THE PANIC AT WASHINGTON.

In spite of the plainest statements of the situation, of the great

disparity of forces, of the dictates of prudence to remain on the

defensive until he could strike an effective blow, which he expected to

deliver in a few days, Thomas was prodded and nagged from City Point and

Washington as no officer in command of an army had been before, and

treated day by day as if he needed tutelage. In the last dispatch of the

series of clear explanations,--which under other circumstances than the

seething of that inside panic which a full appreciation of the

complications that Sherman's march to the sea had caused would doubtless

have been accepted,--General Thomas was peremptorily ordered to "attack

Hood at once without waiting for a remount of your cavalry. There is great

danger in delay resulting in a campaign back to the Ohio." This was sent

in reply to a telegram of Thomas showing that there was the greatest

activity in getting the cavalry ready, and he hoped to have it remounted

"in three days from this time." To this Thomas replied that he would make

all dispositions and attack according to orders, adding, "though I believe

it will be hazardous with the small force of cavalry now at my service."

Orders to prepare for attack were immediately sent out, and dispositions

for the attack began. Meantime a sleet storm came on which covered the

country with a glaze of ice over which neither horses, men, nor artillery

could move even on level ground, to say nothing of assaulting an enemy

intrenched on the hills. The same day Halleck telegraphed: "If you wait

till General Wilson mounts all his cavalry you will wait till doomsday,

for the waste equals the supply." And General Grant telegraphed orders

relieving Thomas. The latter telegraphed Halleck that he was conscious of

having done everything possible to prepare the troops to attack, and if he

was removed he would submit without a murmur.

The order of relief was suspended. The sleet storm continued. All of

General Thomas's officers agreed that it was impracticable to attack. Some

of them even found it impossible to ride to headquarters because of the

ice, and in the midst of it came an order from Grant: "I am in hopes of

receiving a dispatch from you to-day announcing you have moved. Delay no

longer for weather or reinforcements."

Thomas replied:

"I will obey the order as promptly as possible, however much I regret it,

as the attack will have to be made under every disadvantage. The whole

country is covered with a perfect sheet of ice and sleet, and it is with

difficulty the troops are able to move about on level ground."

To Halleck, Thomas replied:

"I have the troops ready to make the attack on the enemy as soon as the

sleet which now covers the ground has melted sufficiently to enable the

men to march, as the whole country is now covered with a sheet of ice so

hard and slippery that it is utterly impossible for troops to ascend the

slopes, or even move upon level ground in anything like order. Under these

circumstances I believe an attack at this time would only result in a

useless sacrifice of life."

The reply to this, unquestionably born of the panic to which allusion has

been made, was an order sending General Logan to relieve Thomas. Grant

himself then started from City Point for Nashville to assume general

command. But the ice having melted, he was met at Washington by the news

of Thomas's victory.

The delay that Thomas had insisted upon, in the face of orders twice given

for his relief, gave him the cavalry force he required for the decisive

blow he intended to strike.

While the official inside at City Point and Washington bordered on panic,

everything at Nashville was being pressed forward with activity and

vigilance, and at the same time with deliberation, prudence, and the

utmost imperturbability. At length, and at the first moment possible

consistent with a reasonable expectation of success, the attack began.

Was General Thomas Slow at Nashville? With a Description of the Greatest Cavalry Movement of the War and General James H. Wilson's Cavalry Operations in Tennessee, Alabama, and Georgia · 第 10 / 18 题