THE BATTLE OF THE LYS
April 13-May 8
Desperate situation--Sir Douglas Haig's "win or die" message--Epic of
the 4th Guards Brigade at Hazebrouck--Arrival of First Australian
Division--Splendid services of Thirty-third Division--Loss of
Armentières, Bailleul, and Neuve Eglise--The First Division at
Givenchy--Fall of Kemmel--Battle of Ridge Wood--Great loss of
ground--Equilibrium.
Up to April 13 twenty-eight German divisions had been traced in the
battle of Flanders. Since the whole British Army consisted of sixty
divisions, and only thirteen had been engaged in Flanders, one can
gather how terrible had been their task.
By the fourth day of the battle the purpose of the enemy became more
clear. It was evident now that his attack consisted really of three
movements. The northern of these, consisting of about six divisions,
had for its task to drive through Wytschaete and Messines to
Bailleul. At present it was held up in the north by the Ninth
Division, but had made its way in the south until Neuve Eglise was
the only village which intervened between it and Bailleul. The
central attack, consisting of the main force, had taken Armentières
and penetrated ten miles deep, capturing Merville, reaching the
Clarence River, touching Robecq, and threatening St. Venant. This
{261} deep penetration reacted upon the British flanks to north and
south of it. Finally, there was an advance by seven or eight
divisions in the south, which had been held at Givenchy, but had bent
the line back the from that point, Bethune being the immediate
objective. The hammering of the Germans was remorseless and
terrific. All that the British needed was a little time, but it
seemed as if it would be denied them. Help was coming, but it did
not arrive so quickly as the new divisions which Von Armin and Von
Quast were pouring over the Messines Ridge and across the plain of
the Lys.
The position was very menacing, as was shown by an order of the day
from the British Commander-in-Chief which is unique perhaps in our
military annals--a stern call to duty and to death, pitched on the
very note which would arouse the historic tenacity of the British
soldier. Documents have been avoided in this chronicle, but this one
at least must be quoted in full. It was addressed to all ranks of
the British Army under his command.
"Three weeks ago to-day," said Sir Douglas Haig, "the enemy began his
terrific attacks against us on a fifty-mile front. His objects are
to separate us from the French, to take the Channel ports, and
destroy the British Army.
"In spite of throwing already 106 divisions into the battle, and
enduring the most reckless sacrifice of human life, he has, as yet,
made little progress towards his goals. We owe this to the
determined fighting and self-sacrifice of our troops.
"Words fail me to express the admiration which I feel for the
splendid resistance offered by all ranks of our army under the most
trying circumstances.
{262}
"Many amongst us now are tired. To these I would say that victory
will belong to the side which holds out the longest.
"The French Army is moving rapidly and in great force to our support.
"There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. Every
position must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement.
With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our
cause, each one of us must fight to the end.
"The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon
the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment."
No words can describe the danger of the crisis more clearly than this
clear call from a leader remarkable for his judgment and restraint,
exhorting his men to fight to the death with their faces to the
raging German line, and their backs to those all-important harbours
on which the fate of the world was now depending. The German
vanguard was forty miles from Calais on the day that the appeal was
made, and there was no strong line to be forced, save that strongest
of all lines which was formed by Sir Herbert Plumer and his men.
A new unit had come into line on April 13. This was the Thirty-third
Division under General Pinney. It was at once thrust in to fill the
gap in front of Bailleul, where it found itself involved from that
date onwards in most desperate fighting, in which it was associated
with the Thirty-first Division. The narrative of the services and
trials, both of them very great, which were rendered and endured by
these divisions may be best told in consecutive form, as a too strict
adhesion to the order of dates produces an {263} effect which makes
it difficult to follow the actual happenings. We shall first
consider the operations at Hazebrouck and Meteren, where these two
divisions and the First Australian Division were chiefly concerned,
and we shall afterwards return to the north and follow the fortunes
of the Nineteenth, Twenty-fifth, Forty-ninth, Thirty-fourth, and
other divisions which were holding the northern curve.
[Sidenote: Central Area. April 12.]
The line was very weak on April 12 in front of central Hazebrouck,
and yet it was absolutely vital that this important railway junction
should not fall into German hands. The need was pressing and
desperate, for the German attack was furious and unremitting, while
the British line was so thin, and composed of such weary units, that
it seemed impossible that it could hold. The exhausted remains of
the Fiftieth Division, who had been at it continually ever since the
breaking of the Portuguese front, were hardly capable now of covering
or defending any serious front. Yet if the ground could be held, the
First Australian Division, brought hurriedly back from the Somme and
in the act of detraining, would be in the line within twenty-four
hours. There have been few moments more heavy with fate during the
whole of the campaign. Everything depended for the moment upon
Pinney's Thirty-third Division, upon the worn remnants of the
Twenty-ninth Division, upon the 92nd and 93rd Brigades, and upon the
4th Guards Brigade of the Thirty-first Division who were brought up
from Pradelles, and thrown hurriedly across the path of the advancing
Germans.
Of the Thirty-first Division the 92nd and 93rd Brigades had already
been heavily engaged on April 11 as already recorded. The Guards
Brigade {264} had been delayed in its journey and was still fresh.
General Reedman of the 92nd Brigade was in local command, and the
situation was a particularly difficult one. At all costs Hazebrouck
must be covered until reinforcements could arrive, for if the line
were cut there was no end to the possible evils. When Merris fell
General Reedman still held the heights west of Merris with the 10th
East Yorkshires, while the 11th East Lancashires were to the south,
and the remnants of the 86th and 87th Brigades of the Twenty-ninth
Division held on to Vieux Berquin. This line held until 5 P.M. on
April 13 in spite of very stormy attacks and very little help from
the guns. About that hour the right of the line gave way under
severe pressure, and Vieux Berquin was taken, but the Germans were
bottled up in it and were unable to get forward. There they remained
until the great turn of the tide. We must now, however, turn our
gaze to the immediate south and follow the phases of the wonderful
stand made by the remaining brigade of the Thirty-first Division, the
4th Guards Brigade, who found themselves involved in a desperate
battle in front of Hazebrouck.
Without enumerating a number of obscure hamlets which are rather
confusing than helpful, it may be said that the brigade under General
Leslie Butler covered the north of the main road from Merville to
Hazebrouck, with their right resting upon the Bourre, a small
sluggish stream. Vierhouck represented roughly the centre of their
line. It was a country of flat cultivated fields, with many roads
and watercourses lined with willows, which cut the view. There were
untouched farms with their human and animal on every side. To the
west lay the great {265} forest of Nieppe. On the right were the 3rd
Coldstream, on the left the 4th Grenadiers, with the 2nd Irish in
close support. They were in position on the morning of April 12, and
at once found the enemy in front of them, who after a strong
preliminary bombardment advanced in great numbers along the whole
line. The rifle-fire of the Guardsmen was too deadly, however, and
the attack dissolved before it. The German machine-gunners were
exceedingly aggressive, "not to say impudent" as a Guards officer
explained it, and many losses were sustained from their fashion of
pushing forward upon the flanks, and worming their way into every
unoccupied crevice. Nothing could exceed both the gallantry and the
intelligence of these men. Having cleared their front the Guards
endeavoured to advance, but the Coldstream on the right met with
murderous fire from the village of Pures Becques, and the movement
could get no farther, nor were the Grenadiers much more fortunate on
the left, though Captain Pryce with his company broke into some
outlying houses, killing a number of Germans, seven of whom fell to
that officer's own automatic. This whole gallant episode occurred
under the very muzzles of a German battery, firing with open sights
at a range of 300 yards.
At this period the brigade seems to have got ahead of the general
British line, and to have had both flanks entirely exposed to every
sort of enfilade fire. About four in the afternoon the right company
of the Coldstream, numbering only forty men, had to turn south to
face the enemy. The Germans had thrust into the centre of the
Coldstream also, but No. 2 Company of the supporting Irish, acting
without {266} orders upon the impulse of the moment, and aided by the
surviving Coldstream, completely re-established the line. The Irish,
who were led by Captain Bambridge, were almost annihilated in their
dashing effort to ease the pressure upon their English comrades.
Their leader was wounded, Lieutenant Dent was killed, and only eleven
men of the company were left standing. On the left the Germans were
500 yards in the rear, and here a rearrangement was called for and
steadily carried out. An hour later another violent attack was made
at the junction of the two battalions, but it also was driven back in
disorder. The Germans had brought their guns well forward and into
the open, but they met their match in Lieutenant Lewis of the 152nd
Brigade Royal Field Artillery, who directed the scanty British
artillery, and handled his pieces in a way which was much appreciated
by the weary Guardsmen.
The readjustment of the line enabled the 4th Guards Brigade to link
up with the 12th Yorkshire Light Infantry, pioneer battalion of their
own division, which was holding the line at La Couronne, and fought
that day with the utmost tenacity and resolution. On the left flank
of the Yorkshiremen, near Vieux Berquin, were the worn remains of the
Twenty-ninth Division.
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{267}
[Illustration: Rough Sketch of Guards' Position, April 13]
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Night fell upon a sorely-tried but unconquered line. The two front
battalions had lost at least a third of their effectives. Under the
screen of darkness the position was re-organised, and it was hoped
that the Fifth Division, drawn back from Italy, would be able to
effect a relief. This could not be fully accomplished, however, and
at best only a small contraction of the front could be effected, so
that the morning {268} of April 13 found the exhausted Coldstream and
Grenadiers still facing the German attack. Their line had been
strengthened by the 210th Field Co. of the Royal Engineers. The
front to be held was still very wide for so weakened a force.
It had been a hard day, but it was only the prelude of a harder one.
On April 13 the morning began with thick mist, of which the Germans
took advantage to rush their machine-guns to very close quarters. At
early dawn the Coldstream found themselves once more heavily
attacked, while an armoured car came down the road and machine-gunned
the outposts at a range of ten yards. After severe mixed fighting
the attack was driven back. At 9.15 it was renewed with greater
strength, but again it made no progress. It is typical of the truly
desperate spirit of the men, that when every man save one in an
outpost had been killed or wounded, the survivor, Private Jacotin of
the Coldstream, carried on the fight alone for twenty minutes before
he was blown to pieces with a grenade.
The left flank of this battalion had also been heavily attacked, the
enemy, with their usual diabolical ingenuity, shouting as they
advanced through the fog that they were the King's Company of the
Grenadier Guards. They were blown back none the less into the mist
from which they had emerged. The 12th Yorkshire Light Infantry was
also four separate times attacked, but held to its appointed line.
This gallant unit fairly earned the title of the "Yorkshire Guards"
that day, for they were the peers of their comrades. Meanwhile,
however, outside the area of this grim fight the Germans had taken
Vieux Berquin, pushing back the scanty line of defence at that point,
so that they were able to bring up trench-mortars and guns {269} to
blast the Yorkshire battalion at La Couronne out of its shallow
trenches. Captain Pryce, on the extreme left of the Guards, found
the Germans all round him, and his Grenadiers were standing back to
back and firing east and west. The company was doomed, and in spite
of the gallant effort of a party of Irish Guards, who lost very
heavily in the venture, the whole of them perished, save for Sergeant
Weedon and six men who reported the manner in which their comrades
had met their end. Captain Pryce had led two bayonet charges, first
with eighteen men, which was entirely successful, and later with
fourteen men, who buried themselves in the grey of the German ranks,
and there remained. Such was the end of No. 2 Company of the 4th
Grenadiers, and of its commander. This brave man received a
posthumous V.C. in the record of which it is stated that with forty
men he had held up a German battalion for ten hours and so saved a
break through.
Apart from this flank company the centre company of the Grenadiers at
this period consisted of six unwounded men, while the right company
was twenty strong. All the officers were down. They were hemmed in
on two sides by the enemy, but they were still resisting as the
shades of night fell upon them. By dawn the Grenadier battalion had
ceased to exist.
The 3rd Coldstream on the right were hardly in better case. The
right company was surrounded, and fought until there was only a
handful left. A few survivors fell back upon the Fifth Division and
the Australians who were now well up to the line. The orders to the
Guards had been to keep the Germans out until the Australians could
arrive. They had {270} been faithfully obeyed. The total casualties
had been 39 officers and 1244 rank and file, the greater part from
two weak battalions; 17 per cent of the brigade mustered after the
action. Soldiers will appreciate the last words of the official
report which are: "No stragglers were reported by the A.P.M." It is
an episode which needs no comment. Its grandeur lies in the bare
facts. Well might General de Lisle say: "The history of the British
Army can record nothing finer than the story of the action of the 4th
Guards Brigade on April 12 and 13."
Whilst the Guards had made their fine stand to the east of
Hazebrouck, the rest of the Thirty-first Division, covering a front
of 9000 yards, had a most desperate battle with the German stormers.
The fine north country material which makes up the 92nd and 93rd
Brigades had never been more highly tried, for they were little more
than a long line of skirmishers with an occasional post. In some
parts of the line they were absolutely exterminated, but like their
comrades of the Guards, they managed somehow or other to retain the
positions and prevent a penetration until reinforcements arrived.
The remains of the Twenty-ninth Division on the left had also fought
with the utmost devotion and held the line at the price of a heavy
drain upon their weakened ranks. It has been calculated that the
line held by the 31st Division upon these days was 5½ miles long, and
that it was attacked by the 35th and 42nd German divisions, the 1st
Bavarian Reserve, and 10th, 11th, and 81st Reserve divisions.
It would be well to continue the action upon the Hazebrouck front by
giving at once an account of the operations of the First Australian
Division under {271} General Sir Harold Walker, which had the
remarkable experience of being sent from Flanders to the Amiens
front, being engaged there, and now being back in the Flanders front
once more, all in little over a week. They detrained on April 12,
and on the 13th their 2nd Brigade (Heane) found themselves in front
of Hazebrouck with the remains of the 92nd British Brigade on their
left and with the hard-pressed 4th Guards Brigade in front of them.
In the evening the remains of the Guards were withdrawn through their
line, and they were facing the pursuing Germans. On their left the
Australians were in touch with the 1st Cameronians of the 19th
Brigade in the Meteren area.
This fierce fighting was going on in a country which was new to war,
with unbroken soil, whole cottages, and numerous refugees, who by
their flight before the German vanguard complicated a situation which
was already so chaotic that it was very difficult for the generals on
the spot to grasp the relative positions of the attack and the
defence.
[Sidenote: Central Area. April 14 onward.]
On April 14 the Germans, advancing behind a deadly barrage, came
forward through Merris and Vieux Berquin. They soon found, however,
that they had before them fresh and steady troops who were not to be
driven. The immediate German objective was the high ground from Mont
de Merris to Strazeele. The 2nd Australian Brigade was on the right
and the 1st (Leslie) on the left. Both were equally attacked, and
both met their assailants with a shattering fire which piled the
level plain with their bodies. Three lines swept forward, but none
reached the shallow trenches of the "digger" infantry. The 3rd and
4th Battalions held the line {272} to the north where the pressure
was greatest. The One hundred and twenty-third French Division was
in support, but there was never any need to call for their
co-operation. Strazeele, however, was blown to pieces by the German
guns.
April 15 and 16 were comparatively quiet, and the Australians busily
strengthened their lines. On the 17th a sharp attack was made upon
the 1st and 4th Battalions on the left and centre of the 1st
Australian Brigade, the advance coming up the valley between Merris
and Meter en. This also was cut to pieces by rifle and gun-fire, so
that it made no progress whatever.
The 3rd Australian Brigade (Bennett) had been in reserve, but it was
destined for severe service after Meteren had passed out of the hands
of the Thirty-third Division in the manner elsewhere described. They
had actually relieved some of the worn elements of the British
Thirty-third and of the French One hundred and thirty-third Divisions
to the west of Meteren, and on April 22 and 23 they endeavoured by
two separate movements upon either flank to fight their way back into
the little town. The first operations carried out by the 11th and
12th Battalions were successful, but the final push into the town by
the 9th and 10th met with heavy opposition, and the casualties were
so great that the attempt had to be abandoned. The three Australian
brigades were shortly relieved, after their very valuable spell in
the line. They were destined soon to find themselves with their
comrades on the Somme once again.
Whilst the 1st Brigade had won a complete defensive victory in the
north of the line, the 2nd {273} Brigade had done equally well in the
south. The 7th and 8th Battalions were in the line, and both were
heavily engaged, especially the latter, which faced Vieux Berquin.
The German attack was once again a complete failure, and it was clear
that the Australians had the historical honour in Flanders as well as
on the Somme, of saying, "Thus far and no farther," upon the sector
which they manned.
We pass on to the movements of the Thirty-third Division, which
arrived upon the scene of action on April 11, and from that time
onwards played an ever increasing part in this great world crisis.
General Pinney had the experience of first being denuded of large
part of his own proper force, which was given away, brigade by
brigade, to points of danger, and afterwards of not only seeing them
reunited under his hand, but of having the remains of four divisions
and a great number of details under him, and so being in actual
command of the whole operations to the south and west of Bailleul.
To his coolness, firmness, and well-tried fortitude, the nation owed
much during those few desperate days.
The 100th Brigade (Baird) was moved forward at once to come under the
orders of General Bainbridge, who, with his Twenty-fifth Division,
had endured so much in the Ploegsteert district and was in urgent
need of help. We shall follow them from the date of their detachment
to that of their return to their own unit. On April 11, after dusk,
they took their position, covering Neuve Eglise, the 16th King's
Royal Rifles on the right of the line, the 2nd Worcesters in the
centre, and the 9th Highland Light Infantry in reserve, the 148th
Brigade being on the left, and the 75th Brigade on their right, the
{274} latter much exhausted by two days of battle. Immediately to
the north lay the much enduring battle line of the Nineteenth
Division, which has already been fully described. Two points can
hardly be described simultaneously, but these facts are to be read in
conjunction with those already given in the last chapter, and it is
to be understood that the whole situation at Neuve Eglise reacted
from hour to hour upon that farther north, since a German capture of
the town would place the enemy in the rear of General Jeffreys and
his men.
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 13.]
On April 12 there was no direct attack upon this area, but about 4
P.M. the 75th Brigade on the right, which was much worn, was driven
back and a gap created, which was filled in by such reserves as could
be got together at the shortest notice. In the morning of April 13
it was found that this flank was still very open, the nearest
organised unit being the 88th Brigade of the Twenty-ninth Division,
which was also stretching out its left in the hope of making
connection. The enemy, however, pushed through early on April 13,
getting to the rear of the 100th Brigade, and swinging north into
Neuve Eglise which they captured. The Glasgow Highlanders, the only
battalion of the Highland Light Infantry which wears Highland
costume, attacked at once with all the vigour of fresh troops, and
cleared the Germans out of the town at the point of the bayonet. The
enemy had filtered into the brigade line, however, and parties of
them were in the rear of the Worcesters. The hardest part of all was
borne by the 16th King's Royal Rifles, who, being the flank
battalion, bore all the weight of an advance which had enveloped them
upon three sides, front, flank, {275} and rear. Of this gallant
battalion there were hardly any survivors. The Worcesters threw back
their right flank, therefore, in order to cover Neuve Eglise upon the
south and south-east, while the Twenty-fifth Division were on the
north and north-east.
The mishaps of a dark day were still not over, for the enemy about
4.30 made a determined attack and again punctured the over-stretched
line. Some of them drove their way once more into Neuve Eglise,
brushing aside or scattering the thin line of defence. Another
strong force broke into the front of the 100th Brigade and drove a
wedge between the Glasgow Highlanders and the Worcesters. The
headquarters of the latter battalion was in the Municipal Building of
Neuve Eglise, and put up a desperate, isolated resistance for many
hours, Colonel Stoney and his staff finally making their way back to
their comrades. In this defence the Chaplain, the Rev. Tanner,
greatly distinguished himself. The survivors of the 2nd Worcesters
had also maintained themselves in Neuve Eglise as house neighbours to
the German stormers, but after mid-day on April 14, finding
themselves entirely cut off, they fought their way out, leaving the
Square round the Church and Mairie piled with corpses. The town was
now entirely German, with results already described upon the northern
section of the outflanked line. Once more the Worcesters, the heroes
of the old Gheluvelt battle, had placed fresh laurels upon their
faded and battle-stained colours. The remains of the 100th Brigade
were now reassembled on the Ravelsberg ridge, west of Neuve Eglise,
where they faced their enemy once more. So worn was it that the
survivors of the Rifles {276} and of the Highlanders were clubbed
together to form one very weak composite battalion. On their right
now was a collection of odds-and-ends under General Wyatt about a
thousand strong, while on their left was the 103rd Brigade of the
Thirty-fourth Division, with the 148th in support.
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 14 onwards.]
This latter brigade had aided in the defence of Neuve Eglise, and
done very severe service, two of the battalions, the 4th Yorkshire
Light Infantry and the 4th York and Lancasters, having sustained
heavy losses. During the two days in which the fate of the village
hung in the balance these battalions were engaged in constant defence
and counter-attack, especially on April 13, when in one desperate
sally they captured a German colonel and nearly a hundred of his men.
When the village fell on April 14 the gallant Yorkshiremen still held
on close to it and gave no ground until they were ordered that night
into reserve. The other battalion of the brigade, the 5th York and
Lancaster, had been ordered to Steenwerck, where also it had borne a
distinguished part in the fight.
The Germans were now nursing their wounds and also digesting their
gains, so that there was a very welcome pause which was mainly in
favour of the defence, who had good hope of reinforcement. A number
of French batteries appeared as the forerunners of relief, and helped
to break up an advance upon the Ravelsberg on the morning of April
16. A second attack had no better luck. Some posts were taken but
were won back again with the help of the 9th Northumberland Fusiliers
of the 103rd Brigade.
April 17 saw a fresh attack which was preceded by {277} a barrage
which tore gaps in the thin line of the Highlanders. It developed
into an infantry attack, which gave the enemy possession of an
orchard near the line. The Highlanders, aided by some of the 6/7th
Scots Fusiliers of the 177th Brigade, tried hard to win it back, but
could at best only block the exits. After dark that night the
brigade was relieved by the 148th Brigade, and staggered out of the
line with only 800 men unscathed. General Baird's infantry had
endured an ordeal which exceeded what the most disciplined troops
could be expected to survive: 58 officers and 1424 men had fallen in
their splendid defence of Neuve Eglise.
The other brigades of the Thirty-third Division had meanwhile been
involved in situations hardly less critical than those which had
faced Baird's Brigade at Neuve Eglise. Maitland's 98th Brigade,
which found itself on April 12 in the Ravelsberg area, was placed to
the north of Bailleul as a support to that place, and the narrative
of its doings will be found in the subsequent account of the defence
of Meteren.
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 12.]
The 19th Brigade (Mayne) of the Thirty-third Division had been
detailed to cover Meteren to the west of Bailleul against the
northward sweep of the Germans. At 9.40 on April 12 it was known
that the enemy had got through at Merville, that their cavalry had
been seen at Neuf Berquin, and by noon that this swiftly advancing
tide was submerging Merris only three miles south of Meteren.
General Pinney, deprived of two of his brigades, had only under his
hand the 19th Brigade, with the 18th Middlesex Pioneers, 11th and
222nd Field Companies Royal Engineers, and the 33rd British
Machine-gun {278} Corps under Colonel Hutchinson, an officer who
until he was gassed, was a tower of strength to the defence. At
mid-day the place was under heavy shell-fire. There is a windmill in
a prominent position south of the town overlooking the dead flats of
Flanders. In and around this was stationed the 1st Queen's West
Surrey. East of the town, facing Bailleul, was the 5th Scottish
Rifles, while the 1st Scottish Rifles (The Cameronians) were in
reserve. The whole situation was under the direct control of General
Pinney, and he was reinforced in the course of the day by several
very welcome units--9th Corps Cyclists, 22nd New Zealand Entrenching
Battalion, and others. Strazeele was included in the line of
defence, which joined up in the night with the hard-worked
Twenty-ninth Division.
The situation on April 12 in this quarter of the field was most
alarming. Everything in the south seemed to be in a state of chaos,
and the line was for the moment absolutely fluid. The fall of
Merville and of Estaires had been exploited with extraordinary energy
by the Germans, who were rushing on at the very heels of the retiring
and often disorganised troops, who were dead-beat after two days and
nights of constant exertion. It was all important to build up some
sort of line south of Meteren, but events were moving so fast that it
was doubtful if it could be done. It was here that the value of the
new machine-gun organisation, perfected during the winter, was
brilliantly exemplified. Colonel Hutchinson was able to throw
forward the whole of his guns to make up for the local weakness of
the infantry, and he ran great risks in doing so, since he had only
broken men and stragglers to man the gaps between his gun {279}
positions. The crisis was such, however, that any risk had to be
taken, and the 33rd Battalion of the Machine-gun Corps saved the
situation. On the other hand it is not too much to say that a humble
hero, Driver Sharples, whose motor-lorry was handy, saved the 33rd
Battalion, for he not only rushed up eight guns under heavy fire,
with their crews, but he brought up afterwards on his own initiative
the wire and other essentials which enabled them to hold their
position. It was a supreme example of what can be done by one brave,
clear-headed man. The German tide was flowing at a rate which was
measured as 1½ miles in forty minutes, but now it was to reach its
limit, when it came under the fire of these eight guns upon Windmill
Hill. The advance was not only from Merris in the south but even
more along the Bailleul-Meteren Road, which was crowded with their
troops. By dusk the infantry of the 19th Brigade had taken the place
of the weary fragments who lined the front, and the immediate danger
of a complete rupture of the line was over.
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 13.]
At 5.30 A.M. on April 13 the attack upon Meteren commenced with a
strong advance against the 1st Queen's at the Windmill, and gained
some ground in the centre. The usual tactics of rushing up
machine-guns was tried, but in spite of the mist they had very
limited success. The 98th Brigade was now in support, and the 2nd
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were ordered forward to cover Meule
Houck Hill on that side. At 10.30 the Queen's were again fiercely
attacked, and after changing hands three times the windmill in their
position remained with the stormers. At noon a well-knit line had
been formed in front of Meteren, with the Yorkshiremen {280} of the
92nd Brigade in touch on the right, while their brother Yorkshiremen
of the 147th Brigade were on the left, drawn respectively from the
Thirty-first and the Forty-ninth Divisions. There were cheering
rumours that the First Australians and the hundred and thirty-third
French were both speeding upon their way, but the need of the present
was very great, for the German guns were many, while there was hardly
one to aid in the defence.
At 4 P.M. the Germans were beating once more along the whole front of
the division, but by 5.30 were back in their own line, what was left
of them, much the worse for the venture. News came, however, that
Vieux Berquin had fallen, and that Meteren was to be taken next day
at all costs. Meanwhile, in spite of the severe fighting, the losses
had not been heavy, save in the 1st Queen's, which had borne all the
brunt of three separate attacks. Colonel Kemp-Welch and his men had
a very severe ordeal that day. Cavalry appeared more than once in
front of the position, and one body, 200 strong, were cut to pieces
by a sudden concentration of machine-guns. The splendid machine-guns
still played a prominent part in the battle. One of them having been
submerged by a rush of the enemy, Corporal Hurd returned
single-handed, advancing 200 yards beyond the line, and brought it
back upon his shoulder. At one time the supplies of belts ran short,
but they were brought up in most dashing fashion. "At noon," says an
officer, "the fighting limbers with belt-boxes, barrels, and S.A.A.
were galloped through a hail of shell to our gun positions in a style
reminiscent of the Royal Horse Artillery upon an Aldershot
field-day." The result was great. {281} "Gunners and gun-commanders
report having piled the dead enemy before their guns."
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 14]
Shortly after dawn on April 14 the 1st Queen's was in the wars once
more, and from six to eight there were constant attacks along the
whole line from Strazeele on the right to Bailleul Station on the
left, the latter forming the front of the Thirty-fourth Division.
The 1st Cameronians, those stern descendants of the Covenanters, beat
the enemy away from Strazeele about noon. At one time there were
renewed attacks upon both the Queen's and the Cameronians. It is
difficult to know which was the more admirable, the perseverance of
the attacks or the tenacity of the defence. About five in the
evening another fierce wave of storm-troops swept up from the south;
and for one critical moment found a gap in the line. Two companies
of the stalwart labourers of the 2nd New Zealand Entrenching
Battalion threw themselves into the breach, and the position was
restored. When night fell, the whole line, though shaken, was still
intact, and the assault had been a complete and a costly failure.
Such operations, which littered the fields of Flanders with their
dead, go far to explain the German weakness in the latter part of
this campaign of 1918.
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 15.]
April 15 was quiet in the morning on the front of Meteren, but the
afternoon proved to be disastrous at Bailleul, since Ravelsberg and
Mont de Lille were stormed by the Germans, with the result that the
town had to be vacated. The Thirty-fourth Division had been
withdrawn from this position, and the Fifty-ninth North Midlanders
(Romer) had taken their place, but this division had, as already
described, suffered extraordinary losses on the Somme front, {282}
and was in no condition to undertake another considerable operation.
It had already been partly engaged in Flanders, and its losses had
been increased. Under these conditions it is not surprising that the
determined assault of the Germans should have forced the line. It
would appear upon the map that this German success entirely
outflanked the position of the Thirty-third Division, but fortunately
a switch line had been constructed which was now manned by the
remains of the Thirty-fourth Division, while the Fifty-ninth passed
through it and concentrated in the rear. In this way an extension of
the German success was prevented, in spite of great energy upon the
part of the enemy, who had his patrols a kilometre to the west of the
town before night. The 98th Brigade had now taken the place of the
19th in the line, the 4th King's Liverpools relieving the Queen's at
the Windmill, while the 5th Scottish Rifles relieved the Cameronians
near Strazeele.
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 15 onwards.]
In the efforts to stop the German advance from Bailleul the 147th
Brigade of Cameron's Forty-ninth Yorkshire Division played an
important part. This unit, containing the 4th, 6th, and 7th
Battalions of the West Riding Regiment found themselves in the front
line on the evening of April 15, and held hard to a defensive
position north-west of Bailleul. For two more days, April 16 and 17,
they maintained the fight, inflicting and receiving heavy losses, but
with the balance well in their favour. The dour Yorkshiremen made it
clear at last to their equally dour assailants, that there was no
road through their ranks, however they might thin them.
In the early morning of April 16 the enemy by a very sudden and
violent attack broke through the {283} switch line and made a
lodgment in the eastern outskirts of Meteren. In spite of determined
counter-attacks made during the morning by the 1st Middlesex, the 4th
King's, and the gallant New Zealand Trench Battalion, it was not
possible to clear these houses to which the enemy's machine-gun
parties clung with great bravery. Evening found them still in
possession, but all efforts to debouch to the north and west had been
stopped. The Australians were coming up on the right, so that the
Thirty-third were able to shorten their line.
One farm west of Meteren was penetrated by a pushful party of
Germans, but they were beaten out of it and destroyed by the 11th
Field Company of sappers, who took a number of prisoners.
On April 17 the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had come into
the line, relieving the 18th Middlesex Pioneers. About 10 A.M. this
battalion was violently attacked, but drove back its assailants, as
did the Thirty-fourth Division on the left at about the same hour.
At six in the evening another very severe attack developed upon the
front of the 4th King's. For a time the line appeared to be
penetrated, but the 1st Middlesex and units of the One hundred and
thirty-third French Division, which had newly arrived, made a brisk
counter-attack, and the situation was completely restored. It must
indeed have been discomposing to the enemy to find that each success
which he won, whether it was the taking of Neuve Eglise, of Bailleul,
or later of Mount Kemmel, instead of being an opening which led to
victory, was only a passage to further trials and further losses in
an unending vista. The edge of the attack had now been completely
blunted in this quarter. April 18 {284} was quiet, and on the 19th,
as the Australians and French were up, arrangements were made for
drawing the Thirty-third out of the line which they had so splendidly
made good. Their losses in the six days amounted to 145 officers and
3302 men. A few days later Monsieur Clemenceau arrived to convey to
General Pinney and his battle-worn men the thanks of the French
Republic for their iron defence of an essential line.
The Thirty-fourth Division was last mentioned in this narrative when
it fell back from Nieppe on April 12, and was afterwards compelled to
take position on the right of the Twenty-fifth Division in the De
Seule neighbourhood. Among other losses during the retreat was a
tried soldier, General Gore of the 101st Brigade.
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 13 onwards.]
On the 13th the enemy made several tentative attacks, but had no
success. Late in the afternoon, however, he had succeeded in
penetrating the line of the Twenty-fifth Division between Neuve
Eglise and De Seule. This success left the left flank of the
Thirty-fourth in the air. The 103rd Brigade had moved to the
Ravelsberg Ridge, however, and so gave a definite line upon which to
withdraw, extending from Bailleul Station to Crucifix Corner, which
was a very important position. The 103rd Brigade was now on the left
of the line, and the 102nd on the right. There followed, on April
15, a day of very severe fighting, the enemy making continual and
very fiery attacks along the whole line, especially upon the three
points, Steam Mill, Mont de Lille, and Crucifix Corner. The latter
was carried by the enemy and then was retaken by the 9th
Northumberland Fusiliers. Mont de Lille was held by the 74th {285}
Brigade, and Steam Mill by the 147th, each the centre of a very
deadly combat. Steam Mill was lost and yet again retaken by the
Yorkshire Territorials who were aided by the 1st Middlesex from the
Thirty-third Division. It was a long and arduous day of battle,
inexpressibly trying to the wearied troops engaged. General
Nicholson had under his hand six brigades that day, and senior
officers upon the spot have testified to the masterly use which he
made of them. That night the Fifty-ninth came up into the front line
and relieved the exhausted infantry. The relief, however, was but a
momentary one, for on the afternoon of April 15 the Germans delivered
yet another strong attack upon the Ravelsberg line, now held by the
Forty-ninth, Fifty-ninth, and Thirty-third Divisions. The
Fifty-ninth, as already described, fell back through the
Thirty-fourth Division, which again found itself in the front line.
The two flank divisions both fell back to conform, and lined up with
the remains of the Thirty-fourth on the new line near St. Jans
Cappel, which held firm from April 16.
On April 17 there was yet another day of heavy fighting upon this
line, both flanks and the Meule Hook being strongly attacked, but the
position was successfully held, and one more limit seemed to have
been reached in the advance. The same six brigades under General
Nicholson, reduced now to the strength of battalions, were still
throwing an iron bar across the German path. From the right the
147th, 74th, 101st, 102nd, 103rd, and 88th, all of them with set
teeth, held on to the appointed line which receded under pressure and
was yet again re-established. The 88th, under that remarkable young
soldier, {286} General Freyberg, had some especially hard work to do.
Late on April 20 this goodly fellowship in arms was dissolved, the
three separate brigades returned to their divisions, and the
Thirty-fourth was relieved by the French. The artillery of the
Thirty-eighth Welsh Division fought throughout these awful days at
the back of the infantry, who could not say too much for these guns
or for General Topping who commanded them. Save two howitzers hit on
April 9, no gun of this division was lost during all this close and
severe fighting. South of the Lys many of the Royal Army Medical
Corps remained with their wounded, and were taken prisoners, sharing
with their charges the wretched treatment which was still meted out
to British captives, especially behind the lines and before reaching
the camps in Germany.
It should be added that the sappers of the 207th, 208th, 209th Field
Companies and the 18th Northumberland Fusiliers Pioneers fought like
ordinary infantry, and did splendid and essential service in holding
the line.
We shall now turn to Jeffreys' Nineteenth Division which we left on
the 12th of April, holding on to the Wulverghem-Wytschaete front,
with formidable enemies in front of them, but an even more formidable
menace upon their right flank, whence came constant rumours that the
enemy had at last penetrated the hard-pressed Twenty-fifth Division,
had occupied Neuve Eglise, and was pushing up along the lines of the
northward roads which would turn the whole of the position. Late at
night on April 12 it had been ascertained that these reports were
premature. {287} The units of the 108th Ulster Brigade on the right
of the line and connecting with the Twenty-fifth Division had been
penetrated and driven back, but were strengthened and stayed by the
advent of the 8th Gloucesters. The situation was obscure on the
right, and there was a dangerous gap which was filled early in the
morning of April 13 by the energy and initiative of Captain Macintosh
of the 94th Field Company Royal Engineers, who with a handful of the
10th Worcester's pushed his way in, and showed a bold front to the
enemy.
The 2/5th Sherwood Foresters from the 178th Brigade (Stansfeld) of
the Fifty-ninth North Midland Division had also been ordered to face
south and with the help of some machine-guns to hold off the turning
movement from that quarter. All these movements were carried out in
pitch darkness and amid a situation so confused that it was
impossible to define which was the attacking line and which the line
of defence. The general scheme of the battle in this area on the
morning of April 13 was that the Twenty-fifth Division, with the help
of the 148th Brigade of Yorkshire Territorials, was fighting
desperately in and around Neuve Eglise to the north of those units of
the 100th Brigade, whose defence of the town has already been
described. Next to them on the north lay the remains of the 108th
Brigade, then the battalion of Sherwood Foresters, and then the 57th
Brigade with the 8th Gloucesters on the southern flank. All the
morning the roar of battle rose from Neuve Eglise where the German
stormers fought hand to hand with the British infantry, who had been
strengthened by the addition of that fine battalion, the 4th
Shropshires from the Nineteenth {288} Division. The contest swung
and swayed as fresh German troops were thrown into the struggle, but
at last about half-past ten in the morning the attack was defeated,
the German infantry fell back in sullen groups under the constant
fire of the defenders, and the British line was pushed forward to the
south of the village.
During the day, which was spent under heavy fire of artillery and the
imminent menace of attack from the grey clouds seen gathering upon
the Messines Ridge, the remaining battalions of the 178th Brigade,
the 2/6th and the 7th Sherwood Foresters, were pushed into the line
to relieve the exhausted 108th Brigade. It was clear that great
German concentrations were being made upon Neuve Eglise, and that the
village was in danger, so every arrangement was made to accommodate
the line to the situation which would arise if that important point
were taken, and the Wulverghem position became in consequence
untenable. This new line would run from Meteren through Kemmel and
Spy Farm to Spanbrockmolen. The night of April 13 would have been
quiet upon the front of the Nineteenth Division had it not been for
the constant pre-occupation and alarm caused by the varying fortunes
of the fighting at Neuve Eglise, in which they were well aware that
their own fate was concerned. The attack had been renewed with fresh
forces, and the Twenty-fifth Division was extremely exhausted and
could only be helped by other units which were in no better case.
Again and again the Germans were deep in the village. Again and
again they were evicted. It seemed to be the beginning of the end,
however, when it was announced towards morning that the Twenty-fifth
Division was {289} out of touch with the British troops upon its
south flank, and that the Germans filtering through this gap had got
to Nordhoek, west of Neuve Eglise, and were pushing to the north in
the rear of the British position, By morning of April 14 Neuve Eglise
had been abandoned, though it does not appear to have been solidly
occupied by the enemy until mid-day, and snipers of both armies
infested the ruins.
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 14.]
The loss of the village and of the low ridge which adjoined it had a
most sinister effect upon the general strategic position to the
north, and it was indeed fortunate that measures had been taken in
advance to deal with the new situation. The Nineteenth Division on
April 14 found itself shelled heavily all day, while it was
machine-gunned and trench-mortared from the right where its flank was
now in the air. The position of the right-hand unit, the 4th
Shropshires, south of the Neuve Eglise-Wulverghem Road, became
impossible, as the Germans were in the rear, and indeed upon three
sides of them.
Major Wingrove stuck to his position till mid-day, and no battalion
could have given a more cogent example of steadiness and fortitude in
adversity. About 2 P.M. the Germans began to emerge in force from
the villages, beating up against the gallant Shropshires, who retired
slowly and steadily, taking toll of their assailants, while the
Sherwood Foresters of the 178th Brigade helped them to hold the enemy
at arm's length.
As the day wore on the pressure became more insistent, until about
seven in the evening Major Wingrove, of whom it has been stated by
his General that "his tenacity, gallantry, and determination had held
the much-tried and isolated line up to this {290} time," was severely
wounded. When his inspiring presence was removed there was a break
to the north of Neuve Eglise and the Twenty-fifth Division, now
reduced to a handful, were retreating westwards, while the Nineteenth
was being rolled up from the south.
General Jeffreys' force was now in so dangerous a position that it
had actually to form a front to the west as well as to the east, a
difficult manoeuvre which was carried out with great coolness and
skill by Colonel Sole of the 10th Worcesters, who was in charge of
the new line, aided by Major Parkes of the 8th Gloucesters. The men
were rallied, led into their new positions, and a dangerous
penetration was narrowly averted. Later a new line was built up with
the Forty-ninth Yorkshire Territorial Division in the place of the
Twenty-fifth Division on the right, reinforced by the 71st Brigade
from the Sixth Division. Next to them on the left was the 178th
Sherwood Foresters Brigade, then the 108th Brigade, and finally the
58th Brigade, standing just in their old positions. The changes in
the British line were such that whereas it used to face east, it now
faced almost south from near Meteren to Kemmel and Spanbrockmolen.
The latter marked the point of junction upon the left with the right
of the Ninth Division. This line was not fully occupied till April
16.
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 15.]
On April 15 the intermediate positions were attacked, the 9th Welsh
Fusiliers, on the extreme left of the line, and the remains of the
6th Wiltshires being heavily engaged. No impression was made. At a
different point the Germans had better results to show with the 108th
Brigade, and made some {291} progress, but the Sherwood Foresters
once more mended the line. In the evening it was reported that the
enemy had taken Crucifix Corner and were moving westwards. The
strength of all battalions had now fallen to such a point, owing to
constant shelling and incessant attacks, that it was very difficult
to form more than a line of outposts. By evening of April 15 all the
troops concerned, the remains of the Twenty-fifth, the Forty-ninth,
and the Nineteenth Divisions were on the general line Meteren-Kemmel,
facing south to the German advance, but also threatening the German
right flank if they should press too far to the west. The remnant of
the 108th Ulsters was relieved that night.
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 15.]
A heavy attack was made at 6 A.M. on the morning of April 16 upon the
front of the Ninth Division, which had withdrawn in conformity with
the new northern line. The 62nd Brigade of the Twenty-first Division
had, as already stated, been put under the orders of General Tudor of
the Ninth Division, for his unit had been greatly weakened by the
terrible losses of the South Africans. The North Countrymen of the
62nd fought desperately against great odds, but they were pushed out
of Spanbrockmolen, and later out of Wytschaete.
They found a new line to the north, however, and the Germans tried in
vain to bend it. The 58th Brigade had thrown back its own line to
correspond, and joined up with the 62nd at Lacache Farm. Late that
evening the worn and weary troops were deeply comforted by the sight
of a small group of blue-clad men with classical helmets surveying
the German lines through their glasses. It was the vanguard and the
observers of the Twenty-eighth and One {292} hundred and thirty-third
French Divisions which were coming up to the aid of the Ninth.
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 17.]
It was clear that the commanding position of Kemmel, a hill which
overlooks a wide range of country, was the immediate objective of the
enemy in this quarter. About 10 A.M. on April 17 they put down a
heavy barrage, and then pushed on in force with the intention of
breaking in the British line and capturing the hill. The battalions
attacked were the three Sherwood Foresters units, with the 8th North
Staffords and 10th Warwicks of the 57th Brigade. This attack was a
complete failure. Weary as they were the sturdy Englishmen stood
fast to their lines, and beat their assailants back in blood and
ruin. Machine-gun fire from the crest of the hill contributed to the
result, and the guns also did their share. The only German gain was
a post called Donegal Farm between the Nineteenth and the Forty-ninth
Divisions. A fresh attack was made upon the 10th Warwicks in the
evening, but this also was thrown back with heavy loss.
Meanwhile, on the northern sector, the Ninth Division endeavoured to
regain the ground which they had lost the day before, but their
efforts had no great success, save that the 7th Seaforths of the 26th
Brigade in a very brilliant advance fought their way into Wytschaete
once more, and took possession of the village which they held until
the following day, when the general position forced them to abandon
it. On April 18 the fighting died down upon this front, and in the
evening the gallant Nineteenth Division, after most glorious service,
was relieved by the French Twenty-eighth Division, which took over
the defence of Kemmel Hill. The total losses {293} of this division
had been nearly 4000 men, which, coming on the top of the heavy
losses on the Somme in the previous fortnight, formed such a record
as had seldom been equalled. Nor was their ordeal yet at an end, and
many a stout battle was still to be fought before a rest should come.
All these stirring episodes, including the glorious destruction of
the 4th Brigade of Guards, the formation of a permanent line by the
Australians, the defence of Meteren and Bailleul by the Thirty-third
and other divisions, the fighting at Neuve Eglise, and the defence of
the Wytschaete and Messines fronts by the Nineteenth and Ninth
Divisions with odd brigades to help them, all came within the area of
Plumer's Second Army, which still consisted of the Ninth and
Fifteenth Corps in the line. It should be mentioned that of fourteen
divisions contained in this army on March 21 no less than twelve had
been sent down to the Somme, while the remaining two, the Forty-ninth
and Twenty-ninth, were under orders to go at the moment when the
great battle in Flanders broke out.
[Sidenote: Southern Area. April 14.]
We shall now for a moment turn to the left flank of the First Army in
the south which had so far, in spite of heavy attacks, lost very
little ground. It has already been described how the Fifty-fifth
Lancashire Division stood like a rock at Givenchy and Festubert,
while the Fifty-first and afterwards the Fourth Division struggled
desperately to hold back the attack on their left. The former had
been relieved on April 16 by Strickland's First Division, while the
Highlanders and Fourth Division also had been drawn out, and gave
place to Deverell's Third Division, which had done so splendidly and
lost so heavily upon the Somme.
{294}
After the repulse from the Fifty-fifth Division, the Germans had
contented themselves with shelling Givenchy, but they had pushed on,
as already narrated, to the north of the position, and had got as far
as Locon. The result was that the First Division had a long frontage
which faced due north and a shorter frontage to the east.
[Sidenote: Southern Area. April 16.]
The Fourth Division held the front at this period to the east of
Robecq, being on the right of the Sixty-first, with the 184th Brigade
between them. It was used on April 14 for a counter-attack which was
carried out at night, and which achieved a local success by the
recapture of the village of Riez, with 150 prisoners. This operation
was carried out by the 11th Brigade, with the 1st Hants and 1st
Somersets in the lead, and was a very workmanlike little action which
was the more valuable when coming at a period of general recoil.
[Sidenote: Southern Area. April 18.]
On April 18 the new German attack upon the First Division at Givenchy
began with a bombardment of great violence. Their plan upon this day
was to carry Givenchy and Festubert by storm, and to win the line of
the canal as far west as Gorre. They would then capture the high
ground at Hinges, and so command the canal right up to Robecq. No
doubt they calculated, and with justice, that if they could overcome
the men on the spot they would find that the reserves had all been
drawn away to the north. Their plan was wrecked, however, by the
fact that the men on the spot were not to be overcome. Eighteen
German battalions moved forward to the attack, and all of them
suffered heavily without gaining any appreciable advantage. So heavy
was the slaughter that many German companies were {295} reduced
before evening to twenty or thirty effectives, while the three
battalions of one regiment were left under the respective command of
one lieutenant and two sub-lieutenants. There have been few more
costly failures, considering the scale of the operations, in the
whole campaign.
The infantry attack was on the two flanks of the British line which
looked northwards, the one attack being in front of Hinges and the
other covering the space from Loisne to the south of Givenchy,
including Festubert. Three German regiments, the 98th, 361st, and
202nd Reserve, advanced in this quarter. They had constructed two
bridges during the night to cross a broad ditch in front of the
British line, but machine-guns were trained upon them, and the troops
which tried to cross were exposed to heavy losses, which left both
the bridges and the banks heaped with bodies. The mist, the smoke,
and the dust from the shells were so thick, however, that a hundred
yards was the limit of visibility. The German shell-storm continued
to be very heavy, but the British were snugly ensconced in trenches
with a parapet and parados, both of which were several feet thick, so
that no very great harm was done. The worst losses were at the
advanced keep at Festubert, which was blown to bits, only eight men
of the garrison surviving.
The First Division had two brigades in the line, the 1st on the right
holding from Givenchy to Le Plantin, and the 3rd to the left from Le
Plantin to Festubert. The fighting was particularly severe in the
latter sector of the line. As the garrison looked north they saw
through the rising mist about 8.15 in the morning the enemy advancing
in small groups {296} of light machine-guns, coming over a slight
rise some 900 yards east of Festubert. These troops pushed bravely
on, though they had no cover but shell-holes, and they suffered very
severely. The 1st Gloucester, under Colonel Tweedie, on the right
and the 1st {297} South Wales Borderers on the left, battalions with
the halo of the first Ypres battle round their heads, held the line
and littered the open ground with their steady rifle-fire. There was
a gap in the defences at a point called Willow Road, and into this
the enemy poured more quickly than they could be shot down. Their
rush carried them through, and into the houses and gardens of Le
Plantin. A company of the Gloucesters under Captain Handford was cut
in two, but both sections stood fast, Lieutenant Hall on one side,
and the company commander on the other, closing in on the centre and
preventing reinforcement, while Lieutenant Gosling attacked with the
reserve company. The Germans ran field-guns right up, but the crews
were shot down. So matters remained until the afternoon, the
stormers being in the British position, but so pinned down by
rifle-fire that they could not raise their heads. On the other hand,
German snipers in the houses and trees were very deadly to any
runners or other exposed defenders. Whilst matters were in this
stage in the Le Plantin area, they were even more critical at
Festubert. The enemy, moving up behind a good barrage, overran a
part of the South Wales Borderers and forced their way into an
orchard just south of the keep known as Route A. Thence they tried
to get into the rear of the defence. About eleven Sergeant-Major
Biddle of D Company ran the gauntlet to Brigade Headquarters to
explain the situation and ask for help. Captain Smith got together a
party of odds and ends, under twenty in number, who made their way up
the west side of Festubert and prevented the extension of this
dangerous German movement.
[Illustration: DEFENCE OF GIVENCHY BY THE FIRST DIVISION, APRIL 18,
1918.*]
* This rough plan was drawn by an officer engaged in the action.
By two o'clock the attack was definitely defeated, {298} and by three
the Germans were retiring along the whole line. They found it,
however, very difficult to disengage themselves from their advance
positions. They tried to crawl back from shell-hole to shell-hole,
while the British stood up all along the parapets and shot them in
scores. Absolutely demoralised, many of the Germans threw away their
arms. Their retirement probably cost as much as their advance.
Those who had got into Le Plantin had to run the gauntlet between two
halves of the Gloucesters in getting out, and few of them escaped.
The performance of the 1st Gloucesters was remarkable, for they were
at one time attacked front, flank, and rear by a force estimated at
four battalions. It is recorded that the barrels of their new Lewis
guns were worn smooth by the intensity of one day of battle. The 1st
Brigade on the right of the defence from the canal to Le Plantin was
also heavily attacked, though their ordeal was not so long or severe
as that of their comrades on the left. The 1st Black Watch, the
flank battalion next to the Gloucesters, had some especially heavy
fighting, but kept their ground intact, and did their full share
towards the victorious result. The whole affair was a fine feat of
arms, for the German gun power had greatly increased since April 9,
while the repulse was even more decisive. It proved to be a final
one, as the Germans made no further attempt to force their passage to
Bethune. During all this long fight the Third Division beyond Loisne
on the left was holding the line firmly against all German pressure.
So ended April 18. Before the evening of the 20th all outlying posts
had been cleared of the Germans. On this same date, April 18, there
was a sharp {299} action to the immediate left of this Givenchy
fighting, when the Fourth Division held up a German attack, and
afterwards countered, capturing the Bois Paquan in the Kobecq sector.
Two hundred prisoners were the fruits of this action, but they were
dearly bought, for many officers and men were killed or wounded.
Among the former were two grand soldiers, Colonel Armitage of the 1st
Hants and Brigade-Major Harston of the 11th Brigade. This forward
movement was continued later by the Sixty-first Division, who did
very good work on April 23, General Pagan of the 184th Brigade being
a leader in the advance, which was notable for a fine attack by the
2/5th Gloucesters under Colonel Lawson. Shortly afterwards General
Colin Mackenzie of this division, who had done splendid work from the
first days of the war, was wounded while reconnoitring in front of
his line and had to return to England.
There now followed a short pause in the German attack, and we may
look around and follow the general line of the defence at this period
before the action was renewed. On the extreme north of the Second
Army the Belgians had relieved the Thirtieth Division, and thus
shortened the British line. Then came the Ninth and Twenty-first
British Divisions near Wytschaete. South and west of this point the
front line had been taken over by General de Mitry with the
Thirty-sixth French Corps, which now succeeded the Ninth British
Corps in this sector. The Thirty-fourth and One hundred and
thirty-third French Divisions were in the line, with the Second
French Cavalry Corps in co-operation. This most welcome and indeed
vital reinforcement had taken over Kemmel, Mont Rouge, Mont Noir,
Mont Vidaigne, {300} and Mont des Cats, the range of kopjes which
screen the Ypres plain from the south. On the right of the French
was the weary Fifteenth Corps, with the First Australian Division as
the flank unit near Meteren. The British divisions in the north were
in close support to the French, the Nineteenth and Thirty-fourth
being near Poperinghe, and the Twenty-fifth behind Kemmel. Such was
the general position in that northern sector, to which the battle was
now more and more confined. Before following the further events it
should be mentioned that on April 17 the Belgians in the
neighbourhood of Bixschoote had been exposed to a very severe attack
from four German divisions, which would have shaken the whole line of
defence had it succeeded. It was met, however, with very great
courage, and the Belgians proved themselves to be valiant soldiers,
well worthy to be admitted upon entirely equal terms into the
battle-line of the larger nations. They fought the action with
heroic gallantry, and gave the Germans a severe check, killing some
2000 of them, and taking 700 prisoners with several guns. It was a
notable performance, and the more welcome in a period of such stress.
[Illustration: Position of the Line in Flanders, April 9]
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 25.]
On April 25, at an early hour of the morning, the Germans made an
attack upon the northern line from a point north of Bailleul to the
east of Wytschaete, a distance of about ten miles. The whole of this
front, save the extreme eastern portion, was held by the French, who
made a very gallant resistance to as fierce an assault as the war has
seen. The main German objective was the very important height of
Mount Kemmel, a bluff five hundred feet high, wooded upon the sides.
This was held by the Twenty-eighth {301} French Division, who fought
most gallantly, but were finally overpowered by the four German
divisions which were brought against it, including a division of
Alpine troops, especially trained for hill fighting. The Allied line
was pushed back along its whole front, Dranoutre and St. Eloi falling
into the hands of the Germans, together with 6000 prisoners. It was
the darkest hour of the Flemish battle, and was the more depressing
as it came after a week of equilibrium in which the tide of invasion
seemed to have been finally dammed. The German infantry had
penetrated through the joining point of the French and British near
Wytschaete, and at the same time through the French at Dranoutre, so
that they were able to assail Kemmel Hill from both sides. It had
fallen by nine o'clock. The Ninth Division in the north was forced
to fall back upon the line of La Clytte, after enduring heavy losses
in a combat lasting nine hours, during which they fought with their
usual tenacity, as did the 64th and 146th Brigades, who fought beside
them.
The Germans, having got through the French upon the right flank, had
got round to the rear of the 27th Brigade, with the result that the
12th Royal Scots were almost entirely destroyed, and the Scottish
Borderers were also very hard hit. None the less, with the enemy in
front and rear, the Lowland infantry held out, finally making their
way back in orderly fashion during the night. Farther north the line
of the 64th and the 146th Brigades was broken and the remnants
reformed in Cheapside, where their reserve battalions thickened their
array. The 26th Highland Brigade threw back all attacks in front,
and formed a defensive flank to the south, withdrawing at leisure and
in order after dark.
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Even the Ninth Division has seldom had a harder day, or a more
honourable one. On the 26th General Cameron of the Forty-ninth
Division took over this sector, and the Ninth went out of the line
with very special messages of thanks from both the British and the
French marshals.
Some small British units were involved in the disaster of Mount
Kemmel as they were on the hill helping in the defence. Among these
were the 19th Lancashire Fusiliers (Pioneers), the 456th Field
Company R.E., and part of the 49th Battalion Machine-gun Corps, all
drawn from the Forty-ninth Division.
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 26.]
A determined effort was at once made to retrieve the situation, and a
counter-attack upon the new German line was ordered for 3 A.M. on
April 26. It was carried out by the Thirty-ninth French Division on
the right, and by the Twenty-fifth Division (Bainbridge) on the left.
The French advance was held by severe machine-gun fire on the line of
the Kemmel Brook. The British advancing from La Clytte had more
success, but were unable to maintain the ground which they had won.
They went forward with Griffin's 7th Brigade on the left and
Bethell's 74th on the right. The water was up to the men's waists as
in the cold of the early morning they splashed their way across the
Kemmel Brook. It was dismal and desperate work, but the spirit of
the men, in spite of all that this division had endured, was still
high, and they beat down all obstacles until they had forced their
way into the village of Kemmel, where they secured 200 prisoners.
Their own losses were heavy, however, including Colonel Cade of the
1st Wilts, Colonel {303} Stewart of the 4th South Staffords, Colonel
Reade of the 10th Chesters, and several other senior officers. It
was now found that the flanks of both brigades were in the air, and
as the losses were increasing through the enfilade fire, they were
ordered to withdraw. It was still early, and the morning mist
screened what would otherwise have been a very murderous operation.
The final line held by the Twenty-fifth Division was about 1000 yards
in advance of the starting-point.
It should be remembered that in this difficult and gallant night
attack against a victorious enemy the young 19-year-old recruits, who
now made up a considerable proportion of the decimated division,
showed a very fine spirit and kept up with the veterans beside them.
Having repulsed the counter-attack of the French and of the
Twenty-fifth Division, the enemy tried with great energy to improve
his advantage, and Von Armin thundered during the whole of April 26
against the Allied line, trying especially to drive in the northern
sector at Wytschaete and Eloi. The fighting on this line was very
desperate during the day, and in spite of every effort the troops
were pushed back from their forward positions. The strain fell
chiefly upon the remains of the 26th Brigade of the Ninth Division,
the Twenty-first Division, the 21st Brigade of the Thirtieth
Division, and the Thirty-ninth Division. The 21st Brigade defended
the northern portion of the line, and one of the outstanding feats of
the day was the defence of the Old Bluff from morning to dusk by that
grand battalion, the 2nd Bedfords. Farther south the two points
called the Brasserie and the Spoil-Bank were eventually {304} won by
the Germans, but they were defended with great determination by units
of the Thirty-ninth Division, the 1st Herts, the Cambridgeshires, and
the Sussex battalions. It was a day of struggle, and the most that
the Allies could say was that they had prevented a break in their
line. That night there was another general withdrawal along the
front which brought the Allied position into very much the same
trenches as had been occupied in the autumn of 1914. Such a result
of four years' fighting might well have caused depression, and yet
these brave hearts never for one instant relinquished their high
hopes of the victory to come.
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 26 onwards.]
The enemy had gained a spectacular advantage at Kemmel, and high
hopes were raised in Germany that some great ulterior result would
come of it, but in spite of strong efforts it was not destined that
there should be any particular consequences from their victory.
Observation can be obtained from a balloon as easily as from a hill,
and the space upon the summit was so limited that the Allied guns
could make it almost untenable. Strong efforts were at once made to
push on upon the line Locre-La Clytte, which was held by the French.
They repulsed three strong attacks on April 27, and though in the
evening the Germans got into Locre, they were thrown out again by our
tenacious Allies. Again on the morning of April 29 the enemy
attacked along the whole line from Mont Vidaigne to Zillebeke Lake.
This attack was repulsed with severe loss to the enemy, and must have
gone far to convince him that he was not destined to develop his
Kemmel success. The battle involved not only the front of the
Thirty-sixth French Corps, but also that of the Twenty-fifth,
Forty-ninth, and {305} Twenty-first Divisions, all of which stood
like a wall and beat off every assault. These attacks extended from
north of Kemmel to Voormezeele. The Twenty-fifth Division was next
to the French on the right of the line, in the British centre was the
Forty-ninth, while on the left the Twenty-first Division connected up
with the Ninth, which was out of the direct line of attack.
[Sidenote: Northern Area. April 29.]
The 75th Brigade formed the fighting line of the Twenty-fifth
Division on this day of battle. They found themselves on the western
side of the Kemmel Brook, while the 3rd Prussian Guards lay on the
farther side and advanced to the attack. To do this they had to pass
over the smooth slope which led down to the stream, and they fell in
heaps in the attempt. They huddled for shelter behind a group of
huts, but the guns got on to them and blew them to pieces. Four
distinct attacks were all equally murderous and unsuccessful. The
8th Border Battalion was particularly conspicuous in the defence.
Next to them, near Ridge Wood, were the well-tried Yorkshiremen of
the Forty-ninth. For some reason the Germans at this point advanced
in close formation with bayonets fixed. Such tactics received the
slating which they deserved. Both the West Riding Battalions of the
147th Brigade and the York and Lancasters of the 148th were in the
firing-line, and they amply repaid themselves for many a distressful
hour. Once for three minutes the Germans made a lodgment, but at the
end of that time a rush of bayonet-men pitchforked them out of their
only gain. The Twenty-first Division held the line above Ridge Wood
and on towards Voormezeele. Upon them came the heaviest attack of
all, and the slaughter {306} of the Germans, coming on at a range of
400 yards under machine-gun and rifle-fire, was very murderous. The
Leicester Brigade did particularly well this day, and so did the worn
89th Brigade of the Thirtieth Division, which had come under the
orders of General Campbell of the Twenty-first Division. The German
attack struck very hard against the front of this unit near the
Brasserie on the Vierstraat-Ypres Road, and all three battalions, the
17th, 18th, 19th King's Liverpools, had desperate fighting, the 17th
coming in for particularly rough treatment. It had each flank
penetrated and one company surrounded, but still managed to shake
itself clear.
The Belgians were also involved in this wide-spread attack, and both
their lines in the north and those of the French round the
Sharpenberg and Mont Rouge were held intact. This severe check,
inflicted upon a force which was not less than twelve divisions,
marked the beginning of the collapse of the great German offensive in
Flanders, which had now lasted for twenty days of constant battle.
Early in May the Franco-British line still lay from Kemmel village in
the south to Ypres in the north, taking Voormezeele upon the way. If
the Germans could succeed in bursting through here they would partly
encircle Ypres, and would probably cause an evacuation, an event
which might be of no great military importance, but could not fail to
have a moral and political repercussion. Ypres stood like an
oriflamme of war amid the ranks of the British Army. Here it was
that in October 1914 they had said to the Germans, "Thus far and no
farther!" Now in the fourth year the words still held good. If
after all the efforts, all the self-sacrifice, all {307} good blood
so cheerfully shed, it was now to pass from their hands, no consoling
lectures upon strategy could soften the heavy blow which it would be
to those who relaxed the grip which their comrades had the held so
firmly. Yet it was this and no less which was at stake in these
early days of May. A crushing German victory with the capture of the
coast was no longer to be feared. But an important local success,
which would reverberate through the world, was still well within
their hopes and their power.
At the moment of this important attack the southern sector of this
line was held by the One hundred and twenty-ninth and Thirty-second
French Divisions, the latter being next to the British just to the
south of Vierstraat. To the north of the French lay the 30th
Composite Brigade (Currie), which had been formed by telescoping the
remains of the Thirtieth Division into a single unit. It had two
splendid though attenuated Regular battalions, the 2nd Bedfords and
2nd Yorkshires in the line with the 17th King's Liverpools in
immediate support. Still farther to the north lay Pinney's
well-tried Thirty-third Division with the 98th Brigade (Maitland) in
front. Their battle line consisted of the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, the 4th King's Liverpools, and the 1st Middlesex, from
south to north. Farther north still from the Voormezeele region to
the southern suburbs of ruined Ypres lay Marden's Sixth Division
which was not involved to any great degree in the fighting.
[Sidenote: Northern Area. May 8.]
In the centre of the position was a well-marked line of trees forming
the edge of Ridge Wood. Behind the British line was the village of
Dickebush with the Dickebush Lake. These two points were the first
{308} objectives of the German attack, which broke with great
violence at 7.30 in the morning of May 8. It was preceded by a
lavish use of mustard gas shells, a hellish device which was used
more and more from this time forward. This poison may be kept out of
the lungs by a mask, but cannot be kept from the body, where it
raises such blisters and irritation as may prove fatal in the same
fashion as a bad burn. When enough has been poured into any position
it can be made untenable by troops, since in heavy weather it hangs
about for days, and has the unpleasant property of appearing to have
vanished and yet becoming active again when exposed to moisture.
Many a battalion which has crossed a dew-moistened field within the
battle area has had reason afterwards to regret it.
Coming after so deadly a preparation the first rush of the Germans
met with success, and they penetrated the line, both of the
Thirty-second French Division and of the 30th Composite Brigade.
Their advance brought them roughly to the south end of Dickebush
Lake, whereupon the 98th Brigade threw back a flank from Ridge Wood
to the lake, so as to cover themselves from a southern attack.
At seven in the evening a strong attempt was made to re-establish the
line, the 19th Brigade (Mayne) being thrown into the battle. The
counter-attack was made by the 1st Cameronians, advancing across the
Hallebast-La Clytte Road, but they were in full view of the enemy
whose machine-gun fire was sweeping the very grass from the ground in
front of their feet. They could not get forward, and many of them
never got back. A fine advance was made, however, by the composite
King's Liverpools with the {309} help of some of the Bedfords. It
actually reached the old front line, but had lost so heavily that it
was unable to retain it in the face of a renewed German assault, but
stuck on as near as it could.
It should be explained that this King's Liverpool unit was really the
old 89th Brigade which had been worn down to such an extent that the
17th, 18th, and 19th King's were now compressed into one battalion,
750 strong. Their heavy losses upon the Somme had been greatly
increased in Flanders, and included Colonel Watson, the gallant and
veteran leader of the 17th Battalion. Now under Colonel Rollo their
sentiment was that of one of their officers who wrote, "We are still
the 89th Brigade, call us what they like and put us in what division
they please. The old spirit remains as ever." This was the unit
whose swan song is here recorded. Next day the survivors made good
their line, and handed it over intact to their relief.
To the north of this composite battalion (which was independent of
the 30th Divisional Brigade already mentioned) the counter-attack was
made by the 5th Scottish Rifles near Dickebush Lake, and by the 2nd
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders at Ridge Wood. Both of these
battalions won home and gained their full objectives. The great
German local effort, urged by four strong divisions, the Fifty-second
and Fifty-sixth in front, the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-first in
support, had been held. Each of these convulsive efforts of Von
Armin's tired army brought the final equilibrium and ultimate
retirement more close.
The fighting died down entirely in this quarter, and the Fourteenth
French Division took it over {310} from the British. Indeed this day
of strenuous battle may be said to have marked the end of the great
Battle of the Lys, which had raged ever since April 9. The Germans
had been fought to a standstill. They had in the course of a month's
fighting won ground, prisoners, and guns, but it is possible in
winning a battle to lose a war, and this is exactly what they had
accomplished. An expensive and barren success had been achieved by a
lavish use of their reserves, and on the day when those reserves were
vitally needed, they had been wastefully strewn over the plains of
the Somme and of Flanders. Never had the British Army been more
severely tried than at this time when their General issued his famous
"back to the wall" appeal, and never had the individual soldier risen
to a greater height. "The British Army," says an Italian observer
who was present throughout the crisis, "impresses one with its
inherent moral soundness. The German," he adds, "uses almost
exclusively machine-guns and bombs, but the Englishman loves his
rifle, and knows much better how to use it. He is a better marksman,
he is more contemptuous of danger, and he is calmer, steadier, and
feels himself individually superior to his enemy. The cheerfulness
of the men is due in great measure to the noble, dignified, serene
example of their officers, so simple in their gentlemanly bearing, so
conscious of the reasons and the end of the war, so proud of their
country and of its unshakeable prestige." It is a noble tribute, but
none who know the men could say that it was a strained one.
No account of the battle of the Lys can close without a word as to
the splendid work done by General Plumer, never wearied, never
flurried, during {311} those fateful days. Hardly less arduous was
the experience of General Horne in the southern sector. The three
corps commanders, too, who bore the brunt, and very especially
General de Lisle, who only took over his command on the second day of
the battle, will always be associated with one of the most desperate
incidents of the war. But above and behind all is the commanding and
heroic figure of Douglas Haig, impassive, serene, still working as he
had worked four years before, at the mending of broken lines and the
bracing of weak ones, until the hour should strike for his tremendous
revenge.
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