WASHINGTON RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE.—BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN.
Washington marched directly to Philadelphia to refit his army and secure
ammunition and provisions, and thence marched to Germantown, “for one
day of rest.” His confidence was not abated. The brave soldiers who had
left Philadelphia with such jubilant anticipations of victory, were
conscious of having fought well against a superior force, and were never
more willing to honor the confidence of their Commander-in-Chief. And
Washington himself was not hurried, but systematic and constantly in
motion. On the thirteenth he ordered Monsieur de Coudray to complete
defensive works along the Delaware River; General Putnam, to forward
fifteen hundred Continental troops; and General Armstrong, to occupy the
line of the Schuylkill, as well as to throw up redoubts near its fords,
in case he should find it desirable to cross that river.
The left wing of General Howe’s army demonstrated toward Reading and
Philadelphia. The right wing, under Generals Grant and Cornwallis,
reached Chester on the thirteenth. General Howe had taken care of the
wounded of both armies, but was compelled to obtain surgeons from
Washington to assist in that duty. At Wilmington, he captured the
governor, and considerable coin which he proposed to use for the benefit
of the wounded of both armies. Inasmuch as Grant and Cornwallis were
practically in the rear of the American army, he proposed to march to
Philadelphia via Germantown; and both threaten the city, and cut off
Washington from retreat northward or westward. But, on the fifteenth,
Washington crossed the Schuylkill at Swede’s Ford; so that Howe’s halt,
even of a single day, on the battlefield, rendered it useless for him to
make a forced march to the city; and his opportunity was lost.
Washington moved out on the Lancaster road as far as Warren tavern.
Howe, watching his keen adversary, advanced toward Westchester, and both
armies prepared for battle. Howe made a partly successful attempt to
throw the American army back upon the Schuylkill River, and both armies
were prepared for action; when a heavy rain which nearly ruined the
ammunition of the Americans, and “directly in the faces of the British
troops,” as reported by Howe, averted battle. Washington left Wayne,
however, with fifteen hundred troops, in a strong position at Paoli
(Wayne’s birthplace), with orders to fall upon the British rear so soon
as it should break camp, and then moved to Yellow Springs and Warwick;
but upon finding that Howe did not intend to attack Reading, recrossed
the Schuylkill at Parkes’ Ford, and encamped on the Perkiomy, September
seventeenth. On the twentieth, Wayne allowed himself to be surprised at
night, through the treachery of the country people, his old neighbors;
and left more than three hundred of his force as prisoners in the hands
of General Gray, although saving his guns and most of his baggage.
General Smallwood’s brigade, left by General Washington for Wayne’s
support, and encamped but a mile distant, failed to be in time to render
aid during the night attack. This disaster took all pressure from Howe’s
army, and he moved on. Washington reports as to Howe’s movement: “They
had got so far the start before I received certain intelligence that any
considerable number had crossed, that I found it in vain to think of
overtaking their rear, with troops harassed as ours had been by constant
marching since the Battle of Brandywine.” Colonel Hamilton was sent to
Philadelphia to force a contribution of shoes from the inhabitants, as
“one thousand of his army were barefooted.”
The simplest possible recital of these days of active marching,
sufficiently indicates the character of those brave troops whose
confidence in Washington seemed as responsive to his will as if his
nervous activities embraced theirs as well.
A small portion of the British left wing crossed at Gordon’s Ford on the
twenty-second, and the main body at Flatland Ford, on the twenty-third,
reaching Germantown on the twenty-fifth. On the twenty-seventh,
Cornwallis entered Philadelphia. Colonel Sterling of the British army
was sent to operate against the defences of the Delaware,—and the fleet
of Admiral Howe was already on its way to Philadelphia.
The boldness of Washington’s attempt on the rear of Howe’s army, and all
his action immediately after the Battle of Brandywine, were a striking
indication of his purpose to retain the gage of battle in his own hands.
He sent a peremptory order to General Putnam, who was constantly making
ill-advised attempts upon the outposts of New York, to send him
twenty-five hundred men without delay; and most significant of all,
directed him “so to use _militia_, that the posts in the Highland might
be perfectly safe.” Congress immediately adjourned to Lancaster,—and
then to York,—after enlarging Washington’s powers; and General Gates was
ordered to send Morgan’s riflemen to headquarters. This, however, he
delayed to do until after the close of the northern campaign.
General Howe established his headquarters at Germantown, having been one
month in marching from the head of the Elk to Philadelphia, a distance
of fifty-four miles.
The town of Germantown consisted of a single street, not so straight
that a complete range of fire could reach its entire length, nor so
uniform in grade that a gun at Mt. Aury, its summit, could have a clean
sweep. The headquarters of Washington were near Pennebeck Mills, twenty
miles from Philadelphia. At seven o’clock of the evening of October
third, he moved with two-thirds of his army by four roads which more or
less directly approached the British encampments, intending to gain
proximate positions, rest his troops, and attack the entire British line
at daybreak. The plan of the movement is of interest for its boldness
and good method. The incidents of the morning, which by reason of fog
and other mishaps rendered the battle less decisive, will not be fully
detailed.[6] The woods, ravines, and difficulties in the way of clear
recognition between friend and foe, in that engagement, only enhance the
value of the general plan, and of the cool self-possession and control
of his army which enabled Washington to terminate the action without
greater loss.
Footnote 6:
See “Battles of the American Revolution,” Chapter LI.
Sullivan and Wayne, with Conway in advance as a flanking corps, were to
move directly over Chestnut Hill and enter the town. Maxwell and Nash,
under Major-General Stirling, were to follow this column as a reserve.
Armstrong, with the Pennsylvania militia, was sent down the Manatawny
River road, to cross the Wissahickon Creek, and fall upon the British
left wing and rear. Greene and Stephen, led and flanked by McDougall’s
Brigade, were to move by the Limestone Road, enter the village at the
Market House, and attack the British right wing. Generals Smallwood and
Forman, with the Maryland and New Jersey militia, were to follow the old
York road until a convenient opportunity should bring them to the
extreme right and rear of the enemy. (See map.)
Washington accompanied Sullivan’s command; and was able, from his
advanced position, early in the fight, to appreciate that by the failure
of an identity of support on the part of the most remote divisions, the
withdrawal of the army had become necessary. The occupation of the stone
building, known as the Chew House, on the main street, had little
significance; except that it misled the outlying divisions as to the
real centre of conflict, and detained the rear-guard and reserve longer
than necessary. The concurrent action of all the assailing columns, in
the directions indicated by their orders, would have made the issue a
well-balanced question of victory or failure. One single incident is
mentioned. General Stephen left Greene’s command without orders, and
moved toward the sound of firing at the Chew House, only to find himself
firing into Wayne’s command, which was in its right place. He was
dismissed, on charges of intoxication.
General Sullivan was in his best element when under superior command;
and his conduct on this occasion was admirable. His two aides were
killed, and his division rendered most efficient service. General Nash
was among the killed, and the American casualties numbered six hundred
and seventy-three, besides four hundred and twelve prisoners.
The British casualties were five hundred and thirty-five, but among the
killed were General Agnew and Lieutenant-Colonel Bird.
Washington regained Metuchen Hill, very little disturbed by the small
detachments that hung upon his rear; and Howe returned to Philadelphia,
abandoning his encampment beyond the city limits.
[Illustration: Battle of Germantown.]
The Battle of Germantown is a signal illustration of a skilful design,
and, at the same time, of the ease with which a victory almost achieved
can be as quickly lost. Its effect upon European minds was signally
impressive, as will hereafter more fully appear. Count de Vergennes, the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in speaking of the report of this
battle which reached him December 12th, said: “Nothing has struck me so
much, as General Washington’s attacking and giving battle to General
Howe’s army. To bring troops raised within the year, to do this,
promises everything.”