THE BATTLE OF THE LYS
April 9-12
The Flanders front--Great German onslaught--Disaster of the
Portuguese--Splendid stand at Givenchy of the Fifty-fifth
Division--Hard fight of the Fortieth Division--Loss of the
Lys--Desperate resistance of the Fiftieth Division--Thirty-fourth
Division is drawn into the Battle--Attack in the north upon the
Ninth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-fifth Divisions--British
retreat--General survey of the situation.
Nearly a hundred German divisions had been used against the British
alone in the great offensive which began on March 21 and ended in the
first week of April. At this time the British forces in France,
including Portuguese and Overseas divisions, numbered sixty in all.
Of these no less than forty-four had been engaged in the great
battle, and all of these were either still in the line, tied to the
Amiens front, or else had been drawn out in a shattered and
disorganised condition, having lost on an average not less than from
4000 to 5000 men each. It will be seen that there was only a very
small margin over, and that if the Germans by a supreme effort had
burst the line and reached the estuary of the Somme, it would have
been possible to have caused a great military disaster. Especially
would this have been the case if the northern flank {224} of the
British could have been driven in as well as the southern, for then
the mutilated and shaken army would have been hurled in upon itself
and would have found itself crowded down upon a sea-coast which would
have given few facilities for embarkation. In the hopes of a débacle
in the south the Germans had prepared out of their huge reserves a
considerable force in the north which would have formed the second
claw of their deadly embrace. When the first claw missed its grip
and could get no farther it was determined that the other should at
least go forward and endeavour to reach the Channel ports. Although
the Somme estuary had not been attained, none the less the Germans
knew well that three-quarters of the whole British force had been
engaged, and that most of it was not fit to take its place in a
renewed battle. Therefore they had reason to hope for great results
from their new offensive in Flanders, and they entered upon it with a
good heart.
The omens were certainly propitious, but there were two factors which
were in favour of the British--factors which could not yet have been
adequately appreciated by the Germans. The first was the new unity
of command under General Foch, a soldier famous for his writings in
peace and for his deeds in war. This great leader, who had
distinguished himself again and again since the first month of the
war, when he had played a vital part in checking the German rush for
Paris, was selected with the cordial consent of every one concerned,
and especially of Sir Douglas Haig, as Generalissimo of the Allied
forces. Therefore a common control and a common policy were ensured,
so that the German chiefs could not {225} turn their whole force upon
half of the Allies with the assurance that the other half would find
the operations outside their war map. Hence the British in Flanders,
though they would have to fight their own battle for a week or two,
could count confidently upon receiving help at the end of that time.
The second and more immediate factor, was that by a fine national
effort a splendid stream of efficient drafts had been despatched from
England during the great battle--young soldiers it is true, but full
of spirit and most eager to meet the Germans and to emulate the great
deeds of their elders. Their training had been short, but it had
been intense and practical, with so excellent a result that one could
but marvel at the old pre-war pundits who insisted that no soldier
could be made under two years. These high-spirited lads flocked into
the depleted battalions, which had often to be reformed from the
beginning, with a skeleton framework of officers and N.C.O.'s upon
which to build. It was of course impossible to assimilate these
drafts in the few days at the disposal of the divisional generals,
but at least they had adequate numbers once more, and they must be
taught to be battle-worthy by being thrown into the battle, as
Spartan fathers have taught their boys to swim.
One more sign of the times was the quick appreciation by the American
authorities of the desperate nature of the crisis all along the
Allied line. With magnanimous public spirit they at once gave
directions that such American troops as were available and had not
yet been formed into special American divisions should be placed
under British or French command and fitted temporarily into their
organisation. The few complete organised American divisions {226} in
France had been on the Alsace line, but some of these were now
brought round to thicken the French army on the Oise. But most
important of all was the effect upon the shipment of American troops,
which had averaged about 50,000 a month and now rose at a bound to
250,000, a number which was sustained or increased for several months
in succession. This result was helped by the whole-hearted
co-operation of the British mercantile marine, which was deflected
from its other very pressing tasks, including the feeding of the
country, in order to carry these troops, and actually handled about
two-thirds of them whilst the British Navy helped to find the
escorts. So efficiently were the transport arrangements carried out
both by British and Americans; that when a million men had been
conveyed they were still able to announce that the losses upon the
voyage were practically nil. Even the lie-fed bemused German public
began to realise in the face of this fact that their much boomed
submarines were only one more of their colossal failures.
The German attack upon the British lines by the army of General von
Quast in Flanders broke on the morning of April 9. There had been
considerable shelling on the day before along the whole line, but as
the hour approached this concentrated with most extreme violence on
the nine-mile stretch from the village of Givenchy in the south to
Fleurbaix, which is just south of Armentières in the north. This
proved to be the area of the actual attack, and against this front
some eight German divisions advanced about 6 o'clock of a misty
morning. So shattering had been their bombardment and so active
their wire-cutters, who were covered {227} by the fog, that the
advanced positions could hardly be said to exist, and they were able
to storm their way at once into the main defences.
The point upon which this attack fell was held the by four divisions,
all of which formed part of Horne's First Army. The general
distribution of the troops at that time was that the Second Army
stretched from the junction with the Belgians near Houthulst Forest
down to the Messines district where it joined the First Army. The
First Army had weakened itself by an extension to the south, and
Plumer's force was about to extend also, and take over the Laventie
district, when the storm suddenly burst upon the very point which was
to be changed.
Two corps were involved in the attack, the Fifteenth (De Lisle) in
the Armentières region, and the Eleventh (Haking) in the region of
Givenchy. The latter had two divisions in the line, Jeudwine's
Fifty-fifth West Lancashire Territorials defending the village and
adjacent lines, while the Portuguese Second Division (Da Costa)
covered the sector upon their left. The depleted Fiftieth Division
(Jackson) was in immediate reserve. On the left of the Portuguese
was Ponsonby's Fortieth Division which had lost five thousand men in
the Somme battle only a fortnight before, and now found itself
plunged once more into one of the fiercest engagements of the war,
where it was exposed again to very heavy losses.
The main force of the German attack fell upon the Portuguese line,
and it was of such strength that no blame can be attached to
inexperienced troops who gave way before so terrific a blow, which
would have been formidable to any soldiers in the world. The
division held the line from 2000 yards south of {228} Richebourg
l'Avoué to the east of Picantin, a frontage of 9350 yards, or more
than half of the total front of the assault. The division had all
three brigades in the line, and even so was very extended to meet a
serious assault. The 3rd Brigade from the First Portuguese Division
was in immediate support. The 5th Brigade was on the right, covering
Le Touret, the 6th in the middle, and the 4th on the left, covering
Laventie. Behind the whole position lay the curve of the River Lys,
a sluggish stream which moves slowly through this desolate plain, the
Golgotha where so many men have died, Indians, French, British, and
German, since the first months of the war. In all that huge flat
canalised space it was only at Givenchy that some small ridge showed
above the dreary expanse.
The Portuguese had been in the line for some months, but had never
experienced anything to approach the severity of the shattering
bombardment which poured upon them from four in the morning. When an
hour or two later the storming columns of the German infantry loomed
through the thick curtain of mist, the survivors were in no condition
to stand such an attack. All telephone and telegraph wires had been
cut within the first half-hour, and it was impossible to direct any
protective barrage. The artillery in the rear, both British and
Portuguese, had been much weakened by a concentration of gas-shells
extending as far as Merville, so that the infantry were left with
insufficient support. The gunners stood to their work like men, and
groups of them continued to fire their guns after the infantry had
left them exposed. These brave men were killed or captured by the
enemy, and their batteries were taken. In the rear the roads had
been so {229} shattered by the German fire that it was impossible to
get a tractor or lorry up to the heavy guns, and there was no way of
removing them. All observers agree that the crews of the heavy guns
did excellently well. The whole front had fallen in, however, and in
spite of scattered groups of infantry who showed the traditional
Portuguese courage--that courage which had caused the great Duke to
place them amongst his best soldiers--the position was in the hands
of the enemy. By mid-day they were at Le Touret upon the right, and
the guns there were blown up and abandoned. About the same time they
had reached Estaires upon the left and Bout Deville in the centre.
Before evening the German line was four miles from its
starting-point, and had reached the River Lawe, a small affluent of
the Lys. From this time onwards the Fiftieth Division, coming up
from the rear, had taken over the front, and the Portuguese were out
of the battle. The Germans in their day's work had taken 6000
prisoners and 100 guns, many of them in ruins. It should be
mentioned that the Portuguese ordeal was the more severe, as
breast-works had taken the place of trenches in this sector. All
were agreed that General da Costa did what was possible. "He is a
fine man, who does not know what fear is," said a British officer who
was with him on the day of the battle.
The caving in of the front of the line had a most serious effect upon
the two British divisions, the Fifty-fifth and the Fortieth, who were
respectively upon the right and the left of the Portuguese. Each was
attacked in front, and each was turned upon the flank and rear. We
shall first consider the case of the Fifty-fifth Division which
defended the lines of {230} Givenchy with an energy and success which
makes this feat one of the outstanding incidents of the campaign.
This fine division of West Lancashire Territorials, containing
several battalions from Liverpool, had some scores to settle with the
Germans, by whom they had been overrun in the surprise at Cambrai at
the end of the last November. At Givenchy they had their glorious
revenge.
The position of the Fifty-fifth Division was a strong one, extending
for some thousands of yards from the hamlet of Le Plantin in the
south to Cailloux in the north, with a section of the old British
line a thousand yards in front, a deserted trench half full of water
and festooned with rusty wire. There were outpost companies along
the scattered line of ruined houses, and a few posts were thrown far
out near the old trench. The village line consisted of a series of
well-concealed breast-works and loopholed walls without any
continuous trench, the whole so cunningly arranged that it was
difficult to get the plan of it from in front. Each post or small
fort had its own independent scheme of defence, with good enfilade
fire, concrete emplacements, belts of wire, and deep ditches.
Very early in the day the left flank of the position had been
entirely exposed by the retirement of the Portuguese, so that during
the whole long and desperate struggle the general formation of the
division was in the shape of an L, the shorter arm being their proper
front, and the longer one facing north and holding up the German
attack from inside the old lines. The northern defensive flank does
not seem to have been entirely improvised, as some precautions of
this nature had already been taken. The new front extended from the
hamlet of Loisne upon the {231} stream of that name, through a second
hamlet called Le Plantin, and so down to the canal. The first strain
of the fighting fell chiefly upon the 165th Brigade (Boyd-Moss),
consisting of three battalions of the famous King's Liverpool
Regiment. The 6th and 7th Battalions were in the line with the 5th
in support at Gorre, but as the day wore on and the pressure
increased, units from both the other brigades were drawn into the
fight, so that all participated in the glory of the victory. By 8.30
the flank was entirely naked, and the Germans in small but audacious
bodies, with a constant rattle of rifle and machine-gun fire, were
pushing in between the outer posts of the British division,
overwhelming and obliterating some of them by a concentrated fire of
trench mortars. Some of these isolated garrisons held out in the
most desperate fashion, and helped to take the pressure off the main
village line. One particularly brilliant example was that of Captain
Armstrong of the 1/4th South Lancashires, who with A Company of that
battalion defended a moated farm, literally to the death, having been
warned that it was a key position.
About mid-day the German attack was still creeping in, and had gained
one important outpost called Princes' Island. The 10th Liverpool
Scots from the 166th Brigade, a battalion which has a great record
for the war, had come up to thicken the line of defenders. Amid the
crash and roar of constant shells, and a storm of bullets which beat
like hail upon every wall and buzzed through every crevice, the
stubborn infantry endured their losses with stoic patience, firing
steadily through their shattered loopholes at any mark they could
see. At 1 o'clock some audacious stormers had got so far forward on
{232} the left that they were in the rear of the Brigade
Headquarters, and were only held there by spare men from the
transport lines who chanced to be available. The attack was drifting
down more and more from the new ground, so about this hour the 5th
South Lancashires, also of the 166th Brigade, were sent across to the
north of Loisne to hold the stream. Each flank was attempted in turn
by the wily assailants, so that when the left proved impervious they
charged in upon the right, and captured Windy Corner, which is near
the canal upon that side, continuing their advance by attacking Le
Plantin South from the rear and the flank, so that the defenders were
in an impossible position. Having taken this point it seemed as if
the Germans would roll up the whole long thin line from the end, and
they actually did so, as far as Le Plantin North. Here the British
rallied, and the survivors of the 6th and 7th King's made a furious
advance, pushed the Germans back, retook Le Plantin South, and
captured a number of prisoners. The position was still serious,
however, as the Germans held Windy Corner, and had penetrated between
the British right and the canal, so as to get into the rear of the
position. A great effort was called for, and the men responded like
heroes. The 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers from the 164th Brigade
(Stockwell) had come up, and these fine soldiers, with the weary
remains of the two King's Liverpool battalions, rushed the whole
German position, dragging them out from the pockets and ruins amid
which they lurked. In this splendid counter-attack more than 700
prisoners were taken in all, with a number of machine-guns. At the
end of it the British right was absolutely intact.
{233}
Whilst these stirring events had taken place on the right flank,
there had been heavy fighting also on the left. Here the British
defence had been based upon two small but strong forts, called
Cailloux North and Route A Keep. The latter fell early in the
action, the German infantry coming upon it so unexpectedly in the fog
that the machine-guns were at the moment mounted upon the parapet and
elevated for indirect fire. They were put out of action, and the
place was surrounded and taken. This greatly weakened the left wing
of the defence. Farther still to the left the Germans were pushing
through Loisne, and the fort called Loisne Central was heavily
engaged. This portion of the line was held by the 166th Brigade.
Once the German wave actually lapped over into the little fort, but
the place was not taken, and its machine-guns still clattered and
flashed. All day the Germans were held at this point though the
pressure was great. During the night the 13th King's Liverpools from
the 9th Brigade were sent as a reserve to the weary line. At 7.40 on
the morning of April 10 the enemy, under cover of a murderous
barrage, attacked Loisne once more, striving hard to break in the
left of the British defence. The garrison suffered terribly, but
none the less the stormers were shot back into their shell-holes and
lurking-places. Two successive attacks on the forts of Cailloux and
Festubert had no better success and were less strongly urged. At
seven in the evening they again, with a sudden rush, got a footing in
the fort of Loisnes, and again were driven out, save for twenty-one
who remained as prisoners. Another day had passed, and still
Lancashire stood fast and the lines were safe. On April 11 the whole
position {234} was swept by a heavy shell-storm, and the German
infantry clustered thickly in front of the crumbling barricades. The
guns both of the Fifty-fifth and of the Eleventh Division played
havoc with them as they assembled, so that the attack was paralysed
on the right, but on the left the two little forts of Festubert East
and Cailloux were both overwhelmed. The former, however, was at once
retaken by a mixed storming party from the 5th and 13th King's
Liverpools. Late in the evening Cailloux Keep was also stormed, and
once more the position was intact.
There was now only Route A Keep in possession of the enemy, and it
was determined to regain it. The guns had quickly registered upon it
during the day, and at midnight they all burst into a concentrated
bombardment which was followed by a rush of two companies, one drawn
from the Liverpool Scots and the other from the 13th King's
Liverpools. The place was carried by assault, and the garrison held
it strongly on the 12th and 13th against a series of attacks. It was
a most murderous business, and the brave little garrisons were sadly
cut about, but they held on with the utmost determination, having
vowed to die rather than give the fort up. The survivors were still
there, crouching among the ruins and exposed to constant heavy
shelling, when on April 15 the old epic was ended and a new one was
begun by the relief of the Fifty-fifth Division by Strickland's First
Division. The episode will live in history, and may match in
tenacity and heroism the famous defence of Ovillers by the German
Guards. The casualties were heavy, but it may be safely said that
they were small compared with those of the attacking battalions.
{235}
The story has been carried forward in this quarter for the sake of
connected narrative, but we must now return to the events of April 9,
and especially to the effect produced upon the Fortieth Division by
the exposure of their southern flank. This fine unit, with its
terrible wounds only half healed, was exposed all day to a desperate
attack coming mainly from the south, but involving the whole of their
line from Laventie to Armentières. The division, which is
predominantly English, but contains one brigade of Highland troops,
fought most valiantly through the long and trying day, enduring heavy
losses, and only yielding ground in the evening, when they were
attacked in the rear as well as in front and flank.
In the morning the Fortieth Division had the 119th Brigade (18th
Welsh, 21st Middlesex, and 13th East Surrey) on the right, while the
121st Brigade (20th Middlesex, 12th Suffolks, and 13th Yorks) was on
the left, joining up with Nicholson's Thirty-fourth Division which
held the Armentières front. The right of the Fortieth was involved
in the heavy initial bombardment and also in the subsequent infantry
advance, which established a footing in the front trenches of the
119th Brigade. Whilst a counter-attack was being organised to drive
the stormers out, it was found that the right and the rear of the
position were threatened by the advance through the Portuguese. The
120th Scottish Brigade in reserve was ordered to form a defensive
flank, but the 10/11th Highland Light Infantry, the nearest unit,
found itself almost overlapped, and the brigade had to fall back upon
the bridges at Nouveau Monde in order to protect the river crossings.
The 2nd Scots Fusiliers covered the bridge-head, while the {236}
whole of the 119th Brigade fell back to the line of the Lys, save
only the garrison of Fleurbaix. The 121st Brigade was still holding
its line in the Bois Grenier sector. By 1 o'clock the bulk of the
Fortieth Division was across the Lys, the bridges being destroyed one
by one as the day advanced. The destruction was not in all cases
complete, and in that of the Pont Levis at Estaires was absolutely
checked by a chance shell which destroyed the leads, and prevented
the explosion. The enemy, under cover of machine-guns mounted in the
houses of Bac St. Maur, were able to cross the river here and get a
footing upon the northern bank. The 74th Brigade from the
Twenty-fifth Division and the 150th from the Fiftieth were coming up,
however, and it was still hoped that the German advance might be
checked. So severe had the fighting been that the 18th Welsh had
only 5 officers and 120 men standing in the evening.
The 121st Brigade were in the meanwhile endeavouring to hold the
Fleurbaix defences on the left of the line. At 11.30 A.M. the
Germans were in the east of the village, but the 12th Suffolks, who
formed the garrison, put up a most determined resistance, in which
they were aided by a company of the 12th Yorkshires Pioneer
Battalion. It was not till 5.30 that the village was nearly
enveloped, and the troops had to make their way as best they could to
the north bank of the Lys. The 20th Middlesex and 13th Yorkshires,
with their flank badly compromised, still held on to the Bois Grenier
sector. These battalions on the left were taken over by the
Thirty-fourth Division, with whom they were now in close liaison.
{237}
On the morning of April 10 the two brigades which had crossed the
river were in very evil case, having sustained heavy losses. They
were concentrated about Le Mortier. The 74th Brigade was in position
south of Croix du Bac in touch on the right with the 150th Yorkshire
Territorials. All day the enemy were pushing west and north, but
meeting a strong resistance from the British who had an excellent
trench, the Steenwerck switch, to help them. Some ground was lost,
but much of it was regained in the evening by a spirited
counter-attack of the 14th and 10/11th Highland Light Infantry, the
2nd Scots Fusiliers, and the 21st Middlesex, which advanced over 600
yards. The pressure was great and unceasing, however, so that the
morning of April 11 found the line farther back again. The two
brigades were reduced to about 1000 men, who were concentrated at
Strazeele, while the 92nd and 93rd Brigades of the Thirty-first
Division came up in their place. A brave counter-attack by the 93rd
Brigade at Le Verrier gained its objective, but created a dangerous
gap between it and the 92nd Brigade on its right, which was filled,
however, by the 11th East Yorkshires. On the 12th the remains of all
three brigades were strung out to cover Strazeele and Hazebrouck from
the east and south-east, but next day they were relieved by the
welcome appearance of the First Australian Division, whose advent
will afterwards be explained. It had been a very desperate term of
service, in which for three days the sappers of the 224th, 229th, and
231st Field Companies Royal Engineers had to fight as hard as the
infantry. The Fortieth, like the other divisions described, were
driven back, but only as the buffer is driven back, {238} with the
ultimate result of stopping the force which drove it. They were much
aided by the guns of the Fifty-seventh Division under General Wray.
The losses of the division were 185 officers and 4307 other ranks.
When one reflects that the losses on the Somme three weeks before had
been equally heavy, one can but marvel.
We shall now follow the fortunes of the Thirty-fourth Division
(Nicholson), which was on the immediate left of the Fortieth,
covering a sector of 8000 yards, including the town of Armentières.
On the north, near Frelinghien, it joined the right of the
Twenty-fifth Division. On the night of April 7 the enemy fired an
enormous number, 30,000 or 40,000, gas-shells into Armentières, and
soaked it to such an extent with mephitic vapours that it became
uninhabitable. Otherwise there was no warning of an impending
attack, which came indeed as a surprise to all the forces engaged.
On April 9 the division lay with the 103rd Brigade upon the right
section and the 102nd upon the left, with the guns of the
Thirty-eighth Division behind them. The main attack on this day was
entirely upon the two divisions, the Portuguese and the Fortieth, to
the south. There was heavy shelling, however, of the back areas,
especially Armentières and Erquinghem. When as the day advanced
everything on the right had given way or weakened, the 103rd Brigade
threw back a long thin defensive line, facing south, which ended in
the direction of Fleurbaix. At the same time the reserve 101st
Brigade was ordered up to cover Bac St. Maur Bridge. One battalion
of the Reserve Brigade, the 11th Suffolks, got into Fleurbaix, when
by a happy chance {239} they were able to reinforce their own
comrades of the 12th Battalion. These two sturdy East Anglian units
held the village in a very desperate fight for many hours. The 15th
and 16th Royal Scots of the the same brigade had some hard fighting
also as they continued the defensive line formed by the 103rd
Brigade, and tried to prevent the victorious Germans from swarming
round and behind the Thirty-fourth Division. Some idea of the danger
may be gathered from the fact that of two brigades of artillery
engaged one was firing south-west and the other due east. The
original front was never in danger, but it was a desperate conflict
upon the refused flank.
During the afternoon the Germans crossed the Lys at Sailly and Bac
St. Maur, though the bridge at the latter place had been destroyed.
Their progress, however, had slowed down and become uncertain. The
74th Brigade of the Twenty-fifth Division had come under the orders
of General Nicholson, and was at once directed against the village of
Croix du Bac, with the ultimate design of recovering the Bac St. Maur
crossing. The 74th Brigade succeeded in clearing Croix du Bac of the
enemy, but night fell before they could get farther. The morning
found this brigade sandwiched in between the Fortieth and
Thirty-fourth Divisions, while the 147th Brigade had also moved up in
support. It was soon found, however, that the enemy had got so far
west in the south that they outflanked the 74th Brigade, who had to
retire on April 10 through Croix du Bac and Steenwerck. On the same
morning the Twenty-fifth Division had been attacked near Frelinghien,
and the Germans penetrated as far as the northern bend of the Lys,
north of Armentières. {240} The left of the Thirty-fourth Division
was now entirely in the air. It was clear, therefore, that a
retirement north of the Lys was necessary, and about 3 P.M. in a
sedate and orderly fashion it was started and carried through,
covered by the fire of the 147th Brigade. The Thirty-fourth drew off
in fine order, the rearguards stopping from time to time, especially
in the streets of Armentières, for the purpose of beating back the
advancing German patrols. All bridges were destroyed, and no
unwounded prisoners were left. The men of the Thirty-fourth were
loud in praise of the way in which the Yorkshire Territorials of the
147th Brigade covered their right flank during this difficult and
dangerous extrication. We will now, having traced the effects upon
the Fifty-fifth to the south, and upon the Fortieth and Thirty-fourth
Divisions to the north, return to the situation created on April 9 by
the breaking of the Portuguese.
Jackson's Fiftieth Division, without its artillery, had only arrived
from the Somme on April 8, having lost half its old soldiers, so that
50 per cent of the personnel were drafts. It had also suffered
severely in officers, and was very battle-weary and exhausted. It
was placed in billets at Merville, with two battalions of the 151st
Brigade holding redoubts at Lestrem south of the Lys close to
Estaires.
As soon as it was seen that the situation was serious, about 8
o'clock in the morning, the division was put in motion. The 151st
Brigade was ordered to extend its left into Estaires, while the 150th
prolonged the line north of Estaires. The 149th was held in reserve,
though one of its battalions, the 4th Northumberland Fusiliers, was
sent in to {241} strengthen the right. The intention was that the
Fiftieth Division should hold the line until the reserves could be
brought to the point of danger.
By two in the afternoon the Germans could be seen all along the
front, and some of the Portuguese had made their way through and
between the ranks. A very heavy fire was opened by both lines of
infantry, and the Germans advancing by short rushes made continuous
progress towards the eastern bank of the stream. Yorkshire and
Durham stood solid upon the farther side, however, and 5000 recruits
endured a long and terrible baptism of fire from the afternoon to the
evening of that spring day. It was on the right at Lestrem, where
the British were to the east of the Lys, that the pressure was most
severe, and eventually the 151st Brigade found it impossible to hold
this point, while farther to the north, upon the left of the
Yorkshire men, the German infantry of the 370th Regiment had won a
footing upon the western bank of the Lys at Sailly and Bac St. Maur.
The British guns were beginning to concentrate, however, and
invaluable time had been gained by the resistance of the Fiftieth
Division. As night fell the 5th Durhams were still holding Estaires,
while the 5th and 6th Northumberland Fusiliers from the reserve were
standing firm along the stretch north and east of Estaires. Farther
north still were the 4th East Yorks, 4th Yorks, and 5th Yorks in that
order from the south, all very weary, but all holding tenaciously to
their appointed line. During the night the Fifty-first Highland
Division (Carter-Campbell) came up on the right of the 151st Brigade
to cover the weak point at Lestrem and all the line to the south of
it. A brigade of the Twenty-fifth Division also came up {242} to
Steenwerck north of where the river line had been broken, but it was
too late for an effective counter-attack, as considerable forces were
already across, which were spreading out north and south on the
western bank.
The fall of night made no change in the battle, and the darkness was
lit up by the red glare of the incessant fire. For many hours the
line was held, though the Germans had brought up fresh divisions for
their attack. Early in the morning of April 10, however, they won a
footing in Estaires, which was desperately defended by the 5th
Durhams. By 8.45, after long-continued street fighting, the Germans
held the whole town, with the exception of the south-western
extremity. The fight raged all day backwards and forwards through
this little straggling place, the infantry upon either side showing
the most determined valour. About 9.30 the 6th Northumberland
Fusiliers, under Colonel Temperley, made a brilliant counter-attack,
crossing 1500 yards of open country with only three batteries to
cover the movement. Before 10 o'clock they were into Estaires and
had cleared the main street, rushing house after house and driving
the Germans down to the river edge, where they rallied and remained.
The 149th Brigade had promptly sent forward its machine-guns, and
these were mounted on the highest houses at the south end of the
town, to fire on any enemy reserves coming up south of the Lys. They
raked the Germans on the farther bank and caused heavy losses. All
day the remains of the 5th Durhams and 6th Northumberlands fought
desperately in Estaires, and held nearly all of it in the evening,
which was in a way a misfortune, since it allowed the Germans to
{243} concentrate their heavies upon it during the night in a
whole-hearted fashion which rendered it absolutely untenable. The
morning of April 11 found Estaires a No Man's Land between the lines
of infantry. In spite of a fresh advance by the 4th and 5th
Northumberland Fusiliers, it was found impossible to regain the
place, while the Germans gradually extended their line from the river
crossings which they had retained all through. By mid-day on April
11, the British line was 500 yards west of the town.
In the southern portion of the line the 151st Brigade of Durhams had
been slowly forced back from the Lestrem sector until they were on
the line of the Lys, which they reached in the evening of April 10.
At that date the 150th Yorkshire Brigade was still firm upon the
river, but the left-hand battalion, the 5th Yorks, had thrown back
its flank, since the enemy, brushing aside the right wing of the
Fortieth Division, had crossed the stream and turned the Fiftieth
from the north. The Fortieth was still fighting hard, as already
described, and endeavouring to hold back the attack, so that the
German advance was slow. Early in the morning of April 11 the attack
became very severe, and broke through to the west of Estaires--the
river at this point runs from west to east--driving back the Durham
Brigade, which was absolutely exhausted after forty-eight hours of
ceaseless fighting without assistance. Their resistance had been an
extraordinarily fine one, but there comes a limit to human powers.
The whole division was at the last extremity, but fortunately at 12
o'clock on the 11th, two brigades of the Twenty-ninth Division
(Cayley) came up in relief. {244} So close was the fighting,
however, and so desperate the situation, that General Riddell of the
149th Northumberland Fusiliers Brigade refused to disengage his men
from the battle, since the confusion of a relief might have led to
disaster. He was at the time holding the line astride the Meteren
Becque, north of Estaires, covering about 1000 yards of vital ground.
Here the Germans attacked all day, making prodigious efforts to push
the 4th and 5th Northumberland Fusiliers out of Trou Bayard. The
ground between this point and Pont Levis, the bridge at the east end
of Estaires, was dead flat, and afforded no particle of cover.
Fifteen British machine-guns stationed beside the infantry swept all
this expanse, and cut down each wave of attack. Four times the place
was supposed to have fallen, and four times the Germans fell back,
leaving long grey swathes of their dead. It was not until 3 P.M.
that the stubborn Northumbrians found that their right was completely
exposed, and were forced to retire from a position which they had
sold at a terrible price.
Instead of dying down the German advance was attaining a greater
proportion with every day that passed, for it seemed to their
commanders that with so favourable an opening some very great success
lay within their power. In spite of the arrival of the Fifty-first
and Twenty-ninth Divisions the battle raged most furiously, and the
weight of the attack was more than the thin line could sustain. The
Germans had rapidly followed up the 151st Brigade as it drew out, and
there was a fierce action round Merville and Robermetz in the early
afternoon of April 11. The exhausted Durhams turned furiously upon
their pursuers, and there was fierce hand-to-hand {245} work in which
even General Martin and his Headquarters Staff found themselves
handling rifles and revolvers. The Thirty-first Division (Bridgford)
had come up and taken position in the rear of the Twenty-ninth, with
their left flank facing east to hold off the enemy, who were now
close to Steenwerck in the north. By nightfall Merville had gone,
and so had Neuf Berquin, which lay between the 151st and the 149th
Brigade, rather in the rear of the latter's right. At this period
the Twenty-ninth Division, with the Thirty-first behind it, was on
the left or north of the 149th Brigade, covering the ground between
Neuf Berquin and Steenwerck. The enemy had turned the right of this
line as already described, and now through the events in the north,
which will soon be narrated, the left of the Twenty-ninth Division
was also turned, and the situation became most dangerous, for the
enemy was in great force in front. A consultation was held by the
various general officers affected, and it was decided to make a side
slip under the cover of darkness to the line of Vierhouck-Meteren
Becque. The British had to fight, however, to gain this position, so
far had the enemy outflanked them, and when the 149th Brigade, with
their indomitable Northumbrians, now reduced to a few hundred men,
had cut their way through to Vierhouck it was only to find it empty
and the British line about 1000 yards to the west of it, where the
4th Guards Brigade of the Thirty-first Division had just begun to
arrive. The Northumbrians held on to Vierhouck none the less on the
morning of April 12, and the Guards Brigade came forward.
Whilst this stern fighting had been in progress, and while the
Fifty-fifth kept its iron grip upon {246} Givenchy and Festubert, the
Fifty-first Highland Division to its north, along the line of the
Lawe Canal, had been very hard pressed. All three brigades had been
engaged in most desperate defence and counter-attack, the fighting
being so close that two at least of the Brigadiers had been compelled
to drop maps and binoculars, while they seized rifles from their
orderlies. The canal was half dry and offered a poor front, but it
was sustained until the Germans got across in the north where the
left flank of the 153rd Brigade was turned and had to fall back. The
Gordons and Black Watch of this unit fought most fiercely in the
neighbourhood of Vieille Chapelle, and the Germans will long remember
their meeting with the clansmen. Finally their line swung back west
of Lestrem, keeping in touch with the right flank of the Fiftieth
Division.
At this period the 184th Brigade was the only one in the Highland
Division which was still capable of service, for the others had lost
so heavily and were so wearied that rest was absolutely necessary.
The Sixty-first Division (Colin Mackenzie), still very weak after its
service on the Somme, came up in the Robecq sector, and, with the aid
of the surviving Highland Brigade, formed a barrier to the terrific
German pressure, the whole coming under General Mackenzie. This line
was held by these troops up to the 23rd of April.
Meanwhile, to revert to the early days of the battle, the German
attack was raging with great fury upon the centre and left of this
line, and finding a gap between the Twenty-ninth Division and the
149th Brigade it poured through it with most menacing results, but
the 4th Guards Brigade counter-attacked {247} and retrieved the
situation west of the Vieux Berquin-Neuf Berquin Road, as will be
told in detail in the next chapter. Farther north, however, the
German attack made more progress and rolled forward to the south of
the village of Merris. The 6th Northumbrians with only two officers
left standing--one of them their gallant Colonel, Temperley,--still
held on to their old stance at Vierhouck, though reduced to the
strength of a company, and in such a state of physical exhaustion
that the men fell to the ground fast asleep between the attacks. One
young soldier woke up during his nap to find the Germans among them,
on which he sprang up, shot the German officer, and organised a
charge which re-established the line. As darkness fell on the
evening of April 12 the survivors of the Fiftieth Division were drawn
from the line, though some were so entangled with other units that
they stayed and shared in the severe fighting of April 13.
As already shown the Givenchy bastion was held firm, which meant that
the Fifty-first Division was also to some extent helped to resist
attack, since an enfilade fire from the Fifty-fifth would beat upon
any advance against them. Such advances were repeatedly made upon
April 11 and were splendidly countered. North of this point the
Fiftieth, Twenty-ninth, and Thirty-first Divisions had all suffered
heavily, while the line had been bent back in a curve from the La
Bassée Canal to a maximum depth of ten miles, ending on the night of
April 12 in a position from west of Merville through the two Berquins
to Merris. The Twenty-ninth Division, which is a particularly good
comrade in a tight place, had been very hard pressed, with its
brigades sent {248} hither and thither wherever a leak was to be
stopped. It was in this action that Colonel Forbes Robertson, one of
the heroes of Cambrai, earned the coveted Cross by fighting on
horseback at the head of his men like some knight of old, and
repeatedly restoring the line when it was broken. In spite of all
valour, however, the general movement was westwards. Whilst these
misfortunes had occurred in the southern sector, others not less
serious had occurred in the north, owing to the great extension of
the German attack. It is to these that we must now turn.
The enemy had achieved a considerable success upon April 9 when they
succeeded in establishing themselves across the Lys at Sailly and Bac
St. Maur, because by doing so they had got to the south-west of
Armentières. They had prepared another attack in the north, and it
was evident that if it had any success the Armentières position would
be impossible. Early in the morning of April 10 the usual shattering
and pulverising bombardment which preceded a full-dress German attack
broke out upon the right of the Second Army, involving the front from
the Ypres-Comines Canal in the north down to the Lys River at
Armentières, thus joining up with the battle of yesterday, and
turning the ten-mile front into one of twenty. The chief points in
this line are Hollebeke in the north, Wytschaete in the centre, and
Messines in the south, with Ploegsteert Wood and village and Nieppe
as the final connecting links with Armentières. It was all classic
and sacred ground drenched with the blood of our bravest. There can
be few regiments in the British Army which have not at one time or
another left their dead upon this shell-pitted slope, or upon the
levels which face it.
{249}
The order of the Second Army from the north at this time was
Twenty-second, Eighth, Second, and Ninth Corps. It was the Ninth
Corps (Hamilton-Gordon) which was now attacked. The order of
divisions upon this front was Campbell's Twenty-first Division
astride the Ypres-Menin Road, the Ninth (Tudor) in the Hollebeke
district, the Nineteenth (Jeffreys) covering 6000 yards east of
Messines and Wytschaete from Ravine Wood in the north to the Douve in
the south, and finally the Twenty-fifth Division (Bainbridge) on the
right, which was already in a most unfavourable position, as its
right flank was menaced by the driving in of the Fortieth and threat
to the Thirty-fourth on the preceding day, while one of its brigades,
the 74th, had been taken away to cover Steenwerck from the German
advance at Bac St. Maur. It was upon these divisions, and, in the
first instance, upon the two southern ones that the new German attack
from the Fourth Army of our old enemy General von Armin broke on
April 10. It should be remembered that, like so many of their
fellow-units, both of these divisions had been very heavily engaged
in the south, and that their losses within the last two weeks had
been very great. Verily we have travelled far from the day when it
was laid down as an axiom that a corps which had lost a quarter of
its numbers would not stand to its work until time had effaced the
shock.
Since the main assault on April 10 fell upon the Nineteenth Division
the story can be most plainly told from their central point of view.
The left of their line was held by the 58th Brigade (Glasgow),
consisting of the 6th Welsh and 9th Welsh Fusiliers. The right was
held by the 57th Brigade (Cubitt) {250} which contained the 10th
Warwick, 8th Gloucester, and 10th Worcesters. The 56th (Heath) was
in reserve. It was upon these troops that there fell the strain of
an attack which can seldom have been exceeded in severity. The total
German force on the corps front was eleven divisions, and of these no
less than five were directed on the morning of April 10 upon the
depleted ranks of General Jeffreys' unit.
A very thick mist prevailed, and through this protective screen the
German infantry advanced about 6 o'clock, driving swiftly through all
the forward posts, and putting them out of action in exactly the same
fashion as on March 21. The enemy were in great numbers, and their
advance was swift and resolute. Within half an hour of the first
alarm they had made a lodgment in the main position of the 57th
Brigade, and had also broken in the face of the left wing of the
Twenty-fifth Division to the south. The garrisons of the outlying
posts were never seen again, and it was observed that they were
greatly hampered by their camouflage screens which they had no time
to tear away in the face of so rapid and overwhelming an attack. At
6.40 the enemy were deep in the position of the 57th Brigade,
especially near Gapard Spur, which marked the centre of that unit.
At 7.30 the whole brigade was in difficulties, which was more marked
in the centre than on either flank, but was serious at every point of
the line. The 8th North Staffords of the Reserve Brigade were
brought up at this hour to help in the defence of this weakening
sector. Before they could arrive upon the scene the enemy had made
such progress that he had reached the crest of the ridge and had
occupied the village of Messines. The 68th Brigade in the north
{251} had not yet been attacked, but General Glasgow seeing his right
flank entirely exposed had thrown back a defensive line. Close to
this line was a post named Pick House, and upon this the mixed
elements of the left of the 57th Brigade, chiefly men of the 10th
Warwicks, now rallied and formed a strong centre of resistance. The
Twenty-fifth Division to the south had been also very hard pressed,
and was in immediate danger of losing the important knoll, Hill 63,
so that the reserve brigade of the Nineteenth Division had to send
the two remaining battalions, the 4th Shropshires and 9th Cheshires,
to strengthen their defence. There was thus no longer any support
for the Nineteenth Divisional fighting line in their great need, save
for the 5th South Wales Borderers, their pioneer battalion, and the
81st Field Company R.E., both of whom were thrown into the battle,
the pioneers pushing bravely forward and connecting up with the 10th
Warwicks at Pick House. Meanwhile the 8th North Staffords had made a
fine attempt to retake Messines, and had actually reached the western
edge of the village, but were unable to gain a permanent footing.
Their right was in touch with the 8th Gloucesters, and some sort of
stable line began to build itself up before the Germans. They had
been unable to occupy Messines in force, owing to the rifle-fire
which became more deadly with the rising of the mist. The scattered
groups of infantry lying upon the ridge on either side of Messines
were greatly heartened by the splendid work of A Battery, 88th
R.F.A., under Captain Dougall, which remained among them, firing over
open sights at the advancing Germans. "So long as you stick it I
will keep my guns here!" he shouted, and the crouching men {252}
cheered him in return. He was as good as his word, and only withdrew
what was left of his battery, man-handling it across almost
impossible ground, when he had not a shell in his limbers. This
brave officer received the Victoria Cross, but unhappily never lived
to wear it.
The 8th North Staffords, still lying opposite Messines, extended
their left down the Messines-Wytschaete Road in an endeavour to join
up with the men at Pick House. Thus a frail curtain of defence was
raised in this direction also. Shortly after mid-day things began to
look better, for the gallant South African Brigade (Tanner) of the
Ninth Division was despatched to the rescue. So severe had been its
losses, however, that it numbered only 1600 bayonets, and had hardly
been re-organised into battalions. Late in the afternoon it
advanced, the 1st Battalion on the left, 2nd on the right, and though
it had not the weight to make any definite impression upon the German
front it entirely re-established the line of the road from Messines
to Wytschaete, and reinforced the thin fragments of battalions who
were holding this precarious front. The South Africans incurred
heavy losses from machine-gun fire in this very gallant attack.
The Ninth Division had hardly relinquished its Reserve Brigade when
it found that it was itself in urgent need of support, for about 2
o'clock on August 10 the attack spread suddenly to the northern end
of the line, involving the 25th, 26th, and 58th Brigades, all under
General Tudor, who was now responsible for the Wytschaete front. So
infernal was the barrage which preceded the attack, that the right of
the Ninth Division in the vicinity of Charity {253} Farm was driven
in, and the 58th Brigade, with both flanks in the air and smothered
under a rain of shells, was compelled also to fall back upon its
support line. About 4 P.M. the 58th Brigade was broken near Torreken
Farm, and the 6th Wiltshires, who were the flank battalion on the
right, were cut off and lost heavily. The enemy were driving hard at
this period towards Wytschaete, but the 9th Welsh stood fast in a
cutting to the south of the village, and held the Germans off with
their rifle-fire. So ended a most trying and unfortunate day, where
the overborne troops had done all that men could do to hold their
ground, fighting often against five times their own number. The
prospects for the morrow looked very black, and the only gleam of
light came with the advent, about midnight, of the 108th Brigade
(Griffiths) from the Ulster Division, with orders to fight alongside
the exhausted 57th, whose commander, General Cubitt, was now
directing the local operations to the west of Messines. The
Wytschaete front was also strengthened by the inclusion in the Ninth
Division of the 62nd and later of the 64th Brigade of the
Twenty-first Division. Farther south the 75th Brigade north of
Armentières had been driven back by the enemy's attack, and the 7th
Brigade on its left, finding its flank uncovered, had hinged back
upon Ploegsteert Wood, where it held its line as best it might. Thus
on the left, the centre, and the right there had been the same story
of unavailing resistance and loss of valuable, dearly-bought ground.
Even more serious, however, than the local loss was the strategical
situation which had been created by the German advance in the lower
sector, by their crossing the Lys, and by the fact that on the night
of {254} April 10 they were closing in upon Steenwerck and La Crêche
far to the right rear of the defenders of the Messines line. It was
a situation which called for the highest qualities of generals as of
soldiers.
By the morning of April 11 General Plumer, dealing out his reserves
grudgingly from his fast diminishing supply, placed the 147th Brigade
of the Forty-ninth Yorkshire Territorial Division (Cameron) behind
the Twenty-fifth Division in the Ploegsteert region, and a brigade of
the Twenty-ninth Division to the north of it. Such succours were
small indeed in the face of what was evidently a very great and
well-prepared attack which had already shaken the whole northern
front to its foundations. The Higher Command had, however, some
points of consolation. If the vital sectors could be held there was
the certainty that strong reinforcements would arrive within a few
days from the south. The Amiens line was now certainly stabilised,
and if once again an equilibrium could be secured then the last
convulsive efforts of this titanic angel of darkness would have been
held. With no illusions, but with a dour determination to do or die,
the British line faced to the east.
The immediate danger was that a gap had opened between Messines and
Wytschaete, while another was threatened farther south between
Ploegsteert and the Nieppe-Armentières Road. The pressure upon the
Damstrasse was also very great in the region of the Ninth Division.
The first disposition in the Messines area was to strengthen the line
of resistance by pushing up the three battalions of the 108th
Brigade, the 1st Irish Fusiliers on the left near Pick House, the 9th
Irish Fusiliers west of Messines, and the 12th Irish Rifles in the
Wulverghem line. The {255} attack on the morning of April 11 was not
heavy in this direction, but was rather directed against the
Twenty-fifth Division in the Ploegsteert district, where it came
ominously close to Hill 63, a commanding point from which the
Messines position of the British would be taken in reverse. General
Jeffreys of the Nineteenth Division determined none the less to stand
his ground, but he threw out a defensive flank along the
Messines-Wulverghem Road, and mounted machine-guns to hold any attack
from the south. Meanwhile the 57th, South African, and 108th
Brigades, in spite of this menace to their right rear continued to
hold the Messines front. There was severe fighting on this sector
during the afternoon in which the remains of the 2nd and 4th
(Transvaal Scots) Battalions were pushed back for some distance, but
counter-attacked under the lead of Captain Green, regaining most of
the ground that they had lost, and connecting up with the 5th South
Wales Borderers, who were still holding fast near Pick House. This
line was maintained until the general withdrawal. It was further
strengthened by the 146th Brigade, one of the three units of the
Forty-ninth Division, which were all engaged at different points.
One battalion, the 7th West Yorkshires, called on suddenly to fill a
gap, made a very fine advance under heavy fire, and restored the
situation. It remained in the line until, on April 16, it was almost
annihilated by a terrific German attack upon it.
But the situation on the right rear was getting worse and worse. In
the evening it was definitely known that Hill 63 had at last fallen
after a long and obstinate struggle. The Twenty-fifth, and later
{256} the Thirty-fourth Divisions had held up against great odds, but
the main force of the enemy was now striking upon that line, and the
British were forced to withdraw from Le Bizet towards Nieppe. These
German gains enforced a completely new re-arrangement of the forces
in the north if they were to avoid being taken in the rear. This
change of a wide and far-reaching character was quickly and safely
effected during the night of April 11 and 12. It involved moving
back the three northern corps into their battle zones, leaving only
outposts in advance. They still covered Ypres, but the retirement
meant that all that had been won in the mud-and-blood struggle of
1917 had passed into German keeping, and coupled with the loss of
Messines it seemed to threaten that the old salient might be renewed
in as disastrous a fashion as ever. This retirement was rather in
the nature of a precaution against the possibilities of the future.
What was of most immediate importance was the withdrawal of the lines
which were at such close grips with the enemy to the west of
Messines. By the morning of April 12 the general line of the
Nineteenth Corps was Steenwerck Station, Pont-d'Achelles, Neuve
Eglise, Wulverghem, Wytschaete. No immediate German attack followed
on the withdrawal. This abstention on the part of the enemy was due
in part to the wonderful work done by a small nest of four
machine-guns on the Messines-Wulverghem Road under the command of
Lieutenant Hodgson. This small unit had already fought for
forty-eight hours, but on this third day of the battle their services
were invaluable, for they shot down hundreds of Germans as they
endeavoured to debouch from Messines and descend the slope. Save for
two {257} wounded men none of this band of heroes ever returned.
Among other detachments who behaved with great heroism were a few men
of the 5th South Wales Borderers, B Company, under Captain Evans, who
maintained themselves at Pick House, north and east of Messines, for
three days, until they were at last rescued by the 58th Brigade from
the north.
Whilst these fresh dispositions and general retrogressions had been
made on this front the Thirty-fourth Division to the south had also
been compelled to rearrange its positions. It has already been
described how, under cover of the 147th Brigade, they withdrew in
absolute order across the Lys. April 11 saw such continued pressure,
however on the right of the Twenty-fifth and the whole of the
Thirty-fourth Divisions that it became clear early in the afternoon
of April 11 that further retirement was imperative. This began at
dusk, the three brigades retiring by the Armentières-Bailleul Road,
while the 147th still acted as rearguard. They retired through the
74th and 88th Brigades near Bailleul Station, fighting back all the
way and considerably harassed by the German guns. On the morning of
the 12th the general line was Steam-mill-Bailleul Station-southern
border of La Crêche to a point about 500 yards north-east of Pont
d'Achelles on the Bailleul Road. Along this line the order of battle
from the south was the 147th, 75th, 101st, 74th, 102nd, and 88th
Brigades. Nieppe, which had been evacuated, was occupied by the
enemy later in the day, and on the evening of April 12 the line was
pushed a little farther back to De Seule.
There was no fighting on the new line opposite {258} Messines on
April 12, but the battle was, as has been shown, raging furiously
elsewhere, and the situation in the south, where the enemy was making
progress, must deeply affect that in the north. Had an aviator taken
a swift flight from Hollebeke to Givenchy on this day, following the
deep curve which had formed in the British line, his observations
would have been roughly as follows: in the Hollebeke district he
would have found no extreme pressure, and that the Ninth Division,
reinforced by the 58th Brigade, was holding the line not far westward
of their original position. From there onwards he would have skirted
the new line of the Ninth Corps, as already indicated, and would have
seen the remains of the Nineteenth Division covering the north of it,
the Twenty-fifth Division, also in fragments, about Neuve Eglise, and
the Thirty-fourth Division near Steenwerck. He would next observe
with consternation or joy according to his colours, that there was a
considerable gap before Bailleul. At the other side of this gap he
would come upon elements of the Thirty-first and Twenty-ninth
Divisions, hard-pressed and worried by the advance which the enemy
had made through Merville on their right. He would catch a glimpse
also of some thin lines of resistance, still farther south, which
represented all that was left of the Fiftieth Division. Finally, he
would see the Fifty-first and the Fifty-fifth on the extreme south,
both of them standing firm in their positions. Looking eastwards he
would see pouring across the Lys the legions of Prince Rupprecht of
Bavaria, hurrying to improve their blow, while behind the British
lines he would see new divisions, the Fifty-ninth Midlanders at
Wulverghem, the Thirty-third {259} near Bailleul, the Sixty-first
near Robecq, the 4th Guards Brigade followed by the First Australians
near Hazebrouck, all hastening with heavy hearts but the most grim
determination to throw themselves across the path of this German
invasion which already threatened the most vital points in Flanders.
Far to the south also our aviator would perhaps have seen the smoke
of many trains, and out at sea might have made out the little dots
which marked in the one case French, in the other British,
reinforcements. Such was the general panorama upon the Flanders
front on the evening of April 12.
{260}