It was under such circumstances and conditions which, after all, are but
faintly shadowed forth by the facts here stated, that General Thomas began
to concentrate his conglomerate forces in Hood's front, and begin under
fire the work of organizing and refitting an army. With superhuman effort,
and such loyal assistance and energy from officers and soldiers as were
not elsewhere exhibited during the war, because not previously required,
General Thomas set about the task of preparing the means of overthrowing
Hood. Deliberate action and the extreme of prudence were essentials of the
situation. The objective of Hood's campaign, under suggestions from
President Davis, was the Ohio River. There was no reserve force in sight
or within summoning distance, or immediately available anywhere in case of
reverses. Thomas could not afford to take the slightest risks so long as
his own position was not imperilled. It was not alone the immediate
interests confided to his keeping and defense which hinged upon his
success or failure, but both Grant and Sherman and possibly the Union
itself were to stand or fall with such success or failure. Had Hood
succeeded, as at the first he might have succeeded without fault of
Thomas, or even fair ground for reflection upon him, what would have been
said of Sherman for marching off to the sea, leaving the central West
without sufficient protection, or of General Grant for having allowed him
to go?
And because the deliberate, prudent, imperturbable, and always successful
Thomas appreciated the situation, and determined to be ready to annihilate
his enemy before he struck, he was hastily declared to be slow by those he
was preparing to save.
All of General Thomas's troubles at Nashville arose from his adhering, in
the face of threatened removal, to plans of action which made General
Wilson's cavalry an essential factor in the attack on Hood for which he
was energetically preparing. He was looking not only to attack, but to
crushing pursuit. In view of the great preponderance of the enemy's
cavalry, which was then double his own, and led by Forrest, one of the
ablest cavalry generals on either side, effective pursuit without a strong
mounted force would be impossible.
The correspondence with Grant--which grew until an order was issued for
General Thomas's relief by General Schofield, and, when this was held in
abeyance, until a second order for superseding him with General
Logan--began with an order from Grant not to "let Forrest get off without
punishment." As Forrest's mounted force was double Wilson's, this was
easier to write than to execute. General Thomas therefore explained the
situation fully, showing that the cavalry of Hatch and Grierson, which
were all the reinforcements he had to depend upon at first, had been
turned in at Memphis; that half his own cavalry had been dismounted to
equip Kilpatrick's column for Sherman; that his dismounted force, which he
had sent to Louisville for horses and arms, was detained there waiting for
both, and that as he was greatly outnumbered both in infantry and cavalry
he would be compelled to act on the defensive. But he added, in closing:
"The moment I can get my cavalry, I will march against Hood, and if
Forrest can be reached he shall be punished."
The day after General Schofield's brilliant and effective battle at
Franklin, Thomas made known to Halleck his confidence that Hood could not
cross the Cumberland, and therefore thought it best to wait until Wilson
could equip his cavalry, as he then felt certain he could whip Hood. Next,
the President, through Secretary Stanton, stirred General Grant up by a
telegram stating that Mr. Lincoln felt "solicitous about the disposition
of Thomas to lay in fortifications for an indefinite period, 'until Wilson
gets equipments.'"