THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED.—PRINCETON.
Washington’s surprise of the garrison of Trenton, equally surprised
General Howe at New York; and he made immediate requisition for twenty
thousand additional troops. His last previous requisition for foreign
auxiliaries met with little favor on the Continent, and only thirty-six
hundred men were secured for service, both in Canada and other American
Colonies. In the meantime, Clinton made no demonstration from Newport;
and Massachusetts had recovered from the temporary effect of his
occupation of that post. Under the impulse of the success at Trenton,
new foundries were established; and systematic effort was made to secure
a complete artillery outfit for the army, on the new basis of
eighty-eight battalions.
[Illustration: Trenton.]
[Illustration: Princeton.]
But on the first day of January, 1777, the Commander-in-Chief did not
pause in the use of the means just at hand. He realized that General
Howe could not afford to remain passive under the new conditions which
his own offensive movement had imposed upon the British army. Lord
Cornwallis, on the eve of returning to England, was at once sent with a
strong division to reoccupy Trenton. But Washington, instead of
retaining his former position on the west bank of the Delaware,
established himself behind the small river Assanpink, which enters the
Delaware just south of Trenton, on the New Jersey side. It was a bold
act. Below him, toward Philadelphia, were the forces of Cadwallader and
Mifflin; and these he ordered to his support. Their arrival, thirty-six
hundred strong, on the morning of January second, increased his command
to about five thousand men. This little Assanpink River, swollen by the
melted snow, was impassable except by a bridge near its junction with
the Delaware. Along its steep and wooded banks, the American army was
distributed for a distance of two miles. Watchful guards and several
pieces of artillery were stationed at every available fording-place, and
these were supported by some of the most reliable Continental troops.
Behind the first line, and on a little higher ground, a second line was
established.
In order to secure ample warning of the arrival of the enemy and delay
their approach, Washington established several small posts along the
road to Princeton. The first, about a mile advanced, occupied rising
ground well flanked by woods and supported by two pieces of artillery.
Colonel Hand’s Rifles were pushed forward as far as Five Mile Creek; and
even, off the road, a small supporting party held a defensive position
at Shebakonk Creek, where heavy timber and broken ground afforded a good
position for skirmishers to annoy an advancing force. General Greene was
placed in command of these outposts. (See map.)
So many writers have worried themselves and their readers in dealing
with Washington’s movements during the first week in January, 1777, as
so many revolutions of a lottery wheel of chance in which he was
remarkably lucky, that it is desirable to understand his own plans, and
how far he anticipated the contingencies which actually happened. His
mind not only grasped possibilities which aroused confidence, at home
and abroad; but embraced strategic conceptions which affected the entire
war.
The Delaware was still filled with floating ice. Large masses were
banked within its curves, so that retreat across the river, in the
presence of a powerful adversary, would be impracticable. And yet, he
had not hesitated to take position at Trenton, on the east bank of the
river. To have remained on the west bank would have made it impossible
for him to prevent Cornwallis from passing down the east bank to
Philadelphia, or at least from driving both Cadwallader and Mifflin to
that city, in disorder. To have retired his own army to Philadelphia,
would have been the abandonment of New Jersey, and of all the prestige
of his exploit on Christmas night. He resolved to save his army; and
leave Philadelphia to the contingencies of the campaign. If compelled to
fight, he would choose the ground; but he did not intend to fight under
conditions that would force him to abandon the aggressive campaign which
he had planned. During December, he had secured a careful reconnoissance
of the roads to Brunswick, had learned the strength of its garrison, and
formed an estimate of the value of the large magazines which General
Howe had located at that post. He believed that a quick dash would
secure their destruction or capture.
While awaiting the advance of Cornwallis, he called a council of
officers, and this bold strategic movement was fully indorsed by them.
But no time was to be lost. The initiative must be taken before the
armies were brought to a deadly struggle for the very ground already
occupied by his camp. Battle must be deferred until another day. The
baggage-wagons which accompanied the commands of Cadwallader and
Mifflin, now parked in the rear of the army, were moved to its extreme
right, toward Princeton, and the army waited.
Washington visited the advance posts, where Greene was on the alert, and
being advised by him that he could keep Cornwallis back until late in
the afternoon, or until night, returned to headquarters. The advance of
Cornwallis was so successively annoyed by the outposts, that he halted
until additional regiments joined him. Greene opened fire with his two
guns, under orders from Washington to “so check the enemy as to prevent
battle until the next day”; and Cornwallis again came to a halt. He knew
that the Delaware River was behind Washington, and felt sure of his
prey. Already the British had made a tiresome march; and at this second
halt, orders were sent back to Princeton to bring up a part of the force
left at that place. Cornwallis had not been neglectful of his flanks,
however, but sent skirmishers along the Assanpink, and even threw both
shot and shell into the woods in the direction of the American lines.
When the day closed, and Cornwallis encamped on the north bank of the
Assanpink, his pickets could see the Americans at work throwing up
intrenchments behind the bridge, and at one point further up the stream.
All along the American lines immense camp-fires burned, and these were
abundantly replenished, during the night, by fence-rails from the
country near by. The British and Hessians also maintained their
camp-fires. A sudden freeze made these fires comfortable. It also
hardened the ground, so that the American artillery and baggage-wagons
could move more readily than on the previous day.
Washington hurried a messenger to General Putnam, at Philadelphia,
advising him of his proposed movement, and instructing him to send
troops to occupy Crosswicks, a short distance above Bordentown, and thus
take charge of some baggage which has been sent in that direction. All
this time, the army, except its wide-awake and conspicuous sentries at
the bridge, and its active fire-builders along the Assanpink, was on the
march for Princeton. When the vanguard reached Stony Brook, Washington
re-formed his columns, and sent General Mercer, who had served with him
in the Indian War of 1756–66, to the left, by the Quaker Road, intending
to advance with the main army directly to the village, by a lower road,
under cover of rising ground, and thus expedite his march upon
Brunswick, now weakened in its garrison by the presence of Cornwallis at
Trenton. But General Mercer’s small command was suddenly confronted by a
part of Colonel Mawhood’s British regiment hastening to reënforce
Cornwallis. This precipitated the action, known as the “Battle of
Princeton.” As soon as firing was heard, Washington hastened to the
scene and took part in the fight. A British bayonet charge was too much
for the American advance guard. The officers in vain attempted to rally
the men. Washington at once appreciated the ruin that would result from
protracted battle; and, as at Kipp’s Bay, dashed into the thickest of
the fight, and with bared head urged the men to rally. He passed
directly across the fire of the British troops, and the Americans
responded to his appeal. Stirling, St. Clair, Patterson and others
promptly brought their troops into action; cut off the retreat of a
portion of the enemy to Princeton, and fought them again, just south of
Nassau Hall, Princeton College.
The short action was costly in precious lives. Colonel Haslet and
General Mercer both fell, while endeavoring to rally their men, and the
total American loss was about one hundred. The British loss was more
than one hundred, besides two hundred and twenty prisoners. The part
taken by Washington in the action requires no further details of its
incidents than its result. But the day was not over. At early dawn, at
Trenton, the “All’s well!” which had been echoed across the little
Assanpink and along its banks the night before, ceased. The fires still
crackled and blazed with fresh wood added to the glowing coals; but no
pacing sentry, nor picketed horses, nor open-mouthed cannon were in view
from the British outposts. And yet, the sullen boom of cannon far in
their rear, from the direction of Princeton, caught the quick ear of
Gen. Sir William Erskine. In an instant he was in the presence of
Cornwallis, with the sharp cry, “Washington has escaped us!” The beat
“To arms!” was immediate. There was no time even to pack supplies
already unloaded for battle. The troops were resting, after hard
marching at the dead of winter, but the presence of Washington’s army at
the head of King Street would not have more thoroughly awakened them to
duty. The distance was only ten miles; while Washington, by his circuit,
had marched sixteen miles. But every moment of delay imperilled their
great magazines of supply for the whole winter at Brunswick. All that
had been stored in the Trenton depot passed into Washington’s possession
on Christmas night. They brought with them, the day before, only
sufficient for a short morning’s capture of their American adversary.
Battalions marched toward Trenton singly, as formed; artillery following
so soon as ready.
The British vanguard reached Stony Brook just as the Americans
disappeared up the road, after destruction of the bridge. Cornwallis
halted, to bring up artillery. Washington, however, had already reached
Kingston, three miles beyond Princeton, and had crossed Millstone River.
Here, a council was held as to future action. British fugitives in the
direction of Brunswick had, most assuredly, warned the garrison of its
danger. At this moment, the sound of cannon at Stony Brook showed that
Cornwallis was pressing forward with despatch. The rear-guard left at
Stony Brook was not yet in sight; but the entire army was put in
marching order, and General Greene led the advance up the Millstone. As
soon as the rear-guard joined, the British not appearing, the bridge was
destroyed, and the army moved through woods, thickets, and improvised
openings, under the lead of well-posted scouts, for the hilly country to
the northward. When Cornwallis reached the Millstone, he had another
bridge to build. A few horsemen toward Brunswick were all that indicated
the presence or whereabouts of Washington’s army. He pushed his men by a
forced march, to save Brunswick, and _fight Washington_. He did indeed
save Brunswick; but Washington and his army were resting in a strong
position near Pluckemin, beyond his reach.
The American soldiers were foot-sore, unshod, weary and hungry. There
had not been time to distribute rations, after breaking camp at Trenton.
More than one-half of the troops had only just arrived with Cadwallader
from Bordentown, when the night march began. The imagination falters and
cannot conceive the experiences of these faithful men, so many of whom
instead of returning immediately home after New Years day, were
voluntarily serving beyond their enlistment, at the simple request of
their heroic Commander-in-Chief.
On the fifth of January, Washington sent his report to Congress, and
despatches to others elsewhere in command. Two of these despatches are
to be noticed. He ordered Putnam, then at Philadelphia: “Give out your
strength twice as great as it is. Keep out spies. Put horsemen in the
dress of the country, and keep them going backwards and forwards for
that purpose. Act with great circumspection, so as not to meet with a
surprise.” He ordered General Heath, then on the Hudson, “to collect
boats, for the contingency of the detail of a part of his forces to New
Jersey”; and also instructed him, that “it had been determined in
council that he should move down toward New York with a considerable
force, as if with a sudden design upon that city.”
On the seventh of January, the American army reached Morristown; where
huts were erected and the Headquarters of the Continental Army of the
United States were established. That army was resting, and working;
working, and resting,—but its Commander-in-Chief knew no rest. On the
same day, additional orders were issued to General Heath; to General
Lincoln, who had reached Peekskill with four thousand New England
militia; and to other officers, north and south, in anticipation of
ulterior movements through every probable field of the rapidly expanding
war. This was also the first occasion for Washington’s exercise of the
high prerogative conferred by Congress,—full control of all military
operations without consultation with that body.
Washington could reprimand, when necessary; while always prompt to
commend, when commendation was both deserved and timely. Heath was
before Fort Independence on the eighteenth day of January. General
Lincoln advanced by the Hudson River road; General Scott by White
Plains; and Generals Wooster and Parsons, from New Rochelle and
Westchester. A few prisoners were taken at Valentine’s Hill. General
Heath, with grave dignity, announced to the Hessian garrison of two
thousand men that he would allow them “twenty minutes in which to
surrender,” or they must “abide the consequences.” Twenty minutes,
thirty minutes, and gradually, ten days elapsed. This large American
force, half-organized, as they were—without barracks, in midwinter,
under conditions of terrible exposure—endured it all, without flinching,
and hardest of all, unrelieved by fighting. Suddenly, the Hessians made
a sortie upon the advanced regiment, and the whole army was retired. Its
fighting pluck had been frittered away. The combined divisions had
arrived with admirable concert of time. The plan was well-conceived and
well-initiated; but failed, because a soldier was not in immediate
command. As a demonstration toward New York, it did affect Howe’s
movements, and compelled him to keep his forces well in hand; but its
chief purpose was not realized.
On the third day of February, the American Commander-in-Chief again
wrote to General Heath, as follows: “This letter is additional to my
public one of this date. It is, to hint to you, and I do it with
concern, that your conduct is censured, and by men of sense and judgment
who have been with you in the expedition to Fort Independence, as being
fraught with too much caution; by which the army has been disappointed
and in some degree disgraced. Your summons, as you did not attempt to
fulfil your threats, was not only idle, but farcical, and will not fail
of turning the laugh exceedingly upon us.”
During the winter and spring, the skirmishes were frequent, and often
with benefit to the American troops. They began to acquire confidence,
and the conviction that, man for man, on fair terms, they were a match
for either British or Hessians, and did not care which invited a fight.
Washington issued a counter-proclamation to that which Howe promulged
when the American army advanced into New Jersey; and then, all offensive
operations of the British army came to a sudden halt.
The eminently impartial Italian historian, Botta, thus sums up his
description of this offensive movement:
“Washington, having received a few fresh battalions, and his little army
having recovered from their fatigue, soon entered the field anew, and
scoured the whole country as far as the Raritan. He even crossed the
river and entered the county of Essex; made himself master of Newark, of
Elizabethtown, and finally of Woodbridge; so that he commanded the
entire coast of New Jersey in front of Staten Island.
“He so judiciously selected his positions, and fortified them so
formidably, that the royalists shrunk from all attempts to dislodge him
from any of them.”... “But the British army, after having overrun,
victoriously, the State of New Jersey quite to the Delaware, and caused
even the City of Philadelphia to tremble for its safety, found itself
now restricted to the only posts of Brunswick and Amboy, which,
moreover, could have no communication with New York, except by sea.
“Thus, by an army almost reduced to extremity, Philadelphia was saved;
Pennsylvania protected; New Jersey nearly recovered; and a victorious
army laid under the necessity of quitting all thoughts of acting
offensively, in order to defend itself.”