_Clothing and equipage produced and ship_America's Munitions 1917-1918

Expeditionary Forces Apr. 6, 1917, to Nov. 11, 1918._

-----------------------------------+-------------+-----------

| Produced. | Shipped

| | overseas.

-----------------------------------+-------------+-----------

| |

Blankets | 19,419,000 | 3,127,000

Coats, denim | 10,238,000 | 3,423,000

Coats, wool | 12,365,000 | 3,871,000

Drawers, summer | 38,118,000 | 3,889,000

Drawers, winter | 33,766,000 | 10,812,000

Overcoats | 7,748,000 | 1,780,000

Shirts, flannel | 22,198,000 | 6,401,000

Shoes, marching and field | 26,423,000 | 9,136,000

Stockings, wool, light and heavy | 89,871,000 | 29,733,000

Trousers and breeches, wool | 17,342,000 | 6,191,000

Undershirts, summer | 40,895,000 | 4,567,000

Undershirts, winter | 28,869,000 | 11,126,000

-----------------------------------+-------------+-----------

CHAPTER III.

MISCELLANEOUS QUARTERMASTER UNDERTAKINGS.

Sergt. Irving Berlin, one of the fountain sources of American jazz

music, found a special job cut out for him when he was drafted into the

military service. The needs of the war machine called upon a wide range

of individual talents, and this range did not exclude the artists. The

painters engaged in camouflage work and made sketches and pictures of

such things as unusual surgical operations for the permanent records

of the Government, the poets fired the zeal of the country, and the

musicians inspired the soldiers by providing them with music.

The American Expeditionary Forces as they grew in size found themselves

possessed of some 390 regimental bands. These bands organized

themselves, gathered such music as they could get, practiced, and

presently regaled the soldiers of units to which they were attached;

and then the inevitable happened--they played and played the same

old pieces until their audiences yearned for something new. One day

a cry of distress trickled through the cables, and then the plight

of the hapless lover of band music in France became the problem of

the quartermaster organization in the United States, resulting in the

largest purchase of band music ever made, 200,000 sheets of it, costing

nearly $50,000.

The music problem of the American Expeditionary Forces was put into

the hands of a special committee of three well-known authorities in

the musical world. Sergt. Berlin was the authority on popular numbers;

Lieut. R. C. Deming, the bandmaster at Camp Meigs, Washington, D. C.,

was the member in charge of the ceremonial numbers; while Mr. Ward

Stephens, the well-known composer, organist, and accompanist, was in

charge of the concerted numbers.

This committee picked out a repertoire of 333 selections, consisting

of 172 concert pieces, 43 ceremonial numbers, and 118 popular numbers.

Four hundred complete sets of these were bought, one for each of

the 390 bands of the American Expeditionary Forces, with 10 sets as

a reserve. The music was bought from some 27 music publishers, the

largest suppliers being Carl Fischer, the Waterson, Berlin & Snyder

Co., the Leo Feist Co., the Jerome H. Remick Co., and G. Schirmer

(Inc.), all of New York, and the Oliver Ditson Co., of Boston.

Each complete set was packed in a separate case so that each case upon

arrival in France could be sent immediately to a band of the American

Expeditionary Forces without being disturbed. The sorting and packing

of this consignment of sheet music was handled by Sergt. Berlin and a

staff of technical musical assistants, who, at his request, contributed

their services.

The supply of music was but one of hundreds of enterprises required

to make the Army efficient, comfortable, and happy, quite aside from

the more obvious ones of supplying guns and ammunition, artillery,

aerial observation, and food and clothing. And these scattered

undertakings in military supplies accounted for the expenditure of

hundreds of millions of dollars. Nearly all of them were quartermaster

enterprises. But before we lift the curtain on this, one of the most

interesting branches of our military preparation, involving, as it

did, the scientific solution of problems ranging from the production

of super-gasoline for the fighting airplanes to the proper and most

economical method of cutting up the carcass of a steer, let us continue

the musical overture by observing how the Army secured its band

instruments.

There was a special branch of the Quartermaster Corps which concerned

itself exclusively with the musical requirements of the Army. This

branch bought in all approximately 143,000 musical instruments. These

were secured at a saving of about $500,000 under the prices which the

Government had been paying for such instruments prior to the war.

Without going into the details of how this economy was effected,

one typical instance may be cited. For years it had been the custom

of manufacturers of musical instruments to embellish the trumpets

and brass horns of bandsmen with engraving, chasings, and other

markings. These were decorative only and had nothing to do with the

quality of tone produced. By eliminating all such markings from the

specifications, a substantial saving in cost was attained.

The principal suppliers of musical instruments were the Wm. Frank Co.,

of Chicago; J. M. York & Son, of Grand Rapids, Mich.; and the H. M.

White Co., of Cleveland, Ohio. C. S. Conn & Co., of Elkhart, Ind.;

the Eugene Geisler Co., of Chicago; and the Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., of

Cincinnati, also supplied several thousand musical instruments.

FUEL, OIL, AND PAINTS.

During the months of hostilities the American public was constantly

informed in advertising literature that fuel would win the war, and

indeed fuel would win it, and did win it, in the sense that without

fuel or with any grave shortage of fuel we could not have won. In this

sense there was no commodity contributing to success in the great

drama more important than coal. Coal not only furnished the power that

transported the khaki-clad millions to France, but it furnished the

manufacturing power in the United States and supplied the coke, which

is essential to the manufacture of steel, thus entering into every

rifle and piece of artillery.

[Illustration: MINING COAL FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S NEEDS WITH ELECTRICALLY

OPERATED MACHINES.]

[Illustration: 6-TON ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVE PULLING A STRING OF COAL

CARS.]

[Illustration: PICKING TABLES AND LOADING BOOMS IN A WEST VIRGINIA COAL

MINE.]

[Illustration: TWENTY-TON ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVE BRINGING COAL OUT OF

MINE.]

America began keeping the records of coal mining in the year 1807.

Woodrow Wilson was inaugurated President of the United States in 1913.

In the 106 years between 1807 and 1913, and including those years,

American mines produced a total of 9,844,159,937 tons of coal. In the

succeeding five years of President Wilson's administration American

mines turned out 2,960,938,597 tons of coal, almost one-third as much

as was mined in the entire 1807-1913 period, and almost one-fourth of

all the coal mined in the United States since records have been kept.

The American coal miners in 1918 met the war emergency by producing

150,000,000 tons of coal more than they had dug in 1914. The shortage

of coal in the winter of 1917-18 was due not to the inability of the

mines to produce the required tonnage but to inadequate railroad

transportation facilities and severe weather conditions.

The war-coal project was in the hands of the United States Fuel

Administration, but the office of the Quartermaster General assisted

in the effort. Army officers were stationed at the offices of the

various district representatives of the Fuel Administration throughout

the country. These officers kept in constant touch with the factories

making war supplies and saw to it that coal was diverted from less

essential enterprises to the munitions factories. This service operated

with such excellent effect that few manufacturers working on Government

contracts were compelled to suspend operations because of the lack

of fuel, and those who did have to suspend were able to resume again

within a few days.

During the summer of 1918 the usual seasonal slack in the demand

for fuel was taken up by the action of the fuel branch in absorbing

practically all of the excess coal in the United States and storing

it at Army posts, camps, and stations. This action kept the mines

working at maximum capacity during a period when there is normally a

curtailment in output. Of course, at the time there was no realization

that the fighting was to end so soon, and this policy was adopted in

preparation for unchecked industrial activity during the winter of

1918-19.

The Army itself was a heavy user of fuel, requiring it not only at its

various manufacturing establishments but also at the great camps for

heating purposes. The following table shows the Army purchases of fuel

for the calendar year 1918.

-------------------------+------------+------------

| Amount. | Cost.

-------------------------+------------+------------

Anthracite coal tons | 710,304 | $4,362,237

Bituminous coal do. | 2,706,737 | 11,711,335

+------------+------------

Total | 3,417,041 | 16,073,572

Coke do. | 9,576 | 80,643

Wood cords | 786,177 | 5,178,161

+------------+------------

Total fuel | | 21,332,376

-------------------------+------------+------------

The Army was an enormous consumer of oil, the total oil purchases,

both in the United States and in France, in the nine-month period from

April 1 to December 31, 1918, amounting to $30,522,837. There were

49 items in the oil-purchasing schedule for the troops in the United

States alone, including lubricating oils, fuel oils, oils for paints

and varnishes, gasoline for motor trucks and airplanes, axle grease,

floor oil, tempering oil, oil for the preservation and waterproofing

of shoes, harness, and other leather equipment, and numerous other

varieties of oils. The gasoline purchases were heaviest of all, Army

motor trucks and cars in the United States requiring 484,282 barrels

of it, worth $5,448,570, in the nine months between April 1 and

December 31, 1918. The American Army motor trucks and cars with the

American Expeditionary Forces were supplied with 703,104 barrels, worth

$10,104,437, in the same period. For Army airplanes in the United

States during the same months there were purchased 306,082 barrels of

special aviation gasoline, at a cost of $3,906,650, and for the planes

in France 146,780 barrels, worth $2,748,839.

To give the American aviator the hottest, most instantaneously

explosive, and surest-fire gasoline ever produced, the American

refiners turned out a naphtha along specifications drawn by the

Government that was the highest refinement of gasoline ever produced in

large quantities. This was done by taking the best gasoline that had

ever been produced in commercial quantities and giving it another run

through the distilling retorts. Thus it was literally the cream of the

cream, containing only the most combustible elements of liquid fuel and

nothing else.

This refinement became known as "257° fighting naphtha," and the Army

confined its use to the service planes actually at the front. It was

not supplied to the aviation training camps, either in this country

or in France. In order to distinguish this naphtha as the finest

engine fuel available and to mark it so that it would not be wasted

by accident in any use other than that of service at the front, it

was colored red with aniline dyes. The Army did not even trust 257°

fighting naphtha to bulk transportation on tank ships, but stored it

in steel drums and freighted it across the ocean in this form in cargo

boats.

America has always been the largest producer of gasoline, and the

experience and development in this country has resulted in many grades

of the fuel. The ordinary commercial gasoline comes in five grades, the

best grade being known as "straight-run" gasoline and the other grades,

in the order of their cost and purity, as "casing-head," "blended,"

"pressure-still," and "cracked." For motor fuel for the Army the

quartermaster specifications would accept nothing but "straight-run"

gasoline, unblended and without dangerous additions which have a

damaging effect upon motor cylinders. This gasoline, the best that

could be bought by the civilian users, is known as "428° gasoline;" and

it was the fuel used universally in our motor trucks and motor cars.

Above that were the three grades of gasoline, or rather, naphtha,

produced specially for the American Army airplanes. The lowest grade

of these was called domestic aviation gasoline, and it was the best

commercial gasoline refined until its boiling point had been brought

down to 347° F. This fuel was used by our aviators in this country

and was known as "347° domestic aviation naphtha." A still greater

refinement was the splendid "302° export aviation naphtha," which was

used by planes in France, other than those at the front. The fighting

naphtha was obtained by taking the cream of export aviation naphtha.

Although purchased in enormous quantities, it cost the Government more

than 41 cents a gallon. The Government paid slightly less than 22 cents

a gallon for its motor gasoline.

Another new development in the oil industry brought about by the

Government's war needs was known as "Liberty aero oil." This was an

airplane lubricating oil of pure mineral origin, a refined lubricant

of excellent viscosity and a low cold test, an oil which proved itself

to be capable and reliable under the ever-changing atmospheric and

pressure conditions of mechanical flight at the front. Liberty aero

oil was a success. Most of it which was shipped overseas was made from

paraffin base oils, although in this country we used successfully many

aero oils of asphaltum base.

The Ordnance Department submitted a requisition for a three-months'

supply of pure neat's-foot oil, which was in quantity almost twice

the total American production of neat's-foot oil in the preceding

year. The Government oil experts worked out a satisfactory substitute

by combining animal and mineral oils. This was not only equal to

neat's-foot oil under tests, but it was considerably cheaper.

The American Expeditionary Forces submitted a rush order for 6,000,000

pounds of dark axle grease. The specifications called for containers

made of tin. But it was almost impossible to secure the tin for such a

shipment. Experiments were conducted with all possible haste, and the

result was a container made of black iron sheets treated with a special

varnish to prevent the moisture in the grease from rusting the iron.

This container proved to be satisfactory.

BRUSHES.

Offhand, one would scarcely say that brushes play any part of vast

importance in the life of an individual; yet to buy the brushes for the

Army required a special organization, competent to spend money by the

millions of dollars and get value received for it.

Indeed it was quite surprising how many brushes in variety the Army

required. The tooth brush, the shaving brush, the hair brush, the

clothes brush, the shoe brush, and the paint brush might occur to

anybody as necessities; but the Army used all these and in addition,

artists' brushes, bottle brushes, chimney brushes, whitewashing

brushes, gun-cleaning brushes, floor brushes, roofing brushes,

stove brushes, horse brushes, and dozens of other kinds. In all,

the Government bought 9,224,210 brushes, at a cost of $3,039,000.

It required 59 factories in the United States to manufacture these

brushes. The most numerous class of all were the tooth brushes, more

than 1,500,000 of these being ordered from one company alone.

Brushes are made from many different materials, such as bristle,

horsehair, fiber of various kinds, imitation bristle, split quills, and

the like, but the most important is bristle. Only a little bristle is

produced in the United States in comparison to the demand for it, the

bulk of the supply coming from China, India, Siberia, and Russia. The

procurement of bristle was no small part of the problem of supplying

brushes for the Army.

Not one in every 10 tooth brushes used in the United States was of

American manufacture before the war, the rest coming from Japan,

France, England, Germany, and Austria. When the European supply was cut

off, Japan became the principal source of supply. The problem of tooth

brushes was further complicated by an embargo on bristles coming into

this country and another on the exporting of bone to Japan.

The Army bought no shaving brushes made of horsehair, even in part,

since horsehair is known to be the carrier of the much dreaded anthrax

germ. The Government specified a shaving brush with an abbreviated

handle, making it more convenient to carry. A handle-less hairbrush

was also specified. Paint brushes were largely standardized, but it

was impossible to standardize toilet brushes because there were not

enough facilities in the country to turn out sufficient quantities, if

machinery had to be remodeled to meet Government specifications.

ROLLING KITCHENS.

Those in charge of general quartermaster purchases designed and

produced the liberty rolling field kitchen, an equipment which could

cook for 200 men. Rolling field kitchens were not new to our Army

or the trade, there being about six types of commercial kitchens

manufactured at the time we entered the war. Most of these were

being produced on foreign war orders. In order, however, to secure

a standardized kitchen with interchangeable parts, thus insuring a

constant supply of spare parts, the division designed the liberty

kitchen. There were two types of it--the horse-drawn type and the

motor-drawn or trailmobile type.

Each kitchen consisted of a stove and a limber. The stove unit

contained a bake oven and three kettles. The limber contained four

bread boxes, which were also used as water containers, one cook's

chest, four fireless cookers, and four kettles. In July, 1918,

contracts were awarded for 15,000 complete kitchens, including the

necessary cooking and camp utensils. Deliveries of these kitchens

eventually reached a rate of over 200 per day.

Two factories adopted and installed track conveyor equipment on which

the assembling process was carried forward from operation to operation

until the finished kitchen, painted and boxed, was delivered to the car

for shipment to the port of embarkation. The kitchens were packed each

in a single crate, ready to be delivered to the front after arriving in

France.

Before this kitchen was designed the Army had been paying from $700 to

$1,050 apiece for rolling kitchens. The average price of the liberty

kitchen was $502. Subsequent orders brought the total projected

purchases of mobile kitchens to 25,000, of which 10,000 were of the

animal-drawn type.

Substantial shipments of these kitchens had been received overseas

before hostilities ceased, and in November deliveries were expanding

at a rate which would have exceeded several times the 3,000 liberty

kitchens required by the American Expeditionary Forces by January 1,

1919. About 7,000 rolling kitchens of all types were shipped to France.

TOOLS AND TOOL CHESTS.

Another important result accomplished in the purchase of general

supplies was the standardization of tool chests. At one time the

Army was buying and using approximately 100 different kinds of

quartermaster tool chests. A committee to standardize tools and tool

chests was appointed, and this committee reduced the number of types

of tool chests to seven standardized ones--the carpenter's chest, the

blacksmith's, the farrier's, the saddler's, the electrician's, the

plumber's, and the horseshoer's emergency chest.

The committee also standardized the tools. Many varieties of such

things as drawknives and handsaws had been purchased previously. This

committee adopted a standard type of draw knife and a standard handsaw,

and also standardized many other tools. Standardization of tool

chests effected a large saving in transportation space by keeping the

dimensions to a minimum. The standardized carpenter's chest occupied 3½

cubic feet less space than the older type wooden chest.

Since at the time the armistice was signed the Army was in the market

for approximately 135,000 tool chests of the seven standardized types,

the saving in shipping space would have been no slight achievement.

But there was also in sight an enormous saving of money, not to speak

of the fact that standardization would greatly increase the rate of

manufacturing the chests.

HARDWARE.

The general supplies division of the quartermaster organization

operated much of the Army's hardware store. In this work the

division not only standardized Army tools, but also standardized the

proportions in which the various tools were bought. This was not only

an intensely interesting development, but it was of utmost importance

to the American people, since it saved large sums of money and great

quantities of shipping space.

The supply officers of the American Expeditionary Forces early began

making up their estimates of the materials that must be produced in

the United States and shipped to France, to maintain the efficiency of

an indefinitely growing Army over a protracted period of time. In the

matter of hardware these estimates came originally from the company

units. Each repair unit, for instance, would look over the future, and

its officers would estimate kinds and quantities of tools required

for such and such a period. These little estimates came together in

larger groups, and so on, the consolidation of figures continuing until

eventually in the case of a certain tool there would be one figure on

file at headquarters. Then one day one of those long daily cablegrams

from France, signed "Pershing," came to Washington, bringing the future

requirements for tools and other hardware.

Theoretically it might be assumed that the proportioning of items in

these requisitions would be correct and that the American Expeditionary

Forces might be expected to need tools in the proportions named. Of

course, Sergt. A, in a repair unit with the artillery, might estimate

too many hammers and too few wrenches, but Machinist X, miles away in

some base shop, might call for too many wrenches and too few hammers.

These two estimates would thus balance correctly; and, following

out this line of reasoning, it would seem that the entire American

Expeditionary Forces' hardware requisitions, compiled as they were,

would be properly proportioned.

Yet when these requisitions came to Washington and were found to call

for the manufacture of such things as files and bolts by the tens of

millions, the supply officers here would not accept the theory that the

proportions of various sizes called for were correct, but turned the

searchlight of science upon these estimates.

The method selected of checking these estimates was simplicity itself,

yet unique in the history of American industry and almost majestic

in the scope of its comprehensive vision. The officer in charge of

the procurement of hardware, in the case of files, for instance,

simply called together the entire file-manufacturing industry--and

that means that not a single manufacturer was overlooked--and asked

that industry to assemble the results of its experience over a period

of the last five or six years. Each manufacturer would show, for

instance, how many flat files he had sold of each length and of each

type of cutting surface--either bastard, second cut, or smooth--how

many half-round files, how many hand files, how many round files,

how many square files, how many warding files, how many knife files,

how many taper files, etc., all by lengths and by cutting surfaces.

Thus when all these experience figures were assembled, the officers

in charge at Washington knew exactly in what proportions the whole

American industrial world had used files of various types throughout a

considerable period of time.

This procedure was followed with respect to many common articles in

hardware. The Hardware Manufacturers' Organization for War Service was

formed to give just such assistance, cooperating up to 100 per cent of

the hardware industry. The consolidation of the experience figures in

American hardware consumption resulted in a schedule of supplies known

as the Army's hardware tariff, a schedule showing the proportions in

which hardware might be expected to be consumed.

The hardware tariff disclosed some surprising errors in the estimates

from the American Expeditionary Forces. The American Expeditionary

Forces' requisitions, for instance, had called for a total of

127,180,387 bolts of various kinds. The experience of bolt consumption

in the American industry was able to correct this to a total of

125,285,000 bolts, or a saving of nearly 2,000,000 in number of pieces.

The requisitions had called for 39,945,458 large carriage bolts. The

experience of American consumption showed that only 9,700,000 large

carriage bolts would be required. The original specifications had

called for 31,839,741 small carriage bolts. The experience in American

consumption showed that 60,300,000 would be necessary. In other words,

the off-hand estimates of the American Expeditionary Forces had called

for 30,000,000 too many large carriage bolts and nearly 30,000,000 too

few small carriage bolts.

The specifications from France called for 5,000,000 stove bolts of the

five-eighths-inch dimension. Since this size was not used or was not

made at all by stove-bolt manufacturers, the item was canceled, and

2,000,000 smaller-dimension bolts substituted.

All bolts were supplied in quantities and proportions determined by

following the proportions of the scientific tariff. They were shipped

to France in these proportions, whence reports from the American

Expeditionary Forces showed that the quantities sent completely covered

the needs of the troops in the field. The saving in the manufacture

of bolts alone came to nearly $4,000,000, and this says nothing of

the saving in railroad and ocean freight charges, or the still more

important saving in ocean tonnage space, since the bolts supplied

according to the scientific tariff occupied many hundreds of cubic feet

less space than the bolts originally specified would have filled.

The same procedure was followed in the supplying of files. The

hardware manufacturers consulted their records and on the basis of

actual consumption in American industry discovered that a repair

unit consisting of a machine shop, a horseshoeing shop, a blacksmith

shop, and a woodworking shop, with 11 mechanics working in the unit,

would consume 305 dozen files per year, the experience tables showing

precisely the proportions of the various sizes of files in this

consumption. Consequently, when the American Expeditionary Forces

requested 439,200 dozen files, the quantities of each size, kind, and

style as specified in the requisition from France were disregarded, and

the so-called tariff proportions substituted. The files as supplied not

only proved adequate in number in every style, but they cost $250,000

less than it would have cost to fill the original order. Moreover, by

using tariff sizes the industry was able to make immediate shipments

and to run at full production from the start, since it needed only to

produce files in the proportions known in the regular trade.

What was done with bolts and files was done in many other lines of

hardware. When the American Expeditionary Forces saw that its hardware

was coming in correct quantities, its officers notified the hardware

supply organization to ship all tools and hardware materials in

accordance with the so-called tariffs. The executive committee of

the Hardware Manufacturers' Association for War Service, which made

possible this achievement in commercial science, consisted of Messrs.

Murray Sargent, Alexander Stanley, Charles W. Asbury, Fayette R. Plumb,

and Isaac Black.

The standardization of proportions in the hardware supply succeeded in

cutting an original requisition of the American Expeditionary Forces

for 8,750 tinners' machines to 860, and an original requisition for

21,600 tinners' assorted groovers to 240, and still met every need of

the Army's tin shops in France.

The Army hardware office was also called upon to supply such small

hardware as fasteners for gas-mask knapsacks and pistol holsters, and

some metallic parts for cartridge belts and similar goods. Less than

two months before the armistice was signed orders were in sight for the

manufacture of some 500,000,000 pieces of these small metallic devices.

Most of them were to be made of brass. The uses of the Army in October,

1918, were calling for these articles in such quantities that it

required approximately 250,000 pounds of brass per working day to meet

the demand.

[Illustration: AMBULANCE BODY BOXED FOR SHIPMENT OVERSEAS.]

[Illustration: PHOTO SHOWING METHOD OF CRATING CHASSIS FOR OVERSEAS

SHIPMENT.]

[Illustration: INTERIOR VIEW OF COAT FACTORY OPERATED BY THE

PHILADELPHIA QUARTERMASTER DEPOT.]

[Illustration: INTERIOR VIEW OF FLAG AND CHEVRON FACTORY OPERATED BY

THE PHILADELPHIA QUARTERMASTER DEPOT.]

At one time there came an order to procure 135,000,000 stud fasteners

within approximately 90 days. The result was that one manufacturer, who

had been producing 400,000 such fasteners in a day succeeded in raising

his production to 1,000,000 per day, and this was only typical of the

expansion elsewhere in the industry. The demands of the Army overtaxed

the brass rolling-mill capacity of the land. As a result the hardware

specialists investigated the possibility of substituting iron and steel

for brass, and these substitutes were under consideration when the war

came to an end.

Vast quantities of large sizes of rope were requested for overseas

to replace steel hoisting cables, which could not be secured in

sufficient quantities. Standard specifications drawn by the Government

in cooperation with rope manufacturers insured the supply to the Army

of rope only of the highest grades. Approximately 14,000,000 pounds

of manila rope, 2,500,000 pounds of halter rope, and 2,000,000 pounds

of cotton and jute twine were purchased at a cost of approximately

$9,000,000.

Army hardware men bought 1,534,679 axes, at a cost of $1,838,979. They

bought 1,256,994 shovels at a cost of $1,140,412, and 425,522 wrenches

costing $395,776. They purchased 380,752 fire extinguishers at a cost

of $1,761,711. They purchased 2,621,521 safety razors and 45,300,000

safety razor blades, the razors costing $3,171,806 and the blades

$1,318,750. These items selected at random give some idea of the extent

of the Army's hardware business.

QUARTERMASTER FACTORY ENTERPRISES.

It may not be generally known that the Quartermaster organization was

an extensive manufacturer of war goods in Government shops. In another

chapter has been described the method by which the Army was supplied

with clothing. While many of the clothing contractors were private

manufacturers, the Government itself manufactured more uniforms than it

secured from any single outside source.

There were two Government uniform factories--one at the plant of the

Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot and the other at the Jeffersonville

(Ind.) Quartermaster Depot. The Philadelphia factory also manufactured

chevrons, flags, and tents. The Jeffersonville depot produced army

shirts in addition to outer clothing. The Jeffersonville depot expanded

in size during the war until it became the largest shirt manufacturing

establishment in the world. When the armistice was signed the

Philadelphia uniform factory was rapidly gaining the eminence of being

the largest clothing manufacturing plant in the United States.

The total value of the articles manufactured by the Philadelphia

Quartermaster Depot during the war was $26,230,000. The garment

factory at Philadelphia was started in June, 1918, and in five months

it turned out 751,883 garments and 45,578 flags of various kinds. It

was working toward an output of 12,000 pairs of trousers and 6,000

woolen coats per day. There were 3,000 employees in the shop and 2,000

outside seamstresses. The outside seamstresses made denim jumpers and

trousers, white clothing, and olive drab shirts, the production of

shirts alone reaching a total of 1,359,801 garments.

The Philadelphia factory attained an output of 5,000 pairs of chevrons

per day, most of them embroidered by hand or by machinery. Before the

war the Philadelphia factory had a maximum capacity of 68 pyramidal

tents per day. This output was raised to 300 per day.

The Jeffersonville uniform factory was established in February, 1918.

Jeffersonville is just a few minutes' ride from Louisville, Ky.,

which is a clothing center, and therefore there was little trouble in

securing experienced workers. The factory was operated day and night

with two shifts, each working eight hours. The plant reached a capacity

of 750 woolen coats and 1,500 pairs of woolen trousers per day. The

salaries of the women employees ranged from $50 to $80 per month. The

Government established at Jeffersonville one of the most modern woolen

cloth shrinking plants in the United States, costing approximately

$50,000 and providing a capacity for sponging 10,000 yards of cloth per

day. The Army supply officers pronounced the uniforms turned out at

Jeffersonville to be the best and most honestly made clothing delivered

to the Army during the war, yet the cost of manufacturing uniforms in

this plant was at least 25 per cent under the average price paid to

private contractors. The average cost of making a woolen service coat

at Jeffersonville was $1.02, and the average cost of making a pair of

woolen trousers was 54 cents.

The shirt factory at Jeffersonville was that depot's largest

manufacturing enterprise. The Jeffersonville depot had been making

army shirts since 1872. The shirt factory greatly expanded during the

Spanish-American War, until it was employing nearly 2,000 operatives,

mostly home workers. Thereafter the depot continued to make shirts at

the rate of about 200,000 per year until the United States declared war

against Germany, and in that time it had accumulated a roll of 2,000

sewing operatives who had worked for the factory at one time or other.

[Illustration: A PAIR OF ARMY SHOES BEFORE AND AFTER BEING SALVAGED AT

JEFFERSONVILLE QUARTERMASTER DEPOT.]

[Illustration: TWO VIEWS OF THE RESCO SHOE-FITTING MACHINE.]

[Illustration: SHOE-FITTING MACHINE WITH PLUNGER AND WINGS OPEN.]

[Illustration: SHOE-FITTING SCHOOL, CAMP MEIGS, D. C.]

When the great demand for shirts came in the spring of 1917, the most

expert of these seamstresses were hired outright by the month to act

as instructors in the homes of new sewing women who had volunteered

for the work. Advertisements were then sent out through the newspapers

of that entire section for women workers, and presently the factory

had a sewing force of 20,000 operatives from practically every town

and village throughout southern Indiana and northwestern Kentucky. The

output of shirts was increased from 600,000 per year to 8,500,000.

Each home worker was supplied with one complete shirt to be used as

a guide, and she secured from the factory as often as she needed it

shirt material cut from the pattern and tied up in bundles of 10

sets. A large corps of sanitary inspectors was employed to visit the

thousands of homes and see to it that the shirts were made under proper

conditions. All shirts accepted from the home workers were thoroughly

fumigated before being issued from the depot.

SHOE FITTING.

The Quartermaster Department, along with its other activities, was

a school-teacher on a large scale. Without going into a general

description of the quartermaster schools and the branches they taught,

we will here consider some of the most interesting educational

enterprises such as the shoe-fitting schools, the schools for butchers,

and the school of goods packing.

Elsewhere in this volume the mechanical system of shoe measuring,

perfected and adopted by the War Department, was described. Studies

made at the camps at various times during 1917 and 1918, studies which

examined nearly 59,000 men, showed that a little more than 70 per cent

were wearing shoes too short, more than 9 per cent were wearing shoes

too long, while less than 19 per cent were correctly fitted. It is

probable that these proportions ran clear through the Army before shoe

fitting was scientifically taken up, and there is no reason to believe

that in civil life the averages of correct shoe fitting are any better.

After the so-called Resco system of shoe fitting was adopted, schools

for shoe measuring were held at Camp Meigs, D. C., and at Jefferson

Barracks, Mo. Each camp and cantonment in the country sent two officers

to one or the other of these schools. The course of instruction lasted

five days and consisted of lectures by experts and demonstrations of

the various appliances. In this way the science of correct shoe fitting

was scattered throughout the Army.

MEAT CUTTING.

It is no easy trick to teach a man to cut meat properly; butchering

is a skilled trade. As soon as it was apparent that the American

Expeditionary Forces in France were to be greatly expanded in size, our

officers overseas sent requests that several trained and experienced

butchery companies be sent over to cut meats properly for the

organizations abroad. In order to comply with this request there was

added to the curriculum of the quartermaster training camp in Florida a

butchery course in the cutting, boning, rolling, and tying of fresh and

frozen beef.

In this course there was developed an entirely new method of cutting

beef known as the "natural guide" method; and by it men who had

never cut meat before were developed into practical meat cutters

in less than eight weeks of instruction and practice. The natural

guide method, which was found to be far superior for Army use to any

other meat-cutting system which had been known, was exactly what it

was named, as it was essentially a separating rather than a cutting

process. The beef quarters were boned and divided into their major

parts by following the natural separations between muscles, tissues,

and bones.

This method, which is not at all like that in commercial use, proved

to be more economical than any meat-cutting system known, because it

utilized every ounce of meat and produced a greater proportion of

choice cuts suitable for pot roasts and other roasts than the older

Army Cooks' Manual method of meat cutting. The Cooks' Manual method was

similar to the method used by the retail butcher, in that it cut meat

along artificial indetermined lines. The natural guide method actually

produced 3 per cent more edible meat than the other method, since even

the most expert meat cutters can not remove all meat from the bones

by the Cooks' Manual method. Moreover, by the natural guide method

all cuts are uniform, and the fats, suets, and bones are separated as

clean, sweet, edible products.

Butchery companies were trained by the natural guide method and sent

overseas in numbers sufficient for the requirements of the American

Expeditionary Forces.

After the discovery of this method and the fact that it produced at

least 3 per cent more meat than even the expert cutters could secure

by the artificial cutting system, it was evident that further research

work along this line would be profitable. Even expert butchers, in

spite of all their skill and care, wasted meat. What must be the

conditions in the mess kitchens of the Army where the cooks, with

no expert knowledge of butchery, cut the meats? It was evident that

numerous edible by-products of meat, such as fats and marrow, were

going into the kitchen garbage pails and thence to the rendering plants.

The result of the investigation was a project to establish central

meat-cutting and rendering plants for all large concentrations of

troops, where all meats would be cut, boned, rolled, and tied, by

experts, and delivered direct to the company kitchens ready for

roasting or cooking in any manner. The fat and suet at such plants

would not be soiled or made unsound by handling, and so it could be

rendered and its food value retained. The oil could be cooked from

the bones as a valuable by-product, the bones could be dried and sold

commercially, and the plant could also have machinery for making

sausage and hamburg steak. A plant of this character was put in

operation during the summer and autumn of 1918 at Camp Johnston, the

quartermaster training camp, and it proved to be a complete success.

When the armistice was signed, the General Staff was considering the

proposition of establishing these centralized meat plants at all the

larger camps.

The meat experts also effected notable economies in ship space by

developing what was known as shankless beef. Shank-less beef was beef

quarters with the four shanks removed. Quarters thus prepared occupied

14 per cent less freezer, cargo, and shipping space than quarters with

their shanks.

A still further economy in shipping space was projected in the plan

to bone all beef at the packing plants and ship it boxed or frozen in

molds and wrapped in burlap. This method saved about 50 per cent of

cargo space, and it began to be extensively used during the winter of

1918-19. One set of packages included tenderloins, sirloins, butts,

loin steaks, top rounds, and shoulder steaks. Another set of packages

contained roasts, including prime ribs, rumps, bottom rounds, and

bottom chucks. A third set was for stews, including flanks, plates,

blades, necks, shanks, and trimmings.

PACKING.

American exporters generally for many years have had the reputation

of packing goods improperly for overseas shipment. Time and again

travelers and investigators in foreign lands have pointed out that

if America expected to compete successfully with other manufacturing

nations in foreign trade, she must learn to pack goods so that the

packages will not break en route and damage the contents. When we sent

an Army of over 2,000,000 men to France, it was evident that unless

we learned quickly how to put up our supplies properly for overseas

shipment, our lack of knowledge would be costly to us.

Accordingly the packing service branch of the Quartermaster Department

was established. One of its first acts was to set up a school of

baling, packing, and crating, this school being located at the Forest

Products Laboratory at Madison, Wis., where studies of packing were

being made by scientists. The school started in July, 1918, and before

the armistice came it had graduated 400 students from its six-weeks'

course.

Now, while it was important that Army supplies reached the other side

in good condition, it was soon seen that of even greater importance

would be the economy that might be effected in shipping space by the

scientific packing of goods. This obscure and little known packing

service branch was really one of the most important agencies in the

whole war organization, since the results which it accomplished in

the saving of ship space were nothing short of astonishing. These

economies came at a time when the German submarines were still highly

destructive to American and allied shipping, and the shortage of

ocean tonnage was one of the most disturbing factors in the whole war

situation. The American packing service, in saving thousands of tons of

shipping space, in reality offset the operations of the U-boats over a

considerable period of time.

These space economies resulted usually from specifications drawn by the

packing experts reducing the sizes of packing cases that were too large

for the goods contained, and also by packing articles more compactly.

For instance, these experts studied the rolling kitchen and determined

the most compact assembly of its parts in a crate. The crate was then

carefully designed to occupy a minimum amount of space. Some 18,000

rolling kitchens were packed ready for shipment to France. Had all of

these been floated, a total of 22,500 cubic tons of ship space would

have been saved, or the equivalent of five or six whole shiploads.

As it was, room aboard ship could be found for only 6,940 rolling

kitchens, which by being scientifically packed occupied 8,700 cubic

tons less cargo space, or about two whole shiploads, than they would

have occupied otherwise.

Wherever possible, entire units of such heavy articles as escort wagons

and ambulances were packed in single crates. Wherever open spaces were

inevitable in the crating, these vacancies were filled with various

subsistence stores, such as dried peas or beans. Galvanized-iron cans,

for instance, were packed with two sacks of flour inside each one.

The experts studied boxing to determine the best thickness of wood

required by various commodities and the proper method of strapping

or otherwise fastening the boxes. As a result there was a great

improvement in the condition of goods arriving in France.

In no respect did the packing service effect greater space economy

than in the packing of clothes for the American Expeditionary Forces.

Formerly clothing had gone forward to troops packed loosely in wooden

boxes. The packing service devised the system of baling all clothing,

and a baling plant was set up at the Army supply base in Brooklyn. The

service gave scientific attention to the proper folding of garments

and eventually, after exhaustive experiments, developed a system of

folding that allowed the maximum number of pieces which could go into a

bale. It was found that these new methods saved two-thirds of the space

that had been used formerly for the shipment of the same quantity of

goods in boxes, to say nothing of the great saving both in labor and in

boxing materials.

[Illustration: A FIELD OF ROLLING KITCHENS AT NEVERS, FRANCE.]

[Illustration: FIELD KITCHEN EQUIPMENT.]

[Illustration: MULES AFTER MALLEINING.

Malleining is a serum test to determine if the animal is suffering from

glanders.]

The baling plant at New York in the calendar year 1918 shipped to

France approximately 1,000,000 bales of clothing and textile and other

equipment that could be baled. The saving in money to the United States

Government by this method of packing at this one plant in a single year

amounted to approximately $55,000,000. The largest item in this economy

was the matter of cargo space, which is estimated at $49,080,000 saved

to the Government. The complete statement of the financial saving in

the shipment of these 1,000,000 bales is as follows:

Material $1,940,000

Labor 583,000

Tare weight 75,000

Cargo space 49,080,000

----------

Total 51,678,000

==========

To these savings are to be added:

Savings effected in rent and maintenance 700,000

Freight to the shipping warehouses 490,000

Rent of additional warehouse awaiting shipment 30,000

Freight from warehouse to ship side 1,250,000

Re-cooperage 200,000

Unloading at the forwarding stations 1,000,000

----------

Total 3,670,000

==========

Grand total 55,348,000

In addition to the financial saving there was a large saving in raw

materials, which count for more than money to a nation engaged in a

desperate war. This million bales of clothing saved 58,000,000 board

feet of lumber, which would have been used in boxing had the old system

of packing been followed. The lumber which might have gone into these

boxes requires 30 years for its growth, but the burlap covering the

bales was made of jute, which is raised in semiannual crops.

The size of the bale adopted was 30 by 15 by 14 inches and up to 19

inches. It is interesting to note that this size was determined upon

because it was found that the burlap covering such bales of this size

would cut into sandbags with a minimum amount of waste material. The

Army abroad used great quantities of sandbags. Thus, by wrapping bales

in burlap pieces of proper size, there was saved a considerable amount

of cargo space previously occupied by baled burlap being shipped to

France to be made into sandbags. It is also notable that baled clothing

arrived in France in much better condition than clothing which had been

packed in cases.

HORSES AND MULES.

The Quartermaster Corps was charged with the duty of providing horses

and mules for the Army. This function is known technically as remount,

and the buying of horses was in the hands of the remount division.

There were three permanent remount depots in the United States when the

war began in April, 1917--one at Front Royal, Va., one at Fort Reno,

Okla., and one at Keogh, Mont.,--an auxiliary remount depot at Fort

Bliss, Tex., and a purchasing headquarters at Kansas City, Mo. When

it became apparent that the Army would need a large number of horses,

some of the most celebrated horsemen and riders in the country offered

their services as buyers. Some 50 of them were commissioned as captains

in the Quartermaster Reserve Corps and sent to the various purchasing

headquarters for short training in the proper types of horses and

animals required by the Army. These buyers purchased a large number of

excellent animals.

In addition to the existing three remount depots there were established

33 additional auxiliary remount depots and two animal embarkation

depots. The horses purchased were shipped to the various remount depots

and there trained and conditioned for Army use.

It required a large number of officers and men to care for the remount

establishment. Shortly before the armistice was signed there were

approximately 400 officers and 19,000 enlisted men in the American

remount service. The following statement shows the total numbers of

horses and mules purchased for the American Army in the calendar years

1917-18, including those acquired by the remount service in France:

_(a) Number of horses and mules purchased from Jan. 1, 1917, to

Jan. 1, 1919._

-------------------+------------------------------+---------------+-------

| Horses. | Mules. |

+--------+----------+----------+-------+-------+ Grand

-------------------+--------+----------+----------+-------+-------+-------

From French | 21,450 | 61,944 | 42,973 | 2,181| 7,160 |135,708

From Spanish | 1,400 | 423 | | 13,329| 3,295 | 18,447

From British | 2,633 | 6,388 | 4,352 | 6,714| 943 | 21,030

In United States | 60,439 | 106,554 | 9,129 |114,687| 9,450 |300,259

Private mounts | 507 | 47 | | | | 554

Young horses | 4,474 | 1,045 | | | | 5,519

+--------+----------+----------+-------+-------+-------

Total purchased to | 90,903 | 176,401 | 56,454 |136,911|20,848 |481,517

Jan. 1, 1919 | | | | | |

-------------------+--------+----------+----------+-------+-------+-------

_(b) Number of horses and number of mules lost in America and

abroad Apr. 6, 1917, to Jan. 1, 1919._

-------------------+---------+---------+-------

| Horses. | Mules. | Total.

-------------------+---------+---------+-------

In America | 24,144 | 6,040 | 30,184

Abroad | 37,615 | 5,667 | 43,282

+---------+---------+-------

Total | 61,759 | 11,707 | 73,466

-------------------+---------+---------+-------

_(c) Number of horses and mules on hand in the United States

and insular possessions, Jan. 1, 1919._

Horses:

Cavalry 83,774

Draft 77,172

Mules:

Draft 96,542

Pack and riding 13,950

-------

Grand total 271,438

Thousands of American animals were shipped to the American

Expeditionary Forces in France. Because of the lack of tonnage there

were no animal shipments between March 26, 1918, and August 11.

Between the declaration of war and March 26, 1918, a total of 30,329

animals were shipped abroad, and in the August 12-November 30 period

37,619 animals crossed the Atlantic, making a total of 67,948 American

horses and mules sent to the American Expeditionary Forces.

The total expenditures of the Army both abroad and at home for horses

and mules during the war period was $115,957,000, divided about half

and half between the United States on the one hand and France, England,

and Spain on the other.

The largest remount depot developed during the war is located at Camp

Jackson, Columbia, S. C. This depot has a capacity of about 10,000

animals and its construction cost was about $300,000. Soon after the

armistice was signed, when it became apparent that animals would no

longer be needed, thousands of horses and mules at the different

remount depots were sold at auction, these auction sales drawing large

crowds of buyers.

STORAGE.

The problem of storing Army supplies became great only after

hostilities had ceased. Before that time supplies were going through

the warehouses and to the ships at the deep-water ports so rapidly

that there was no backing up of the tide of them in the vast warehouse

facilities that had been provided as a war measure. But as soon as the

armistice was signed and the Army no longer grew in size but rapidly

diminished as men were discharged, the manufacturing operations under

way, necessarily continued for a time on a scale which had been

developed in preparation for an Army nearly double the size of the one

that existed on November 11, 1918, soon began filling up the warehouses.

The total storage capacity which the Army had on hand at the time of

the fighting, exclusive of that at ports and that for the Department of

Military Aeronautics, was as follows:

-----+-------------------+----------------+----------------+-----------

Zone.| Depot. | Warehouse. | Open. | Total.

-----+-------------------+----------------+----------------+-----------

| | _Square feet._ | _Square feet._ |

1 | Boston | 1,295,460 | | 1,295,460

2 | New York | 2,900,141 | | 2,900,141

3 | Philadelphia | 2,333,124 | | 2,333,124

4 | Baltimore | 1,468,572 | | 1,468,572

5 | Atlanta | 1,499,848 | 14,300 | 1,514,148

6 | Jeffersonville | 2,000,000 | | 2,000,000

7 | Chicago | 3,825,286 | 1,742,400 | 5,567,686

8 | St. Louis | 1,216,776 | | 1,216,776

9 | New Orleans | 405,172 | 100,000 | 505,172

10 | San Antonio | 991,582 | | 991,582

11 | Omaha | 130,472 | | 130,472

12 | El Paso | 232,803 | 80,212 | 313,015

13 | San Francisco | 1,170,533 | | 1,170,533

14 | Newport News | 234,879 | | 234,879

15 | Washington, D. C. | 815,606 | 342,100 | 1,157,706

| +----------------+----------------+-----------

| Grand total | 20,520,254 | 2,279,012 | 22,799,266

=====+===================+================+================+===========

| Warehouse | Open | Total.

-------------------------+----------------+----------------+-----------

| _Square feet._ | _Square feet._ |

Camps | 5,326,590 | 5,104,901 | 10,431,491

-------------------------+----------------+----------------+-----------

The operation of one of the Quartermaster depot warehouses might

be described at this point, and the general supply depot at

Jeffersonville, Ind., is typical. During the war this depot procured

for the Quartermaster Corps of the entire Army all horse-drawn vehicles

and harness, and such items as barrack ranges, field ranges, and ovens,

pack-train equipment, and other supplies.

The war deliveries began at Jeffersonville in the late summer of 1917.

Receipts soon outgrew storage space. Adjoining lands were leased, and

supplies, covered by paulins, were stored in the open. This early

period of the war, prior to the spring of 1918, was a back-up period

at all the warehouses, as supplies were produced faster than men

were trained and transported to France. In the late spring of 1918

Jeffersonville began making heavy shipments of supplies overseas and

from then on shipments exceeded receipts. For three months before the

armistice was signed the Jeffersonville depot's shipments averaged 60

carloads a day and its receipts about 25 carloads.

After the armistice was signed, Jeffersonville was designated as the

depot for the storage of all surplus horse-drawn vehicles and black

harnesses therefor. Extensive temporary storage sheds were erected.

Inbound shipments increased to about 80 cars a day. The depot has

stored 4,000 rolling kitchens of the trailmobile type, these kitchens

being packed in boxes, each package weighing about 4,300 pounds. The

work of storing these kitchens is still in progress, and the pile of

boxes will ultimately be 45 feet wide, 30 feet high, and 1,000 feet

long. As the pile is made, corrugated-iron roofing is placed on the

sides and top, thus forming a waterproof building.

Crated automobile trailers, weighing about 9,000 pounds per crate, are

being handled in the same manner. Wagons are stored in galvanized-iron

warehouses, each one capable of receiving 2,500 wagons, without wheels.

Wagon wheels are stored in specially adapted sheds. About 2,000

automobile trucks have already been received for storage in specially

constructed sheds. These trucks are mainly Nash Quads, four-wheel-drive

trucks, and G. M. C. ambulance chassis. These chassis are stored on

end, resting on the bumpers. The engines of all trucks are well oiled

and the magnetos are covered with waterproof material.

[Illustration: STORAGE OF AUTOMOBILE CHASSIS, JEFFERSONVILLE, IND.]

[Illustration: STORING ROLLING KITCHENS.]

[Illustration: METHOD OF STORING WAGON WHEELS AT JEFFERSONVILLE

QUARTERMASTER STORAGE DEPOT.]

[Illustration: METHOD OF STORING HORSE COLLARS AT JEFFERSONVILLE

DEPOT.]

As the supplies backed up into the warehouses, it became necessary

for the Army to know where it stood in the matter of property; and

a complete inventory was ordered, since there had been no time

during the hurry and bustle of the war period to take stock. This

inventory in itself was an enormous undertaking. To prepare for it the

quartermaster training school at Camp Meigs, D. C., was completely

transformed into a school for training experts for taking inventories.

A standard scheme was worked out. The experts, after being trained in

the standard method, were sent out into every zone in the country as

instructors. In each zone they convened the so-called "town meetings."

The town meeting was made up of Army storekeepers from each depot,

post, camp, and station in the zone--any place where Army supplies were

stored. These representatives were schooled in the inventory method

and then sent back to their stations with instructions to start the

inventory on December 31, 1918. The next operation was to organize an

inventory factory in Washington as the consolidating point for all the

inventories in the United States.

Some idea of the number of articles which Uncle Sam accumulated as a

result of the war may be gained from the fact that the inventories

received in Washington filled 40,600 sheets of paper, the size of an

ordinary large letterhead, with typewriting single spaced. To take the

inventory required a force in Washington of approximately 100 officers

and 400 civilians, while there were probably over 10,000 officers and

men engaged in the entire operation over the country. The inventory was

undoubtedly the largest ever taken in the world.

Before the war the standard items of Army supplies had been 20,000.

The inventory in the consolidation of its figures in Washington

disclosed the fact that at the beginning of the year 1919 there were

120,000 standard items, and many of these stood for large quantities

of individual pieces. As this report is written, a catalogue, or

standard nomenclature list of supplies, comprising 120,000 items, is

being prepared, to establish throughout the United States one language

of supply for all items stored, distributed, and issued under the

direction of the Director of Storage.

CHAPTER IV.

MOTOR AND HORSE-DRAWN VEHICLES.

The punitive expedition into Mexico in pursuit of Francisco Villa

marked the real beginning of the use of motor transportation for

the Army, although for many years the motor truck had received some

attention for military purposes.

In 1904 a few progressive officers at West Point made preliminary

tests of 1½-ton trucks, but these tests, while demonstrating that the

truck would doubtless be of value to the Army in the future, were not

sufficiently successful to create any particular interest. A few trucks

were in use in the Army in 1907, but no systematic tests were made

until 1912. At that time officers were seriously studying the motor

transportation needs and problems of the Army.

In 1914 the Society of Automobile Engineers, having learned from the

experience of European nations then at war that motor transportation

is one of the most vital factors in the success of any army, offered

its services to our War Department for the purpose of making a complete

survey of the automotive industry, in the hope that the interests of

the industry and of the Army could be coordinated so that in an extreme

emergency the industry might be able to provide the necessary motor

equipment for the Army, and that the Army might be able to use such

equipment in the most efficient manner.

Pursuant to this offer, on April 28, 1916, the War Department asked

the society's cooperation in issuing revised specifications for the

purchase of 1½-ton and 3-ton Army trucks. In May of the same year, a

committee consisting of the engineers from five companies manufacturing

trucks, from five companies assembling trucks, and an engineer from a

truck company not making the types of trucks under consideration, was

appointed to cooperate with Army officers in making plans to provide

our troops with motor vehicles suitable to their needs. On this

committee were representatives of the Locomobile Co. of America, the

Packard Motor Car Co., the Peerless Motor Car Co., the Pierce-Arrow

Motor Car Co., the Kelly-Springfield Motor Truck Co., the Selden Motor

Vehicle Co., the Commercial Truck Co. of America, the White Co.,

and the General Motors Co. This committee went over the Government

specifications for the 1½-ton and 3-ton trucks, which had been proposed

by the Army, and after a few changes had been made, the specifications

were drawn up for what then seemed to be the ideal trucks for Army use

in these two sizes.

Trucks at this time were urgently needed for our forces along the

Mexican border and for the punitive expedition entering Mexico.

Consequently rush orders for the first large quantities of trucks

ever purchased or used by our Army were placed with the White

Co., the Packard Motor Car Co., The Garford Motor Truck Co., the

Kelly-Springfield Motor Truck Co., the Four Wheel Drive Co., and the

Jeffery (Nash) Quad. It was with the trucks of these concerns that our

Army officers obtained their first real experience on a big scale with

motor transportation. The trucks themselves also received the most

severe tests while in service on the border and in Mexico.

Not only did the Army officers secure valuable experience in operating

this motor equipment but the manufacturer also took this exceptional

opportunity to study motor vehicles in actual operation under Army

conditions, and early in 1917 revised specifications for Army trucks

were issued as a result of the numerous conferences that had been

held between representatives of the War Department and the automobile

industry.

In May standard specifications for the so-called class A (1½-ton to

2-ton) and the class B (3-ton to 5-ton) motor trucks were established,

showing that the fundamental requirements of motor trucks for the

Army were as follows: low-gear reduction, larger engines, 4-speed

transmission (with very low first speed), maximum ground clearance,

demountable tires of standardized size and specifications, large

gasoline tank, electric lighting system, 3-point engine suspension,

locking differential, extra quality alloy steel springs, and larger

radiators.

After deciding on the requisites of an Army truck, the matter of

standardization began to receive definite attention, it being the

belief of many of the Army officers that it would be entirely possible

and practicable so to standardize Army vehicles that but one type of

truck would be sufficient for each size, and it became quite evident if

this ideal could be worked out, the maintenance of Army vehicles would

be a simple matter. Without some standardization, the providing of the

proper stock of spare parts became a problem of extreme difficulty.

In the early summer of 1917 an appropriation of $175,000 was set aside

by the Quartermaster Department for the purpose of financing the cost

of designing and drawing up specifications for a complete new vehicle,

which would become a standardized truck for our military forces. On

August 1, 1917, there were assembled in Washington 50 automotive

engineers who had been in touch with the truck needs of the Army; and

these men, with the help of Army officers, began the task of designing

a sample standardized truck, first centering their efforts on the 3-ton

size, as this was at that time most urgently needed by the Army. On

October 10 of this same year the engineers had finished designing the

new type of truck and had completed the first two sample trucks of this

type, afterwards known as the "Standardized B." These two sample trucks

were driven to Washington on October 19, were formally presented to the

War Department, tested, and pronounced wholly successful.

Orders for 10,000 of these class B trucks were placed within the next

few weeks. Five additional trucks were rushed through the plants

as a check on tools and were completed January 10, 1918. In April,

actual production having begun on the first 10,000, the purchase of an

additional 8,000 was authorized, and orders for them were placed in

May. In September, 1918, additional orders were placed for 25,000, but

on account of the signing of the armistice no trucks were delivered

under this last order.

Production of these standardized class B trucks was directed by

the following men, who were called to Washington: Christian Girl,

head of the Standard Parts Co., of Cleveland; James F. Bourquin,

Continental Motor Co., Louisville, Ky.; Percy W. Tracy, of the Premier

Motor Co., Indianapolis; Walter S. Quinlan, of the Maynard H. Murch

Co., Cleveland; Guy Morgan, of the Mitchell Motors Corporation,

Racine, Wis.; J. G. Utz, of the Standard Parts Co., Cleveland; G. W.

Randels, of the Foote-Burt Co., Cleveland; and A. G. Drefs, of the

Miller-Franklin Co.

All materials for the building of a standardized truck were mobilized

through officials at Washington. In general, it was the idea to have at

least three or four sources of supply for each part that went into the

standardized truck, and as a result 150 parts manufacturers were given

contracts.

During the time in which the Quartermaster Department was attempting

to standardize all Army cargo-carrying vehicles, and up to May 15,

1918, the other branches of the Army were buying commercial trucks

of different makes for their special uses. The Ordnance Department

had concentrated on the Nash and F. W. D. trucks for ammunition and

other ordnance work, and had ordered approximately 30,000 of these two

types. The Signal Corps had specialized in the light and heavy aviation

trucks, these being assembled from known and tried units, such as

motors, axles, transmission, etc., and equipped with special apparatus

for the Signal Corps. Approximately 4,000 of the light aviation and

4,600 of the heavy aviation trucks were ordered. The Engineer Corps had

adopted the Mack 5½-ton truck and had ordered approximately 3,600. The

Medical Corps had gone in for the G. M. C. model 16 for ambulances, of

which approximately 5,800 had been ordered, and they had also purchased

approximately 2,600 Ford ambulances.

These five branches of the Army had purchased trucks of other makes as

well, and during the winter of 1917 and 1918 it became evident that

the buying of so many makes and from so many different manufacturers

was not a logical solution of the motor transportation problem. Each

corps had its own ideas as to the type of truck required, and the sum

of these ideas resulted in a decided lack of standardization for the

Army as a whole, and no complete standardization for any corps as a

unit.

During the first year of operations in France the American

Expeditionary Forces had purchased various types of vehicles abroad

in order to fill their immediate requirements, and the result was

that over 200 different makes of motor vehicles were actually in use

by the American Expeditionary Forces. This diversity in types was to

some extent caused by lack of shipping space in which to transport

motor equipment abroad. Not being able to secure sufficient trucks

from the United States, due to shortage of ocean tonnage, the American

Expeditionary Forces were compelled to purchase a miscellaneous

assortment of foreign-made vehicles, thus complicating the maintenance

problem beyond the possibility of a satisfactory solution.

The buying of motor equipment by so many different agencies of the

Government was not only confusing to the manufacturer, who was selling

to five different corps, but it also precluded any possibility of

real standardization; and with a view of eliminating these two evils,

Special Order 91, W. D. 1918, and General Order 38, W. D. 1918, were

issued. The first created a standardization board and the second

consolidated the procurement of all motor vehicles in the Motor

Transport Service, which service operated under the direction of the

Quartermaster General.

Under the special orders the standardization board was charged with

selecting and approving the proper types for the use of the Army,

the board being composed of representatives from each of the various

corps. In this manner the various ideas of the different corps were

coordinated through the discussion of the board, and the final result

was that the following chassis were standardized for use:

Passenger cars: light, Ford and Dodge; heavy, Cadillac.

Ambulances: G. M. C. and Ford (with longer wheel base).

Trucks: one-half-ton to ¾-ton, Ford and Dodge (same chassis as in

passenger cars); ¾-ton to 1-ton, G. M. C. Model 16; 1½-ton to 2-ton,

White; 3-ton to 5-ton, Quartermaster standardized "B."

The 4-wheel-drive TT type, called the "Militor," was also standardized,

this being a special truck tractor designed by the Ordnance Department.

These latter vehicles were never furnished to the Army, as production

had not progressed far enough at the time of the signing of the

armistice.

On this limited number of chassis could be mounted any bodies required

by the Army. For instance the White ¾-ton to 1-ton chassis could be

used as a passenger car when equipped with pneumatic tires and with the

ordnance staff observation or reconnaissance body. The Ford and Dodge

chassis could be used either with the regular passenger-car bodies or

with light-delivery or light-repair bodies. The G. M. C. chassis could

be used either as an ambulance or could be equipped with a light-cargo

body, thus providing a ¾-ton to 1-ton truck. The standardized "B"

chassis could be used with special machine-shop bodies, special Signal

Corps apparatus, or the regular "B" cargo body, etc. The work of the

board was painstaking and thorough, and decisions were rendered only

after experts had been consulted and exhaustive tests made.

While the board was standardizing on the types of vehicles to be

purchased in the future for the Army, the Motor Transport Service was

being formed, and by June 1, 1918, the consolidation of procurement,

inspection, production, maintenance, etc., was well underway.

The needs of the American Expeditionary Forces for motor equipment

were increasing by leaps and bounds, and the Motor Transport Service

found that it was impossible to purchase the trucks standardized by

the motorization board in sufficient quantities to meet the overseas

requirements. It was therefore decided, after the consent of the

board had been received, that certain other types of vehicles should

be procured to fill the requirements of the Army until such time as

production of the standardized truck could be increased. Therefore,

the makes of trucks which were already in use in large quantities with

the American Expeditionary Forces were temporarily made standard to

meet the immediate needs of the Army. It being extremely difficult to

purchase sufficient trucks, even of these additional makes, to meet the

needs overseas, it was decided that still other makes of trucks would

be procured for use in the United States, thus allowing all the makes

standardized for overseas use to be shipped to France.

The Motor Transport Service operated from May 15 until August 15, 1918,

when the Motor Transport Corps was organized under General Order No.

75. This order created a separate corps under the operations division

of the General Staff for the operation as well as the procurement of

all passenger and cargo carrying motor equipment for the Army. A few

weeks later, however, Supply Circular 87, P., S. & T., was issued,

placing the procurement of the above under the Director of Purchase,

Storage and Traffic (Motors and Vehicles Division), but the operation

and maintenance of vehicles was left with the Motor Transport Corps.

From September on these organizations remained unchanged up to and

after the signing of the armistice.

The table appended shows the status of the procurement and production

of motor-vehicle orders as of November 1, 1918, 11 days prior to the

signing of the armistice. It will be noted that there had been ordered

for delivery before July 1, 1919, a total of 185,000 trucks, 23,053

ambulances, and 38,462 passenger cars.

The Army in April, 1917, possessed 3,039 trucks, 437 automobiles, 670

motor cycles, and 12 tractors. One and one-half years later it owned

approximately 85,000 trucks, and had the war continued until July 1,

1919, there would have been approximately 185,000 trucks provided for

its use by American industry. In addition, this same industry would

have provided 30,000 ambulances, 40,000 passenger cars, 70,000 motor

cycles, 70,000 bicycles, making a grand total approaching 400,000

vehicles, costing (with spare parts) over $700,000,000.

From the very beginning the Government received the hearty cooperation

of the entire industry. The need was urgent, the demand tremendous, and

many manufacturers were called upon to sacrifice their own product in

order to meet the needs of the Army, and many were on a 100-per-cent

war-work basis.

_Motor truck production._

VEHICLES STANDARDIZED FOR OVERSEAS SHIPMENT.

Key: (A) - Class

(B) - Capacity in tons

(D) - Total completed to Nov. 1, 1918

(E) - Floated overseas

---------------+---+-------+---------------------------+------+------+-------

Name. |(A)| (B) | Manufacturer. / Address. | (C) | (D) | (E)

---------------+---+-------+---------------------------+------+------+-------

G. M. C. |AA | 1 |Commerce Motor Car Co. | 450| |

Do. |AA | do. |Velie Motors Corp. | 1,000| |

Do. |AA | do. |Dort Motor Co. | 1,000| |

Do. |AA | do. |Elgin Motor Car Corp. | 500| |

Do. |AA | do. |Lexington Motor Co. | 500| |

Do. |AA | do. |Auburn Auto Co. | 500| |

Do. |AA | do. |Hupp Motor Car Corp. | 500| |

Do. |AA | do. |General Motor Truck Co. | 1,000| |

Do. |AA | do. |Saxon Motor Car Co. | 500| |

Do. |AA | do. |Campbell Motor Car Co. | 200| |

Do. |AA | do. |Columbia Motor Co. | 300| |

Do. |AA | do. |Moon Motor Car Co. | 300| |

Do. |AA | do. |Liberty Motor Co. | 450| |

G. M. C. |AA | do. |General Motors Truck Co. | 5,811| 5,553| 4,001

White |AA | do. |The White Co. | 2,695| 2,196| 809

| | | +------+------+-------

Total | | | |15,706| 7,749| 4,810

| | | +======+======+=======

Dodge light |AA | ½ |Dodge Bros. Co. | 9,352| 2,644|}

delivery | | | Detroit, Mich. | | |} 1,802

Dodge light |AA | ¾ | do. do. | 1,012| 1,012|}

Ford light |AA | do. |Ford Motor Co. |12,002| 5,492| 7,206

delivery | | | do. | | |

Ford |AA | do. | do. do. |10,042| 5,340| 4,362

| | | +------+------+-------

Total | | | |32,408|14,488| 13,370

| | | +======+======+=======

White | A | 1½ |The White Co. | 9,201| 1,813| 1,532

Do. | A | do. |Peerless Motor Co. | 3,000| |

| | | do. | | |

| | | +------+------+-------

Total | | | |12,201| 1,813| 1,532

| | | +======+======+=======

Light aviation | A | 1½ |General Motor Truck Co. | 2,400| 1,888|}

| | to 2 | Pontiac, Mich. | | |}

Do. | A | do. |Paige Motor Car Co. | 500| 480|}

| | | Detroit, Mich. | | |} 1,829

Do. | A | do. |Republic Motor Truck Co. | 500| 354|}

| | | Alma, Mich. | | |}

Do. | A | do. |Denby Motor Truck Co. | 500| 488|}

Garford | A | 1½ |Garford Motor Truck Co. | 5,010| 1,010| 499

Packard | A | do. |Packard Motor Car Co. | 831| 636| 526

Pierce-Arrow | A | do. |Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co. | 4,023| 2,423| 534

| | | +------+------+-------

Total | | | |13,764| 7,279| 3,388

| | | +======+======+=======

Standardized B | B | 3 |Packard Motor Car Co. | 5| 5|

Do. | B | do. |Gramm-Bernstein Motor | 3,750| 1,000|

Do. | B | do. |Kelly-Springfield Motor | 1,045| 301|

Do. | B | do. |Indiana Truck Corporation | 2,545| 475|

Do. | B | do. |Service Motor Truck Co. | 1,795| 337|

Do. | B | do. |Republic Motor Truck Co. | 3,750| 967|

Do. | B | do. |Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co. | 1,000| 975|

Do. | B | do. |Selden Truck Sales Co. | 3,750| 1,000|

Do. | B | do. |Bethlehem Motors | 2,725| 675|

Do. | B | do. |Diamond T Motor Co. | 3,203| 638|

Do. | B | do. |U. S. Motor Truck Co. | 2,545| 490|

Do. | B | do. |Brockway Motor Truck Co. | 2,202| 587|

Do. | B | do. |Velie Motors Corporation | 3,045| 455|

Do. | B | do. |Sterling Motor Truck | 1,795| 479|

Do. | B | do. |Garford Motor Truck Co. | 1,750| 978|

Do. | B | do. |Hurlburt Motor Truck Co. | 100| |

Do. | B | do. |Midland Motor Truck Co. | 500| |

Do. | B | do. |Atterbury Motor Car Co. | 750| |

Do. | B | do. |Standard Motor Truck Co. | 750| |

Do. | B | do. |Maccar Co. | 500| |

Do. | B | do. |Clyde Cars Co. | 500| |

Do. | B | do. |Rowe Motor Manufacturing | 500| |

| | | Co. | | |

Do. | B | do. |J. C. Wilson Co. | 500| |

Do. | B | do. |Lewis Hall Iron Works | 500| |

| | | do. | | |

Do. | B | do. |Denby Motor Truck Co. | 1,500| |

| | | do. | | |

Do. | B | do. |Winther Motor Truck Co. | 500| |

Do. | B | do. |Vim Motor Truck Co. | 500| |

Do. | B | do. |Signal Motor Truck Co. | 500| |

| | | do. | | |

Do. | B | do. |United Motors Co. | 500| |

| | | +------+------+-------

Total | | | |43,005| 9,452| 7,655

| | | +======+======+=======

Packard | B | 3 |Packard Motor Car Co. |10,106| 4,856| 3,479

Heavy aviation | B | do. |United Motors Co. | 200| 188|}

| | | Grand Rapids, Mich. | | |}

Do. | B | do. |Federal Motor Truck Co. | 1,000| 1,000|}

| | | Detroit Mich. | | |}

Do. | B | do. |Kelly-Springfield Motor | 2,225| 1,725|} 2,110

| | | Truck Co. | | |}

| | | Springfield, Ohio | | |}

Do. | B | do. |Standard Motor Truck Co. | 250| 186|}

| | | Detroit, Mich. | | |}

Do. | B | do. |Velie Motors Corporation | 1,000| 700|}

Riker | B | 4 |Locomobile Co. of America | 3,690| 1,690| 1,351

Pierce-Arrow | B | 5 |Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co. | 3,170| 1,970| 1,660

Mack | B | 5½ |International Motors Co. | 5,575| 2,563| 1,365

| | | +------+------+-------

Total | | | |27,216|14,878| 9,965

| | | +======+======+=======

Four-wheel |TT | 2 |Nash Motors Co. |14,684| 8,139|}

drive | | | Kenosha, Wis. | | |}

Do. |TT | do. |Hudson Motor Car Co. | 3,000| 219|}

| | | Detroit, Mich. | | |}

Do. |TT | do. |National Motor Car & | 3,000| 95|}

| | | Vehicle | | |}

| | | Indianapolis, Ind. | | |} 7,034

Do. |TT | do. |Paige Motor Car Co. | 3,000| 145|}

| | | Detroit, Mich. | | |}

Do. | W | do. |Nash Motors Co. | 100| 100|}

| | | Kenosha, Wis. | | |}

Do. | W | 3 |Four-Wheel Drive Auto Co. | 800| 364|}

Do. |TT | do. | do. do. | 7,150| 4,233|}

| | | | | |}

Do. |TT | do. |Mitchell Motors | 5,023| 855|}

| | | Corporation | | |}

| | | Racine, Wis. | | |} 4,748

Do. |TT | do. |Premier Motor Co. | 4,500| 1,307|}

| | | Indianapolis, Ind. | | |}

Do. |TT | do. |Kissel Motor Car Co. | 3,500| 997|}

| | | +------+------+-------

Total | | | |44,757|16,454| 11,782

| | | +======+======+=======

Cadillac, | P | |Cadillac Motor Car Co. | 1,043| 222|}

limousine | | | Detroit, Mich. | | |} 1,503

Cadillac, open | P | | do. do. | 2,970| 1,734|}

| | | | | |

Dodge, open | P | |Dodge Bros Co. | 8,559| 5,065|}

| | | | | |} 3,390

Dodge, Winter | P | | do. do. | 3,201| 2,126|}

top | | | | | |

Ford; touring | P | |Ford Motor Co. |20,201| 5,379| 2,344

| | | do. | | |

| | | +------+------+-------

Total | | | |35,974|14,526| 7,237

---------------+---+-------+---------------------------+------+------+-------

Key: W - Winch

P - Pass

MOTOR VEHICLES FOR DOMESTIC DISTRIBUTION.

Key: (A) - Class

(B) - Capacity in tons

(D) - Completed to Nov. 1, 1918

(E) - Completed to Dec. 1, 1918

(F) - Total floated overseas

P - Passenger

--------------+---+-----+----------------------+------+------+-------+------

Name. |(A)| (B) |Manufacturer./Address.| (C) | (D) | (E) | (F)

--------------+---+-----+----------------------+------+------+-------+------

Commerce |AA |1 |Commerce Motor Car Co.| 1,548| 1,548| 1,548 | 272

Ford trucks | |¾ |Ford Motor Co. | 2,494| 2,474| 2,474 | 1,772

| |to 1 | do. | | | |

| | | +------+------+-------+------

Total | | | | 4,042| 4,022| 4,022 | 2,044

| | | +======+======+=======+======

White Un- | A |1½ |The White Co. | 394| 394| 394 | 327

Kelly- | A | do. |Kelly-Springfield | 356| 16| 16 |

Denby | A | do. |Denby Motor Truck Co. | 500| | 182 |

International | A | do. |International | 1,125| 125| 485 |

Miscellaneous | A |1½ | | 949| 945| 949 | 220

| |to 2 | | | | |

| | | | | | |

Wilson | A |1½ |J. C. Wilson Co. | 200| | 75 |

| |to 2 | Detroit, Mich. | | | |

Moreland | A | do. |Moreland Motor Truck | 85| 43| 76 |

| | | Co. | | | |

Miscellaneous | A | do. | | 78| 78| 78 |

| | | +------+------+-------+------

Total | | | | 3,687| 1,601| 2,255 | 547

| | | +======+======+=======+======

White | B |3 |The White Co. | 306| 306| 306 | 280

Peerless | B | do. |Peerless Motor Car | 385| 385| 697 | 385

| | | do. | | | |

Mack | B |3½ |International Motors | 368| 368| 368 | 278

| | | Co. | | | |

Velie | B | do. |Velie Motors | 125| | 28 |

Gramm- | B | do. |Gramm-Bernstein | 100| | 66 |

Federal | B | do. |Federal Motor Truck | 500| | 85 |

| | | Co. | | | |

Standard | B | do. |Standard Motor Truck | 287| 35| 89 |

| | | Co. | | | |

| | | do. | | | |

Selden | B | do. |Selden Motor Truck Co.| 171| 71| 121 | 5

Republic | B | do. |Republic Motor Truck | 250| | |

| | | Co. | | | |

Moreland | B |4 |Moreland Motor Truck | 60| | 40 |

White | B |5 |The White Co. | 48| 48| 48 | 34

Packard | B | do. |Packard Motor Car Co. | 65| 60| 60 | 17

Hurlburt | B | do. |Hurlburt Motor Truck | 200| | |

| | | Co. | | | |

Federal | B | do. |Federal Motor Truck | 300| | 53 |

Miscellaneous | B |3 to | | 278| 278| 250 | 209

American | | 5 | | | | |

| | | +------+------+-------+------

Total | | | | 3,443| 1,551| 2,211 | 1,20

| | | +======+======+=======+======

| | | | | | |

Dodge Sedan | P | |Dodge Bros. | 10| | |

Dodge Roadster|do.| | do. do. | 550| 22| 175 |

| | | | | | |

Ford Roadster |do.| |Ford Motor Co. | 435| 185| 186 |

| | | do. | | | |

Ford Closed |do.| | do. do. | 16| 16| 16 |

| | | | | | |

Miscellaneous |do.| | | 958| 958| 958 |

| | | +------+------+-------+------

Total | | | | 1,969| 1,181| 1,335 |

--------------+---+-----+----------------------+------+------+-------+------

MOTORCYCLES, SIDE CARS, AND BICYCLES.

The need of the Army for motorcycles, side cars, and bicycles was so

tremendous that for many months during the war practically the entire

output of these vehicles of the kinds selected as being most suitable

for Army use was taken by the Government.

It was found that the Indian and Harley-Davidson motorcycles were best

adapted to meet the necessities of the Expeditionary Forces in France,

and these types were standardized for overseas shipment. Orders for a

total of 39,070 Indian motorcycles were placed with the manufacturers

at Springfield, Mass., and before the end of 1918, 18,081 of these had

been delivered. From the Harley-Davidson manufacturers at Milwaukee,

Wis., the Government received 14,666 machines of the total of 26,487

ordered before the end of 1918. In addition to the Harley-Davidson and

Indian machines, 1,526 Cleveland motorcycles, made in Cleveland, Ohio,

were contracted for, and 1,476 delivered previous to 1919.

Side-car equipment for the Indian and Harley-Davidson machines was

bought in almost as great quantities as the motorcycles themselves. In

fact, the demand for motorcycles and side cars from these two concerns

was so great that they were working at 100-per-cent capacity for the

Government before the summer of 1918.

The needs of the Army for machines increased so steadily and the

requirements were so vast that both the Indian and Harley-Davidson

concerns had made large additions to their plants for meeting the

Government needs at the time the armistice was signed.

A standard military type of bicycle was turned out for the Army by the

Westfield Manufacturing Co., at Westfield, Mass., and other bicycles

were ordered from the Great Western Manufacturing Co., at Laporte,

Ind., and the Davis Sewing Machine Co., at Dayton, Ohio.

_Motorcycles, bicycles, and side cars._

MOTORCYCLES.

----------+-----------------+------------+--------+-----------------+---------

Name. | Manufacturer. | Address. | to +--------+--------+ Shipped

| | |Nov. 1, |Nov. 1, |Dec. 31,|overseas.

| | | 1918. | 1918. | 1918. |

----------+-----------------+------------+--------+--------+--------+---------

| Mfg. Co. | Ohio | 1,526 | 780 | 1,476 | 1,003

Davidson | Motorcycle Co. | Wis. | 26,485 | 12,376 | 14,666 |}

| |Springfield,| | | |} 20,007

Indian |Hendee Mfg. Co. | Mass. | 39,870 | 14,054 | 18,018 |}

| | +--------+--------+--------+---------

Total | | | 67,881 | 27,210 | 34,160 | 21,010

----------+-----------------+------------+--------+--------+--------+---------

SIDE CARS.

----------+-----------------+------------+--------+--------+--------+---------

Davidson | Motorcycle Co. | Wis. | 26,099 | 11,934 | 14,332 |}

| |Springfield,| | | |} 19,160

Indian |Hendee Mfg. Co. | Mass. | 39,124 | 13,863 | 16,804 |}

| | +--------+--------+--------+---------

Total | | | 65,223 | 25,797 | 31,136 | 19,160

----------+-----------------+------------+--------+--------+--------+---------

BICYCLES.

----------+-----------------+------------+--------+--------+--------+---------

Standard | Mfg. Co. | Mass. | 36,002 | 19,164 | 22,502 |}

| Mfg. Co. | Ind. | 15,750 | | 3,750 |} 26,407

Do. |Davis Sewing |Dayton, |

| Machine Co. | Ohio | 15,750 | 1,992 | 3,252 |}

| | +--------+--------+--------+---------

Total | | | 67,502 | 21,156 | 29,504 | 26,407

----------+-----------------+------------+--------+--------+--------+---------

HORSE AND HAND DRAWN VEHICLES.

It was early realized by Army officers upon our entry in the war

that procurement of horse-drawn vehicles for the Army would require

mobilization of practically the entire wagon-making industry of the

Nation. Consequently one of the first steps taken to provide the Army

with the necessary vehicles of this type was to call into conference

representatives of the four largest manufacturing companies in the

industry.

R. V. Board, of the Kentucky Wagon Co.; A. B. Thielens, of the

Studebaker Corporation of America; E. E. Parsonage, of the John Deere

Wagon Co.; and R. W. Lea, of the Moline Plow Co., were named members of

an advisory committee to assist the Army in the procurement of vehicles.

Our first requisition called for the manufacture of 34,000 escort

wagons. This order, with the necessary spare parts for these vehicles

meant the building of the equivalent of about 50,000 wagons.

At the beginning of the war the manufacture of vehicles from kiln-dried

lumber was almost unknown, as there had always been a sufficient

amount of air-dried lumber on hand to meet every demand for farm-wagon

construction. Our first order, however, practically used up all of

the air-dried lumber then in existence in the country. In order that

dry lumber could be obtained in sufficient quantities to keep up

with the demands for Army vehicles, the War Department entered into

an arrangement by which dry-kilns were built by contractors with the

Government defraying half of the cost, the wagon manufacturer being

reimbursed at the rate of $10 for each wagon produced, or on a basis of

$10 for each $185 worth of spare parts fabricated.

Despite the fact that ordinarily six months were required even with

kiln-drying before a log was ready for fabrication into a vehicle, all

orders for the War Department were filled on time and in accordance

with the plans outlined. To make this possible every manufacturer of

the industry capable of turning out the class of vehicles desired did

his part and did it so well that up to the signing of the armistice

approximately 110,000 horse-drawn or hand-drawn vehicles had been

delivered, of the total of 185,727 for which contracts had been placed.

Escort wagons formed the large bulk of the requirements at the start,

but as the war progressed, the necessity was created for different

designs of vehicles. So from time to time there were designed

drinking-water carts and wagons, medical and ration carts, combat

wagons, veterinary ambulances, sprinkling wagons, and various other

types to meet special needs.

In the early spring of 1918 it was found that the wagon industry had

about reached its limit so far as output was concerned, and that, if

the war continued another year, new sources of supply would have to

be developed. Then it was that the furniture industry was called upon

to produce spare parts for vehicles. Under the presidency of P. B.

Schravesande, president of the Grand Rapids School Equipment Co., the

Furniture and Fixture and Light-wood Industry War Service Committee was

organized to cooperate in arranging to have furniture makers enter the

field of manufacture of spare parts.

It was arranged that the furniture manufacturers were to produce 75 per

cent of the spare parts then requisitioned, totaling in value about

$8,000,000. While the furniture industry was preparing its plants

for the manufacture of these parts, the wagon industry continued to

manufacture 25 per cent of the required parts in order to keep up a

satisfactory flow.

When the armistice was signed practically all the furniture

manufacturers had prepared to fill the spare-parts orders, but none of

them had reached quantity production.

Automobile-wheel manufacturers were induced to turn out the immense

quantity of wheels needed for escort wagons.

There were in all about 250 manufacturers of wagons, wagon parts,

and wheels. Among the prominent wagon companies engaged in this work

were: Bain Wagon Co., Oshkosh, Wis.; Columbia Wagon Co., Columbia,

Pa.; Deere & Co., Moline, Ill.; Emerson-Brantingham Co., Rockford,

Ill.; Florence Wagon Co., Florence, Ala.; Hackney Wagon Co., Wilson,

N. C.; International Harvester Co., Memphis, Tenn.; Moline Plow Co.,

Moline, Ill; Mogul Wagon Co., Hoskinsville, Ky.; Owensboro Wagon Co.,

Owensboro, Ky.; Pekin Wagon Co., Pekin, Ill.; Peter Schuttler Co.,

Chicago, Ill.; Springfield Wagon Co., Springfield, Mo.; Stoughton Wagon

Co., Stoughton, Wis.; A. Streich & Bros. Co., Oshkosh, Wis.; Thornhill

Wagon Co., Lynchburg, Va.; Tiffin Wagon Co., Tiffin, Ohio; Eagle Wagon

Works, Auburn, N. Y.; A. A. Cooper Wagon & Buggy Co., Dubuque, Iowa;

Winona Wagon Co., Winona, Minn.; White Hickory Wagon Co., Atlanta, Ga.;

Kentucky Wagon Co., Louisville, Ky.; Studebaker Corporation, South

Bend, Ind.; American Car & Foundry Co., Jeffersonville, Ind.

Among the leading automobile-wheel manufacturers who were given

contracts for escort-wagon wheels were the following: Mutual Wheel Co.,

Moline, Ill.; Roger Wheel Co., Aurora, Ind.; Crane & McMahon (Inc.),

St. Marys, Ohio; Hayes Wheel Co., Jackson, Mich.; Imperial Wheel Co.,

Flint, Mich.; Kelsey Wheel Co., Detroit, Mich.; Binnel Spoke & Auto

Wheel Co., Portland, Ind.; Archibald Wheel Co., Lawrence, Mass.;

Chattanooga Wagon Co., Chattanooga, Tenn.; Hoopes Bros. & Dalington

(Inc.), Westchester, Pa.; Prudden Wheel Co., Lansing, Mich.; Standard

Wheel Co., Terre Haute, Ind.; Avoca Wheel Co., Avoca, N. Y.; New

Wapakoneta Wheel Co., Wapakoneta, Ohio; Piedmont Wagon Co., Hickory, N.

Furniture factories that assumed contracts for making spare parts

for horse-drawn vehicles included about 30 furniture manufacturers

of Rockford, Ill., as well as the following: Grand Rapids School

Equipment Co., Grand Rapids, Mich.; Sherman Bros. Co., Jamestown, N.

Y.; Ramsey-Alton Manufacturing Co., Portland, Mich.; Connersville

Furniture Co., Connersville, Ind.; P. Derby & Co., Gardner, Mass.;

Ebert Furniture Co., Red Lion, Pa.; S. Karpen & Bros., Chicago, Ill.;

Chas. T. Lambert & Co., Holland, Mich.; The Macey Co., Grand Rapids,

Mich.; Thos. Madden Son & Co., Indianapolis, Ind.; Sidney Manufacturing

Co., Sidney, Ohio; Basic Furniture Co., Waynesboro, Va.; Brecht Co.,

St. Louis, Mo.

_Production data for horse-drawn vehicles._

-------------------+-----------+-----------+---------+---------+----------

| Apr. 6, | |Nov. 11, | | overseas.

| 1917, and | | 1918. | |

| Nov. 11, | | | |

| 1918. | | | |

-------------------+-----------+-----------+---------+---------+----------

Commercial vehicles| 181,077|$41,247,911| 89,024| 28,918|$7,247,522

Spare parts | | 39,690,255| | | 2,551,642

-------------------+-----------+-----------+---------+---------+----------

Total | 181,077| 80,938,166| 89,024| 28,918| 9,799,164

-------------------+-----------+-----------+---------+---------+----------

The following table shows the principal items listed under commercial

vehicles, with the total number ordered, value of the order, and the

total number delivered up to November 11, 1918:

---------------------+---------+-------------+-----------+--------------

| | Value of | | Value of

Item. | Total | number | Total | number

| ordered.| ordered. | delivered.| delivered.

---------------------+---------+-------------+-----------+--------------

_Wagons._ | | | |

Ambulance | 3,339 | $1,168,650 | 3,319 | $1,161,650

Escort, model A | 1,000 | 242,000 | 1,000 | 242,000

Escort, J-118 | 102,078 | 20,415,600 | 37,613 | 7,522,600

Combat | 15,500 | 7,750,000 | 7,099 | 3,549,500

Drinking water | 2,687 | 1,262,890 | 2,687 | 1,262,890

Mountain, 3-seat | 1,000 | 300,000 | 1,000 | 300,000

Sprinkling | 1,056 | 496,320 | 1,056 | 496,320

Bottom, dump | 436 | 71,940 | 255 | 42,075

Milk | 4 | 1,400 | 4 | 1,400

Buckboard | 1,859 | 232,375 | 1,155 | 144,375

|---------+-------------+-----------+--------------

Total | 128,959 | 31,941,175 | 55,188 | 14,722,810

|==================================================

_Carts._ | | | |

Drinking water | 22,000 | 6,050,000 | 14,729 | 4,050,475

Ration | 15,000 | 1,875,000 | 10,185 | 1,273,125

Medical | 5,500 | 819,500 | 2,350 | 350,150

Hand | 7,309 | 211,961 | 4,607 | 133,003

Dump | 1,183 | 118,300 | 1,037 | 103,700

Sanitary | 1,009 | 201,800 | 811 | 162,200

Veterinary ambulance | 80 | 20,000 | 80 | 20,000

Disinfecting spray | 37 | 10,175 | 37 | 10,175

|---------+-------------+-----------+--------------

Total | 52,118 | 9,306,736 | 33,836 | 6,103,428

|==================================================

Grand total | | 41,247,911 | | 20,826,238

---------------------+---------+-------------+-----------+--------------

This table shows the total number of horse-drawn vehicles sent overseas

during the war; also the value of these shipments and the unit prices.

_Horse-drawn vehicles._

--------------+-------+--------+------------------

| | | Items shipped.

Article. | Unit. | Number.+-------+----------

| | | Unit | Total

| | | value.| value.

--------------+-------+--------+-------+----------

Ambulances | Each | 507 | $350 | $177,450

Escort wagons | do. | 15,979 | 230 | 3,675,170

Combat wagons | do. | 2,672 | 500 | 1,336,000

Spring wagons | do. | 147 | 235 | 34,545

Water carts | do. | 5,314 | 275 | 1,461,350

Ration carts | do. | 3,231 | 125 | 403,875

Medical carts | do. | 1,068 | 149 | 159,132

| | | +----------

Total | | | | 7,247,522

--------------+-------+--------+-------+----------

CHAPTER V.

MEDICAL AND DENTAL SUPPLIES.

Lest it be thought that the American Army was dependent in any way

for its hospital facilities and surgical supplies upon private

contributions, it may be said that the Government during the period

between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918, placed contracts for

medical supplies amounting to $424,761,031. Contract cancellations

after the armistice was signed amounted to $56,000,000. The remaining

$370,000,000 approximately represents the cost to the United States

of medicine, surgical instruments and dressings, ambulances, hospital

furniture, equipment and supplies, and dental and veterinary supplies

for the war.

This was considerably more money than was contributed by the American

people to the American Red Cross, a great part of whose funds went

to the relief of civilian populations in Europe, or to any other

war charity. Thus it will be seen that the Government with billions

of dollars to spend could well afford the few hundreds of millions

necessary to give the American soldiers who needed it the best possible

hospital attention. It accepted the gifts of this sort, ranging from

gauze bandages to fully equipped motor ambulances, as the offerings

of the people whose hearts overflowed with love and gratitude to the

American soldiers and took this means of showing their concern; but the

Government in no sense was dependent upon these donations.

Before 1914 four-fifths of all surgical instruments used in the United

States were imported from Germany. This country, too, was practically

dependent upon Germany for many of its most important medicines,

including the potassium salts and such drugs as digitalin, salvarsan,

atropin, etc. While in a way we had been developing substitute sources

of supply in the United States for these indispensable commodities

in the months between the outbreak of the great war and the date of

our participation in it, the raising of a vast army and the project

to send this army to the bloody battle fields of France created an

American demand for medicines and surgical instruments beyond anything

ever known in the United States. Yet, through the cooperation of

manufacturers and the officers of the Medical Department's general

purchasing office, which was on November 15, 1918, incorporated in the

office of the Director of Purchase and Storage, sufficient supplies

were developed, not only of medicine but of surgical instruments.

The development of the production of medicines for the use of troops

in the field was particularly notable. The important drug, salvarsan,

used in the treatment of syphilis, was a patented formula and had been

furnished formerly by a single German manufacturer. In this country we

produced arsphenamine as a substitute, gradually increasing the supply

and constantly improving the drug until at length its toxicity had been

so reduced that it equaled or even excelled the German product.

The facilities of the American drug and tablet manufacturers were taxed

to the utmost to supply the Army. For example, during the year 1918 a

total of 46,000,000 quinine tablets was produced, while 172,000,000

aspirin tablets were manufactured during the same period, and 835,000

pounds of calomel ointment, 45,000,000 iodine swabs, 10,250,000 tins of

foot powder, and 300,000,000 tubes of iodine-potassium. All other items

of medicines, antiseptics, and disinfectants, required by the Medical

Department, were increased in proportion. This production not only

strained the facilities of the manufacturers of chemicals and drugs but

also called upon the glassware manufacturers for the necessary bottles

and tubes in which to pack these medicines satisfactorily. Here again

was an effort that required close cooperation between the trade and the

Medical Department in order to meet the demand.

When it became evident that a declaration of war against Germany was

imminent, the Medical Department proceeded to analyze the country's

resources of medical supplies. These resources were to a large extent

limited. The Allied nations had been making heavy and constant demands

for these materials, so much so that even the mobilization of such a

relatively small number of troops as were centered along the Mexican

Border put a severe burden upon the medical supply facilities of the

country.

The Council of National Defense took up the medical supplies problem

at the outset. The various manufacturers sent their representatives

to consult with the Surgeon General, and committees on surgical

instruments, surgical dressings, medicines, and other important

supplies were formed. These committees allocated among the various

manufacturers the first emergency orders for these materials. The

result was that the base hospitals at the 32 mobilization camps in 1917

were equipped in an amazingly short time. The New York Medical Supply

Depot, which was then the largest purchasing agent, was called upon to

supply 500 hospital beds each to 22 of the camps. This work was handled

so rapidly that in some cases the shipments had to be held back to wait

for the completion of the hospital buildings.

Perhaps the most difficult task was to determine what quantities

of medical supplies would be needed for a given period. It is a

comparatively simple matter to estimate the quantity of clothing

necessary for a certain number of troops, or to figure what food they

will require; but it is not possible to forecast the number of men who

will be sick at a given camp at a specified time, nor is it possible

to foretell the nature of diseases or injuries. An epidemic of measles

or mumps requires different treatment than an epidemic of influenza,

and makes necessary the use of a different variety of medical supplies.

Experience sheets of supplies actually used in the past formed the

basis of our requirements schedules.

Eventually there was worked out a system of supply based on the initial

requirements of the unit of 25,000 men in the Expeditionary Forces and

the automatic supply of replenishment of this equipment. In this system

use was made of the knowledge and experience obtained by the British

and French medical forces during their nearly three years of warfare

before America went in.

The following statement of estimated expenditures for the fiscal year

1920 illustrates the difference in the medical requirements of an army

of 500,000 men under peace conditions and an army of 5,000,000 men in a

war such as the recent one:

_Clothing and equipage produced and shipped to the American