WASHINGTON IN NEW YORK.
Washington’s labors were neither lessened nor interrupted when he
assembled his army on the thirtieth day of August, 1776. He had been in
the saddle or on foot, without sleep, for more than forty-eight hours;
and it would require a large volume even to outline the mass of minute
details which had to receive his attention. His own account, as
contained in private letters, can be summed up in suggestive groups—such
as, “tools carelessly strewn about”; “cartridges exposed to the rain”;
and, “the soldiers, too often the officers, ignorant as children of the
responsibility of a single sentry or gunner, wherever located, along
rampart or trench.”
On the evening of the thirtieth, he thus described the situation: “The
militia are dismayed, intractable, and impatient to return home. Great
numbers have gone off; in some instances almost by whole regiments, by
half ones, and by companies, at a time. With the deepest concern I am
obliged to confess my want of confidence with the generality of the
troops.”
He urged Congress to establish a regular army at once; to enlist men for
the war; pressed the immediate abandonment of the city, and put the
plain question, whether it “should be left standing for British
headquarters.”
On the second day of September, the number of men present for duty was
less than twenty thousand. On the same day he reorganized its formation
into three grand divisions, or corps: one under Putnam, in command of
the city; one under Spencer, in the absence of Greene, at Harlem, to
prevent a British landing there; and the third under Heath, at King’s
Bridge.
On the third of September, Congress ordered two North Carolina
battalions, under General Moore, to march with all possible expedition
to reënforce the army at New York; also a Continental battalion from
Rhode Island; and urged Virginia to forward all the troops within her
power to furnish. On the same day, Putnam urged the fortification of
Harlem Heights, Mount Washington, and the Jersey shore; if possible, to
prevent Howe’s ascending the Hudson River to attack the northern army.
On the next day, the fourth, Washington was again compelled to occupy
himself with such minute details as belonged to officers of the lowest
rank. Such “diabolical practices as robbing apple orchards and gardens,
and straggling without aim or purpose, instead of drilling and preparing
for their country’s safety,” were officially reprimanded, and three
roll-calls per day were advised, to keep the men near their duty. On the
fifth of September, Greene advised a general and speedy retreat from the
city, and a council was called to meet on the day succeeding, for
consideration of the proposition. The council did convene on the sixth,
and Washington thus announces to Congress its action: “The Council was
opposed to retiring from New York, although they acknowledged that it
would not be tenable if attacked by artillery”; and adds significantly:
“Some, to whom the opinion of Congress was known, were not a little
influenced in their opinions, as they were led to suspect that Congress
wished it to be retained at all hazards.” General Putnam, in concurring
with his Commander-in-Chief, shrewdly observed: “This dooms New York to
destruction; but what are ten or twenty cities, to the grand object?”
On the eighth of September, Washington reported the militia of
Connecticut as reduced from six thousand to two thousand men; and in a
few days their number was but nominal, twenty or thirty in some
regiments. The residue were discharged and sent home with a
recommendation to Governor Trumbull, “that it was about time to begin
dealing with deserters.”
Although Washington concurred in Putnam’s general idea of strengthening
the Hudson River shore by earthworks and redoubts, he anticipated
failure to make them adequate for control of its waters, because of the
limited power and range of his guns. The British had already extended
their right wing as far as Flushing (see map), with posts at Bushwick,
Newtown, and Astoria, and had also occupied Montressor and Buchanan’s,
now Ward’s and Randall’s islands.
Upon appeal to Massachusetts, that Colony made a draft of one-fifth of
her population, excepting only certain exposed localities and certain
classes. Connecticut was no less patriotic, and Governor Trumbull made
earnest effort to place the Colony foremost in support of the cause in
peril. That Colony, so closely adjoining New York on the west, and
exposed on its entire southern boundary to maritime excursions, was
peculiarly in danger. On the fourteenth, Congress at last authorized
eighty-five regiments to be enlisted for five years; and the advice of
Greene, when he first joined the army in 1775, and of Washington, after
assuming command at Cambridge, began to be accepted as sound policy and
essential to ultimate success.
At this stage of the narrative of Washington’s career as a Soldier, it
is interesting to consider his own views of the situation as expressed
in a letter to the Continental Congress. He thus wrote: “Men of
discernment will see that by such works and preparations we have delayed
the operations (British) of the campaign till it is too late to effect
any capital incursions into the country. It is now obvious that they
mean to enclose us on the island of New York, by taking post in my rear,
while their shipping secures the front, and thus oblige us to fight them
on their own terms, or surrender at discretion.”
Again, “Every measure is to be formed with some apprehension that all of
our troops will not do their duty. On our side the war should be
defensive. It has even been called a ‘war of posts.’ We should, on all
occasions, avoid a general action, and never be drawn into the necessity
to put anything to risk. Persuaded that it would be presumptuous to draw
out our young troops into open ground against their superior numbers and
discipline, I have never spared the spade and the pick-axe; but I have
never found that readiness to defend, even strong posts, at all hazards,
which is necessary to derive the greatest benefit from them.”
Again, “I am sensible that a retreating army is encircled with
difficulties, that declining an engagement subjects a general to
reproach; but when the fate of America may be at stake on the issue, we
should protract the war, if possible. That they can drive us out is
equally clear. Nothing seems to remain but the time of their taking
possession.”
The thoughtful reader will find these quotations to be very suggestive
of some future offensive action on the part of Washington whenever the
British might be shut up in winter quarters; and the reply of Congress,
whereby they authorize him “not to retain New York longer than he
thought proper for the public service,” was accompanied by the following
_Resolution_: “That General Washington be acquainted that Congress would
have special care taken, in case he should find it necessary to quit New
York, that no damage be done to the said city by his troops, on their
leaving it; the Congress having no doubt of their being able to recover
the same, though the enemy should, for a time, have possession of it.”
The experience of the Continental army before Boston was now repeated.
New recruits came in daily, to fill the places made vacant by expiring
enlistments; but again the army seemed to be “fast wasting away.”
The interval is significant because of another effort on the part of
General Howe and his brother, Admiral Howe, special commissioners, to
settle the controversy upon terms alike satisfactory to the American
people and the British crown; but John Adams, Edward Rutledge, and
Benjamin Franklin, commissioners appointed by Congress, insisted first
upon Independence, and a subsequent alliance between the two nations as
friendly powers. This ended the negotiations. Such a settlement, if it
had been realized, might have imparted to Great Britain even a prouder
destiny than the succeeding century developed.
At that juncture of affairs, however, and as a key to General Howe’s
importunity in securing at least “a suspension of hostilities,” he was
urging upon the British Government, with the same pertinacity as
Washington besought Congress, to increase his army. His figures were
large, and worthy of notice. He wanted ten thousand men for the
occupation of Newport, R.I., that he might threaten Boston, and make
incursions into Connecticut. He demanded for the garrison of New York
twenty thousand men; of which number, seventeen thousand should be
available for field service. He asked for ten thousand more, for
operations into New Jersey, where Washington had established a general
Camp of Instruction for all troops arriving from the south; and still
another ten thousand for operations in the Southern Colonies. It is not
improbable that much of General Howe’s tardiness in following up
temporary success, in all his subsequent campaigns, was based upon the
conviction—embodied in these enormous requisitions for troops—that the
war had already assumed a character of very grave importance and a
corresponding uncertainty of the result.
Events crowded rapidly. On the tenth of September. Washington began the
removal of valuable stores. He acted as quickly as if he were in Howe’s
place, seeking the earliest possible possession of New York. On the
twelfth, a Council of War decided that a force of eight thousand men
should be left for the defence of Fort Washington and its dependencies.
Of eight regiments of the very best troops, reporting three thousand
three hundred and twenty-two present, the sick-roll reduced the
effective strength twelve hundred and nine men. On the fourteenth,
additional British vessels passed up East River, landing troops at
Kipp’s Bay on the sixteenth. Then occurred one of the most stirring
incidents of the war. One of the best brigades in the army, and one
which had previously fought with gallantry and success, gave way.
Washington, advised of the panic, denounced their behavior as “dastardly
and cowardly.” He dashed among them, and with drawn sword mingled with
the fugitives, to inspire them with courage. In his report he says: “I
used every means in my power to rally them to the fight, but my attempts
were fruitless and ineffectual: and on the appearance of not more than
sixty or seventy of the enemy they ran away without firing a shot.” In
the strong language of General Greene: “Washington, on this occasion,
seemed to seek death, rather than life.” These same troops, a part of
Parsons’ Brigade, afterwards redeemed themselves; and Washington was
wise enough to give them opportunity, under his own eye, as especially
trustworthy troops. This incident found its counterpart in the career of
Napoleon. At the siege of Toulon, one demi-brigade fled before a sally
of less than one-fourth its numbers: but afterwards lost nearly half its
strength in storming and entering the same fortress.
Immediately upon this unfortunate affair, the whole army was withdrawn
to Harlem Heights. This position was regarded as impregnable; but the
following extract, from Washington’s report to Congress exposes the deep
anguish of his soul: “We are now encamped with the main body of the army
upon the Heights of Harlem, where I should hope the enemy would meet
with a retreat, in case of attack, but experience, to my great
affliction, has convinced me that this is a matter to be wished, rather
than expected.”
The British lines were advanced, and extended from Bloomingdale across
to Horn’s Hook, near Hell Gate; and General Howe made his headquarters
at the Beekman Mansion, not far from those just vacated by Washington on
Murray Hill.
And just then and there occurred an incident of the war which made
an indelible impress upon the great heart of the American
Commander-in-Chief; and that was the execution of one of his
confidential messengers, who had been sent to report upon the
British movements on Long Island—young Nathan Hale. The Rev. Edward
Everett Hale, of Roxbury, Boston, furnishes the following outline of
service which had greatly endeared Captain Hale to Washington:
“Just after the Battle of Lexington, at a town-meeting, with the
audacity of boyhood, he cried out, ‘Let us never lay down our arms till
we have achieved independence!’ Not yet two years out of Yale College,
he secured release from the school he was teaching in New London;
enlisted in Webb’s Regiment, the 7th Connecticut; by the first of
September was promoted from Lieutenant to Captain; and on the
fourteenth, marched to Cambridge. He shared in the achievement at
Dorchester Heights, and his regiment was one of the first five that were
despatched to New London, and thence to New York, by water. On the
twenty-ninth of August, 1776, while the garrison of Brooklyn Heights was
being hurried to the boats, Hale, with a sergeant and four of his men,
attempted to burn the frigate _Phœnix_; and did actually capture one of
her tenders, securing four cannon. At a meeting of officers, Washington
stated that ‘he needed immediate information of the enemy’s plans.’ When
dead silence ensued, Hale, the youngest of the Captains, still pale from
recent sickness, spoke out: ‘I will undertake it. If my country demands
a _peculiar_ service, its claims are imperious.’ During the second week
in September, taking his Yale College diploma with him, to pass for a
school-master, he procured the desired information; but his boat failed
to meet him. A British boat answered the signal, and his notes, written
in Latin, exposed him. He was taken to New York on that eventful
twenty-first of September, when five hundred of its buildings were
burned; was summarily tried, and executed the next day at the age of
twenty-one. His last sentence, when in derision he was allowed to speak
as he ascended the gallows, was simply this: ‘I only regret that I have
but one life to give to my country.’”
He had become a member of Knowlton’s Connecticut Rangers; and the
Beekman House and Rutger’s apple orchard, where he was hanged from a
tree, located by Lossing near the present intersection of East Broadway
and Market streets, were long regarded with interest by visitors in
search of localities identified with the Revolutionary period of
Washington’s occupation of New York.
In resuming our narrative, we find the American army spending its first
night upon Harlem Heights. Rain fell, but there were no tents. The men
were tired and hungry, but there were no cooking utensils; and only
short rations, at best. They realized that through a perfectly useless
panic they had sacrificed necessaries of life. For four weeks the army
remained in this position, not unfrequently engaging the British
outposts, and on several occasions, with credit, making sallies or
resisting attack; but the fresh troops, as ever before, had to mature
slowly, under discipline. After a brilliant action on the sixteenth, in
which Colonel Knowlton, who had distinguished himself at Bunker Hill,
was killed, as well as Colonel Leich, and where Adjutant-General Reed,
of Washington’s staff, equally exposed himself—“to animate,” as he said,
“troops who would not go into danger unless their officers led the way,”
the Commander-in-Chief issued an order of which the following is an
extract: “The losses of the enemy, yesterday, would undoubtedly have
been much greater if the orders of the Commander-in-Chief had not in
some instances been contradicted by inferior officers, who, however well
they meant, ought not to presume to direct. It is therefore ordered,
that no officer commanding a party, and having received orders from the
Commander-in-Chief, depart from them without orders from the same
authority; and as many may otherwise err, the army is now acquainted
that the General’s orders are delivered by his Adjutant-General, or one
of his _aides-de-camp_, Mr. Tighlman, or Colonel Moylan, the
Quartermaster-General.”
At this time, Massachusetts sent her drafted men under General Lincoln.
General Greene assumed command in New Jersey. Generals Sullivan and
Stirling, exchanged, resumed their old commands.
The army Return of October fifth indicated a total rank and file of
twenty-seven thousand seven hundred and thirty-five men, of whom eight
thousand and seventy-five were sick, or on a furlough; and requiring to
complete these regiments, eleven thousand two hundred and seventy-one
men. On the eighth of October, General Moore, commanding the Camp of
Instruction (called the “Flying Camp,” because of its changeable
location) in New Jersey, reported a total force of six thousand five
hundred and forty-eight men.
On the ninth of October, the frigates _Phœnix_ and _Roebuck_ safely
passed the forts as far north as Dobb’s Ferry. It became evident that
General Putnam’s methods would not control the Hudson River route of
British advance. Sickness increased in the camps. The emergency forced
upon Washington the immediate reorganization of the medical department;
and he ordered an examination of applicants before allowing a commission
to be issued and rank conferred. Such had been the laxity of this
necessary class of officers, that General Greene reported his surgeons
as “without the least particle of medicine”; adding: “The regimental
surgeons embezzle the public stores committed to their care, so that the
regimental sick suffer, and should have the benefit of a general
hospital.” Washington issued an order, after his own very lucid style,
deploring the fact that “the periodical homesickness, which was common
just before an anticipated engagement, had broke out again with
contagious virulence.”
The want of discipline, however, was not wholly with the rank and file.
Adjutant-General Reed, in writing to his wife, expressed his purpose to
resign, for he had seen a captain shaving one of his men before the
house; and added: “To enforce discipline in such cases, makes a man
odious and detestable, a position which no one will choose.” And Colonel
Smallwood, afterwards General, and one of the best soldiers of the war,
in writing to the Maryland Council of Safety, complains of “the
ignorance and inattention of officers who fail to realize the importance
of that discipline which is so excellent in the Commander-in-Chief”;
adding: “It would be a happy day for the United States if there was as
much propriety in every department under him.”
At this period, General Howe again wrote to Lord Germaine, that he “did
not expect to finish the campaign until spring”; “that the Provincials
would not join the British army”; and called for more foreign troops,
and eight additional men-of-war. The monotony of these frequent
requisitions of the British Commander-in-Chief makes a tiresome story;
but like the successive appeals of Washington—to Congress, Provincial
Councils and Committees of Safety—they form an indispensable part of the
narrative of those facts which tested Washington’s character as a
Soldier.
Having observed increased activity of the British shipping in the East
River, and indications that Howe would abandon a direct attack upon his
fortified position upon Harlem Heights, Washington prepared for the
contingency of more active duty elsewhere, and announced October
eleventh as the day for a personal inspection of every company under his
command.
[Illustration: Operations near New York.]