Napoleon at the last moment, when urged by Joseph to be merciful, gave
way, and despatched orders late at night to Réal to repair to
Vincennes. Réal received some order, the exact purport of which is
unknown: it was late at night and he postponed going till the morrow.
On his way he met Savary, who came towards Paris bringing the news of
the duke's execution. Réal's first words, on hearing this unexpected
news, were: "How is that possible? I had so many questions to put to
the duke: his examination might disclose so much. Another thing gone
wrong; the First Consul will be furious." These words were afterwards
repeated to Pasquier both by Savary and by Real: and, unless Pasquier
lied, the belated order sent to Réal was not a pardon (and Napoleon on
his last voyage said to Cockburn it was not), but merely an order to
extract such information from the duke as would compromise other
Frenchmen. Besides, if Napoleon had despatched an order for the duke's
_pardon_, why was not that order produced as a sign of his innocence
and Réal's blundering? Why did he shut himself up in his private room
on March 20th, so that even Josephine had difficulty in gaining
entrance? And if he really desired to pardon the duke, how came it
that when, at noon of March 21st, Réal explained that he arrived at
Vincennes too late, the only words that escaped Napoleon's lips were
"C'est bien"? (See Méneval, vol. i, p. 296.) Why also was his
countenance the only one that afterwards showed no remorse or grief?
Caulaincourt, when he heard the results of his raid into Baden,
fainted with horror, and when brought to by Bonaparte, overwhelmed him
with reproaches. Why also had the grave been dug beforehand? Why,
finally, were Savary and Réal not disgraced? No satisfactory answer to
these questions has ever been given. The "Catastrophe du duc
d'Enghien" and Count Boulay de la Meurthe's "Les dernières Années du
duc d'Enghien" and Napoleon's "Correspondance" give all the documents
needed for forming a judgment on this case. The evidence is examined
by Mr. Fay in "The American Hist. Rev.," July and Oct., 1898. For the
rewards to the murderers see Masson, "Nap. et sa Famille," chap.
xiii.]
[Footnote 303: Ducasse, "Les Rois Frères de Nap.," p. 9.]
[Footnote 304: Miot de Melito; vol. ii., ch. i.; Pasquier, vol. i.,
ch. ix.]
[Footnote 305: I cannot agree with M. Lanfrey, vol. ii., ch. xi., that
the Empire was not desired by the nation. It seems to me that this
writer here attributes to the apathetic masses his own unrivalled
acuteness of vision and enthusiasm for democracy. Lafayette well sums
up the situation in the remark that he was more shocked at the
submission of all than at the usurpation of one man ("Mems.," vol. v.,
p. 239).]
[Footnote 306: See Aulard, "Rév. Française," p. 772, for the
opposition.]
[Footnote 307: Roederer, "oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 513.]
[Footnote 308: Macdonald, "Souvenirs," ch. xii.; Ségur, "Mems.," ch.
vii. When Thiébault congratulated Masséna on his new title, the
veteran scoffingly replied: "Oh, there are fourteen of us."
(Thiébault, "Mems.," ch. vii., Eng. edit.) See too Marmont ("Mems.,"
vol. ii., p. 227) on his own exclusion and the inclusion of
Bessières.]
[Footnote 309: Chaptal, "Souvenirs," p. 262. For Moreau's popularity
see Madelin's "Fouché," vol. i., p. 422.]
[Footnote 310: At the next public audience Napoleon upbraided one of
the judges, Lecourbe, who had maintained that Moreau was innocent, and
thereafter deprived him of his judgeship. He also disgraced his
brother, General Lecourbe, and forbade his coming within forty leagues
of Paris. ("Lettres inédites de Napoléon," August 22nd and 29th,
1805.)]
[Footnote 311: Miot de Melito, vol ii., ch. i.]
[Footnote 312: Napoleon to Roederer, "oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 514.]
[Footnote 313: Lafayette, "Mems.," vol. v., p. 182.]
[Footnote 314: "Mémoires de Savary, Duc de Rovigo." So Bourrienne, who
was informed by Rapp, who was present (vol. ii., ch. xxxiii.). The
"Moniteur" (4th Frimaire, Year XIII.) asserted that the Pope took the
right-hand seat; but I distrust its version.]
[Footnote 315: Mme. de Rémusat, vol. i., ch. x. As the _curé_ of the
parish was not present, even as witness, this new contract was held by
the Bonapartes to lack full validity. It is certain, however, that
Fesch always maintained that the marriage could only be annulled by an
act of arbitrary authority. For Napoleon's refusal to receive the
communion on the morning of the coronation, lest he, being what he
was, should be guilty of sacrilege and hypocrisy, see Ségur.]
[Footnote 316: Ségur, ch. xi.]
[Footnote 317: F. Masson's "Joséphine, Impératrice et Reine," p. 229.
For the Pitt diamond, see Yule's pamphlet and Sir M. Grant Duff's
"Diary," June 30, 1888.]
[Footnote 318: De Bausset, "Court de Napoléon," ch. ii.]
[Footnote 319: "Foreign Office Records," Intelligences, No. 426.]
[Footnote 320: "Life of Fulton," by Colden(1817); also one by Reigart
(1856).]
[Footnote 321: Jurien de la Gravière, "Guerres Maritimes," vol. ii.,
p. 75; Chevalier, "Hist. de la Marine Française," p. 105; Capt.
Desbrière's "Projets de Débarquement aux Iles Britanniques," vol. i.
The accompanying engraving shows how fantastic were some of the
earlier French schemes of invasion.]
[Footnote 322: "Mémoires du Maréchal Ney," bk. vii., ch. i.; so too
Marmont, vol. ii., p. 213; Mahan, "Sea Power," ch. xv.]
[Footnote 323: Roederer, "OEuvres," vol. iii., p. 494.]
[Footnote 324: Colonel Campbell, our Commissioner at Elba, noted in
his diary (December 5th, 1814): "As I have perceived in many
conversations, Napoleon has no idea of the difficulties occasioned by
winds and tides, but judges of changes of position in the case of
ships as he would with regard to troops on land."]
[Footnote 325: Jurien de la Gravière, vol. ii., p. 88, who says: "His
mild and melancholy disposition, his sad and modest behaviour, ill
suited the Emperor's ambitious plans."]
[Footnote 326: "Corresp.," No. 8063. See too No. 7996 for Napoleon's
plan of carrying a howitzer in the bows of his gun vessels so that his
projectiles might _burst in the wood_. Already at Boulogne he had
uttered the prophetic words: "We must have shells that will shiver the
wooden sides of ships."]
[Footnote 327: James, "Naval History," vol. iii., p. 213, and
Chevalier, p. 115, imply that Villeneuve's fleet from Toulon, after
scouring the West Indies, was to rally the Rochefort force and cover
the Boulogne flotilla: but this finds no place in Napoleon's September
plan, which required Gantheaume first to land troops in Ireland and
then convoy the flotilla across if the weather were favourable, or if
it were stormy to beat down the Channel with the troops from Holland.
See O'Connor Morris, "Campaigns of Nelson," p. 121.]
[Footnote 328: Colomb, "Naval Warfare," p. 18.]
[Footnote 329: Jurien de la Gravière, vol. ii., p. 100. Nelson was
aware of the fallacies that crowded Napoleon's brain: "Bonaparte has
often made his boast that our fleet would be worn out by keeping the
sea, and that his was kept in order and increasing by staying in port;
but he now finds, I fancy, if emperors hear truth, that his fleet
suffers more in a night than ours in one year."--Nelson to
Collingwood, March 13th, 1805.]
[Footnote 330: Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 276-290; also Capt.
Mahan, "Influence of Sea Power, etc.," vol. ii., ch. xv. _ad fin_. He
quotes the opinion of a Spanish historian, Don José de Couto: "If all
the circumstances are properly weighed ... we shall see that all the
charges made against England for the seizure of the frigates may be
reduced to want of proper foresight in the strength of the force
detailed to effect it."--In the Admiralty secret letters (1804-16) I
have found the instructions to Sir J. Orde, with the Swiftsure,
Polyphemus, Agamemnon, Ruby, Defence, Lively, and two sloops, to seize
the treasure-ships. No fight seems to have been expected.]
[Footnote 331: "Corresp.," No. 8379; Mahan, _ibid_., vol. ii., p.
149.]
[Footnote 332: Letter of April 29th, 1805. I cannot agree with Mahan
(p. 155) that this was intended only to distract us.]
[Footnote 333: "Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," p. 121.]
[Footnote 334: Jurien de la Gravière, vol. ii., p. 367.]
[Footnote 335: Thiers writes, most disingenuously, as though
Napoleon's letters of August 13th and 22nd could have influenced
Villeneuve.]
[Footnote 336: Dupin, "Voyages dans la Grande Bretagne" (tome i., p.
244), who had the facts from Daru. But, as Méneval sensibly says
("Mems.," vol. i., ch. v.), it was not Napoleon's habit dramatically
to dictate his plans so far in advance. Certainly, _in military
matters,_ he always kept his imagination subservient to facts. Not
until September 22nd, did he make any written official notes on the
final moves of his chief corps; besides, the Austrians did not cross
the Inn till September 8th.]
[Footnote 337: Diary of General Bingham, in "Blackwood's Magazine,"
October, 1896. The accompanying medal, on the reverse of which are the
words "frappée à Londres, en 1804," affords another proof of his
intentions.]
[Footnote 338: Marbot, "Mems.," ch. xix; Fouché, "Mems.," part 1; Miot
de Melito, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. i.]
[Footnote 339: See Nelson's letters of August 25th, 1803, and May 1st,
1804; also Collingwood's of July 21st, 1805.]
[Footnote 340: In "F.O.," France, No. 71, is a report of a spy on the
interview of Napoleon with O'Connor, whom he made General of Division.
See Appendix, p. 510.]
* * * * *
FOOTNOTES TO VOLUME II:
[Footnote 1: Armfeldt to Drake, December 24th, 1803 ("F.O.," Bavaria,
No. 27).]
[Footnote 2: Drake's despatch of December 15th, 1803, _ib_.]
[Footnote 3: Czartoryski, "Memoirs," vol. ii., ch. ii.]
[Footnote 4: The Czar's complaints were: the exile of the King of
Sardinia, the re-occupation of S. Italy by the French, the changes in
Italy, the violation of the neutrality of Baden, the occupation of
Cuxhaven by the French, and the levying of ransom from the Hanse Towns
to escape the same fate ("F.O.," Russia, No. 56).]
[Footnote 5: Lord Harrowby to Admiral Warren ("F.O.," Russia, No.
56).]
[Footnote 6: Garden, "Traités" vol. viii., p. 302; Ulmann,
"Russisch-Preussische Politik," p. 117]
[Footnote 7: See the letter in the "Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 170.]
[Footnote 8: "F.O.," Russia, No. 55. See note on p. 28.]
[Footnote 9: Czartoryski's "Mems.," vol. ii., chs. ii.-iv.]
[Footnote 10: "Lettres inédites de Napoléon" (May 30th, 1805).]
[Footnote 11: See Novossiltzoff's Report in Czartoryski's "Memoirs,"
vol. ii., ch. iv., and Pitt's note developing the Russian proposals in
Garden's "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 317-323, or Alison, App. to ch.
xxxix. A comparison of these two memoranda will show that on
Continental questions there was no difference such as Thiers affected
to see between the generous policy of Russia and the "cold egotism" of
Pitt. As Czartoryski has proved in his "Memoirs" (vol. ii., ch. x.)
Thiers has erred in assigning importance to a mere first draft of a
conversation which Czartoryski had with that ingenious schemer, the
Abbé Piatoli. The official proposals sent from St. Petersburg to
London were very different; _e.g._, the proposal of Alexander with
regard to the French frontiers was this: "The first object is to bring
back France into its ancient limits or such other ones as might appear
most suitable to the general tranquillity of Europe." It is,
therefore, futile to state that this was solely the policy of Pitt
after he had "remodelled" the Russian proposals.]
[Footnote 12: "Corresp.," No. 8231. See too Bourrienne, Miot de
Melito, vol. ii., ch. iv., and Thiers, bk. xxi.]
[Footnote 13: This refusal has been severely criticised. But the
knowledge of the British Government that Napoleon was still
persevering with his schemes against Turkey, and that the Russians
themselves, from their station at Corfu, were working to gain a
foothold on the Albanian coast, surely prescribed caution ("F.O.,"
Russia, Nos. 55 and 56, despatches of June 26th and October 10th,
1804). It was further known that the Austrian Government had proposed
to the Czar plans that were hostile to Turkey, and were not decisively
rejected at St. Petersburg; and it is clear from the notes left by
Czartoryski that the prospect of gaining Corfu, Moldavia, parts of
Albania, and the precious prize of Constantinople was kept in view.
Pitt agreed to restore the conquests made from France (Despatch of
April 22nd).]
[Footnote 14: Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 328-333. It is clear
that Gustavus IV. was the ruler who insisted on making the restoration
of the Bourbons the chief aim of the Third Coalition. In our "F.O.
Records" (Sweden, No. 177) is an account (August 20th, 1804) of a
conversation of Lord Harrowby with the Swedish ambassador, who stated
that such a declaration would "palsy the arms of France." Our Foreign
Minister replied that it would "much more certainly palsy the arms of
England: that we made war because France was become too powerful for
the peace of Europe."]
[Footnote 15: "Corresp.," No. 8329.]
[Footnote 16: Bailleu, "Preussen und Frankreich," vol. ii., p. 354.]
[Footnote 17: Thiers (bk. xxi.) gives the whole text.]
[Footnote 18: The annexation of the Ligurian or Genoese Republic took
place on June 4th, the way having been prepared there by Napoleon's
former patron, Salicetti, who liberally dispensed bribes. A little
later the Republic of Lucca was bestowed on Elisa Bonaparte and her
spouse, now named Prince Bacciochi. Parma, hitherto administered by a
French governor, was incorporated in the French Empire about the same
time.]
[Footnote 19: Paget to Lord Mulgrave (March 19th, 1805).]
[Footnote 20: Beer, "Zehn Jahre oesterreich. Politik (1801-1810)." The
notes of Novossiltzoff and Hardenberg are printed in Sir G. Jackson's
"Diaries," vol i., App.]
[Footnote 21: See Bignon, vol. iv., pp. 271 and 334. Probably Napoleon
knew through Laforest and Talleyrand that Russia had recently urged
that George III. should offer Hanover to Prussia. Pitt rejected the
proposal. Prussia paid more heed to the offer of Hanover from Napoleon
than to the suggestions of Czartoryski that she might receive it from
its rightful owner, George III. Yet Duroc did not succeed in gaining
more from Frederick William than the promise of his neutrality (see
Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 339-346). Sweden was not a member
of the Coalition, but made treaties with Russia and England.
The high hopes nursed by the Pitt Ministry are seen in the following
estimate of the forces that would be launched against France: Austria,
250,000; Russia, 180,000; Prussia, 100,000 (Pitt then refused to
subsidize more than 100,000); Sweden, 16,000; Saxony, 16,000; Hesse
and Brunswick, 16,000; Mecklenburg, 3,000; King of Sardinia, 25,000;
Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, 25,000; Naples, 20,000. In a P.S. he
adds that the support of the King of Sardinia would not be needed, and
that England had private arrangements with Naples as to subsidies.
This Memoir is not dated, but it must belong to the beginning of
September, before the defection of Bavaria was known ("F.O.," Prussia,
No. 70).]
[Footnote 22: "F.O.," Russia, No. 57; Gower's note of July 22nd,
1805.]
[Footnote 23: Colonel Graham's despatches, which undoubtedly
influenced the Pitt Ministry in favouring the appointment of Mack to
the present command. Paget ("Papers," vol. ii., p. 238) states that
the Iller position was decided on by Francis. The best analysis of
Mack's character is in Bernhardi's "Memoirs of Count Toll" (vol. i.,
p. 121). The State Papers are in Burke's "Campaign of 1805," App.]
[Footnote 24: Marmont, "Mems.," vol. ii., p. 310.]
[Footnote 25: See "Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 224; also Schönhals
"Der Krieg 1805 in Deutschland," p. 67.]
[Footnote 26: "Corresp.," No. 9249. See too No. 9254 for the details
of the enveloping moves which Napoleon then (September 22nd)
accurately planned twenty-five days before the final blows were dealt:
yet No. 9299 shows that, even on September 30th, he believed Mack
would hurry back to the Inn. Beer, p. 145.]
[Footnote 27: Rüstow, "Der Krieg 1805." Hormayr, "Geschichte Hofers"
(vol. i., p. 96), states that, in framing with Russia the plan of
campaign, the Austrians forgot to allow for the difference (twelve
days) between the Russian and Gregorian calendars. The Russians
certainly were eleven days late.]
[Footnote 28: "Corresp.," No 9319; Sir G. Jackson's "Diaries," vol.
i., p. 334.]
[Footnote 29: _Ibid_.; also Metternich, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. iii. For
Prussia's protest to Napoleon, which pulverized the French excuses,
see Garden, vol. ix., p. 69.]
[Footnote 30: Schönhals; Ségur, ch. xvi., exculpates Murat and Ney.]
[Footnote 31: Schönhals, p. 73. Thiers states that Dupont's 6,000
gained a victory over 25,000 Austrians detached from the 60,000 who
occupied Ulm!]
[Footnote 32: Marmont, vol. ii., p. 320; Lejeune, "Memoirs," vol. i.,
ch. iii.]
[Footnote 33: Thiers, bk. xxii. During Mack's interview with Napoleon
(see "Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 235), when the Emperor asked him why
he did not cut his way through to Ansbach, he replied, "Prussia would
have declared against us." To which the Emperor retorted: "Ah! the
Prussians do not declare so quickly."]
[Footnote 34: "Alexandre I et Czartoryski," pp. 32-34.]
[Footnote 35: See these terms compared with the Anglo-Russian treaty
of April 11th, 1805, in the Appendix of Dr. Hansing's "Hardenberg und
die dritte Coalition" (Berlin, 1899).]
[Footnote 36: Häusser, vol. ii., p. 617 (4th. edit.); Lettow-Vorbeck,
"Der Krieg von 1806-1807," vol. i., _ad init_.]
[Footnote 37: For the much more venial stratagem which Kutusoff played
on Murat at Hollabrunn, see Thiers, bk. xxiii.]
[Footnote 38: Lord Harrowby, then on a special mission to Berlin,
reports (November 24th) that this appeal of the Czar had been "coolly
received," and no Prussian troops would enter Bohemia until it was
known how Prussia's envoy to Napoleon, Count Haugwitz, had been
received.]
[Footnote 39: Thiers says December 1st, which is corrected by
Napoleon's letter of November 30th to Talleyrand.]
[Footnote 40: Thiébault, vol. ii., ch. viii.; Ségur, ch. xviii.; York
von Wartenburg, "Nap. als Feldherr," vol. i., p. 230.]
[Footnote 41: Davoust's reports of December 2nd and 5th in his
"Corresp."]
[Footnote 42: Ségur, Thiébault, and Lejeune all state that Napoleon in
the previous advance northwards had foretold that a great battle would
soon be fought opposite Austerlitz, and explained how he would fight
it.]
[Footnote 43: Thiébault wrongly attributes this succour to Lannes: for
that Marshal, who had just insulted and challenged Soult, Thiébault
had a manifest partiality. Savary, though hostile to Bernadotte, gives
him bare justice on this move.]
[Footnote 44: Harrowby evidently thought that Prussia's conduct would
depend on events. Just before the news of Austerlitz arrived, he wrote
to Downing Street: "The eyes of this Government are turned almost
exclusively on Moravia. It is there the fate of this negotiation must
be decided." Yet he reports that 192,000 Prussians are under arms
("F.O.," Prussia, No. 70).]
[Footnote 45: Jackson, "Diaries," vol. i., p. 137.]
[Footnote 46: "Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," pp. 205-208.]
[Footnote 47: Metternich, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. iii.]
[Footnote 48: Hanover, along with a few districts of Bavarian
Franconia, would bring to Prussia a gain of 989,000 inhabitants, while
she would lose only 375,000. Neufchâtel had offered itself to
Frederick I. of Prussia in 1688, and its proposed barter to France
troubled Hardenberg ("Mems.," vol. ii., p. 421).]
[Footnote 49: Gower to Lord Harrowby from Olmütz, November 25th, in
"F.O. Records," Russia, No. 59.]
[Footnote 50: "Lettres inédites de Tall.," p. 216.]
[Footnote 51: Printed for the first time in full in "Lettres inédites
de Tall.," pp. 156-174. On December 5th Talleyrand again begged
Napoleon to strengthen Austria as "a needful bulwark against the
barbarians, the Russians."]
[Footnote 52: I dissent, though with much diffidence, from M. Vandal
("Napoléon et Alexandre," vol. i., p. 9) in regard to Talleyrand's
proposal.]
[Footnote 53: Napoleon to Talleyrand (December 14th, 1805): "Sûr de la
Prusse, l'Autriche en passera par où je voudrai. Je ferai également
prononcer la Prusse contre l'Angleterre."]
[Footnote 54: Report of M. Otto, August, 1799.]
[Footnote 55: Czartoryski ("Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xii.) states that
England offered Holland to Prussia. I find no proof of this in our
Records. The districts between Antwerp and Cleves are Belgian, not
Dutch; and we never wavered in our support of the House of Orange.]
[Footnote 56: These proposals, dated October 27th, 1805, were modified
somewhat on the news of Mack's disaster and the Treaty of Potsdam.
Hardenberg assured Harrowby (November 24th) that, despite England's
liberal pecuniary help, Frederick William felt great difficulty in
assenting to the proposed territorial arrangements ("F.O.," Prussia,
No. 70).]
[Footnote 57: Hardenberg's "Memoirs," vol. ii., pp. 377, 382.]
[Footnote 58: Ompteda, p. 188. The army returned in February, 1806.]
[Footnote 59: "F.O.," Prussia, No. 70 (November 23rd).]
[Footnote 60: "Diaries of Right Hon. G. Rose," vol. ii., pp. 223-224.]
[Footnote 61: _Ib._, pp. 233-283; Rosebery, "Life of Pitt," p. 258.]
[Footnote 62: Lord Malmesbury's "Diary," vol. iv., p. 114.]
[Footnote 63: Letter of December 27th, 1805; Jackson, "Diaries," vol.
ii., p. 387.]
[Footnote 64: Mollien, "Mems.," vol. i. _ad fin_., and vol. ii., p.
80, for the budget of 1806; also, Fiévée, "Mes Relations avec
Bonaparte," vol. ii., pp. 180-203.]
[Footnote 65: The Court of Naples asserted that in the Convention with
France its ambassador, the Comte de Gallo, exceeded his powers in
promising neutrality. See Lucchesini's conversation with Gentz, quoted
by Garden, "Traités," vol. x., p. 129.]
[Footnote 66: See my article in the "Eng. Hist. Rev.," April, 1900.]
[Footnote 67: Ducasse, "Les Rois Frères de Napoléon," p. 11.]
[Footnote 68: Letter of February 7th, 1806. On the same day he blames
Junot, then commander of Parma, for too great lenience to some rebels
near that city. The Italians were a false people, who only respected a
strong Government. Let him, then, burn two large villages so that no
trace remained, shoot the priest of one village, and send three or
four hundred of the guilty to the galleys. "Trust my old experience of
the Italians."]
[Footnote 69: For a list of the chief Napoleonic titles, see Appendix,
_ad fin_.]
[Footnote 70: January 2nd, 1802; so too Fiévée, "Mes Relations avec
Bonaparte," vol. ii., p. 210, who notes that, by founding an order of
nobility, Napoleon ended his own isolation and attached to his
interests a powerful landed caste.]
[Footnote 71: Hardenberg's "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 390-394.]
[Footnote 72: Hardenberg to Harrowby on January 7th, "Prussia," No.
70.]
[Footnote 73: I have not found a copy of this project; but in
"Prussia," No. 70 (forwarded by Jackson on January 27th, 1806), there
is a detailed "Mémoire explicatif," whence I extract these details, as
yet unpublished, I believe. Neither Hardenberg, Garden, Jackson, nor
Paget mentions them.]
[Footnote 74: Records, "Prussia," No. 70, dated February 21st.]
[Footnote 75: Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol. ii., pp. 463-469; "Nap.
Corresp.," No. 9742, for Napoleon's thoughts as to peace, when he
heard of Fox being our Foreign Minister.]
[Footnote 76: See "Nap. Corresp.," Nos. 9742, 9773, 9777, for his
views as to the weakness of England and Prussia. This treaty of
February 15th, 1806, confirmed the cession of Neufchâtel and Cleves to
France, and of Ansbach to Bavaria; but did not cede any Franconian
districts to Prussia's Baireuth lands. See Hardenberg, "Mémoires,"
vol. ii., p. 483, for the text of the treaty.]
[Footnote 77: The strange perversity of Haugwitz is nowhere more shown
than in his self-congratulation at the omission of the adjectives
_offensive et défensive_ from the new treaty of alliance between
France and Prussia (Hardenberg, vol. ii., p. 481). Napoleon was now
not pledged to help Prussia in the war which George III. declared
against her on April 20th.]
[Footnote 78: It is noteworthy that in all the negotiations that
followed, Napoleon never raised any question about our exacting
maritime code, which proves how hollow were his diatribes against the
tyrant of the seas at other times.]
[Footnote 79: Despatch of April 20th, 1806, in Papers presented to
Parliament on December 22nd, 1806.]
[Footnote 80: Czartoryski's "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xiii.]
[Footnote 81: "I do not intend the Court of Rome to mix any more in
politics" (Nap. to the Pope, February 13th, 1806).]
[Footnote 82: I translate literally these N.B.'s as pasted in at the
end of Yarmouth's Memoir of July 8th ("France," No. 73). As Oubril's
instructions have never, I believe, been published, the passage given
above is somewhat important as proving how completely he exceeded his
powers in bartering away Sicily. The text of the Oubril Treaty is
given by De Clercq, vol. ii., p. 180. The secret articles required
Russia to help France in inducing the Court of Madrid to cede the
Balearic Isles to the Prince Royal of Naples; the dethroned King and
Queen were not to reside there, and Russia was to recognize Joseph
Bonaparte as King of the Two Sicilies.]
[Footnote 83: In conversing with our ambassador, Mr. Stuart, Baron
Budberg excused Oubril's conduct on the ground of his nervousness
under the threats of the French plenipotentiary, General Clarke, who
scarcely let him speak, and darkly hinted at many other changes that
must ensue if Russia did not make peace; Switzerland was to be
annexed, Germany overrun, and Turkey partitioned. That Clarke was a
master in diplomatic hectoring is well known; but, from private
inquiries, Stuart discovered that the Czar, in his private conference
with Oubril, seemed more inclined towards peace than Czartoryski: when
therefore the latter resigned, Oubril might well give way before
Clarke's bluster. (Stuart's Despatch of August 9th, 1806, F.O.,
Russia, No. 63; also see Czartoryski's "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xiv.;
and Martens, "Traités," Suppl. vol. iv.)]
[Footnote 84: "Memoirs of Karl Heinrich, Knight of Lang."]
[Footnote 85: Garden, vol. ix., pp. 157, 189, 255.]
[Footnote 86: "Corresp.," Nos. 10522 and 10544. For a French account
see the "Mems." of Baron Desvernois, p. 288.]
[Footnote 87: "F.O. Records," Naples, No. 73.]
[Footnote 88: This was on Napoleon's advice. He wrote to Talleyrand
from Rambouillet on August 18th, to give as an excuse for the delay,
"The Emperor is hunting and will not be back before the end of the
week."]
[Footnote 89: So too Napoleon said at St. Helena to Las Cases: "Fox's
death was one of the fatalities of my career."]
[Footnote 90: Despatches of September 26th and October 6th.]
[Footnote 91: Bailleu, "Frankreich und Preussen," Introd.]
[Footnote 92: Decree of July 26th.]
[Footnote 93: See "Corresp." No. 10604, note; also Talleyrand's letter
of August 4th ("Lettres inédites," p. 245), showing the indemnities
that might be offered to Prussia after the loss of Hanover: they
included, of course, little States, Anhalt, Lippe, Waldeck, etc.]
[Footnote 94: Gentz, "Ausgew. Schriften," vol. v., p. 252.
Conversation with Lucchesini.]
[Footnote 95: "Corresp.," Nos. 10575, 10587, 10633.]
[Footnote 96: "Mems.," vol. iii., pp. 115, _et seq._ The
Prusso-Russian convention of July, by which these Powers mutually
guaranteed the integrity of their States, was mainly the work of
Hardenberg.]
[Footnote 97: Bailleu, pp. 540-552. See too Fournier's "Napoleon,"
vol. ii., p. 106.]
[Footnote 98: Bailleu, pp. 556-557. So too Napoleon's letter of
September 5th to Berthier is the first hint of his thought of a
Continental war.]
[Footnote 99: Queen Louisa said to Gentz (October 9th) that war had
been decided on, not owing to selfish calculations, but the sentiment
of honour (Garden, "Traités," vol. x., p. 133).]
[Footnote 100: A memorial was handed in to him on September 2nd. It
was signed by the King's brothers, Henry and William, also by the
leader of the warlike party, Prince Louis Ferdinand, by Generals
Rüchel and Phull, and by the future dictator, Stein. The King rebuked
all of them. See Pertz, "Stein," vol. i., p. 347.]
[Footnote 101: "F.O.," Russia, No. 64. Stuart's despatches of
September 30th and October 21st.]
[Footnote 102: Müffling, "Aus meinem Leben."]
[Footnote 103: Lettow-Vorbeck, "Der Krieg von 1806-7," p. 163.]
[Footnote 104: See Prince Hohenlohe's "Letters on Strategy" (p. 62,
Eng. ed.) for the effect of this rapid marching; Foucart's "Campagne
de Prusse," vol. i., pp. 323-343; also Lord Fitzmaurice's "Duke of
Brunswick."]
[Footnote 105: Höpfner, vol. i.p. 383; and Lettow-Vorbeck, vol. i., p.
345.]
[Footnote 106: Foucart, _op. cit._, pp. 606-623.]
[Footnote 107: Marbot says Rüchel was killed: but he recovered from
his wound, and did good service the next spring.
Vernet's picture of Napoleon inspecting his Guards at Jena before
their charge seems to represent the well-known incident of a soldier
calling out "_en avant_"; whereupon Napoleon sharply turned and bade
the man wait till he had commanded in twenty battles before he gave
him advice.]
[Footnote 108: Foucart, p. 671.]
[Footnote 109: Lang thus describes four French Marshals whom he saw at
Ansbach: "Bernadotte, a very tall dark man, with fiery eyes under
thick brows; Mortier, still taller, with a stupid sentinel look;
Lefebvre, an old Alsatian camp-boy, with his wife, former washerwoman
to the regiment; and Davoust, a little smooth-pated, unpretending man,
who was never tired of waltzing."]
[Footnote 110: Davoust, "Opérations du 3ème Corps," pp. 31-32. French
writers reduce their force to 24,000, and raise Brunswick's total to
60,000. Lehmann's "Scharnhorst," vol. i., p. 433, gives the details.]
[Footnote 111: Foucart, pp. 604-606, 670, and 694-697, who only blames
him for slowness. But he set out from Naumburg before dawn, and,
though delayed by difficult tracks, was near Apolda at 4 p.m., and
took 1,000 prisoners.]
[Footnote 112: For this service, as for his exploits at Austerlitz,
Napoleon gave few words of praise. Lannes' remonstrance is printed by
General Thoumas, "Le Maréchal Lannes," p. 169. The Emperor secretly
disliked Lannes for his very independent bearing.]
[Footnote 113: "Nap. Corresp.," November 21st, 1807; Baron Lumbroso's
"Napoleone I e l'Inghilterra," p. 103; Garden, vol. x., p. 307.]
[Footnote 114: This decree, of 10 Brumaire, an V, is printed in full,
and commented on by Lumbroso, _op. cit._, p. 49. See too Sorel,
"L'Europe et la Rév. Fr.," vol. iii., p. 389; and my article,
"Napoleon and English Commerce," in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." of October,
1893.]
[Footnote 115: This phrase occurs, I believe, first in the
conversation of Napoleon on May 1st, 1803: "We will form a more
complete coast-system, and England shall end by shedding tears of
blood" (Miot de Melito, "Mems.," vol. i., chap. xiv.).]
[Footnote 116: _E.g._, Fauchille, "Du Blocus maritime," pp. 93 _et
seq._]
[Footnote 117: See especially the pamphlet "War in Disguise, or the
Frauds of the Neutral Flags" (1805), by J. Stephen. It has been said
that this pamphlet was a cause of the Orders in Council. The whole
question is discussed by Manning, "Commentaries on the Law of Nations"
(1875); Lawrence, "International Law"; Mahan, "Infl. of Sea Power,"
vol. ii., pp. 274-277; Mollien, vol. iii., p. 289 (first edit.); and
Chaptal, p. 275.]
[Footnote 118: Hausser, vol. iii., p. 61 (4th edit.). The Saxon
federal contingent was fixed at 20,000 men.]
[Footnote 119: Papers presented to Parliament, December 22nd, 1806.]
[Footnote 120: After the interview of November 28th, 1801, Cornwallis
reports that Napoleon "expressed a wish that we could agree to remove
disaffected persons from either country ... and declared his
willingness to send away United Irishmen" ("F.O. Records," No. 615).]
[Footnote 121: Czartoryski, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xv.]
[Footnote 122: In our "F.O. Records," Prussia, No. 74, is a report of
Napoleon's reply to a deputation at Warsaw (January, 1807): "I warn
you that neither I nor any French prince cares for your Polish throne:
I have crowns to give and don't know what to do with them. You must
first of all think of giving bread to my soldiers--'Bread, bread,
bread.' ... I cannot support my troops in this country, where there is
no one besides nobles and miserable peasants. Where are your great
families? They are all sold to Russia. It is Czartoryski who wrote to
Kosciusko not to come back to Poland." And when a Galician deputy
asked him of the fate of his province, he turned on him: "Do you think
that I will draw on myself new foes for one province." Nevertheless,
the enthusiasm of the Poles was not wholly chilled. Their contingents
did good service for him. Somewhat later, female devotion brought a
beautiful young Polish lady to act as his mistress, primarily with the
hope of helping on the liberation of her land, and then as a willing
captive to the charm which he exerted on all who approached him. Their
son was Count Walewska]
[Footnote 123: Marbot, ch. xxviii.]
[Footnote 124: Lettow-Vorbeck estimates the French loss at more than
24,000; that of the Russians as still heavier, but largely owing to
the bad commissariat and wholesale straggling. On this see Sir R.
Wilson's "Campaign in Poland," ch. i.]
[Footnote 125: Napoleon on February 13th charged Bertrand to offer
_verbally, but not in writing_, to the King of Prussia a separate
peace, without respect to the Czar. Frederick William was to be
restored to his States east of the Elbe. He rejected the offer, which
would have broken his engagements to the Czar. Napoleon repeated the
offer on February 20th, which shows that, at this crisis, he did wish
for peace with Prussia. See "Nap. Corresp.," No. 11810; and Hausser,
vol. iii., p. 74.]
[Footnote 126: "I have been repeatedly pressed by the Prussian and
Russian Governments," wrote Lord Hutchinson, our envoy at Memel, March
9th, 1807, "on the subject of a diversion to be made by British troops
against Mortier.... Stettin is a large place with a small garrison and
in a bad state of defence" ("F.O.," Prussia, No. 74). in 1805 Pitt
promised to send a British force to Stralsund (see p. 17).]
[Footnote 127: Lord Cathcart's secret report to the War Office, dated
April 22nd, 1807, dealt with the appeal made by Lord Hutchinson, and
with a _Projet_ of Dumouriez, both of whom strongly urged the
expedition to Stralsund. On May 30th Castlereagh received a report
from a Hanoverian officer, Kuckuck, stating that Hanover and Hesse
were ripe for revolt, and that Hameln might easily be seized if the
North Germans were encouraged by an English force ("Castlereagh
Letters," vol. vi., pp. 169 and 211).]
[Footnote 128: "F.O.," Russia, No. 69.]
[Footnote 129: "Correspond.," No. 12563; also "La Mission du Gen.
Gardane en Perse," par le comte de Gardane. Napoleon in his
proclamation of December 2nd, 1806, told the troops that their
victories had won for France her Indian possessions and the Cape of
Good Hope.]
[Footnote 130: Wilson, "Campaign in Poland"; "Opérations du 3'me Corps
[Davoust's], 1806-1807," p. 199.]
[Footnote 131: "Corresp.," Nos. 12749 and 12751. Lejeune, in his
"Memoirs," also shows that Napoleon's chief aim was to seize
Königsberg.]
[Footnote 132: "Memoirs of Oudinot," ch. i]
[Footnote 133: The report is dated Memel, June 21st, 1807, in "F.O.,"
Prussia, No. 74. Hutchinson thinks the Russians had not more than
45,000 men engaged at Friedland, and that their losses did not exceed
15,000: but there were "multitudes of stragglers." Lettow-Vorbeck
gives about the same estimates. Those given in the French bulletin are
grossly exaggerated.]
[Footnote 134: On June 17th, 1807, Queen Louisa wrote to her father:"
... we fall with honour. The King has proved that he prefers honour to
shameful submission." On June 23rd Bennigsen professed a wish to
fight, while secretly advising surrender (Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol.
iii., p. 469).]
[Footnote 135: "F.O.," Russia, No. 69. Soult told Lord Holland
("Foreign Reminiscences," p. 185) that Bennigsen was plotting to
murder the Czar, and he (S.) warned him of it.]
[Footnote 136: "Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," p. 468; also Garden,
vol. x., pp. 205-210; and "Ann. Reg." (1807), pp. 710-724, for the
British replies to Austria.]
[Footnote 137: Canning to Paget ("Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 324). So
too Canning's despatch of July 21st to Gower (Russia, No. 69).]
[Footnote 138: Stadion saw through it. See Beer, p. 243.]
[Footnote 139: "Nap. Corresp.," No. 11918.]
[Footnote 140: _Ib._, No. 12028. This very important letter seems to
me to refute M. Vandal's theory ("Nap. et Alexandre," ch. i.), that
Napoleon was throughout seeking for an alliance with _Austria_, or
Prussia, or Russia.]
[Footnote 141: Canning to Paget, May 16th, 1807 ("Paget Papers," vol.
ii., p. 290).]
[Footnote 142: Garden, vol. x., pp. 214-218; and Gower's despatch of
June 17th. 1807 (Russia, No. 69).]
[Footnote 143: All references to the story rest ultimately on Bignon,
"Hist. de France" (vol. vi., p. 316), who gives no voucher for it. For
the reasons given above I must regard the story as suspect. Among a
witty, phrase-loving people like the French, a good _mot_ is almost
certain to gain credence and so pass into history.]
[Footnote 144: Tatischeff, "Alexandre I et Napoléon" (pp. 144-148).]
[Footnote 145: Reports of Savary and Lesseps, quoted by Vandal, _op.
cit._, p. 61; "Corresp.," No. 12825.]
[Footnote 146: Vandal, p. 73, says that the news reached Napoleon at a
review when Alexander was by his side. If so, the occasion was
carefully selected with a view to effect; for the news reached him on,
or before, June 24th (see "Corresp.," No. 12819). Gower states that
the news reached Tilsit as early as the 15th; and Hardenberg secretly
proposed a policy of partition of Turkey on June 23rd ("Mems.," vol.
iii., p. 463). Hardenberg resigned office on July 4th, as Napoleon
refused to treat through him.]
[Footnote 147: "Corresp.," No. 12862, letter of July 6th.]
[Footnote 148: Tatischeff (pp. 146-148 and 163-168) proves from the
Russian archives that these schemes were Alexander's, and were in the
main opposed by Napoleon. This disproves Vandal's assertion (p. 101)
that Napoleon pressed Alexander to take the Memel and Polish
districts.]
[Footnote 149: "Erinnerungen der Gräfin von Voss."]
[Footnote 150: Probably this refers not to the restitution of Silesia,
which he politely offered to her (though he had previously granted it
on the Czar's request), but to Madgeburg and its environs west of the
Elbe. On July 7th he said to Goltz, the Prussian negotiator, "I am
sorry if the Queen took as positive assurances the _phrases de_
_politesse_ that one speaks to ladies" (Hardenberg's "Mems.," vol.
iii., p. 512).]
[Footnote 151: See the new facts published by Bailleu in the
"Hohenzollern Jahrbuch" (1899). The "rose" story is not in any German
source.]
[Footnote 152: In his "Memoirs" (vol. i., pt. iii.) Talleyrand says
that he repeated this story several times at the Tuileries, until
Napoleon rebuked him for it.]
[Footnote 153: Before Tilsit Prussia had 9,744,000 subjects;
afterwards only 4,938,000. See her frontiers in map on p. 215.]
[Footnote 154: The exact terms of the secret articles and of the
secret treaty have only been known since 1890, when, owing to the
labours of MM. Fournier, Tatischeff, and Vandal, they saw the light.]
[Footnote 155: Gower's despatch of July 12th. "F.O.," Russia, No. 69.]
[Footnote 156: De Clercq, "Traités," vol. ii., pp. 223-225; Garden,
vol. x., p. 233 and 277-290. Our envoy, Jackson, reported from Memel
on July 28th: "Nothing can exceed the insolence and extortions of the
French. No sooner is one demand complied with than a fresh one is
brought forward."]
[Footnote 157: That he seriously thought in November, 1807, of leaving
to Prussia less than half of her already cramped territories, is clear
from his instructions to Caulaincourt, his ambassador to the Czar: "Is
it not to Prussia's interest for her to place herself, at once, and
with entire resignation, among the inferior Powers?" A new treaty was
to be framed, under the guise of _interpreting_ that of Tilsit, Russia
keeping the Danubian Provinces, and Napoleon more than half of Prussia
(Vandal, vol. i., p. 509).]
[Footnote 158: Lucchesini to Gentz in October, 1806, in Gentz's
"Ausgewählte Schriften," vol. v., p. 257.]
[Footnote 159: See Canning's reply to Stahremberg's Note, on April
25th, 1807, in the "Ann. Reg.," p. 724.]
[Footnote 160: For Mackenzie's report and other details gleaned from
our archives, see my article "A British Agent at Tilsit," in the "Eng.
Hist. Rev." of October, 1901.]
[Footnote 161: James, "Naval History," vol. iv., p. 408.]
[Footnote 162: "F.O.," Denmark, No. 53.]
[Footnote 163: Garden, vol. x., p. 408.]
[Footnote 164: "Corresp.," No. 12962; see too No. 12936, ordering the
15,000 Spanish troops now serving him near Hamburg to form the nucleus
of Bernadotte's army of observation, which, "in case of events," was
to be strengthened by as many Dutch.]
[Footnote 165: "F.O.," Denmark, No. 53. I published this Memorandum of
Canning and other unpublished papers in an article, "Canning and
Denmark," in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." of January, 1896. The terms of the
capitulation were, it seems, mainly decided on by Sir Arthur
Wellesley, who wrote to Canning (September 8th): "I might have carried
our terms higher ... had not our troops been needed at home" ("Well.
Despatches," vol. iii., p. 7).]
[Footnote 166: Castlereagh's "Corresp.," vol. vi. So too Gower
reported from St. Petersburg on October 1st that public opinion was
"decidedly averse to war with England, ... and it appears to me that
the English name was scarcely ever more popular in Russia than at the
present time."]
[Footnote 167: Letters of July 19th and 29th.]
[Footnote 168: The phrase is that of Viscount Strangford, our
ambassador at Lisbon ("F.O.," Portugal, No. 55). So Baumgarten,
"Geschichte Spaniens," vol. i., p. 136.]
[Footnote 169: Report of the Portuguese ambassador, Lourenço de Lima,
dated August 7th, 1807, inclosed by Viscount Strangford ("F.O.,"
Portugal, No. 55).]
[Footnote 170: This statement as to the date of the summons to
Portugal is false: it was July 19th when he ordered it to be sent,
that is, long before the Copenhagen news reached him.]
[Footnote 171: "Corresp.," No. 12839.]
[Footnote 172: See Lady Blennerhasset's "Talleyrand," vol. ii., ch.
xvi., for a discussion of Talleyrand's share in the new policy. This
question, together with many others, cannot be solved, owing to
Talleyrand's destruction of most of his papers. In June, 1806, he
advised a partition of Portugal; and in the autumn he is said to have
favoured the overthrow of the Spanish Bourbons. But there must surely
be some connection between Napoleon's letter to him of July 19th,
1807, on Portuguese affairs and the resignation which he persistently
offered on their return to Paris. On August 10th he wrote to the
Emperor that that letter would be the last act of his Ministry
("Lettres inédites de Tall.," p. 476). He was succeeded by Champagny.]
[Footnote 173: "Corresp.," Nos. 13235, 37, 43.]
[Footnote 174: "Corresp.," Nos. 13314 and 13327. So too, to General
Clarke, his new Minister of War, he wrote: "Junot may say anything he
pleases, so long as he gets hold of the fleet" ("New Letters of Nap.,"
October 28th, 1807).]
[Footnote 175: Strangford's despatches quite refute Thiers' confident
statement that the Portuguese answers to Napoleon were planned in
concert with us. I cannot find in our archives a copy of the
Anglo-Portuguese Convention signed by Canning on October 22nd, 1807;
but there are many references to it in his despatches. It empowered us
to occupy Madeira; and our fleet did so at the close of the year. In
April next we exchanged it for the Azores and Goa.]
[Footnote 176: "Corresp.," July 22nd, 1807.]
[Footnote 177: Between September 1st, 1807, and November 23rd, 1807,
he wrote eighteen letters on the subject of Corfu, which he designed
to be his base of operations as soon as the Eastern Question could be
advantageously reopened. On February 8th, 1808, he wrote to Joseph
that Corfu was more important than Sicily, and that "_in the present
state of Europe, the loss of Corfu would be the greatest of
disasters_." This points to his proposed partition of Turkey.]
[Footnote 178: Letter of October 13th, 1807.]
[Footnote 179: "Ann. Register" for 1807, pp. 227, 747.]
[Footnote 180: _Ibid._, pp. 749-750. Another Order in Council
(November 25th) allowed neutral ships a few more facilities for
colonial trade, and Prussian merchantmen were set free (_ibid._, pp.
755-759). In April, 1809, we further favoured the carrying of British
goods on neutral ships, especially to or from the United States.]
[Footnote 181: Bourrienne, "Memoirs." The case against the Orders in
Council is fairly stated by Lumbroso, and by Alison, ch. 50.]
[Footnote 182: Gower reported (on September 22nd) that the Spanish
ambassador at St. Petersburg had been pleading for help there, so as
to avenge this insult.]
[Footnote 183: Baumgarten, "Geschichte Spaniens," vol. i., p. 138.]
[Footnote 184: "Nap. Corresp." of October 17th and 31st, November
13th, December 23rd, 1807, and February 20th, 1808; also Napier,
"Peninsular War," bk. i., ch. ii.]
[Footnote 185: Letter of January 10th, 1808.]
[Footnote 186: Letter of Charles IV. to Napoleon of October 29th,
1807, published in "Murat, Lieutenant de l'Empereur en Espagne,"
Appendix viii.]
[Footnote 187: "New Letters of Napoleon."]
[Footnote 188: "Corresp.," letter of February 25th.]
[Footnote 189: Murat in 1814 told Lord Holland ("Foreign
Reminiscences," p. 131) he had had no instructions from Napoleon.]
[Footnote 190: Thiers, notes to bk. xxix.]
[Footnote 191: "Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la Révolution
d'Espagne, par Nellerto"; also "The Journey of Ferdinand VII. to
Bayonne," by Escoiquiz.]
[Footnote 192: "Corresp.," No. 13696. A careful comparison of this
laboured, halting effusion, with the curt military syle*style of the
genuine letters--and especially with Nos. 93, 94, and 100 of the "New
Letters"--must demonstrate its non-authenticity. Thiers' argument to
the contrary effect is rambling and weak. Count Murat in his recent
monograph on his father pronounces the letter a fabrication of St.
Helena or later. It was first published in the "Mémorial de St.
Hélène," an untrustworthy compilation made by Las Cases after
Napoleon's death from notes taken at St. Helena.]
[Footnote 193: Napoleon had at first intended the Spanish crown for
Louis, to whom he wrote on March 27th: "The climate of Holland does
not suit you. Besides, Holland can never rise from her ruins." Louis
declined, on the ground that his call to Holland had been from heaven,
and not from Napoleon!]
[Footnote 194: Memoirs of Thiébault and De Broglie; so, too, De Rocca,
"La Guerre en Espagne."]
[Footnote 195: See the letter of an Englishman from Buenos Ayres of
September 27th, 1809, in "Cobbett's Register" for 1810 (p. 256),
stating that the new popular Government there was driven by want of
funds, "not from their good wishes to England," to open their ports to
all foreign commerce on moderate duties.]
[Footnote 196: Vandal, "Napoléon et Alexandre," ch. vii. It is not
published in the "Correspondence" or in the "New Letters."]
[Footnote 197: Vandal, "Napoléon et Alexandre," vol. i., ch. iv., and
App. II.]
[Footnote 198: In the conversations which Metternich had with Napoleon
and Talleyrand on and after January 22nd, 1808, he was convinced that
the French Emperor intended to partition Turkey as soon as it suited
him to do so, which would be after he had subjected Spain. Napoleon
said to him: "When the Russians are at Constantinople you will need
France to help you against them."--"Metternich Memoirs," vol. ii., p.
188.]
[Footnote 199: So Soult told Lord Holland ("Foreign Reminiscences," p.
171).]
[Footnote 200: Vandal, vol. i., p. 384.]
[Footnote 201: Metternich, "Mems.," vol. ii. p. 298 (Eng. edit.).]
[Footnote 202: I think that Beer (pp. 330-340) errs somewhat in
ranking Talleyrand's work at Erfurt at that statesman's own very high
valuation, which he enhanced in later years: see Greville's "Mems.,"
Second Part, vol. ii., p. 193.]
[Footnote 203: Vandal, vol. i., p. 307.]
[Footnote 204: Sklower, "L'Entrevue de Napoléon avec Goethe"; Mrs.
Austin's "Germany from 1760 to 1814"; Oncken, bk. vii., ch. i. For
Napoleon's dispute with Wieland about Tacitus see Talleyrand, "Mems.,"
vol. i., pt. 5. When the Emperors' carriages were ready for departure,
Talleyrand whispered to Alexander: "Ah! si Votre Majesté pouvait se
tromper de voiture."]
[Footnote 205: "F.O.," Russia, No. 74, despatch of December 9th, 1808.
On January 14th, 1809, Canning signed a treaty of alliance with the
Spanish people, both sides agreeing never to make peace with Napoleon
except by common consent. It was signed when the Spanish cause seemed
desperate; but it was religiously observed.]
[Footnote 206: Madelin's "Fouché," vol. ii., p. 80; Pasquier, vol. i.,
pp. 353-360.]
[Footnote 207: Seeley, "Life and Times of Stein," vol. ii., p. 316;
Hausser, vol. iii., p. 219 (4th edition).]
[Footnote 208: Our F.O. Records show that we wanted to help Austria;
but a long delay was caused by George III.'s insisting that she should
make peace with us first. Canning meanwhile sent £250,000 in silver
bars to Trieste. But in his note of April 20th he assured the Court of
Vienna that our treasury had been "nearly exhausted" by the drain of
the Peninsular War. (Austria, No. 90.)]
[Footnote 209: For the campaign see the memoirs of Macdonald, Marbot,
Lejeune, Pelet and Marmont. The last (vol. iii., p. 216) says that,
had the Austrians pressed home their final attacks at Aspern, a
disaster was inevitable; or had Charles later on cut the French
communications near Vienna, the same result must have followed. But
the investigations of military historians leave no doubt that the
Austrian troops were too exhausted by their heroic exertions, and
their supplies of ammunition too much depleted, to warrant any risky
moves for several days; and by that time reinforcements had reached
Napoleon. See too Angelis' "Der Erz-Herzog Karl."]
[Footnote 210: Thoumas, "Le Maréchal Lannes," pp. 205, 323 _et seq._
Desvernois ("Mems.," ch. xii.) notes that after Austerlitz none of
Napoleon's wars had the approval of France.]
[Footnote 211: For the Walcheren expedition see Alison, vol. viii.;
James, vol. iv.; as also for Gambier's failure at Rochefort. The
letters of Sir Byam Martin, then cruising off Danzig, show how our
officers wished to give timely aid to Schill ("Navy Records," vol.
xii.).]
[Footnote 212: Captain Boothby's "A Prisoner of France," ch. iii.]
[Footnote 213: For Charles's desire to sue for peace after the first
battles on the Upper Danube, see Häusser, vol. iii., p. 341; also,
after Wagram, _ib._, pp. 412-413.]
[Footnote 214: Napier, bk. viii., chs. ii. and iii. In the App. of
vol. iii. of "Wellington's Despatches" is Napoleon's criticism on the
movements of Joseph and the French marshals. He blames them for their
want of _ensemble_, and for the precipitate attack which Victor
advised at Talavera. He concluded: "As long as you attack good troops
like the English in good positions, without reconnoitring them, you
will lead men to death _en pure perte_."]
[Footnote 215: An Austrian envoy had been urging promptitude at
Downing Street. On June 1st he wrote to Canning: "The promptitude of
the enemy has always been the key to his success. A long experience
has proved this to the world, which seems hitherto not to have
profited by this knowledge." On July 29th Canning acknowledged the
receipt of the Austrian ratification of peace with us, "accompanied by
the afflicting intelligence of the armistice concluded on the 12th
instant between the Austrian and French armies."
Napoleon at St. Helena said to Montholon that, had 6,000 British
troops pushed rapidly up the banks of the Scheldt on the day that the
expedition reached Flushing, they could easily have taken Antwerp,
which was then very weakly held. See, too, other opinions quoted by
Alison, ch. lx.]
[Footnote 216: Beer, p. 441.]
[Footnote 217: Vandal, vol. ii., p. 161; Metternich, vol. i., p. 114.]
[Footnote 218: Letter of February 10th, 1810, quoted by Lanfrey. See,
too, the "Mems." of Prince Eugène, vol. vi., p. 277.]
[Footnote 219: "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 365 (Eng. ed.).]
[Footnote 220: Bausset, "Mems.," ch. xix.]
[Footnote 221: Mme. de Rémusat, "Mems.," ch. xxvii.]
[Footnote 222: Tatischeff, "Alexandre et Napoléon," p. 519.
Welschinger, "Le Divorce de Napoléon," ch. ii.; he also examines the
alleged irregularities of the religious marriage with Josephine; Fesch
and most impartial authorities brushed them aside as a flimsy excuse.]
[Footnote 223: Metternich's despatch of December 25th, 1809, in his
"Mems.," vol. ii., § 150. The first hints were dropped by him to
Laborde on November 29th (Vandal, vol. ii., pp. 204, 543): they
reached Napoleon's ears about December 15th. For the influence of
these marriage negotiations in preparing for Napoleon's rupture with
the Czar, see chap, xxxii. of this work.]
[Footnote 224: "Conversations with the Duke of Wellington," p. 9. The
disobedience of Ney and Soult did much to ruin Masséna's campaign, and
he lost the battle of Fuentès d'Onoro mainly through that of
Bessières. Still, as he failed to satisfy Napoleon's maxim, "Succeed:
I judge men only by results," he was disgraced.]
[Footnote 225: Decree of February 5th, 1810. See Welschinger, "La
Censure sous le premier Empire," p. 31. For the seizure of Madame de
Staël's "Allemagne" and her exile, see her preface to "Dix Années
d'Exil."]
[Footnote 226: Mollien, "Mems.," vol. iii., p. 183.]
[Footnote 227: Fouché retired to Italy, and finally settled at Aix.
His place at the Ministry of Police was taken by Savary, Duc de
Rovigo. See Madelin's "Fouché," chap. xx.]
[Footnote 228: Porter, "Progress of the Nation," p. 388.]
[Footnote 229: Letters of August 6th, 7th, 29th. The United States had
just repealed their Non-Intercourse Act of 1807. For their relations
with Napoleon and England, see Channing's "The United States of
America," chs. vi. and vii.; also the Anglo-American correspondence in
Cobbett's "Register for 1809 and 1810."]
[Footnote 230: Mollien, "Mems." vol. i., p. 316.]
[Footnote 231: Tooke, "Hist. of Prices," vol. i., p. 311; Mollien,
vol. iii., pp. 135, 289; Pasquier, vol. i., p. 295; Chaptal, p. 275.]
[Footnote 232: Letter of August 6th, 1810, to Eugène.]
[Footnote 233: "Progress of the Nation," p. 148.]
[Footnote 234: So Mollien, vol. iii., p. 135: "One knows that his
powerful imagination was fertile in illusions: as soon as they had
seduced him, he sought with a kind of good faith to enhance their
prestige, and he succeeded easily in persuading many others of what he
had convinced himself. He braved business difficulties as he braved
dangers in war."] [Footnote 235: Miot de Melito, vol. ii., ch. xv. For
some favourable symptoms in French industry, see Lumbroso, pp.
165-226, and Chaptal, p. 287. They have been credited to the
Continental System; but surely they resulted from the internal free
trade and intelligent administration which France had enjoyed since
the Revolution.]
[Footnote 236: "Nap. Corresp.," May 8th, 1811.]
[Footnote 237: Goethe published the first part of "Faust," _in full_,
early in 1808.]
[Footnote 238: Baur, "Stein und Perthes," p. 85.]
[Footnote 239: Lavalette, "Mems.," ch. xxv.]
[Footnote 240: Letters of October 10th and 13th, 1810, and January
1st, 1811.]
[Footnote 241: Letter of September 17th, 1810.]
[Footnote 242: Letter of March 8th, 1811. For a fuller treatment of
the commercial struggle between Great Britain and Napoleon see my
articles, "Napoleon and British Commerce" and "Britain's Food Supply
during the French War," in a volume entitled "Napoleonic Studies"
(George Bell and Sons, 1904).]
[Footnote 243: Czartoryski, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xvii. At this time
he was taken back to the Czar's favour, and was bidden to hope for the
re-establishment of Poland by the Czar as soon as Napoleon made a
blunder.]
[Footnote 244: Tatischeff, p. 526; Vandal, vol. ii., ch. vii.]
[Footnote 245: "Corresp.," No. 16178; Vandal, vol. ii., ch. vii. The
_exposé_ of December 1st, 1809, had affirmed that Napoleon did not
intend to re-establish Poland. But this did not satisfy Alexander.]
[Footnote 246: Letters of October 23rd and December 2nd, 1810.]
[Footnote 247: Vandal, vol. ii., p. 529.]
[Footnote 248: Tatischeff, p. 555.]
[Footnote 249: Vandal, vol. ii., p. 535, admits that we had no hand in
it. But the Czar naturally became more favourable to us, and at the
close of 1811 secretly gave entry to our goods.]
[Footnote 250: Quoted by Garden, vol. xiii., p. 171.]
[Footnote 251: Bernhardi's "Denkwürdigkeiten des Grafen von Toll,"
vol. i. p. 223.]
[Footnote 252: Czartoryski, vol. ii., ch. xvii. At Dresden, in May,
1812, Napoleon admitted to De Pradt, his envoy at Warsaw that Russia's
lapse from the Continental System was the chief cause of war; "Without
Russia, the Continental System is absurdity."]
[Footnote 253: For the overtures of Russia and Sweden to us and their
exorbitant requests for loans, see Mr. Hereford George's account in
his careful and systematic study, "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia," ch.
iv. It was not till July, 1812, that we formally made peace with
Russia and Sweden, and sent them pecuniary aid. We may note here that
Napoleon, in April, 1812, sent us overtures for peace, if we would
acknowledge Joseph as King of Spain and Murat as King of Naples, and
withdraw our troops from the Peninsula and Sicily: Napoleon would then
evacuate Spain. Castlereagh at once refused an offer which would have
left Napoleon free to throw his whole strength against Russia (Garden,
vol. xiii., pp. 215, 254).]
[Footnote 254: Garden, vol. xiii., p. 329.]
[Footnote 255: Hereford George, _op. cit._, pp. 34-37. Metternich
("Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 517, Eng. ed.) shows that Napoleon had also
been holding out to Austria the hope of gaining Servia, Wallachia and
Moldavia (the latter of which were then overrun by Russian troops), if
she would furnish 60,000 troops: but Metternich resisted
successfully.]
[Footnote 256: See his words to Metternich at Dresden, Metternich's
"Mems.," vol. i., p. 152; as also that he would not advance beyond
Smolensk in 1812.]
[Footnote 257: Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. i., p. 226; Stern,
"Abhandlungen," pp. 350-366; Müffling, "Aus meinem Leben"; L'Abbé de
Pradt, "L'histoire de l'Ambassade de Varsovie."]
[Footnote 258: "Erinnerungen des Gen. von Boyen," vol. ii., p. 254.
This, and other facts that will later be set forth, explode the story
foisted by the Prussian General von dem Knesebeck in his old age on
Müffling. Knesebeck declared that his mission early in 1812 to the
Czar, which was to persuade him to a peaceful compromise with
Napoleon, was directly controverted by the secret instructions which
he bore from Frederick William to Alexander. He described several
midnight interviews with the Czar at the Winter Palace, in which he
convinced him that by war with Napoleon, and by enticing him into the
heart of Russia, Europe would be saved. Lehmann has shown ("Knesebeck
und Schön") that this story is contradicted by all the documentary
evidence. It may be dismissed as the offspring of senile vanity.]
[Footnote 259: "Toll," vol. i., pp. 256 _et seq._ Müffling was assured
by Phull in 1819 that the Drissa plan was only part of a grander
design which had never had a fair[*Scanner's note: fair is correct]
chance!]
[Footnote 260: Bernhardi's "Toll" (vol. i., p. 231) gives Barclay's
chief "army of the west" as really mustering only 127,000 strong,
along with 9,000 Cossacks; Bagration, with the second "army of the
west," numbered at first only 35,000, with 4,000 Cossacks; while
Tormasov's corps observing Galicia was about as strong. Clausewitz
gives rather higher estimates.]
[Footnote 261: Labaume, "Narrative of 1812," and Ségur.]
[Footnote 262: See the long letter of May 28th, 1812, to De Pradt;
also the Duc de Broglie's "Memoirs" (vol. i., ch. iv.) for the
hollowness of Napoleon's Polish policy. Bignon, "Souvenirs d'un
Diplomate" (ch. xx.), errs in saying that Napoleon charged De
Pradt--"Tout agiter, tout enflammer." At St. Helena, Napoleon said to
Montholon ("Captivity," vol. iii., ch. iii.): "Poland and its
resources were but poetry in the first months of the year 1812."]
[Footnote 263: "Toll," vol. i., p. 239; Wilson, "Invasion of Russia,"
p. 384.]
[Footnote 264: We may here also clear aside the statements of some
writers who aver that Napoleon intended to strike at St. Petersburg.
Perhaps he did so for a time. On July 9th he wrote at Vilna that he
proposed to march _both on Moscow and St. Petersburg_. But that was
while he still hoped that Davoust would entrap Bagration, and while
Barclay's retreat on Drissa seemed likely to carry the war into the
north. Napoleon always aimed first at the enemy's army; and Barclay's
retreat from Drissa to Vitepsk, and thence to Smolensk, finally
decided Napoleon's move towards Moscow. If he had any preconceived
scheme--and he always regulated his moves by events rather than by a
cast-iron plan--it was to strike at Moscow. At Dresden he said to De
Pradt: "I must finish the war by the end of September.... I am going
to Moscow: one or two battles will settle the business. I will burn
Tula, and Russia will be at my feet. Moscow is the heart of that
Empire. I will wage war with Polish blood." De Pradt's evidence is not
wholly to be trusted; but I am convinced that Napoleon never seriously
thought of taking 200,000 men to the barren tracts of North Russia
late in the summer, while the English, Swedish, and Russian fleets
were ready to worry his flank and stop supplies.]
[Footnote 265: Letter of August 24th to Maret; so too Labaume's
"Narrative," and Garden, vol. xiii., p. 418. Mr. George thinks that
Napoleon decided on August 21st to strike at Moscow on grounds of
general policy.]
[Footnote 266: Labaume, "Narrative"; Lejeune's "Mems.," vol. ii., ch.
vi.]
[Footnote 267: Marbot's "Mems." Bausset, a devoted servant to
Napoleon, refutes the oft-told story that he was ill at Borodino. He
had nothing worse than a bad cold. It is curious that such stories are
told about Napoleon after every battle when his genius did not shine.
In this case, it rests on the frothy narrative of Ségur, and is out of
harmony with those of Gourgaud and Pelet. Clausewitz justifies
Napoleon's caution in withholding his Guard.]
[Footnote 268: Bausset, "Cour de Napoléon." Tolstoi ("War and
Liberty") asserts that the fires were the work of tipsy pillagers. So
too Arndt, "Mems.," p. 204. Dr. Tzenoff, in a scholarly monograph
(Berlin, 1900), comes to the same conclusion. Lejeune and Bourgogne
admit both causes.]
[Footnote 269: Garden, vol. xiii., p. 452; vol. xiv., pp. 17-19.]
[Footnote 270: Cathcart, p. 41; see too the Czar's letters in Sir Byam
Martin's "Despatches," vol. ii., p. 311. This fact shows the
frothiness of the talk indulged in by Russians in 1807 as to "our
rapacity and perfidy" in seizing the Danish fleet.]
[Footnote 271: _E.g._, the migration of Rostopchin's serfs _en masse_
from their village, near Moscow, rather than come under French
dominion (Wilson, "French Invasion of Russia," p. 179).]
[Footnote 272: Letter of October 16th; see too his undated notes
("Corresp.," No. 19237). Bausset and many others thought the best plan
would be to winter at Moscow. He also says that the Emperor's
favourite book while at Moscow was Voltaire's "History of Charles
XII."]
[Footnote 273: Lejeune, vol. ii., chap. vi. As it chanced, Kutusoff
had resolved on retreat, if Napoleon attacked him. This is perhaps the
only time when Napoleon erred through excess of prudence. Fezensac
noted at Moscow that he would not see or hear the truth.]
[Footnote 274: It has been constantly stated by Napoleon, and by most
French historians of this campaign, that his losses were mainly due to
an exceptionally severe and early winter. The statement will not bear
examination. Sharp cold usually sets in before November 6th in Russia
at latitude 55°; the severe weather which he then suffered was
succeeded by alternate thaws and slighter frosts until the beginning
of December, when intense cold is always expected. Moreover, the bulk
of the losses occurred before the first snowstorm. The Grand Army
which marched on Smolensk and Moscow may be estimated at 400,000
(including reinforcements). At Viasma, _before severe cold set in_, it
had dwindled to 55,000. We may note here the curious fact,
substantiated by Alison, that the French troops stood the cold better
than the Poles and North Germans. See too N. Senior's "Conversations,"
vol. i., p. 239.]
[Footnote 275: Bausset, "Cour de Napoléon"; Wilson, pp. 271-277.]
[Footnote 276: Oudinot, "Mémoires."]
[Footnote 277: Hereford George, pp. 349-350.]
[Footnote 278: Bourgogne, ch. viii.]
[Footnote 279: Pasquier, vol. ii., _ad init._]
[Footnote 280: Colonel Desprez, who accompanied the retreat, thus
described to King Joseph its closing scenes: "The truth is best
expressed by saying that _the army is dead_. The Young Guard was 8,000
strong when we left Moscow: at Vilna it scarcely numbered 400.... The
corps of Victor and Oudinot numbered 30,000 men when they crossed the
Beresina: two days afterwards they had melted away like the rest of
the army. Sending reinforcements only increased the losses."
The following French official report, a copy of which I have found in
our F.O. Records (Russia, No. 84), shows how frightful were the losses
after Smolensk. But it should be noted that the rank and file in this
case numbered only 300 at Smolensk, and had therefore lost more than
half their numbers--and this in a regiment of the Guard.
GARDE IMPÉRIALE: 6ème RÉGIMENT DE TIRAILLEURS.
_lère Division. Situation à l'époque du 19 Décembre, 1812_.
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | Perte depuis le départ de Smolensk |
| |------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|--------|
|Présents sous|Restés sur |Blessés qui|Morts de |Restés en |Total des|Reste |
|les armes au |le champ |n'ont pu |froid ou de|en arrière |Pertes |présents|
|départ de |de bataille |suivre, |misère |gelés, ou | |sous les|
|Smolensk | |restés au | |pour cause | |armes |
| | |pouvoir de | |de maladie | | |
| | |l'ennemi | |au pouvoir | | |
| | | | |de l'ennemi| | |
|-----|-------|------------|------|--- |------|----|------|----|-----|---|----|---|
| Off.|Tr. | Off. |Tr. | Off. |Tr. | Off. |Tr. | Off. |Tr. | Off.|Tr.|Off.|Tr.|
| 31 |300 | -- |13 | 4 | 52 | -- | 24 | 13 |201 | 17 |290| 14 |10 |
|-----|-------|------|-----|------|----|------|----|------|----|-----|---|----|---|
_Signé_ le Colonel Major Commandant
le dit Regiment. CARRÉ.
Les autres régiments sont plus
ou moins dans le même état.]
[Footnote 281: "Corresp.," December 20th, 1812. For the so-called
Concordat of 1813, concluded with the captive Pius VII. at
Fontainebleau, see "Corresp." of January 25th, 1813. The Pope
repudiated it at the first opportunity. Napoleon wanted him to settle
at Avignon as a docile subject of the Empire.]
[Footnote 282: Mollien, vol. iii., _ad fin._ For his vague offers to
mitigate the harsh terms of Tilsit for Prussia, and to grant her a
political existence if she would fight for him, see Hardenberg,
"Mems.," vol. iv., p. 350.]
[Footnote 283: Walpole reports (December 19th and 22nd, 1812)
Metternich's envy of the Russian successes and of their occupation of
the left bank of the Danube. Walpole said he believed Alexander would
grant Austria a set-off against this; but Metternich seemed entirely
Bonapartist ("F.O.," Russia, No. 84). See too the full account, based
on documentary evidence, in Luckwaldt's "Oesterreich und die Anfange
des Befreiungskrieges" (Berlin, 1898).]
[Footnote 284: Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol. iv., p. 366.]
[Footnote 285: Oncken, "Oesterreich und Preussen," vol. ii.; Garden,
vol. xiv., p. 167; Seeley's "Stein," vol. ii., ch. iii.]
[Footnote 286: Arndt, "Wanderungen"; Steffens, "Was ich erlebte."]
[Footnote 287: At this time she had only 61,500 men ready for the
fighting line; but she had 28,000 in garrison and 32,000 in Pomerania
and Prussia (Proper), according to Scharnhorst's report contained in
"F.O.," Russia, No. 85.]
[Footnote 288: Letters of March 2nd and 11th.]
[Footnote 289: Metternich's "Memoirs," vol. i., p. 159; Luckwaldt,
_op. cit._, ch. vi.]
[Footnote 290: See the whole note in Luckwaldt, Append. No. 4.]
[Footnote 291: Oncken, _op. cit._, vol. ii., p. 205. So too
Metternich's letter to Nesselrode of April 21st ("Memoirs," vol. i.,
p. 405, Eng. ed.): "I beg of you to continue to confide in me. If
Napoleon will be foolish enough to fight, let us endeavour not to meet
with a reverse, which I feel to be only too possible. One battle lost
for Napoleon, and all Germany will be under arms."]
[Footnote 292: "F.O.," Austria, No. 105. Doubtless, as Oncken has
pointed out with much acerbity, Castlereagh's knowledge that Austria
would suggest the modification of our maritime claims contributed to
his refusal to consider her proposal for a general peace: but I am
convinced, from the tone of our records, that his chief motive was his
experience of Napoleon's intractability and a sense of loyalty to our
Spanish allies: we were also pledged to help Sweden and Russia.]
[Footnote 293: Letters of April 24th.]
[Footnote 294: Napoleon's troops in Thorn surrendered on April 17th;
those in Spandau on April 24th (Fain, "Manuscrit de 1813," vol. ii.,
ch. i.).]
[Footnote 295: Oncken, vol. ii., p. 272.]
[Footnote 296: Cathcart's report in "F.O.," Russia, No. 85. Müffling
("Aus meinem Leben") regards the delay in the arrival of
Miloradovitch, and the preparations for defence which the French had
had time to make at Gross Görschen, as the causes of the allies'
failure. The chief victim on the French side was Bessières, commander
of the Guard.]
[Footnote 297: "Corresp.," Nos. 20017-20031. For his interview with
Bubna, see Luckwaldt, p. 257.]
[Footnote 298: Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. iii., pp. 490-492. Marmont
gives the French 150,000; Thiers says 160,000.]
[Footnote 299: In his bulletin Napoleon admitted having lost 11,000 to
12,000 killed and wounded in the two days at Bautzen; his actual
losses were probably over 20,000. He described the allies as having
150,000 to 160,000 men, nearly double their actual numbers.]
[Footnote 300: Müffling, "Aus meinem Leben."]
[Footnote 301: "Lettres inédites." So too his letters to Eugène of
June 11th and July 1st; and of June 11th, 17th, July 6th and 29th, to
Augereau, who was to threaten Austria from Bavaria.]
[Footnote 302: See his conversation with our envoy, Thornton, reported
by the latter in the "Castlereagh Letters," 2nd series, vol. iv., p.
314.]
[Footnote 303: "Castlereagh Letters," 2nd series, vol. iv., p. 344.]
[Footnote 304: Garden, vol. xiv., p. 356. We also stipulated that
Sweden should not import slaves into Guadeloupe, and should repress
the slave trade. When, at the Congress of Vienna, that island was
given back to France, we paid Bernadotte a money indemnity.]
[Footnote 305: "Lettres inédites de Napoléon," June 18th, 1813. See
too that of July 16th, _ibid._]
[Footnote 306: Letters of F. Perthes.]
[Footnote 307: Joseph to Marmont, July 21st, 1812.]
[Footnote 308: "Méms. du Roi Joseph," vols. viii. and ix.; Napier,
book xix., ch. v.]
[Footnote 309: "Mémoires du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., p. 195.]
[Footnote 310: Napier and Alison say March 18th, which is refuted by
the "Méms. du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., p. 131.]
[Footnote 311: _Ibid._, vol. ix., p. 464.]
[Footnote 312: As a matter of fact he had 50,000 there for three
months, and did not succeed. See Clarke's letter to Clausel, "Méms. du
Roi Joseph," vol. ix., p. 251.]
[Footnote 313: Stanhope's "Conversations with Wellington," p. 20.]
[Footnote 314: "Mémoires du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., p. 60.]
[Footnote 315: Thiers, bk. xlix.; "Nap. Corresp.," No. 20019;
Baumgarten vol i., p. 577.]
[Footnote 316: "Mémoires du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., pp. 284, 294.
Joseph's first order to Clausel was sent under protection of _an
escort of 1,500 men_.]
[Footnote 317: See Lord Melville's complaint as to Wellington's
unreasonable charges on this head in the "Letters of Sir B. Martin"
("Navy Records," 1898).]
[Footnote 318: Miot de Melito, vol. ii., ch. xviii.]
[Footnote 319: Clausel afterwards complained that if he had received
any order to that effect he could have pushed on so as to be at
Vittoria ("Méms. du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., p. 454). The muster-rolls
of the French were lost at Vittoria. Napier puts their force at
70,000; Thiers at 54,000; Jourdan at 50,000.]
[Footnote 320: Wellington's official account of the fight states that
the French got away only two of their cannon; and Simmons, "A British
Rifleman," asserts that the last of these was taken near Pamplona on
the 24th. Wellington generously assigned much credit to the Spanish
troops--far more than Napier will allow.]
[Footnote 321: Ducasse, "Les rois, frères de Napoléon."]
[Footnote 322: "Lettres inédites de Napoléon," July 1st, 3rd, 15th,
and 20th.]
[Footnote 323: Stadion to Metternich, May 30th, June 2nd and 8th; in
Luckwaldt, p. 382.]
[Footnote 324: Cathcart's "most secret" despatch of June 4/16* from
Reichenbach. Just a month earlier he reported that the Czar's
proposals to Austria included all these terms in an absolute form, and
also the separation of Holland from France, the restoration of the
Bourbons to Spain, and "L'Italie libre dans toutes ses parties du
Gouvernement et de l'influence de la France." Such were also
Metternich's _private_ wishes, with the frontier of the Oglio on the
S.W. for Austria. See Oncken, vol. ii., p. 644. The official terms
were in part due to the direct influence of the Emperor Francis.]
[Footnote 325: In a secret article of the Treaty we promised to
advance to Austria a subsidy of £500,000 as soon as she should join
the allies.]
[Footnote 326: Martens, vol. ix., pp. 568-575. Our suspicion of
Prussia reappears (as was almost inevitable after her seizure of
Hanover), not only in the smallness of the sum accorded to her--for we
granted £2,000,000 in all to the Swedish, Hanseatic, and Hanoverian
contingents--but also in the stipulation that she should assent to the
eventual annexation of the formerly Prussian districts of East Frisia
and Hildesheim to Hanover. We also refused to sign the Treaty of
Reichenbach until she, most unwillingly, assented to this prospective
cession. This has always been thought in Germany a mean transaction;
but, as Castlereagh pointed out, those districts were greatly in the
way of the development of Hanover. Prussia was to have an indemnity
for the sacrifice; and we bore the chief burden in the issue of
"federative paper notes," which enabled the allies to prepare for the
campaign ("Castlereagh Papers," 2nd series, vol. iv., p. 355; 3rd
series, vol. i., pp. 7-17; and "Bath Archives," vol. ii., p. 86).
Moreover, we were then sending 30,000 muskets to Stralsund and Colberg
for the use of Prussian troops (Despatch from "F.O.," July 28th, to
Thornton, "Sweden," No. 79). On July 6th we agreed to pay the cost of
a German Legion of 10,000 men under the Czar's orders. Its Commissary
was Colonel Lowe.]
[Footnote 327: For the official reports see Garden, vol. xiv., pp.
486-499; also Bausset's account, "Cour de Napoléon."]
[Footnote 328: Any account of a private interview between two astute
schemers must be accepted with caution; and we may well doubt whether
Metternich really was as firm, not to say provocative, as he
afterwards represented in his "Memoirs." But, on the whole, his
account is more trustworthy than that of Fain, Napoleon's secretary,
in his "Manuscrit de 1813," vol. ii., ch. ii. Fain places the
interview on June 28th; in "Napoleon's Corresp." it is reprinted, but
assigned to June 23rd. The correct date is shown by Oncken to have
been June 26th. Bignon's account of it (vol. xii., ch. iv.) is marked
by his usual bias.]
[Footnote 329: Cathcart reported, on July 8th, that Schwarzenberg had
urged an extension of the armistice, so that Austria might meet the
"vast and unexpected" preparations of France ("Russia," No. 86).]
[Footnote 330: "Russia," No. 86.]
[Footnote 331: Thornton's despatch of July 12th ("Castlereagh Papers,"
2nd Series, vol. iv., _ad fin._).]
[Footnote 332: _Ibid._, pp. 383 and 405.]
[Footnote 333: For details see Oncken, Luckwaldt, Thiers, Fain, and
the "Mems." of the Duc de Broglie; also Gentz, "Briefe an Pilat," of
July 16th-22nd, 1813. Humboldt, the Prussian ambassador, reported on
July 13th to Berlin that Metternich looked on war as quite
unavoidable, and on the Congress merely as a means of convincing the
Emperor Francis of the impossibility of gaining a lasting peace.]
[Footnote 334: Thiers; Ernouf's "Maret, Duc de Bassano," p. 571.]
[Footnote 335: Bignon "Hist. de France," vol. xii., p. 199; Lefebvre,
"Cabinets de l'Europe," vol. v., p. 555.]
[Footnote 336: Letter of July 29th.]
[Footnote 337: Gentz to Sir G. Jackson, August 4th ("Bath Archives,"
vol. ii., p. 199). For a version flattering to Napoleon, see Ernouf's
"Maret" (pp. 579-587), which certainly exculpates the Minister.]
[Footnote 338: Metternich, "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 546 (Eng. ed.).]
[Footnote 339: "F.O.," Russia, No. 86. A letter of General Nugent
(July 27th), from Prague, is inclosed. When he (N.) expressed to
Metternich the fear that Caulaincourt's arrival there portended peace,
M. replied that this would make no alteration, "as the proposals were
such that they certainly would not be accepted, and they would even be
augmented."]
[Footnote 340: "Souvenirs du Duc de Broglie," vol. i., ch. v.]
[Footnote 341: British aims at this time are well set forth in the
instructions and the accompanying note to Lord Aberdeen, our
ambassador designate at Vienna, dated Foreign Office, August 6th,
1813: " ... Your Lordship will collect from these instructions that a
general peace, in order to provide adequately for the tranquillity and
independence of Europe, ought, in the judgment of His Majesty's
Government, to confine France at least within the Pyrenees, the Alps,
and the Rhine: and if the other Great Powers of Europe should feel
themselves enabled to contend for such a Peace, Great Britain is fully
prepared to concur with them in such a line of policy. If, however,
the Powers most immediately concerned should determine, rather than
encounter the risks of a more protracted struggle, to trust for their
own security to a more imperfect arrangement, it never has been the
policy of the British Government to attempt to dictate to other States
a perseverance in war, which they did not themselves recognize to be
essential to their own as well as to the common safety." As regards
details, we desired to see the restoration of Venetia to Austria, of
the Papal States to the Pope, of the north-west of Italy to the King
of Sardinia, but trusted that "a liberal establishment" might be found
for Murat in the centre of Italy. Napoleon knew that we desired to
limit France to the "natural frontiers" and that we were resolved to
insist on our maritime claims. As our Government took this unpopular
line, and went further than Austria in its plans for restricting
French influence, he had an excellent opportunity for separating the
Continental Powers from us. But he gave out that those Powers were
bought by England, and that we were bent on humiliating France.]
[Footnote 342: Boyen, "Erinnerungen," Pt. III., p. 66.]
[Footnote 343: Fain, vol. ii., p. 27. The italicized words are given
thus by him; but they read like a later excuse for Napoleon's
failures.]
[Footnote 344: "Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany," p.
195.]
[Footnote 345: In his letters of August 16th to Macdonald and Ney he
assumed that the allies might strike at Dresden, or even as far west
as Zwickau: but meanwhile he would march "pour enlever Blücher."]
[Footnote 346: "Lettres inédites de Napoléon." The Emperor forwarded
this suggestion to Savary (August 11th): it doubtless meant an issue
of false paper notes, such as had been circulated in Russia the year
before.]
[Footnote 347: Cathcart, "Commentaries," p. 206.]
[Footnote 348: "Extrait d'un Mémoire sur la Campagne de 1813." With
characteristic inaccuracy Marbot remarks that the defection of Jomini,
_with Napoleon's plans_, was "a disastrous blow." The same is said by
Dedem de Gelder, p. 328.]
[Footnote 349: The Emperor's eagerness is seen by the fact that on
August 21st he began dictating despatches, at Lauban, at 3 a.m. On the
previous day he had dictated seventeen despatches; twelve at Zittau,
four after his ride to Görlitz, and one more on his arrival at Lauban
at midnight.]
[Footnote 350: Letters of August 23rd to Berthier.]
[Footnote 351: Boyen, vol. iii., p. 85. But see Wiehr, "Nap. und
Bernadotte in 1813," who proves how risky was B.'s position, with the
Oder fortresses, held by the French, on one flank, and Davoust and the
Danes on the other. He disposes of many of the German slanders against
Bernadotte.]
[Footnote 352: Hausser, pp. 260-267. Oudinot's "Memoirs" throw the
blame on the slowness of Bertrand in effecting the concentration on
Grossbeeren and on the heedless impetuosity of Reynier. Wiehr (pp.
74-116) proves from despatches that Bernadotte meant to attack the
French _south of Berlin_: he discredits the "bones" anecdote.]
[Footnote 353: Letters of August 23rd.]
[Footnote 354: So called to distinguish it from the two other Neisses
in Silesia.]
[Footnote 355: Blasendorfs "Blücher"; Müffling's "Aus meinem Leben"
and "Campaigns of the Silesian Army in 1813 and 1814"; Bertin's "La
Campagne de 1813." Hausser assigns to the French close on 60,000 at
the battle; to the allies about 70,000.]
[Footnote 356: Jomini, "Vie de Napoléon," vol. iv., p. 380; "Toll,"
vol. iii., p. 124.]
[Footnote 357: "Toll," vol. iii., p. 144. Cathcart reports (p. 216)
that Moreau remarked to him: "We are already on Napoleon's
communications; the possession of the town [Dresden] is no object; it
will fall of itself at a future time." If Moreau said this seriously
it can only be called a piece of imbecility. The allies were far from
safe until they had wrested from Napoleon one of his strong places on
the Elbe; it was certainly not enough to have seized Pirna.]
[Footnote 358: "Corresp." No. 20461.]
[Footnote 359: Cathcart's "Commentaries," p. 230: Bertin, "La Campagne
de 1813," p. 109; Marmont, "Mems.," bk. xvii.; Sir Evelyn Wood's
"Achievements of Cavalry."]
[Footnote 360: It is clear from Napoleon's letters of the evening of
the 27th that he was not quite pleased with the day's work, and
thought the enemy would hold firm, or even renew the attack on the
morrow. They disprove Thiers' wild statements about a general pursuit
on that evening, thousands of prisoners swept up, etc.]
[Footnote 361: Vandamme on the 28th received a reinforcement of
eighteen battalions, and thenceforth had in all sixty-four; yet Marbot
credits him with only 20,000 men.]
[Footnote 362: Thiers gives Berthier's despatch in full. See also map,
p. 336.]
[Footnote 363: Marmont, bk. xvii., p. 158. He and St. Cyr ("Mems.,"
vol. iv., pp. 120-123) agree as to the confusion of their corps when
crowded together on this road. Napoleon's aim was to insure the
capture of all the enemy's cannon and stores; but his hasty orders had
the effect of blocking the pursuit on the middle road. St. Cyr sent to
headquarters for instruction; but these were now removed to Dresden;
hence the fatal delay.]
[Footnote 364: Thiers has shown that Mortier did not get the order
from Berthier to support Vandamme _until August 30th_. The same is
true of St. Cyr, who did not get it till 11.30 a.m. on that day. St.
Cyr's best defence is Napoleon's letter of September 1st to him
("Lettres inédites de Napoléon"): "That unhappy Vandamme, who seems to
have killed himself, had not a sentinel on the mountains, nor a
reserve anywhere.... I had given him positive orders to intrench
himself on the heights, to encamp his troops on them, and only to send
isolated parties of men into Bohemia to worry the enemy and collect
news." With this compare Napoleon's approving statement of August 29th
to Murat ("Corresp.," No. 20486): "Vandamme was marching on Teplitz
_with all his corps_."]
[Footnote 365: "Lettres inédites de Napoléon," September 3rd.]
[Footnote 366: Häusser, vol. iv., p. 343, and Boyen, "Erinnerungen,"
vol. ii., pp. 345-357, for Bernadotte's suspicious delays on this day;
also Marmont, bk. xviii., for a critique on Ney. Napoleon sent for
Lejeune, then leading a division of Ney's army, to explain the
disaster; but when Lejeune reached the headquarters at Dohna, south of
Dresden, the Emperor bade him instantly return--a proof of his
impatience and anger at these reverses.]
[Footnote 367: Thornton, our envoy at Bernadotte's headquarters, wrote
to Castlereagh that that leader's desire was to spare the Swedish
corps; he expected that Bernadotte would aim at the French crown
("Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. i., pp. 48-59). See too Boyen,
vol. ii., p. 378.]
[Footnote 368: Letter of October 10th to Reynier. This and his letter
to Maret seem to me to refute Bernhardi's contention ("Toll," vol.
iii., pp. 385-388) that Napoleon only meant to drive the northern
allies across the Elbe, and then to turn on Schwarzenberg. The
Emperor's plans shifted every few hours: but the plan of crossing the
Elbe in great force was distinctly prepared for.]
[Footnote 369: Thiers asserts that he had. But if so, how could the
Emperor have written to Macdonald (October 2nd) that the Silesian army
had made a move on Grossenhain: "It appears that this is so as to
attack the intrenched camp [at Dresden] by the side of the plain, by
the roads of Berlin and Meissen."? On the same day he scoffs at
Lefebre-Desnoëttes for writing that Bernadotte had crossed the Elbe,
and retorts that if he had, it would be so much the worse for him: the
war would soon be over.}
[Footnote 370: Letter of October 10th to Reynier. This and his letter
to Maret seem to me to refute Bernhardi's contention ("Toll," vol.
iii., pp. 385-388) that Napoleon only meant to drive the northern
allies across the Elbe, and then to turn on Schwarzenberg. The
Emperor's plans shifted every few hours: but the plan of crossing the
Elbe in great force was distinctly prepared for.]
[Footnote 371: Martens, "Traités," vol. ix., p. 610. This secret
bargain cut the ground from under the German unionists, like Stein,
who desired to make away with the secondary princes, or strictly to
limit their powers.]
[Footnote 372: Thiers and Bernhardi ("Toll," vol. iii., p. 388) have
disposed of this fiction.]
[Footnote 373: Sir E. Wood, "Achievements of Cavalry."]
[Footnote 374: "Corresp.," No. 20814. Marmont, vol. v., p. 281,
acutely remarks that Napoleon now regarded as true only that which
entered into his combinations and his thoughts.]
[Footnote 375: Bernadotte was only hindered from retreat across the
Elbe by the remonstrances of his officers, by the forward move of
Blücher, and by the fact that the Elbe bridges were now held by the
French. For the council of war at Köthen on October 14th, see Boyen,
vol. ii., p. 377.]
[Footnote 376: Müffling, "Campaign of 1813."]
[Footnote 377: Colonel Lowe, who was present, says it was won and lost
five times (unpublished "Memoirs").]
[Footnote 378: Napoleon's bulletin of October 16th, 1813, blames Ney
for this waste of a great corps; but it is clear, from the official
orders published by Marmont (vol. v., pp. 373-378), that Napoleon did
not expect any pitched battle on the north side on the 16th. He
thought Bertrand's corps would suffice to defend the north and west,
and left the defence on that side in a singularly vague state.]
[Footnote 379: Dedem de Gelder, "Mems.," p. 345, severely blames
Napoleon's inaction on the 17th; either he should have attacked the
allies before Bennigsen and Bernadotte came up, or have retreated
while there was time.]
[Footnote 380: Lord Burghersh, Sir George Jackson, Odeleben, and Fain
all assign this conversation to the night of the 16th; but Merveldt's
official account of it (inclosed with Lord Cathcart's despatches),
gives it as on October 17th, at 2 p.m. ("F.O.," Russia, No. 86). I
follow this version rather than that given by Fain.]
[Footnote 381: That the British Ministers did not intend anything of
the kind, even in the hour of triumph, is seen by Castlereagh's
despatch of November 13th, 1813, to Lord Aberdeen, our envoy at the
Austrian Court: "We don't wish to impose any dishonourable condition
upon France, which limiting the number of her ships would be: but she
must not be left in possession of this point [Antwerp]" ("Castlereagh
Papers," 3rd series, vol. i., p. 76).]
[Footnote 382: Boyen describes the surprising effects of the fire of
the British rocket battery that served in Bernadotte's army. Captain
Bogue brought it forward to check the charge of a French column
against the Swedes. He was shot down, but Lieutenant Strangways poured
in so hot a fire that the column was "blown asunder like an ant-heap,"
the men rushing back to cover amidst the loud laughter of the allies.]
[Footnote 383: The premature explosion was of course due, not to
Napoleon, but to the flurry of a serjeant and the skilful flanking
move of Sacken's light troops, for which see Cathcart and Marmont. The
losses at Leipzig were rendered heavier by Napoleon's humane refusal
to set fire to the suburbs so as to keep off the allies. He rightly
said he could have saved many thousand French had he done so. This is
true. But it is strange that he had given no order for the
construction of other bridges. Pelet and Fain affirm that he gave a
verbal order; but, as Marbot explains, Berthier, the Chief of the
Staff, had adopted the pedantic custom of never acting on anything
less than _a written order_, which was not given. The neglect to
secure means for retreat is all the stranger as the final miseries at
the Beresina were largely due to official blundering of the same kind.
Wellington's criticism on Napoleon's tactics at Leipzig is severe
(despatch of January 10th, 1814): "If Bonaparte had not placed himself
in a position that every other officer would have avoided, and
remained in it longer than was consistent with any ideas of prudence,
he would have retired in such a state that the allies could not have
ventured to approach the Rhine."]
[Footnote 384: Sir Charles Stewart wrote (March 22nd, 1814): "On the
Elbe Napoleon was quite insane, and his lengthened stay there was the
cause of the Battle of Leipzig and all his subsequent misfortunes"
("Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 373).]
[Footnote 385: Napier, vol. v., pp. 368-378.]
[Footnote 386: On November 10th Lord Aberdeen, our ambassador at the
Austrian Court, wrote to Castlereagh: " ... As soon as he [Murat]
received the last communication addressed to him by Prince Metternich
and myself at Prague, he wrote to Napoleon and stated that the affairs
of his kingdom absolutely demanded his presence. Without waiting for
any answer, he immediately began his journey, and did not halt a
moment till he arrived at Basle. While on the road he sent a cyphered
dispatch to Prince Cariati, his Minister at Vienna, in which he
informs him that he hopes to be at Naples on the 4th of this month:
that he burns with desire to revenge himself of [_sic_] all the
injuries he has received from Bonaparte, and to connect himself with
the cause of the allies in contending for a just and stable peace. He
proposes to declare war on the instant of his arrival." Again, on
December 19th, Aberdeen writes: "You may consider the affair of Murat
as settled.... It will probably end in Austria agreeing to his having
a change of frontier on the Papal territory, just enough to satisfy
his vanity and enable him to show something to his people. I doubt
much if it will be possible, with the claims of Sicily, Sardinia, and
Austria herself in the north of Italy, to restore to him the three
Legations: but something adequate must be done" ("Austria," No. 102).
The disputes between Murat and Napoleon will be cleared up in Baron
Lumbroso's forthcoming work, "Murat." Meanwhile see Bignon, vol.
xiii., pp. 181 _et seq._; Desvernois, "Mems.," ch. xx.; and Chaptal
(p. 305), for Fouché's treacherous advice to Murat.]
[Footnote 387: Lady Burghersh's "Journal," p. 182.]
[Footnote 388: Fain, "Manuscrit de 1814," pp. 48-63. Ernouf, "Vie de
Maret," p. 606, states that Napoleon touched up Maret's note; the
sentence quoted above is doubtless the Emperor's. The same author
proves that Maret's advice had always been more pacific than was
supposed, and that now, in his old position of Secretary of State, he
gave Caulaincourt valuable help during the negotiations at Châtillon.]
[Footnote 389: "Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. i., p. 74. This
was written, of course, before he heard of the Frankfurt proposals;
but it anticipates them in a remarkable way. Thiers states that
Castlereagh, after hearing of them, sent Aberdeen new instructions. I
cannot find any in our archives. This letter warned Aberdeen against
any compromise on the subject of Antwerp; but it is clear that
Castlereagh, when he came to the allied headquarters, was a partisan
of peace, as compared with the Czar and the Prussian patriots.
Schwarzenberg wrote (January 26th) at Langres: "We ought to make peace
here: our Kaiser, also Stadion, Metternich, even Castlereagh, are
fully of this opinion--but Kaiser Alexander!"]
[Footnote 390: Fournier, "Der Congress von Châtillon," p. 242.]
[Footnote 391: "Castlereagh Papers," _loc. cit._, p. 112.]
[Footnote 392: Metternich. "Memoirs," vol. i., p. 214.]
[Footnote 393: "F.O.," Austria, No. 102.]
[Footnote 394: "Lettres inédites" (November 6th, 1813).]
[Footnote 395: The memorandum is endorsed, "Extract of Instructions
delivered to me by Gen. Pozzo di Borgo, 18 Dec, 1813" ("Russia," No.
92).]
[Footnote 396: Metternich's letter to Hudelist, in Fournier, p. 242.]
[Footnote 397: Houssaye's "1814," p. 14; Metternich, "Memoirs," vol.
i., p. 308.]
[Footnote 398: "Our success and everything depend upon our moderation
and justice," he wrote to Lord Bathurst (Napier, bk. xxiii., ch.
ii.).]
[Footnote 399: "Lettres inédites" (November 12th). The date is
important: it refutes Napier's statement (bk. xxiii., ch. iv.) that
the Emperor had planned that Ferdinand should enter Spain early in
November when the disputes between Wellington and the Cortès at Madrid
were at their height. Bignon (vol. xiii., p. 88 _et seq._) says that
Talleyrand's indiscretion revealed the negotiations to the Spanish
Cortès and Wellington; but our general's despatches show that he did
not hear of them before January 9th or 10th. He then wrote: "I have
long suspected that Bonaparte would adopt this expedient; and if he
had had less pride and more common sense, it would have succeeded."]
[Footnote 400: On January 14th the Emperor ordered Soult, as soon as
the ratification of the treaty*treatry was known, to set out
northwards from Bayonne "with all his army, only leaving what is
necessary to form a screen." Suchet was likewise to hurry with 10,000
foot, _en poste_, and two-thirds of his horse, to Lyons. On the 22nd
the Emperor blames both Marshals for not sending off the infantry,
though the Spanish treaty had _not_ been ratified. After long delays
Ferdinand set out for Spain on March 13th, when the war was almost
over.]
[Footnote 401: Houssaye's "1814," ch. ii.; Müffling's "Campaign of
1814."]
[Footnote 402: Letter of January 31st to Joseph.]
[Footnote 403: "Méms. de Langeron" in Houssaye, p. 62; but see
Müffling.]
[Footnote 404: Letter of February 2nd to Clarke.]
[Footnote 405: Metternich said of Castlereagh, "I can't praise him
enough: his views are most peaceful, in our sense" (Fournier, p.
252).]
[Footnote 406: Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, January 22nd and 30th,
1814.]
[Footnote 407: Letter to Hudelist (February 3rd), in Fournier, p.
255.]
[Footnote 408: Stewart's Mem. of January 27th, 1814, in "Castlereagh
Papers," vol. ix., p. 535. On that day Hardenberg noted in his diary:
"Discussion on the plan of operations, and misunderstandings. Intrigue
of Stein to get the army straight to Paris, as the Czar wants. The
Austrians oppose this: others don't know what they want" (Fournier, p.
361).]
[Footnote 409: Stewart's notes in "Castlereagh Papers," pp. 541-548.
On February 17th Castlereagh promised to give back all our conquests
in the West Indies, except Tobago, and to try to regain for France
Guadaloupe and Cayenne from Sweden and Portugal; also to restore all
the French possessions east of the Cape of Good Hope except the Iles
de France (Mauritius) and de Bourbon (Fournier, p. 381).]
[Footnote 410: Letters of January 31st and February 2nd to Joseph.]
[Footnote 411: Printed in Napoleon's "Corresp." of February 17th. I
cannot agree with Ernouf, "Vie de Maret," and Fournier, that
Caulaincourt could have signed peace merely on Maret's "carte blanche"
despatch. The man who had been cruelly duped by Napoleon in the
D'Enghien affair naturally wanted an explicit order now.]
[Footnote 412: Given by Ducasse, "Les Rois Frères de Napoléon," p.
64.]
[Footnote 413: Hausser, p. 503. According to Napoleon, 6,000 men and
forty cannon were captured!]
[Footnote 414: Letter of February 18th, 1814.]
[Footnote 415: At Elba Napoleon told Colonel Campbell that he would
have made peace at Châtillon had not England insisted on his giving up
Antwerp, and that England was therefore the cause of the war
continuing. This letter, however, proves that he was as set on
retaining Mainz as Antwerp. Caulaincourt then wished him to make peace
while he could do so with credit ("Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p.
287).]
[Footnote 416: Fournier, pp. 132-137, 284-294, 299.]
[Footnote 417: See Metternich's letter to Stadion of February 15th in
Fournier, pp. 319, 327.]
[Footnote 418: Houssaye, p. 102.]
[Footnote 419: Instructions of February 24th to Flahaut, "Corresp.,"
No. 21359; Hardenberg's "Diary," in Fournier, pp. 363-364.]
[Footnote 420: Fournier, pp. 170, 385.]
[Footnote 421: _Ibid._, pp. 178-181, 304; Martens, vol. ix., p. 683.
Castlereagh, vol. ix., p. 336, calls it "my treaty," and adds that
England was practically supplying 300,000 men to the Coalition. One
secret article invited Spain and Sweden to accede to the treaty;
another stated that Germany was to consist of a federation of
sovereign princes, that Holland must receive a "suitable" military
frontier, and that Italy, Spain, and Switzerland must be independent,
that is, of France; a third bound the allies to keep their armies on a
war footing for a suitable time after the peace.]
[Footnote 422: See his instructions of March 2nd to Caulaincourt:
"Nothing will bring France to do anything that degrades her national
character and deposes her from the rank she has held in the world for
centuries." But it was precisely that rank which the allies were
resolved to assign to her, neither more nor less. The joint allied
note of February 29th to the negotiators at Châtillon bade them
"announce to the French negotiator that you are ready to discuss, in a
spirit of conciliation, every modification that he might be authorized
to propose"; but that any essential departure from the terms already
proposed by them must lead to a rupture of the negotiations.]
[Footnote 423: Letters of March 2nd, 3rd, 4th, to Clarke.]
[Footnote 424: Houssaye, p. 156, note. So too Müffling, "Aus meinem
Leben," shows that Blücher could have crossed the Aisne there or at
Pontavaire or Berry-au-Bac.]
[Footnote 425: See Napoleon's letters to Clarke of March 4th-6th.]
[Footnote 426: Houssaye, pp. 176-188.]
[Footnote 427: Müffling says that Blücher and Gneisenau feared an
attack by _Bernadotte_ on their rear. Napoleon on February 25th
advised Joseph to try and gain over that prince, who had some very
suspicious relations with the French General Maison in Belgium.
Probably Gneisenau wished to spare his men for political reasons.]
[Footnote 428: Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. iv., p. 697. Lord Burghersh
wrote from Troyes (March 12th): "I am convinced this army will not be
risked in a general action.... S. would almost wish to be back upon
the Rhine." So again on the 19th he wrote to Colonel Hudson Lowe from
Pougy: "I cannot say much for our activity; I am unable to explain the
causes of our apathy--the facts are too evident to be disputed. We
have been ten days at Troyes, one at Pont-sur-Seine, two at Arcis, and
are now at this place. We go tomorrow to Brienne" ("Unpublished Mems.
of Sir H. Lowe"). Stewart wittily said that Napoleon came to Arcis to
feel Schwarzenberg's pulse.]
[Footnote 428: Letters of March 20th to Clarke.]
[Footnote 430: "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., pp. 325, 332.]
[Footnote 431: These letters were written in pairs--the one being
official, the other confidential. Caulaincourt's replies show that he
appreciated them highly (see Fain, Appendix).]
[Footnote 432: From Caulaincourt's letter of March 3rd to Napoleon;
Bignon, vol. xiii., p. 379.]
[Footnote 433: "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 555.]
[Footnote 434: "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., pp. 335, 559.
Caulaincourt's project of March 15th much resembled that dictated by
Napoleon three days later; Austria was to have Venetia as far as the
Adige, the kingdom of Italy to go to Eugène, and the duchy of Warsaw
to the King of Saxony, etc. The allies rejected it (Fain, p. 388).]
[Footnote 435: Fournier, p. 232, rebuts, and I think successfully,
Houssaye's objections (p. 287) to its genuineness. Besides, the letter
is on the same moral level with the instructions of January 4th to
Caulaincourt, and resembles them in many respects. No forger could
have known of those instructions. At Elba, Napoleon admitted that he
was wrong in not making peace at this time. "_Mais je me croyais assez
fort pour ne pas la faire, et je me suis trompé_" (Lord Holland's
"Foreign Rem.," p. 319). The same writer states (p. 296) that he saw
the official correspondence about Châtillon: it gave him the highest
opinion of Caulaincourt, but N.'s conduct was "full of subterfuge and
artifice."]
[Footnote 436: Castlereagh to Clancarty, March 18th.]
[Footnote 437: Napier, bk. xxiv., ch. iii. Wellington seems to have
thought that the allies would probably make peace with Napoleon.]
[Footnote 438: Broglie, "Mems.," bk. iii., ch. i.]
[Footnote 439: Letter of February 25th to Joseph. Thiébault gives us
an odd story that Bernadotte sent an agent, Rainville, to persuade
Davoust to join him in attacking the rear of the allies; but that
Rainville's nerve so forsook him in Davoust's presence that he turned
and bolted for his life!]
[Footnote 440: Caulaincourt to Metternich on March 25th: "Arrived only
this [last] night near the Emperor, His Majesty has ... given me all
the powers necessary to sign peace with the Ministers of the allied
Courts" (Fain, p. 345; Ernouf, "Vie de Maret," p. 634).
Thiers does not mention these overtures of Napoleon, which are surely
most characteristic. His whole eastward move was motived by them.
Efforts have been made (_e.g._, by M. de Bacourt in Talleyrand's
"Mems.," pt. vii., app. 4) to prove that on the 25th Napoleon was
ready to agree to all the allied terms, and thus concede more than was
done by Louis XVIII. But there is no proof that he meant to do
anything of the sort. The terms of Caulaincourt's note were perfectly
vague. Moreover, even on the 28th, when Napoleon was getting alarmed,
he had an interview with a captured Austrian diplomatist, Wessenberg,
whom he set free in order that he might confer with the Emperor
Francis. He told the envoy that France would yet give him support: he
wanted the natural frontiers, but would probably make peace on less
favourable terms, as he wished to end the war: "I am ready to renounce
all the French colonies if I can thereby keep the mouth of the Scheldt
for France. England will not insist on my sacrificing Antwerp if
Austria does not support her" (Arneth's "Wessenberg," vol. i., p.
188). This extract shows no great desire to meet the allied terms, but
rather to separate Austria from her allies. According to Lady
Burghersh ("Journals," p. 216), Napoleon admitted to Wessenberg that
his position was desperate. I think this was a pleasing fiction of
that envoy. There is no proof that Napoleon was wholly cast down till
the 29th, when he heard of La Fère Champenoise (Macdonald's
"Souvenirs").]
[Footnote 441: Bignon, vol. xiii., pp. 436, 437.]
[Footnote 442: On hearing of their withdrawal Stein was radiant with
joy: "Now, he said, the Czar will go on to Paris, and all will soon be
at an end" (Tourgueneff quoted by Häusser, vol. iv., p. 553).]
[Footnote 443: Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. iv., pp. 737 _et seq._;
Houssaye, pp. 354-362; also Nesselrode's communication published in
Talleyrand's "Mems." Thielen and Radetzky have claimed that the
initiative in this matter was Schwarzenberg's; and Lord Burghersh, in
his despatch of March 25th ("Austria," No. 110), agrees with them.
Stein supports Toll's claim. I cannot agree with Houssaye (p. 407)
that "Napoleon had resigned himself to the sacrifice of Paris." His
intercepted letter, and also the official letters, Nos. 21508, 21513,
21516, 21526, 21538, show that he believed the allies would retreat
and that his communications with Paris would be safe.]
[Footnote 444: I take this account largely from Sir Hudson Lowe's
unpublished memoirs. Napoleon blamed Marmont for not marching to
Rheims as he was ordered to do. At Elba, Napoleon told Colonel
Campbell that Marmont's disobedience spoilt the eastern movement, and
ruined the campaign. But had Marmont and Mortier joined Napoleon at
Vitry, Paris would have been absolutely open to the allies.]
[Footnote 445: Houssaye, pp. 485 _et seq._; Napoleon's letters of
February 8th and March 16th; Mollien, vol. iv., p. 128. In Napoleon's
letter of April 2nd to Joseph ("New Letters") there is not a word of
reproach to Joseph for leaving Paris.]
[Footnote 446: "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 420; Pasquier, vol.
iii., ch. xiii.]
[Footnote 447: We do not know definitely why Alexander dropped
Bernadotte so suddenly. On March 17th he had assured the royalist
agent, Baron de Vitrolles, that he would not hear of the Bourbons, and
that he had first thought of establishing Bernadotte in France, and
then Eugène. We do know, however, that Bernadotte had made suspicious
overtures to the French General Maison in Belgium ("Castlereagh
Papers," vol. ix., pp. 383, 445, 512).]
[Footnote 448: De Pradt, "Restauration de la Royauté, le 31 Mars,
1814"; Pasquier, vol. iii., ch. xiii. Vitrolles ("Mems.," vol. i., pp.
95-101) says that Metternich assured him on March 15th that Austria
would not insist on the Regency of Marie Louise, but would listen to
the wishes of France.]
[Footnote 449: For the first draft of this Declaration, see
"Corresp.," No. 21555 (note).]
[Footnote 450: Pasquier, vol. iii., ch. xv.; Macdonald, "Souvenirs."]
[Footnote 451: Houssaye, pp. 593-623; Marmont, vol. vi., pp. 254-272;
Macdonald, chs. xxvii.-xxviii. At Elba, Napoleon told Lord Ebrington
that Marmont's troops were among the best, and his treachery ruined
everything ("Macmillan's Mag.," Dec, 1894).]
[Footnote 452: Pasquier, vol. iii., ch. xvi.; "Castlereagh Papers,"
vol. ix., p. 442. Alison wrongly says that _Napoleon_ chose Elba.]
[Footnote 453: Martens, vol. ix., p. 696.]
[Footnote 454: Thiers and Constant assign this event to the night of
11th-12th. I follow Fain and Macdonald in referring it to the next
night.]
[Footnote 455: Bausset, "Cour de Napoléon."]
[Footnote 456: Sir Neil Campbell's "Journal," p. 192.]
[Footnote 457: Ussher, "Napoleon's Last Voyages," p. 29.]
[Footnote 458: A quondam Jacobin, Pons (de l'Hérault), Commissioner of
Mines at Elba, has left "Souvenirs de l'Ile d'Elbe," which are of
colossal credulity. In chap. xi. he gives tales of plots to murder
Napoleon--some of them very silly. In part ii., chap, i., he styles
him "essentiellement religieux," and a most tender-hearted man, who
was compelled by prudence to hide his sensibility! Yet Campbell's
official reports show that Pons, _at that time_, was far from admiring
Napoleon.]
[Footnote 459: "F.O.," Austria, No. 117. Talleyrand, in his letters to
Louis XVIII., claims to have broken up the compact of the Powers. But
it is clear that fear of Russia was more potent than Talleyrand's
_finesse_. Before the Congress began Castlereagh and Wellington
advised friendship with France so as to check "undue pretensions"
elsewhere.]
[Footnote 460: Stanhope's "Conversations," p. 26. In our archives
("Russia," No. 95) is a suspicious letter of Pozzo di Borgo, dated
Paris, July 10/22, 1814, to Castlereagh (it is not in his Letters)
containing this sentence: "_L'existence de Napoléon_, comme il était
aisé à prévoir, est un inconvénient qui se rencontre partout." For
Fouché's letter to Napoleon, begging him voluntarily to retire to the
New World, see Talleyrand's "Mems.," pt. vii., app. iv. Lafayette
("Mems.," vol. v., p. 345) asserts that French royalists were plotting
his assassination. Brulart, Governor of Corsica, was suspected by
Napoleon, but, it seems, wrongly (Houssaye's "1815," p. 172).]
[Footnote 461: Pallain, "Correspondance de Louis XVIII avec
Talleyrand," pp. 307, 316.]
[Footnote 462: "Recollections," p. 16; "F.O.," France, No. 114. The
facts given above seem to me to refute the statements often made that
the allies violated the Elba arrangement and so justified his escape.
The facts prove that the allies sought to compel Louis XVIII. to pay
Napoleon the stipulated sum, and that the Emperor welcomed the
non-payment. His words to Lord Ebrington on December 6th breathe the
conviction that France would soon rise.]
[Footnote 463: Fleury de Chaboulon's "Mems.," vol. i., pp. 105-140;
Lafayette, vol. v., p. 355.]
[Footnote 464: Campbell's "Journal"; Peyrusse, "Mémorial," p. 275.]
[Footnote 465: Houssaye's "1815," p. 277.]
[Footnote 466: Guizot, "Mems.," ch. iii.; De Broglie, "Mems.," bk.
ii., ch. ii.; Fleury, vol. i., p. 259.]
[Footnote 467: Peyrusse, "Mémorial," p. 277.]
[Footnote 468: As Wellington pointed out ("Despatches," May 5th,
1815), the phrase "il s'est livré à la vindicte publique" denotes
public justice, _not_ public vengeance. At St. Helena, Napoleon told
Gourgaud that he came back _too soon_ from Elba, _believing that the
Congress had dissolved!_ (Gourgaud's "Journals," vol. ii., p. 323.)]
[Footnote 469: "Diary," April 15th and 18th, 1815.]
[Footnote 470: "Parl. Debates"; Romilly's "Diary," vol. ii., p. 360.]
[Footnote 471: Napoleon told Cockburn during his last voyage that he
bestowed this constitution, not because it was a wise measure, but as
a needful concession to popular feeling. The continental peoples were
not fit for representative government as England was ("Last Voyages of
Nap.," pp. 115, 137). So, too, he said to Gourgaud he was wrong in
summoning the Chambers at all "_especially as I meant to dismiss them
as soon as I was a conqueror_" (Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., p. 93).]
[Footnote 472: Mercer's "Waterloo Campaign," vol. i., p. 352. For
Fleury de Chaboulon's mission to sound Austria, see his "Mems.," vol.
ii., and Madelin's "Fouché," ch. xxv.]
[Footnote 473: In the "English Hist. Review" for July, 1901, I have
published the correspondence between Sir Hudson Lowe
(Quartermaster-General of our forces in Belgium up to May, 1815) and
Gneisenau, Müffling, and Kleist. These two last were _most reluctant_
to send forward Prussian troops into Belgium to guard the weak
frontier fortresses from a _coup de main_: but Lowe's arguments
prevailed, thus deciding the main features of the war.]
[Footnote 474: "F.O.," France, No. 116. On June 9th the Duke charged
Stuart, our envoy at Ghent, to defend this course, on the ground that
Blücher and he had many raw troops, and could not advance into France
with safety and invest fortresses until the Russians and Austrians
co-operated.]
[Footnote 475: Sir H. Vivian states ("Waterloo Letters," No. 70) that
the Duke intended to give a ball on June 21st, the anniversary of
Vittoria. See too Sir E. Wood's "Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign,"
ch. ii.]
[Footnote 476: "F.O.," France, No. 115. A French royalist sent a
report, dated June 1st, recommending "point d'engagement avec
Bonaparte.... Il faut user l'armée de Bonaparte: elle ne peut plus se
recruter."]
[Footnote 477: Ropes's "Campaign of Waterloo," ch. v.; Chesney,
"Waterloo Lectures," p. 100; Sir H. Maxwell's "Wellington" (vol. ii.,
p. 14); and O'Connor Morris, "Campaign of 1815," p. 97.]
[Footnote 478: Janin, "Campagne de Waterloo," p. 7.]
[Footnote 479: Pétiet, "Souvenirs militaires," p. 195.]
[Footnote 480: Credit is primarily due to Constant de Rebecque, a
Belgian, chief of staff to the Prince of Orange, for altering the
point of concentration from Nivelles, as ordered by Wellington, to
Quatre Bras; also to General Perponcher for supporting the new
movement. The Belgian side of the campaign has been well set forth by
Boulger in "The Belgians at Waterloo" (1901).]
[Footnote 481: Gourgaud, "Campagne de 1815," ch. iv.]
[Footnote 482: Houssaye, "1815," pp. 133-138, 186, notes.]
[Footnote 483: Hamley, "Operations of War," p. 187.]
[Footnote 484: For Gérard's delays see Houssaye, p. 158, and
Horsburgh, "Waterloo," p. 36. Napoleon's tardiness is scarcely noticed
by Houssaye or by Gourgaud; but it has been censured by Jomini,
Charras, Clausewitz, and Lord Wolseley.]
[Footnote 485: Ollech (p. 125) sees in it a conditional offer of help
to Blücher. But on what ground? It states that the Prince of Orange
has one division at Quatre Bras and other troops at Nivelles: that the
British reserve would reach Genappe at noon, and their cavalry
Nivelles at the same hour. How could Blücher hope for help from forces
so weak and scattered? See too Ropes (note to ch. x.). Horsburgh (ch.
v.) shows that Wellington believed his forces to be more to the front
than they were: he traces the error to De Lancey, chief of the staff.
But it is fair to add that Wellington thought very highly of De
Lancey, and after his death at Waterloo severely blamed subordinates.]
[Footnote 486: Stanhope, "Conversations," p. 109.]
[Footnote 487: Reiche, "Memoiren," vol. ii., p. 183.]
[Footnote 488: The term _corps_ is significant. Not till 3.15 did
Soult use the term _armée_ in speaking of Blücher's forces. The last
important sentence of the 2 p.m. despatch is not given by Houssaye (p.
159), but is printed by Ropes (p. 383), Siborne (vol. i., p. 453),
Charras (vol. i., p. 136), and Ollech (p. 131). It proves that _as
late as 2 p.m._ Napoleon expected an easy victory over the Prussians.]
[Footnote 489: The best authorities give the Prussians 87,000 men, and
the French 78,000; but the latter estimate includes the corps of
Lobau, 10,000 strong, which did not reach Fleurus till dark.]
[Footnote 490: I follow Houssaye's solution of this puzzle as the
least unsatisfacty, but it does not show why Napoleon should have been
so perplexed. D'Erlon debouched from the wood of Villers Perwin
_exactly where he might have been expected_. Was Napoleon puzzled
because the corps was heading south-east instead of east?]
[Footnote 491: Delbrück ("Gneisenau," vol. ii., p. 190) shows how the
storm favoured the attack.]
[Footnote 492: I here follow Delbrück's "Gneisenau" (vol. ii., p. 194)
and Charras (vol. i., p. 163). Reiche ("Mems.," vol ii., p. 193) says
that his corps of 30,800 men lost 12,480 on the 15th and 16th: he
notes that Blücher and Nostitz probably owed their escape to the
plainness of their uniforms and headgear.]
[Footnote 493: "Waterloo Letters," Nos. 163 and 169, prove that the
time was 3 p.m. and not 3.30; see also Kincaid's account in Fitchett's
"Wellington's Men" (p. 120).]
[Footnote 494: "Waterloo Letters," No. 169.]
[Footnote 495: See Houssaye, p. 205, for the sequence of these
events.]
[Footnote 496: Ollech, pp. 167-171. Colonel Basil Jackson, in his
"Waterloo and St. Helena" (printed for private circulation), p. 64,
states that he had been employed in examining and reporting on the
Belgian roads, and did so on the road leading south from Wavre. This
report had been sent to Gneisenau, and must have given him greater
confidence on the night of the 16th.]
[Footnote 497: O'Connor Morris, p. 176, approves Napoleon's criticism,
and censures Gneisenau's move on Wavre: but surely Wavre combined more
advantages than any other position. It was accessible for the whole
Prussian army (including Bülow); it was easily defensible (as the
event proved); and it promised a reunion with Wellington for the
defence of Brussels. Houssaye says (p. 233) that Gneisenau did not at
once foresee the immense consequences of his action. Of course he did
not, because he was not sure of Wellington; but he took all the steps
that might lead to immense consequences, if all went well.]
[Footnote 498: Müffling, "Passages," p. 238: Charras, vol. i., p. 226,
discredits it.]
[Footnote 499: Basil Jackson, _op. cit._, p. 24; Cotton, "A Voice from
Waterloo," p. 20.]
[Footnote 500: Grouchy suppressed this despatch, but it was published
in 1842.]
[Footnote 501: Mercer, vol. i., p. 270.]
[Footnote 502: Pétiet, "Souvenirs militaires," p. 204.]
[Footnote 503: Ropes, pp. 212, 246, 359. I follow the "received"
version of this despatch. For a comparison of it with the "Grouchy"
version see Horsburgh, p. 155, note.]
[Footnote 504: Ropes, pp. 266, 288; Houssaye, p. 316, with a good
note.]
[Footnote 505: Ollech, pp. 187-192; Delbrück's "Gneisenau," vol. ii.,
p. 205. I cannot credit the story told by Hardinge in 1837 to Earl
Stanhope ("Conversations," p. 110), that, on the night of the 16th
June, Gneisenau sought to dissuade Blücher from joining Wellington.
Hardinge only had the story at second hand, and wrongly assigns it to
Wavre. On the afternoon of the 17th Gneisenau ordered Ziethen _to keep
open communications with Wellington_ (Ollech, p. 170). The story that
Wellington rode over to Wavre on the night of the 18th on his horse
"Copenhagen" is of course a myth.]
[Footnote 506: "Blackwood's Magazine," October, 1896; "Cornhill,"
January, 1901.]
[Footnote 507: Beamish's "King's German Legion," vol. ii., p. 352. Sir
Hussey Vivian asserts that the allied position was by no means strong;
but General Kennedy, in his "Notes on Waterloo" (p. 68), pronounces it
"good and well occupied." A year previously Wellington noted it as a
good position. Sir Hudson Lowe then suggested that it should be
fortified: "Query, in respect to the construction of a work at Mt.
Jean, being the commanding point at the junction of two principal
chaussées" ("Unpublished Memoirs").]
[Footnote 508: Wellington has been censured by Clausewitz, Kennedy and
Chesney for leaving so large a force at Hal. Perhaps he desired to
protect the King of France at Ghent, though he was surely relieved of
responsibility by his despatch of June 18th, 3 a.m., begging the Duc
de Berri to retire with the King to Antwerp. It seems to me more
likely that he was so confident of an early advance of the Prussians
(see his other despatch of the same hour and Sir A. Frazer's
statement--"Letters," p. 553--"We expected the Prussian co-operation
early in the day") as to assume that Napoleon would stake all on an
effort against his right; and in that case the Hal force would have
crushed the French rear, though it was very far off.]
[Footnote 509: Wellington to Earl Bathurst, June 25th, 1815. The Earl
of Ellesmere, who wrote under the Duke's influence, stated that not
more than 7,000 of the British troops had seen a shot fired. This is
incorrect. Picton's division, still 5,000 strong, was almost wholly
composed of tried troops; and Lambert's brigade counted 2,200
veterans; many of the Guards had seen fire, and the 52nd was a
seasoned regiment. Tomkinson (p. 296) reckons all the 5,220 British
and 1,730 King's German troopers as "efficient," and Wellington
himself, so Mercer affirms, told Blücher he had 6,000 of the finest
cavalry in the world.]
[Footnote 510: "A British Rifleman," p. 367.]
[Footnote 511: I distrust the story told by Zenowicz, and given by
Thiers, that Napoleon at 10 a.m. was awaiting Grouchy with impatience;
also Marbot's letter referred to in his "Memoirs," _ad fin._, in which
he says the Emperor bade him push on boldly towards Wavre, as the
troops near St. Lambert "could be nothing else than the corps of
Grouchy." Grouchy's despatch and the official reply show that Napoleon
knew Grouchy to be somewhere between Gembloux and Wavre. Besides,
Bülow's report (Ollech, p. 192) states that, while at St. Lambert, he
sent out two strong patrols to the S.W., and was not observed by the
French, "who appeared to have no idea of our existence." This
completely disposes of Marbot's story.]
[Footnote 512: Houssaye, ch. vii. In the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for
October, 1900, p. 815, Mr. H. George gives a proof of this, citing the
time it took him to pace the roads by which Grouchy might have
advanced.]
[Footnote 513 "Waterloo Letters," pp. 60-63, 70-77, 81-84, 383. The
whole brigade was hardly 1,000 sabres strong. Sir E. Wood, pp.
126-146; Siborne, vol. ii., pp. 20-45.]
[Footnote 514: Houssaye, pp. 354, 499, admits the repulse.]
[Footnote 515 B. Jackson, p. 34. Müffling says the defaulters numbered
10,000! While sympathizing with the efforts of Dutch-Belgian writers
on behalf of their kin, I must accept Jackson's evidence as conclusive
here. See also Mr. Oman's article in "Nineteenth Century," Oct.,
1900.]
[Footnote 516: B. Jackson, p. 35; "Waterloo Letters," pp. 129-144,
296; Cotton, p. 79.]
[Footnote 517: Houssaye, pp. 365, 371-376; Kennedy, pp. 117-120;
Mercer, vol. i., pp. 311-324.]
[Footnote 518: Gourgaud (ch. vi.) states that the time of Lobau's move
was 4.30, though he had reconnoitred on his right earlier. Napoleon's
statements on this head at St. Helena are conflicting. One says that
Lobau moved at 1.30, another at 4.30. Perhaps Janin's statement
explains why Lobau did nothing definite till the later hour.]
[Footnote 519: Baring's account ("King's German Legion," App. xxi.)
shows that the farm was taken about the time of the last great cavalry
charge. Kennedy (p. 122) and Ompteda (_ad fin._) are equally explicit;
and the evidence of the French archives adduced by Houssaye (p. 378)
places the matter beyond doubt.]
[Footnote 520: Ollech, pp. 243-246. Reiche's exorbitant claims (vol.
ii., pp. 209-215) are refuted by "Waterloo Letters," p. 22.]
[Footnote 521: Lacoste (Decoster), Napoleon's Flemish guide, told this
to Sir W. Scott, "Life of Napoleon," vol. viii., p. 496.]
[Footnote 522: See Boulger's "The Belgians at Waterloo" (1901), p.
33.]
[Footnote 523: The formation and force of the French Guards in this
attack have been much discussed. Thiers omits all notice of the second
column; Houssaye limits its force to a single battalion, but his
account is not convincing. On p. 385 he says nine battalions of the
Guard advanced into the valley, but, on p. 389, he accounts only for
six. Other authorities agree that eight joined in the attack. As to
their formation, Houssaye advances many proofs that it was in hollow
squares. Here is one more. On the 19th Basil Jackson rode along the
slope and ridge near the back of Hougoumont and talked with some of
the wounded of the Imperial Guard. "As they lay they formed large
squares, of which the centres were hollow" (p. 57). Maitland
("Waterloo Letters," p. 244.) says: "There was one great column at
first, which separated into two parts." Gawler (p. 292) adds that:
"The second column was subdivided in two parts, close together, and
that _its whole flank was much longer than the front of our 52nd
regiment_." It is difficult to reconcile all this with the attack in
hollow squares; but probably the squares (or oblongs?) followed each
other so closely as to seem like a serried column. None of our men
could see whether the masses were solid or hollow, but naturally
assumed them to be solid, and hence greatly over-estimated their
strength. A column made up of hollow squares is certainly an odd
formation, but perhaps is not unsuitable to withstand cavalry and
overthrow infantry.
I cannot accept Houssaye's statement (p. 393) that the French squares
attacked our front at four different places, from the 52nd regiment on
our right to the Brunswickers in our centre, a quarter of a mile to
the east. The only evidence that favours this is Macready's ("Waterloo
Letters," p. 330); he says that the men who attacked his square (30th
and 73rd regiments) were of the Middle Guard; for their wounded said
so; but Kelly, of the same square, thought they were Donzelot's men,
who certainly attacked there. Siborne, seemingly on the strength of
Macready's statement, says that part of the Guards' column diverged
thither: but this is unlikely. Is it credible that the Guards, less
than 4,000 strong, should have spread their attacks over a quarter of
a mile of front? Was not the column the usual method of attack? I
submit, then, that my explanation of the Guard attacking in hollow
oblongs, formed in two chief columns, harmonizes the known facts. See
Petit's "Relation" in "Eng. Hist. Rev.," April, 1903.]
[Footnote 524: Janin, p. 45.]
[Footnote 525: Bertrand at St. Helena said he _heard_ Michel utter
these words (Montholon, vol. iii., ch. iv.).]
[Footnote 526: Maitland's "Narrative," p. 222. Basil Jackson, who knew
Gourgaud well at St. Helena, learnt from him that he could not finish
his account of Waterloo, "as Napoleon could never decide on the best
way of ending the great battle: that he (Gourgaud) had suggested no
less than six different ways, but none were satisfactory" ("Waterloo
and St. Helena," p, 102). Gourgaud's "Journal" shows that Napoleon
blamed in turn the rain, Ney, Grouchy, Vandamme, Guyot, and Soult; but
he ends--"it was a fatality; for in spite of all, I should have won
that battle."]
[Footnote 527: "Lettres inédites de Napoléon."]
[Footnote 528: Gourgaud, "Journal inédit de Ste. Hélène," vol. ii., p.
321, small edit.]
[Footnote 529: Lucien, "Mems.," vol. iii., p. 327.]
[Footnote 530: Stuart's despatch of June 28th, "F.O.," France, No.
117; Gneisenau to Müffling, June 27th, "Passages," App.]
[Footnote 531: Croker ("Papers," vol. iii., p. 67) had this account
from Jaucourt, who had it from Becker.]
[Footnote 532: Ollech, pp. 350-360. The French cavalry success near
Versailles was due to exceptional circumstances.]
[Footnote 533: Maitland's "Narrative," pp. 23-39, disproves Thiers'
assertion that Napoleon was not expected there. Maitland's letter of
July 10th to Hotham ("F.O.," France, No. 126, not in the "Narrative")
ends: "It appears to me from the anxiety the bearers express to get
away, that they are very hard pressed by the Government at Paris."
Hotham's instructions of July 8th to Maitland were most stringent. See
my Essay in "Napoleonic Studies" (1904).]
[Footnote 534: The date of the letter disproves Las Cases' statement
that it was written _after_ his second interview with Maitland, and
_in consequence of_ the offers Maitland had made!
Napoleon's reference to Themistocles has been much admired. But why?
The Athenian statesman was found to have intrigued with Persia against
Athens in time of peace; he fled to the Persian monarch and was richly
rewarded _as a renegade_. No simile could have been less felicitous.]
[Footnote 535: "Narrative," p. 244. [This work has been republished by
Messrs. Blackwood, 1904.]]
[Footnote 536: "F.O.," France, No. 126; Allardyce, "Mems. of Lord
Keith."]
[Footnote 537: Maitland, pp. 206, 239-242; Montholon, vol. i., ch.
iii.]
[Footnote 538: "Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. ii., pp.
434,438. Beatson's Mem. is in "F.O.," France, No. 123. This and other
facts refute Lord Holland's statement ("Foreign Reminiscences," p.
196) that the Government was treating for the transfer of St. Helena
from the East India Company _early in_ 1815.--Why does Lord Rosebery,
"Napoleon: last Phase," p. 58, write that Lord Liverpool thought that
Napoleon should either (1) be handed over to Louis XVIII. to be
treated as a rebel; or (2) treated as vermin; or (3) that we would
(regretfully) detain him? In his letters to Castlereagh at Paris,
Liverpool expressly says it would be better for us, rather than any
other Power, to detain him, and writes not a word about treating him
as vermin. Lord Rosebery is surely aware that our Government and
Wellington did their best _to preclude the possibility of the
Prussians treating him as vermin_.]
[Footnote 539: Keith's letter of August 1st, in "F.O.," France, No.
123: "The General and many of his suite have an idea that if they
could but put foot on shore, no power could remove them, and they are
determined to make the attempt if at all possible: they are becoming
most refractory."]