THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN.—TRENTON.
Historical accuracy must recognize the First Campaign of Washington in
New Jersey, as a masterly conduct of operations toward American
Independence. The loss of Fort Washington has been a frequent topic of
discussion, as if its retention or loss had determining value. As
already indicated by Washington’s letters, there was no substantial
benefit to be realized by the detachment of troops to retain it, so long
as British ships controlled its water-front. Behind it was New England,
which could furnish no base of American operations for a general war;
and yet, in order to prosecute the war to success, the American army
must be established where it could harass and antagonize British
operations at and out from New York. Fort Washington could do neither,
but, so long as held, must drain resources which were more valuable
elsewhere.
It has already been noticed, that Washington prepared New England for
its own immediate defence; and the assembling of supplies ordered was in
anticipation of the campaign of 1777. The new system of enlistments,
also, provided for five years of contingent service. The rapid
organization of regiments at the South, and the authorized increase of
the army, in excess of any possible British accessions from Europe, had
induced the establishment of the Camp of Observation before alluded to,
and indicated New Jersey as the essential centre of operations for all
general military purposes. British operations from Canada, or against
the Southern Colonies, could be successfully met only by a closely
related and compactly ordered base of operation and supply.
It is therefore a misnomer to dwell with emphasis upon Washington’s next
movement, as simply a “masterly retreat.” The extracts, few out of many
available, already cited, are declarations of a clearly defined
strategic system, which would admit of no permanent failure so long as
Congress and the American people completely filled the measure of his
demands for men and money.
A glance at the disposition of both armies is invited. All operations in
the northern department were practically suspended with Carleton’s
withdrawal to Canada. But on the ninth of November, the official returns
of that northern army showed a force of seven thousand three hundred and
forty-five rank and file, present for duty; with three thousand nine
hundred and sixty-one sick, present, and absent. Enlistments were to
expire with the year, but weeks were to intervene. Lee’s Grand Division,
at North Castle Heights, at date of the loss of Fort Washington, and as
late as November, reported “seven thousand eight hundred and twenty-four
of effective rank and file, present for duty and on command.”
Enlistments here, also, were near their limit; but Lee ultimately
crossed into New Jersey with thirty-four hundred effective troops.
Washington had the right to expect, and did expect, that this force was
available upon call. The division of General Heath, commanding upon the
Hudson, with headquarters at Fishkill, numbered, on November
twenty-fourth, five thousand four hundred and ten men for duty. Leaving
to the governors of New England and New York the responsibility of
maintaining their quotas when enlistments should expire, the time had
come for American operations in the middle _zone_ of military action.
Cornwallis was detached from his immediate command and sent into New
Jersey, with a strong force, to attack Washington. The American army
abandoned the space between the Hackensack and Passaic rivers; crossed
the latter at Aquackonock on the twenty-first of November; burned the
bridge after a slight skirmish, and followed the right bank of the
Passaic to Newark, reaching that city on the twenty-third. At this
point, a muster of the army was ordered by Washington, and five thousand
four hundred and ten reported for duty. New Brunswick was reached on the
twenty-ninth. Here another skirmish with the army of Cornwallis took
place. But Cornwallis halted his command under orders of Howe to
“proceed no further than New Brunswick.”
Washington moved on to Princeton, and then to Trenton, where he arrived
on the third day of December. He immediately gathered from Philadelphia
all available boats, and for a stretch of seventy miles cleared both
banks of the Delaware River of everything that could float, and took
them into his own charge.
The reader should appreciate that these movements were not in the
original design of the American Commander-in-Chief. He would have made a
stand at both Hackensack and New Brunswick, if Lee’s Division,
confidently expected, had joined him as ordered; and at least, the
enemy’s progress would have been retarded.
Having left the Delaware regiment and five Virginia regiments at
Princeton, under Lord Stirling, he moved all heavy military stores
behind the Delaware, and returned to Princeton. Meeting Lord Stirling,
who was falling back before a superior force of the enemy, he recrossed
the Delaware at Trenton, established headquarters, and fixed the base
for future action.
In writing to Congress on the fifth, he used this language: “As nothing
but necessity obliged me to retire before the enemy and leave so much of
New Jersey unprotected, I conceive it my duty, and it corresponds with
my _inclination_, to make head against them so soon as there shall be
the least probability of doing so with propriety.”
On the twelfth, he learned that General Lee had entered New Jersey with
his division. As early as November twenty-fifth, he had ordered General
Schuyler to forward to him all Pennsylvania and New Jersey troops then
in the Northern Department.
A glance at the plans and movements of the British army is now of
interest. Howe reported his movements as follows: “My first design
extended no further than to get, and keep possession of, East New
Jersey. Lord Cornwallis had orders not to advance beyond Brunswick; but,
on the sixth, I joined his lordship with the Fourth Brigade of British,
under General Grant. On the seventh, Cornwallis marched with his corps,
except the Guards who were left at Brunswick, to Princeton, which the
Americans had quitted the same day. He delayed seventeen hours at
Princeton, and was an entire day in marching to Trenton. He arrived
there, just as the rear-guard of the enemy had crossed; but they had
taken the precaution to destroy, or secure to the south side, all the
boats that could possibly have been employed for crossing the river.”
Cornwallis remained at Pennington until the fourteenth, when the British
army was placed in winter quarters; “the weather,” says General Howe,
“having become too severe to keep the field.”
On the previous day, the thirteenth, General Charles Lee, next in rank
to Washington, while leisurely resting at a country house at
Baskenridge, three miles from his troops, was taken prisoner by a
British scouting detachment. It may be of interest to the reader to be
reminded, that this Major-General required from Congress an advance of
thirty thousand dollars, to enable him to transfer his English property
to America, before he accepted his commission, and was disappointed that
he was made second, instead of first, in command. When captured, he was
in company with Major Wilkinson, a messenger from his old Virginia
friend, General Horatio Gates, who had just been ordered by Washington
to accompany certain reënforcements from the northern army, to increase
the force of the Commander-in-Chief. This Major Wilkinson escaped
capture, but the British scouts used his horse for Lee’s removal. On the
table was a letter, not yet folded, which the messenger was to convey to
General Gates. It reads as follows (omitting the expletives),—
BASKENRIDGE, December 13, 1776.
MY DEAR GATES: The ingenious manœuvre of Fort Washington has
completely unhinged the goodly fabrick we had been building. There
never was so —— a stroke. _Entre nous_, a certain great man is ——
deficient. He has thrown me into a position where I have my choice of
difficulties. If I stay in the Province, I risk myself and my army;
and if I do not stay, the Province is lost forever.... Our councils
have been weak, to the last degree. As to what relates to yourself, if
you think you can be in time to aid the general, I would have you, by
all means, go. You will at least save your army.
No comment is required, except to state that repeated orders had been
received and acknowledged by Lee, to join Washington; but he had
determined not to join him, and to act independently with his division,
regardless of the orders of his Commander-in-Chief, and of Congress. Two
extracts only are admissible. Washington had reprimanded Lee for
interfering with the independent command of General Heath, on the
Hudson. On the twenty-sixth of November, Lee wrote to Heath: “The
Commander-in-Chief is now separated from us. I, of course, command on
this side the water; for the future I will, and I must, be obeyed.” On
the twenty-third of November, in order to induce New England to trust
_him_, and _distrust_ Washington, he wrote the following letter to James
Bowdoin, President of the Massachusetts Council:
Before the unfortunate affair at Fort Washington, it was my opinion,
that the two armies, that on the east and that on the west side of the
North River, must rest, each, on its own bottom; that the idea, of
detaching and reënforcing from one side to the other, on every motion
of the enemy, was chimerical; but to harbor such a thought, in our
present circumstances, is absolute insanity.... We must therefore
depend upon ourselves. Should the enemy alter the present direction of
their operation, I would never entertain the thought on being succored
from the western army (that across the Hudson, with Washington).
Affairs appear in so important a crisis, that I think even the
resolves of Congress must be no longer nicely weighed with us. There
are times when we must commit treason against the laws of the State,
for the salvation of the State. The present crisis demands this brave,
_virtuous_ kind of treason. For my part, and I flatter myself my way
of thinking is congenial with that of Mr. Bowdoin, I will stake my
head and reputation on the measure.
James Bowdoin loved Massachusetts; but no selfish or local
considerations, such as were those of Lee, could impair his confidence
in the wisdom and patriotism of the American Commander-in-Chief.
The capture of Lee was thus mildly noticed by Washington: “It was by his
own folly and imprudence, and without a view to effect any good, that he
was taken.”
General Sullivan succeeded to the command of Lee’s Division. Gates
joined from the northern army, and on the twentieth of December, the
Continental Army was reorganized for active service.
General Howe had returned to New York December 20th. The British
cantonments for the winter embraced Brunswick, Trenton, Burlington,
Bordentown, and other places; with the Hessian, Donop, in command at
Bordentown, and Rahl at Trenton.
The month had been one of great strain upon the American
Commander-in-Chief. He was, practically, on trial. The next in command,
who, by virtue of previous military training, largely commanded public
confidence, had failed him, simply because Washington, with the modesty
of a true aspirant for excellence in his profession, would not pass
judgment, and enforce his own will, in disobedience of the will of
Congress. But, by this time Congress itself began to realize that a
deliberate civil body was not the best Commander-in-Chief for field
service, and that it would have to trust the men who did the fighting.
It adjourned on the twelfth of December, quite precipitately, but
_Resolved_ “That, until Congress shall otherwise order, General
Washington be possessed of full power to order and direct all things
relative to the department and to the operations of war.”
Repair of bridges below Trenton, by the British troops, led Washington
to suspect that some move might be made against Philadelphia, from the
east side of the Delaware River. He therefore divided the entire river
front into divisions under competent commanders, on the day of the
adjournment of Congress. Light earthworks were thrown up, opposite all
ferries and places of easy landing, with small guards at frequent
intervals; and constant patrols were ordered to be in motion, promptly
to report any suspicious signs of British activity, or the movement of
other persons than soldiers of the army. Points of rendezvous were also
established, to resist any sudden attempt of persons to cross; all boats
were kept in good order, and under guard; and rations for three days
were distributed and required to be kept up to that standard, by night
and by day. On the same day he promulged an order that affected
Philadelphia itself; viz., “requiring all able-bodied men in the city,
not conscientiously scrupulous as to bearing arms, to report at the
State House yard the next day, with arms and equipments; that all
persons who have arms and accoutrements, which they cannot, or do not
mean to employ in defence of America, are hereby ordered to deliver the
same to Mr. Robert Tower, who will pay for the same; and that those who
are convicted of secreting any arms, or accoutrements, will be severely
punished.”
On the fourteenth, he also definitely resolved to “face about and meet
the enemy,”—a purpose which only the conduct of General Lee had made
impracticable before. He wrote to Governor Trumbull, General Gates, and
General Heath, in confidence, of his purpose, “_to take the offensive_.”
To Congress, he wrote sternly, stating that “ten days will put an end to
the existence of this army”; adding: “This is not a time to stand upon
expense. A character to lose; an estate to forfeit; the inestimable
blessing of liberty at stake, and a life devoted, must be my excuse.”
At this juncture, Washington definitely resolved to establish his
permanent base, as against New York; and selected Morristown, which had
already been made the rendezvous of the New Jersey troops. General
Maxwell, who was familiar with the country, was assigned to the command
of this new position. Three regiments from Ticonderoga were ordered to
halt at the new post. On the twenty-third of December, Washington sent a
confidential communication to Adjutant-General Reed, then with General
Cadwallader, in which he designated “Christmas night, an hour before
day, as the time fixed for an attack upon Trenton.” Reed had fully
shared in the desire for active, offensive duty, and in one letter thus
concurred in the Commander-in-Chief’s opinion, that “to repossess
ourselves of New Jersey, or any part of it, would have more effect than
if we had never left it.” The purpose of Washington was so to combine
the movements of various divisions, including one under Putnam from
Philadelphia, as practically to clear the east bank of the Delaware of
all Hessian garrisons. Putnam feared that the Tory element would rise
during his absence, and that order was suspended. The right wing, under
Cadwallader, was to cross at Bristol (see map); but owing to ice, which
prevented the landing of artillery, he returned to Bristol, and reported
to Washington. After expressing regret over his failure, he thus closes:
“I imagine the badness of the night must have prevented you from passing
over as you intended.” Ewing was to cross over just below Trenton, to
intercept any reënforcements that might approach the garrison from
Bordentown; but the violence of the storm prevented that movement also.
Washington took charge of the left wing, consisting of twenty-four
hundred men, which was to cross at McConkey’s Ferry, nine miles above
Trenton, accompanied by Sullivan and Greene as division commanders. When
preparations were complete, and Washington in his saddle, Major
Wilkinson, of the staff of Gates, notified him that General Gates had
gone to Baltimore to visit Congress. This was a deliberate “_absence,
without leave_,” at an hour when he knew, and in advance, that
Washington intended to force a battle; but Stark, of Breed’s Hill, was
there. Glover, the man of Marblehead and hero of the Long Island
retreat, was there; and William Washington, and James Monroe, were
there!
[Illustration:
WASHINGTON BEFORE TRENTON.
[From Dael’s painting.]
]
The Hessian garrison of fifteen hundred and forty men had enjoyed a
right “merry Christmas,” after the style of their own “old country”
fashion; and the night, inclement without, was bright within, as dance
and song with every cheery accompaniment dispelled thoughts of
watchfulness of ice-bound Delaware and driving tempest. It was indeed a
night for within-door relish, and the season of the year was most
conducive to the abandonment of all care and worry. “Toasts were drank”
with gleesome delight; and the hilarity of the happy Hessian soldiers,
officers and men, only ceased when the worn-out night compelled them to
seek relief in rest. The garrison were sleeping as soundly when the
stormy morning broke into day, as if they had compassed a hard day’s
march during the night hours. The usual detail for guard was
distributed, but no other sign of life appeared on the streets of
Trenton. Before Colonel Rahl’s headquarters, two guns, stationed there
more as a recognition of his commanding position than for use, were
partly buried in snow. A battery of four guns was in open ground, not
far from the Friends’ Meeting house; but neither earthworks nor other
defences had been deemed essential to the security of the British winter
quarters.
General Grant had indeed written from Brunswick on the twenty-fourth:
“It is perfectly certain there are no more rebel troops in New Jersey;
they only send over small parties of twenty or thirty men. On last
Sunday, Washington told his assembled generals that the ‘British are
weak at Trenton and Princeton.’ I wish the Hessians to be on guard
against sudden attack; but, at the same time, I give my opinion that
nothing of the kind will be undertaken.” General Grant did, it would
seem, compliment Washington’s sagacity, without comprehending his
will-power to realize in action every positive conviction of possible
duty. And so it was, that the garrison of Trenton on that Christmas
night slept at ease, until morning dawned and Washington paid his
unexpected visit.
Under cover of high ground, just back of McConkey’s Ferry, on Christmas
afternoon, 1776, Washington held a special evening parade. Neither
driving wind nor benumbing cold prevented full ranks and prompt response
to “roll-call,” as company after company fell into line; and when
darkness obscured the closing day, all was in motion. It had been his
design to complete the crossing by midnight, and enter Trenton at five
o’clock in the morning. He was to lead, in person, and announced as the
countersign, “Victory or Death!” The order to march to the river bank,
by divisions and sub-divisions, each to its designated group of boats,
was communicated by officers especially selected for that duty, so that
the most perfect order attended each movement. The few days of mild
weather which had opened the ice, had been succeeded by a sudden freeze,
and a tempest of hail and sleet that checked the swift current and made
a safe passage of daring and doubtful venture. The shore was skirted
with ice, while the floating blocks of _old_ ice twisted and twirled the
fragile boats as mere playthings in their way. But no one grumbled at
cold, sleet or danger. The elements were not the patriot’s foe that
night of nights. All faces were set against their country’s foes. They
were, at last, to pursue their old pursuers. The “man of retreats,” as
Washington had been called in derision by such men as Gates and Lee, was
guiding, and leading to “Victory or Death!”
The landing of the artillery was not effected until three o’clock in the
morning, with nearly nine miles yet to march. At four o’clock the
advance was ordered. The snow ceased, but the hail and sleet returned,
driven by a fierce wind from the north-east. A mile and a quarter
brought them to Bear Tavern (see map). Three and a half miles more
brought them to Birmingham. Here a messenger from General Sullivan
informed Washington that his men reported “their arms to be wet.” “Tell
your general,” replied Washington, “to use the bayonet, and penetrate
into the town. The town must be taken. I am resolved to take it.”
[Illustration: Trenton and Vicinity]
From this point Sullivan took the river road. Washington and Greene,
bearing to the left, crossed to the old Scotch road, and then entered
the Pennington road, only one mile from Trenton. The distance by each
road was about the same, four and one-half miles. Washington moved at
once to the head of King and Queen streets, where they joined at a sharp
angle; and here, under direction of General Knox, Forrest’s Battery was
placed in position, to sweep both streets, even down to the river. “It
was exactly eight o’clock,” says Washington, “and three minutes after, I
found from the firing on the lower road that that division had also got
up.” The entire movement was with the utmost silence, to enable Sullivan
and Stark to pass through the lower town and take the Hessians in the
rear and by surprise.
The battle was over in an hour. The Hessian troops burst from their
quarters, half dressed, but in the narrow streets already swept by
Forrest’s guns, any regular formation was impossible. The two guns
before Rahl’s headquarters were manned; but before they could deliver a
single round Capt. William Washington and Lieut. James Monroe
(subsequently President Monroe), with a small party, rushed upon the
gunners and hauled the guns away for use elsewhere. Sullivan had entered
the town by Front and Second streets. Stark led his column directly to
the Assanpink Bridge, to cut off retreat to Bordentown; and then swung
to the left, and attacked the Hessians, who were gallantly attempting to
form in the open ground between Queen Street and the Assanpink. Hand’s
Rifles and Scott’s and Lawson’s Virginia regiments were conspicuous for
gallantry. All did well.
The American casualties were two killed and three wounded,—Captain
Washington and Lieutenant Monroe being among the latter. The Hessian
loss in killed and wounded, besides officers, was forty-one. The number
of prisoners, including thirty officers, was one thousand and nine.
Colonel Rahl fell, mortally wounded, while using his bravest energies to
rally his men for an attack on Washington’s position at the head of King
Street; but the surprise was so complete, and the coöperation of the
American divisions was so timely and constant, that no troops in the
world could have resisted the assault. Six bronze guns, over a thousand
stand of arms, four sets of colors, twelve drums, and many valuable
supplies were among the trophies of war.
The American army countermarched during the night after the battle,
reaching the old headquarters at Newtown with their prisoners before
morning; having made the entire distance of fully thirty miles under
circumstances of such extreme hardship and exposure, that more than one
thousand men were disabled for duty through frozen limbs and broken-down
energies.
The Hessian troops were proudly escorted through Philadelphia, and the
country began to realize the value of a Soldier in command. Fugitives
from Trenton reached Bordentown, where Colonel Donop had already been so
closely pressed by Colonel Griffiths in an adventurous skirmish, as to
require the services of his entire garrison to meet it. He abandoned
Bordentown instantly, leaving the sick and wounded, and the public
stores; marched with all haste to Princeton, via Crosswicks and
Allentown, and started the next day for South Amboy, the nearest port to
New York.
On the twenty-seventh, Cadwallader crossed at Bristol with eighteen
hundred men, not knowing that Washington had recrossed the Delaware.
Generals Mifflin and Ewing followed with thirteen hundred men; but Mt.
Holly and Black Horse had also been abandoned by the Hessian garrisons.
While the American army rested, its Commander-in-Chief matured his plans
for further offensive action. A letter from Colonel De Hart, at
Morristown, advised him that the regiments of Greaton, Bond, and Porter
would extend their term of service two weeks. The British post at
Boundbrook and vicinity had been withdrawn to Brunswick. Generals
McDougall and Maxwell, then at Morristown, were instructed by Washington
“to collect as large a body of militia as possible, and to assure them,
that nothing is wanting but for them to lend a hand, and drive the enemy
from the whole Province of New Jersey.” On the twenty-eighth, he wrote
thus to Maxwell: “As I am about to enter the Jerseys with a considerable
force, immediately, for the purpose of attempting a recovery of that
country from the enemy; and as a diversion from your quarter may greatly
facilitate this event, by dividing and distracting their troops, I must
request that you will collect all the forces in your power, and annoy
and distress them by every means which prudence may suggest.”
To General Heath, he wrote: “I would have you advance as rapidly as the
season will permit, with the eastern militia, by the way of the
Hackensack, and proceed downwards until you hear from me. I think a fair
opportunity is offered of driving the enemy entirely from, or, at least
to the extremity of New Jersey.”
On the thirtieth, having again crossed to Trenton, Washington was able
to announce that “the eastern Continental troops had agreed to remain
six weeks longer, upon receipt of a bounty of ten dollars; and the
services of eminent citizens were enlisted in an effort to use the
success at Trenton, as a stimulus to recruiting,” and, “to hasten the
concentration of the militia.” Washington intensely realized that in a
few weeks, at furthest, he was to begin again the instruction of a new
army; and determined to get the largest possible benefits from the
presence of four thousand veterans who had consented to remain for a
short period beyond their exact term of enlistment.
On the twenty-seventh of December, Congress clothed Washington with full
dictatorial authority in the matter of raising troops, and in all that
pertained to the conduct of the war, for the period of six months;
reciting as the foundation of such action, that affairs were in such a
condition that the very existence of civil liberty depended upon the
right exercise of military powers; and, “the vigorous, decisive conduct
of these being impossible in distant, numerous, and deliberative bodies,
it was confident of the wisdom, vigor, and uprightness of George
Washington.”
It was under the burden of this vast responsibility that Washington
rested, when he closed the year 1776 in camp near Trenton. He responded
to this confidence on the part of the Continental Congress, in this
simple manner: “Instead of thinking myself freed from all civil
obligation, I shall immediately bear in mind that as the sword was the
last resort for the preservation of our liberty, so it ought to be the
first thing laid aside, when those liberties are finally established. I
shall instantly set about making the most necessary reforms in the
army.”
Thus rapidly, in as natural and orderly sequence as seemed desirable,
omitting incidents, correspondence, and names of persons that do not
seem essential in the illustration of qualities which attach to the
career of Washington as a Soldier, the reader is brought to the midnight
hour of December 31, 1776.
All his struggles in camp, in field, on the march, have closed with one
tremendous blow struck at British prestige and British power. The
greatest soldiers and statesmen of that period recognized its
significance, and rendered unstinted praise to the “wisdom, constancy,
and intrepidity of the American Commander-in-Chief.”
But, at that midnight hour, the Soldier who had been the kind and
faithful guardian of the humblest men in the ranks, as well as the
example and instructor of the proudest veteran, waited with swelling
breast and aching heart for the morning’s dawn; realizing the solemnity
of its certain ordeal, when the organization of a new army, and more
herculean efforts of the British crown, were to test not only his own
capacity and will, but test the readiness and fitness of the American
people to rise to the emergencies of one supreme issue—“Victory or
Death!”