CHAPTER XXI.

PHILADELPHIA AND VALLEY FORGE IN WINTER, 1778.

Mr. Charles Stedman, who served on the staffs of Generals Howe, Clinton

and Cornwallis, during the Revolutionary War, in an interesting

historical narrative states that “the British army enlivened the dull

times of their winter residence in Philadelphia, with the dance-house,

the theatre, and the game of faro.” But it is equally true that this

large license which relieved the monotony of garrison life, gradually

aroused disgust and positive hatred on the part of the citizens of that

city. No diversions in force against the American position, or their

chief outposts, were possible, since the garrison must be alert for any

sudden attack upon the city. The large number of wealthy royalist

families had much to dread from the possible capture of their

dwelling-place. Scouting parties from Washington’s army pressed so

closely to the city limits, at times, that occasional efforts of small

detachments to secure wood for fuel and cooking purposes, were

admonished, that the limit of their picket-lines was their boundary of

possession and safe enjoyment. Carriage drives and daily saddle

exercise, which were favorite recreations, had to be abandoned. They

were unsafe; as Washington’s cavalry, scouts and artillery needed all

the horses that were not needed by the farmers for farm use.

The American army drilled daily, under the patient instruction of Baron

Steuben, so far as they had clothing and shoes for that purpose; while

their comrades sat down or laid themselves down by log fires and burning

stumps, to avoid freezing to death.

[Illustration: Encampment at Valley Forge.]

After the camp was fully established, and Washington had asserted his

purpose to command, and allow no interference by civilians of whatever

pretension, or by military men of whatever rank, the antagonism of the

previous months gradually retired from public exhibition. It never drew

breath from popular sympathy, and the soldiers regarded his censors as

their enemies. And so it was, that in spite of sickness, wretchedness,

inevitable desertions and frequent deaths, the soldiers were kept to

duty, and acquired toughness and knowledge for future endeavor. A calm

reliance upon the future, and a straightforward way of dealing with men

and measures, were still vindicating the fitness of Washington for the

supreme command.

To the demand of the British Government for the reasons of the

inactivity of the British army, General Howe replied that, he “did not

attack the intrenched position at Valley Forge, a strong point, during

the severe season, although everything was prepared with that intention,

judging it imprudent until the season should afford a prospect of

reaping the advantages that ought to have resulted from success in that

measure; but having good information in the spring that the enemy had

strengthened the camp by additional works, and being certain of moving

him from thence when the campaign should open, he dropped thought of

attack.”

During the winter, a proposition for the invasion of Canada was again

under consideration; and General Lafayette, with other officers, visited

Albany and the northern army to see what arrangements were both

available and desirable for that purpose. It was soon dropped; and was

never fully favored by Washington.[7]

Footnote 7:

“Battles of the American Revolution,” p. 461.

During January, Congress sent a committee to visit Valley Forge. As the

result, Washington’s whole policy was indorsed and their support was

pledged. Baron Steuben, recommended by the Commander-in-Chief, was

confirmed as Major-General without a dissenting vote. Conway started for

France early in April. The historical “Conway cabal” had lost its most

unprincipled abettor. On the fourth of April, Congress authorized

Washington to call upon Pennsylvania, Maryland and New Jersey, for five

thousand additional militia. On the ninth, General Howe received his

recall to England. On the tenth, Lafayette returned to camp. On the

thirteenth, General McDougall accompanied Count Kosciusko to West Point,

to perfect the fortifications at that post. On the fifteenth, Gates was

placed in command at Peekskill.

When the spring opened at Valley Forge, the propositions of the many

generals, respecting the approaching campaign, were as diverse and

varied as the leafage of the forest. As the mind recalls the relations

of these officers to earlier campaigns, it will be seen how essential to

any real success was the presence of a strong-willed Commander-in-Chief.

It is especially to be noticed, that men whose judgment had been

accredited as uniformly conservative and yet energetic radically

differed as to the immediate objective of army action. It settles beyond

question the principle that the entire war, and the entire country, had

to be made of paramount consideration, in the decision of any important

movement.

Wayne, Patterson and Maxwell recommended an immediate attack upon

Philadelphia. Knox, Poor, Varnum and Muhlenburg advised an attack upon

New York, with four thousand regulars and Eastern militia, Washington in

command; leaving Lee to command in Pennsylvania, while the main army

should remain at Valley Forge. Stirling recommended operations against

both Philadelphia and New York. Lafayette, Steuben and Du Portail

expressed doubts as to making _any_ aggressive movement whatever, until

the army should be strengthened or the British unfold their plans. This

wise suggestion was also the opinion of Washington.

On the seventh of May, the British ascended the Delaware and destroyed

public stores at Bordentown. Maxwell and Dickenson had been sent across

the river for the protection of these stores; but heavy rains delayed

their march, and forty-four vessels, including several frigates on the

stocks, were burned.

But the seventh day of May, 1778, was not a day of gloom at Valley

Forge. Spring had fairly opened, and the forest began to don its new

attire for a fresh summer campaign. At nine o’clock in the morning, the

entire army was on parade, with drums beating, colors flying and salutes

echoing among the hills. The brigades were steady in their ranks. No

brilliant uniforms were conspicuous anywhere, and many had neither coats

nor shoes. The pomp and circumstance of war were missing. There was no

display of gold lace, or finery of any kind. Strongly marked faces and

tough muscles showed the fixedness of purpose of these troops. But it

was an occasion of rare interest. This American army was in line, for

the reception of a visitor from over the sea. The visitor was a herald

sent by Louis XVI., King of France, to announce to Washington and the

American people that an armed alliance between France and the United

States of America had been consummated. The French frigate _Le Sensible_

had landed at Falmouth (Portland), Me., with this messenger, and the

American army was drawn up in battle array to receive his message. The

chaplain of each brigade proclaimed the treaty and read its terms. It

was one of those occasions, not infrequent during the war, and habitual

to Washington throughout his mature life, when he had no way through

which to express his deepest anxieties or profoundest sense of

gratitude, other than that of communion with God. And now, the listening

army was called upon to unite in one “grand thanksgiving to Almighty God

that He had given to America this friend.” The scene that followed can

never be described. It can only be imagined and felt. Huzzas for the

King of France mingled with shouts for Washington, whose face, as

described by one, “shone as did that of Moses, when he descended from

the Mount.” Caps were tossed high in air. Hand-shaking, leaping,

clapping of hands, and every homely sign of joy and confident

expectation, followed. Washington had dismounted. He stood with folded

arms—calm, serene, majestic, silent. For several moments the whole army

stood, awaiting his action. He remounted his horse, and a single word to

his assembled staff quickly ran through the lines—that the

Commander-in-Chief proposed that all should speak together, by the

soldier’s method, through powder. No matter if powder were scarce. Every

cannon, wherever mounted about the long circuit of intrenchments,

roared; and the hills carried the echoes to British headquarters.

Throughout the lines of division and brigade, to the remotest picket

post, a running fire at will closed with one grand volley; and then the

camp of Valley Forge resumed the “business” of preparing for battle.

With the opening of the spring of 1778, General Howe also was moved to

action. His winter supplies, as well as those procurable from the fleet

and the city, had been expended. “The storehouses were empty.”

Detachments, large and small, were sent to scour the country. To cut off

and restrict these detachments, General Lafayette was intrusted with a

special command of twenty-four hundred men, and advanced to Barren Hill,

about half the distance to Philadelphia. It also formed a corps of

observation, and was the first independent command of that officer under

his commission as Major-General. He was especially instructed to note

signs of the evacuation of Philadelphia, which Washington regarded as a

military necessity on the part of General Howe. The American

Commander-in-Chief, although reticent of his own opinions, rarely failed

to read other men accurately, and rightly read Lafayette. With singular

enthusiasm, great purity of character, unswerving fidelity to

obligation, and a thorough contempt for everything mean or dishonorable,

this young French gentleman combined a keen sagacity, sound judgment,

prompt execution, and an intense love for liberty.

Having taken position at Barren Hill, Lafayette at once introduced a

system of communication with parties in the city of Philadelphia. He had

with him fifty Indian scouts, and Captain McLean’s Light troops. A

company of dragoons had also been ordered to join him. General Howe had

been relieved from duty on the eleventh, by General Clinton; who

signalized his accession to command by a series of brilliant _fêtes_ in

honor of his predecessor, on the eve of his departure for England. A

regatta on the Delaware; a tournament on land; triumphal arches;

decorated pavilions; mounted ladies, with their escorts in Turkish

costume; slaves in fancy habits; knights, esquires, heralds, and every

brilliant device, made the day memorable from earliest dawn until dark.

And after dark, balls, illuminations both upon water and land,

fireworks, wax-lights, flowers and fantastic drapery, cheered the night

hours, “exhibiting,” as described by André himself, master of

ceremonies, “a _coup d’œil_, beyond description magnificent.” The

procession of knights and maidens was led by Major André and Miss

Shippen, the beautiful daughter of one of the wealthiest royalists in

Philadelphia. She long retained the title of the “belle of the Michianza

_fêtes_.” She subsequently became the wife of General Arnold; and the

incidents thus grouped show how felicitous was Clinton’s subsequent

choice of André to negotiate with Arnold the exchange of West Point, for

“gold and a brigadier-general’s commission in the British army.”

During the evening of this luxurious entertainment, and while at supper,

General Clinton announced to his officers his intention to march at

daybreak to Barren Hill, and bring back for their next evening’s guest,

the distinguished French officer, Marquis de Lafayette. At four o’clock

on the morning of the nineteenth, when the twenty hours of hilarity,

adulation and extravagance closed, General Clinton, accompanied by

Generals Grant, Gray, and Erskine, and five thousand picked troops,

marched to capture Lafayette. General Gray crossed the Schuylkill with

two thousand men to cut off Lafayette’s retreat, in case Clinton

successfully attacked in front. Washington advanced sufficiently to

observe the movement of General Gray, and signalled with cannon to

Lafayette of his danger; but Lafayette, by occupying a stone church and

other buildings, and showing false fronts of columns as if about to take

the offensive, caused the advance column of Grant to halt for

reënforcements; and then retired safely with the loss of but nine men.

Lafayette gives an amusing account of portions of the skirmish: “When my

Indian scouts suddenly confronted an equal number of British dragoons,

the mutual surprise was such that both fled with equal haste.” The

officers and men of Lafayette’s command were greatly elated by his

conduct of the affair, especially as he was at one time threatened by a

force more than twice that of his entire division; and the confidence

thus acquired followed his service through the entire war. The

congratulations of Washington were as cordial upon his return, as those

of the officers of the Philadelphia garrison were chilling upon the

return of Clinton, without Lafayette as prisoner.

On the same day, General Mifflin rejoined the army. In writing to

Gouverneur Morris of New York, the American Commander-in-Chief, noticing

the event, expresses his surprise “to find a certain gentleman who some

time ago, when a heavy cloud hung over us and our affairs looked gloomy,

was desirous of resigning, to be now stepping forward in the line of the

army”; adding: “If he can reconcile such conduct to his own feelings as

an officer, and a man of honor, and Congress have no objection to his

leaving his seat in another department, I have nothing personally to

oppose to it. Yet, I must think that gentleman’s stepping in, and out,

as the sun happens to beam out, or become obscure, isn’t quite the

thing, nor quite just, with respect to those officers who take the

bitter with the sweet.”

By this time, the movements of shipping, and within the city, clearly

indicated the design of the British to abandon Philadelphia without

battle. A Council of War was convened on the twentieth, to hear reports

upon the condition of the various American armies; and Generals Gates,

Greene, Stirling, Mifflin, Lafayette, Armstrong, Steuben and de Kalb

were present. The opinion was unanimous that the army should remain on

the defensive, and await the action of the British commander. On the

twentieth, also, General Lee rejoined the army. He had been exchanged on

the twenty-first of April for Major-General Prescott, who had been

captured five miles above Newport, R.I., on the night of July 20, 1777.

Lee had been placed on his parole as early as the twenty-fifth of March,

and he actually visited York, where Congress was in session, on the

ninth of April.

The relations of Charles Lee to the war were as marked as were those of

Arnold, except that Arnold rendered valuable service until he turned

traitor. During the month of February, 1777, Lee secured permission from

General Howe to write letters to Congress, urging that body to “send

commissioners to confer confidentially concerning the national cause.”

On the twenty-first of February, Congress declined to send such

commissioners, as “altogether improper”; and they could “not perceive

how compliance with his wish would tend to his advantage, or the

interests of the public.” Letters were also written in March; and in one

addressed to Washington on the fifth of April, 1777, Lee had written: “I

think it a most unfortunate circumstance for myself, and I think no less

so for the public, that the Congress have not thought proper to comply

with my request. It could not possibly have been attended with any ill

consequences, and might have been with good ones. At least, it was an

indulgence which I thought my situation entitled me to. But I am

unfortunate in everything, and this stroke is the severest I have ever

experienced. God send you a different fate.” The answer of Washington

was as follows: “I have received your letter of this date, and thank

you, as I shall any officer, over whom I have the honor to be placed,

for their opinions and advice in matters of importance; especially when

they proceed from the fountain of candor, and not from a captious

spirit, or an itch for criticism; ... and here, let me again assure you,

that I shall always be happy to be in a free communication of your

sentiments upon any important subject relative to the service, and only

beg that they may come directly to myself. The custom which many

officers have, of speaking freely of things, and reprobating measures

which upon investigation may be found to be unavoidable, is never

productive of good; but often, of very mischievous consequences.”

During the year 1872 George H. Moore, of the New York Historical

Society, brought to light a certain paper indorsed, “Mr. Lee’s Plan,

29th March, 1777,” which was found among the papers of the brothers

Howe, British Commissioners at New York. Lee was at that date a prisoner

of war, but at the same time a British officer who had been taken in

rebellion to the British crown. This letter is noticed, in order to make

more intelligible the subsequent relations of Lee to the American

Commander-in-Chief. The following is an extract: “It appears to me, that

by the continuance of the war, America has no chance of obtaining its

ends. As I am not only persuaded, from the high opinion I have of the

humanity and good sense of Lord and Admiral Howe, that the terms of

accommodation will be as moderate as their powers will admit; but that

their powers are more ample than their successor would be tasked with, I

think myself not only justifiable, but bound in conscience, in

furnishing ’em all the light I can, to enable ’em to bring matters to a

conclusion in the most commodious manner. 1 know the most generous use

will be made of it in all respects. Their humanity will incline ’em to

have consideration for individuals who have acted from principle.” Then

follow hypothetical data as to troops required on the part of Britain,

and these passages: “If the Province of Maryland, or the greater part of

it, is reduced, or submits, and the people of Virginia are prevented, or

intimidated, from marching aid to the Pennsylvania army, the whole

machine is divided, and a period put to the war; and if the plan is

adopted in full, I am so confident of success, that I would stake my

life on the same. Apprehensions from Carleton’s army will, I am

confident, keep the New Englanders at home, or at least, confine ’em to

that side of the river. I would advise that four thousand men be

immediately embarked in transports, one-half of which should proceed up

the Potomac and take post at Alexandria, the other half up Chesapeake

Bay and possess themselves of Annapolis.” The relations of various posts

to the suggested movement, and the character of the German population of

Pennsylvania who would be apprehensive of injury to their fine farms,

were urged in favor of his “plan” for terminating the war on terms of

“moderate accommodation.”

The reply of Washington to General Lee’s letter is a very distinct

notice that he was advised of the letters written by him to Gates and

others, derogatory of the action of his superior officer, the

Commander-in-Chief.

The return of Lee to duty found the American army in readiness to bid

its last farewell to the camp at Valley Forge; but the ordeals through

which so many brave men passed, for their country’s sake, were hardly

more severe than were those through which their beloved

Commander-in-Chief passed into a clearer future, and the well-earned

appreciation of mankind.

Washington the Soldier · 第 21 / 37 章