BRITISH INVASION FROM CANADA.—OPERATIONS ALONG THE HUDSON.
On the twentieth of June, Washington learned that Burgoyne was
approaching St. John’s; and that a detachment of British and Canadian
troops, accompanied by Indians, had been organized for the occupation of
the Mohawk Valley, west of Albany, under Colonel St. Leger. This would
enable them to court the alliance of the “Six Nations,” and to suppress
the enlistment into the American army of the scattered white population
of that region. On the same day, he ordered General Putnam to hold in
readiness to move up the river, at a moment’s notice, four regiments of
Massachusetts troops which were then at his headquarters at Peekskill,
and also to hire sloops at Albany for their transportation northward.
The briefest possible history of these expeditions is all that can find
space in this narrative. Lieutenant-General Burgoyne left London on the
twenty-ninth day of March, and reached Quebec on the sixth day of May.
He promptly notified General Howe of his instructions, and recognized
Albany as his chief objective point, so soon as he might recapture the
posts on Lake Champlain, then occupied by the American forces. The
organization and strength of the force with which he undertook his
memorable campaign is noticed elsewhere.[5] His confident expectation of
obtaining an adequate Canadian force of teams, teamsters, axe-men,
horses, wagons, and guides familiar with the country, proved
unwarranted. Instead of two thousand, less than two hundred reported for
duty. This was not the fault of General Carleton, for of him Burgoyne
said, “He could not have done more for his own brother”; but the
Canadians themselves were more desirous of peace with their New England
neighbors than to be involved in war with them. The proclamation of
Burgoyne to the people of New England and New York was arrogant and
repellant, instead of being sympathetic and conciliatory. Washington at
once furnished the antidote by the following: “Harassed as we are by
unrelenting persecution; obliged by every tie to repel violence by
force; urged by self-preservation to exert the strength which Providence
has given us, to defend our natural rights against the aggressor, we
appeal to the hearts of all mankind for the justice of our course; its
event we leave with Him who speaks the fate of nations, in humble
confidence that as His omniscient eye taketh note even of a sparrow that
falleth to the ground, so He will not withdraw His confidence from a
people who humbly array themselves under His banner, in defence of the
noblest principles with which He has adorned humanity.”
Footnote 5:
See Appendix.
General Burgoyne was equally infelicitous in his negotiations with the
Iroquois, Algonquins, Abenagies and Ottawa Indians, whom he met on the
twenty-second day of June. In fact, General Burgoyne had no sympathy
with the British policy which ordered the hire of Indian allies. The
following declaration stands to his perpetual credit, and should appear
in every volume that may ever be published which refers to his campaign
in America. His words were these: “The Indian principle of war is at
once odious and unavailing, and if encouraged, I will venture to
pronounce its consequences, will be sorely repented by the present age
and be universally abhorred by posterity.” And afterwards, in the
presence of the Earl of Harrington, when St. Luc claimed that “Indians
must fight their own way, or desert,” Burgoyne answered: “I would rather
lose every Indian than connive at their enormities.” And still another
incident is to be noticed, especially as it places before the reader a
very characteristic utterance of General Gates, his adversary in that
campaign. The latter wrote to General Burgoyne as follows: “The
miserable fate of Miss McCrea, massacred by Indians, was peculiarly
aggravated by her being dressed to receive her promised husband, but met
her murderers instead, employed by you. Upward of one hundred men, women
and children, have perished by the hands of ruffians to whom it is
asserted you have paid the price of blood.” To this, the gallant general
replied: “I would not be conscious of the acts you presume to impute to
me, for the whole continent of America; though the wealth of worlds was
in its bowels, and a paradise upon its surface.”
On the twenty-fifth of March, General Gates relieved General Schuyler
from command of the Northern Department; but the latter was promptly
restored, after presenting his case before Congress. General Schuyler
promptly tendered to General Gates the command of Ticonderoga; but it
was sneeringly and disrespectfully declined. To a requisition upon
Washington for tents, made by Gates, Washington replied: “As the
northern troops are hutted, the tents must be used for southern troops
until a supply can be obtained.” The reply of Gates is an illustration
of his ambition and jealousy, and points the trend of his subsequent
career. It reads as follows: “Refusing this army what you have not in
your power, is one thing; but saying that this army has not the same
necessities as the southern army, is another. I can assure your
excellency, the services of the northern army require tents as much as
any service I ever saw.” To Mr. Lovell, of the New England delegation in
Congress, Gates wrote: “Either I am exceedingly dull, or unreasonably
jealous, if I do not discover by the style and tenor of the letters from
Morristown, how little I have to expect from thence. Generals are like
parsons, they are all for christening their own child, first; but let an
impartial, moderating power decide between us, and do not suffer
southern prejudice to weigh heavier in the balance than the northern.”
Washington, of course, used the term “southern” simply in its
geographical sense; but this subtle appeal to Congressmen by Gates was
exactly the counterpart of that of his most intimate friend General
Charles Lee; and both alike, ultimately, paid the penalty of their
unsoldierly conduct. On the ninth of June, Gates took a “leave of
absence” and left the department.
Schuyler ordered all forts to be put in condition for service; appealed
to the States to forward militia; and on the twentieth proceeded to
inspect each post for himself. Although the garrison of Fort Ticonderoga
consisted of only twenty-five hundred and forty-six Continental troops
and nine hundred militia, it was deemed advisable to “protract defence
until reinforcements could arrive, or the stores be removed.” St. Clair
“did not consider it practicable to fortify Sugar Loaf Hill,” which,
subsequently occupied by Burgoyne, placed the garrison at his mercy.
Meanwhile, the personal inspection by Schuyler realized his worst
apprehensions as to the actual condition of the troops in the Northern
Department. Supplies, other than pork and flour, had not been
accumulated, and there was nothing to sustain the belief of the American
people that Ticonderoga had been made a real fortress. Schuyler hastened
to Albany, to forward troops and supplies. St. Clair wrote as late as
the last of June: “Should the enemy attack us, they will go back faster
than they came.” But on the first day of July, Burgoyne was before
Ticonderoga, and St. Clair abandoned the post without prolonged
resistance. The absence of General Schuyler at so critical a time was
the subject of a Court of Inquiry, called at his own request, in view of
very harsh criticisms, chiefly from New England; but he was acquitted,
with “the highest honor for services already rendered.”
The close observation of the American Commander-in-Chief, and the
movements of Burgoyne’s army, drew from him, when so many were
despondent, the following extraordinary prophetic letter to General
Schuyler, dated July 22d: “Though our affairs have for some days past
worn a dark gloomy aspect, I yet look forward to a fortunate and happy
change. I trust General Burgoyne’s army will meet, sooner or later, an
important check; and as I have suggested before [letter of July 15th],
that; the success he has had, will precipitate his ruin. From your
accounts, he appears to be pursuing that line of conduct which of all
others is most favorable to us:—I mean, acting in detachments. This
conduct will certainly give room for enterprise on our part and expose
his parties to great hazard. Could we be so happy as to cut one of them
off, though it should not exceed four, five, or six hundred men, it
would inspirit the people, and do away much of this present anxiety. In
such an event, they would lose sight of past misfortunes, and, urged at
the same time by a regard for their own security, they would fly to arms
and afford every aid in their power.” This forecast of the Battle of
Bennington was realized in its best promise; That battle, fought on the
sixteenth day of August, in which General Stark and Colonel Warner won
enviable renown, brought to the former his well-earned promotion. Other
nearly concurrent events in the Mohawk Valley—the gallant defence of
Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany, aroused the militia to action;
and General Schuyler succeeded in organizing and preparing for the field
a force fully adequate to meet Burgoyne’s entire force, with the
assurance of victory. That he was superseded by Gates, and lost the
command of the northern army on the eve of its anticipated triumph, was
no discredit to him, but an incident of political management which
Washington himself, at that period, was powerless to control.
On the seventeenth day of October, Burgoyne surrendered his army,
numbering five thousand seven hundred and fifty-three men. The total
strength of the American army opposed to him was eighteen thousand six
hundred and twenty-four; of which number nine thousand nine hundred and
ninety-three Continental troops, besides militia, were present.
Of the incidents most memorable in the entire campaign, was the
monumental daring of Arnold on the seventeenth of September. Tedious
discussions have in vain attempted to deny him due credit for bravery at
a critical hour of that battle-issue; as if his subsequent treason were
to be reflected back to his discredit. His eventual promotion, and the
congratulations of Washington when it was attained, and the latest duly
authenticated documents, are conclusive in his favor.
This brief outline of the invasion of Burgoyne only intensifies the
interest with which the mind returns to the headquarters of the American
Commander-in-Chief. Every possible effort had been made by him, and with
success, to supply the northern army with men and means to meet that
invasion. The side issues, especially that of Bennington, had, as
Washington predicted, imparted courage to other Colonies than those
which were immediately affected; for the cause was the common cause of
all. The location of Washington’s headquarters in the fastnesses of New
Jersey had already so restricted the movements of the garrison at New
York, and threatened the city itself, as to prevent the promised support
which Burgoyne had regarded as essential to the success of his invasion.
A careful perusal of his evidence before the House of Commons, his
field-notes, itineraries, and correspondence with General Howe and the
British War Office, leave no doubt that he regarded his movement as
having for its ultimate result the entire control of the Hudson River
and the practical conquest of New England. But General Howe, having in
vain attempted to force the American Commander-in-Chief to abandon New
Jersey and his perpetual menace to New York, or engage in a general
action without choice of time and place, resolved to move by sea to
Philadelphia and force him to fight for, or lose without battle, the
American seat of government itself. His own views as to such an
expedition are worthy of notice. While practically ready to sail for the
capture of Philadelphia, he made other demonstrations, and wrote a
specious autograph letter, which was designed to reach Washington, and
put him off his guard. Washington was not deceived by it. It reads as
follows, addressed to General Burgoyne:
NEW YORK, July 2, 1777.
DEAR SIR: I received your letter of the 14th of May from Quebec, and
shall fully observe its contents. The expedition to B—— [Boston] will
take the place of that up the North River. If, according to my
expectations, we may succeed rapidly in the possession of B——
[Boston], the enemy having no force of consequence there, I shall,
without loss of time, proceed to coöperate with you in the defeat of
the rebel army opposed to you. Clinton is sufficiently strong to amuse
Washington and Putnam. I am now making a demonstration southward,
which I think will have the full effect in carrying our plan into
execution. Success attend you.
W. HOWE.
The allusion of Howe to General Putnam indicated a better knowledge of
the methods of that officer than appreciation of the character of
Washington. The headquarters of General Putnam, who then commanded the
Highland range of the defences of the Hudson, were at Peekskill. Forts
Clinton and Montgomery were located upon a high spur of the range, on
the west side of the river, separated by the Poplen, a small creek. Both
were above the range of guns from ships-of-war, and so surrounded by
ravines and crags as to be difficult of approach, even by land. A boom
and heavy chain extended from the foot of the cliff to a sharp
promontory opposite, known as “St. Anthony’s Nose.” So many troops had
been sent to the support of Gates, that the garrison consisted mainly of
militia. Advices had already been received that an expedition had been
organized at New York for a diversion of troops from any further
reënforcement of the American Northern army. Governor Clinton therefore
ordered a considerable militia force to report to General Putnam for
strengthening the garrisons of the river posts. But General Putnam
furloughed the men during harvest and seeding, because the New York
garrison seemed to rest so peacefully in their city quarters. Hearing of
this extensive furlough, Governor Clinton promptly modified his own
order, allowing one-half to remain upon their farms; but for the other
half to report at Peekskill and the forts named. Before this modified
order could take effect, the expedition of Clinton was under way; while
the entire force assembled at the two forts was less than six hundred
and fifty men.
[Illustration: Attack of Forts Clinton and Montgomery.]
Clinton’s expedition left New York on the third of October, and
intentionally “made every appearance of their intention to land only at
Fort Independence and Peekskill.” Putnam and his army, and his immediate
surroundings, on the east bank of the Hudson, were ostentatiously
announced as Clinton’s objective, and Putnam acted upon that basis.
Governor Clinton was not so deceived, but adjourned the Legislature,
then in session at Kingston, and hastened to Fort Montgomery to assist
in its defence, and advise its garrison as to the available approaches
to the post through the mountains, with which he was familiar. (See map,
“Attacks of Forts Clinton and Montgomery.”)
Both Governor Clinton at Montgomery and Gen. James Clinton at Fort
Clinton distinguished themselves by a stubborn resistance and great
gallantry; but both posts were taken on the night of the fifth. The
American loss was nearly three hundred—killed, wounded and missing; and
two hundred and thirty-seven were taken prisoners. The British loss was
forty killed and one hundred and fifty-one wounded. General Clinton was
wounded in a bayonet charge, but escaped to the mountains; and Governor
Clinton escaped by a skiff and joined Putnam. That officer was so
confident of attack upon his own position that he had fallen back to the
heights behind Peekskill. He thought it impracticable to leave that
position to attack General Clinton, who first landed upon the east side
of the river, but did make a reconnoissance southward when too late. He
says, in his Report: “On my return from this reconnoissance with General
Parsons we were alarmed by a very heavy and hot firing, both of
small-arms and cannon, at Fort Montgomery. Upon which, I immediately
detached five hundred men to reënforce the garrison; but before they
could possibly cross to their assistance, the enemy, superior in
numbers, had possessed themselves of the fort.”
The British advanced above Peekskill and destroyed some stores at
Connecticut Village, and General Vaughan destroyed Esopus (Kingston).
The forts were dismantled, and General Clinton returned to New York.
General Putnam, reënforced by militia from Connecticut, New York and New
Jersey, soon reoccupied Peekskill; where he was shortly afterwards
strengthened by Continental troops from the northern army. The presence
of an intelligent commanding officer of reasonable military skill, or
the absolute control of both posts by Governor Clinton, would have
prevented their loss. The limited range of this expedition of Sir Henry
Clinton confirms Stedman’s statement, that he had no intention of
pressing north to the aid of General Burgoyne.