In spite of this elaborate technical sec_America's Munitions 1917-1918

not stop with it. There was a special field-testing section of the Gas

Defense Division, composed of about 150 men who were trained to the

minute in field maneuvers and did most of their work in gas masks.

They were constantly in and out of gas with regular production and

experimental masks, they played baseball in them, they dug trenches,

laid out wire, cut wire, and fought sham battles at night, both with

and without actual gas. This section was not organized until July, but

it should have been one of the first of our units. It was there that

we learned all the fine points of gas mask comfort and durability. The

work of this section even went so far in the case of the later designs

as to include a test where six men worked, played, and slept in the

masks for an entire week, only taking them off for 30 minutes at each

mealtime, and each day entering high concentrations of the most deadly

gases, without any ill effects whatsoever to the wearers. When it is

remembered that eight hours was the limit of time which a strong man

could wear the old-type mask, something of the efficiency of the new

mask may be realized.

We also built 377,881 horse masks. Investigation showed that a horse's

eyes did not shed tears in the presence of even strong lachrymatory

gases. Moreover a horse never breathes through his mouth; and it was,

therefore, necessary only to cover his nostrils. Furthermore, horses

proved to be more resistant to the toxic gases used in Europe than were

men, and his mask, accordingly, needed to be only a bag of many layers

of chemically treated gauze. The horse masks were all manufactured by

the Fifth Avenue Uniform Co., of New York City, under the supervision

of a detachment of the Gas Defense Division.

We furnished 191,338 dugout blankets to be used at the doors of dugouts

to make them gas proof. These were specially woven all-cotton blankets

which were treated in France with a special heavy oil, shipped from the

United States.

Toward the end of the war we received large requisitions for protective

suits and gloves to safeguard men against mustard gas burns. The suits

were made of oiled fabric and the gloves were of cloth impregnated with

chemicals. As a work just starting, we produced 2,450 suits and 1,773

pairs of gloves.

A total of 1,246 tons of a new ointment known as sag paste was made and

shipped. This was an ointment to protect the skin against mustard-gas

burns.

Gas warning signals were of several types, watchmen's rattles and

Klaxon horns being the most commonly used to sound the gas alarms. We

shipped 45,906 of these special hand horns. The rattles were secured in

Europe.

[Illustration: THE AKRON TISSOT MASK. AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE MASK THAT

WAS IN GENERAL USE AMONG OUR TROOPS.]

[Illustration: THE KOPS TISSOT MASK. OUR LATEST DEVELOPMENT AND

CONSIDERED TO BE THE BEST OF ALL MASKS.]

[Illustration: GAS MASK OF FLANNELETTE TYPE FOR HORSE.]

Trench fans, for fanning out gas from trenches and dugouts, were

produced, to the number of 50,549.

_Production data of gas defense division of Chemical Warfare

Service--Final statistical report._

-------------------+--------------------------------+-------------------

| Production. | Shipped overseas--

-------------------+----------+----------+----------+---------+---------

Item. | 1, 1918. | 11, 1918.|1918(total| 1918. | 1918.

| | | ion). | |

-------------------+----------+----------+----------+---------+---------

Respirators | 1,719,424| 5,276,515| 5,692,499|1,196,787|3,938,808

Extra canisters | 507,663| 3,144,485| 3,189,357| 484,236|1,805,076

Horse masks | 154,094| 366,529| 377,881| 101,250| 351,270

Bleaching powder | 1,484| 3,677| 3,590| 586| 1,867

Extra anti-dimming | | 2,855,776| 2,855,776| |2,855,776

Sag paste (tons) | 20| 1,136| 1,246| | 915

Dugout blanket oil | | 95,000| 95,000| | 5,000

Protective suits | | 500| 2,450| |

Protective gloves | | 1,773| 1,773| |

Dugout blankets | | 159,127| 191,338| | 36,221

Warning devices | | 33,202| 45,906| | 19,620

Trench fans | 11,343| 29,977| 50,549| 9,600| 27,690

-------------------+----------+----------+----------+---------+---------

BOOK V.

QUARTERMASTER ACTIVITIES.

CHAPTER I.

SUBSISTENCE.

When the American soldier went to war against Germany he took his

appetite with him. The task of keeping that appetite satisfied with

good food (and the soldier, therefore, contented and well) fell to the

Quartermaster General. The average American soldier at the end of the

fighting in 1918 is said to have weighed 12 pounds more than he did

when the Selective-Service Act or his own enlistment brought him into

the Army. This is the complete testimonial to the quality and quantity

of the food served to the American troops in 1917 and 1918. Assuming

3,700,000 to have been the greatest number of Americans under arms,

this average increase in weight means that the beans and bacon and

fresh meat of the American Army ration were transmogrified into some

45,000,000 pounds of Yankee brawn to be the basis of untold resources

of health and energy during the coming quarter of a century.

Consider these millions of soldiers as one composite, gigantic man in

khaki; compress the war period into a single hour, the dinner hour; and

it will be seen that the American fighter consumed what might be called

a sizeable meal. Let us say that he started off with the main course.

The roast of beef weighed over 800,000,000 pounds. It was flanked by a

rasher of bacon weighing 150,000,000 pounds. Over 1,000,000,000 pounds

of flour went into the loaf of bread, while to spread the bread was

there a lump of butter weighing 17,500,000 pounds and another lump of

oleomargarine weighing 11,000,000 pounds. As a side dish this giant

had over 150,000,000 pounds of baked beans, half of these coming in

cans ready baked and flavored with tomato sauce. The potatoes weighed

487,000,000 pounds. To add gusto to his appetite there were 40,000,000

pounds of onions. Then scattered over the table were such items as

150,000,000 cans of corn, peas, and string beans; while the salad

contained 50,000,000 cans of salmon and 750,000 tins of sardines. Then

there was a huge bowl of canned tomatoes, nearly 190,000,000 tins

supplying its contents. For dessert he had 67,000,000 pounds of prunes

and 40,000,000 pounds of evaporated peaches and apples. The sugar for

sweetening various dishes weighed 350,000,000 pounds. He washed it all

down with a draft made of 75,000,000 pounds of coffee thinned with

200,000,000 cans of evaporated milk. The bill for the meal, paid by the

American public, amounted to $727,092,430.44, this figure to December

1, 1918.

In supplying such vast quantities of food, scientific attention was

concentrated upon the details of the effort. At the time the armistice

was signed the American troops in France were eating about 9,000,000

pounds of food every day. Never before in history had any nation been

compelled to send subsistence so great a distance to so many men.

It was not possible to ask France and England to divide their food

supplies, as they were already rationing their civilian populations.

We were required to purchase practically all food in America and

transport it nearly 5,000 miles. Ships were relatively scarce. There

was a strong bid for every inch of tonnage space. The tonnage allotted

to subsistence must be filled with sufficient food not only to supply

the immediate consumption, but to overcome losses due to the sinking

of ships and the possible capture of base depots. These contingencies

required two pounds of food to be shipped where one would ordinarily be

sent; yet because of the shortage of ships the subsistence authorities

were asked to pack these two pounds into almost the space of one. The

result was foods in forms never before known by American soldiers and

in some cases never before known at all--such forms as dehydrated

vegetables, boneless beef, and the so-called shankless beef. Trench

warfare made new demands for food. Calls came for such rare articles as

soluble coffee or the wheat-and-meat cake of the emergency ration.

These problems were solved only by the assistance of the American food

industry. In numerous instances new factories, or even whole new types

of food manufacture, were built up as rapidly as three shifts of men

could work and money accomplish results.

The cost of food rates high among the war costs of 1917 and 1918. Back

in 1897 the average meal in the Army cost about 4 cents, and the daily

three meals 13 cents. At the end of 1918 the cost of the ration was

approximately 48 cents. The advance was not all due to the advance in

living costs. Much of it was on account of the improved standards of

the ration. In 1916 Congress appropriated $10,000,000 to feed the Army;

the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1918, brought an appropriation of

$830,000,000 for the same purpose.

The American fighting man of 1917-18 was a good feeder. He ate nearly

three-quarters of a ton of food each year, or over ten times his own

weight. Without counting any transportation costs or the expense of

handling at all, each man's yearly supply of food cost more than $165.

In spite of the most rigid and painstaking economies in the purchase of

this subsistence the American people were paying at the peak of Army

expansion more than $2,500,000 per day to feed the troops.

The distance of the American Expeditionary Forces from the source of

their food supplies required that their food be largely purchased

in nonperishable forms. That is, meats must be cured, meats and

vegetables tinned, vegetables and fruits dried. We literally paved

the way to Berlin with tin cans. The various foods put up in tins and

purchased during the year 1918 totaled over 1,000,000,000 cans, or

enough, standing on end, to make a road wide enough and long enough

for a force of men marching in columns of four to go from the port of

embarkation at Hoboken, N. J., to the heart of Germany. The largest

closing machine can seal 240 tin cans per minute. If such a machine

could be operated eight hours a day seven days a week, it would take it

23 years and 6 months to seal these tins.

During the spring of 1918, when the demand for men in France resulted

in reducing the available tonnage for supplies, the cry came from

France to cut every nonessential. As a result most of the canned

vegetables and fruits, including peas, corn, sweet potatoes, asparagus,

pineapple, pears, and apples were stricken from the list of food

supplies for the American Expeditionary Forces.

From France came calls for tomatoes and men, men and tomatoes. This

phrase did not mean that bread and bacon, beans and beef, should be

eliminated; but it emphasized the importance of this one vegetable, the

tomato. The total purchases of tomatoes exceeded those of all other

vegetables combined. In addition to the many ways of serving tomatoes,

they were used in the trenches to relieve thirst, being, perhaps, more

effective than any other substitute for water. Because of its food

value and slight acidity, a quart of tomato juice was worth several

quarts of water to the thirsty men in the field. The Army took 45 per

cent of the total 1918 American pack of tomatoes. These tomatoes were

bought from 5,000 firms scattered throughout the rural districts of the

United States.

The demands of the overseas forces for meat during the summer of 1918

were so heavy that they created a shortage of beef in the United

States. Beef is the mainstay of the soldier's diet. The Army allows 456

pounds of beef per year for each soldier. This does not mean that the

soldier actually eats that much beef, beef being simply the Army's meat

standard. Pork, usually in the form of bacon, is substituted for 30

per cent of this quantity of beef, 12 ounces of bacon being considered

the equivalent of 20 ounces of beef. The major portion of the American

Expeditionary Forces' beef was fresh beef shipped frozen all the way

from the packing plants in the United States to the company kitchens at

the front, through an elaborate system of cold-storage warehouses and

refrigerator cars and ships.

The Food Administration asked that the people substitute corn meal,

rye flour, and other grain flour for 20 per cent of the wheat flour

ordinarily used in making bread. The troops in the United States

complied with this ruling and saved 1,000,000 barrels of flour. The

use of substitutes in France was not insisted upon, as bread making

in the field is more difficult. Field bakeries are not adapted to

experimenting with doughs and yeasts, as is required when substitutes

for flour are used. The Army allowance of flour for a year for one man

is 410 pounds. Flour was usually issued in the form of bread, 1 pound

of bread being allowed for each man each day. Other yearly allowances

are 56 pounds of beans, 27 pounds of prunes, 27 pounds of coffee, 73

pounds of sugar, 11½ pounds of condensed milk, 3½ pounds of vinegar,

and 13½ pounds of salt. For variety other items are specified which may

be substituted for these foods.

Food was purchased by the Quartermaster's Department and furnished to

the individual companies at cost of the food. In charge of the mess was

a sergeant, who had had special instruction in schools as to methods of

feeding the Army. The mess sergeant checked over his stocks daily and

made up a list of what he would require for the coming day. This list,

in turn, was given to the camp supply officer, under whose direction

the order was made up and delivered to the kitchen on Army trucks.

This order was based on a ration allowance, as has been stated, a

ration being the food required to subsist one man for one day. The

general components of the overseas camp ration consisted of the

following:

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Component articles | Substitutive articles

and quantities. | and quantities.

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Beef, fresh ounces 20 |Mutton, fresh ounces 20

|Beef, fresh, boneless ounces 16

|Bacon ounces 12

|Pork, fresh ounces 16

|Sausages, canned pork

|or Vienna ounces 16

|Canned roast beef

|or corned beef ounces 16

|Hash, corned beef ounces 16

|Fish, dried ounces 14

|Cheese, not exceeding 10 per cent

|of total issue ounces 10

|Fish, canned ounces 16

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Bread, soft ounces 16 |Flour, corn meal, oatmeal, or

| macaroni, in lieu of an equal

| quantity bread, but not exceeding

| 15 per cent of total issue.

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Baking powder (to be issued only |

with flour or corn meal, 1 |

ounce to 20 ounces), ounce .08 |

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Beans, dry (not to exceed 4 issues |Beans, baked (not to exceed 4

in 10 days) ounces 4 | issues in 10 days) ounces 8

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Rice or hominy (not to exceed 6 |

issues in 10 days) ounces 2 |

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Potatoes, fresh ounces 20 |Onions, fresh, in lieu of an equal

| quantity of potatoes, but not

| exceeding 20 per cent of total issue.

| Tomatoes, canned, in lieu of an equal

| quantity of potatoes, but not

| exceeding 20 per cent of total issue.

|Canned potatoes ounces 15

|Other fresh vegetables (not canned)

| when they can be obtained in the

| vicinity by purchase or from the

| U. S. Garden Service, or can be

| transported in a wholesome condition

| from a distance, in lieu of an equal

| quantity of potatoes.

|Dehydrated vegetables to be issued

| only in case fresh vegetables are

| not available. ounces 4

|Corn, canned ounces 12

|Peas, canned ounces 20

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Jam ounces 3 |Prunes, or evaporated apples,

| or peaches, or apricots, or figs,

| or dates, or raisins, in lieu of

| an equal quantity of jam.

|Sirup gill .64

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Coffee, R. & G ounces 1.12 |Tea, black or green ounces .32

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Sugar ounces 3.2 |

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Milk, evaporated, |

unsweetened ounce 1 |

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Vinegar gill .16 |Pickles, cucumber, in lieu of an

| equal quantity of vinegar.

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Salt ounce .64 |

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Pepper, black ounce .02 |

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Cinnamon ounce .014 |Cloves, or ginger, or nutmeg, or

| sage, thyme, or

| allspice ounce .014

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Butter ounce .5 |Oleomargarine or lard or

| lard substitute, ounces .5

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Flavoring extract, |

vanilla ounce .014 |Flavoring extract, lemon .014

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Candy (issued ½ pound |

once in 10 days) ounce .8 |

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

Tobacco, smoking (100 cigarette |Cigarettes number .4

papers for each 4 ounces |Tobacco, chewing ounce .4

smoking tobacco) ounce .4 |

-----------------------------------+------------------------------------

The ration at home was practically the same. The home ration, however,

did not include candy and tobacco. The commanding officer had authority

to modify or change all rations to meet special conditions. For

instance, in times of great cold and when the men were subject to

great exposure, or after long and tedious campaigns or marches, or

when the work required of the troops was abnormal, the ration might be

increased. The ration also included soap, candles, matches, towels, and

a few other items considered necessary in the daily life of a soldier.

The value of a ration fluctuated with the market from month to month.

Each day's food weighed about 4.6 pounds per man.

The men actually in the trenches sometimes made use of the emergency

ration, the little flat can of compressed nourishment which every

soldier carried in his pocket. This ration, however, was used only

in severe straits, on the order of an officer, or on the enlisted

man's own responsibility in the direst emergency, when the activity

of the enemy made it impossible to get hot food to the men during

daylight hours. Hot food was served in the trenches whenever possible.

The hot food consisted principally of soups and soluble coffee.

Specially constructed cans, made on the principle of thermos bottles,

kept the food hot when it was being carried to the front. The chief

quartermaster of the American Expeditionary Forces relates that on a

tour of inspection made by him, during the Argonne-Meuse offensive, on

November 1, 1918, he inspected the meals served at noon to the troops

of the Fifth Corps actually engaged in battle on that day, and found

in a number of cases that Artillery organizations were being served

beefsteak, potatoes, onions, tomatoes, white bread and butter, rice

pudding, and hot coffee, the men eating in reliefs in order that there

might be no cessation of fire. The hot meals for the Infantry were

prepared at their rolling kitchens a short distance in rear of the

line, and sent forward to them in "marmite" cans.

The company was the unit on which the feeding of the men was based.

Each month the company was given credit at the quartermaster's store

equal to the number of men in the company multiplied by thirty times

the ration allowance. On the basis of this credit the mess sergeant of

the company made purchases to feed his men. He might be as economical

as he desired, provided that he fed the men sufficiently. If the entire

credit extended him at the camp quartermaster's office was not used up

during the month, a check was given for the difference. This went into

the company's funds, with which the mess sergeant might buy in the open

market such extras and delicacies as the savings would permit, up to

the quantity specified in the ration.

But this system was followed only in the United States. Savings were

not allowed in France, all food there being issued on a straight ration

basis. This was due to the fact that the shortage of tonnage made it

imperative that no article not absolutely essential be shipped from

the United States, while difficulties of transportation in France

necessarily eliminated all except the most essential articles of food.

Under the procedure in vogue previous to the recent war, subsistence

was purchased by depot quartermasters located in 13 principal cities

throughout the United States. The plan gave the Army a large number of

purchasing officers for subsistence, working without coordination and

even in active competition with each other. This condition resulted in

a wide range of prices and a lack of uniform quality; while under war

conditions, with the enormous quantities to be procured, it would cause

at times a congestion of buying orders, with consequent disturbance of

market prices.

A plan of control was soon worked out whereby the Subsistence Division,

with headquarters at Washington, received at regular intervals the

estimates of the needs for subsistence for the Army, both at home and

abroad. These estimates were compared and a budget made up. Bids were

then asked through zone supply officers, who reported the bids to the

control body in Washington. The lowest or most advantageous bid was

accepted, and the purchase was completed by the zone supply officer in

whose zone the seller was located. The plan eliminated one army zone

bidding against another. At the same time it enabled every manufacturer

or producer to bid on the needs of the Army. In this way active

competition was secured and low prices obtained. A decided advantage of

the plan was that purchases were made with a minimum of disturbance to

prices paid by the civilian trade.

Not only was it necessary to coordinate army organizations, but it

was also found that the independent buying of the Army, the Navy,

and the Allied Provision Export Commission was having the effect of

increasing prices of a number of food products. These buying agencies

were unconsciously bidding against each other. In December, 1917,

at the suggestion of the Food Administrator, with the consent and

approval of the Secretary of War and of the Secretary of the Navy, the

food purchase board was organized to coordinate all of the purchases

of food products in this country intended for military purposes.

The plan adopted was to allot through the Food Administration the

required quantity to the industry producing the commodity in question,

dividing the business among the various producers in proportion to

their capacity. Products so controlled were those in which there was

an actual or prospective shortage. The prices were determined by the

food purchase board after studying and investigating the costs of

production. The products so purchased included flour, sugar, all canned

vegetables, canned and evaporated fruits, salmon, sardines, canned

milk, rice, and, for a time, fresh beef. These products totaled about

40 per cent of all food requirements for the Army.

Practically all purchasing of meat was done by the Subsistence

Division's packing-house branch, located in Chicago. Circular proposals

were submitted by the various packers whose headquarters are located

there. The Subsistence Division ordered the required purchases made,

and the Chicago office at once allotted the amount needed among the

packers. After the butchering and inspection of the meat, it was sent

to the freezers and, after being frozen, was loaded in the cars and

shipped to the embarkation points. The whole process from the time the

animal was killed until it was loaded on the boat took about two weeks.

The Middle West produced practically all the beef which nourished our

fighting men. Some of the cattle were bought in California, inspected

at the packing-house plants along the Pacific coast, and sent to France

via the Panama Canal.

The packers of Chicago and other cities found their plants, gigantic as

they were, all too small to handle the demand of our troops for meat

products packed in special forms; and extensive additions, both in

buildings and machinery, were required by the Army's demands.

It was only by careful vigilance on the part of its inspection branch

that the millions of men dependent on the Subsistence Division for

their food were protected from deterioration of supplies and abuses by

certain dealers and manufacturers. Such firms were in the minority,

for the food industry backed the Army with great loyalty, giving

honest and patriotic support. In a certain week the inspection service

found oatmeal flour moldy and unfit for use, having been stored too

long before using; large amounts of potatoes, shipped to Camp Devens,

undersize and frostbitten; 3,000 pounds of butter at Camp Greene too

old for use; and 12 carloads of tomatoes of poor quality. The system in

vogue of demanding reinspection was responsible for discovering many

such cases, and traveling inspectors also kept the products up to the

highest standard. Any information from outside sources was immediately

investigated.

Samples of all shipments of food stuffs were required to be sent to

the inspection branch. In this way many violations of the food laws

were found. One packer was found to be using pork which contained large

numbers of skippers. Another tried, consciously or unconsciously, to

pass off wormy dried fruits. Milk has in some cases been found to be

much below standard. All of these supplies were promptly rejected as

improper for Army use. In many cases the fault has been found to be

the result of improper manufacturing conditions, and in this event the

manufacturer has been compelled to make good the loss to the Army. The

general result of this inspection was that manufacturers gave the Army

their very best products.

One of the most important divisions of the inspection branch was the

meat and meat-products section. Its function was the supervision of

the reinspection, storage, and handling of meat and meat products,

butter, and cheese. Special care was taken to see that there were no

embalmed meats. Meat and meat products, butter, and cheese are all

highly perishable articles; and, although they may be delivered in

perfect condition, many imperfections may develop if diligent care is

not exercised during shipment, handling, and storage. One of the first

steps taken at the camps was the installing of complete cold-storage

plants with adequate chill rooms, so that the proper preservation of

fresh meats was assured after arrival at camps. From the first the

most rigid inspection of meat and meat products was insisted on and no

product allowed to pass which did not comply with Army specifications.

The carcass might be from a perfectly healthy animal, yet be rejected,

as lightweight carcasses were not approved for consumption in the Army.

Instructions as to Army requirements were placed in the hands of every

inspector, covering the inspection, storage, and handling of meat and

dairy products. Supervisory traveling inspectors visited all stations

at irregular intervals to insure these instructions being followed and

to instruct quartermasters in posts which were too small to warrant a

qualified meat inspector being stationed there.

One object of the Subsistence Division was to educate the proper

officers throughout the Army to be inspectors. To accomplish this

the inspection branch compiled a manual covering practically all the

principal items of Army subsistence, the exact methods of inspection,

and how to detect imperfections in foods. Complete Army specifications

for all supplies were included. Gen. Pershing cabled for 250 copies to

be used in France, and the University of California adopted the manual

to be used in zymology classes. It placed exact knowledge in the hands

of the men who received the food and who had the responsibility that it

be up to specifications.

The overseas forces were the particular concern of the Subsistence

Division. It was planned to have approximately three months' advance

supply of food sent over each month for the number of troops actually

sent to France during that month. This was called the initial supply.

In addition to this, there was sent over a monthly automatic supply,

equivalent to the amount of food the troops already in France would

consume during that month. In this way a 90 days' reserve was usually

maintained overseas.

The problems of the overseas forces demanded quick solution. The new

modes of warfare gave rise to many needs unknown in peace times. The

result was that calls came in for commodities which were not at the

time being produced in adequate quantities. Factories had to be built,

labor secured, and machinery manufactured; in instances entirely new

industries had to be created.

The Service of Supply found it was impossible to secure sufficient

fresh vegetables in Europe to take care of the requirements of our

troops, and the Subsistence Division at home was called upon to

supply dehydrated vegetables for overseas requirements. To send fresh

vegetables from the United States was impossible, due to the great

necessity for conserving ship tonnage, and a substitute was imperative.

To supply dehydrated vegetables meant the development of an industry.

Dehydration was practically unknown in the United States, there being

but three small plants in existence. The Subsistence Division searched

the country for advantageous locations where there were prospects of

having such factories established. Within a few months the cooperation

of companies was secured and factories were built whose combined output

for the month of December, 1918, amounted to 6,000,000 pounds, there

being 15 large plants in the United States at that time. Up to the

date of the signing of the armistice 62,000,000 pounds of dehydrated

vegetables had been ordered by Gen. Pershing.

The difficulty of supply was increased by the delicate process which

is required to make dehydrated vegetables. The moisture of the fresh

product must be removed without extracting the nutritious juices or

destroying the food value or flavor. After the vegetables have been

peeled and sliced or cubed, they are blanched, in order that they

may retain their starch components. They are then placed on trays in

huge kilns, through which heated air is blown until only the small

required amount of moisture is retained. The product is then packed in

hermetically sealed cans.

Dehydrated vegetables occupied a prominent place in the soldier's menu

in France. Reports from overseas made by inspectors of the Subsistence

Division indicate that dehydrated vegetables were quite satisfactory.

The Surgeon General's Office has approved their use. However, when

fresh vegetables could be purchased in foreign markets they were used

in preference. The use of dehydrated vegetables saved two-thirds of the

cargo space in ships over the amount required for fresh vegetables.

Their use came at the time when the cargo space was as valuable as life

itself, and it enabled men and munitions to be transported sooner than

would otherwise have been possible. Dehydrated vegetables were also

found especially adapted for use at the front when food was carried

forward from the rail heads to the trench kitchens under shell fire.

The emergency ration and its production make another interesting

story. Designed to be used only in dire extremity, primarily for No

Man's Land fighting, the ration was packed in small cans to be carried

in the soldier's pocket, usually the upper left-hand jacket pocket.

This ration corresponded to the starvation ration of the allies. Its

components were adopted after experiments at the battle front and after

consultations with food experts. It represented the greatest amount of

food that could be concentrated in the smallest compass.

The complete ration consisted of three cakes of a mixture of beef and

ground cooked wheat, each cake weighing 3 ounces; three 1-ounce cakes

of chocolate; three-quarters of an ounce of fine salt; and 1 dram of

black pepper. From the beef the preparation process removed all fat,

sinew, and white fibrous tissue. The meat was then heated, and all of

its moisture was evaporated so skillfully that no flavor was lost.

The wheat or bread component of the cake was prepared by removing the

chaff from cooked wheat which had been kiln-dried, parched, and then

ground to a coarse powder. The meat and bread were compounded together,

about two parts of bread to each part of meat, making a perfectly

homogeneous cake. The chocolate of the ration was prepared by combining

equal weights of fine chocolate, containing not less than 20 per cent

of cocoa butter, and pure sugar, and molding the product into cakes

weighing 1 ounce each.

The several components were packed into oval tin cans, which were

camouflaged to render them inconspicuous. These cans bore the legend:

"U. S. Army Emergency Ration. Not to be opened except by order

of an officer, or in extremity."

Many ways of preparing the emergency ration for eating in the field

were found by experiments. The bread and meat cake could be eaten

dry; or, when boiled in 3 pints of water, it made a palatable soup;

boiled in 1 pint of water, it produced a thick porridge which could be

eaten hot or cold; the cold porridge could be sliced and fried when

circumstances permitted. The chocolate could be eaten as candy or made

into a drink by placing the chocolate in a tin cup with hot water.

The gas attacks in the trenches made it necessary that the soldier's

food be packed in containers impervious to mustard gas poison, mustard

gas, when swallowed, attacking the intestines. The first call for such

a ration came during October, 1917, and it called for the shipment

of 100,000 sealed rations a month for 20 months. The food was to be

packed in hermetically sealed galvanized iron containers, holding

25 rations each. The contents of each can consisted of 25 pounds of

meat in 1-pound cans, 25 pounds of hard bread in 8-ounce cans, and 25

rations each of soluble coffee, sugar, and salt. Tobacco and cigarettes

were added for the comfort of the men. The addition of tobacco and

cigarettes was accidental. It was found necessary at first to fill the

surplus space in the containers with excelsior. The office force of a

large corporation learned of this fact and got permission to fill the

empty space in some of the containers with tobacco. The Subsistence

Division thought so well of the idea that orders were issued for the

tobacco ration to be placed in all reserve ration containers.

One of the most difficult elements in supplying the reserve ration

was the securing of tin cans for hard bread. These, because of their

unusual size and shape, could only be manufactured after new can-making

machines had been designed. The demand for such cans exceeded

10,000,000 in number. Within a comparatively short time, however, hard

bread in cans for special reserve rations was being produced on a large

scale, and the overseas requirements were filled.

Next the manufacture of the necessary galvanized containers and

crates was contracted for. A packing plant was then designed to pack

the components into the containers, which was an intricate operation

in itself, the number of rations being so great. This plant was so

contrived that the parts of the packing material came in at one end of

the plant, and the hard bread, canned corned beef hash, canned roast

beef, and canned corned beef, canned fish, coffee, sugar, salt, and can

openers were packed into the galvanized containers as they traveled on

a conveyor belt, until all the components were included.

Only the best of Army purchases were put in the reserve ration. A

study was made of the best packers of the various commodities, and

their products were used exclusively. Everyone connected with the

packing knew the purpose of the ration. It was to be used only when

the trenches were under the heaviest fire--when hot food could not be

carried forward, and when the men were most in need of good food. The

reserve ration became the quality ration of the Army as a result. After

the packing was complete, the cans were hermetically sealed by solder

and camouflaged with olive drab paint. The container of the ration,

when packed, was so buoyant it would support two men upon it when

thrown into the sea, thus being a potential life raft.

It was also necessary to feed our men in German prison camps. A ration

for American prisoners was prepared by the Subsistence Division of

the Quartermaster Corps, in conjunction with the Food and Nutrition

Division of the Surgeon's General office. This ration was distributed

by the American Red Cross from Denmark and Switzerland. Individual

packages each containing sufficient food to supply one man were sent

to the prison camps each week. The chief components of the package

were corned beef and salmon (with an occasional substitution of corned

beef hash and canned roast beef), hard dry bread, dry beans, rice,

baked beans, and fresh potatoes (where possible). Prunes, jam, apples,

peaches, coffee, sugar, evaporated milk, vinegar, salt, pepper, and

pickles were also supplied. Potatoes and onions were procured when

possible in Ireland, France, and Italy. Otherwise dehydrated potatoes

and onions were used.

Special food was sent for the invalid prisoners, this ration containing

potted chicken, crackers, concentrated soup, dehydrated spinach,

creamed oat meal, cornstarch pudding, sweet chocolate, extract of beef,

soluble coffee, etc. There were several substitutes for all items

mentioned, among the substitutes being dried eggs, potted veal, cheese,

peanut butter, dried apricots, honey, corn meal, gelatine, malted milk

powder, bouillon cubes, apples, oranges, lemons, cocoa, and tea.

When the American troops entered the trenches it was found

impracticable to use the ordinary roasted and ground coffee. Its

preparation required too much fire, the smoke of which made a target

for the enemy. Experiments were made with soluble coffee, looking

toward guaranteeing a warm stimulant in the trenches. It was found

necessary to give hot drinks to the men before they went over the top

or after they had undergone periods of exposure. The British and French

troops were supplied with brandy, wine, or rum on such occasions. But

issues of intoxicants to soldiers were contrary to the American policy,

and quantities of soluble coffee were substituted. Solidified alcohol

was supplied so that the coffee could be served hot.

The soluble-coffee industry was in its infancy in the United States. So

great was the demand for soluble coffee from the overseas forces that

the calls were for over thirty times the prewar production. A cablegram

was received in October informing us that after January 1, 1919, the

troops would require 25,000 pounds of coffee each day in addition to

the amounts packed in the trench rations, these latter quantities alone

amounting to 12,000 pounds daily. Allowance was also made for possible

sinkings of 5,000 pounds daily, making a total of 42,000 pounds

necessary to meet the daily requirements of the American Expeditionary

Forces.

[Illustration: MANUFACTURING BARRINGTON-HALL SOLUBLE COFFEE AT THE

BAKER IMPORTING CO. PLANT, NEW YORK. THREE BATTERIES OF 21 PERCOLATORS.

CAPACITY 5 CASES OF COFFEE EACH.]

[Illustration:

MANUFACTURING SOLUBLE COFFEE FOR THE U. S. GOVERNMENT IN THE

PLANT OF C. J. BLANKE TEA & COFFEE CO., ST. LOUIS, MO.]

The entire American output of soluble coffee was taken over for

the Army, but this amounted to only 6,000 pounds daily. A number

of manufacturers of other food products were induced to turn their

entire plants into soluble-coffee factories. The greatest difficulty

was incurred in the securing of the necessary equipment for these new

plants. There was but one company in the entire United States which

made the revolving bronze drums essential to the manufacturing process.

This company ran its plant seven days a week, with three shifts daily,

to produce the necessary materials. The metals which went into these

drums were vital in the manufacture of other munitions, but it was even

more important that men in the front lines be given hot drinks when

tired and worn from long fighting and exposure.

The signing of the armistice saw the difficulties of supplying soluble

coffee about overcome. The Subsistence Division had won one of its

hardest fights. The cooperation of American manufacturers had made the

achievement possible.

The problem of supplying good coffee to the troops was a difficult

one. To make good coffee for a unit as large as a company is not easy

for the average cook. To guarantee that good coffee would always be

available, the Subsistence Division made one of its most radical

changes in handling supplies. This change was so complete that whereas

the Army formerly was served with coffee from three to six months out

of the roasters, it came to be supplied with coffee freshly roasted

every day.

At the beginning of the war coffee was purchased, ready roasted and

ground, from competitive dealers. It was then held in New York for

about 30 days before being shipped overseas, the transportation

requiring 30 days more. Received in France, the coffee often was kept

for 90 days before it was distributed to the troops. In addition, a

30 days' supply must be kept on hand, making the coffee 6 months old

by the time it was used. The result was that when the coffee finally

reached the men it had lost half of its value as a stimulant and was

greatly deteriorated in flavor, often being in a crumbly condition.

"Muddy" coffee on the mess tables resulted.

The only way for the troops to secure fresh coffee was for us to send

over the green product for roasting as it was needed. Buildings were

erected to house coffee-roasting machinery at home and abroad; men were

trained as quickly as possible in the process of coffee-roasting, and

sent out to take charge of the plants. In a relatively short length

of time 16 plants were in full operation in France, and an increasing

number at home. Eventually all the coffee used in France was shipped

over green and roasted in the plants there. These plants were capable

of roasting sufficient coffee to take care of 3,000,000 men at a

considerably lower cost to the Government than under the old system.

The Expeditionary Forces, as is noted elsewhere, organised a purchasing

office in Paris. Its purpose was to save tonnage space by securing as

many products as possible in Europe. Its scope covered all classes of

supplies, but a large section was devoted to subsistence. Candy, hard

bread, and macaroni factories under the direction of the Quartermaster

Corps were built or secured from the French Government. Large

quantities of beans, fresh potatoes, onions, coffee, rice, salt, and

vinegar were secured from European markets. Many thousands of tons of

foodstuffs were purchased and manufactured in Europe for our Army,

every ton representing space on ships saved for additional men and

munitions. Overseas purchases were generally discontinued after the

signing of the armistice, as the Director of Purchase and Storage and

the Expeditionary Forces were firm for the policy of favoring American

manufacturers wherever possible.

To reduce tonnage still further, extensive experiments were made in the

packing of beef for overseas consumption. All bones, surplus fats, and

waste portions were removed. The remainder, all edible, was pressed

into 100-pound moulds and frozen. The initial shipment was composed of

16 carloads of boneless beef. The meat arrived in France in splendid

condition, and was carefully watched from its arrival at the ports in

France to its consumption in the front-line trenches. Officers, mess

sergeants, and cooks were enthusiastic over the boneless beef, as it

took much less time to prepare it and so conserved labor to a great

extent. The men were gratified, as the inferior portions of the beef

were not included, and much better meat resulted for the mess. After

the success of this experimental shipment, as much boneless beef as

possible was sent to France. Trouble was encountered in securing the

skilled butchers to bone the great quantities needed, but this shortage

was largely overcome.

No means was discovered so effective for reducing tonnage as boning

beef, dehydrating vegetables, and purchasing foods in France, but in

many of the smaller items there were stories just as interesting.

Efforts to save tonnage brought about the reduction of moisture in

soap. While the Subsistence Division was securing toilet paper it found

that the entire supply for the Expeditionary Forces could be stored

in the waste space of Army rolling field kitchens. A special formula

for vinegar was devised, and double-strength vinegar was shipped.

This, when mixed with an equal quantity of water in France, was a good

product.

The saving of space in the transportation of subsistence stores makes

a long story in itself. Just so much tonnage was allotted to food

each month; and the ablest men in the food industry spent much time

in working out how the maximum amount of essentials and luxuries in

foodstuffs could be sent in the minimum amount of space.

[Illustration: COFFEE-ROASTING PLANT AS OPERATED AT A NUMBER OF CAMPS.]

[Illustration: FURNISHING THE ARMY WITH TOBACCO.

Packing machines in a Winston-Salem, N. C. plant. These machines

automatically weigh the tobacco, wrap and seal tins in which this

particular brand of tobacco is marketed.]

[Illustration: MAKING CIGARETTES FOR THE ARMY.

Leaf tobacco being blended for cigarette-making purposes in a Richmond,

Va., tobacco plant.]

The Subsistence Division not only looked after the working fighter but

the playing fighter as well. The American soldier is fond of candy,

tobacco, and chewing gum. The supply of these commodities brought much

pleasure to the troops. Long lines of men waiting for free candy and

tobacco in France, men who just came from the front, formed one of the

interesting sights of the war. Tobacco has established its claim to a

recognized place in the soldier's life. Probably 95 per cent of the

soldiers of the American Expeditionary Forces used it in one form or

another. In May of 1918 it was decided to adopt the practice of the

allies, namely, to allow each soldier a certain amount of tobacco per

day. This unusual innovation was the official recognition of tobacco

as a necessity for men in active service. To men enduring physical

hardships, obliged to live without the comforts and often even the

necessities of life in times of battle, tobacco fills a need nothing

else can satisfy. The daily ration of four-tenths of an ounce was given

to every man overseas who desired it. The soldier had the choice of

cigarettes, smoking tobacco, or chewing tobacco. If he chose smoking

tobacco he received cigarette papers with it. In addition the men could

buy at any Army or other canteen the most popular brands of cigars and

cigarettes in unlimited quantities.

The Subsistence Division purchased for overseas shipment a monthly

average of 20,000,000 cigars and 425,000,000 cigarettes. Abundant

supplies of tobacco were on hand in the commissaries overseas, and the

soldier could buy it at actual cost. There was no profit or tax added

on any tobacco shipped to France, and it was sold at retail to the

troops at a cost lower than the price paid by the biggest wholesalers

in the United States. The plan for the purchase of cigars and

cigarettes was to divide the contracts among the most popular brands in

the same proportions as the latter are sold in this country.

Candy in the days of the old Army was considered a luxury. The war

with Germany witnessed a change. The old popularity of chewing tobacco

waned; that of candy increased. Approximately 300,000 pounds of candy

represented the monthly purchases during the early period of the war.

This amount included both the home and overseas consumption. Demands

from overseas grew steadily. The soldier far from home and from his

customary amusements could not be considered an ordinary individual

living according to his own inclinations, and candy became more

and more sought after. As the demand increased, the Quartermaster

Department came to recognize the need of systematic selection and

purchase.

The first purchases were made from offerings of manufacturers without

any particular standard, 40 per cent being assorted chocolates, 30 per

cent assorted stick candy, and 30 per cent lemon drops. A standard

was developed through the steady work of confectionery experts. This

standard offered no opportunities for deception, and it guaranteed

candy made from pure sugar and the best of other materials. The

specifications furnished all bidders covered raw materials, the methods

of manufacture, packing, and casing. Specifications were adopted after

many conferences with the leading manufacturers of the country. These

men cooperated in the work by giving their best suggestions and often

their trade secrets.

Huge purchases of candy were made during the days when sugar was

scarcest in the United States. The Food Administration was convinced

that the Army should have all the candy it desired, and sufficient

quantities of sugar were allotted for the purpose. From 300,000 pounds

monthly the candy purchases increased till they equaled 1,373,300

pounds in November, 1918, the highest amount purchased up to that time.

In December, 1918, an innovation was adopted, consisting of giving the

troops a regular monthly ration of candy. The candy which had been

shipped every month for sale in the various canteens had always been

quickly disposed of. Many men did not get the opportunity to make

purchases. The ration plan, however, assured each man a pound and a

half a month, without exception. It required 3,495,000 pounds the first

month of the ration system to provide each soldier overseas with his

allotted portion.

In December, 1918, the Subsistence Division took over the purchase of

all candy for the various organizations conducting canteens for our

troops. The purchase for that month totaled 10,137,000 pounds, all of

which was shipped overseas. It was the largest exportation of candy

on record. The candy purchased for the canteens, commissaries, and

other agencies was manufactured by the best known candy firms in the

country. A portion of the candy consumed overseas was manufactured

in France. This French supply was discontinued January 15, 1919, and

thereafter all requirements were shipped over from the United States.

The candy was sold to the men at just half the price it would have cost

individuals here. After December, 1918, 50,000 pounds were furnished

each month for sales purposes for every 25,000 men in France. Up to

February 1, 1919, 21,000,000 pounds of candy had been sent across. The

demand for candy jumped skyward after the signing of the armistice, the

men then having more time on their hands in which to enjoy luxuries.

Tobacco demands likewise increased.

The suffering sweet tooth of the Yank was not appeased by candy alone.

The third of a billion pounds of sugar bought for the Army represents a

tremendous number of cakes, tarts, pies, and custards. An old soldier

recently stated that the ice cream eaten by the Army during the war

would start a new ocean. The serious shortage of sugar which at one

time threatened to reduce sweets to an irreducible minimum on the

civilian bill of fare did not interfere with the soldier's ration,

which continued to be 6 pounds monthly in this country and about 9

pounds overseas. The ration for the civilian population was reduced

to 2 pounds monthly. Army officers were placed on the same status as

the civilian population and were allowed to purchase only the amount

stipulated for civilians for use in their homes.

Up to the signing of the armistice the total amount of granulated,

cut, and powdered sugar purchased by the Subsistence Division equaled

342,745,862 pounds and cost $28,465,050. Of this amount the greater

portion was shipped to the troops in France.

A close companion in popularity to candy and tobacco was the typical

American product, chewing gum. This confection was found of great value

on the march as a substitute for water. Its importance is shown in the

vast amount sent overseas. A total of 3,500,000 packages represents

the overseas shipment in January, 1919. The shipment for February

was 3,200,000 packages. The winter consumption of gum was heavier

than that of summer, the average monthly supply being only 1,500,000

packages during the summer of 1918. Chewing gum came to be considered a

necessity by the men in France and has been found to be an invaluable

aid to keeping up their spirits in the midst of hardships.

Every complaint against meals served in the Army reaching the attention

of the Subsistence Division was investigated. These investigations

were made in conjunction with the Inspector General's Department of

the Army. Where complaints were justified, remedial action was taken.

A study of the complaints revealed that most dissatisfaction was among

new troops who, when first separated from the luxuries of home, wrote

of their adventures at the mess table, enlarging any lack of home

comforts into stories of privation. The more solid food, however, soon

became popular, as the hard work in training gave an appetite for

sustaining rather than for the more fancy foods.

Subsistence to the value of $327,060,097 was shipped to our forces

overseas from the United States from the start of the war to December

1, 1918. The following table gives the quantity, unit price, and total

value of these subsistence items:

-------------------------------+--------------+--------+-------------

Item. | Quantity. | Unit | Total

| | price. | value.

-------------------------------+--------------+--------+-------------

| _Pounds._ |_Cents._|

Ham | 1,772,917 | 34.42 | $610,238

Bacon | 147,956,223 | 44.42 | 65,722,154

Beef, fresh, frozen | 250,584,692 | 23.36 | 58,536,584

Beef, tinned | 140,843,475 | 32.46 | 45,717,792

Fish, salmon | 30,961,801 | 14.24 | 4,408,960

Cheese | 314,203 | 27.75 | 87,191

Flour | 542,874,797 | 5.25 | 28,500,927

Hard bread | 27,978,830 | 12.92 | 3,614,865

Corn meal | 16,074,687 | 4.58 | 736,221

Oatmeal | 4,661,732 | 6.35 | 296,020

Beans, dry | 39,646,677 | 10.84 | 4,297,700

Beans, baked | 54,731,786 | 9.55 | 5,226,886

Rice | 25,466,547 | 7.97 | 2,029,684

Hominy | 1,826,269 | 8.54 | 155,963

Tomatoes | 100,081,789 | 6.02 | 6,024,924

Peas, green | 4,689,425 | 5.60 | 262,608

Corn, sweet | 7,639,786 | 5.65 | 431,648

Beans, stringless | 2,148,759 | 5.92 | 127,207

Vegetables, dehydrated | 12,971,935 | 30.25 | 3,924,010

Prunes | 15,748,931 | 10.35 | 1,630,014

Fruit, evaporated | 8,976,848 | 13.27 | 1,191,228

Jam | 26,029,028 | 18.74 | 4,877,840

Apples, canned | 1,831,096 | 6.39 | 117,007

Peaches, canned | 2,415,182 | 10.56 | 255,043

Apricots, canned | 863,415 | 9.12 | 78,743

Pears, canned | 1,150,120 | 10.22 | 117,542

Cherries, canned | 423,444 | 12.21 | 51,703

Pineapples, canned | 899,258 | 9.12 | 82,012

Coffee | 39,185,167 | 12.07 | 4,729,650

Sugar | 106,169,345 | 7.43 | 7,888,382

Milk, evaporated | 42,922,743 | 10.48 | 4,498,303

Lard and substitutes | 15,781,228 | 24.47 | 3,861,666

Butter and substitutes | 16,200,799 | 39.71 | 6,433,337

Candy | 7,895,053 | 27.76 | 2,191,667

Tobacco | 27,449,645 | 67.06 | 18,407,732

Salt | 13,707,276 | .88 | 120,624

Vinegar gallons| 1,319,877 | 27.85 | 367,586

Pickles do.| 1,333,210 | 46.94 | 625,809

Sirup do.| 6,171,808 | 59.22 | 3,654,945

Cigars each| 160,180,225 | 4.85 | 7,768,741

Cigarettes do.|2,439,260,097 | .62 | 15,123,412

Special reserve rations do.| 15,623,150 | 76.00 | 11,873,594

Emergency rations do.| 765,400 | 52.50 | 401,835

| | +------------

Total | | | 327,060,097

-------------------------------+--------------+--------+------------

[Illustration:

MEAT FOR THE U. S. ARMY RECEIVES THOROUGH INSPECTION. FEDERAL

INSPECTORS ARE EXAMINING SHEEP AS THEY PASS ALONG THE ENDLESS

TROLLEY IN THE PROCESS OF DRESSING. ARMOUR & CO.]

[Illustration: MANUFACTURING RAZORS FOR SOLDIERS: BLADE HONING

DEPARTMENT. DURHAM DUPLEX RAZOR CO.]

[Illustration: MAKING UNIFORMS FOR THE ARMY.

View of the cutting department of a plant at Red Bank, N. J.]

[Illustration: MANUFACTURING SPIRAL PUTTEES FOR THE ARMY.

This photo shows yarn being wound in a Cleveland, Ohio, factory.]

CHAPTER II.

CLOTHING AND EQUIPAGE.

The Army raised against Germany had to have stout shoes for its feet.

It required warm uniforms and overcoats and good socks and underwear.

It had to have heavy blankets for its beds. The men needed raincoats

and rubber boots for wet and muddy weather. Tentage was required, pup

tents for the front and large tents and flies at the camps. Belts and

bandoleers of cotton webbing added to the soldier's efficiency as a

rifleman or machine gunner.

To procure these and other supplies for an American Army that

eventually reached the strength of 3,750,000 men required the best

brains in the textile, rubber fabric, and leather goods industries.

From the counting rooms, from the laboratories, and from the American

factories the needs of the Government called to Washington several

hundred men, experts in a thousand lines, and put them into American

officers' uniforms. Eventually the various agencies of the War

Department purchasing these supplies were centralized in a single

division known as the Clothing and Equipage Division of the Office of

the Director of Purchase and Storage, which in turn was part of the

Division of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic.

The total cost of this necessary equipment of textiles and leather and

rubber goods was approximately $2,100,000,000. Of the enormous sum of

money appropriated for the so-called quartermaster activities, a full

one-quarter went for clothing and equipage of this sort.

The group who handled this enormous manufacturing effort not only

conducted one of the biggest undertakings of the war but did it in a

way to command the admiration of those who knew the story of what was

going on. The division turned scientific attention, and that means the

attention of real scientists, to the proper construction of all sorts

of articles. It designed new styles of soldiers' clothing adapted

in every curve and line to the service in France. It standardized

dyes and made studies of protective coloring. It produced highly

specialized shoes. It saved millions of dollars by the scientific study

of specifications of various articles. It educated manufacturers in

the production of articles strange to their experience, and in some

cases developed entirely new industries. At one time it constituted the

entire wool trade of the United States, since it had optioned every

pound of wool in sight and had its agents out gathering up the excess

wool of the earth. It was a shipmaster, an employer of men, a reformer

in labor conditions, and an inventor and originator of new products.

The organization was important not only for the size of its business

but because it dealt more intimately with the individual soldier

than perhaps any other production branch of the Government, with the

possible exception of the branch which fed him. It might seem to be a

fairly easy proposition to buy clothing for a soldier, his tent, and

the bed clothing that kept him warm in active service or when he was

a patient in a military hospital. But it was not a simple task. None

of these articles was standard for civilian use, either in material,

color, or pattern. Everything had to be made to order. The ordinary

factory could not begin work on contracts for these supplies on a

minute's notice, but usually only after special and sometimes costly

preparation.

And as the Army grew in size it had to have large quantities of special

clothing. Cooks needed cotton aprons, and blacksmiths leather ones.

Linemen had to have special gloves; hospital orderlies and waiters

at messes required white duck suits; motorcyclists needed hoods;

laborers, overalls; and firemen, helmets. There were special garments

for aviators. We began capturing prisoners and they had to have special

uniforms. Convalescents at hospitals needed special suits. The women

nurses of the Army were supplied with uniforms, something entirely

outside of previous Army experience.

The Government was something more than the designer and manufacturer of

these goods, drawing the specifications, placing the orders, and then

teaching the processes of manufacture in the thousands of factories

which had virtually become Government plants. The clothing and equipage

organization had to go further back and become the actual procurer

of the raw materials; and this phase of its work eventually became

one of the largest and most spectacular and romantic elements of the

whole undertaking. In addition to procuring the raw cotton and the raw

wool and the hides, the Government had to go into the manufacture of

cloth and the tanning of leather to supply these commodities to the

manufacturers of the finished articles. The Government went into a raw

materials market which was already glutted with orders from the allied

governments and from domestic consumption. It went into this market

at first without money, since funds on the scale demanded were not

available between March 4, 1917, and June 15 of the same year; and it

had to buy on credit and secure the commodities in the face of cash

bidding for them.

Nevertheless the whole enormous undertaking was successfully carried

through. Except in rare instances, the American soldier never lacked

for necessary supplies of this character. The organization which

handled the work originally consisted of 6 officers and 25 clerks.

When the armistice was signed this great purchasing and manufacturing

agency had an enrollment of 1,693 people.

Wool was the most important of the raw materials to be procured,

since wool entered into the composition of more items than any other

material. Uniforms, overcoats, underwear, socks, breeches, shirts,

and many other articles had to be made entirely or partially of wool.

The purchases of woolen breeches alone during the war period amounted

to 13,176,000 pairs. On September 10, 1918, the wool experts of the

army estimated the Nation's total needs for wool up to June 30, 1919.

The War Department, it was found, during this time would require

246,000,000 pounds of clean wool; the allotment to civilian needs was

but 15,000,000 pounds. In other words, the war demands were to absorb

practically the entire supply of wool; civilians were to be forced to

do without it almost entirely.

Soon after the declaration of war the Quartermaster Corps estimated

that it would require about 100,000,000 pounds of scoured wool to meet

the initial demands of the Army in 1917. A meeting was called of the

principal wool dealers of the United States, most of them from Boston,

and a quick inventory was taken of the available wool supplies, not

only in the United States, but on order from foreign countries. It was

found that there was in sight 78,000,000 pounds of greasy wool, which,

after being scoured, would produce 35,000,000 pounds of wool of the

quality needed. This was barely one-third of the Army's demand alone.

It should be noted, however, that this inventory was taken just before

the annual American clip, which would be finished by the end of July.

To insure that the Government would secure every pound of wool

in sight, options were promptly obtained on all wool in American

warehouses or on the sea, and speculation in the prices of the domestic

clip for 1917 was thus headed off by the entry of the Government itself

in the raw wool business. The prices were fixed for the 1917 clip as of

July 31. A year later the clothing and equipage division had become the

entire wool trade of the United States. There was no wool market again

and no public sale of wool until after the armistice was signed.

To handle this enormous undertaking the division appointed a wool

administrator to buy wool, a wool purchasing quartermaster to pay for

it, and a wool distributor to sell it to the Government contractors.

The Government's wool headquarters was in Boston, with branches at

Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis, San Francisco, and Seattle. This

organization arranged to procure the whole 1917 clip, if needed, took

over all wool destined for the United States under import licenses, and

sent its agents to foreign markets.

The largest of the foreign markets practically available from the

standpoint of distance was the Argentine in South America. Australia

and New Zealand were, of course, enormous markets, but the dearth of

shipping made it impossible to spare many bottoms for the long voyage

into the Antipodes. As a matter of fact, when the fighting ceased, the

whole world was suffering for wool, except Australia and New Zealand.

America was short of wool, France had practically none, there was a

little in England, but Australia and New Zealand had the staggering

surplus of 1,000,000,000 pounds. This was due to the fact that there

had been no shipping available to bring this wool to America or Europe.

The Government's wool administrator secured such Australian and New

Zealand wool as he could; but he had to rely principally on sailing

vessels, which could not, under the most favorable conditions, go to

Australia and back again in less than seven months, while nine or ten

months were more often required. A quick sailing voyage to Argentina

and back required five months.

Nevertheless, and this was particularly true in the early fall of 1918,

when preparations were being made for the equipment of the Army in

1919, every effort was made to secure foreign wool. A South American

wool-buying commission was formed and sent to Buenos Aires, arriving

there October 30, 1918. By that time, however, the end of the war was

in sight, and the commission never opened up its Argentine headquarters.

The Government conducted its raw-wool business on the lines of a great

department store. Headquarters were established in Boston, where the

wool distributors kept samples of almost every kind of wool produced

on earth, these samples representing stocks on hand in the various

Government warehouses in Boston and elsewhere. Charles J. Nichols,

a member of a large Boston wool firm, was the wool administrator

and E. W. Brigham was wool distributor. Prices were fixed, and the

manufacturers bought from the samples. Carpet wool was sold at an

office in Philadelphia. The wool administrator did a business that

averaged $2,500,000 per day during his incumbency, his total purchases

amounting to about 722,000,000 pounds of wool.

At first the supply of the better grades of wool seemed to be adequate

to meet the Army's demands. Later, however, changes were made in the

specifications for various cloths, uniform cloth being increased

from 16 to 20 ounces in weight, overcoating from 30 to 32 ounces,

shirting flannel from 8½ to 9½ ounces, and blankets from 3 to 4

pounds. These increases made it necessary for the Army to use grades

of wool previously made only into coarse materials like carpet. The

lower grades of wool were blended with the finer grades to provide the

necessary weight and warmth, even at the expense of fineness of texture

and appearance. This action explains why at the end of the period of

hostilities some of the American soldiers' uniforms looked rough and

uneven in color. But the necessary cloth was provided, and it was warm.

The Government saved every ounce of wool that it possibly could save.

More economical patterns and layouts for the cutting of uniforms were

designed in Washington and furnished to the manufacturers. The American

soldier's uniform did not meet the approval of officers of the American

Expeditionary Forces as to style, after the latter had become used

to seeing the smartly dressed troops of Europe. Accordingly, after

Gen. Pershing had recommended a better-appearing uniform, a new one

was designed, incidentally with an eye to saving cloth. The coat of

the uniform--formerly called the blouse, a designation which is now

obsolete--was cut with new lines, making it slimmer without sacrifice

of warmth or comfort. The patch pockets of the original blouse were

usually unsightly bulges when the soldiers filled them with articles.

On the new coat the patch pocket was retained only in appearance, the

pocket actually being on the inside.

It is not known to most Americans that the breeches, which have been

typical of the American service uniform for many years, were abandoned

late in the war in favor of long trousers. This change was also due

to studies made by the army clothing experts. The soldiers themselves

were not enamored of breeches, since they had to be either laced or

buttoned below the knee, a process which took time always, but seemed

to take more when a man was in a hurry. The laces sometimes chafed the

leg under the leggins. Then, too, it was often impossible to remove the

breeches from soldiers wounded in their legs without cutting the cloth.

Long trousers did away with all these objections and had the added

virtue of being warmer than the breeches.

The overcoat, too, was redesigned, following Gen. Pershing's

recommendations, the stock overcoat being too long to be worn in the

trenches. A knee-length garment was provided which was much smarter

than the older coat.

The redesigning of the overcoat and the uniform (although the new

uniform never appeared in the field) accomplished numerous economies.

Merely by the elimination of lacings, eyelets, tape, and stays, the

new trousers cost 95.25 cents less than a pair of army breeches. By

July 1, 1919, this change in design would have saved the Government

$16,988,440 in orders for trousers already placed or in sight. The

change in overcoat styles saved 62 cents per garment, or a total saving

to July 1, 1919, estimated at $897,140. The service coat, made by

redesigning the blouse, saved the Government $1.598 on each garment, or

an estimated saving of $4,977,770 to July 1, 1919.

This was not only financial saving, but what was more important, it was

saving the consumption of the raw material, wool. The Government could

always raise more money; but if the wool supply were exhausted, all the

money on earth could not buy any more of it.

A more economical cutting pattern saved twenty-three one-hundredths

of a yard of cloth in the manufacture of every pair of trousers. This

resulted in the total saving of 2,300,000 yards of woolen cloth. Part

of the facings of the service coats and overcoats were eliminated

without sacrificing warmth or serviceability, and cheaper cotton

linings were substituted. Another important cloth economy came when the

Army designers cut off the right-hand pocket of the O. D. shirt, on the

ground that this pocket was seldom used. The designers also substituted

an oblong elbow patch on the Army shirt for the circular patch formerly

specified. This substitution was not economy in cloth, but the original

circular patch, put on the sleeve to reinforce it at the point of

greatest wear, actually resulted in reducing or shortening the life of

the garment by tearing loose at the stitches, a fault which the oblong

patch overcame.

In the earlier contracts the garment makers were stimulated to save

wool by being allowed a percentage of the cost of yardage saved. Each

contractor, too, was permitted to sell his own clippings. But as the

Government obtained a more scientific grasp of the clothing problem and

produced pattern layouts which utilized the maximum percentages of the

cloth, the issues of cloth to the garment makers were calculated more

closely. Thereafter the contractors received no reimbursement for cloth

savings, and the Government itself took all the clippings.

These clippings were shipped to a base sorting plant at New York, where

they were baled and shipped out to mills to be used as reworked wool in

blankets and other articles. The clippings were sorted at a cost of 1.7

cents per pound and sold at an average price of 23 cents per pound, the

total sales bringing in to the Government $5,500,000.

The history of the Government's wool enterprise during the war

illustrates how hard it was to check the momentum of the whole

production undertaking against Germany once it had attained full speed.

A week before the armistice was signed the wool stocks looked small,

and shortages plainly existed to cause anxiety for the executives in

Washington. That was because we were thinking in terms of consumption

made familiar by the terrific destruction of war. A week later the

same stocks looked overwhelming in size, and the shortages had

become enormous surpluses. It had been a constant worry to procure

a sufficient quantity of blankets, yet as soon as the armistice was

signed, we had on hand a 47-months' supply of blankets for 1,000,000

men in the United States and 2,400,000 men overseas. As soon as the

German plenipotentiaries affixed their signatures to the armistice

agreement at Spa an apparently small stock of marching shoes turned

into a 4-year supply for 3,400,000 soldiers at home and abroad. On

November 1, 1918, the Clothing and Equipage Division had on hand a

reserve stock of goods valued at $811,000,000.

The entire woolen industry, from the handlers of raw wool to the

textile mills, worked splendidly with the Government. At all times

there was plenty of available machinery to make all the cloth for which

wool could be furnished. Mills which found no Government use for their

regular business output went heartily to work to make something else

that the Government would need. The Government's uses for carpet, for

instance, were practically negligible; so that the carpet mills, many

of them, swung their entire production to Army blankets and Army duck.

Blankets, in fact, were one of the largest items. The total purchases

brought to the Government warehouses about 22,000,000 blankets, at

a total cost of over $145,000,000. Melton cloth for overcoats and

uniforms consumed an enormous quantity of wool. The total purchases of

melton amounted to more than 100,000,000 yards, or enough to stretch

twice around the world at the Equator, with a strip left over long

enough to reach from New York across Germany and Russia and into

Siberia. The total quantity of raw wool bought by the Government up to

December 14, 1918, cost over $504,000,000.

After the Government had secured the wool and various types of cloth,

there still remained the task of making this cloth into uniforms. The

usual method was for the Government to furnish the materials and to pay

the contractor his cost of manufacturing.

All Army clothing was made up according to the so-called tariff sizes.

The average coat for a man is a 38 or 40, and experience shows how many

men in a given number will need this average. But there were always

exceptions. One camp sent in a special order for 46 overcoats for

"fats."

Through a scientific study of the problem, notable reforms in the

matter of fitting soldiers were brought about. When the men were coming

in greatest numbers from civilian life to the training camps they

were often put to great inconvenience in securing proper clothing.

Each man would ask for such sizes as he thought were correct, but it

often happened that the garments supplied to him did not fit him, and

he thereafter spent some hours or even days swapping garments with

other recruits until he eventually acquired an outfit somewhere near

his size. Then, too, there was confusion in the way the articles were

supplied to the men, who sometimes had to stand in line all day long,

awaiting their turn at the issue windows.

The matter of fitting was satisfactorily solved by adopting the

so-called foolproof size labels. The labels originally used were merely

paper tags pinned to the garments, and in the handling of garments by

men unfamiliar with the fitting of ready-made clothing mistakes often

resulted. As in the case of civilian clothing, all Army clothing was

divided into four classes, known as "longs," "shorts," "stouts," and

"regulars." A garment of any size would come in these four classes.

The labels were marked with diagonal, colored stripes to indicate the

general characteristics of the garment to which it was attached. Thus

green meant a "short," red indicated a "long," and yellow showed the

garment to be a "stout." The soldier was pretty sure to remember the

color of the stripe attached to the garment that fitted him. If he were

a green striper, he would refuse to accept anything that did not bear a

green stripe on its ticket.

Before hostilities ceased a system providing a more scientific issue of

clothing to recruits had been introduced. Under this system the recruit

would enter the supply building at one end and there, in a special

room, strip himself of his civilian clothing. He would thereupon enter

the mill as naked as the Lord made him. He would stop first at the

underwear counter, where he would procure garments that fitted him,

would don them, and then pass on to the hosiery counter. Thus he would

progress down the line, eventually emerging from the other end of the

building a fully dressed American soldier, the process reminding one of

the progress of an automobile through the Ford factory.

It required the services of some 4,000 inspectors to supervise the

garment-making in thousands of shops scattered throughout the country.

This inspection also looked at the character of the shops taking

contracts, and the Government was sometimes hard put to it to prevent

child labor and sweat shop production in the work.

At one time there came a rush order from France to supply several

hundred thousand mackinaws. An officer who was familiar with, mackinaws

was sent out from Washington to buy them from goods in stock. He

accomplished his mission in 10 days, literally baring the shelves

of the United States of these garments, his purchases including the

extensive quantities of mackinaws held by mail-order houses in Chicago.

It was always a problem in clothing the Army to find olive-drab dyes

that were fast in color. The first dyes used were apt to fade quickly.

A certain dye was of the proper color, yet it was found on test to

have the peculiar characteristic of being visible at a distance. As

the new American synthetic dye industry expanded and processes were

perfected, the officers of the Clothing and Equipage Division were able

to cooperate with the American dye makers to produce satisfactory dyes.

Yet while the olive-drab dye used in dyeing coats and trousers seemed

to withstand the sun and rain, that used in coloring the leggins proved

to be fugitive to a remarkable degree. It seemed to be impossible

to produce a dye that would hold its shade in leggins. The experts

working on the dye problem had expended a good deal of valuable energy

in worry and had grown a few gray hairs in their heads over the failure

of leggin dyes when they discovered the true cause of the fading. The

men were deliberately bleaching out their leggins, usually by using

salt solutions on them, since anything but a faded leggin indicated

that the soldier who wore it was a rookie and a greenhorn.

The materials which went into the manufacture of clothing came from

various sections of the country, since the several garment industries

had grown up around centers. For instance, the melton cloth came

generally from the Boston district. Linings were supplied from Atlanta,

buttons from Philadelphia, and duck from Chicago. This geographic

distribution of supplies simplified the Government's problem of

supplying materials to the various contractors. It was possible to

supply materials on short notice to any garment-making district.

At one time Chicago wired that unless 500,000 yards of flannel shirting

were supplied immediately hundreds of shirt factories in Chicago and

the Chicago district would have to close down. Accordingly, a special

freight train was loaded with shirting in the East and started for

Chicago on a special movement in charge of a "live tracer"--that is,

an officer who saw that the train was put through to its destination.

The train arrived in Chicago on the second day after the order was

received, so rapidly had the goods been procured and loaded.

In addition to the regular uniforms for the men, almost half a million

articles of clothing for officers were also bought by the Government.

The Quartermaster Department went into an entirely new field when it

bought uniforms for the women nurses of the Army. There was a Norfolk

suit which cost about $30 and a cotton uniform that cost about $3, an

overcoat costing nearly $28, and then there were waists made from navy

blue silk and from white cotton, and hats.

Before leaving the subject of clothing, it is interesting to refer

again to the clothing furnished for interned prisoners. This was not

manufactured for the purpose. Uniforms discarded by our own men were

reclaimed and dyed a special shade of green. Over 50,000 of these

garments were prepared at an average cost of less than 30 cents

per garment. It had been the original intention to make a special

prisoner's uniform striped in resemblance to the prison suits worn in

American penitentiaries.

Another interesting development in the manufacture of Army clothing

was the production of a special uniform for expeditionary troops sent

to Russia. The uniforms were so warm that they could well serve as

the equipment for an Arctic exploration party. The determination to

send an expedition to Russia was made suddenly by the Government,

and the decision brought with it the problem of producing in a jiffy

an equipment of garments not only expensive in themselves, but of a

character unknown to the American garment trade. An agent for the

division in New York at once bought on the New York market large

quantities of muskrat, wolf, and marmot fur. Other agents were sent

into our own Northwest and to Canada to pick up such suitable garments

as these markets afforded. The Siberian equipment as specified by the

commanders of the expedition called for fur caps, fur mittens and fur

overcoats, mucklucks, moccasins, felt shoes, fur parkas, and underwear

for 15,000 men or more. The order for the equipment came in the latter

part of August, 1918, so that only the fastest kind of work would

produce the garments in time to catch the last steamer that could get

into the northern Russian and Siberian ports before the ice closed

navigation for the season. The result was that whenever the articles

specified could not be procured on time, suitable substitutes were

provided.

The specifications called for 80 per cent wool underwear. Underwear

with that percentage of wool could not be provided, but underwear

of equal weight was substituted. Where fur-lined garments were

unobtainable, fur-trimmed ones were procured. The specifications called

for Buffalo coats. The division sent a man to the north woods country

of Minnesota and Wisconsin, and there in the supply cities he bought

sheep-lined coats with moleskin or duck shells as a substitute. These

coats were the sort used by woodsmen and Alaskan miners and explorers.

There was no time to procure mucklucks, moccasins, and felt shoes, so

an agent of the division was sent into Canada to buy shoe pacs (or

lumbermen's boots) and lumbermen's knee-length socks. The total cost of

the whole outfit was more than $100 per man.

It was impossible to find any substitute for the Alaskan parka. A parka

is a sort of overshirt, wind proof and waterproof and hooded, to be

worn over the overcoat and cap of the uniform. Consequently it was

necessary to produce the parkas in this country, although our garment

makers were entirely unfamiliar with such manufacture. The work was

undertaken by the International Duplex Coat Co., at 114 Fifth Avenue,

New York. It was necessary from the start in turning out this order for

the employees of this plant to work overtime. In order to speed the

production the principal member of this firm himself took his place at

the bench and worked almost day and night in cutting out garments.

[Illustration: CLOTHING WORN BY OUR SIBERIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.]

[Illustration: MANUFACTURING WOOLEN UNDERWEAR FOR THE ARMY.

The weaving department of a plant at Cohoes, N. Y.]

[Illustration: MANUFACTURING HOSIERY FOR THE ARMY.

The knitting room of a hosiery mill at Durham, N. C.]

The day approached closer and closer when the shipment would have to

start across the country if it were to catch the last boat from San

Francisco. On the home stretch of the race the entire working force

of the plant went 36 hours, stopping only for meals. The last stitch

was taken at 1.30 o'clock in the morning. The garments were then piled

upon auto trucks to be rushed to the baling plant in Brooklyn. One of

the loaded trucks developed engine trouble and stopped in the middle

of a bridge across the East River. The officer in charge thereupon

commandeered every automobile that came along, piled them all full

of parkas and sent them to the baling plant. The entire shipment was

aboard the train less than one hour before its starting time.

It was not only necessary for the Government to furnish cloth for the

uniforms, shirts, and other articles, but it had to supply the fittings

and findings as well, such needs as linings, tape, buttons, and hooks

and eyes. In the calendar year 1918 the purchases amounted to over

46,000,000 yards of cotton lining and 2,500,000 yards of felt lining,

worth over $18,000,000. The Government spent over $100,000 for hooks

and eyes, $150,000 for tape, $1,250,000 for thread, and practically

$3,000,000 for buttons.

When it was found that the standard specifications for Army uniform

buttons favored a certain class of manufacturers and excluded many

others, new specifications were drawn so as to make it possible for

every button manufacturer in the country to compete for contracts. An

exclusive study was made of new materials for buttons. They had been

made of brass or bronze, but due to other war necessities for metals

an effort was made to provide a substitute. It was found, too, that

metal buttons sometimes resulted in infection of wounds received on the

battlefield.

Substitution of vegetable ivory for metal in buttons was attempted.

The Bureau of Standards in Washington tested the taqua, or ivory,

nuts from which buttons are made and found them suitable. A vegetable

ivory button with a shank was developed, although no such ivory button

had been known before, and the Government's insignia was stamped on

this button. Gen. Pershing approved the use of ivory buttons, and

thereafter many manufacturers produced millions of gross of them.

Every manufacturer who took button contracts agreed to turn over the

ivory nut waste to the Chemical Warfare Service to be used in making

charcoal for the gas-absorbing canisters of the gas masks. Most of the

buttons were produced by firms in Rochester and Philadelphia. Many

concerns made them who had never made buttons before. Manufacturers of

electric goods, hardware, billiard balls, celluloid, pearl buttons, and

phonograph records turned their plants into ivory-button factories.

Enormous quantities of buttons were required. For the Army shirts alone

the Government needed 216,000,000 buttons in 1918.

Flags constituted another class of goods requiring wool. In all, the

division produced 40,000 flags during the war period, most of these

being made at the Government's own shop at Philadelphia. It is a grim

fact that many of these flags were used to wrap around the bodies of

soldiers who died at sea. Thirty million chevrons for noncommissioned

officers were also turned out by the Government.

The production of overseas caps for the American Expeditionary Forces

was likewise an extensive undertaking. When the requisition for

overseas caps came from France, it was not possible to design one here

because of lack of knowledge of what was required. Later a courier

bearing a sample cap came to the United States from Gen. Pershing. As

soon as this sample was received a meeting of cap makers was called in

New York, and 100 manufacturers attended. One and all agreed to turn

over their factories to the exclusive production of overseas caps until

the requirements were met. It took these cap makers only two weeks to

turn out the first order. In all 4,972,000 caps were delivered.

Our experts on this side of the water were not satisfied with the

overseas cap. It shrank after being wet, it quickly lost shape,

it absorbed much water and did not dry out quickly, and it was

unattractive in appearance. Also it did not shade the eyes, and the

experience in France showed that the soldiers usually improvised peaks

to their caps by sticking their girls' letters between their caps and

their foreheads. Then, moreover, the standard cap was made of 20-ounce

melton, which was a fabric hard to get. But there was plenty of rabbit

fur available to make felt caps for an army of 6,000,000 or 7,000,000

men. Accordingly a new cap was designed, made of felt and doing away

with the bad features of the melton cap; but this cap improvement came

at the end of the war and was never used.

Wool was required not only for the outer clothing of the Army--for the

uniforms, overcoats, and caps--but there was also a tremendous war

demand for it for the manufacture of such knit goods as undershirts,

drawers, stockings, gloves, and puttees. The matter of providing the

Army with these necessary articles offered a problem of peculiar

difficulty, since, in addition to the ever-threatening shortage of

raw wool, there was an actual shortage of machinery in the knitting

industry. When it was found that the regular mills could not turn out

all the woolen knit goods the Army required, numerous mills which had

been turning out specialties exclusively, such as women's underwear

or men's union suits, were converted into factories to knit garments

according to the Army specifications. Some idea of the extent of the

Army's demand for this class of goods may be read in the fact that

toward the close of hostilities every machine in the United States that

could make hosiery at all was knitting socks for the Government.

[Illustration: SEWING OVERSEAS CAPS IN A ST. PAUL. MINN., FACTORY.]

[Illustration: HEAPS OF OVERSEAS CAPS READY FOR SEWING IN A ST. PAUL

FACTORY.]

[Illustration: UNDERWEAR FOR THE ARMY AT A MILL IN ST. JOHNSVILLE, N.

Y.]

[Illustration: KNITTING ARMY UNDERWEAR IN A SYRACUSE, N. Y., MILL.]

At one time there was an acute shortage of needles. Germany had

previously supplied America with knitting needles. When this source was

cut off, we turned to Japan. The Japanese needles proved disappointing;

they were not correctly tempered and frequent breakage caused great

loss. At one time it was rumored that there were 10,000,000 knitting

needles in Sweden, and the need here was so urgent that several buyers

were sent to that country. Their effort was well worth while, for they

actually secured a million needles to help relieve the situation here.

Meanwhile, American needles were improved and American needle makers

were pushed to the limit; but until the close of the war there was

always an acute shortage of needles for the knitting industry.

It was soon discovered that there was not enough machinery in America

to knit one-tenth of the seamless woolen gloves that the soldiers

required. Consequently it was necessary to adopt a substitute--a glove

of knit fabric cut to pattern and sewed up with seams. In actual

service this glove did not stand up to the hard usage required of it.

Consequently there was designed an over-glove of canton flannel with

the palm cased in leather, this to be worn outside the seamed woolen

glove. In the effort to produce gloves which would give longer wear the

so-called ambidextrous glove was designed so cut that it could be worn

comfortably upon either hand.

Puttees, the spirally wound leggins that had long been used by the

British Army, were unknown articles to American manufacture when the

American Expeditionary Forces adopted them as standard articles of

equipment. A puttee of knitted wool was designed and 6,000,000 of them

were ordered in the spring of 1918, these to be preliminary to future

orders for 8,000,000. The work required the installation of much new

machinery in the textile plants. On November 1, 1918, we had produced

all the puttees required by the troops then in France and had a surplus

of 1,500,000 of them.

In the production of knit goods, economies in the use of material

were constantly effected. An original article of equipment for the

overseas troops had been a knitted woolen toque, which was a sort of

stocking-cap. The toques had cost the Government $1 apiece, and some

1,500,000 of them had been piled up in the quartermaster warehouses

before the toque was abandoned as a piece of standard equipment.

Later a requisition was received for 400,000 woolen mufflers to be

used by drivers of automobiles and motor trucks. According to the

specifications these would cost about $3 apiece. Then it was discovered

here that the abandoned toques might be sewed together to make

mufflers. With this stock in hand it cost the Government only 20 cents

each for the mufflers instead of $3, a clear saving of over $1,000,000.

The Quartermaster Department was the Mecca of inventors during the war

period, who came bringing real or fancied improvements in many lines

of apparel and personal equipment. One brought in a trench shower bath,

consisting of a hot-water bag and a hose. He was much chagrined when

informed that if this apparatus were set up in the trench there would

be no room for soldiers to pass it. In no respect did the inventors

have more novel ideas than they had in the manufacture of underwear.

One of them brought in a patented vacuum suit of underwear which acted

on the principle of a fireless cooker or thermos bottle to exclude

the cold from the wearer's body. However, he had failed to take into

consideration the fact that not only must cold be kept out, but

perspiration must be given a chance to escape. The vacuum underwear

would never dry out, after a man had become sweaty in it. For that

reason it was not adopted.

A woman of Iowa invented cootie-proof underclothing by impregnating

underwear with vermin-destroying chemicals. The State of Iowa was so

interested in her invention that there was a public movement to clothe

all Iowa troops in this underwear, should the Government fail to

adopt it. The underwear was submitted to the experts of the Bureau of

Entomology (the Government agency that deals with bugs), whose experts

tested the invention. They found that the underwear was indeed death

to the cootie. However, if the chemicals were applied in weak strength

they soon evaporated and left the underwear harmless to the insect; if

applied in great strength, the poisonous chemicals irritated the skin

of the wearer.

During the first winter the men were in camp, the winter of 1917-18,

there was no time to provide the troops with standard Army underwear.

Consequently Government agents went into the underwear market and

bought outright whatever was in sight. As a result, the soldiers that

first winter wore underwear of almost every description and grade

of merit. This gave the Army's underwear experts a fine opportunity

to study the qualities of underwear of various types as proved by

actual use. These studies contained hints of use to the civilian.

For instance, the warning is plainly given to wear no fleece-lined

underwear. A study was made of the causes of colds, and it was

discovered that soldiers wearing fleece-lined underwear caught cold

more easily than those wearing any other sort. The fleece of the lining

absorbed perspiration and retained it, staying damp. Since many of the

soldiers slept in their underclothing, they were thus encased in damp

clothes 24 hours a day. Sick reports plainly showed the result of it.

When it comes to the production of cotton cloth for the Army's uses,

the figures are so large as to appear almost fantastic. In all we

procured over 800,000,000 square yards of cotton textiles. This was

enough to carpet an area nearly four times as large as the District

of Columbia. In a strip 3 feet wide there was enough of it to wrap

18 layers of cloth around the equator. Spread this strip out on some

cosmic floor, and you could place upon it side by side 55 globes as

large as the earth.

In addition to the cotton khaki required for uniforms and other

purposes, the principal other cotton items were duck, denim, webbing,

gauze, venetian, sheets, pillowcases, and towels.

The purchases made by the Army were beyond anything that had been

known in the textile industry. In March, 1918, the supplies of cotton

khaki on hand seemed to indicate a surplus of 21,000,000 yards beyond

the needs of the immediate future. Then came the start of the German

drive, and by the middle of April this great surplus of khaki cloth was

not sufficient to the need. In other words, there was a shortage of

khaki, since the Army needed at once 25,000,000 yards and thereafter

would require a monthly supply of 10,000,000 yards. This was looking

toward the great increase in the number of men soon to be called to the

colors. It was planned to draft 300,000 in June alone, and subsequent

drafts would be on a like scale.

In order to supply summer uniforms for these men it was necessary

for Army officers to get every yard of khaki goods in the country.

All stocks of goods in the hands of dealers and manufacturers

were inventoried, and the positive order went out of Washington

forbidding the use of khaki in articles for civilians. In spite of the

Government's tremendous demand upon a limited supply, these stocks of

khaki were acquired at a price 20 per cent lower than the prevailing

market.

The requirements for cotton duck and cotton webbing also leaped upward

as soon as the United States began to avalanche soldiers upon France.

The demands were greater than could be supplied by the output of mills

regularly producing these materials, and consequently the Clothing and

Equipage Division called upon manufacturers of similar materials to

adapt their plants to the production of duck and webbing. This they

did, in many cases at considerable inconvenience and expense. Among the

concerns which assisted in supplying these materials were manufacturers

of carpets, automobile tire fabric, and even lace.

Owing to the scarcity and the high cost of leather a great deal of

cotton webbing was substituted in the manufacture of such equipment

as cartridge belts, suspenders, gun slings, and horse bridles. Here

was additional demand, and to meet it factories which had been making

such things as asbestos brake linings, hose, lamp wicks, suspenders,

garters, cotton belting, and other similar fabrics, became webbing

mills. All these plants thus adapted to the emergency manufacture of

webbing were dependent on purchased yarns, which they had to secure in

the open market from yarn manufacturers.

In the South particularly, where most of this yarn was purchased, the

securing of power was a serious question. Many of the mills depended

upon electricity generated by water power. These power plants did

not always have good railway connections and many of them had no

steam power equipment even if fuel could have been furnished. In the

late summer of 1918 the rivers of the South ran nearly dry, and in

order to operate many of the southern mills it was necessary for the

Government to allocate according to most pressing needs the available

power among the mills working on contracts. Also, for a long time when

transportation facilities were seriously overtaxed, it was hard to

secure a steady flow of materials from the South to the northern mills.

With regard to labor, employees in the cotton and webbing mills had to

be educated in the manufacture of the new types of work to which these

plants had been shifted. In the South, more especially, there was a

question of child labor and of hours of labor for women and minors;

for the Government inserted clauses in the later contracts requiring

certain standards for the benefit and protection of labor. In some

instances contracts were returned because of the child-labor clause. In

such cases compulsory orders were often issued, practically compelling

the mills to produce the goods called for.

Considerable burlap used for packing, as well as burlap bags, silk for

flags, hat bands, and badges were also purchased in quantity.

The United States was never forced to turn to the use of paper in the

manufacture of clothing, as the central powers were compelled to do;

nevertheless preparation was made for the time when the cotton supply

of the United States might become unequal to the demand. Garments made

of paper cloth captured from the Germans were shipped to the United

States and carefully studied by the Clothing and Equipage Division

to learn the possibilities of paper fabrics should the need for them

develop.

Over 100,000,000 yards of denim were bought. Denim was used

particularly in making working clothes for the soldiers. At one time

the factories were consuming denim at the rate of 13,000,000 yards a

month. Brown denim which was required by regulations was a material

hard to get, blue denim being the standard fabric for American

overalls, and consequently heavy gray goods and drills were dyed

olive-drab and put into use.

As to gauze, about 140,000,000 yards of it were purchased. Sheets

and pillowcases were required in such quantities that at one time

every mill in the country whose normal business was the production of

sheeting was working for the Government. There were over 120,000,000

yards of webbing purchased, and nearly 300,000,000 yards of the various

kinds of duck.

The duck and webbing just mentioned went into the manufacture of a

numerous class of articles, known as textile equipment, including such

articles as belts, tool bags, tool kits, flasks, canteen covers, and

the like. The procurement of the webbing for these articles was in

itself a manufacturing achievement. Before the war there were only a

half dozen plants in the United States which could make webbing of the

grade demanded by the Army. When the armistice came there there were

150 such plants. At the beginning of the war an order for 5,000,000

yards of webbing fairly staggered the industry, but that industry was

to witness the day when an order for 50,000,000 yards would be absorbed

as a matter of course.

But even after the webbing was secured there were practically no

factories in the United States that had machinery heavy enough to make

the Army's textile equipment. This work for the standing Army had been

done exclusively by the Rock Island Arsenal. In order to increase

the manufacturing capacity of the country it was necessary to get

the Singer Sewing Machine Co. to build special machines adapted to

this heavy work; and we also had to send experts from the Rock Island

Arsenal to teach all new contractors how to make the articles. Many of

the factory workers were women.

In spite of all difficulties production was wonderfully increased.

Along in January, 1918, about 100,000 pistol belts a month were being

made; while at the time of the signing of the armistice 560,000 were

being manufactured monthly. Of cartridge belts in the same period the

production was increased from 85,000 to about 410,000 monthly, and of

haversacks from 290,000 to about 850,000 monthly.

No soldier could be sent overseas without a haversack, a cartridge

belt, and a canteen cover; yet during the period of active hostilities

no movement of troops was delayed one day on account of the lack of

textile equipment. Up to December 1, 1918, the production of haversacks

was over 2,500,000 in number, costing over $8,000,000; of canteen

covers, about 3,750,000, costing $2,250,000; of cartridge belts, about

1,500,000, costing over $4,000,000. Another large item was bandoleers,

which were procured to the number of over 31,000,000 at a cost of

$5,500,000. These are only a few of the major items, but they serve to

illustrate the extent of the purchases of textile equipment.

At the end of hostilities the Government was buying textile equipment

at the rate of $22,000,000 a month, and was working toward the goal of

being able to supply 750,000 men a month with all articles of textile

equipment.

When the Army began to expand in size at an unexpected rate in the

spring of 1918, it created a great shortage in cotton underwear.

Government agents went out over the country and bought all cotton

underwear stocks. In order to provide a sufficient manufacturing

capacity for cotton underwear, women's underwear factories were

enlisted for war work, and so were even corset factories.

The Army experts in cotton textiles also effected many economies.

A standard pattern layout was drawn for the overall makers with

consequent large savings of cloth in the manufacture of brown denim

fatigue clothing, or soldiers' working clothes. At one time practically

every overall factory in the United States was making fatigue clothing

for the Army, after Gen. Pershing had cabled an order for 3,000,000

garments to be delivered in 90 days.

In making the soldiers' barrack bags, in which they pack their clothing

and personal effects, the manufacturers in cutting out the pattern left

a 3-inch strip of cloth. Army officers discovered these 3-inch strips

and also noted the fact that every barrack bag must be provided with a

draw-string. The specifications were thereupon changed so that these

3-inch strips could be used as draw-strings in the barrack bags, a

trifling economy apparently, yet amounting to a saving of 6 cents in

the cost of each one of millions of these bags.

A vast amount of tentage was required, not only for tents themselves,

but also for such articles as paulins, tent covers, bed rolls and

clothing rolls, canvas basins and buckets, bags for stakes, tool bags,

coal bags, and mail bags, cargo covers, wagon covers, horse covers, and

many similar articles.

Valuable work was done in substituting cotton thread for linen. Linen

thread became so scarce that the Ordnance Department commandeered

the whole supply. This worked havoc in the shoe industry, and as a

result the Council of National Defense secured from the Ordnance

Department enough linen thread to take care of the Army shoe contracts.

Nevertheless it was discovered that cotton thread might be substituted

for linen in many industries. In fact, it often proved to be better

than linen.

Valuable standard tests for waterproof cloth were also worked out.

These tests were developed at the Bureau of Chemistry, a branch of

the Department of Agriculture in Washington. In these tests cloth

was required to withstand a deluge of water equivalent in intensity

to a tropical rain, and also to undergo a dry temperature of 120°

Fahrenheit. There were also tests to determine under what conditions

the cloth would mildew. These tests are expected to have a use in the

waterproof-goods industry in normal times.

Another important contribution of the Army to peace-time industry was

the design of the over-suit for the use of truck drivers. This was a

waterproof garment, air-tight and cold-proof. It is expected that this

new garment will continue in commercial use.

The principal items of rubber goods bought by the Army were rubber

boots and overshoes, raincoats, and slickers. The production of rubber

boots for the Army took practically the entire capacity of all mills

in the United States, the rubber boot manufacturers having pledged

themselves to discontinue their civilian business until the needs of

the Government were taken care of. Of different types of rubber boots,

the purchases were considerably over 4,000,000 pairs, at the cost of

$20,500,000.

Incidentally there was worked out an improvement in rubber boots to

prevent them from blistering the heels of wearers. It was discovered

that a rubber boot blisters the heel because it rubs slightly as the

wearer walks, no matter how well fitted to the foot the boot may

be. To the specifications for the Army's rubber boots was added the

requirement that straps be incorporated in the article to be buckled

both around the ankle and around the instep, thus holding the boot so

that it can not slip.

Raincoats caused a good deal of trouble, as there was not a sufficient

manufacturing capacity in this country to meet the requirements.

Practically all stocks of commercial raincoats were purchased, on the

theory that even a poor cover was better than none. As these garments

were made for civilian use, they were not built according to Army

specifications, and considerable criticism was made as to their quality.

When the manufacture of raincoats commenced on a large scale, many new

concerns went into the business, and some of them, either through lack

of experience or through carelessness or intent, made garments that

were not properly cemented. This led to investigations and indictments.

The total purchases of ponchos, raincoats, and slickers amounted to

about 10,000,000 garments, costing over $46,000,000.

In all 7,000,000 service hats of felt were manufactured on orders

placed by the War Department. The felt for these hats was made of

rabbit fur imported from Australia, New Zealand, and Russia and

produced in the United States. Hats were made principally at Danbury,

Conn., and Fall River, Mass., with smaller sources of supply at Yonkers

and Peekskill, N. Y., and Reading, Pa.

The numerous requirements of the Army for pillows created a shortage in

feathers. In all there were manufactured on Government order 500,000

pillows weighing 2½ pounds each. It had been the original intention

to fill these pillows with duck feathers; but when the American

duck-feather supply was exhausted and thousands of the ducks of China

had given up their plumage for the comfort of the American soldiers,

and still there were not enough feathers for the pillows, adulterations

with goose feathers and other light plumage were permitted.

The procurement of leather for the Army, both the raw material and

the finished products of leather, was one of the most important

undertakings, the principal war uses for leather being in shoes for the

soldiers and in harness for the horses and mules.

When the Government entered the leather market it found a high level of

prices, due to the large quantities of leather and leather equipment

which America had been exporting to the European nations at war. The

tanners were called together, and they came to an agreement with the

Government as to the prices of all grades of equipment which the Army

expected to buy. The packers next agreed on a maximum price for hides

suitable for Army leathers. The Government took an option on 750,000

hides then in the hands of the packers.

By consulting with the industry at all times the Government officers

were able to stabilize prices of leather. The price of harness leather,

which was originally fixed at 66 cents per pound, was advanced only

4 cents during the 18 months of the war period, while russet leather

never advanced more than 4 cents per pound above the $1.03 fixed at the

beginning of the war.

As the stocks of leather on hand diminished it became necessary to

stimulate the production of leather goods, and there was formed a hide

and leather control board, with a representative on it from each branch

of the trade, one for harness, one for sole leather, one for upper

leather, and one for the sheepskin trade. This board also inspected

leather at all the tanneries and the finished leather in the various

factories, a course of action which resulted in great improvement in

the quality of leather, particularly in leather used in shoemaking.

At the outset the Quartermaster Corps, the Ordnance Department, the

Signal Corps, the Engineering Department, the Medical Department,

the Navy, and the Marine Corps were all buying leather or leather

equipment, and the Y. M. C. A. and the Red Cross were also in the

market for large amounts of leather materials. These activities,

except those of the Navy and Marine Corps, were all eventually brought

under the administration of the Clothing and Equipage Division, thus

virtually eliminating competition in the leather market.

At the signing of the armistice it is safe to say there was enough

leather equipment, either in the United States or in France, or in

process of manufacture here, to meet the needs of 5,000,000 men.

Leather equipment was available at all times. The principal items of

leather were harnesses, shoes, jerkins, gloves, and mittens.

In all, $75,000,000 was spent for harness and leather equipment. The

procurement of saddles in itself was a hard problem, since there were

only three or four makers of saddletrees in the United States, and

only one of these could get the ash or basswood required. The division

induced various furniture factories to install the special lathes

required for turning saddletrees, and in this way built up eight

factories, which gave us sufficient capacity. Belting manufacturers

and manufacturers of shoes were educated in the art of producing the

leather for the saddles. The Army harness is of russet leather, a

product for which there is no commercial demand. The result is that

surpluses of Army harness can not be disposed of to advantage.

[Illustration: Dieing Out Uppers with Clicking Machine.]

[Illustration: Pulling Upper Over Last.

MANUFACTURING ARMY SHOES.]

[Illustration: Stitching Vamp to Quarter.]

[Illustration: Attaching Heels.

MANUFACTURING ARMY SHOES.]

The former American Army shoe built on the Munson last and known as the

russet marching shoe was machine sewed, had an upper of calfskin with

the rough side turned in, and was lined with duck. This shoe proved

to be short lived when subjected to the severe service in France. At

the beginning of the war a new shoe was designed for trench service.

This was a much heavier shoe and the calfskin of the upper was turned

rough side out. There was no lining in the shoe. The shoe had two heavy

soles, the outer one being hobnailed. Yet this shoe, too, proved to

be unsatisfactory for the service. The uppers wore fairly well, but

the soles could not stand the constant submerging in mud and water.

The demands of trench service eventually led to the design of what

was called the Pershing shoe. This was a shoe with three heavy soles,

stitched, screwed, and nailed together. It had steel reinforcements on

toe and heel. The outer sole was studded with hobnails.

The original requisitions from France for this shoe called for leather

tanned with bark. As bark tanning is practically obsolete in the United

States to-day, it was necessary to go into the tanneries and build up

what was virtually a new industry. It may be mentioned that the design

for the Pershing shoe was completed in 30 days.

The culmination of the shoe development was the model known as the

Victory shoe. This model corrected certain defects in the Pershing

shoe. The Pershing shoe was prone to rip along the back stays, and the

upper did not fit snugly. In the Victory shoe the entire back of the

upper was one piece.

At one time 52 shoe factories in 13 States were working on Army shoe

contracts. A scheme of packing shoes for overseas shipment in burlap

bags instead of in boxes was worked out, and it resulted in saving a

great deal of space on board ship.

Machinery and tools for the shoe repair shops of the salvage division

were purchased by the Clothing and Equipage Division. This was the

first time that Uncle Sam had ever acted as cobbler for his soldiers.

About 2,000 machines for repairing shoes were bought, besides some

28,000 repair kits, each one of which cost $135. Among the items of

supplies for the Army shoe repair shops may be noted 20,000,000 pairs

of half soles.

A shoe waterproofing grease, or dubbin, as it is called, which had no

odor and which would not turn rancid, was developed. The experts worked

closely with officers in the field in training soldiers in the care of

shoes to make them last as long as possible. Every man who received a

new pair of shoes was required to break the pair in by standing in

them in water for a certain period and then walking for an hour until

the shoes dried on his feet. The men were cautioned not to dry their

shoes by placing them too closely to any heating apparatus, as this

shortens the life of the leather. Good care of the soldier's feet has

long been standard Army practice with us. No soldier in 1917 and 1918

was permitted to wear darned socks, unless he wore two pairs at once.

At regular intervals officers inspected their men's feet, treated any

blisters or sores that might exist, and dusted the feet with powder.

Bad shoe fitting means foot troubles, leg troubles, and sometimes

even spinal and mental troubles. E. J. Bliss, a Boston manufacturer

of shoes, developed a shoe fitting system which was adopted as being

unexcelled. The fitter was an implement about like a roller skate,

with movable wings on the sides and a movable plunger in front of the

toes. The soldier to be fitted equipped himself with rifle and loaded

pack. With this weight on his shoulders he stepped both feet upon the

skate-like devices and then raised on the balls of his feet, until

the weight and movement pressed out the wings as far as they would

go and advanced the front plungers. With the size thus automatically

determined, the next step was to check the accuracy of it. This was

done by inserting a pair of implements with knob-like ends in the toes

of the shoes, the implements just filling the space in front of the

soldier's toes. Wearing shoes and implements, the soldier then walked

about the room, stepped upon a platform, climbed a cleated ramp, and

otherwise simulated actual service demanded of shoes in the field. If

the checking implements in the shoes did not hurt his toes the fit was

regarded as correct.

In spite of this elaborate technical section, the testing of masks did