CHAPTER XLII

CLOSING YEARS

After a voyage of sixty-seven days the exiles sighted St.

Helena--"that black wart rising out of the ocean," as Surgeon Henry

calls it. Blank dismay laid hold of the more sensitive as they gazed

at those frowning cliffs. What Napoleon's feelings were we know not.

Watchful curiosity seemed to be uppermost; for as they drew near to

Jamestown, he minutely scanned the forts through a glass. Arrangements

having been made for his reception, he landed in the evening of the

17th October, so as to elude the gaze of the inhabitants, and entered

a house prepared for him in the town.

On the morrow he was up at dawn, and rode with Cockburn and Bertrand

to Longwood, the residence of the Lieutenant-Governor. The orders of

our East India Company, to which the island then belonged, forbade his

appropriation of Plantation House, the Governor's residence; and a

glance at the accompanying map will show the reason of this

prohibition. This house is situated not far from creeks that are

completely sheltered from the south-east trade winds, whence escape by

boat would be easy; whereas Longwood is nearer the surf-beaten side

and offers far more security. After conferring with Governor Wilks and

others, Cockburn decided on this residence.

"At Longwood," wrote Cockburn, "an extent of level ground, easily

to be secured by sentries, presents itself, perfectly adapted for

horse exercise, carriage exercise, or for pleasant walking, which

is not to be met with in all the other parts of the island. The

house is certainly small; but ... I trust the carpenters of the

'Northumberland' will in a little time be able to make such

additions to the house as will render it, if not as good as might

be wished, yet at least as commodious as necessary."[553]

[Illustration: ST. HELENA]

"Napoleon," wrote Glover, "seemed well satisfied with the situation of

Longwood, and expressed a desire to occupy it as soon as possible." As

he disliked the publicity of the house in Jamestown, Cockburn

suggested on their return that he should reside at a pretty little

bungalow, not far from the town, named "The Briars." He readily

assented, and took up his abode there for seven weeks, occupying a

small adjoining annexe, while Las Cases and his son established

themselves in the two garrets. A marquee was erected to serve as

dining-room. It was a narrow space for the lord of the Tuileries, but

he seems to have been not unhappy. There he dictated Memoranda to Las

Cases or Gourgaud in the mornings, and often joined the neighbouring

family of the Balcombes for dinner and the evening. Mr. Balcombe, an

elderly merchant, was appointed purveyor to the party; he and his wife

were most hospitable, and their two daughters, of fifteen and fourteen

years, frequently beguiled Napoleon's evening hours with games of

whist or naïve questions. On one supreme occasion, in order to please

the younger girl, Napoleon played at blindman's buff; at such times

she ventured to call him "Boney"; and, far from taking offence at this

liberty, he delighted in her glee. It is such episodes as these that

reveal the softer traits of his character, which the dictates of

policy had stunted but not eradicated.[554]

In other respects, the time at "The Briars" was dull and monotonous,

and he complained bitterly to Cockburn of the inadequate

accommodation. The most exciting times were on the arrival of

newspapers from Europe. The reports just to hand of riots in England

and royalist excesses in France fed his hopes of general disorders or

revolutions which might lead to his recall. He believed the Jacobins

would yet lord it over the Continent. "It is only I who can tame

them."

Equally noteworthy are his comments on the trials of Labédoyère and

Ney for their treason to Louis XVIII. He has little pity for them.

"One ought never to break one's word," he remarked to Gourgaud, "and I

despise traitors." On hearing that Labédoyère was condemned to death,

he at first shows more feeling: but he comes round to the former view:

"Labédoyère acted like a man without honour," and "Ney dishonoured

himself."[555]

We may hereby gauge the value which Napoleon laid on fidelity. For him

it is the one priceless virtue. He esteems those who staunchly oppose

him, and seeks to gain them over by generosity: for those who _come

over_ he ever has a secret contempt; for those who desert him, hatred.

Doubtless that is why he heard the news of Ney's execution unmoved.

Brilliantly brave as the Marshal was, he had abandoned him in 1814,

and Louis XVIII. in the Hundred Days. The tidings of Murat's miserable

fate, at the close of his mad expedition to Calabria, leave Napoleon

equally cold.--"I announce the fatal news," writes Gourgaud, "to His

Majesty, whose expression remains unchanged, and who says that Murat

must have been mad to attempt a venture like that."--Here again his

thoughts seem to fly back to Murat's defection in 1814. Later on, he

says he loved him for his brilliant bravery, and therefore pardoned

his numerous follies. But his present demeanour shows that he never

forgave that of 1814.[556]

Meanwhile, thanks to the energy of Cockburn and his sailors, Longwood

was ready for the party (December 9th, 1815), and the Admiral hoped

that their complaints would cease. The new abode contained five rooms

for Napoleon's use, three for the Montholons, two for the Las Cases,

and one for Gourgaud: it was situated on a plateau 1,730 feet above

the sea: the air there was bracing, and on the farther side of the

plain dotted with gum trees stretched the race-course, a mile and a

half of excellent turf. The only obvious drawbacks were the occasional

mists, and the barren precipitous ravines that flank the plateau on

all sides. Seeing, however, that Napoleon disliked the publicity of

Jamestown, the isolation of Longwood could hardly be alleged as a

serious grievance. The Bertrands occupied Hutt's Gate, a small villa

about a mile distant.

The limits within which Napoleon might take exercise unaccompanied by

a British officer formed a roughly triangular space having a

circumference of about twelve miles. Outside of those bounds he must

be so accompanied; and if a strange ship came in sight, he was to

return within bounds. The letters of the whole party must be

supervised by the acting Governor. This is the gist of the official

instructions. Napoleon's dislike of being accompanied by a British

officer led him nearly always to restrict himself to the limits and

generally to the grounds of Longwood.

And where, we may ask, could a less unpleasant place of detention have

been found? In Europe he must inevitably have submitted to far closer

confinement. For what safeguards could there have been proof against a

subtle intellect and a personality whose charm fired thousands of

braves in both hemispheres with the longing to start him once more on

his adventures? The Tower of London, the eyrie of Dumbarton Castle,

even Fort William itself, were named as possible places of detention.

Were they suited to this child of the Mediterranean? He needed sun; he

needed exercise; he needed society. All these he could have on the

plateau of Longwood, in a singularly equable climate, where the heat

of the tropics is assuaged by the south-east trade wind, and plants of

the sub-tropical and temperate zones alike flourish.[557]

But nothing pleased the exiles. They moped during the rains; they

shuddered at the yawning ravines; they groaned at the sight of the

red-coats; above all, they realized that escape was hopeless in face

of Cockburn's watchful care. His first steps on arriving at the island

were to send on to the Cape seventy-five foreigners whose presence was

undesirable. He also despatched the "Peruvian" to hoist the British

flag on the uninhabited island, Ascension, in order, as he wrote to

the Admiralty, "to prevent America or any other nation from planting

themselves [_sic_] there ... for the purpose of favouring sooner or

later the escape of General Bonaparte." Four ships of war were also

kept at St. Helena, and no merchantmen but those of the East India

Company were to touch there except under stress of weather or when in

need of water.

These precautions early provoked protests from the exiles. Bertrand

had no wish to draw them up in the trenchant style that the ex-Emperor

desired; but Gourgaud's "Journal" shows that he was driven on to the

task (November 5th). It only led to a lofty rejoinder from Cockburn,

in which he declined to relax his system, but expressed the wish to

render their situation "as little disagreeable as possible." On

December 21st, Montholon returned to the charge with a letter dictated

by Napoleon, complaining that Longwood was the most barren spot on the

island, always deluged with rain or swathed in mist; that O'Meara was

not to count as a British officer when they went beyond the limits,

and had been reprimanded by the Admiral for thus acting; and that the

treatment of the exiles would excite the indignation of all times and

all people. To this the Admiral sent a crushing rejoinder, declining

to explain why he had censured O'Meara or any other British subject:

he asserted that Longwood was "the most pleasant as well as the most

healthy spot of this most healthful island," expressed the hope that,

when the rains had ceased, the party would change their opinion of

Longwood, and declared that the treatment of the party would "obtain

the admiration of future ages, as well as of every unprejudiced person

of the present."

We now know that the Admiral's trust in the judicial impartiality of

future ages was a piece of touching credulity, and that the next

generation, like his own, was greedily to swallow sensational slander

and to neglect the prosaic truth. But, arguing from present signs, he

might well believe that Montholon's letter was a tissue of falsehoods;

for that officer soon confessed to him that "it was written in a

moment of petulance of the General [Bonaparte] ... and that he

[Montholon] considered the party to be in point of fact vastly well

off and to have everything necessary for them, though anxious that

there should be no restrictions as to the General going unattended by

an officer wherever he pleased throughout the island."[558] On the

last point Cockburn was inflexible.

The Admiral's responsibility was now nearly at an end. On April 14th,

1816, there landed at St. Helena Sir Hudson Lowe, the new Governor,

who was to take over the powers wielded both by Cockburn and Wilks.

The new arrival, on whom the storms of calumny were thenceforth

persistently to beat, had served with distinction in many parts. Born

in 1769, within one month of Napoleon, he early entered our army, and

won his commission by service in Corsica and Elba, his linguistic and

military gifts soon raising him to the command of a corps of Corsican

exiles who after 1795 enlisted in our service. With these "Corsican

Rangers" Lowe campaigned in Egypt and finally at Capri, their devotion

to him nerving them to a gallant but unavailing defence of this islet

against a superior force of Murat's troops in 1808.[559] In 1810 Lowe

and his Corsicans captured the Isle of Santa Maura, which he

thereafter governed to the full satisfaction of the inhabitants. Early

in 1813 he was ordered to Russia, and thereafter served as _attaché_

on Blücher's staff in the memorable advance to the Rhine and the

Seine. He brought the news of Napoleon's first abdication to England,

was knighted by the Prince Regent, and received Russian and Prussian

orders of distinction for his services. At the close of 1814 he was

appointed Quartermaster-General of our forces in the Netherlands and

received flattering letters of congratulation from Blücher and

Gneisenau, the latter expressing his appreciation of "Your rare

military talents, your profound judgment on the great operations of

war, and your imperturbable _sang froid_ in the day of battle. These

rare qualities and your honourable character will link me to you

eternally." In 1822, when O'Meara was slandering Lowe's character, the

Czar Alexander met his step-daughter, the Countess Balmain, at Verona,

and in reference to Sir Hudson's painful duties at St. Helena, said of

him: "Je l'estime beaucoup. Je l'ai connu dans les temps

critiques."[560]

Lowe's firmness of character, command of foreign languages, and

intimate acquaintance with Corsicans, seemed to mark him out as the

ideal Governor of St. Helena in place of the mild and scholarly Wilks.

And yet the appointment was in some ways unfortunate. Though a man of

sterling worth, Lowe was reserved, and had little acquaintance with

the ways of courtiers. Moreover, the superstitious might deem that all

the salient events of his career proclaimed him an evil genius dogging

the steps of Napoleon; and, as superstition laid increasing hold on

the great Corsican in his later years, we may reasonably infer that

this feeling intensified, if it did not create, the repugnance which

he ever manifested to _la figure sinistre_ of the Governor. Lowe also

at first shrank from an appointment that must bring on him the

intrigues of Napoleon and of his partisans in England. Only a man of

high rank and commanding influence could hope to live down such

attacks; and Lowe had neither rank nor influence. He was the son of an

army surgeon, and was almost unknown in the country which for

twenty-eight years he had served abroad.

His first visits to Longwood were unfortunate. Cockburn and he

arranged to go at 9 a.m., the time when Napoleon frequently went for a

drive. On their arrival they were informed that the Emperor was

indisposed and could not see them until 4 p.m. of the next day, and it

soon appeared that the early hour of their call was taken as an act of

rudeness. On the following afternoon Lowe and Cockburn arranged to go

in together to the presence; but as Lowe advanced to the chamber,

Bertrand stepped forward, and a valet prevented the Admiral's

entrance, an act of incivility which Lowe did not observe. Proceeding

alone, the new Governor offered his respects in French; but on

Napoleon remarking that he must know Italian, for he had commanded a

regiment of Corsicans, they conversed in Napoleon's mother-tongue. The

ex-Emperor's first serious observation, which bore on the character of

the Corsicans, was accompanied by a quick searching glance: "They

carry the stiletto: are they not a bad people?"--Lowe saw the snare

and evaded it by the reply: "They do not carry the stiletto, having

abandoned that custom in our service: I was very well satisfied with

them." They then conversed a short time about Egypt and other topics.

Napoleon afterwards contrasted him favourably with Cockburn: "This new

Governor is a man of very few words, but he appears to be a polite

man: however, it is only from a man's conduct for some time that you

can judge of him."[561]

Cockburn was indignant at the slight put upon him by Napoleon and

Bertrand, which succeeded owing to Lowe's want of ready perception;

but he knew that the cause of the exiles' annoyance was his recent

firm refusal to convey Napoleon's letter of complaint direct to the

Prince Regent, without the knowledge of the Ministry. Failing to bend

the Admiral, they then sought to cajole the retiring Governor, Wilks,

who, having borne little of the responsibility of their custody, was

proportionately better liked. First Bertrand, and then Napoleon,

requested him to take this letter _without the knowledge of the new

Governor_. Wilks at once repelled the request, remarking to Bertrand

that such attempts at evasion must lead to greater stringency in the

future. And this was the case.[562] The incident naturally increased

Lowe's suspicion of the ex-Emperor.

At first there was an uneasy truce between them. Gourgaud, though cast

down at the departure of the "adorable" Miss Wilks, found strength

enough to chronicle in his "Journal" the results of a visit paid by

Las Cases to Lowe at Plantation House (April 26th): the Governor

received the secretary very well and put all his library at the

disposal of the party; but the diarist also notes that Napoleon took

amiss the reception of any of his people by the Governor. This had

been one of the unconscious crimes of the Admiral. With the hope of

brightening the sojourn of the exiles, he had given several balls, at

which Mmes. Bertrand and Montholon shone resplendent in dresses that

cast into the shade those of the officers' wives. Their triumph was

short-lived. When _la grande Maréchale_ ventured to desert the

Emperor's table on these and other festive occasions, her growing

fondness for the English drew on her sharp rebukes from the ex-Emperor

and a request not to treat Longwood as if it were an inn.[563] Many

jottings in Gourgaud's diary show that the same policy was thenceforth

strictly maintained. Napoleon kept up the essentials of Tuileries

etiquette, required the attendance of his courtiers, and jealously

checked any familiarity with Plantation House or Jamestown.

On some questions Lowe was more pliable than the home Government,

notably in the matter of the declarations signed by Napoleon's

followers. But in one matter he was proof against all requests from

Longwood: this was the extension of the twelve-mile limit. It

afterwards became the custom to speak as if Lowe could have granted

this. Even the Duke of Wellington declared to Stanhope that he

considered Lowe a stupid man, suspicious and jealous, who might very

well have let Napoleon go freely about the island provided that the

six or seven landing-places were well guarded and that Napoleon showed

himself to a British officer every night and morning. Now, it is

futile to discuss whether such liberty would have enabled Napoleon to

pass off as someone else and so escape. What is certain is that our

Government, believing he could so escape, _imposed rules which Lowe

was not free to relax_.

Napoleon realized this perfectly well, but in the interview of April

30th, 1816, he pressed Lowe for an extension of the limits, saying

that he hated the sight of our soldiers and longed for closer

intercourse with the inhabitants. Other causes of friction occurred,

such as Lowe's withdrawal of the privilege, rather laxly granted by

Cockburn to Bertrand, of granting passes for interviews with Napoleon;

or again a tactless invitation that Lowe sent to "General Bonaparte"

to meet the wife of the Governor-General of India at dinner at

Plantation House. But in the midst of the diatribe which Napoleon

shortly afterwards shot forth at his would-be host--a diatribe

besprinkled with taunts that Lowe was sent to be his

_executioner_--there came a sentence which reveals the cause of his

fury: "If you cannot extend my limits, you can do nothing for

me."[564]

Why this wish for wider limits? It did not spring from a desire for

longer drives; for the plateau offered nearly all the best ground in

the island for such exercise. Neither was it due to a craving for

wider social intercourse. There can be little doubt that he looked on

an extension of limits as a necessary prelude to attempts at escape

and as a means of influencing the slaves at the outlying plantations.

Gourgaud names several instances of gold pieces being given to slaves,

and records the glee shown by his master on once slipping away from

the sentries and the British officer. These feelings and attempts were

perfectly natural on Napoleon's part; but it was equally natural that

the Governor should regard them as part of a plan of escape or

rescue--a matter that will engage our closer attention presently.

Napoleon had only two more interviews with Lowe namely, on July 17th

and August 18th. In the former of these he was more conciliatory; but

in the latter, at which Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm was present, he

assailed the Governor with the bitterest taunts. Lowe cut short the

painful scene by saying: "You make me smile, sir." "How smile, sir?"

"You force me to smile: your misconception of my character and the

rudeness of your manners excite my pity. I wish you good day." The

Admiral also retired.[565]

Various causes have been assigned for the hatred that Napoleon felt

for Lowe. His frequents taunts that he was no general, but only a

leader of Corsican deserters, suggests one that has already been

referred to. It has also been suggested that Lowe was not a gentleman,

and references have been approvingly made to comparisons of his

physiognomy with that of the devil, and of his eye with "that of a

hyæna caught in a trap." As to this we will cite the opinion of

Lieutenant (later Colonel) Basil Jackson, who was unknown to Lowe

before 1816, and was on friendly terms with the inmates both of

Longwood and of Plantation House:

"He [Lowe] stood five feet seven, spare in make, having good

features, fair hair, and eyebrows overhanging his eyes: his look

denoted penetration and firmness, his manner rather abrupt, his

gait quick, his look and general demeanour indicative of energy

and decision. He wrote or dictated rapidly, and was fond of

writing, was well read in military history, spoke French and

Italian with fluency, was warm and steady in his friendships, and

popular both with the inhabitants of the isle and the troops. His

portrait, prefixed to Mr. Forsyth's book, is a perfect

likeness."[566]

If overhanging eyebrows, a penetrating glance, and rather abrupt

manners be thought to justify comparisons with the devil or a hyæna,

the art of historical portraiture will assuredly have to be learnt

over again in conformity with impressionist methods. That Lowe was a

gentleman is affirmed by Mrs. Smith (_née_ Grant), who, in later

years, _when prejudiced against him by O'Meara's slanders_, met him at

Colombo without at first knowing his name:

"I was taken in to dinner by a grave, particularly gentlemanly

man, in a General's uniform, whose conversation was as agreeable

as his manner. He had been over half the world, knew all

celebrities, and contrived without display to say a great deal one

was willing to hear.... Years before, with our Whig principles and

prejudices, we had cultivated in our Highland retirement a horror

of the great Napoleon's gaoler. The cry of party, the feeling for

the prisoner, the book of Surgeon O'Meara, had all worked my

woman's heart to such a pitch of indignation that this maligned

name [Lowe] was an offence. We were to hold the owner in

abhorrence. Speak to him, never! Look at him, sit in the same room

with him, never! None were louder than I, more vehement; yet here

was I beside my bugbear and perfectly satisfied with my position.

It was a good lesson."[567]

The real cause of Napoleon's hatred of Lowe is hinted at by Sir George

Bingham in his Diary (April 19th). After mentioning Napoleon's

rudeness to Cockburn on parting with him, he proceeds:

"You have no idea of the dirty little intrigues of himself

[Napoleon] and his set: if Sir H. Lowe has firmness enough not to

give way to them, he will in a short time treat him in the same

manner. For myself, it is said I am a favourite [of Napoleon],

though I do not understand the claim I have to such."[568]

Yes! Lowe's offence lay not in his manners, not even in his features,

but in his firmness. Napoleon soon saw that all his efforts to bend

him were in vain. Neither in regard to the Imperial title, nor the

limits, nor the transmission of letters to Europe, would the Governor

swerve a hair's breadth from his instructions. At the risk of giving a

surfeit of quotations, we must cite two more on this topic. Basil

Jackson, when at Paris in 1828, chanced to meet Montholon, and was

invited to his Château de Frémigny; during his stay the conversation

turned upon their sojourn at St. Helena, to the following effect:

"He [Montholon] enlarged upon what he termed _la politique de

Longwood_, spoke not unkindly of Sir Hudson Lowe, allowing he had

a difficult task to execute, since an angel from Heaven, as

Governor, could not have pleased them. When I more than hinted

that nothing could justify detraction and departure from truth in

carrying out a policy, he merely shrugged his shoulders and

reiterated: '_C'était notre politique; et que voulez-vous?_' That

he and the others respected Sir Hudson Lowe, I had not the shadow

of a doubt: nay, in a conversation with Montholon at St. Helena,

when speaking of the Governor, he observed that Sir Hudson was an

officer who would always have distinguished employment, as all

Governments were glad of the services of a man of his calibre.

"Happening to mention that, owing to his inability to find an

officer who could understand and speak French, the Governor was

disposed to employ me as orderly officer at Longwood, Montholon

said it was well for me that I was not appointed to the post, as

they did not want a person in that capacity who could understand

them; in fact, he said, we should have found means to get rid of

you, and perhaps ruined you."[569]

Las Cases also, _in a passage that he found it desirable to suppress

when he published his "Journal"_ wrote as follows (November 30th,

1815):

"We are possessed of moral arms only: and in order to make the

most advantageous use of these it was necessary to reduce into _a

system_ our demeanour, our words, our sentiments, _even our

privations_, in order that we might thereby excite a lively

interest in a large portion of the population of Europe, and that

the Opposition in England might not fail to attack the Ministry on

the violence of their conduct towards us."[570]

We are now able to understand the real nature of the struggle that

went on between Longwood and Plantation House. Napoleon and his

followers sought by every means to bring odium upon Lowe, and to

furnish the Opposition at Westminster with toothsome details that

might lead to the disgrace of the Governor, the overthrow of the

Ministry, and the triumphant release of the ex-Emperor. On the other

hand, the knowledge of the presence of traitors on the island, and of

possible rescuers hovering about on the horizon, kept Lowe ever at

work "unravelling the intricate plotting constantly going on at

Longwood," until his face wore the preoccupied worried look that

Surgeon Henry describes.

That both antagonists somewhat overacted their parts does not surprise

us when we think of the five years thus spent within a narrow space

and under a tropical sun. Lowe was at times pedantic, witness his

refusal to forward to Longwood books inscribed to the "Emperor

Napoleon," and his suspicions as to the political significance of

green and white beans offered by Montholon to the French Commissioner,

Montchenu. But such incidents can be paralleled from the lives of most

officials who bear a heavy burden of responsibility. And who has ever

borne a heavier burden?[571]

Napoleon also, in his calmer moods, regretted the violence of his

language to the Governor. He remarked to Montholon: "This is the

second time in my life that I have spoilt my affairs with the English.

Their phlegm leads me on, and I say more than I ought. I should have

done better not to have replied to him." This reference to his attack

on Whitworth in 1803 flashes a ray of light on the diatribe against

Lowe. In both cases, doubtless, the hot southron would have bridled

his passion sooner, had it produced any visible effect on the colder

man of the north. Nevertheless, the scene of August 18th, 1816, had an

abiding influence on his relations with the Governor. For the rest of

that weary span of years they never exchanged a word.

Lowe's official reports prove that he did not cease to consult the

comfort of the exiles as far as it was possible. The building of the

new house, however, remained in abeyance, as Napoleon refused to give

any directions on the subject: and the much-needed repairs to Longwood

were stopped owing to his complaints of the noise of the workmen. But

by ordering the claret that the ex-Emperor preferred, and by sending

occasional presents of game to Longwood, Lowe sought to keep up the

ordinary civilities of life; and when the home Government sought to

limit the annual cost of the Longwood household to £8,000, Lowe took

upon himself to increase that sum by one half.

Napoleon's behaviour in this last affair is noteworthy. On hearing of

the need for greater economy, he readily assented, sent away seven

servants, and ordered a reduction in the consumption of wine. A day or

two later, however, he gave orders that some of his silver plate

should be sold in order "to provide those little comforts denied

them." Balcombe was accordingly sent for, and, on expressing regret to

Napoleon at the order for sale, received the reply: "_What is the use

of plate when you have nothing to eat off it?_" Lowe quietly directed

Balcombe to seal up the plate sent to him, and to advance money up to

its value (£250); but other portions of the plate were broken and sold

later on. O'Meara reveals the reason for these proceedings in his

letter of October 10th: "In this he [Napoleon] has also a wish to

excite odium against the Governor by saying that he has been obliged

to sell his plate in order to provide against starvation, _as he

himself told me was his object_."[572]

Another incident that embittered the relations between Napoleon and

the Governor was the arrival from England of more stringent

regulations for his custody. The chief changes thus brought about

(October 9th, 1816) were a restriction of the limits from a

twelve-mile to an eight-mile circumference and the posting of a ring

of sentries at a slight distance from Longwood at sunset instead of at

9 p.m.[573] The latter change is to be regretted; for it marred the

pleasure of Napoleon's evening strolls in his garden; but, as the

Governor pointed out, the three hours after sunset had been the

easiest time for escape. The restriction of limits was needful, not

only in order to save our troops the labour of watching a wide area

that was scarcely ever used for exercise, but also to prevent

underhand intercourse with slaves.

Was there really any need for these "nation-degrading" rules, as

O'Meara called them? Or were they imposed in order to insult the great

man? A reference to the British archives will show that there was some

reason for them. Schemes of rescue were afoot that called for the

greatest vigilance.

As we have seen (page 527, note), a letter had on August 2nd, 1815,

been directed to Mme. Bertrand (really for Napoleon) at Plymouth,

stating that the writer had placed sums of money with well-known firms

of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charlestown on his behalf, and

that he (Napoleon) had only to make known his wishes "_avec le thé de

la Chine ou les mousselines de l'Inde_": for the rest, the writer

hoped much from English merchantmen. This letter, after wide

wanderings, fell into our hands and caused our Government closely to

inspect all letters and merchandise that passed into, or out of, St.

Helena. Its attention was directed specially to the United States.

There the Napoleonic cult had early taken root, thanks to his

overthrow of the kings and his easy sale of Louisiana; the glorifying

haze of distance fostered its growth; and now the martyrdom of St.

Helena brought it to full maturity. Enthusiasm and money alike

favoured schemes of rescue.

In our St. Helena Records (No. 4) are reports as to two of them.

Forwarded by the Spanish Ambassador at Washington, the first reached

Madrid on May 9th, 1816, and stated that a man named Carpenter had

offered to Joseph Bonaparte (then in the States) to rescue Napoleon,

and had set sail on a ship for that purpose. This was at once made

known to Lord Bathurst, our Minister for War and the Plantations, who

forwarded it to Lowe. In August of that year our Foreign Office also

received news that four schooners and other smaller vessels had set

sail from Baltimore on June 14th with 300 men under an old French

naval officer, named Fournier, ostensibly to help Bolivar, but really

to rescue Bonaparte. These fast-sailing craft were to lie out of sight

of the island by day, creep up at night to different points, and send

boats to shore; from each of these a man, _in English uniform_, was to

land and proceed to Longwood, warning Napoleon of the points where the

boats would be ready to receive him. The report concludes:

"Considerable sums in gold and diamonds will be put at his disposal to

bribe those who may be necessary to him. They seem to flatter

themselves of a certain co-operation on the part of certain

individuals domiciled or employed at St. Helena."[574]

Bathurst sent on to Lowe a copy of this intelligence. Forsyth does not

name the affair, though he refers to other warnings, received at

various times by Bathurst and forwarded to the Governor, that there

were traitors in the island who had been won over by Napoleon's gold

to aid his escape.[575] I cannot find out that the plans described

above were put to the test, though suspicious vessels sometimes

appeared and were chased away by our cruisers. But when we are

considering the question whether Bathurst and Lowe were needlessly

strict or not, the point at issue is _whether plans of escape or

rescue existed, and if so, whether they knew of them_. As to this

there cannot be the shadow of doubt; and it is practically certain

that they were the cause of the new regulations of October 9th, 1816.

We have now traced the course of events during the first critical

twelvemonth; we have seen how friction burst into a flame, how the

chafing of that masterful spirit against all restraint served but to

tighten the inclosing grasp, and how the attempts of his misguided

friends in America and Europe changed a fairly lax detention into

actual custody. It is a vain thing to toy with the "might-have-beens"

of history; but we can fancy a man less untamable than Napoleon

frankly recognizing that he had done with active life by assuming a

feigned name (_e.g._, that of Colonel Muiron, which he once thought

of) and settling down in that equable retreat to the congenial task of

compiling his personal and military Memoirs. If he ever intended to

live as a country squire in England, there were equal facilities for

such a life in St. Helena, with no temptations to stray back into

politics. The climate was better for him than that of England, and the

possibilities for exercise greater than could there have been allowed.

Books there were in abundance--2,700 of them at last: he had back

files of the "Moniteur" for his writings, and copies of "The Times"

came regularly from Plantation House: a piano had been bought in

England for £120. Finally there were the six courtiers whose jealous

devotion, varying moods, and frequent quarrels furnished a daily

comedietta that still charms posterity.

What then was wanting? Unfortunately everything was wanting. He cared

not for music, or animals, or, in recent years, for the chase. He

himself divulged the secret, in words uttered to Gallois in the days

of his power: "_Je n'aime pas beaucoup les femmes, ni le jeu--enfin

rien: je suis tout à fait un être politique!_"--He never ceased to

love politics and power. At St. Helena he pictured himself as winning

over the English, had he settled there. Ah! if I were in England, he

said, I should have conquered all hearts.[576] And assuredly he would

have done so. How could men so commonplace as the Prince Regent,

Liverpool, Castlereagh, and Bathurst have made head against the

influence of a truly great and enthralling personality? Or if he had

gone to the United States, who would have competed with him for the

Presidency?

As it was, he chose to remain indoors, in order to figure as the

prisoner of Longwood,[577] and spent his time between intrigues

against Lowe and dictation of Memoirs. On the subject of Napoleon's

writings we cannot here enter, save to say that his critiques of

Cæsar, Turenne, and Frederick the Great, are of great interest and

value; that the records of his own campaigns, though highly

suggestive, need to be closely checked by the original documents,

seeing that he had not all the needful facts and figures at hand; and

that his record of political events is in the main untrustworthy: it

is an elaborate device for enhancing the Napoleonic tradition and

assuring the crown to the King of Rome.

We turn, then, to take a brief glance at his last years. The first

event that claims notice is the arrest of Las Cases. This subtle

intriguer had soon earned the hatred of Montholon and Gourgaud, who

detested "the little Jesuit" for his Malvolio-like airs of importance

and the hints of Napoleon that he would have ceremonial precedence

over them. His rapid rise into favour was due to his conversational

gifts, literary ability, and thorough knowledge of the English people

and language. This last was specially important. Napoleon very much

wished to learn our language, as he hoped that any mail might bring

news of the triumph of the Whigs and an order for his own departure

for England. His studies with Las Cases were more persevering than

successful, as will be seen from the following curious letter, written

apparently in the watches of the night: it has been recently

re-published by M. de Brotonne.

"COUNT LASCASES,

"Since sixt week y learn the English and y do not any progress.

Sixt week do fourty and two day. If might have learn fivty word,

for day, i could know it two thousands and two hundred. It is in

the dictionary more of fourty thousand: even he could most twenty;

bot much of tems. For know it or hundred and twenty week, which do

more two years. After this you shall agree that the study one

tongue is a great labour who it must do into the young aged."

How much farther Napoleon progressed in his efforts to absorb our

language by these mathematical methods we do not know; for no other

English letter of his seems to be extant. The arrest and departure of

his tutor soon occurred, and there are good grounds for assigning this

ultimately to the jealousy of the less cultured Generals. Thus, we

find Gourgaud asserting that Las Cases has come to St. Helena solely

"in order to get talked about, write anecdotes, and make money."

Montholon also did his best to render the secretary's life miserable,

and on one occasion predicted to Gourgaud that Las Cases would soon

leave the island.[578]

The forecast speedily came true. The secretary intrusted to his

servant, a dubious mulatto named Scott, two letters for Europe sewn up

in a waistcoat: one of them was a long letter to Lucien Bonaparte. The

servant showed the letters to his father, who in some alarm revealed

the matter to the Governor. It is curious as illustrating the state of

suspicion then prevalent at St. Helena, that Las Cases accused the

Scotts of being tools of the Governor; that Lowe saw in the affair the

frayed end of a Longwood scheme; while the residents there suspected

Las Cases of arranging matters as a means of departure from the

island. There was much to justify this last surmise. Las Cases and his

son were unwell; their position in the household was very

uncomfortable; and for a skilled intriguer to intrust an important

letter to a slave, who was already in the Governor's black books, was

truly a singular proceeding. Besides, after the arrest, when the

Governor searched Las Cases' papers in his presence, they were found

to be in good order, among them being parts of his "Journal." Napoleon

himself thought Las Cases guilty of a piece of extraordinary folly,

though he soon sought to make capital out of the arrest by comparing

the behaviour of our officers and their orderlies with "South Sea

savages dancing around a prisoner that they are about to devour."[579]

After a short detention at Ross Cottage, _when he declined the

Governor's offer that he should return to Longwood_, the secretary was

sent to the Cape, and thence made his way to France, where a judicious

editing of his "Memoirs" and "Journal" gained for their compiler a

rich reward.

Gourgaud is the next to leave. The sensitive young man has long been

tormented by jealousy. His diary becomes the long-drawn sigh of a

generous but vain nature, when soured by real or fancied neglect.

Though often unfair to Napoleon, whose egotism the slighted devotee

often magnifies into colossal proportions, the writer unconsciously

bears witness to the wondrous fascination that held the little Court

in awe. The least attention shown to the Montholons costs "Gogo" a fit

of spleen or a sleepless night, scarcely to be atoned for on the

morrow by soothing words, by chess, or reversi, or help at the

manuscript of "Waterloo." Again and again Napoleon tries to prove to

him that the Montholons ought to have precedence: it is in vain. At

last the crisis comes: it is four years since the General saved the

Emperor from a Cossack's lance at Brienne, and the recollection

renders his present "humiliations" intolerable. He challenges

Montholon to a duel; Napoleon strictly forbids it; and the aggrieved

officer seeks permission to depart.

Napoleon grants his request. It seems that the chief is weary of his

moody humours; he further owes him a grudge for writing home to his

mother frank statements of the way in which the Longwood exiles are

treated. These letters were read by Lowe and Bathurst, and their

general purport seems to have been known in French governmental

circles, where they served as an antidote to the poisonous stories

circulated by Napoleon and his more diplomatic followers. Clearly

nothing is to be made of Gourgaud; and so he departs (February 13th,

1818). Bidding a tearful adieu, he goes with Basil Jackson to spend

six weeks with him at a cottage near Plantation House, when he is

astonished at the delicate reserve shown by the Governor. He then sets

sail for England. The only money he has is _£100_ advanced by Lowe.

Napoleon's money he has refused to accept.[580]

And yet he did not pass out of his master's life. Landing in England

on May 1st, he had a few interviews with our officials, in which he

warned them that Napoleon's escape would be quite easy, and gave a

hint as to O'Meara being the tool of Napoleon. But soon the young

General came into touch with the leaders of the Opposition. No change

in his sentiments is traceable until August 25th, when he indited a

letter to Marie Louise, asserting that Napoleon was dying "in the

torments of the longest and most frightful agony," a prey to the

cruelty of England! To what are we to attribute this change of front?

The editors of Gourgaud's "Journal" maintain that there was no change;

they hint that the "Journal" may have been an elaborate device for

throwing dust into Lowe's eyes; and they point to the fact that before

leaving the island Gourgaud received secret instructions from Napoleon

bidding him convey to Europe several small letters sewn into the soles

of his boots. Whether he acted on these instructions may be doubted;

for at his departure he gave his word of honour to Lowe that he was

not the bearer of any paper, pamphlet, or letter from Longwood.

Furthermore, we hear nothing of these secret letters afterwards; and

he allowed nearly four months to elapse in England before he wrote to

Marie Louise. The theory referred to above seems quite untenable in

face of these facts.[581]

How, then, are we to explain Gourgaud's conduct at St. Helena and

afterwards? Now, in threading the mendacious labyrinths of St. Helena

literature it is hard ever to find a wholly satisfactory clue; but

Basil Jackson's "Waterloo and St. Helena" (p. 103) seems to supply it

in the following passage:

"To finish about Gourgaud, I may add that on his reaching England,

after one or two interviews with the Under-Secretary of State, he

fell into the hands of certain Radicals of note, who represented

to him the folly of his conduct in turning against Napoleon; that,

as his adherent, he was really somebody, whereas he was only

ruining himself by appearing inimical. In short, they so worked

upon the poor weak man, that he was induced to try and make it

appear that he was still _l'homme de l'Empereur:_ this he did by

inditing a letter to Marie Louise, in which he inveighed against

the treatment of Napoleon at the hands of the Government and Sir

H. Lowe, which being duly published, Gourgaud fell to zero in the

opinion of all right-minded persons."

This seems consonant with what we know of Gourgaud's character: frank,

volatile, and sensitive, he could never have long sustained a policy

of literary and diplomatic deceit. He was not a compound of Chatterton

and Fouché. His "Journal" is the artless outpouring of wounded vanity

and brings us close to the heart of the hero-worshipper and his hero.

At times the idol falls and is shivered but love places it on the

shrine again and again, until the fourth anniversary of Brienne finds

the spell broken. Even before he leaves St. Helena the old fascination

is upon him once more; and then Napoleon seeks to utilize his devotion

for the purpose of a political mission. Gourgaud declines the _rôle_

of agent, pledges his word to the Governor, and keeps it; but, thanks

to British officialism or the seductions of the Opposition,

hero-worship once more gains the day and enrolls him beside Las Cases

and Montholon. This we believe to be the real Gourgaud, a genuine,

lovable, but flighty being, as every page of his "Journal" shows.

One cannot but notice in passing the extraordinary richness of St.

Helena literature. Nearly all the exiles kept diaries or memoirs, or

wrote them when they returned to Europe. And, on the other hand, of

all the 10,000 Britons whom Napoleon detained in France for eleven

years, not one has left a record that is ever read to-day.

Consequently, while the woes of Napoleon have been set forth in every

civilized tongue, the world has forgotten the miseries causelessly

inflicted on 10,000 English families. The advantages possessed by a

memoir-writing nation over one that is but half articulate could not

be better illustrated. For the dumb Britons not a single tear is ever

shed; whereas the voluble inmates of Longwood used their pens to such

effect that half the world still believes them to have been bullied

twice a week by Lowe, plied with gifts of poisoned coffee, and nearly

eaten up by rats at night. On this last topic we are treated to tales

of part of a slave's leg being eaten off while he slept at

Longwood--nay, of a horse's leg also being gnawed away at night--so

that our feelings are divided between pity for the sufferers and envy

at the soundness of their slumbers.

Longwood was certainly far from being a suitable abode; but a word

from Napoleon would have led to the erection of the new house on a

site that he chose to indicate. The materials had all been brought

from England; but the word was not spoken until a much later time; and

the inference is inevitable that he preferred to remain where he was

so that he could represent himself as lodged in _cette grange

insalubre._[582] The third of the Longwood household to depart was the

surgeon, O'Meara. The conduct of this British officer in facilitating

Napoleon's secret correspondence has been so fully exposed by Forsyth

and Seaton that we may refer our readers to their works for proofs of

his treachery. Gourgaud's "Journal" reveals the secret influence that

seduced him. Chancing once to refer to the power of money over

Englishmen, Napoleon remarked that that was why we did not want him to

draw sums from Europe, and continued: "_Le docteur n'est si bien pour

moi que depuis que je lui donne mon argent. Ah! j'en suis bien sûr, de

celui-là!"_[583] This disclosure enables us to understand why the

surgeon, after being found out and dismissed from the service, sought

to blacken the character of Sir Hudson Lowe by every conceivable

device. The wonder is that he succeeded in imposing his version of

facts on a whole generation.

The next physician who resided at Longwood, Dr. Stokoe, was speedily

cajoled into disobeying the British regulations and underwent official

disgrace. An attempt was then made, through Montholon, to bribe his

successor, Dr. Verling, who indignantly repelled it and withdrew from

his duty.[584]

There can be no doubt that Napoleon found pleasure in these intrigues.

In his last interview with Stürmer, the Austrian Commissioner at St.

Helena, Gourgaud said, in reference to this topic: "However unhappy he

[Napoleon] is here, he secretly enjoys the importance attached to his

custody, the interest that the Powers take in it, and the care taken

to collect his least words." Napoleon also once remarked to Gourgaud

that it was better to be at St. Helena than as he was at Elba.[585] Of

the same general tenour are his striking remarks, reported by Las

Cases at the close of his first volume:

"Our situation here may even have its attractions. The universe is

looking at us. We remain the martyrs of an immortal cause:

millions of men weep for us, the fatherland sighs, and Glory is in

mourning. We struggle here against the oppression of the gods, and

the longings of the nations are for us.... Adversity was wanting

to my career. If I had died on the throne amidst the clouds of my

omnipotence, I should have remained a problem for many men:

to-day, thanks to misfortune, they can judge of me naked as I am."

In terseness of phrase, vividness of fancy, and keenness of insight

into the motives that sway mankind, this passage is worthy of

Napoleon. He knew that his exile at St. Helena would dull the memory

of the wrongs which he had done to the cause of liberty, and that from

that lonely peak would go forth the legend of the new Prometheus

chained to the rock by the kings and torn every day by the ravening

vulture. The world had rejected his gospel of force; but would it not

thrill responsive to the gospel of pity now to be enlisted in his

behalf? His surmise was amazingly true. The world was thrilled. The

story worked wonders, not directly for him, but for his fame and his

dynasty. The fortunes of his race began to revive from the time when

the popular imagination transfigured Napoleon the Conqueror into

Napoleon the Martyr. Viewed in this light, and thrown up into telling

relief against the sinister policy of the Holy Alliance of the

monarchs, the dreary years spent at St. Helena were not the least

successful of his career. Without them there could have been no second

Napoleonic Empire.

Not that his life there was a "long-drawn agony." His health was

fairly good. There were seasons of something like enjoyment, when he

gave himself up to outdoor recreations. Such a time was the latter

part of 1819 and the first half of 1820: we may call it the Indian

summer of his life, for he was then possessed with a passion for

gardening. Lightly clad and protected by a broad-brimmed hat, he went

about, sometimes spade in hand, superintending various changes in the

grounds at Longwood and around the new house which was being erected

for him hard by. Or at other times he used the opportunity afforded by

the excavations to show how infantry might be so disposed on a hastily

raised slope as to bring a terrific fire to bear on attacking cavalry.

Marshalling his followers at dawn by the sound of a bell, he made them

all, counts, valets, and servants, dig trenches as if for the front

ranks, and throw up the earth for the rear ranks: then, taking his

stand in front, as the shortest man, and placing the tallest at the

rear (his Swiss valet, Noverraz), he triumphantly showed how the

horsemen might be laid low by the rolling volleys of ten ranks.[586]

In May or June he took once more to horse exercise, and for a time his

health benefited from all this activity. His relations with the

Governor were peaceful, if not cordial, and the limits were about this

time extended.

Indoors there were recreations other than work at the Memoirs. He

often played chess and billiards, at the latter using his hand instead

of the cue! Dinner was generally at a very late hour, and afterwards

he took pleasure in reading aloud. Voltaire was the favourite author,

and Montholon afterwards confessed to Lord Holland that the same

plays, especially "Zaïre," were read rather too often.

"Napoleon slept himself when read to, but he was very observant

and jealous if others slept while he read. He watched his audience

vigilantly, and _'Mme. Montholon, vous dormez'_ was a frequent

ejaculation in the course of reading. He was animated with all

that he read, especially poetry, enthusiastic at beautiful

passages, impatient of faults, and full of ingenious and lively

remarks on style."[587]

During this same halcyon season two priests, who had been selected by

the Bonapartes, arrived in the island, as also a Corsican doctor,

Antommarchi. Napoleon was disappointed with all three. The doctor,

though a learned anatomist, knew little of chemistry, and at an early

interview with Napoleon passed a catechism on this subject so badly

that he was all but chased from the room. The priests came off little

better. The elder of them, Buonavita by name, had lived in Mexico, and

could talk of little else: he soon fell ill, and his stay in St.

Helena was short. The other, a Corsican named Vignali, having neither

learning, culture, nor dialectical skill, was tolerated as a

respectable adjunct to the household, but had little or no influence

over the master. This is to be regretted on many grounds, and partly

because his testimony throws no light on Napoleon's religious views.

Here we approach a problem that perhaps can never be cleared up.

Unfathomable on many sides of his nature, Napoleon is nowhere more so

than when he confronts the eternal verities. That he was a convinced

and orthodox Catholic few will venture to assert. At Elba he said to

Lord Ebrington: "_Nous ne savons d'où nous venons, ce que nous

deviendrons_": the masses ought to have some "fixed point of faith

whereon to rest their thoughts."--"_Je suis Catholique parce que mon

père l'étoit, et parce que c'étoit la religion de la France_." He also

once or twice expressed to Campbell scorn of the popular creed: and

during his last voyage, as we have seen, he showed not the slightest

interest in the offer of a priest at Funchal to accompany him. At St.

Helena the party seems to have limited the observances of religion to

occasional reading of the Bible. When Mme. Montholon presented her

babe to the Emperor, he teasingly remarked that Las Cases was the most

suitable person to christen the infant; to which the mother at once

replied that Las Cases was not a good enough Christian for that.

Judging from the entries in Gourgaud's "Journal," this young General

pondered more than the rest on religious questions; and to him

Napoleon unbosomed his thoughts.--Matter, he says, is everywhere and

pervades everything; life, thought, and the soul itself are but

properties of matter, and death ends all. When Gourgaud points to the

majestic order of the universe as bearing witness to a Creator,

Napoleon admits that he believes in "superior intelligences": he avers

that he would believe in Christianity if it had been the original and

universal creed: but then the Mohammedans "follow a religion simpler

and more adapted to their morality than ours." In ten years their

founder conquered half the world, which Christianity took three

hundred years to accomplish. Or again, he refers to the fact that

Laplace, Monge, Berthollet, and Lagrange were all atheists, though

they did not proclaim the fact; as for himself, he finds the idea of

God to be natural; it has existed at all times and among all peoples.

But once or twice he ends this vague talk with the remarkable

confession that the sight of myriad deaths in war has made him a

materialist. "Matter is everything."--"Vanity of vanities!"[588]

Mirrored as these dialogues are in the eddies of Gourgaud's moods,

they may tinge his master's theology with too much of gloom: but,

after all, they are by far the most lifelike record of Napoleon's

later years, and they show us a nature dominated by the tangible. As

for belief in the divine Christ, there seems not a trace. A report has

come down to us, enshrined in Newman's prose, that Napoleon once

discoursed of the ineffable greatness of Christ, contrasting His

enduring hold on the hearts of men with the evanescent rule of

Alexander and Cæsar. One hopes that the words were uttered; but they

conflict with Napoleon's undoubted statements. Sometimes he spoke in

utter uncertainty; at others, as one who wished to believe in

Christianity and might perhaps be converted. But in the political

testament designed for his son, the only reference to religion is of

the diplomatic description that we should expect from the author of

the "Concordat": "Religious ideas have more influence than certain

narrow-minded philosophers are willing to believe: they are capable of

rendering great services to Humanity. By standing well with the Pope,

an influence is still maintained over the consciences of a hundred

millions of men."

Equally vague was Napoleon's own behaviour as his end drew nigh. For

some time past a sharp internal pain--the stab of a penknife, he

called it--had warned him of his doom; in April, 1821, when vomiting

and prostration showed that the dread ancestral malady was drawing on

apace, he bade the Abbé Vignali prepare the large dining-room of

Longwood as a _chapelle ardente_; and, observing a smile on

Antommarchi's face, the sick man hotly rebuked his affectation of

superiority. Montholon, on his return to England, informed Lord

Holland that extreme unction was administered before the end came,

Napoleon having ordered that this should be done as if solely on

Montholon's responsibility, and that the priest, when questioned on

the subject, was to reply that he had acted on Montholon's orders,

without having any knowledge of the Emperor's wishes. It was

accordingly administered, but apparently he was insensible at the

time.[589] In his will, also, he declared that he died in communion

with the Apostolical Roman Church, in whose bosom he was born. There,

then, we must leave this question, shrouded in the mystery that hangs

around so much of his life.

The decease of a great man is always affecting: but the death of the

hero who had soared to the zenith of military glory and civic

achievement seems to touch the very nadir of calamity. Outliving his

mighty Empire, girt around by a thousand miles of imprisoning ocean,

guarded by his most steadfast enemies, his son a captive at the Court

of the Hapsburgs, and his Empress openly faithless, he sinks from

sight like some battered derelict. And Nature is more pitiless than

man. The Governor urges on him the best medical advice: but he will

have none of it. He feels the grip of cancer, the disease which had

carried off his father and was to claim the gay Caroline and Pauline.

At times he surmises the truth: at others he calls out "_le foie_"

"_le foie_." Meara had alleged that his pains were due to a liver

complaint brought on by his detention at St. Helena; Antommarchi

described the illness as gastric fever (_febbre gastrica pituitosa_);

and not until Dr. Arnott was called in on the 1st of April was the

truth fully recognized.

At the close of the month the symptoms became most distressing,

aggravated as they were by the refusal of the patient to take medicine

or food, or to let himself be moved. On May 4th, at Dr. Arnott's

insistence, some calomel was secretly administered and with beneficial

results, the patient sleeping and even taking some food. This was his

last rally: on the morrow, while a storm was sweeping over the island,

and tearing up large trees, his senses began to fail: Montholon

thought he heard the words _France, armée, tête d'armée, Joséphine_:

he lingered on insensible for some hours: the storm died down: the sun

bathed the island in a flood of glory, and, as it dipped into the

ocean, the great man passed away.

By the Governor's orders Dr. Arnott remained in the room until the

body could be medically examined--a precaution which, as Montchenu

pointed out, would prevent any malicious attempt on the part of the

Longwood servants to cause death to appear as the result of poisoning.

The examination, conducted in the presence of seven medical men and

others, proved that all the organs were sound except the ulcerated

stomach; the liver was rather large, but showed no signs of disease;

the heart, on the other hand, was rather under the normal size. Far

from showing the emaciation that usually results from prolonged

inability to take food, the body was remarkably stout--a fact which

shows that that tenacious will had its roots in an abnormally firm

vitality.[590]

After being embalmed, the body was laid out in state, and all

beholders were struck with the serene and beautiful expression of the

face: the superfluous flesh sank away after death, leaving the

well-proportioned features that moved the admiration of men during the

Consulate.

Clad in his favourite green uniform, he fared forth to his

resting-place under two large weeping willow trees in a secluded

valley: the coffin, surmounted by his sword and the cloak he had worn

at Marengo, was borne with full military honours by grenadiers of the

20th and 66th Regiments before a long line of red-coats; and their

banners, emblazoned with the names of "Talavera," "Albuera,"

"Pyrenees," and "Orthez," were lowered in a last salute to our mighty

foe. Salvos of artillery and musketry were fired over the grave: the

echoes rattled upwards from ridge to ridge and leaped from the

splintery peaks far into the wastes of ocean to warn the world beyond

that the greatest warrior and administrator of all the ages had sunk

to rest.

His ashes were not to remain in that desolate nook: in a clause of his

will he expressed the desire that they should rest by the banks of the

Seine among the people he had loved so well. In 1840 they were

disinterred in presence of Bertrand, Gourgaud, and Marchand, and borne

to France. Paris opened her arms to receive the mighty dead; and Louis

Philippe, on whom he had once prophesied that the crown of France

would one day rest, received the coffin in state under the dome of the

_Invalides_. There he reposes, among the devoted people whom by his

superhuman genius he raised to bewildering heights of glory, only to

dash them to the depths of disaster by his monstrous errors.

* * * * *

Viewing his career as a whole, it seems just and fair to assert that

the fundamental cause of his overthrow is to be found, not in the

failings of the French, for they served him with a fidelity that would

wring tears of pity from Rhadamanthus; not in the treachery of this or

that general or politician, for that is little when set against the

loyalty of forty millions of men; but in the character of the man and

of his age. Never had mortal man so grand an opportunity of ruling

over a chaotic Continent: never had any great leader antagonists so

feeble as the rulers who opposed his rush to supremacy. At the dawn of

the nineteenth century the old monarchies were effete: insanity

reigned in four dynasties, and weak or time-serving counsels swayed

the remainder. For several years their counsellors and generals were

little better. With the exception of Pitt and Nelson, who were carried

off by death, and of Wellington, who had but half an army, Napoleon

never came face to face with thoroughly able, well-equipped, and

stubborn opponents until the year 1812.

It seems a paradox to say that this excess of good fortune largely

contributed to his ruin: yet it is true. His was one of those

thick-set combative natures that need timely restraint if their best

qualities are to be nurtured and their domineering instincts curbed.

Just as the strongest Ministry prances on to ruin if the Opposition

gives no effective check, so it was with Napoleon. Had he in his early

manhood taken to heart the lessons of adversity, would he have

ventured at the same time to fight Wellington in Spain and the Russian

climate in the heart of the steppes? Would he have spurned the offers

of an advantageous peace made to him from Prague in 1813? Would he

have let slip the chance of keeping the "natural frontiers" of France

after Leipzig, and her old boundaries, when brought to bay in

Champagne? Would he have dared the uttermost at all points at

Waterloo? In truth, after his fortieth year was past, the fervid

energies of youth hardened in the mould of triumph; and thence came

that fatal obstinacy which was his bane at all those crises of his

career. For in the meantime the cause of European independence had

found worthy champions--smaller men than Napoleon, it is true, but men

who knew that his determination to hold out everywhere and yield

nothing must work his ruin. Finally, the same clinging to unreal hopes

and the same love of fight characterized his life in St. Helena; so

that what might have been a time of calm and dignified repose was

marred by fictitious clamours and petty intrigues altogether unworthy

of his greatness.

For, in spite of his prodigious failure, he was superlatively great in

all that pertains to government, the quickening of human energies, and

the art of war. His greatness lies, not only in the abiding importance

of his best undertakings, but still more in the Titanic force that he

threw into the inception and accomplishment of all of them--a force

which invests the storm-blasted monoliths strewn along the latter

portion of his career with a majesty unapproachable by a tamer race of

toilers. After all, the verdict of mankind awards the highest

distinction, not to prudent mediocrity that shuns the chance of

failure and leaves no lasting mark behind, but to the eager soul that

grandly dares, mightily achieves, and holds the hearts of millions

even amidst his ruin and theirs. Such a wonder-worker was Napoleon.

The man who bridled the Revolution and remoulded the life of France,

who laid broad and deep the foundations of a new life in Italy,

Switzerland, and Germany, who rolled the West in on the East in the

greatest movement known since the Crusades and finally drew the

yearning thoughts of myriads to that solitary rock in the South

Atlantic, must ever stand in the very forefront of the immortals of

human story.

APPENDIX I

LIST OF THE CHIEF APPOINTMENTS AND DIGNITIES BESTOWED BY NAPOLEON

[_An asterisk is affixed to the names of his Marshals_.]

Arrighi. Duc de Padua.

*Augereau. Duc de Castiglione.

*Bernadotte. Prince de Ponte Corvo.

*Berthier. Chief of the Staff. Prince de Neufchâtel. Prince

de Wagram.

*Bessières. Duc d'Istria. Commander of the Old Guard.

Bonaparte, Joseph. (King of Naples.) King of Spain.

" Louis. King of Holland.

" Jerome. King of Westphalia.

*Brune.

Cambacérès. Arch-Chancellor. Duc de Parma.

Caulaincourt. Duc de Vicenza. Master of the Horse. Minister

of Foreign Affairs (1814).

Champagny. Duc de Cadore. Minister of Foreign Affairs

(1807-11).

Chaptal. Minister of the Interior. Comte de Chanteloupe.

Clarke. Minister of War. Duc de Feltre.

Daru. Comte.

*Davoust. Duc d'Auerstädt. Prince d'Eckmühl.

Drouet. Comte d'Erlon.

Drouot. Comte. Aide-Major of the Guard.

Duroc. Grand Marshal of the Palace. Duc de Friuli.

Eugène (Beauharnais). Viceroy of Italy.

Fesch (Cardinal). Grand Almoner.

Fouché. Minister of Police (1804-10). Duc d'Otranto.

*Grouchy. Comte.

Jomini. Baron.

*Jourdan. Comte.

Junot. Duc d'Abrantès.

*Kellermann. Duc de Valmy.

*Lannes. Duc de Montebello.

Larrey. Baron.

Latour-Maubourg. Baron.

Lauriston. Comte.

Lavalette. Comte. Minister of Posts.

*Lefebvre. Duc de Danzig.

*Macdonald. Duc de Taranto.

Maret. Minister of Foreign Affairs (1811-14.) Duc de Bassano.

*Marmont. Duc de Ragusa.

*Masséna. (Duc de Rivoli.) Prince d'Essling.

Miot. Comte de Melito.

Méneval. Baron.

Mollien. Comte. Minister of the Treasury.

*Moncey. Duc de Conegliano.

Montholon. Comte.

*Mortier. Duc de Treviso.

Mouton. Comte de Lobau.

*Murat. (Grand Duc de Berg.) King of Naples.

*Ney. (Duc d'Elchingen.) Prince de la Moskwa.

*Oudinot. Duc de Reggio.

Pajol. Baron.

Pasquier, Duc de. Prefect of Police.

*Pérignon.

*Poniatowski.

Rapp. Comte.

Reynier. Duc de Massa.

Rémusat. Chamberlain.

Savary. Duc de Rovigo. Minister of Police (1810-14).

Sébastiani. Comte.

*Sérurier.

*Soult. Duc de Dalmatia.

*St. Cyr, Marquis de.

*Suchet. Duc d'Albufera.

Talleyrand. Minister of Foreign Affairs (1799-1807). Grand

Chamberlain (1804-8). Prince de Benevento.

Vandamme. Comte.

*Victor. Duc de Belluno.

APPENDIX II

THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO

Some critics have blamed me for underrating the _rôle_ of the

Prussians at Waterloo; but after careful study I have concluded that

it has been overrated by some recent German writers. We now know that

the Prussian advance was retarded by Gneisenau's deep-rooted suspicion

of Wellington, and that no direct aid was given to the British left

until nearly the end of the battle. Napoleon always held that he could

readily have kept off the Prussians at Planchenoit, that the main

battle throughout was against Wellington, and that it was decided by

the final charge of British cavalry. The Prussians did not wholly

capture Planchenoit until the French opposing Wellington were in full

flight. But, of course, Blücher's advance and onset made the victory

the overwhelming triumph that it was.

An able critic in the "Saturday Review" of May 10, 1902, has charged

me with neglecting to say that the French left wing (Foy's and

Bachelu's divisions) supported the French cavalry at the close of the

great charges. I stated (p. 502) that French infantry was not "at hand

to hold the ground which the cavaliers seemed to have won." Let me

cite the exact words of General Foy, written in his Journal a few days

after the battle (M. Girod de L'Ain's "Vie militaire du General Foy,"

p. 278): "Alors que la cavalerie française faisait cette longue et

terrible charge, le feu de notre artillerie était déjà moins nourri,

et notre infanterie ne fit aucun mouvement. Quand la cavalerie fut

rentrée, et que l'artillerie anglaise, qui avait cessé de tirer

pendant une demi-heure, eut recommencé son feu, on donna ordre aux

divisions Foy et Bachelu d'avancer droit aux carrés qui s'y étaient

avancés pendant la charge de cavalerie et qui ne s'étaient pas

repliés. L'attaque fut formée en colonnes par échelons de régiment,

Bachelu formant les échelons les plus avancés. Je tenis par ma gauche

à la haie [de Hougoumont]: j'avais sur mon front un bataillon en

tirailleurs. Près de joindre les Anglais, nous avons reçu un feu très

vif de mitraille et de mousqueterie. C'était une grêle de mort. Les

carrés ennemis avaient le premier rang genoux en terre et présentaient

une haie de baïonettes. Les colonnes de la 1're division ont pris la

fuite les premières: leur mouvement a entraîné celui de mes colonnes.

En ce moment j'ai été blessé...."

This shows that the advance of the French infantry was far too late to

be of the slightest use to the cavalry. The British lines had been

completely re-formed.

FOOTNOTES TO VOLUME I:

[Footnote 1: From a French work, "Moeurs et Coutumes des Corses"

(Paris, 1802), I take the following incident. A priest, charged with

the duty of avenging a relative for some fourteen years, met his enemy

at the gate of Ajaccio and forthwith shot him, under the eyes of an

official--who did nothing. A relative of the murdered man, happening

to be near, shot the priest. Both victims were quickly buried, the

priest being interred under the altar of the church, "because of his

sacred character." See too Miot de Melito, "Mémoires," vol. i., ch.

xiii., as to the utter collapse of the jury system in 1800-1, because

no Corsican would "deny his party or desert his blood."]

[Footnote 2: As to the tenacity of Corsican devotion, I may cite a

curious proof from the unpublished portion of the "Memoirs of Sir

Hudson Lowe." He was colonel in command of the Royal Corsican Rangers,

enrolled during the British occupation of Corsica, and gained the

affections of his men during several years of fighting in Egypt and

elsewhere. When stationed at Capri in 1808 he relied on his Corsican

levies to defend that island against Murat's attacks; and he did not

rely in vain. Though confronted by a French Corsican regiment, they

remained true to their salt, even during a truce, when they could

recognize their compatriots. The partisan instinct was proof against

the promises of Murat's envoys and the shouts even of kith and kin.]

[Footnote 3: The facts as to the family of Napoleon's mother are given

in full detail by M. Masson in his "Napoléon Inconnu," ch. i. They

correct the statement often made as to her "lowly," "peasant" origin.

Masson also proves that the house at Ajaccio, which is shown as

Napoleon's birthplace, is of later construction, though on the same

site.]

[Footnote 4: See Jacobi, "Hist. de la Corse," vol. ii., ch. viii. The

whole story is told with prudent brevity by French historians, even by

Masson and Chuquet. The few words in which Thiers dismisses this

subject are altogether misleading.]

[Footnote 5: Much has been written to prove that Napoleon was born in

1768, and was really the eldest surviving son. The reasons, stated

briefly, are: (1) that the first baptismal name of Joseph Buonaparte

was merely _Nabulione_ (Italian for _Napoleon_), and that _Joseph_ was

a later addition to his name on the baptismal register of January 7th,

1768, at Corte; (2) certain statements that Joseph was born at

Ajaccio; (3) Napoleon's own statement at his marriage that he was born

in 1768. To this it maybe replied that: (_a_) other letters and

statements, still more decisive, prove that Joseph was born at Corte

in 1768 and Napoleon at Ajaccio in 1769; (_b_) Napoleon's entry in the

marriage register was obviously designed to lessen the disparity of

years of his bride, who, on her side, subtracted four years from her

age. See Chuquet, "La Jeunesse de Napoléon," p. 65.]

[Footnote 6: Nasica, "Mémoires," p. 192.]

[Footnote 7: Both letters are accepted as authentic by Jung,

"Bonaparte et son Temps," vol. i., pp. 84, 92; but Masson, "Napoléon

Inconnu," vol. i., p. 55, tracking them to their source, discredits

them, as also from internal evidence.]

[Footnote 8: Chaptal, "Mes Souvenirs sur Napoléon," p. 177.]

[Footnote 9: Joseph Buonaparte, "Mems.," vol. i., p. 29. So too Miot

de Melito, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. x.]

[Footnote 10: Chaptal, "Souvenirs sur Napoléon," p. 237. See too

Masson, "Napoléon Inconnu," vol. i., p. 158, note.]

[Footnote 11: In an after-dinner conversation on January 11th, 1803,

with Roederer, Buonaparte exalted Voltaire at the expense of Rousseau

in these significant words: "The more I read Voltaire, the more I like

him: he is always reasonable, never a charlatan, never a fanatic: he

is made for mature minds. Up to sixteen years of age I would have

fought for Rousseau against all the friends of Voltaire. Now it is the

contrary. _I have been especially disgusted with Rousseau since I

have seen the East. Savage man is a dog._" ("Oeuvres de Roederer,"

vol. iii., p. 461.)

In 1804 he even denied his indebtedness to Rousseau. During a family

discussion, wherein he also belittled Corsica, he called Rousseau "a

babbler, or, if you prefer it, an eloquent enough _idéalogue_. I never

liked him, nor indeed well understood him: truly I had not the courage

to read him all, because I thought him for the most part tedious."

(Lucien Buonaparte, "Mémoires," vol. ii., ch. xi.)

His later views on Rousseau are strikingly set forth by Stanislas

Girardin, who, in his "Memoirs," relates that Buonaparte, on his visit

to the tomb of Rousseau, said: "'It would have been better for the

repose of France that this man had never been born.' 'Why, First

Consul?' said I. 'He prepared the French Revolution.' 'I thought it

was not for you to complain of the Revolution.' 'Well,' he replied,

'the future will show whether it would not have been better for the

repose of the world that neither I nor Rousseau had existed.'" Méneval

confirms this remarkable statement.]

[Footnote 12: Masson, "Napoléon Inconnu," vol. ii., p. 53.]

[Footnote 13: Joseph Buonaparte, "Mémoires," vol. i, p. 44.]

[Footnote 14: M. Chuquet, in his work "La Jeunesse de Napoléon"

(Paris, 1898), gives a different opinion: but I think this passage

shows a veiled hostility to Paoli. Probably we may refer to this time

an incident stated by Napoleon at St. Helena to Lady Malcolm ("Diary,"

p. 88), namely, that Paoli urged on him the acceptance of a commission

in the British army: "But I preferred the French, because I spoke the

language, was of their religion, understood and liked their manners,

and I thought the Revolution a fine time for an enterprising young

man. Paoli was angry--we did not speak afterwards." It is hard to

reconcile all these statements.

Lucien Buonaparte states that his brother seriously thought for a time

of taking a commission in the forces of the British East India

Company; but I am assured by our officials that no record of any

application now exists.]

[Footnote 15: The whole essay is evidently influenced by the works of

the democrat Raynal, to whom Buonaparte dedicated his "Lettres sur la

Corse." To the "Discours de Lyons" he prefixed as motto the words

"Morality will exist when governments are free," which he modelled on

a similar phrase of Raynal. The following sentences are also

noteworthy: "Notre organisation animale a des besoins indispensables:

manger, dormir, engendrer. Une nourriture, une cabane, des vêtements,

une femme, sont donc une stricte nécessité pour le bonheur. Notre

organisation intellectuelle a des appétits non moins impérieux et dont

la satisfaction est beaucoup plus précieuse. C'est dans leur entier

développement que consiste vraiment le bonheur. Sentir et raisonner,

voilà proprement le fait de l'homme."]

[Footnote 16: Nasica; Chuquet, p. 248.]

[Footnote 17: His recantation of Jacobinism was so complete that some

persons have doubted whether he ever sincerely held it. The doubt

argues a singular _naïveté_ it is laid to rest by Buonaparte's own

writings, by his eagerness to disown or destroy them, by the testimony

of everyone who knew his early career, and by his own confession:

"There have been good Jacobins. At one time every man of spirit was

bound to be one. I was one myself." (Thibaudeau, "Mémoires sur le

Consulat," p. 59.)]

[Footnote 18: I use the term _commissioner_ as equivalent to the

French _représentant en mission,_ whose powers were almost limitless.]

[Footnote 19: See this curious document in Jung, "Bonaparte et son

Temps," vol. ii., p. 249. Masson ignores it, but admits that the

Paolists and partisans of France were only seeking to dupe one

another.]

[Footnote 20: Buonaparte, when First Consul, was dunned for payment by

the widow of the Avignon bookseller who published the "Souper de

Beaucaire." He paid her well for having all the remaining copies

destroyed. Yet Panckoucke in 1818 procured one copy, which preserved

the memory of Buonaparte's early Jacobinism.]

[Footnote 21: I have chiefly followed the careful account of the siege

given by Cottin in his "Toulon et les Anglais en 1793" (Paris, 1898).

The following official figures show the weakness of the British army.

In December, 1792, the parliamentary vote was for 17,344 men as

"guards and garrisons," besides a few at Gibraltar and Sydney. In

February, 1793, 9,945 additional men were voted and 100 "independent

companies": Hanoverians were also embodied. In February, 1794, the

number of British regulars was raised to 60,244. For the navy the

figures were: December, 1792, 20,000 sailors and 5,000 marines;

February, 1793, 20,000 _additional_ seamen; for 1794, 73,000 seamen

and 12,000 marines. ("Ann. Reg.")]

[Footnote 22: Barras' "Mémoires" are not by any means wholly his. They

are a compilation by Rousselin de Saint-Albin from the Barras papers.]

[Footnote 23: Jung, "Bonaparte et son Temps," vol. ii.]

[Footnote 24: M.G. Duruy's elaborate plea (Barras, "Mems.,"

Introduction, pp. 69-79) rests on the supposition that his hero

arrived at Toulon on September 7th. But M. Chuquet has shown

("Cosmopolis," January, 1897) that he arrived there not earlier than

September 16th. So too Cottin, ch, xi.]

[Footnote 25: As the burning of the French ships and stores has been

said to be solely due to the English, we may note that, _as early as

October 3rd_, the Spanish Foreign Minister, the Duc d'Alcuida,

suggested it to our ambassador, Lord St. Helens: "If it becomes

necessary to abandon the harbour, these vessels shall be sunk or set

on fire in order that the enemy may not make use of them; for which

purpose preparations shall be made beforehand."]

[Footnote 26: Thiers, ch. xxx.; Cottin, "L'Angleterre et les

Princes."]

[Footnote 27: See Lord Grenville's despatch of August 9th, 1793, to

Lord St. Helens ("F.O. Records, Spain," No. 28), printed by M. Cottin,

p. 428. He does not print the more important despatch of October 22nd,

where Grenville asserts that the admission of the French princes would

tend to invalidate the constitution of 1791, for which the allies were

working.]

[Footnote 28: A letter of Lord Mulgrave to Mr. Trevor, at Turin ("F.

O. Records, Sardinia," No. 13), states that he had the greatest

difficulty in getting on with the French royalists: "You must not send

us one _émigré_ of any sort--they would be a nuisance: they are all so

various and so violent, whether for despotism, constitution, or

republic, that we should be distracted with their quarrels; and they

are so assuming, forward, dictatorial, and full of complaints, that

no business could go on with them. Lord Hood is averse to receiving

any of them."

NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.--From the information which Mr. Spenser

Wilkinson has recently supplied in his article in "The Owens College

Hist. Essays" (1902), it would seem that Buonaparte's share in

deciding the fate of Toulon was somewhat larger than has here been

stated; for though the Commissioners saw the supreme need of attacking

the fleet, they do not seem, as far as we know, to have perceived that

the hill behind Fort L'Eguillette was the key of the position.

Buonaparte's skill and tenacity certainly led to the capture of this

height.]

[Footnote 29: Jung, "Bonaparte et son Temps," vol. ii., p. 430.]

[Footnote 30: "Mémorial," ch. ii., November, 1815. See also

Thibaudeau, "Mémoires sur le Consulat," vol. i., p. 59.]

[Footnote 31: Marmont (1774-1852) became sub-lieutenant in 1789,

served with Buonaparte in Italy, Egypt, etc., received the title Duc

de Ragusa in 1808, Marshal in 1809; was defeated by Wellington at

Salamanca in 1812, deserted to the allies in 1814. Junot (1771-1813)

entered the army in 1791; was famed as a cavalry general in the wars

1796-1807; conquered Portugal in 1808, and received the title Duc

d'Abrantès; died mad.]

[Footnote 32: M. Zivy, "Le treize Vendémiaire," pp.60-62, quotes the

decree assigning the different commands. A MS. written by Buonaparte,

now in the French War Office Archives, proves also that it was Barras

who gave the order to fetch the cannon from the Sablons camp.]

[Footnote 33: Buonaparte afterwards asserted that it was he who had

given the order to fire, and certainly delay was all in favour of his

opponents.]

[Footnote 34: I caution readers against accepting the statement of

Carlyle ("French Revolution," vol. iii. _ad fin_.) that "the thing we

specifically call French Revolution is blown into space by the whiff

of grapeshot." On the contrary, it was perpetuated, though in a more

organic and more orderly governmental form.]

[Footnote 35: Chaptal, "Mes Souvenirs sur Napoléon," p. 198.]

[Footntoe 36: Koch, "Mémoires de Masséna," vol. ii., p. 13, credits

the French with only 37,775 men present with the colours, the

Austrians with 32,000, and the Sardinians with 20,000. All these

figures omit the troops in garrison or guarding communications.]

[Footnote 37: Napoleon's "Correspondence," March 28th, 1796.]

[Footnote 38: See my articles on Colonel Graham's despatches from

Italy in the "Eng. Hist. Review" of January and April, 1899.]

[Footnote 39: Thus Mr. Sargent ("Bonaparte's First Campaign") says

that Bonaparte was expecting Beaulieu to move on Genoa, and saw herein

a chance of crushing the Austrian centre. But Bonaparte, in his

despatch of April 6th to the Directory, referring to the French

advance towards Genoa, writes: "J'ai été très fâché et extrêmement

mécontent de ce mouvement sur Gênes, d'autant plus déplacé qu'il a

obligé cette république à prendre une attitude hostile, et a réveillé

l'ennemi que j'aurais pris tranquille: ce sont des hommes de plus

qu'il nous en coûtera." For the question how far Napoleon was indebted

to Marshal Maillebois' campaign of 1745 for his general design, see

the brochure of M. Pierron. His indebtedness has been proved by M.

Bouvier ("Bonaparte en Italie," p. 197) and by Mr. Wilkinson ("Owens

Coll. Hist. Essays").]

[Footnote 40: Nelson was then endeavouring to cut off the vessels

conveying stores from Toulon to the French forces. The following

extracts from his despatches are noteworthy. January 6th, 1796: "If

the French mean to carry on the war, they must penetrate into Italy.

Holland and Flanders, with their own country, they have entirely

stripped: Italy is the gold mine, and if once entered, is without the

means of resistance." Then on April 28th, after Piedmont was

overpowered by the French: "We English have to regret that we cannot

always decide the fate of Empires on the Sea." Again, on May 16th: "I

very much believe that England, who commenced the war with all Europe

for her allies, will finish it by having nearly all Europe for her

enemies."]

[Footnote 41: The picturesque story of the commander (who was not

Rampon, but Fornésy) summoning the defenders of the central redoubt to

swear on their colours and on the cannon that they would defend it to

the death has been endlessly repeated by historians. But the documents

which furnish the only authentic details show that there was in the

redoubt no cannon and no flag. Fornésy's words simply were: "C'est

ici, mes amis, qu'il faut vaincre ou mourir"--surely much grander than

the histrionic oath. (See "Mémoires de Masséna," Vol. ii.;" Pièces

Just.," No. 3; also Bouvier, _op. cit._)]

[Footnote 42: Jomini, vol. viii., p. 340; "Pièces Justifs."]

[Footnote 43: "Un Homme d'autrefois," par Costa de Beauregard.]

[Footnote 44: These were General Beaulieu's words to Colonel Graham on

May 22nd.]

[Footnote 45: Periods of ten days, which, in the revolutionary

calendar, superseded the week.]

[Footnote 46: I have followed the accounts given by Jomini, vol.

viii., pp. 120-130; that by Schels in the "Oest. Milit. Zeitschrift"

for 1825, vol. ii.; also Bouvier "Bonaparte en Italie," ch. xiii.; and

J.G.'s "Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97." Most French accounts,

being based on Napoleon's "Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 212 _et seq_., are

a tissue of inaccuracies. Bonaparte affected to believe that at Lodi

he defeated an army of sixteen thousand men. Thiers states that the

French cavalry, after fording the river at Montanasso, influenced the

result: but the official report of May 11th, 1796, expressly states

that the French horse could not cross the river at that place till the

fight was over. See too Desvernois, "Mems.," ch, vii.]

[Footnote 47: Bouvier (p. 533) traces this story to Las Cases and

discredits it.]

[Footnote: 48 Directorial despatch of May 7th, 1796. The date rebuts

the statement of M. Aulard, in M. Lavisse's recent volume, "La

Révolution Française," p. 435, that Bonaparte suggested to the

Directory the pillage of Lombardy.]

[Footnote 49: "Corresp.," June 6th, 1797.]

[Footnote 50: "Corresp.," June 1st, 1796.]

[Footnote 51: Gaffarel, "Bonaparte et les Républiques Italiennes," p.

22.]

[Footnote 52: "Corresp.," May 17th, 1796.]

[Footnote 53: Virgil, Aeneid, x. 200.]

[Footnote 54: Colonel Graham's despatches.]

[Footnote 55: "Corresp.," June 26th, 1796.]

[Footnote 56: Despatch of Francis to Würmser, July 14th, 1796.]

[Footnote 57: Jomini (vol. viii., p. 305) blames Weyrother, the chief

of Würmser's staff, for the plan. Jomini gives the precise figures of

the French on July 25th: Masséna had 15,000 men on the upper Adige;

Augereau, 5,000 near Legnago; Sauret, 4,000 at Salo; Sérurier, 10,500

near Mantua; and with others at and near Peschiera the total fighting

strength was 45,000. So "J.G.," p. 103.]

[Footnote 58: See Thiébault's amusing account ("Memoirs," vol. i., ch.

xvi.) of Bonaparte's contempt for any officer who could not give him

definite information, and of the devices by which his orderlies played

on this foible. See too Bourrienne for Bonaparte's dislike of new

faces.]

[Footnote 59: Marbot, "Mémoires," ch. xvi. J.G., in his recent work,

"Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97," p. 115, also defends Augereau.]

[Footnote 60: Jomini, vol. viii., p. 321.]

[Footnote 61: "English Hist. Review," January, 1899]

[Footnote 62: Such is the judgment of Clausewitz ("Werke," vol. iv.),

and it is partly endorsed by J.G. in his "Etudes sur la Campagne de

1796-97." St. Cyr, in his "Memoirs" on the Rhenish campaigns, also

blames Bonaparte for not having _earlier_ sent away his siege-train to

a place of safety. Its loss made the resumed siege of Mantua little

more than a blockade.]

[Footnote 63: Koch, "Mémoires de Masséna," vol. i., p. 199.]

[Footnote 64: "Corresp.," October 21st, 1796.]

[Footnote 65: "Corresp.," October 24th, 1796. The same policy was

employed towards Genoa. This republic was to be lulled into security

until it could easily be overthrown or absorbed.]

[Footnote 66: "Ordre du Jour," November 7th, 1796.]

[Footnote 67: Marmont, "Mémoires," vol. i., p. 237. I have followed

Marmont's narrative, as that of the chief actor in this strange scene.

It is less dramatic than the usual account, as found in Thiers, and

therefore is more probable. The incident illustrates the folly of a

commander doing the work of a sergeant. Marmont points out that the

best tactics would have been to send one division to cross the Adige

at Albaredo, and so take Arcola in the rear. Thiers' criticism, that

this would have involved too great a diffusion of the French line, is

refuted by the fact that on the third day a move on that side induced

the Austrians to evacuate Arcola.]

[Footnote 68: Koch, "Mémoires de Masséna," vol. i., p. 255, in his

very complete account of the battle, gives the enemy's losses as

upwards of 2,000 killed or wounded, and 4,000 prisoners with 11

cannon. Thiers gives 40,000 as Alvintzy's force before the battle--an

impossible number. See _ante_.]

[Footnote 69: The Austrian official figures for the loss in the three

days at Arcola give 2,046 killed and wounded, 4,090 prisoners, and 11

cannon. Napoleon put it down as 13,000 in all! See Schels in "Oest.

Milit. Zeitschrift" for 1829.]

[Footnote 70: A forecast of the plan realized in 1801-2, whereby

Bonaparte gained Louisiana for a time.]

[Footnote 71: Estimates of the Austrian force differ widely. Bonaparte

guessed it at 45,000, which is accepted by Thiers; Alison says 40,000;

Thiébault opines that it was 75,000; Marmont gives the total as

26,217. The Austrian official figures are 28,022 _before_ the fighting

north of Monte Baldo. See my article in the "Eng. Hist. Review" for

April, 1899. I have largely followed the despatches of Colonel Graham,

who was present at this battle. As "J.G." points out (_op.cit. _, p.

237), the French had 1,500 horse and some forty cannon, which gave

them a great advantage over foes who could make no effective use of

these arms.]

[Footnote 72: This was doubtless facilitated by the death of the

Czarina, Catherine II., in November, 1796. She had been on the point

of entering the Coalition against France. The new Czar Paul was at

that time for peace. The Austrian Minister Thugut, on hearing of her

death, exclaimed, "This is the climax of our disasters."]

[Footnote 73: Hüffer, "Oesterreich und Preussen," p. 263.]

[Footnote 74: "Moniteur," 20 Floreal, Year V.; Sciout, "Le

Directoire," vol. ii., ch. vii.]

[Footnote 75: See Landrieux's letter on the subject in Koch's

"Mémoires de Masséna," vol. ii.; "Pièces Justif.," _ad fin._; and

Bonaparte's "Corresp.," letter of March 24th, 1797. The evidence of

this letter, as also of those of April 9th and 19th, is ignored by

Thiers, whose account of Venetian affairs is misleading. It is clear

that Bonaparte contemplated partition long before the revolt of

Brescia.]

[Footnote 76: Botta, "Storia d'Italia," vol. ii., chs. x., etc.; Daru,

"Hist. de Venise," vol. v.; Gaffarel, "Bonaparte et les Républiques

Italiennes," pp. 137-139; and Sciout, "Le Directoire," vol ii., chs.

v. and vii.]

[Footnote 77: Sorel, "Bonaparte et Hoche en 1797," p. 65.]

[Footnote 78: Letter of April 30th, 1797.]

[Footnote 79: Letter of May 13th, 1797.]

[Footnote 80: It would even seem, from Bonaparte's letter of July

12th, 1797, that not till then did he deign to send on to Paris the

terms of the treaty with Venice. He accompanied it with the cynical

suggestion that they could do what they liked with the treaty, and

even annul it!]

[Footnote 81: The name _Italian_ was rejected by Bonaparte as too

aggressively nationalist; but the prefix _Cis_--applied to a State

which stretched southward to the Rubicon--was a concession to Italian

nationality. It implied that Florence or Rome was the natural capital

of the new State.]

[Footnote 82: See Arnault's "Souvenirs d'un sexagénaire" (vol. iii.,

p. 31) and Levy's "Napoléon intime," p. 131.]

[Footnote 83: For the subjoined version of the accompanying new letter

of Bonaparte (referred to in my Preface) I am indebted to Mr. H.A.L.

Fisher, in the "Eng. Hist. Rev.," July, 1900:

"Milan, 29 Thermidor [l'an IV.]

"À LA CITOYENNE TALLIEN

"Je vous dois des remerciements, belle citoyenne, pour le souvenir

que vous me conservez et pour les choses aimables contenues dans

votre apostille. Je sais bien qu'en vous disant que je regrette les

moments heureux que j'ai passé dans votre société je ne vous répète

que ce que tout le monde vous dit. Vous connaître c'est ne plus

pouvoir vous oublier: être loin de votre aimable personne lorsque

l'on a goûté les charmes de votre société c'est désirer vivement de

s'en rapprocher; mais l'on dit que vous allez en Espagne. Fi! c'est

très vilain à moins que vous ne soyez de retour avant trois mois,

enfin que cet hiver nous ayons le bonheur de vous voir à Paris.

Allez donc en Espagne visiter la caverne de Gil Blas. Moi je crois

aussi visiter toutes les antiquités possibles, enfin que dans le

cours de novembre jusqu'à février nous puissions raconter sans

cesse. Croyez-moi avec toute la considération, je voulais dire le

respect, mais je sais qu'en général les jolies femmes n'aiment pas

ce mot-là.

"BONAPARTE.

"Mille e mille chose à Tallien."]

[Footnote 84: Lavalette, "Méms.," ch. xiii.; Barras, "Méms.," vol.

ii., pp. 511-512; and Duchesse d'Abrantès, "Méms.," vol. i., ch.

xxviii.]

[Footnote 85: Barras, "Méms.," vol. ii., ch, xxxi.; Madame de Staël,

"Directoire," ch. viii.]

[Footnote 86: "Mémoires de Gohier"; Roederer, "Oeuvres," tome iii., p.

294.]

[Footnote 87: Brougham, "Sketches of Statesmen"; Ste. Beuve,

"Talleyrand"; Lady Blennerhasset, "Talleyrand."]

[Footnote 88: Instructions of Talleyrand to the French envoys

(September 11th); also Ernouf's "Maret, Duc de Bassano," chs. xxvii.

and xxviii., for the _bona fides_ of Pitt in these negotiations.

It seems strange that Baron du Casse, in his generally fair treatment

of the English case, in his "Négociations relatives aux Traités de

Lunéville et d'Amiens," should have prejudiced his readers at the

outset by referring to a letter which he attributes to Lord

Malmesbury. It bears no date, no name, and purports to be "Une Lettre

de Lord Malmesbury, oubliée à Lille." How could the following

sentences have been penned by Malmesbury, and written to Lord

Grenville?--"Mais enfin, outre les regrets sincères de Méot et des

danseuses de l'Opéra, j'eus la consolation de voir en quittant Paris,

que des Français et une multitude de nouveaux convertis à la religion

catholique m'accompagnaient de leurs voeux, de leurs prières, et

presque de leurs larmes.... L'évènement de Fructidor porta la

désolation dans le coeur de tous les bons ennemis de la France. Pour

ma part, j'en fut consterné: _je ne l'avais point prévu_." It is

obviously the clumsy fabrication of a Fructidorian, designed for

Parisian consumption: it was translated by a Whig pamphleteer under

the title "The Voice of Truth!"--a fit sample of that partisan

malevolence which distorted a great part of our political literature

in that age.]

[Footnote 89: Bonaparte's letters of September 28th and October 7th to

Talleyrand.]

[Footnote 90: See too Marsh's "Politicks of Great Britain and France,"

ch. xiii.; "Correspondence of W.A. Miles on the French Revolution,"

letters of January 7th and January 18th, 1793; also Sybel's "Europe

during the French Revolution," vol. ii.]

[Footnote 91: Pallain, "Le Ministère de Talleyrand sous le

Directoire," p. 42.]

[Footnote 92: Bourrienne, "Memoirs," vol. i., ch. xii. See too the

despatch of Sandoz-Rollin to Berlin of February 28th, 1798, in

Bailleu's "Preussen und Frankreich," vol. i., No. 150.]

[Footnote 93: The italics are my own. I wish to call attention to the

statement in view of the much-debated question whether in 1804-5

Napoleon intended to invade our land, _unless he gained maritime

supremacy_. See Desbrière's "Projets de Débarquement aux Iles

Britanniques," vol. i., _ad fin_.]

[Footnote 94: Letter of October 10th, 1797; see too those of August

16th and September 13th.]

[Footnote 95: The plan of menacing diverse parts of our coasts was kept

up by Bonaparte as late as April 13th, 1798. In his letter of this

date he still speaks of the invasion of England and Scotland, and

promises to return from Egypt in three or four months, so as to

proceed with the invasion of the United Kingdom. Boulay de la Meurthe,

in his work, "Le Directoire et l'Expédition d'Egypte," ch. i., seems

to take this promise seriously. In any case the Directors' hopes for

the invasion of Ireland were dashed by the premature rising of the

Irish malcontents in May, 1798. For Poussielgue's mission to Malta,

see Lavalette's "Mems.," ch. xiv.]

[Footnote 96: Mallet du Pan states that three thousand Vaudois came to

Berne to join in the national defence: "Les cantons démocratiques sont

les plus fanatisés contre les Français"--a suggestive remark.]

[Footnote 97: Dändliker, "Geschichte der Schweiz," vol. iii., p. 350

(edition of 1895); also Lavisse, "La Rév. Franç.," p. 821.]

[Footnote 98: "Correspondance," No. 2676.]

[Footnote 99: "Foreign Office Records," Malta (No. 1). Mr. Williams

states in his despatch of June 30th, 1798, that Bonaparte knew there

were four thousand Maltese in his favour, and that most of the French

knights were publicly known to be so; but he adds: "I do believe the

Maltees [_sic_] have given the island to the French in order to get

rid of the knighthood."]

[Footnote 100: I am indebted for this fact to the Librarian of the

Priory of the Knights of St. John, Clerkenwell.]

[Footnote 101: See, for a curious instance, Chaptal, "Mes Souvenirs,"

p. 243.]

[Footnote 102: The Arab accounts of these events, drawn up by Nakoula

and Abdurrahman, are of much interest. They have been well used by M.

Dufourcq, editor of Desvernois' "Memoirs," for many suggestive

footnotes.]

[Footnote 103: Desgenettes, "Histoire médicale de l'Armée d'Orient"

(Paris, 1802); Belliard, "Mémoires," vol. i.]

[Footnote 104: I have followed chiefly the account of Savary, Duc de

Rovigo, "Mems.," ch. iv. See too Desvernois, "Mems.," ch. iv.]

[Footnote 105: See his orders published in the "Correspondance

officielle et confid. de Nap. Bonaparte, Egypte," vol. i. (Paris,

1819, p. 270). They rebut Captain Mahan's statement ("Influence of Sea

Power upon the Fr. Rev. and Emp.," vol. i., p. 263) as to Brueys'

"delusion and lethargy" at Aboukir. On the contrary, though enfeebled

by dysentery and worried by lack of provisions and the insubordination

of his marines, he certainly did what he could under the

circumstances. See his letters in the Appendix of Jurien de la

Graviere, "Guerres Maritimes," vol. i.]

[Footnote 106: Desvernois, "Mems.," ch. v.]

[Footnote 107: _Ib._, ch. vi.]

[Footnote 108: Order of July 27th, 1798.]

[Footnote 109: Ducasse, "Les Rois, Frères de Napoléon," p. 8.]

[Footnote 110: "Mémoires de Napoléon," vol. ii.; Bourrienne, "Mems.,"

vol. i., ch. xvii.]

[Footnote 111: "Méms. de Berthier."]

[Footnote 112: On November 4th, 1798, the French Government forwarded

to Bonaparte, in triplicate copies, a despatch which, after setting

forth the failure of their designs on Ireland, urged him either (1) to

remain in Egypt, of which they evidently disapproved, or (2) to march

towards India and co-operate with Tippoo Sahib, or (3) to advance on

Constantinople in order that France might have a share in the

partition of Turkey, which was then being discussed between the Courts

of Petersburg and Vienna. No copy of this despatch seems to have

reached Bonaparte before he set out for Syria (February 10th). This

curious and perhaps guileful despatch is given in full by Boulay de la

Meurthe, "Le Directoire et l'Expédition d'Egypte," Appendix, No. 5.

On the whole, I am compelled to dissent from Captain Mahan ("Influence

of Sea Power," vol. i., pp. 324-326), and to regard the larger schemes

of Bonaparte in this Syrian enterprise as visionary.]

[Footnote 113: Berthier, "Mémoires"; Belliard, "Bourrienne et ses

Erreurs," also corrects Bourrienne. As to the dearth of food, denied

by Lanfrey, see Captain Krettly, "Souvenirs historiques."]

[Footnote 114: Emouf, "Le General Kléber," p. 201.]

[Footnote 115: "Admiralty Records," Mediterranean, No. 19.]

[Footnote 116: "Corresp.," No. 4124; Lavalette, "Mems.," ch. xxi.]

[Footnote 117: Sidney Smith's "Despatch to Nelson" of May 30th, 1799.]

[Footnote 118: J. Miot's words are: "Mais s'il en faut croire cette

voix publique, trop souvent organe de la vérité tardive, qu'en vain

les grands espèrent enchaîner, c'est un fait trop avéré que quelques

blessés du Mont Carmel et une grande partie des malades à l'hôpital de

Jaffa ont péri par les médicaments qui leur ont été administrés." Can

this be called evidence?]

[Footnote 119: Larrey, "Relation historique"; Lavalette, "Mems.," ch.

xxi.]

[Footnote 120: See Belliard, "Bourrienne et ses Erreurs"; also a

letter of d'Aure, formerly Intendant General of this army, to the

"Journal des Débats" of April 16th, 1829, in reply to Bourrienne.]

[Footnote 121: "On disait tout haut qu'il se sauvait lâchement," Merme

in Guitry's "L'Armée en Egypte." But Bonaparte had prepared for this

discouragement and worse eventualities by warning Kléber in the letter

of August 22nd, 1799, that if he lost 1,500 men by the plague he was

free to treat for the evacuation of Egypt.]

[Footnote 122: Lucien Bonaparte, "Mémoires," vol. ii., ch. xiv.]

[Footnote 123: In our "Admiralty Records" (Mediterranean, No. 21) are

documents which prove the reality of Russian designs on Corsica.]

[Footnote 124: "Consid. sur la Rév. Française," bk. iii., ch. xiii.

See too Sciout, "Le Directoire," vol. iv., chs. xiii.-xiv.]

[Footnote 125: La Réveillière-Lépeaux, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xliv.;

Hyde de Neuville, vol. i., chs. vi.-vii.; Lavisse, "Rév. Française,"

p. 394.]

[Footnote 126: Barras, "Mems.," vol. iv., ch. ii.]

[Footnote 127: "Hist. of the United States" (1801-1813), by H. Adams,

vol. i., ch. xiv., and Ste. Beuve's "Talleyrand."]

[Footnote 128: Gohier, "Mems.," vol. i.; Lavalette's "Mems.," ch.

xxii.; Roederer, "OEuvres," vol. iii., p. 301; Madelin's "Fouché," p.

267.]

[Footnote 129: For the story about Aréna's dagger, raised against

Bonaparte see Sciout, vol. iv., p. 652. It seems due to Lucien

Bonaparte. I take the curious details about Bonaparte's sudden pallor

from Roederer ("Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 302), who heard it from

Montrond, Talleyrand's secretary. So Aulard, "Hist, de la Rév. Fr.,"

p. 699.]

[Footnote 130: Napoleon explained to Metternich in 1812 why he wished

to silence the _Corps Législatif_; "In France everyone runs after

applause: they want to be noticed and applauded.... Silence an

Assembly, which, if it is anything, must be deliberative, and you

discredit it."--Metternich's "Memoirs," vol. i., p. 151.]

[Footnote 131: This was still further assured by the first elections

under the new system being postponed till 1801; the functionaries

chosen by the Consuls were then placed on the lists of notabilities of

the nation without vote. The constitution was put in force Dec. 25th,

1799.]

[Footnote 132: Roederer, "Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 303. He was the

go-between for Bonaparte and Sieyès.]

[Footnote 133: See the "Souvenirs" of Mathieu Dumas for the skilful

manner in which Bonaparte gained over the services of this

constitutional royalist and employed him to raise a body of volunteer

horse.]

[Footnote 134: "Lettres inédites de Napoléon," February 21st, 1800;

"Mémoires du Général d'Andigné," ch. xv.; Madelin's "Fouché," p. 306.]

[Footnote 135: "Georges Cadoudal," par son neveu, G. de Cadoudal; Hyde

de Neuville, vol. i., p. 305.]

[Footnote 136: Talleyrand, "Mems.," vol. i., part ii.; Marmont, bk.

v.]

[Footnote 137: "F.O.," Austria, No. 58; "Castlereagh's Despatches," v.

_ad init._ Bowman, in his excellent monograph, "Preliminary Stages of

the Peace of Amiens" (Toronto, 1899), has not noted this.]

[Footnote 138: "Nap. Correspond.," February 27th 1800; Thugut,

"Briefe" vol. ii., pp. 444-446; Oncken, "Zeitalter," vol. ii. p. 45.]

[Footnote 139: A Foreign Office despatch, dated Downing Street,

February 8th, 1800, to Vienna, promised a loan and that 15,000 or

20,000 British troops should be employed in the Mediterranean to act

in concert with the Austrians there, and to give "support to the

royalist insurrections in the southern provinces of France." No

differences of opinion respecting Piedmont can be held a sufficient

excuse for the failure of the British Government to fulfil this

promise--a failure which contributed to the disaster at Marengo.]

[Footnote 140: Thiers attributes this device to Bonaparte; but the

First Consul's bulletin of May 24th ascribes it to Marmont and

Gassendi.]

[Footnote 141: Marbot, "Mems.," ch. ix.; Allardyce, "Memoir of Lord

Keith," ch. xiii.; Thiébault's "Journal of the Blockade of Genoa."]

[Footnote 142: That Melas expected such a march is clear from a letter

of his of May 23rd, dated from Savillan, to Lord Keith, which I have

found in the "Brit. Admiralty Records" (Mediterranean, No. 22), where

he says: "L'ennemi a cerné le fort de Bard et s'est avancé jusque sous

le château d'Ivrée. Il est clair que son but est de délivrer

Masséna."]

[Footnote 143: Bonaparte did not leave Milan till June 9th: see

"Correspondance" and the bulletin of June 10th. Jomini places his

departure for the 7th, and thereby confuses his description for these

two days. Thiers dates it on June 8th.]

[Footnote 144: Lord W. Bentinck reported to the Brit. Admiralty

("Records," Meditn., No. 22), from Alessandria, on June 15th: "I am

sorry to say that General Elsnitz's corps, which was composed of the

grenadiers of the finest regiments in the (Austrian) army, arrived

here in the most deplorable condition. His men had already suffered

much from want of provisions and other hardships. He was pursued in

his retreat by Genl. Suchet, who had with him about 7,000 men. There

was an action at Ponte di Nava, in which the French failed; and it

will appear scarcely credible, when I tell your Lordship, that the

Austrians lost in this retreat, from fatigue only, near 5,000 men; and

I have no doubt that Genl. Suchet will notify this to the world as a

great victory."]

[Footnote 145: The inaccuracy of Marbot's "Mémoires" is nowhere more

glaring than in his statement that Marengo must have gone against the

French if Ott's 25,000 Austrians from Genoa had joined their comrades.

As a matter of fact, Ott, with 16,000 men, had _already_ fought with

Lannes at Montebello; and played a great part in the battle of

Marengo.]

[Footnote 146: "Corresp.," vol. vi., p. 365. Fournier, "Hist. Studien

und Skizzen," p. 189, argues that the letter was written from Milan,

and dated from Marengo for effect.]

[Footnote 147: See Czartoryski's "Memoirs," ch. xi., and Driault's "La

Question d'Orient," ch. iii. The British Foreign Office was informed

of the plan. In its records (No. 614) is a memoir (pencilled on the

back January 31st, 1801) from a M. Leclerc to Mr. Flint, referring the

present proposal back to that offered by M. de St. Génie to Catherine

II., and proposing that the first French step should be the seizure of

Socotra and Perim.]

[Footnote 148: Garden, "Traités," vol. vi., ch. xxx.; Captain Mahan's

"Life of Nelson," vol. ii., ch. xvi.; Thiers, "Consulate," bk. ix. For

the assassination of the Czar Paul see "Kaiser Paul's Ende," von R.R.

(Stuttgart, 1897); also Czartoryski's "Memoirs," chs. xiii.-xiv. For

Bonaparte's offer of a naval truce to us and his overture of December,

1800, see Bowman, _op. cit_.]

[Footnote 149: Pasquier, " Mems.," vol. i., ch. ii., p. 299. So too

Mollien, "Mems.": "With an insatiable activity in details, a

restlessness of mind always eager for new cares, he not only reigned

and governed, he continued to administer not only as Prime Minister,

but more minutely than each Minister."]

[Footnote 150: Lack of space prevents any account of French finances

and the establishment of the Bank of France. But we may note here that

the collection of the national taxes was now carried out by a

State-appointed director and his subordinates in every Department--a

plan which yielded better results than former slipshod methods. The

_conseil général_ of the Department assessed the direct taxes among

the smaller areas. "Méms." de Gaudin, Duc de Gaëte.]

[Footnote 151: Edmond Blanc, "Napoléon I; ses Institutions," p. 27.]

[Footnote 152: Theiner, "Hist. des deux Concordats," vol. i., p. 21.]

[Footnote 153: Thibaudeau estimated that of the population of

35,000,000 the following assortment might be made: Protestants, Jews,

and Theophilanthropists, 3,000,000; Catholics, 15,000,000, equally

divided between orthodox and constitutionals; and as many as

17,000,000 professing no belief whatever.]

[Footnote 154: See Roederer, "Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 475. On the

discontent of the officers, see Pasquier's "Mems.," vol. i., ch. vii.;

also Marmont's "Mems.," bk. vi.]

[Footnote 155: See the drafts in Count Boulay de la Meurthe's

"Négociation du Concordat," vol. ii., pp. 58 and 268.]

[Footnote 156: Theiner, vol. i., pp. 193 and 196.]

[Footnote 157: Méneval, "Mems.," vol. i., p. 81.]

[Footnote 158: Thiers omits any notice of this strange transaction.

Lanfrey describes it, but unfortunately relies on the melodramatic

version given in Consalvi's "Memoirs," which were written many years

later and are far less trustworthy than the Cardinal's letters written

at the time. In his careful review of all the documentary evidence,

Count Boulay de la Meurthe (vol. iii., p. 201, note) concludes that

the new project of the Concordat (No. VIII.) was drawn up by

Hauterive, was "submitted immediately to the approbation of the

First Consul," and thereupon formed the basis of the long and

heated discussion of July 14th between the Papal and French

plenipotentiaries. A facsimile of this interesting document, with all

the erasures, is appended at the end of his volume.]

[Footnote 159: Pasquier, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. vii. Two of the organic

articles portended the abolition of the revolutionary calendar. The

first restored the old names of the days of the week; the second

ordered that Sunday should be the day of rest for all public

functionaries. The observance of _décadis_ thenceforth ceased; but the

months of the revolutionary calendar were observed until the close of

the year 1805. Theophilanthropy was similarly treated: when its

votaries applied for a building, their request was refused on the

ground that their cult came within the domain of philosophy, not of

any actual religion! A small number of priests and of their

parishioners refused to recognize the Concordat; and even to-day there

are a few of these _anti-concordataires_.]

[Footnote 160: Chaptal, "Souvenirs," pp. 237-239. Lucien Bonaparte,

"Mems.," vol. ii., p. 201, quotes his brother Joseph's opinion of the

Concordat: "Un pas rétrograde et irréfléchi de la nation qui s'y

soumettait."]

[Footnote 161: Thibaudeau, "Consulat," ch. xxvi.]

[Footnote 162: "Code Napoléon," art. 148.]

[Footnote 163: In other respects also Bonaparte's influence was used

to depress the legal status of woman, which the men of 1789 had done

so much to raise. In his curious letter of May 15th, 1807, on the

Institution at Ecouen, we have his ideas on a sound, useful education

for girls: "... We must begin with religion in all its severity. Do

not admit any modification of this. Religion is very important in a

girls' public school: it is the surest guarantee for mothers and

husbands. We must train up believers, not reasoners. The weakness of

women's brains, the unsteadiness of their ideas, their function in the

social order, their need of constant resignation and of a kind of

indulgent and easy charity--all can only be attained by religion."

They were to learn a little geography and history, but no foreign

language; above all, to do plenty of needlework.]

[Footnote 164: Sagnac, "Législation civile de la Rév. Fr.," p. 293.]

[Footnote 165: Divorce was suppressed in 1816, but was re-established

in 1884.]

[Footnote 166: Sagnac, _op. cit._, p. 352.]

[Footnote 167: "The Life of Sir S. Romilly," vol. i., p. 408.]

[Footnote 168: Madelin in his "Fouché," ch. xi., shows how Bonaparte's

private police managed the affair. Harel was afterwards promoted to

the governorship of the Castle of Vincennes: the four talkers, whom he

and the police had lured on, were executed after the affair of Nivôse.

That dextrous literary flatterer, the poet Fontanes, celebrated the

"discovery" of the Aréna plot by publishing anonymously a pamphlet ("A

Parallel between Caesar, Cromwell, Monk, and Bonaparte") in which he

decided that no one but Caesar deserved the honour of a comparison

with Bonaparte, and that certain destinies were summoning him to a yet

higher title. The pamphlet appeared under the patronage of Lucien

Bonaparte, and so annoyed his brother that he soon despatched him on a

diplomatic mission to Madrid as a punishment for his ill-timed

suggestions.]

[Footnote 169: Thibaudeau, _op. cit_., vol. ii., p. 55. Miot de

Melito, ch. xii.]

[Footnote 170: It seems clear, from the evidence so frankly given by

Cadoudal in his trial in 1804, as well as from his expressions when he

heard of the affair of Nivôse, that the hero of the Chouans had no

part in the bomb affair. He had returned to France, had empowered St.

Réjant to buy arms and horses, "dont je me servirai plus tard"; and it

seems certain that he intended to form a band of desperate men who

were to waylay, kidnap, or kill the First Consul in open fight. This

plan was deferred by the bomb explosion for three years. As soon as he

heard of this event, he exclaimed: "I'll bet that it was that---- St.

Réjant. He has upset all my plans." (See "Georges Cadoudal," par G. de

Cadoudal.)]

[Footnote 171: Roederer, "Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 352. For these

negotiations see Bowman's "Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens"

(Toronto, 1899).]

[Footnote 172: Porter, "Progress of the Nation," ch. xiv.]

[Footnote 173: "New Letters of Napoleon I." See too his letter of June

17th.]

[Footnote 174: "Cornwallis Correspondence," vol. iii., pp. 380-382.

Few records exist of the negotiations between Lord Hawkesbury and M.

Otto at London. I have found none in the Foreign Office archives. The

general facts are given by Garden, "Traités," vol. vii., ch. xxxi.;

only a few of the discussions were reduced to writing. This seriously

prejudiced our interests at Amiens.]

[Footnote 175: Lefebvre, "Cabinets de l'Europe," ch. iv]

[Footnote 176: Chaptal. "Mes Souvenirs," pp. 287, 291, and 359.]

[Footnote 177: See Chapter XIV. of this work.]

[Footnote 178: Thibaudeau, _op. cit_., ch. xxvi.; Lavisse, "Napoléon,"

ch. i.]

[Footnote 179: "A Diary of St. Helena," by Lady Malcolm, p. 97.]

[Footnote 180: "The Two Duchesses," edited by Vere Foster, p. 172.

Lord Malmesbury ("Diaries," vol. iv., p. 257) is less favourable:

"When B. is out of his ceremonious habits, his language is often

coarse and vulgar."]

[Footnote 181: Jurien de la Graviere, "Guerres Maritimes," vol. ii.,

chap. vii.]

[Footnote 182: These facts were fully acknowledged later by Otto: see

his despatch of January 6th, 1802, to Talleyrand, published by Du

Casse in his "Négociations relatives au Traité d'Amiens," vol. iii.]

[Footnote 183: "F.O.," France, No. 59. The memoir is dated October

19th, 1801.]

[Footnote 184: "F.O.," France, No. 59.]

[Footnote 185: Castlereagh, "Letters and Despatches," Second Series,

vol. i., p. 62, and the speeches of Ministers on November 3rd, 1801.]

[Footnote 186: Cornwallis, "Correspondence," vol. iii., despatch of

December 3rd, 1801. The feelings of the native Maltese were strongly

for annexation to Britain, and against the return of the Order at all.

They sent a deputation to London (February, 1802), which was shabbily

treated by our Government so as to avoid offending Bonaparte. (See

"Correspondence of W.A. Miles," vol. ii., pp. 323-329, who drew up

their memorial.)]

[Footnote 187: Cornwallis's despatches of January 10th and 23rd,

1802.]

[Footnote 188: Project of a treaty forwarded by Cornwallis to London

on December 27th, 1801, in the Public Record Office, No. 615.]

[Footnote 189: See the "Paget Papers," vol. ii. France gained the

right of admission to the Black Sea: the despatches of Mr. Merry from

Paris in May, 1802, show that France and Russia were planning schemes

of partition of Turkey. ("F.O.," France, No. 62.)]

[Footnote 190: The despatches of March 14th and 22nd, 1802, show how

strong was the repugnance of our Government to this shabby treatment

of the Prince of Orange; and it is clear that Cornwallis exceeded his

instructions in signing peace on those terms. (See Garden, vol. vii.,

p. 142.) By a secret treaty with Prussia (May, 1802), France procured

Fulda for the House of Orange.]

[Footnote 191: Pasolini, "Memorie," _ad init_.]

[Footnote 192: "Lettres inédites de Talleyrand à Napoléon" (Paris,

1889).]

[Footnote 193: Mr. Jackson's despatch of February 17th, 1802, from

Paris. According to Miot de Melito ("Mems.," ch. xiv.), Bonaparte had

offered the post of President to his brother Joseph, but fettered it

by so many restrictions that Joseph declined the honour.]

[Footnote 194: Roederer tells us ("OEuvres," vol. iii., p. 428) that

he had drawn up two plans of a constitution for the Cisalpine; the one

very short and leaving much to the President, the other precise and

detailed. He told Talleyrand to advise Bonaparte to adopt the former

as it was "_short and_"--he was about to add "_clear_" when the

diplomatist cut him short with the words, "_Yes: short and obscure!_"]

[Footnote 195: Napoleon's letter of February 2nd, 1802, to Joseph

Bonaparte; see too Cornwallis's memorandum of February 18th.]

[Footnote 196: It is only fair to Cornwallis to quote the letter,

marked "Private," which he received from Hawkesbury at the same time

that he was bidden to stand firm:

"DOWNING STREET, _March 22nd_, 1802.

"I think it right to inform you that I have had a confidential

communication with Otto, who will use his utmost endeavours to induce

his Government to agree to the articles respecting the Prince of

Orange and the prisoners in the shape in which they are now proposed.

I have very little doubt of his success, and I should hope therefore

that you will soon be released. I need not remind you of the

importance of sending your most expeditious messenger the moment our

fate is determined. The Treasury is almost exhausted, and Mr.

Addington cannot well make his loan in the present state of

uncertainty."]

[Footnote 197: See the British notes of November 6th-16th, 1801, in

the "Cornwallis Correspondence," vol. iii. In his speech in the House

of Lords, May 13th, 1802, Lord Grenville complained that we had had to

send to the West Indies in time of peace a fleet double as large as

that kept there during the late war.]

[Footnote 198: For these and the following negotiations see Lucien

Bonaparte's "Mémoires," vol. ii., and Garden's "Traités de Paix," vol.

iii., ch. xxxiv. The Hon. H. Taylor, in "The North American Review" of

November, 1898, has computed that the New World was thus divided in

1801:

Spain 7,028,000 square miles.

Great Britain 3,719,000 " "

Portugal 3,209,000 " "

United States 827,000 " "

Russia 577,000 " "

France 29,000 " "

[Footnote 199: "History of the United States, 1801-1813," by H. Adams,

vol. i, p. 409.]

[Footnote 200: Napoleon's letter of November 2nd, 1802.]

[Footnote 201: Merry's despatch of October 21st, 1802.]

[Footnote 202: The instructions which he sent to Victor supply an

interesting commentary on French colonial policy: "The system of this,

as of all our other colonies, should be to concentrate its commerce in

the national commerce: it should especially aim at establishing its

relations with our Antilles, so as to take the place in those colonies

of the American commerce.... The captain-general should abstain from

every innovation favourable to strangers, who should be restricted to

such communications as are absolutely indispensable to the prosperity

of Louisiana."]

[Footnote 203: Lucien Bonaparte, "Mémoires," vol. ii., ch. ix. He

describes Josephine's alarm at this ill omen at a time when rumours of

a divorce were rife.]

[Footnote 204: Harbé-Marbois, "Hist. de Louisiana," quoted by H.

Adams, _op. cit._, vol. ii., p. 27; Roloff, "Napoleon's Colonial

Politik."]

[Footnote 205: Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., ch. xxxiv. See too

Roederer, "Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 461, for Napoleon's expressions

after dinner on January 11th, 1803: "Maudit sucre, maudit café,

maudites colonies."]

[Footnote 206: Cornwallis, "Correspondence," vol. iii., despatch of

December 3rd, 1801.]

[Footnote 207: See the valuable articles on General Decaen's papers in

the "Revue historique" of 1879 and of 1881.]

[Footnote 208: Dumas' "Précis des Événements Militaires," vol. xi., p.

189. The version of these instructions presented by Thiers, book xvi.,

is utterly misleading.]

[Footnote 209: Lord Whitworth, our ambassador in Paris, stated

(despatch of March 24th, 1803) that Decaen was to be quietly

reinforced by troops in French pay sent out by every French, Spanish,

or Dutch ship going to India, so as to avoid attracting notice.

("England and Napoleon," edited by Oscar Browning, p. 137.)]

[Footnote 210: See my article, "The French East India Expedition at

the Cape," and unpublished documents in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." of

January, 1900. French designs on the Cape strengthened our resolve to

acquire it, as we prepared to do in the summer of 1805.]

[Footnote 211: Wellesley, "Despatches," vol. iii., Appendix, despatch

of August 1st, 1803. See too Castlereagh's "Letters and Despatches,"

Second Series, vol. i., pp. 166-176, for Lord Elgin's papers and

others, all of 1802, describing the utter weakness of Turkey, the

probability of Egypt falling to any invader, of Caucasia and Persia

being menaced by Russia, and the need of occupying Aden as a check to

any French designs on India from Suez.]

[Footnote 212: Wellesley's despatch of July 13th, 1804: with it he

inclosed an intercepted despatch, dated Pondicherry, August 6th, 1803,

a "Mémoire sur l'Importance actuelle de l'Inde et les moyens les plus

efficaces d'y rétablir la Nation Française dans son ancienne

splendeur." The writer, Lieutenant Lefebvre, set forth the

unpopularity of the British in India and the immense wealth which

France could gain from its conquest.]

[Footnote 213: The report of the Imaum is given in Castlereagh's

"Letters," Second Series, vol. i., p. 203.]

[Footnote 214: "Voyage de Découverte aux Terres Australes sur les

Corvettes, le Géographe et le Naturaliste," rédigé par M.F. Péron

(Paris, 1807-15). From the Atlas the accompanying map has been

copied.]

[Footnote 215: His later mishaps may here be briefly recounted. Being

compelled to touch at the Ile de France for repairs to his ship, he

was there seized and detained as a spy by General Decaen, until the

chivalrous intercession of the French explorer, Bougainville, finally

availed to procure his release in the year 1810. The conduct of Decaen

was the more odious, as the French crews during their stay at Sydney

in the autumn of 1802, when the news of the Peace of Amiens was as yet

unknown, had received not only much help in the repair of their ships,

but most generous personal attentions, officials and private persons

at Sydney agreeing to put themselves on short rations in that season

of dearth in order that the explorers might have food. Though this

fact was brought to Decaen's knowledge by the brother of Commodore

Baudin, he none the less refused to acknowledge the validity of the

passport which Flinders, as a geographical explorer, had received from

the French authorities, but detained him in captivity for seven years.

For the details see "A Voyage of Discovery to the Australian Isles,"

by Captain Flinders (London, 1814), vol. ii., chs. vii.-ix. The names

given by Flinders on the coasts of Western and South Australia have

been retained owing to the priority of his investigation: but the

French names have been kept on the coast between the mouth of the

Murray and Bass Strait for the same reason.]

[Footnote 216: See Baudin's letter to King of December 23rd, 1803, in

vol. v. (Appendix) of "Historical Records of New South Wales," and the

other important letters and despatches contained there, as also

_ibid_., pp. 133 and 376.]

[Footnote 217: Mr. Merry's ciphered despatch from Paris, May 7th,

1802.]

[Footnote 218: It is impossible to enter into the complicated question

of the reconstruction of Germany effected in 1802-3. A general

agreement had been made at Rastadt that, as an indemnity for the

losses of German States in the conquest of the Rhineland by France,

they should receive the ecclesiastical lands of the old Empire. The

Imperial Diet appointed a delegation to consider the whole question;

but before this body assembled (on August 24th, 1802), a number of

treaties had been secretly made at Paris, with the approval of Russia,

which favoured Prussia and depressed Austria. Austria received the

archbishoprics of Trent and Brixen: while her Archdukes (formerly of

Tuscany and Modena) were installed in Salzburg and Breisgau. Prussia,

as the _protégé_ of France, gained Hildesheim, Paderborn, Erfurt, the

city of Münster, etc. Bavaria received Würzburg, Bamberg, Augsburg,

Passau, etc. See Garden, "Traités," vol. vii., ch. xxxii.; "Annual

Register" of 1802, pp. 648-665; Oncken, "Consulat und Kaiserthum,"

vol. ii.; and Beer's "Zehn Jahre Oesterreichischer Politik."]

[Footnote 219: The British notes of April 28th and May 8th, 1803,

again demanded a suitable indemnity for the King of Sardinia.]

[Footnote 220: See his letters of January 28th, 1801, February 27th,

March 10th, March 25th, April 10th, and May 16th, published in a work,

"Bonaparte, Talleyrand et Stapfer" (Zürich, 1869).]

[Footnote 221: Daendliker, "Geschichte der Schweiz," vol. iii., p.

418; Muralt's "Reinhard," p. 55; and Stapfer's letter of April 28th:

"Malgré cette apparente neutralité que le gouvernement français

déclare vouloir observer pour le moment, différentes circonstances me

persuadent qu'il a vu avec plaisir passer la direction des affaires

des mains de la majorité du Sénat [helvétique] dans celles de la

minorité du Petit Conseil."]

[Footnote 222: Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., p. 10. Mr. Merry, our

_chargé d'affaires_ at Paris, reported July 21st; "M. Stapfer makes a

boast of having obtained the First Consul's consent to withdraw the

French troops entirely from Switzerland. I learn from some

well-disposed Swiss who are here that such a consent has been given;

but they consider it only as a measure calculated to increase the

disturbances in their country and to furnish a pretext for the French

to enter it again."]

[Footnote 223: Reding, in a pamphlet published shortly after this

time, gave full particulars of his interviews with Bonaparte at Paris,

and stated that he had fully approved of his (Reding's) federal plans.

Neither Bonaparte nor Talleyrand ever denied this.]

[Footnote 224: See "Paget Papers," vol. ii., despatches of October

29th, 1802, and January 28th, 1803.]

[Footnote 225: Napoleon avowed this in his speech to the Swiss

deputies at St. Cloud, December 12th, 1802.]

[Footnote 226: Lord Hawkesbury's note of October 10th, 1802, the

appeal of the Swiss, and the reply of Mr. Moore from Constance, are

printed in full in the papers presented to Parliament, May 18th, 1803.

The Duke of Orleans wrote from Twickenham a remarkable letter to Pitt,

dated October 18th, 1802, offering to go as leader to the Swiss in the

cause of Swiss and of European independence: "I am a natural enemy to

Bonaparte and to all similar Governments....England and Austria can

find in me all the advantages of my being a French prince. Dispose of

me, Sir, and show me the way. I will follow it." See Stanhope's "Life

of Pitt," vol. iii., ch. xxxiii.]

[Footnote 227: See Roederer, "oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 454, for the

curious changes which Napoleon prescribed in the published reports of

these speeches; also Stapfer's despatch of February 3rd, 1803, which

is more trustworthy than the official version in Napoleon's

"Correspondance." This, however, contains the menacing sentence: "It

is recognized by Europe that Italy and Holland, as well as

Switzerland, are at the disposition of France."]

[Footnote 228: It is only fair to say that they had recognized their

mistake and had recently promised equality of rights to the formerly

subject districts and to all classes. See Muralt's "Reinhard," p.

113.]

[Footnote 229: See, _inter alia_, the "Moniteur" of August 8th,

October 9th, November 6th, 1802; of January 1st and 9th, February

19th, 1803.]

[Footnote 230: Lord Whitworth's despatches of February 28th and March

3rd, 1803, in Browning's "England and Napoleon."]

[Footnote 231: Secret instructions to Lord Whitworth, November 14th,

1802.]

[Footnote 232: "Foreign Office Records," Russia, No. 50.]

[Footnote 233: In his usually accurate "Manuel historique de Politique

Etrangère" (vol. ii., p. 238), M. Bourgeois states that in May, 1802,

Lord St. Helens succeeded in persuading the Czar _not_ to give his

guarantee to the clause respecting Malta. Every despatch that I have

read runs exactly counter to this statement: the fact is that the Czar

took umbrage at the treaty and refused to listen to our repeated

requests for his guarantee. Thiers rightly states that the British

Ministry pressed the Czar to give his guarantee, but that France long

neglected to send her application. Why this neglect if she wished to

settle matters?]

[Footnote 234: Castlereagh's "Letters and Despatches," Second Series,

vol. i., pp. 56 and 69; Dumas' "Evénements," ix. 91.]

[Footnote 235: Mémoire of Francis II. to Cobenzl (March 31st, 1801),

in Beer, "Die Orientalische Politik Oesterreichs," Appendix.]

[Footnote 236: "Memoirs," vol. i., ch. xiii.]

[Footnote 237: Ulmann's "Russisch-Preussische Politik, 1801-1806," pp.

10-12.]

[Footnote 238: Warren reported (December 10th, 1802) that Vorontzoff

warned him to be very careful as to the giving up of Malta; and, on

January 19th, Czartoryski told him that "the Emperor wished the

English to keep Malta." Bonaparte had put in a claim for the Morea to

indemnify the Bourbons and the House of Savoy. ("F.O.," Russia, No.

51.)]

[Footnote 239: Browning's "England and Napoleon," pp. 88-91.]

[Footnote 240: "F.O.," France, No. 72.]

[Footnote 241: We were undertaking that mediation. Lord Elgin's

despatch from Constantinople, January 15th, 1803, states that he had

induced the Porte to allow the Mamelukes to hold the province of

Assouan. (Turkey, No. 38.)]

[Footnote 242: Papers presented to Parliament on May 18th, 1803. I

pass over the insults to General Stuart, as Sebastiani on February 2nd

recanted to Lord Whitworth everything he had said, or had been made to

say, on that topic, and mentioned Stuart "in terms of great esteem."

According to Méneval ("Mems.," vol i., ch. iii.), Jaubert, who had

been with Sebastiani, saw a proof of the report, as printed for the

"Moniteur," and advised the omission of the most irritating passages;

but Maret dared not take the responsibility for making such omissions.

Lucien Bonaparte ("Mems.," vol. ii., ch. ix.) has another

version--less credible, I think--that Napoleon himself dictated the

final draft of the report to Sebastiani; and when the latter showed

some hesitation, the First Consul muttered, as the most irritating

passages were read out: "Parbleu, nous verrons si ceci--si cela--ne

décidera pas John Bull à guerroyer." Joseph was much distressed about

it, and exclaimed: "Ah, mon pauvre traité d'Amiens! Il ne tient plus

qu'à un fil."]

[Footnote 243: So Adams's "Hist, of the U.S.," vol. ii., pp. 12-21.]

[Footnote 244: Miot de Melito, "Mems.," vol. i, ch. xv., quotes the

words of Joseph Bonaparte to him: "Let him [Napoleon] once more drench

Europe with blood in a war that he could have avoided, and which, but

for the outrageous mission on which he sent his Sebastiani, would

never have occurred."

Talleyrand laboured hard to persuade Lord Whitworth that Sebastiani's

mission was "solely commercial": Napoleon, in his long conversation

with our ambassador, "did not affect to attribute it to commercial

motives only," but represented it as necessitated by our infraction of

the Treaty of Amiens. This excuse is as insincere as the former. The

instructions to Sebastiani were drawn up on September 5th, 1802, when

the British Ministry was about to fulfil the terms of the treaty

relative to Malta and was vainly pressing Russia and Prussia for the

guarantee of its independence]

[Footnote 245: Despatch of February 21st.]

[Footnote 246: "View of the State of the Republic," read to the Corps

Législatif on February 21st, 1803.]

[Footnote 247: Papers presented to Parliament May 18th, 1803. See too

Pitt's speech, May 23rd, 1803.]

[Footnote 248: See Russell's proclamation of July 22nd to the men of

Antrim that "he doubted not but the French were then fighting in

Scotland." ("Ann. Reg.," 1803, p. 246.) This document is ignored by

Plowden ("Hist. of Ireland, 1801-1810").]

[Footnote249: Despatch of March 14th, 1803. Compare it with the very

mild version in Napoleon's "Corresp.," No. 6636.]

[Footnote 250: Lord Hawkesbury to General Andreossy, March 10th.]

[Footnote 251: Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, April 4th, 1803.]

[Footnote 252: Despatches of April 11th and 18th, 1803.]

[Footnote 253: Whitworth to Hawkesbury, April 23rd.]

[Footnote 254: Czartoryski ("Mems.," vol. i., ch. xiii.) calls him "an

excellent admiral but an indifferent diplomatist--a perfect

representative of the nullity and incapacity of the Addington Ministry

which had appointed him. The English Government was seldom happy in

its ambassadors." So Earl Minto's "Letters," vol. iii., p. 279.]

[Footnote 255: See Lord Malmesbury's "Diaries" (vol. iv., p. 253) as

to the bad results of Whitworth's delay.]

[Footnote 256: Note of May 12th, 1803: see "England and Napoleon," p.

249.]

[Footnote 257: "Corresp.," vol. viii., No. 6743.]

[Footnote 258: See Romilly's letter to Dumont, May 31st, 1803

("Memoirs," vol. i.).]

[Footnote 259: "Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," November 3rd, 1802.

In his letter of May 3rd, 1803, to Lord Whitworth, M. Huber reports

Fouché's outspoken warning in the Senate to Bonaparte: "Vous êtes

vous-même, ainsi que nous, un résultat de la révolution, et la guerre

remet tout en problème. On vous flatte en vous faisant compter sur les

principes révolutionnaires des autres nations: _le résultat de notre

révolution les a anéantis partout._"]

[Footnote 260: A copy of this letter, with the detailed proposals, is

in our Foreign Office archives (Russia, No. 52).]

[Footnote 261: Bourgeois, "Manuel de Politique Etrangère," vol. ii.,

p. 243.]

[Footnote 262: See Castlereagh's "Letters and Despatches," Second

Series, vol. i., pp. 75-82, as to the need of conciliating public

opinion, even by accepting Corfu as a set-off for Malta, provided a

durable peace could thus be secured.]

[Footnote 263: "Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," August 21st, 1803.]

[Footnote 264: Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., p. 191.]

[Footnote 265: Holland was required to furnish 16,000 troops and

maintain 18,000 French, to provide 10 ships of war and 350 gunboats.]

[Footnote 266: "Corresp.," May 23rd, 1803.]

[Footnote 267: Nelson's letters of July 2nd. See too Mahan's "Life of

Nelson," vol. ii., pp. 180-188, and Napoleon's letters of November

24th, 1803, encouraging the Mamelukes to look to France.]

[Footnote 268: "Foreign Office Records," Sicily and Naples, No. 55,

July 25th.]

[Footnote 269: Letter of July 28th, 1803.]

[Footnote 270: "Nap. Corresp.," August 23rd, 1803, and Oncken, ch. v.]

[Footnote 271: "Corresp.," vol. viii., No. 6627.]

[Footnote 272: Lefebvre, "Cabinets de l'Europe," ch. viii.; "Nap.

Corresp.," vol. viii., Nos. 6979, 6985, 7007, 7098, 7113.]

[Footnote 273: The French and Dutch ships in commission were: ships of

the line, 48; frigates, 37; corvettes, 22; gun-brigs, etc., 124;

flotilla, 2,115. (See "Mems. of the Earl of St. Vincent," vol. ii., p.

218.)]

[Footnote 274: Pellew's "Life of Lord Sidmouth," vol. ii., p. 239.]

[Footnote 275: Stanhope's "Life of Pitt," vol. iv., p. 213.]

[Footnote 276: Roederer, " OEuvres," vol. iii., p. 348; Méneval, vol.

i., ch. iv.]

[Footnote 277: Lucien ("Mems.," vol. iii., pp. 315-320) says at

Malmaison; but Napoleon's "Correspondance" shows that it was at St.

Cloud. Masson (" Nap. et sa Famille," ch. xii.) throws doubt on the

story.]

[Footnote 278:_Ibid_., p. 318. The scene was described by Murat: the

real phrase was _coquine_, but it was softened down by Murat to

_maîtresse_.]

[Footnote 279: Miot de Melito, "Mems.," vol. 1., ch. xv. Lucien

settled in the Papal States, where he, the quondam Jacobin and proven

libertine, later on received from the Pope the title of Prince de

Canino.]

[Footnote 280: "Lettres inédites de Napoléon," April 22nd, 1805.]

[Footnote 281: Pasquier, "Mems.," vol. i., p. 167, and Boulay de la

Meurthe, "Les dernières Années du duc d'Enghien," p. 299. An

intriguing royalist of Neufchâtel, Fauche-Borel, had been to England

in 1802 to get the help of the Addington Ministry, but failed. See

Caudrillier's articles in the "Revue Historique," Nov., 1900--March,

1901.]

[Footnote 282: Madelin's "Fouché," vol. i., p. 368, minimizes Fouché's

_rôle_ here.]

[Footnote 283: Desmarest, "Témoignages historiques," pp. 78-82.]

[Footnote 284: "Alliance des Jacobins de France avec le Ministère

Anglais."]

[Footnote 285: Brit. Mus., "Add. MSS.," Nos. 7976 _et seq_.]

[Footnote 286: In our Records (France, No. 71) is a letter of Count

Descars, dated London, March 25th, 1805, to Lord Mulgrave, Minister

for War, rendering an account for various sums advanced by our

Government for the royalist "army."]

[Footnote 287: "Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 96.]

[Footnote 288: "Parl. Debates," April, 1804 (esp. April 16th). The

official denial is, of course, accepted by Alison, ch. xxxviii.]

[Footnote 289: The expression is that of George III., who further

remarked that all the ambassadors despised Hawkesbury. (Rose,

"Diaries," vol. ii., p. 157.) Windham's letter, dated Beaconsfield,

August 16th, 1803, in the Puisaye Papers, warned the French _émigrés_

that they must not count on any aid from Ministers, who had "at all

times shown such feebleness of spirit, that they can scarcely dare to

lift their eyes to such aims as you indicate. ("Add. MSS.," No.

7976.)]

[Footnote 290: See in chapter xxi., p. 488. Our envoy, Spencer Smith,

at Stuttgart, was also taken in by a French spy, Captain Rosey, whose

actions were directed by Napoleon. See his letter (No. 7669).]

[Footnote 291: "F.O.," Austria, No. 68 (October 31st, 1803).]

[Footnote 292: Lavalette, "Mems.," ch. xxiii.; "Georges Cadoudal," by

Georges de Cadoudal (Paris, 1887).]

[Footnote 293: See his letter of January 24th, 1804, to Réal,

instructing him to tell Méhée what falsehoods are to find a place in

Méhée's next bulletin to Drake! "Keep on continually with the affair

of my portfolio."]

[Footnote 294: Miot de Melito, vol. i., ch. xvi.; Pasquier, vol. i.,

ch. vii. See also Desmarest, "Quinze ans de la haute police": his

claim that the police previously knew nothing of the plot is refuted

by Napoleon's letters (e.g., that of November 1st, 1803); as also by

Guilhermy, "Papiers d'un Emigré," p. 122.]

[Footnote 295: Ségur, "Mems.," ch. x. Bonaparte to Murat and Harel,

March 20th.]

[Footnote 296: Letter to Réal, "Corresp.," No. 7639.]

[Footnote 297: The original is in "F.O." (Austria, No. 68).]

[Footnote 298: Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. i., p. 187.]

[Footnote 299: The Comte de Mosbourg's notes in Count Murat's "Murat"

(Paris, 1897), pp. 437-445, prove that Savary did not draw his

instructions for the execution of the duke merely from Murat, but from

Bonaparte himself, who must therefore be held solely responsible for

the composition and conduct of that court. Masson's attempt ("Nap. et

sa Famille," ch. xiv.) to inculpate Murat is very weak.]

[Footnote 300: Hulin in "Catastrophe du duc d'Enghien," p. 118.]

[Footnote 301: Dupin in "Catastrophe du duc d'Enghien," pp. 101, 123.]