BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND.
Only a summary analysis of the Battle of Long Island is required for
explanation of the general operations indicated upon the map. Almost
every hour had its incidents of eventful interest, and few historic
battles, from its first conception to the ultimate result, more
strikingly illustrate the influence of one regardful judgment which
could convert unpromising features into conditions of final benefit. The
value of military discipline, of presence of mind, and the subordination
of every will to one ruling spirit, never had a more definite
illustration.[4] The infinite value of small details, in preparation for
and the conduct of so serious a venture as to meet this great British
army, is exhibited at every phase of its progress.
Footnote 4:
See “Battles of the Revolution,” Chapter XXXI.
The American army contrasted unfavorably with its adversary in every
respect. Although the British forces, and generally the American forces
employed during the years of the war, are to be found stated in the
Appendix, the official roll of Washington’s army, on this occasion, will
add interest to the event.
On the third of August its strength was as follows: Commissioned
officers and staff, twelve hundred and twenty-five; non-commissioned
officers, fifteen hundred and two; present for duty, ten thousand five
hundred and fourteen; sick, present and absent, three thousand six
hundred and seventy-eight: making a total of seventeen thousand two
hundred and twenty-five men.
Less than one-third of this force had served from the beginning of the
war. The artillery battalion of Colonel Knox numbered less than six
hundred men, and the guns themselves were of various patterns and
calibre, to be handled by men who knew little of their use or range. On
the fifth of August Governor Trumbull of Connecticut assured Washington
that “he did not greatly dread what the enemy could do, trusting Heaven
to support us, knowing our cause to be righteous.” Washington’s reply,
dated the seventh, was characteristic and practical: “To trust in the
justice of our cause, without our utmost exertion, would be tempting
Providence.” Although Trumbull had already sent five regiments forward,
he soon sent nine additional regiments, averaging about three hundred
men each, in time to be present when the British eventually landed in
Westchester County.
Two regiments under Colonel Prescott, of Bunker Hill fame, were on duty
upon Governor’s Island. The works on Long Island, begun by General Lee,
had been completed by General Greene, who had explored the country
thoroughly and knew the range of every piece. A redoubt with seven guns
crowned the Heights. The exposed point of Red Hook, a combination of
marsh and solid land, was supplied with five guns. The intrenchments,
more than a half mile in length, were protected by abatis and four
redoubts which mounted twenty guns. Greene occupied these redoubts and
lines with two regiments of Long Island militia and six regiments of
Continental troops, not one of which exceeded four hundred men, for
duty. The line extended from Wallabout, the present Navy Yard, to
Gowanus Bay.
The total nominal strength of the American army about New York on the
twenty-sixth of August, including the sick, non-effectives, and those
without arms, was a little over twenty-seven thousand men. The
Connecticut regiments which had just joined brought such arms as they
could provide for themselves, and were simply that many citizens with
nominal organization, but without drill.
Meanwhile, the entire line from Brooklyn to King’s Bridge, fifteen
miles, with the navigable waters of the Hudson, the Harlem, and East
rivers, and their shore approaches, had to be guarded. It was not
entirely certain but that Howe simply feigned an attack upon the
intrenched position upon the Heights, to draw thither Washington’s best
troops, and take the city by water approach. Paulus Hook, then an
island, was fortified in a measure, but was unable to prevent the
passage of two vessels which at once cut off water communication with
Albany and the northern American army.
Washington had previously issued orders for the government of
sharp-shooters; and particularly, “not to throw away fire. To fire first
with ball and shot.” This order had its specific significance, and was
illustrated in the Mexican War, and early in 1861, in America.
“Buck-and-ball” scattered its missiles, and wounded many who would be
missed by a single rifle-shot; and the wounded required details of
others for their care or removal. “Brigadiers were ordered to mark a
circle around the several redoubts, by which officers are to be directed
in giving orders for the first discharge.” He also ordered “small brush
to be set up, to mark the line more distinctly, and make it familiar to
the men, before the enemy arrive within the circle.”
The reader will recall the experience of Washington in his early career,
when similar methods made his success so emphatic.
When advised of the landing of the British on the twenty-second, and
that Colonel Hand had retired to Prospect Hill (now Prospect Park),
Washington sent six regiments to reënforce the garrison of the Heights.
Orders were also sent to General Heath, then at the head of Manhattan
Island, to be prepared to forward additional troops; and live regiments
from the city force were ready to cross East River so soon as it should
be determined whether the attack was to be made, in force, against the
Heights.
General Greene, prostrated with fever, had written on the fifteenth,
that “he hoped, through the assistance of Providence, to be able to ride
before an attack should be made, but felt great anxiety as to the
result.” On the twenty-third, Washington was compelled to write to
Congress, “I have been compelled to appoint General Sullivan to the
command of the island, owing to General Greene’s indisposition.” In a
letter written by Sullivan, on the twenty-third, respecting a minor
skirmish after the British landing, when Hand retired, he said: “I have
ordered a party out for prisoners to-night. Things argue well for us,
and I hope are so many preludes to victory.” This confidence was hardly
less unfounded than his faith in the success of operations in Canada. It
was the inverse of sound reason, and made the “less include the
greater.” He was immediately superseded, and General Putnam was placed
in command.
The following are some of Washington’s orders issued to General Putnam
on the twenty-sixth of August, when it seemed as if only his
omnipresence could compel even general officers to understand their
responsibility for the good behavior of the troops:
“Stop the scattering, unmeaning, and wasteful firing, which prevents
the possibility of distinguishing between a real and a false alarm,
which prevents deserters from approaching our lines, and must
continue, so long as every soldier conceives himself at liberty to
fire when, and at what, he pleases.”
[Illustration: Battle of Long Island]
“Guards are to be particularly instructed in their duty.”
“A ‘brigadier of the day’ is to remain constantly on the lines, that
he may be upon the spot, and see that orders are executed.”
“Skulkers must be shot down upon the spot.”
“The distinction between a well-regulated army and a mob, is the good
order and discipline of the former, and the licentiousness and
disorderly behavior of the latter.”
“The men not on duty are to be compelled to remain at, or near, their
respective camps or quarters, that they may turn out at a moment’s
warning; nothing being more probable than that the enemy will allow
little time enough for the attack.”
“Your best men should at all hazards prevent the enemy passing the
woods and approaching your works.”
These orders were preëminently adapted to the character of the American
troops. Their neglect disconcerted the entire plan of the
Commander-in-Chief for an efficient defence of the works.
The American force on the Heights, including Stirling’s Brigade, which
crossed over the river to Brooklyn on the day of the battle, was not
quite eight thousand men; but included Atlee’s Pennsylvania Rifles,
Smallwood’s Maryland and Haslet’s Delaware regiments, which then, and
ever after, were among Washington’s “Invincibles.” But notwithstanding
Greene’s designation of suitable outposts, and Washington’s orders, the
disposition of the American advance outposts was of the feeblest kind.
At the time of the first landing on the twenty-second, when Colonel Hand
fell back to Prospect Hill (see map), it does not appear from any
official paper, or record, that he gave notice of the landing of the
second British division, or established scouts to ascertain and report
subsequent British movements. Their landing, division after division,
had been as impressive as it was successful, and deserves notice. Four
hundred transports were escorted by ten line-of-battle ships and twenty
frigates. Seventy-five flat-boats, besides batteaux and galleys, moving
in ten distinct, well-ordered divisions, simultaneously touched the
beach near the present site of Fort Hamilton, and landed four thousand
men in just two hours, according to the Admiral’s “log-book,” after the
signal reached the topmast of the “flag-ship.” Five thousand additional
troops were landed with equal celerity and order, a little lower down
the bay. Before twelve o’clock, fifteen thousand men, with artillery,
baggage, and stores, were landed without hindrance or mishap. On the
twenty-fifth, De Heister’s Hessian command landed with equal skill at
Gravesend.
A glance at the map indicates that the long range of hills between
Brooklyn and the sea had four openings available for approach by the
British troops; the first, and shortest, along the bay by Martense Lane;
the second, in front of Flatbush and the American intrenchments; the
third, by road northward from Flatbush, to Bedford and Newtown; and a
fourth, by road past Cypress Hill, which extended to Flushing, but
crossed the Bedford and Jamaica road about three miles eastward from
Bedford.
General Stirling, who had been awakened at three o’clock on the morning
of the twenty-seventh, commanded the extreme American right. In front of
Flatbush there were intrenchments, and one redoubt, with one howitzer
and three field-pieces. General Sullivan, second in command, was, he
stated after his capture, “to have commanded within the lines; but went
to the hill near to Flatbush, to reconnoitre, with a picket of four
hundred men, when he was surrounded by the enemy who had advanced by the
very road he had paid horsemen fifty dollars for patrolling by night,
while he was in command.” Miles’ Pennsylvania Rifles and Wylie’s
Connecticut were at, or near, the Bedford Pass. The Jamaica road had
been overlooked, or neglected. Putnam, already somewhat impaired in
physical vigor, and wholly unacquainted with the outposts, made neither
reconnoissance nor change of pickets, upon receipt of Washington’s
orders. Instead of feeling for, and finding, the enemy, he awaited their
arrival.
Without full details, the following incidents occurred before Washington
arrived and took command in person. The British left wing, under General
Grant, crowded Stirling and his small command of seventeen hundred men
back nearly to the Cortelyou House; but they made a gallant fight near
the present Greenwood Cemetery. The battalions of Smallwood, Haslet, and
Atlee covered themselves with honors. Stirling heard the firing at
Flatbush, and hastened his retreat.
Cornwallis, upon his first landing, on the twenty-second, moved toward
Flatbush, but finding it held by the American advance works, dropped
down to Flatlands. De Heister, however, moved directly upon Flatbush,
and commenced cannonading the redoubt and intrenchments, where Sullivan,
being incidentally present, was in command. This advance of De Heister
was in effect a _feint_ attack, to be made real and persistent at the
proper time.
On the British right, General Howe, with Clinton, Percy, and Cornwallis,
gained the Jamaica road undiscovered, rested their forces until
half-past eight in the morning, and were soon directly in front of the
American works, in the rear of Sullivan and cutting off his retreat.
Cornwallis gained position near the Cortelyou House, in the line of
Stirling’s retreat. De Heister, advised by Clinton’s guns that the
British right had accomplished its flank movement, advanced promptly
upon both Sullivan and Stirling, and captured both, with a considerable
portion of their commands.
The Battle of Long Island had been fought. Washington had declared that
he would make the acquisition of Brooklyn Heights by the British, if
realized, “as costly as possible.” It had been his expectation that by
the advance posts ordered, and careful pickets, he could prolong
resistance, if not winning full success. He had taken pains to convince
the troops that the resistance at Bunker Hill and Fort Moultrie was a
fair indication of their ability, and that the British troops understood
it well. When John Jay proposed to burn New York and leave it in ruins,
Washington insisted that it would tend to demoralize his army, and offer
to the people and to the world a painful contrast with the successful
restoration of Boston to her own people.
The Battle of Long Island _had_ to be fought. As soon as it began,
Washington crossed the river with three regiments. If Howe had made
immediate advance, Washington would have resisted, with quite as large a
force as Howe could have handled, in an assault.
Washington immediately, and in person, examined every phase of the
situation. His first act was to organize a strong detachment to support
Stirling who was opposing the advance by the harbor road; but the swift
advance of the British Grenadiers across the very face of the
intrenchments, defeated his purpose. Every man was summoned to roll-call
and kept on the alert. At early dawn the next morning he went through
all the intrenchments, encouraging the men. Before noon, General Mifflin
arrived with the well-drilled regiments of Glover, Shaw, and Magee.
These organizations, which had been sneered at as “proud of line arms
and fine feathers,” as they marched up the ascent with solid ranks and
steady step, supplied with knapsacks, and trim as if on special parade,
were received by the garrison with cheers and congratulations. The
garrison was now nine thousand strong. But a “north-easter” set in. The
rain fell in torrents, tilling the trenches, and compelling even the
British regulars to keep to the shelter of their tents. Washington was
everywhere, and took no sleep. The British opened trenches six hundred
yards from the face of Fort Putnam (now Washington Park), not daring to
storm the position; but could work only during intervals in the tempest.
Washington held his enemy at bay. But upon the same reasoning which
enforced his first occupation of Brooklyn Heights, boldly facing the
British army at its first landing, he resolved to evacuate the position
without decisive battle. His fixed policy,—to avoid positively
determining issues which were beyond his immediate mastery, so as to
wear out his adversary by avoiding his strokes, and thereby gain
vantage-ground for turning upon him when worn out, over-confident, and
off his guard,—had its illustration now. His army was not versed in
tactical movements upon a large scale, and was largely dependent for its
success upon the supervising wisdom with which its undoubted courage
could be made available in the interests of the new Nation.
The retreat from Brooklyn was a signal achievement, characteristic of
Washington’s policy and of the men who withdrew under his guidance. They
were kept closely to duty, as if any hour might command their utmost
energies in self-defence; but their Commander-in-Chief had his own plan,
as before Boston, which he did not reveal to his officers until it was
ripe for execution. How well he kept his own counsel will be seen by his
action. The military _ruse_ by which he achieved the result had its
climax five years later, when he so adroitly persuaded Sir Henry Clinton
of immediate danger to New York, that the capture of Cornwallis closed
the war, and the surrender of New York followed. And as the month of
August, 1776, was closing, Generals Clinton and Cornwallis were
reckoning, by hours, upon the capture of Washington’s army and the
restoration of British supremacy over the American continent.
Early on the morning of the twenty-ninth day of August, the following
private note was placed in the hands of General Heath, then commanding
at Kingsbridge, by General Mifflin, the confidential messenger of the
American Commander-in-Chief:
LONG ISLAND, Aug. 29, 1776.
DEAR GENERAL: We have many battalions from New Jersey which are coming
over to relieve others here. You will therefore please to order every
flat-bottomed boat and other craft at your post, fit for transporting
troops, down to New York, as soon as possible. They must be manned by
some of Colonel Hutchinson’s men, and sent without the least delay. I
write by order of the General.
MIFFLIN.
TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH.
Commissary-General Trumbull, also, at the same time, bore orders to
Assistant Quartermaster-General Hughes, instructing him “to impress
every craft, on either side of New York, that could be kept afloat, and
had either oars, or sails, or could be furnished with them, and to have
them all in the East River by dark.” The response to these orders was so
promptly made that the boats reached the foot of Brooklyn Heights just
at dusk that afternoon. An early evening conference of officers was
ordered, and Washington announced his plan for immediate return to New
York. The proposition was unanimously adopted. The Commander-in-Chief
acted instantly. By eight o’clock the troops were under arms. The fresh
and experienced regiments were sent to man the advance works, to relieve
the weary troops, including the militia. The sick were promptly gathered
for the earliest removal. Every indication promised immediate action;
and intimations were disseminated among the troops that as soon as the
sick and inefficient troops were withdrawn, a sortie would be made, in
force, against Howe’s investing works. The _ruse_ of anticipated
reënforcements from New Jersey, upon removal of the invalids, cheered
both sick and well. No possible method of inspiring self-possession and
courage for any endeavor could have been more wisely designed.
Colonel Glover, of Marblehead, Mass., whose regiment was composed of
hardy fishermen and seamen, had charge of the boats. The regiments last
recruited, and least prepared for battle, and the sick, were the first
to be withdrawn. As early as nine o’clock, and within an hour after the
“general beat to arms,” the movement began,—systematically, steadily,
company by company, as orderly as if marching in their own camp. A
fearful storm still raged. Drenched and weary, none complained. It was
Washington’s orders. Often hand-in-hand, to support each other, these
men descended the steep, slippery slopes to the water’s edge, and seated
themselves in silence; while increasing wind and rain, with incessant
violence, constantly threatened to flood, or sink, the miserable
flat-boats which were to convey them to the city, only a few hundred
yards away. And thus until midnight. At that hour the wind and tide
became so violent that no vessel could carry even a closely reefed sail.
The larger vessels, in danger of being swept out to sea, had to be held
fast to shore; dashing against each other, and with difficulty kept
afloat. Other boats, with muffled oars, were desperately but slowly
propelled against the outgoing tide. A few sickly lanterns here and
there made movement possible. The invisible presence of the
Commander-in-Chief seemed to resolve all dangers and apparent confusion
into some pervasive harmony of purpose among officers and men alike, so
that neither leaking boats nor driving storm availed to disconcert the
silent progress of embarking nearly ten thousand men.
Just after midnight, both wind and tide changed. The storm from the
north which had raged thus long, kept the British fleets at their
anchorage in the lower bay. At last, with the clearing of the sky and
change of wind, the water became smooth, and the craft of all kinds and
sizes, loaded to the water’s edge, made rapid progress. Meanwhile,
strange to relate, a heavy fog rested over the lower bay and island,
while the peninsula of New York was under clear starlight.
For a few moments, toward morning, a panic nearly ensued. An order to
hasten certain troops to the river was misunderstood as applying to all
troops, including those in the redoubts; and a rumor that the British
were advancing, and had entered the works, led even the covering party
to fall back. Washington instantly saw the error, restored the men to
their places, and the British pickets never discovered their temporary
absence.
The military stores, and such guns as were not too heavy to be taken
through the mud, were safely placed on the transports. With the last
load, Mifflin, and last of all, Washington, took passage.
During the day, the troops and stores on Governor’s Island were also
removed; and the evacuation was complete. If the landing of ten thousand
disciplined troops by General Howe, on the twenty-second, over a placid
sea, and in bright sunlight, was magnificent for its beauty and system,
the safe embarkation of ten thousand men by Washington, on the night of
the twenty-ninth, was sublime for the implicit faith of the soldiers and
the supreme potency of his commanding will.
The Italian historian Botta says of this event: “Whoever will attend to
all the details of this retreat, will easily believe that no military
operation was ever conducted by great captains with more ability and
prudence, or under more favorable auspices.”
At daybreak of the thirtieth, British pickets entered the American
works; and the most advanced were enabled to fire a few shots at the
last American detachment as it landed safely upon the New York side.