WASHINGTON TENDERS, AND HOWE DECLINES, BATTLE.—HARLEM HEIGHTS AND WHITE
PLAINS.
The steady hold of Harlem Heights against Howe’s advance on the
sixteenth day of September, sometimes called the Battle of Harlem
Heights, was another “object lesson” for General Howe’s improvement, and
he observed its conditions. His adversary invited and he declined the
invitation to attack the American position. His next plan was
self-suggestive, to cut the American army from its Connecticut supplies,
since his fleet controlled the Hudson River, and by a flank and rear
movement to pen it up for leisurely capture. He began this movement
October twelfth.
The Guards, Light Infantry, Reserve, and Donop’s Hessians, landed at
Throgg’s Neck (see map). But Hand’s American Rifles had already
destroyed the bridge to the mainland; and even at low tide the artillery
could not safely effect a crossing. Colonel Prescott, with others,
especially detailed by Washington, watched every movement, and held
firmly their posts without flinching; so that Howe placed his troops in
camp, “awaiting reënforcements.” On the sixteenth and seventeenth,
several brigades from Flushing, with the Grenadiers, landed at Pell’s
Point. Even here, Washington had anticipated his advance; for Colonel
Glover made such resistance from behind stone fences, then common to
that region, that this last command also went into camp, “waiting for
reënforcements.” On the twenty-first, Howe advanced his right and centre
columns beyond New Rochelle, where he again went into camp, “waiting for
reënforcements.”
During the week, General Knyphausen reached Staten Island from Europe
with additional Hessian troops; and these, with the British Light
Dragoons, landed at Myer’s Point near New Rochelle. De Heister also came
up from Howe’s first camping-ground, and the entire army advanced
parallel with the River Bronx, to within four miles of White Plains.
Much had been expected of the Light Dragoons and their charges on
horseback, with drawn sabres, to cut to pieces the undisciplined rebels.
But they inspired no terror. It was the rebels’ opportunity. Washington
reminded the army, “that in a country where stone fences, crags, and
ravines were so numerous, the American riflemen needed no better chance
to pick off the riders and supply the army with much-needed horses.” He
offered a “reward of one hundred dollars to any soldier who would bring
in an armed trooper and his horse.” Colonel Haslet crossed the Bronx and
attacked the Queen’s Rangers, captured thirty-six, and left as many on
the field, besides carrying away sixty muskets. Colonel Hand next had a
lively skirmish with the Hessian Yagers, who, accustomed to marching in
close array, met an experience similar to that of Braddock’s command
years before.
Besides all that, it was a constant inspiration to the American troops,
and not least to the Militia, thus to distribute themselves along the
extended British columns, and shoot, when they pleased, at some live
target. Howe had already sent ships-of-war up the Hudson, and proposed
to swing to the left at White Plains, and sweep the entire American army
back upon the Harlem.
When Washington learned from his scouts that the British army was thus
extended along the Sound, he hurried all supplies forward to White
Plains; pushed forward his own army, division by division, along the
west hank of the Bronx, always on high ground; established earthworks at
every prominent point, and made a small chain of communicating posts
throughout the entire distance. His purpose was to crowd the British
army upon the coast, where innumerable sea-inlets made progress
difficult; and by using the shorter, _interior line_ to White Plains, to
place himself in position to fight to advantage, upon ground of his own
selection. Of course time became an element of determining value. Howe
gained a start on the twelfth; but lost five days at Throgg’s Neck, and
four days more at New Rochelle. As Washington already had a depot of
Connecticut supplies at White Plains, he advanced to that point with
vigor, so soon as he perceived that Howe would not attack from the east,
as he had declined to attack from the south.
On the twelfth, General Greene asked permission to join from New Jersey,
and on the fourteenth General Lee reported for duty. Some reference to
this officer is of immediate interest. On that very morning he had
written a letter to General Gates, who, as well as himself, had seen
military service in the British army, each holding commissions in the
American army subordinate to Washington,—Lee, as senior Major-General.
The insubordination and arrogance of this letter are patent. The
following is an extract:
FORT CONSTITUTION, Oct. 14, 1776.
MY DEAR GENERAL GATES: I write this scroll in a hurry. Colonel Wood
will describe the position of our army, which in my breast I do not
approve. _Inter nos_, the Congress seems to stumble at every step. I
don’t mean one or two of the cattle, but the whole stable. I have been
very free in delivering my opinions, and in my opinion General
Washington is much to blame in not menacing ’em with resignation,
unless they refrain from unhinging the army in their absurd
interference.
On the twenty-second of October, while General Howe was still awaiting
reënforcements two miles above New Rochelle, General Heath’s division
made a night march, reached Chatterton Hill at daylight, and began to
strengthen the defences at White Plains. Sullivan’s division arrived the
next night, and General Lord Stirling’s immediately after. On the
twenty-third, Lee’s Grand Division joined from New Jersey, and the
entire American army, with its best officers and troops, awaited the
action of General Howe. McDougall’s Brigade and Lieutenant Alexander
Hamilton, with two guns, occupied Chatterton Hill. (See map.)
Washington’s position was not, intrinsically, the best for final
defence; but he had selected an ultimate position which Howe could not
assail without loss of communication with New York.
The American left was protected by low ground, accessible only with
difficulty. The right was met by a bend in the River Bronx. One line of
breastworks controlled the Connecticut road. Two successive lines in the
rear were upon a gradual ascent, capable of vigorous defence. Washington
also controlled all roads that lead westward to the Hudson River. But
more important than all, somewhat advanced to the south-west, was
Chatterton Hill, commanding the L of the river, in which angle the army
of Howe had taken position. Behind the American army was still higher
ground, which commanded the passes through the hills by the Peekskill
and upper Tarrytown roads.
Washington was now superior to his adversary in respect of numbers, and
was in one of his moods when he invited attack. On the twenty-eighth of
October, the two armies confronted each other. But a direct advance by
Howe required first that he dislodge the Americans from Chatterton’s
Hill. Otherwise, Howe would leave his supplies exposed, as well as his
left wing, to an attack from the rear. He decided to storm the hill. The
guns of Hamilton and the steepness of the ascent foiled the first
attempt. Then Colonel Rahl, afterwards killed at Trenton, and Donop,
with their Hessian brigades, turned the American right by another route,
and the Americans retired just as General Putnam was starting other
troops to their support. The British brigade of General Leslie lost one
hundred and fifty-four men, and the Hessian casualties increased the
entire loss to two hundred and thirty-one. The American casualties were
one hundred and thirty.
On the twenty-ninth, both armies rested. On the thirtieth, Lord Percy
arrived with his division, and the next day was designated for the
advance. But the day was stormy and the movement was suspended. The next
day following, was named in Orders for advance all along the lines,
“weather permitting,” the British improving their time by strengthening
their own position.
The next day came. The British army was by itself. During the night,
Washington had retired in good order, five miles, to North Castle
Heights, from which the entire British army could not dislodge him. Such
was the historical battle of White Plains, more properly, the Battle of
Chatterton’s Hill, where the fighting took place.
Howe immediately abandoned New Rochelle as his base, left White Plains
on the fifth, encamped at Dobb’s Ferry on the sixth, and thus gained
communication with his ships on the Hudson.
On the same day, the sixth, Washington advised Congress that “he
expected a movement of General Howe into New Jersey.” He called a
Council of War, under that conviction, the same afternoon, and decided
to throw a considerable body of troops into that Province.
The retention of Fort Washington was a question of much embarrassment.
Even its capture by Howe would not be a compensation to him, or to Great
Britain, for the escape of Washington’s army. On the twenty-ninth of
October, General Greene prepared a careful itinerary for a march through
New Jersey, minutely specifying the proposed distance for each day’s
progress, and the requisite supplies for each. That itinerary furnishes
a remarkable model of good Logistics. Washington wrote to Congress, that
“General Howe must do something to save his reputation; that he would
probably go to New Jersey”; and then urged, “that the militia be in
readiness to supply the places of those whose terms of service would
soon expire.” To Greene he wrote: “They can have no other capital
object, unless it be Philadelphia.” It was then known that General
Carleton retired from Crown Point November second, so that there was no
danger of a British movement up the Hudson. He again wrote to Greene as
to Fort Washington: “If we cannot prevent vessels from passing up, and
the enemy are in possession of the surrounding country, what valuable
purpose can it answer to hold a post from which the expected benefit
cannot be had? I am therefore inclined to think that it will not be
prudent to hazard the men and stores at Fort Washington; but as you are
on the spot, leave it to you to give such orders as you deem best, and,
so far revoking the order to Colonel McGee, to defend it to the last.”
At this time, more than half of the enlistments of the army were on
their extreme limit of service. Howe promised the militia of New York,
many of whom were in the garrison of the fort, that “he would guarantee
to them their liberties and properties, as well as a free and general
pardon.” Many decided not to reënlist. On the ninth of November, having
in mind the eventualities of a New Jersey campaign, Washington moved one
division of the army across the Hudson at Peekskill, and ordered a
second to move the day following. On the tenth he placed General Lee in
charge of the general camp, with careful instructions as to the
discipline of the men; and notified him, in case the enemy should remove
the whole or the greater part of their force to the west side of the
Hudson, to follow with all possible despatch, leaving the militia to
cover the frontiers of Connecticut, in case of need.
On the eve of his own departure he also notified Governor Trumbull of
Connecticut, that “the campaign into New Jersey would withdraw Lee and
his division from the Hudson”; and made arrangements for the “care and
storage for the winter, of all tents and stores that might remain on
hand after the discharge of enlisted men whose term should expire.”
The following terse order was then issued to all the divisions which
were to accompany him in this, his “First New Jersey campaign”:
“Colonels will examine the baggage of troops under marching orders;
tents and spare arms, to go in the first wagons, then the proper baggage
of the regiment; no chairs, tables, or heavy chests, or personal
baggage, to be put in, as it will certainly be put off and left. No
officer of any rank to meddle with a wagon or a cart appropriated for
any other regiment, or use; that no discharged man be allowed to carry
away arms, camp kettles, utensils, or any other public stores;
recruiting officers, as detailed, to proceed with their duty; no boys,
or old men, to be enlisted, and if so, to be returned at the hands of
the officer, with no allowance for any expense he may be at.”
On the twelfth of November, before crossing the Hudson River, Washington
placed General Heath in command of the Highlands, and proceeded to Fort
Lee, opposite Fort Washington. The British army had already removed from
Dobb’s Ferry to King’s Bridge. At this time, three hundred British
transports with a large force on board, lay at Sandy Hook, and their
destination was suspected to be either Newport, Rhode Island,
Philadelphia, or South Carolina.
Washington established his headquarters about nine miles from Fort Lee.
It is not desirable to burden the narrative with the details of the
capture of Fort Washington. The fort had been built to control the
river, and it was weak, landward; depending upon the river, even for
water, having no well. The ground fell off rapidly; but there were
neither trenches nor regular bastions, and only one redoubt. Washington
wrote to Congress, after reaching Fort Lee: “It seems to be generally
believed that the investing of Fort Washington, is one object they have
in view. I propose to stay in this neighborhood a few days; in which
time I expect the design of the enemy will be more disclosed, and their
incursions made in this quarter, or their investure of Fort Washington,
if they are intended.” While the assault was in preparation, Washington
took boat to cross and examine for himself the condition of the works;
but meeting Generals Putnam and Greene, who satisfied him that there
would be a stout defence, he returned without landing. Three assaults
were made, Generals Knyphausen, Percy, Cornwallis and Matthews
commanding divisions. These repeated charges up the very steep ascents
from the rear, and from the open face of the work northward, were very
costly to the British and Hessian columns. When their forces first
gained the interior lines, surrender, or rescue, was inevitable. To the
demand for surrender Magaw replied with a request for five hours’ delay.
A half hour only was granted. Magaw received a billet from Washington
stating that if he could hold out awhile, he would endeavor to bring off
the garrison at night; but no delay was permitted, and the garrison
surrendered. It was for many years an unexplained fact, how the British
troops appeared so suddenly at the open face of the fort, northward,
below which was a deep ravine, itself almost a protection. But William
Dumont, Magaw’s Adjutant, deserted, two weeks before the investment, and
placed detailed drawings of all the defences in the hands of General
Howe. This fact affords the key to General Howe’s otherwise very
singular excuse to the British Government for not following Washington’s
army from White Plains to North Castle Heights,—“_political reasons_”
having been assigned by General Howe, as “controlling his action.”
[Illustration: Capture of Fort Washington.]
The British loss in the assault was one hundred and twenty-eight; and
that of the Hessian troops, three hundred and twenty-six. The American
loss was one hundred and twenty, killed and wounded, and two thousand
six hundred and thirty-four, prisoners. The loss in cannon, tents, arms
and military stores, was very severe.
Fort Lee was of necessity abandoned, its powder and principal supplies
being first removed in safety.
The first New Jersey campaign immediately ensued.