PENNSYLVANIA INVADED.—BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE.
The British Commander-in-Chief entertained no doubts of the success of
Burgoyne’s invasion from Canada. His reiterated appeals to Britain for
reënforcements were not heeded, and he certainly knew that troops could
not be furnished up to his demand. But he still hoped that the invasion
from the north would so drain New England and New York of their
able-bodied militia, as to render it impossible for either section to
forward its respective full quota to the Continental army of Washington.
Two campaigns into New Jersey had sufficiently satisfied him that he
never could bend Washington to his knees; and yet he must get Washington
away from his position near New York, and then defeat that army utterly,
before British supremacy could be restored. This conviction, once before
noticed, was reflected in a letter to Lord Germaine, from which extracts
have interest. He had “not overlooked New England,” but says in this
letter, that “Burgoyne’s movement would draw Washington’s army
northward, where the population was dense and the spirit of defence was
animated.” “In Connecticut,” he continues, “there was no object for
which he would be willing to risk a general action; and only two or
three places upon the coast of Long Island Sound could be kept in the
winter.” But he adds that, if his “reënforcements had been forthcoming,
New England would have had a share in the general operations of the
campaign, while the main army acted toward the southward.” “To have
moved up the Hudson, in force, would have imperiled New York, or
sacrificed all other operations to a union with Burgoyne, who was
expected to force his own way to Albany.” “To enter Pennsylvania, was
not only to assail the capital, but attempted the surest road to peace,
the defeat of the rebel army.”
All these considerations, thus tersely communicated to the British
Government, were sound in military policy; and yet all of them had been
anticipated by the American Commander-in-Chief, as prudent on the part
of General Howe. Even very insignificant incidents were weighed by him,
as of determining value in a nearly balanced scale; so that the number,
character and distribution of pickets from the New York garrison became
valuable indications to the keen espionage with which Washington
conducted his search for the real intent of General Howe’s published or
unpublished designs.
The British fleet had actually sailed from New York before Washington
received Howe’s letter of the second. Clinton returned to the city on
the tenth. On the fifteenth, an express from Burgoyne informed General
Howe of the capture of Ticonderoga, and stated, that “his army was in
good health, and [which was never realized] that Ticonderoga would be
garrisoned by troops from Canada, which would leave his force complete
for further operations.” Howe’s expedition southward left New York on
the twenty-third of July, and did not arrive off the Delaware until the
thirtieth.
Upon the first disappearance of the fleet, Washington, suspecting some
_ruse_—its possible return and a movement in support of Burgoyne, or a
descent upon New England, or even New Jersey, started his army for
Coryell’s Ferry; to be ready to march northward, or eastward, in the
prospect of an active campaign. When assured that the entire fleet had
positively sailed southward, he marched with exceeding celerity to
Philadelphia. Active measures were initiated for gathering the militia,
sinking obstructions in the Delaware, and picketing every spot along the
river which might be utilized for the landing of troops. But the
appearance of the British fleet in Delaware Bay, its speedy withdrawal,
and its long absence due to contrary winds, foiled all calculations of
Washington as to its ultimate destination. At a Council of War, held on
the twenty-first of August, it was unanimously concluded that Howe had
sailed for Charleston, S.C. But, on the twenty-second, at half-past one
in the afternoon, Washington received the following despatch from
President Hancock: “This moment an express arrived from Maryland with an
account of near two hundred sail of General Howe’s fleet being anchored
in Chesapeake Bay.”
This information was received with the most intense interest. In the
face of slow enlistments, scarcity of funds, and deficiencies in
clothing and all military supplies, the transfer of British military
operations from the Hudson was regarded as an indication that New Jersey
had been substantially recovered from British aggression, and that
Washington had outgeneraled his adversary. The operations of Burgoyne
northward could be taken care of by the rapidly increasing flow of New
England militia to resist his advance; and the Pennsylvania people were
wide awake.
The army of Washington paraded through Philadelphia, gayly decorated
with evergreens. The enthusiasm of the soldiers, rank and file, received
fresh inspiration from the almost wild demonstrations of thousands who
bordered their course of march. Incessant cheering, loud greetings of
encouragement, as well as bountiful gifts of delicacies and of useful
conveniences for the camp or march, sent them forward hopeful and happy.
The American army which finally marched against General Howe’s well
equipped force of nearly eighteen thousand men was of the nominal
strength of fourteen thousand; but the entire roster added up not quite
eleven thousand “effectives, present for duty.”
The thoughtful reader, of whatever age or training, is prompted to
linger here a moment, and catch a parting view of this column of earnest
men, so proudly and joyfully marching to meet in battle the magnificent
array of Britain’s chief captains and most honored battalions, the
famous Grenadiers of Hanau, and the dragoons and lancers of Hesse. When
all are waiting for the advance, who is that man who swiftly rides past
the column to its front, erect in saddle, calm, self-reliant, imposing
in presence, and with face radiant in confidence and trust? What sort of
faith is that which inspires the utterance, which rings like that of the
Hebrew Captain when about to face the horsemen and chariots of the
Egyptian Pharaoh: “Tell the people that they go _forward_”? How dare
this American soldier reckon upon chances for victory in such an unequal
measurement of physical force, unless he discern, through plainest garb,
the proof-panoply of those whose cause is just? And whence the
inspiration of those men of brawn, whose nerves seemed turned to steel,
that they are so firmly and confidently ready to enter into the trying
ordeal of battle.
_It is the Continental Army of America, with Washington in command!_
Only short halts at Derby, Chester and Wilmington delayed their march;
and after each halt, that single word, “Forward!” as it ran down the
lines, brigade after brigade, again brought shouts from spectators and
soldiers alike.
General Sullivan, who had been detained in New Jersey to make an attack
upon the British posts on Staten Island which failed of its anticipated
success joined the command just in time for Brandywine. There was no
timidity in this advancing army. Every heart beat with steady cadence.
Maxwell, with a selected corps of one hundred men from each brigade,
supplied the place of Morgan’s Rifles, then with the northern army. He
pushed forward even to Elk River, accompanied by the youthful Lafayette,
hoping to save some stores gathered there before the British could
effect a landing, and possibly to obstruct the landing itself.
This was on September third; but too late to save the stores, for the
British were already encamped. A sharp skirmish with Cornwallis was
reported by General Howe to have resulted in a British loss of two
officers and twenty-two men, killed or wounded.
On the seventh, the entire army reached Newport, and took position along
Red Clay Creek. On the same day, General Howe occupied Iron Hill, within
eight miles of Red Clay, and again the American Rifles had a skirmish
with the British advance. These picked men deliberately took up position
after position, and only yielded to superior force as they slowly
retired. The confidence of Washington was everywhere fully realized. On
the eighth, the British army demonstrated in force; with view to turning
the right of Washington, and to cut him off from communication with
Philadelphia. At half-past nine of the morning of the ninth, pursuant to
the unanimous vote of a council of officers, Washington took up a new
position, selected by General Greene, on the east bank of the Brandywine
and on high ground, just back of Chadd’s Ford, and commanding the
Chester and Philadelphia road. The Battle of Brandywine followed. The
space which has been allowed for this narrative can admit only such
leading incidents as unfold Washington’s general management, and the
ultimate results.
A reference to the map will aid the reader to understand the relative
positions of the opposing armies. The American army was on the eastern
bank of the river, which was quite rugged of approach and easily
defended. Its left wing, southward, began with Armstrong’s Pennsylvania
militia. At the next ford, Chadd’s, and nearly as far as Brinton’s, are
Weedon, Muhlenburg and Wayne, with Proctor’s artillery in their rear,
behind light earthworks thrown up in haste. In _their_ rear, on still
higher ground, is the reserve division of General Greene, with
Washington’s headquarters. Next in order, up the river, are the
divisions of Sullivan, Stephen and Stirling, each of two brigades—with
Sullivan in virtual command, and Stirling, next in rank, commanding the
right division—and practically reaching Jones’ Ford. Major Spear had
charge of scouts extended as far as the forks of the Brandywine and the
adjacent fords, both below and above the forks. The upper ford,
Jeffries, was not thoroughly watched, and its distance almost precluded
the liability of its use. A road from Jones’ Ford runs perpendicularly
to the river, over to the Dilworth and Winchester road, and just before
reaching the Birmingham Meeting House, passes high, rough and wooded
ground, where the chief fighting took place. The British encampment on
the tenth is indicated at the left of the map.
[Illustration: Battle of Brandywine.]
On the morning of the eleventh, Maxwell crossed at Chadd’s Ford;
advanced to Kennett Meeting House, and skirmished with Knyphausen, until
compelled by a superior force to fall back to high ground near the
river. Porterfield and Waggoner crossed at his left and attacked
Ferguson’s Rifles. Knyphausen brought up two brigades, with guns; and
this force, with the Queen’s Rangers, on Knyphausen’s extreme right,
compelled both American detachments to recross the river. The American
casualties were sixty, and those of the Hessian and British troops about
one hundred and thirty. A fog along the river had facilitated Maxwell’s
operations; but it prevented the American scouts from gaining accurate
data as to the movements of the British. While Knyphausen was
demonstrating as if to force a crossing at Chadd’s Ford, Cornwallis was
reported to be moving with five thousand men and artillery toward a ford
near the forks of the Brandywine. Bland had crossed at Jones’ Ford,
between nine and ten in the morning, and reported this movement of
Cornwallis. Washington ordered Sullivan to cross and attack Cornwallis,
while he intended to cross at Chadd’s Ford, in person, and attack
Knyphausen, assigning to General Greene an intermediate crossing, to
strike the left of the Hessian general. When the fog disappeared, there
was no evidence of the whereabouts of the British column. It seemed
hardly possible that it had gone further up the river; while, if it had
joined Knyphausen, the force was too strong to be attacked. Washington
therefore revoked his orders, and withdrew the skirmish party that had
already made the crossing. As a matter of fact, the movement of
Cornwallis was but a flanking support to the advance of the entire
British army; while Knyphausen’s advance towards Chadd’s Ford, although
prepared to cross, if opportunity favored, was a _ruse_ to draw
attention from General Howe’s splendid manœuvre. That officer left
Kennett Square at daylight, marched seventeen miles, and by two o’clock
had crossed the upper fork of the Brandywine, and was moving down upon
the right of the entire American army.
As soon as advised that the British were advancing, Washington ordered
Sullivan to bring the entire right wing into position to oppose their
progress. The woods were dense and the surface was rocky, so that three
divisions must swing back and present to the British advance a new
front, almost perpendicular to that with which they had previously faced
the river. But it would bring them to the high ground, before noticed,
between Birmingham Meeting House and the river. This movement, which
practically involved one of the most difficult elements of Grand
Tactics,—defined in the Preface as the “Art of handling force on the
battlefield,”—was not within General Sullivan’s capacity. The best
troops in the world would have found it slow of execution, while no less
vital to success in the existing emergency. It required of the division
commanders just that kind of familiarity with combined movements of
brigades and divisions, which is required of regiments in a single
brigade, or of companies in a regiment. Sullivan could not at the same
time command the Grand Division, or Corps, and his own division proper,
unless able to place that division in charge of a brigadier-general who
was fully competent to command a division. It is also to be borne in
mind that the woods, rocks, undergrowth, and suddenness of the order
complicated the movement. Stirling and Stephen succeeded in gaining the
new position, barely in time to meet the assault of Cornwallis, without
time for intrenching to any effect. Sullivan’s Division fell into such
disorder, that after sending four aides, and then a personal appeal, he
gave up the attempt to rally his division. He says: “Some rallied,
others could not be brought even by their officers to do anything but
fly.” Only three of his regiments—those of Hazen, Dayton and Ogden, ever
reliable—gained and firmly held the new position throughout the battle.
The enemy, which had formed behind Osborne’s Hill, advanced rapidly,
Cornwallis in the lead. The resistance was stubborn and well maintained,
as General Howe admitted, from three o’clock until sunset. Sullivan,
upon finding himself powerless to rally and move his own division, while
he was responsible for the entire combined movement, went to the
battlefield and was conspicuous for bravery during the day. The
resistance of Stirling and Stephen was admirable; but the brigade of
Deborre, a French general, broke and fled, in wild disorder. The absence
of Sullivan’s Division left a gap on the American left of nearly half a
mile, and Deborre’s cowardice shattered the right wing.
As soon as the right wing gave way, Washington hastened, with Greene, to
the front. There was no retreat except toward Dilworth. By a direct
march of nearly four miles in fifty minutes, and a wheel to the left, of
half a mile, Washington was enabled to occupy a defile from which to
open a passage for the retreating battalions. He then closed in upon
their rear, and prolonged the resistance with vigor. In an orchard
beyond Dilworth, three regiments made another stand. Night separated the
two armies. Stirling and Stephen saved both artillery and baggage.
Armstrong’s brigade, on the extreme left, below Chadd’s Ford, was not
engaged: but, together with Maxwell’s, and Wayne, who was compelled to
abandon his guns, joined the main army, without further loss. They had,
however, kept Knyphausen beyond the river. The entire army fell back to
Chester. The American casualties were seven hundred and eighty, and
those of the British were six hundred. Lafayette lost a horse, and was
himself wounded, in this his first service after receipt of his
commission.
Deborre was dismissed for cowardice. Conflicts as to the defective
reconnoissance that nearly sacrificed the army arose, which need not be
discussed. In justice to General Sullivan, Washington wrote a letter
responsive to his request for some testimonial to submit to Congress,
which is here given in part: “With respect to your other query, whether
your being posted on the right was to guard that flank, and whether you
had neglected it, I can only observe that the only obvious if not the
declared purpose of your being there, implied every necessary precaution
for the security of that flank. But it is at the same time to be
remarked, that all the fords above Chadd’s from which we were taught to
apprehend danger were guarded by detachments from your division, and
that we were led to believe by those whom we had every reason to think
well acquainted with the country, that no ford above our picket-lines
could be passed without making a very circuitous march.” The British
army remained on the field; and the wounded of both armies were properly
cared for by General Howe. His skill as a scientific soldier was again
illustrated, as well as his habitual failure to follow up a first
success; but he was under peculiar conditions which must have influenced
his judgment. His army had left its ships, which had been ordered to go
to the Delaware; as his objective was the capture of Philadelphia, after
first destroying the American army. That army had retreated in
remarkable order and under good control. Humanity alone would have
persuaded Howe to care for the wounded, and a night pursuit, of the
Americans through that country, would have been a wild venture.
Washington’s despatch to President Hancock announcing his retreat to
Chester, was dated from that place at midnight, September 11, 1777. The
wonderful presence of mind of the American Commander-in-Chief, his
aptitude for emergencies, and his extraordinary capacity for making the
most of raw troops, were never more thoroughly evinced during his entire
public career. The uneven ground, dense woods, and facilities for good
rifle-practice, were features favorable to inspire his troops with
special resisting capacity; and it is not beyond a fair presumption to
suggest that, if the main army had been allowed two hours for fortifying
their position, the British, accustomed to lighting in close order,
would have been repulsed. It is certain that General Howe had skilful as
well as willing guides, to secure to him, by so long a détour, his
surprise of Sullivan’s right wing. That was part of the same toryism of
that period which a few days later, and not far away, betrayed Wayne’s
forces, with great loss. But with all the mistakes, and the retreat of
the American army, there was much of hope in the experience and in the
sequel of the Battle of Brandywine.
NOTE.—Lafayette, or LaFayette, makes his first appearance in this
battle. At that period “_affix-names_,” derived from fiefs,
seigniories, or estates, long held by families, were emphasized.
Hence, La villa Faya, in Auvergne, when acquired, was added to
the family name Motier. In the parish register, now in
the war archives of France, the name is thus recorded:
“Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Rock-Gilbert Dumotier Lafayette.” He signed
his name _Lafayette_, and his grandsons, Senators Oscar and Edmond
Lafayette, followed his example. The permanent acceptance of the
spelling _Lafayette_ is therefore fully warranted, and harmonizes with
its use for counties and cities in many of the States.
This gallant young volunteer in the cause of American Independence,
attended by Baron John De Kalb, and nine others, came to America in
the ship _Victoire_, chartered by himself; and on the 19th of June,
Lafayette wrote to his wife of his enthusiastic welcome at Charleston,
S.C. On the 27th of July, he reached Philadelphia. He was commissioned
Major-General by the American Congress, and took his first seat at a
Council of War, August 21st, when the movement of the American army
against Howe was under advisement.