The developments of the battle, the energy and success of the pursuit, and
the marvelous results of the whole, namely, the virtual destruction of a
veteran army, reveal at every step what General Thomas had in mind when he
insisted upon waiting till he could remount his cavalry.
In no other battle of the war did cavalry play such a prominent part as in
that of Nashville. In no other pursuit did it so distinguish itself.
Students of the movement will find themselves constantly questioning, as
their investigations proceed, whether, with the force of infantry which
General Thomas had been able to gather, Hood could have been driven from
his position in front of Nashville without the co-operation of the
cavalry. Had Thomas been obliged to fight without it, as the authorities
at City Point and Washington tried to compel him to do, it is no
reflection upon his infantry to say that there is ground for serious doubt
as to the result. Hood was intrenched on strong ground. His positions were
commanding. The infantry force against him was not sufficient in numbers
and experience to make up for the usual difference due to field works
placed as Hood's were and manned by veterans. Unquestionably Wilson's
cavalry was the dominating and controlling element of the battle. To say
this does not detract from the distinguished infantry generals or their
excellent and brilliant work. But General Thomas's plan turned on cavalry
work as its directrix. His consultations with General Wilson had been
exhaustive. That officer was charged with reorganizing, remounting, and
refitting a great cavalry force, even as Thomas was organizing a new
army--under fire. There had been nothing like either of those herculean
tasks in any campaign.
Many officers have organized and built up an effective cavalry force in
times of rest and peace, but no one except General Wilson ever did it in
the heat and hurry of a desperate midwinter campaign. And he could not
have succeeded, nor could any man have accomplished it, in the face of the
interferences which were attempted, but for the protection and support of
the peerless and imperturbable Thomas.
When General Thomas felt himself to be ready, or so nearly ready that he
believed success attainable, he delivered the battle of Nashville. In his
whole career he had never struck a blow till he felt himself ready. He
looked upon the lives of his soldiers as a sacred trust, not to be
carelessly imperiled. Whenever he moved to battle, it was certain that
everything had been done that prudence, deliberation, thought, and cool
judgment could do under surrounding circumstances to insure success
commensurate with the cost of the lives of men. And so it came to pass
that when the war ended it could be truthfully written of Thomas alone
that he never lost a movement or a battle.
It was an unprecedented array for attack. The inner lines about the city
were held by quartermasters' employees. Half the outer, or main line, was
manned mostly by convalescents and new troops; the other, or right of this
line, was occupied by General A. J. Smith's division. Steedman's
provisional division and his two colored brigades were on the extreme left
of the front, and opened the battle. The order of infantry in the line
from right to left was Smith's Corps (Thirteenth), Wood's Corps (Fourth),
Schofield's Corps (Twenty-third), and Steedman's troops.