BRITAIN AGAINST AMERICA.—HOWE INVADES NEW YORK.
In order rightly to measure the American War for Independence by fixed
standards, it is both interesting and instructive to notice the
systematic method adopted by Great Britain to suppress revolution and
restore her supremacy over the revolting Colonies. The recovery of
Boston was no longer to be seriously considered; but New England, as a
strong and populous centre of disaffection, must still be so restricted
through her coast exposure as to prevent her proportionate contribution
to the Continental army at New York. If threatened from the north, New
York also would be compelled to retain a large force of fully equipped
militia for frontier defence. The occupation of Newport, R.I., which was
only one day’s forced march from Boston, together with the patrol of
Long Island Sound by ships-of-war, would therefore be positive factors
in both limiting a draft and the transportation of troops from
Massachusetts. If to this were added the control of the Hudson River, by
a competent fleet, the whole of New England would be cut off from
actively supporting the forces to be raised in the Middle Colonies.
The fiery spirit and patriotic fervor of Virginia, as well as the lusty
vigor of North Carolina and other Southern patriots, must also be
subjected to a military surveillance and pressure from the sea, and
thus, equally with New England, be deprived of a free and full
contribution of its proper quota to the American army.
The three sections named, using New York as the base of all British
demonstrations in force, represented so many radiating belts, or zones,
of military operation; and to secure ultimate British success, each of
these zones must be so occupied in its own defence that a force from New
York could be thrown with overwhelming effect upon each, in turn, and
thus render it practically impossible for Washington to concentrate an
effective army of resistance to each assailing column. To the southward,
the waters of Delaware and Chesapeake bays, if once occupied by a
sufficient fleet, would sever the lower Colonies from the American
centre of service, as effectively as those of Long Island and the Hudson
River would isolate New England. This was a sound military policy, and
had been fully adopted so soon as Lord Howe received reënforcements and
recovered breath after his severe punishment at Boston.
The adoption of New York as the base of all British supply, as well as
service, not only had its central and dominating site for the
rendezvous, equipment, and despatch of troops, but through its auxiliary
naval stations at Halifax and the West Indies, afforded opportunities
for expeditions where large land forces were not required, and still
keep such threatened localities under constant terror of assault.
These considerations will have their better appreciation as the progress
of the narrative unfolds successive campaigns.
_Sooner_ or _later_, in order to achieve absolute independence, and
vanquish Great Britain in the fight, _the American army must so
neutralize the domination of New York, that its occupation by either
army would cease to be the determining factor in the final result of the
war_.
The prestige of Great Britain was overshadowing; but could its arm reach
the range of its shadow? Her fleets were many and mighty, but so were
those of her jealous foes across the British Channel. Her armies in
America must be adequate for operations in each of the zones mentioned,
and be constantly supplied with munitions of war and every other
accessory of successful field service. And, on the other hand, the
American army, almost wholly dependent upon land transportation and hard
marching, must have a correspondingly larger force, or fail to
concentrate and fight upon equal terms with its adversary.
The British Government having adopted a sound military policy, so soon
as the object lessons of Lexington, Bunker Hill, and their expulsion
from Boston unveiled their dull vision, did not fail to realize the
necessity for an army strong enough to meet the full requirements of
that policy. Forty regiments were assigned to the American service.[3]
But the militia of New England had already driven twenty battalions
(half the number) from its coast. Washington was no careless observer of
European conditions, nor of the straitened nature of the British army
organization, however superior to rivals on the sea. His deliberate
conviction, ever a rallying force to his faith in deepest peril, that
Britain could never spare more than one more army as large as the
garrison of Boston, was the result of almost literal insight of the
practical resources at her command. Hence, that Government contracted
with petty European principalities for seventeen thousand men, for
immediate delivery. These men were impressed and paid wages by their own
local princes who speculated on the greater sums to be paid them, _per
capita_, by Great Britain. The former estimate of General Gage, at
twenty thousand men, and his significant hint as to the need of more
than that force, was no longer ridiculed; but forty thousand was decided
to be the minimum number required for the immediate prosecution of the
war. Taking into account the foreign troops, the British ministry
estimated as available for the American service a total, on paper, of
fifty-five thousand men. To this was to be added, upon their hopeful
estimate, four thousand Canadians, Indians, and royalists. Allowing for
every possible shrinkage, on account of weakened regiments and other
contingencies, the effective force was officially placed at forty
thousand men.
Footnote 3:
See Appendix for regiments designated.
Two facts are significant in connection with this specious estimate of
the British army. If the drain of this forcible conscription upon the
industry of Hesse-Cassel and Hanau had been applied to England and
Wales, at that date, it would have raised an army of four hundred
thousand men; and yet, Britain did not venture to draw from her own
subjects, at home, for the defence of her own Crown.
Washington rightly conceived that the whole scheme would divide the
sentiment of the British people, and that the success even of these
mercenary troops, against their own blood in America, would prove no
source of pride or congratulation. It was his intense love of English
liberty, exhibited in its history, that undergirded his soul with
sustaining faith in American liberty; and he read the hearts of the
English people aright.
He did not wait long for its echo. The Duke of Richmond used this
emphatic and prophetic utterance: “An army of foreigners is now to be
introduced into the British dominion; not to protect them from invasion,
not to deliver them from the ravages of a hostile army, but to assist
one-half of the inhabitants in massacring the other. Unprovided with a
sufficient number of troops for the cruel purpose; or, unable to prevail
upon the natives of the country [England] to lend their hands to such a
sanguinary business, Ministers have applied to those foreign princes who
trade in human blood, and have hired mercenaries for the work of
destruction.” His closing sentence foreshadowed the alliance of America
with Louis XVI., of France. It reads thus: “The Colonies themselves,
after our example, will apply to strangers for assistance.”
This British army was designed for four distinct, and as nearly as
possible, concurrent, operations: one through Canada, down the Hudson
River to Albany and New York, with divergent pressure upon New England
and central New York; one to occupy Newport, R.I.; the third to control
New York City and its related territory in New Jersey; and the fourth
against representative centres at the South.
Reference has been made to the anxiety expressed by Washington as early
as February, 1776, lest the siege of Boston might be protracted until
Britain could invade the other colonies, particularly New York, with an
overwhelming retentive force. As a fact, only surmised and not known by
him for weeks, Sir Peter Parker and Earl Cornwallis were ready to start
from Cork, Ireland, by the twentieth of January; but did not sail until
the thirteenth of February, and then the transports and ships were so
buffeted by storms, and driven back for refitting, as not to reach
Wilmington, N.C., until the third day of May. Here, as before indicated,
he was joined by General Clinton, and both had the suggestive lesson of
American courage in their repulse by the brave Moultrie, at Charleston,
on the twenty-eighth of June.
And now we are to consider Washington’s reception of the most formidable
of these expeditions.
General Howe sailed from Halifax on the tenth of June with one hundred
and twenty square-rigged vessels besides smaller craft; and on the fifth
day of July the entire force, amounting to nine thousand two hundred
men, was landed upon Staten Island, in the lower bay of New York. During
the voyage two transports were captured by American privateers, and
General Sir William Erskine, with a part of the seventy-first Highland
Regiment, were made prisoners. The incident is worthy of notice as
materially affecting the correspondence between Washington and General
Howe, shortly after the event.
General Howe reached Sandy Hook in the despatch frigate “Greyhound,” on
the twenty-fifth of June, and held a secret conference with Governor
Tryon, on shipboard. His fleet first cast anchor at Gravesend Cove, July
1st, but after conference with Governor Tryon, he changed his purpose.
He would be too near Washington. He wrote to Lord Germaine on July 8th
as follows: “He declined to land, as being so near the front of the
enemy’s works. It would be too hazardous, until the arrival of the
troops with Commodore Holtham, daily expected. He was also waiting for
the return of General Clinton, and deemed it best to defer the
possession of Rhode Island until the arrival of the second embarkation
from Europe, unless Carleton should penetrate early into this province
[New York].” The letter thus closes: “As I must esteem an impression
upon the enemy’s principal force collected in this quarter to be the
first object of my attention, I shall hold it steadily in view without
losing sight of those which may be only considered collateral.”
Admiral Lord Richard Howe arrived on July 12th with a powerful squadron
and one hundred and fifty transports filled with troops. On the
thirteenth a communication was despatched to George Washington, _Esqr._,
on behalf of the Brothers Howe, Commissioners, proposing terms of peace.
Washington, in a letter to Schuyler, facetiously styled these gentlemen
“Commissioners to dispense pardon to repenting sinners.” Howe’s
Adjutant-General, Patterson, called upon General Washington, on the
twentieth of July, respecting the exchange of prisoners, especially
General Erskine, and, “purely to effect, the exchange of these
prisoners,” addressed Washington by his military title.
Generals Clinton and Cornwallis, repulsed at Charleston, arrived August
first, and Commodore Holtham, having arrived on the twelfth, landed
twenty-six hundred British troops, eight thousand four hundred Hessians,
and camp equipage for the entire army. On the fifteenth Sir Peter Parker
arrived with twenty-four sail from the south.
The British army thus encamped on Staten Island numbered, all told,
thirty-one thousand six hundred and twenty-five men. The effective
force, for duty, was twenty-six thousand nine hundred and eight, of
which number twenty thousand accompanied General Howe to the attack upon
Brooklyn Heights. This was the largest army under one command during the
war.
Washington was fully advised of every movement, and the Proclamation of
Commissioner Howe to the people was circulated with his full approval.
Sensational rumors were as common then as in modern times. As late as
the nineteenth of August General Roberdeau notified Washington, in all
seriousness, that “a post-rider had told him, with great confidence,
that General Howe had proposed to retire with the fleet and army, and
was willing to settle the present dispute on any terms asked by
Washington: that this came from an officer who was willing to swear to
it; but as it might have a tendency to lull the inhabitants, he made it
the subject of an express.” This was based upon another false rumor,
that England and France were at war. Such “recklessness of
gossip-mongers” received from Washington a scorching rebuke which he
declared to be the “more important, since many of those who opposed the
war, on account of business relations with the British authorities, were
most active in words, while lacking in courage to take up arms on either
side.”