THE AMERICAN BASE OF OPERATIONS ESTABLISHED.—THE SECOND NEW JERSEY
CAMPAIGN.
The narrative of Washington’s career as a Soldier, up to the time when
he foiled the best efforts of Howe and Cornwallis to capture his weary
band of Continentals and militia, has been a continuous story of love of
country and devotion to her brave defenders. The most assiduous care for
their discipline, their health, their moral deportment, and their
loyalty to duty, has been the burden of his soul. Pleading,
remonstrance, and even reprimand, however earnest and pungent, have
never worn a selfish garb, nor breathed of arrogance or fitful temper.
Presumptuous denunciations by his chief antagonist have never impaired
the dignity of his carriage, his felicity of utterance, nor the serenity
of his faith.
The indiscretions of his subordinates, their jealousies, and their
weaknesses, have been so condoned, or accommodated to the eventful hours
of camp or field service, that while he rests in camp, during the
opening week of the second year of battling with the might of Britain,
he has in mind, only words of thanksgiving for mercies realized, and a
bold challenge to the American Congress and the American people for men
and means whereby to make their sublime Declaration of Independence a
realized fact.
[Illustration: Operations in New Jersey.]
And yet, never before has there gathered about his pathway such ominous
mutterings of a threatening tempest. It is no longer the spectacle of a
half-organized army parrying the strokes of a compact enemy, well
equipped for war. He has halted, faced the foe, and assumed the
aggressive. Washington has been fencing. His first lunge in return draws
blood. He will fight to the finish.
Already, he understands that his first New Jersey campaign indicates the
real field of endeavor in which the fate of his country is to be
settled. Whatever may be in store of sacrifice, or battle, he must now
plan for victory; and to ensure its happy realization, he must so
neutralize the domination of New York, that its occupation, whether by
himself or Great Britain, will cease to be a controlling factor in the
momentous struggle.
Even the battle-issue is no longer to be with its strong garrison; but
from Lake Champlain to Savannah, along the entire Atlantic coast, and
wherever great cities or seaboard towns fight strongest for liberty, he
is to be their standard-bearer; and there the people are to bleed and
triumph. Like Habib in the Arabian tale, when he drew from its scabbard
the talismanic sword of Solomon, and there flashed upon the glittering
steel the divine word “Power,” so he had the faith to know that “the
substance of things hoped for” was to be the trophy won.
Thus far, the recital of marchings and fightings has proved his ability
to command the confidence of his countrymen, of Congress, and of
disinterested mankind. Hereafter, the details of battles must be
relegated to fuller records; and this account will be more closely
restricted to the potential part borne by him in their conduct, general
management, and improvement.
A reference to the accompanying map will furnish a simple key to the
progress of the War for American Independence. Concentric circles about
New York, as a radius point, indicate the immediate sweep of the British
arm of offence. Similar circles about Morristown and Middlebrook
indicate, that as a fortified centre this section, like the hub of a
wheel, would endanger along its divergent spokes all operations out from
New York as far up the Hudson River as West Point, and throughout the
Province of New Jersey. It would compel Great Britain to maintain a
permanent garrison of sufficient strength for all such excursions; and a
correspondingly large, half-idle force for the protection of its own
headquarters and its general depot of supplies. It was like a mountain
peak for an observatory; and such was the systematic organization of
scouts, messengers and runners, in the confidence and pay of the
American Commander-in-Chief, that almost daily information was furnished
him of the minutest occurrence in and about the British headquarters;
and a regular Shipping List was supplied by competent spies, of every
movement of British men-of-war, transports, and tenders, as far out as
Sandy Hook.
One of the most noteworthy facts connected with the American civil
conflict of 1861–’65, was the measurement of generals on either side by
knowledge of their antecedent education, qualities and characteristics.
McClellan would have taken Vicksburg, as surely as did General Grant:
the mathematics of a siege are irresistible. But he never could have
marched to the sea, as did Sherman, or swept like a tornado to the rear
of Lee, as did Sheridan. It appears from the correspondence of
Washington, that he carefully studied the antecedents and followed the
operations of his chief antagonists; that in several of the most
critical periods of the war he anticipated their plans as fully as if he
had shared their confidence in advance. But he did not merely interpret
the lessons of campaigns as objectives for his own action. He penetrated
the secret chambers of Howe’s brain. He cross-examined himself: “If I
were in Howe’s place what would I do?” “In his own place, what will Howe
do?” “What must the British Ministry do, to conquer America—in the way
of ships, men, and money?” “Can they do it?” “Can they risk their West
India Colonies, by the diversion of adequate means to conquer America?”
The expectancies of aid from France, partly realized through the
purchase of arms and munitions of war as early as 1776, were never out
of his thought. To maintain one central army intact, and wear out his
adversary, was the pivot on which hinged American destiny. In the hills
of New Jersey he worked this problem to its solution.
Washington remained at the Morristown headquarters until the
twenty-fourth of May.
On the twenty-first day of January, Howe withdrew two thousand troops
from Newport, R.I., to reënforce the garrison of New York. Generals
Spencer and Arnold, then at Providence, R.I., with about four thousand
troops, were ordered by Washington, whenever practicable, to attempt the
capture of Newport; but they regarded their force as inadequate for the
purpose. General Parsons, then upon recruiting service in Connecticut,
was also instructed to make a descent upon Long Island; but his force
was hardly equal to the movement, for want of suitable boats. All these
external signs of American watchfulness and activity were as nettles to
irritate the British Commander-in-Chief, while he sat, powerless, in his
sumptuous headquarters at New York.
Knox was sent by Washington to Massachusetts to enlist a battalion of
artillery, and during his trip mentioned Springfield as the proper site
for the establishment of a laboratory and gun-factory. General Schuyler,
of the northern army, was instructed to draw from New England the entire
force required to resist the anticipated advance of Carleton from
Canada. Washington assigned as a special reason for this limitation,
that “troops of extreme sections could not be favorably combined.”
Besides this, he proportionately relieved New England from sending
troops of her own from her borders, which would be most exposed in case
the invasion from Canada materialized. General Maxwell was stationed at
Elizabethtown to watch tories and the movements of the British. Orders
were issued repressing plundering done by the militia, of which
complaint had been made. Similar outrages had been perpetrated by
British and Hessian troops in the vicinity of New York; and Washington
followed up his own ideas of civilized warfare, by sending to General
Howe a protest, and a demand for similar remedial action on his part.
At this period, a correspondence occurred as to the position of General
Charles Lee, then a prisoner of war in General Howe’s custody. It was
for a time quite in doubt whether Lee would be treated as a prisoner of
war, or be shot as a deserter from the British army. The pledge of
Washington, that he would hang an officer of equal rank if Lee were
executed, ultimately secured Lee’s exchange.
During the month of March, a ship from France landed at Portsmouth,
N.H., another invoice of military supplies; and a second soon after
reached Philadelphia with a large cargo. These timely accessions of
material of war amounted to twenty-three thousand fusees, one thousand
barrels of powder, and blankets and other stores.
On the second of March, Washington communicated to Robert Morris, of
Philadelphia, some of his personal studies of General Howe and his
plans. The following are pertinent extracts:
“General Howe cannot, by the best intelligence I have been able to get,
have less than ten thousand men in New Jersey, and on board of
transports at Amboy. Our number does not exceed four thousand. His are
well-disciplined, well-officered and well-supplied; ours, raw militia,
badly officered and under no government. His numbers cannot be, in short
time, augmented; ours must be, very considerably, and by such troops as
we can have some reliance on, or the game is at an end. His situation as
to horses and forage is bad, very bad; but will it be better? No, on the
contrary, worse; and therefore, if for no other, to shift quarters.
General Howe’s informants are too numerous, and too well acquainted, to
suffer him to remain in ignorance of them. With what propriety, then,
can he miss so favorable an opportunity of striking a capital stroke
against a city from which we draw so many advantages, the carrying of
which would give such _éclat_ to his arms, and strike such a damp to
ours. Nor is his difficulty of moving so great as is imagined. All the
heavy baggage of the army, their salt provisions, flour and stores,
might go round by water, while their superior numbers would enable them
to make a sweep of the horses for many miles around them, not already
taken off by us.”
The separate movements suggested by Washington, some of which have been
referred to, indicated his purpose to keep officers in the field
wherever there promised opportunity for aggressive action, while at the
same time enuring the militia to active field service.
Although Congress had granted the Commander-in-Chief full powers for the
conduct of the war, it did assert its general prerogatives very freely
in the matter of promotions and appointments without consulting him.
Ambition for rapid promotion and honorable commands was as conspicuous
then as since. The promotions made during the month of March were a
source of much jealousy and bitter conflict. Among the new
Major-Generals, much to Washington’s disgust, the name of Arnold was
omitted. General Wooster was at home in command of the Connecticut
militia, having resigned his commission in the regular service. Gen.
George Clinton was assigned to command the forts in the Highlands; and
General McDougall succeeded General Heath at Peekskill. General Sullivan
considered these details as so many independent commands; and fretted
over it so constantly and freely, that Washington administered a rebuke
which illustrates the directness and frankness with which he handled
such provoking interruptions of the domestic harmony of the army. He
writes as follows: “Why these unreasonable and unjustifiable suspicions,
which can answer no other end than to poison your own happiness and add
vexation to that of others? I know of but one separate command, properly
so-called, and that is in the Northern Department; and General Sullivan,
General St. Clair, or any other general officer at Ticonderoga, will be
considered in no other light, while there is a superior officer in the
department, than if he were placed at Chatham, Baskenridge or Princeton.
I shall quit, with an earnest expostulation that you will not suffer
yourself to be teased with evils that only exist in the imagination, and
with slights that have no existence at all; keeping it in mind, that if
there are to be several distinct armies to be formed, there are several
gentlemen before you in point of rank who have a right to claim
preference.”
General Greene was sent to Congress to urge relief for the suffering
army; and all governors were urged to furnish supplies and troops for
the ensuing campaign.
On the twenty-fifth of April, Governor Tryon of New York made an
incursion into Connecticut with two thousand men, and fought with
Wooster and Arnold at Ridgefield; where Arnold distinguished himself,
and Wooster was mortally wounded. The loss of sixteen hundred tents was
also a serious affair at the time. General Greene was despatched to
inspect the Highlands and its defences. A British fleet had ascended the
Hudson as far as Peekskill; and as spring advanced, every possible
preparation was made for active duty, in all departments where British
troops could gain access by land or sea. On the twenty-third of May,
Colonel Meigs crossed from Guilford to Long Island, and destroyed twelve
brigs and sloops, one of them carrying twelve guns, and a large quantity
of British stores, the small detachment guard having been recalled to
New York two days before.
It had become apparent to Washington that General Howe, having withdrawn
so many troops from advanced posts, would enter New Jersey in force; and
on the twenty-ninth of May, he moved his headquarters to the
well-fortified position at Middlebrook. On the seventh of June, Arnold
was placed in command at Philadelphia, to act with General Mifflin in
anticipation of Howe’s possible movement in that direction. On the
twelfth, General Howe, reënforced by two additional regiments recalled
from Newport, R.I., marched from Brunswick towards Princeton with an
aggregate force of seventeen thousand men.
This second New Jersey campaign was short in duration, and of small
results. Howe intrenched near Somerset Court House, where the Raritan
River was not fordable; and neither army could attack the other. He was
between Washington and Philadelphia. It was a challenge to the
abandonment of Middlebrook, risking an open, circuitous march, if the
American army intended to prevent a British movement upon the American
capital. Howe expected to cut off the division of Sullivan, which was at
Princeton, but that officer had moved to the hills to the north-west,
near Flemington. Cornwallis advanced as far as Hillsborough, when he
found that no enemy remained at Princeton. The British left was on the
Millstone, and their right rested at Brunswick. A glance at the
map—“Operations in New Jersey”—will show that any movement of the
American army to the west or south-west would uncover their defences at
Middlebrook to any attack by the road running due north from Brunswick.
Washington, anticipating the possibility of a general action, and
resolved to select a good opportunity to bring it on, ordered all of the
Continental troops at Peekskill, except one thousand effective men, to
march in three divisions, at one day’s interval, under Generals Parsons,
McDougall and Glover, to his support; the first two columns to bring,
each, two pieces of artillery.
It certainly was General Howe’s impression that Washington would have
such fears for the safety of Philadelphia as to risk an action south of
the Raritan. On the succeeding fifth of July he wrote to Lord Germaine,
that his “only object was to bring the American army to a general
action.” But Washington only strengthened his works, and never believed
that Howe was making Philadelphia the object of his movement. The
following letter explains his views: “Had they designed for the
Delaware, on the first instance, they probably would have made a secret,
rapid march of it, and not have halted as they have done, to awaken our
attention and give us time for obstructing them. Instead of this, they
have only advanced to a position to facilitate an attack on our right:
which is the part they have the greatest likelihood of injuring us in.
In addition to this consideration, they have come out as light as
possible, in leaving all their baggage, provisions, boats, and bridges,
at Brunswick, which plainly contradicts the idea of their pushing for
the Delaware.”
On the morning of the nineteenth, Howe suddenly returned to Brunswick.
Greene and Maxwell were advanced by Washington to a position between
Brunswick and Amboy. Howe marched early in the morning of the
twenty-second. Morgan and Wayne drove in the Hessian rear-guard upon the
main army, after a spirited skirmish. It had been Greene’s intention to
have Maxwell strike the column near Piscataway. Washington advanced his
entire army as far as Quibbletown, now Newmarket, upon the advice of his
officers that the retreat was genuine; yet not without a suspicion,
afterward verified, that the whole was a _ruse_ to entice him from his
stronghold.
On the twenty-sixth, Howe put his whole army in motion to resume the
offensive. Cornwallis, with the extreme right, was to gain the passes to
Middlebrook. Four battalions, with six pieces of artillery, were to
demonstrate on Washington’s left. Without further details, the action is
outlined as follows: Cornwallis found himself confronted by Stirling. A
lively skirmish ensued, near Westfield, now Plainfield. The Americans
were overmatched in numbers, and lost nearly two hundred men in
casualties and prisoners, besides three brass guns, but steadily fought
on, while slowly retiring. Washington, comprehending the whole movement,
retired Maxwell’s Division, without loss, and regained the passes
threatened; and the prolonged resistance of Stirling delayed Cornwallis
until too late for him to gain the American rear. On the afternoon of
the twenty-seventh, Cornwallis, after a loss of seventy men, passed
through Sampton unopposed, and joined Howe who had already retired from
Washington’s front. The American Commander-in-Chief dictated the choice
of battlefield. Howe, representing Great Britain, declined his terms. On
the thirtieth, Howe crossed to Staten Island, and his last military
operations in New Jersey came to an end. He afterwards claimed that his
forces were numerically inferior to those of Washington; but both
friends and critics, in the protracted controversy which afterwards
arose as to this costly and fruitless march into New Jersey, admit that
the disparity of force, in all respects, was with the American army.
The simple fact remains unobscured, that as General Howe’s acquaintance
with Washington’s methods matured, he better appreciated his qualities
as a Soldier.