a moment swerved. His purpose and his self-control matured, until he
attained such calm contempt for jealousy and intrigue that he could move
on through the deepest waters, regardless of restless, dashing
wave-crests.
The Battle of Germantown, and Howe’s abandonment of his suburban
encampment, naturally suggested the immediate occupation of Philadelphia
by the American army. It, like Boston, “must be seized” at once. The
“almost” victory on the fourth of October, blinded the vision of many to
the broader range of national activity which Washington’s supervision
embraced. News of the surrender of Burgoyne reached his headquarters on
the eighteenth day of October. He promptly congratulated General Gates
and the northern army, in terms of most, gracious sincerity and
emphasis. And yet, General Gates presumed to send his Report to Congress
direct, and not to his Commander-in-Chief. Then, the “almost” victory of
Washington over Howe, at Germantown, was contrasted with the complete
victory of Gates over Burgoyne. The fact that Washington fought with
fewer numbers, and these, of hungry, poorly armed men, nearly worn out
by marches and counter-marches, while the northern army, three to one of
their adversaries, simply penned up first, and then starved out, a force
that had not rations for another day, counted little with these
pseudo-scientific experts. And yet, let it ever be remembered, that the
British garrison of Philadelphia was not panting for any more field
service. The very restriction of that garrison to city limits and the
immediate suburbs, proved not only subversive of their discipline and
efficiency, but ultimately vindicated the wisdom of Washington. He saw
distinctly, just how its partial inaction afforded him time to mature
his own army organization; while the garrison of New York must, of
necessity, be kept equally passive, for lack of this very strong
detachment which idled in barracks, on the banks of the Delaware.
But while the garrison of Philadelphia limited its excursions to
plundering farms and the country adjacent for wood, forage and
provisions generally, both commanding generals were studying the
relations of the Delaware River to the conduct of all future operations
upon any decisive scale. The river had been so obstructed that the fleet
of Admiral Howe, which had been compelled to land his army at the head
of the Chesapeake in September, could not yet communicate with the army
since it gained the city. He arrived off Newcastle on the sixth day of
October. Washington realized that by retaining control of the Delaware
he not only restricted the supply of provisions and military stores to
the garrison, but retained easy communications with New Jersey and the
Camps of Instruction and rendezvous at the adequately fortified posts of
Morristown and Middlebrook.
At Billingsport, _chevaux-de-frise_ obstructed the channel. Just below
the mouth of the Schuylkill was Fort Mifflin, on Mud Island. On the
opposite shore, at Red Bank, was Fort Mercer. Washington determined to
maintain these posts, or make their acquisition by the enemy most costly
in men and materials. His foresight grasped, as if in hand, the rapidly
maturing facts, that Britain could not much longer meet the drain of the
American war and at the same time hold her own against her European
foes; and that America needed only a thoroughly concerted effort to
consummate her independence.
Colonel Christopher Green, courageous at Bunker Hill and during Arnold’s
expedition to Canada, was assigned to command Fort Mercer, with troops
from his own State, Rhode Island. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, of Maryland,
with Maryland troops, was stationed at Fort Mifflin. These little
garrisons were strengthened by the detail of four hundred Continental
troops to each. In these details, the same wisdom marked Washington’s
choice; as Angel’s Rhode Island regiment reported to Greene, and a
portion of Greene’s Virginia regiment reported to Smith.
The British army was not an idle observer of these movements. On the
twenty-second of October, the two Grenadier regiments of Donop and
Minnigerode, and two regiments of the line, with the Infantry Chasseurs
(all Hessian), with eight 3–pounders and two howitzers, approached Fort
Mercer and demanded its surrender. They had crossed at Coopers Ferry on
the twenty-first, slightly interrupted by skirmishers, and on the
following morning suddenly emerged from the woods, expecting an easy and
an immediate victory. Defiance was returned to their demand. Two
assaulting columns, already formed, made an immediate and simultaneous
advance upon the north and south faces of the fort. The garrison,
however, knowing that it could not hold the exterior works, which were
still incomplete, retired to the interior defences; but still occupied a
curtain of the old works, which afforded an enfilading fire upon any
storming party which should attempt the inner stockade. The withdrawal
of the garrison from the exterior works was misunderstood. The assault
was bold, desperate, and brilliant. The resistance was incessant,
deadly, overwhelming. Colonel Donop fell, mortally wounded, and near
him, Lieutenant-Colonel Minnigerode. These confident assailants lost, in
less than sixty minutes, four hundred men—being one-third of their
entire force. And still, one more attempt was made at the escarpment
near the river; but here also the Americans were on the alert. Armed
galleys in the stream opened a raking fire at short range, and dispersed
the assailants. Two British ships—the _Augusta_ (64–gun man-of-war), and
the _Merlin_ (frigate), which had been so disposed as to aid the
assault, grounded. On the next day, the former took fire from a hot
shot, and blew up, before her entire crew could escape; and the _Merlin_
was burned, to avoid capture. The American loss was fourteen killed and
twenty-one wounded. Colonel Donop was buried carefully by Major Fleury,
a French officer in the American service, and his grave at the south end
of the old works is still an object of interest to visitors. Colonel
Greene, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, and Commodore Hazlewood of the galley
service, received from Washington and from Congress worthy testimonials
for “gallant conduct.”
In the meantime, the British had found two solid points of land amid the
marshy ground at the mouth of the Schuylkill River, within cannon-range
of Fort Mifflin, where they constructed two heavy batteries bearing upon
that fort. Four 32–pounders from the _Somerset_ and six 24–pounders from
the _Eagle_, with one 13–inch mortar, were added to works erected on
Province Island, to bring a more direct fire upon the fort than could be
secured from the batteries at the mouth of the Schuylkill River. (See
map.)
In order to anticipate a possible movement of troops into New Jersey, in
case of a successful assault upon Fort Mifflin, Washington ordered
General Varnum’s brigade to take post at Woodbury, near Red Bank, and
General Forman to rally the New Jersey militia to his support. But the
British made no attempt to land. The later assault upon the fort, made
on the tenth, was successful. Seven ships of the British fleet joined in
the attack; among them the _Somerset_, the _Roebuck_, and the _Pearl_,
which had taken part in operations before Boston and New York.
Lieutenant-Colonel Smith was wounded early in the action and removed to
Fort Mercer, Major Thayer succeeding to the command. Major Fleury, who
planned the works, was also wounded; and after a loss of two hundred and
fifty men, the remnant of the garrison, on the night of the fifteenth,
retired to Fort Mercer. At dawn of the sixteenth, the Grenadiers of the
Royal Guards occupied the island.
[Illustration: Operations on the Delaware.]
The Report of Washington upon this action thus honors the brave
defenders of Fort Mifflin: “The defence will always reflect the highest
honor upon the officers and men of the garrison. The works were entirely
beat down; every piece of cannon was dismounted, and one of the enemy’s
ships came so near that she threw grenades from her tops into the fort,
and killed men upon the platforms, before they quitted the island.”
On the eighteenth, General Cornwallis landed at Billingsport in force,
and Washington sent General Greene to take command of the troops in New
Jersey and check his progress; but the demonstration was so formidable
that the garrison evacuated the works. The Americans, unable to save
their galleys, set fire to them near Gloucester Point; and the British
fleet gained the freedom of the Delaware River.
During this movement, Lafayette, intrusted with a detachment of troops
by General Greene, had several skirmishes with the enemy, and on the
first of December was assigned to command of the division left without a
commander by the dismissal of Stephen. While Cornwallis was on this
detached service, four general officers of Washington’s army against
eleven dissenting voted to attack General Howe. The incident, occurring
at such a period, is noteworthy.
Late in October, the American army advanced from Perkiomy to White
Marsh; General Varnum’s Rhode Island Brigade, twelve hundred strong,
reported for duty, as well as about a thousand additional troops from
Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia. Generals Gates and Putnam still
retained troops for their semi-independent commands; and General Gates,
in particular, only grudgingly sent such as were peremptorily ordered to
report to Washington. It was not until Colonel Hamilton, Aide-de-camp,
visited him in person, that Gates sent the troops which were absolutely
indispensable at army headquarters, and as absolutely useless at Albany.
His ostentatious proclamation of his military success over Burgoyne, and
his criticism of the tardiness and non-efficiency of his
Commander-in-Chief, began to expose his renewed aspirations to succeed
to the chief command.
On the fourth of December, General Howe with a force of fourteen
thousand men, accompanied by Generals Knyphausen and Cornwallis,
advanced to Chestnut Hill, within three miles of the right of the
American army, and slight skirmishing ensued. On the seventh, the
British troops left Chestnut Hill, and took a position at Edge Hill near
the American left. Morgan, just arrived from the northern army, and the
Maryland militia under Colonel Mordecai Gist (subsequently
Brigadier-General) had a sharp skirmish with Cornwallis, losing
forty-four men and indicting an equal loss upon the enemy. Major-General
Gray and the Queen’s Rangers indicted a loss of about fifty men upon an
advance post of the American left; and when night came on, the British
pickets were within a half mile of the American lines, where battle was
awaited with satisfaction and hopeful expectancy. But on the morning of
the eighth, the British camp disappeared, for Howe had suddenly returned
to Philadelphia.
[Illustration: Operations near Philadelphia.]
Howe’s Report, dated December 13th, reads as follows: “Upon the
presumption that a forward movement might tempt the enemy, after
receiving such a reënforcement [reported afterwards as four thousand
men], to give battle for the recovery of this place [Philadelphia]; or,
that a vulnerable part might be found to admit of an attack upon their
camp; the army marched out on the night of the fourth instant.” It was
afterwards learned that Howe had full knowledge of the jealous spirit
then existing towards Washington, and that several of his generals
favored an attack upon Philadelphia, against his better judgment.
Washington, in noticing Howe’s movement, says: “I sincerely wish that
they had made the attack; as the issue, in all probability, from the
disposition of our troops and the strong position of our camp, would
have been fortunate and happy. At the same time, I must add, that
reason, prudence, and every principle of policy, forbid us quitting our
post to attack them. Nothing but success would have justified the
measure; and this could not be expected from their position.”
The army of Washington, nominally eleven thousand strong, had, says
Baron De Kalb, but seven thousand effective men for duty, so general was
the sickness, from extreme cold and the want of sufficient clothing and
other necessaries of a campaign. And yet, under these conditions,
Congress placed in responsible positions those officers who were most
officiously antagonistic to the American Commander-in-Chief. On the
sixth of November, Gates had been made President of the Board of War.
Mifflin, withdrawn from duty as Quartermaster-General, was also placed
upon the Board, retaining his full rank. On the twenty-eighth of
December, Congress appointed Conway Major-General and Inspector-General,
and placed him in communication with the Board of War, to act
independently of the Commander-in-Chief. Lee, then a prisoner of war,
through letters addressed to Gates, Mifflin, Wayne and Conway, united
with them in concerted purpose to oppose the policy of Washington, and
to dictate his action; and more than this, there was a strong influence
brought to bear upon Congress to force Washington’s resignation, or
removal from command.
Washington, however, established his headquarters at Valley Forge,
twenty-one miles from Philadelphia; and on the nineteenth of December
announced his winter quarters by a formal order. On the same day he sent
General Smallwood to Wilmington, to occupy the country south of
Philadelphia and cut off supplies for that city and its garrison.
McDougall was established at Peekskill. Putnam was on the shore of Long
Island Sound until the middle of December, when he was ordered back to
the Highlands. The absence of General Mifflin from the army, and his
total neglect of duty as Quartermaster-General, in which he had once
been so efficient, “caused,” says Washington, “the want of two days’
supply of provisions, and thereby cost an opportunity scarcely ever
offered, of taking an advantage of the enemy.”
It was an hour of deep distress to Washington, when, on the twenty-third
day of December, 1777, he felt compelled to advise Congress of the
condition of his army: “The numbers had been reduced since the fourth of
the month, only three weeks, two thousand men, from hardship and
exposure. Two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight were unfit for
duty, because barefoot and otherwise naked. Only eight thousand two
hundred men were present for duty.” He added: “We have not more than
three months in which to prepare a great deal of business. If we let
them slip, or waste, we shall be laboring under the same difficulties in
the next campaign as we have in this, to rectify mistakes and bring
things to order. Military arrangements and movements, in consequence,
like the mechanism of a clock, _will be imperfect and disordered by the
want of any part_.” The concluding clause, italicized, illustrates one
of his peculiar characteristics—never to slight the humblest man or
agency in his country’s service, and never to count any duty too small
to be done well.
[Illustration:
WASHINGTON AT VALLEY FORGE
[From the painting by Scheuster.]
]
At this time, the Assembly of Pennsylvania began to snuff up some of the
malarious odors of selfish and senseless gossip. They even remonstrated
against his going into winter quarters at all. His reply was not wanting
in directness and clearness. It reads as follows: “Gentlemen reprobate
the going into winter quarters as much as if they thought the soldiers
were made of sticks, or stones. I can assure those gentlemen that it is
a much easier and less distressing thing to remonstrate in a comfortable
room, than to occupy a cold bleak hill, and sleep under frost and snow,
without clothing or blankets. However, as they seem to have little
feeling for the naked and distressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly
for them, and from my soul I pity their miseries which it is neither in
my power to relieve, or prevent.”
On the twenty-sixth, General Sullivan, who generally kept aloof from
active participation in the movements of the intriguing class of
officers, urged Washington to “make an attempt upon Philadelphia, and
risk every consequence, in an action.” General Sullivan meant well; but
the reader will recognize the characteristic style of this officer under
circumstances of special doubt as to “what is to be done next.” But
Washington never wavered in his purpose. On the thirtieth of December,
Baron De Kalb was appointed Inspector-General, _vice_ Conway, resigned.
Washington closed the year at Valley Forge. The twelve months since he
recrossed the Delaware at Trenton and outgeneraled Lord Cornwallis, had
indeed been eventful. Once more, amid snow and cold, surrounded by
faithful but suffering thousands, he plans for other perils and
exposure; before the goal of his desire, substantial victory, could
bring to them and to his beloved country the boon of realized
independence. And yet, unknown to him, two days before he occupied the
barren site of Valley Forge a thrilling event occurred beyond the
Atlantic Ocean, and one which was, in the providence of God, to verify
the soldier’s faith, and secure for him final victory.
As early as December 2d, the tidings of Burgoyne’s disaster reached the
royal palace of George III. Fox, Burke, and Richmond favored immediate
peace, and such an alliance, or Federal Union, as would be for the
material interests of both countries. Burke solemnly declared that
“peace upon any honorable terms was in justice due to both nations.” But
the king adjourned Parliament to the twentieth of January, 1778.
Meanwhile a speedy ship from Boston was on the high seas, bound for
France, and the account of Burgoyne’s surrender was received by the
American Commissioners. On the twelfth of the month it was announced to
the Count de Vergennes, Minister for Foreign Affairs at the French
Court. The sensation throughout Paris was intense. “Europe need no
longer dread the British power, since her very Colonies have
successfully defied unjust laws, and equally defied her power to enforce
them.” This was the public utterance. One pregnant sentence already
cited, that of Count de Vergennes, proved the incentive to immediate
action. “Saratoga” and “Germantown” were coupled in a message sent to
Spain, to solicit her co-operation. Without any real sympathy with
America, Spain had already discriminated in favor of American privateers
which took prizes to her ports.
But France did not await reply before announcing her own action. And
just when Washington was gathering his weary army into humble huts for
partial shelter and rest, and while his tired spirit was pained by the
small jealousies which impaired the value of his personal service and
sacrifice, and threatened the harmony of his entire command, a new ally
and friend had taken him to heart; and Louis XVI. was dropping into the
scales both the prestige and the power of France, to vindicate and
accomplish American liberty. On that day, December 17, 1777, Gerard, one
of the secretaries of Count de Vergennes, announced to Benjamin Franklin
and Silas Deane, two American Commissioners, “by the King’s order,”
“that the King of France, in Council, had determined not only to
acknowledge, but to support American independence.”
The declaration of the Duke of Richmond, already cited, which predicted
“the application of the Colonists to strangers for aid, if Parliament
authorized the hire of Hessians,” had been realized.