The concentration and organization of the fragments which finally made up
the force with which he practically annihilated his enemy was one of the
most remarkable accomplishments of the war. It was prosecuted and
consummated in the immediate presence of the enemy, and a large portion of
the work was performed during the continued movement, constant
skirmishing, frequent affairs, and one great battle of an active campaign.
Arriving at Nashville, the first point of concentration, General Thomas,
after careful study of the situation, decided upon his plan of battle. It
included, as one of its essentials, the remounting of an effective force
of cavalry. From the moment his plans were formed the utmost energy was
put forth to prepare for their execution. Greater or more effective
activity was never exerted in the Union army than was manifest at
Nashville throughout this period. Every stroke of effort was directed
toward the predetermined end, with the result which the country knows.
Naturally, the part played by the cavalry in our great battles was often
concealed or minimized, while the infantry operations filled the public
eye and for the time dimmed the credit due to the cavalry arm. The history
of the war does not afford another case where the cavalry formed the
determining factor, and, notwithstanding this, where it was so largely
overlooked in the distribution of the honors.
It is necessary to a full understanding of the brilliancy, efficiency, and
completeness of Thomas's final movements to have in mind the situation
after General Sherman had marched away from Hood and left Thomas in
Tennessee to stand between that veteran Confederate army and the Ohio.
Preparatory to the march to the sea the great army about Atlanta had been
carefully inspected both as to men and equipments. Every weak man, all
convalescents, those whose terms of service were expiring--in short, all
the "trash," as General Sherman expressed it--were sent to the rear, that
is, to Thomas. All equipments of infantry, artillery, and cavalry were
examined, and every weak or worn piece replaced by new, and all the
"trash" either destroyed or "sent to Thomas." The entire cavalry force was
dismounted for close inspection and for the perfect remounting of
Kilpatrick's column. Of the sound men whom Thomas received he lost 15,000
by expiration of terms of service and previous furloughs to vote, within a
week after Hood's movement began.
After this sifting of the armies General Sherman started for the sea with
62,000 veterans, of whom he wrote that "all on this exhibit may be assumed
to have been able-bodied, experienced soldiers, well armed, well equipped
and provided, so far as human foresight could, with all the essentials of
life, strength, and vigorous action." With this force was included the
entire equipment of trains, pontoons, and similar essentials which Thomas,
with great care, had perfected for the army of the Cumberland. Thomas's
request that he might have his old corps which he had organized, which had
fought under him so long, was refused, and, instead, two small corps were
sent him.
The nucleus around which General Thomas was to organize an army to take
care of Hood--who from May till November had taxed the offensive resources
of Sherman's three armies--was, the Fourth Corps, General Stanley, with an
effective force of 13,907, and the Twenty-third, General Schofield, with
10,358 effectives.
The means of holding Chattanooga are indicated by the instructions from
Sherman to Steedman, whose troops had almost dwindled away by expiration
of service: "You must organize and systematize the hospitals and men sent
back to Chattanooga. You could use some of them for your forts," and it
was suggested to Thomas: "To make things sure, you might call upon the
Governors of Kentucky and Indiana for some militia, cautioning them
against a stampede." Thomas was so short of men that when Steedman asked
for enough for a small but important garrison, he was obliged to reply:
"You might send a force from the organization of convalescents now being
made up by General Cruft at Chattanooga." To which Steedman replied, "So
far, all such detachments reported from the front [Sherman] are with
furloughs, and are waiting transportation home."
In place of the 15,000 veterans whose terms had expired, Thomas received
12,000 newly enlisted recruits. General A. J. Smith's veteran corps had
been ordered from Missouri, and a great parade has been made of this fact
by those whose interest it was to show that Thomas had been left with a
competent force. But the fact that it did not arrive at Nashville till
after the battle of Franklin, and that Thomas was waiting for it as well
as to remount the cavalry, was not so loudly proclaimed.
However, when Sherman was ready to start for the sea, with Hood's veteran
army concentrated behind him, and Thomas, with the above mentioned
elements of an army scattered over a territory as large as France, had
been assigned to take care of Hood, General Sherman telegraphed Halleck:
"I therefore feel no uneasiness as to Tennessee, and have ordered Thomas
to assume the offensive in the direction of Selma, Ala." And General
Grant, after receiving some inflated figures of a great force left with
Thomas, telegraphed Sherman: "With the force you have left with Thomas, he
must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him." Later, when the
anxiety at City Point referred to in the opening of this paper had become
intense, the margin of force with which General Thomas was really
operating was found to be so small that General Grant suggested that he
should "arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employees,
citizens, etc.," and again, a few hours later, he was suggesting what he
could do "with your citizen employees armed."