reflections must he have made, if he had had leisure to reflect, in
comparing the recollections of his rising glory with the sad picture of
his falling fortune? What a contrast presents itself when we compare
the famous flag of the army of Italy, which the youthful conqueror,
Bonaparte, carried to the Directory, with those drooping eagles who had
now to defend the aerie whence they had so often taken flight to spread
their triumphant wings over Europe! Here we see the difference between
liberty and absolute power! Napoleon, the son of liberty, to whom he
owed everything, had disowned his mother, and was now about to fall.
Those glorious triumphs were now over when the people of Italy consoled
themselves for defeat and submitted to the magical power of that liberty
which preceded the Republican armies. Now, on the contrary, it was to
free themselves from a despotic yoke that the nations of Europe had in
their turn taken up arms and were preparing to invade France.
With the violation of the Swiss territory by the Allied armies, after
the consent of the Cantons, is connected a fact of great importance in
my life, and which, if I had chosen, might have made a great difference
in my destiny. On Tuesday, the 28th of December, I dined with my old
friend, M. Pierlot, and on leaving home I was in the habit of saying
where I might be found in case I should be wanted. At nine o'clock at
night an express arrived from the Minister of Police desiring me to come
immediately to his office. I confess, considering the circumstances
of the times, and knowing the Emperor's prejudices against me, such
a request coming at such an hour made me feel some uneasiness, and I
expected nothing less then a journey to Vincennes. The Duc de Rovigo,
by becoming responsible for me, had as yet warded off the blow, and the
supervision to which the Emperor had subjected me--thanks to the good
offices of Davoust--consisted in going three times a week to show myself
to Savory.
I accordingly, having first borrowed a night-cap, repaired to the hotel
of the Minister of Police. I was ushered into a well-lighted room, and
when I entered I found Savary waiting for me. He was in full costume,
from which I concluded he had just come from the Emperor. Advancing
towards me with an air which showed he had no bad news to communicate,
he thus addressed me:
"Bourrienne, I have just come from the Emperor, who asked me where you
were? I told him you were in Paris, and that I saw you often. 'Well,'
continued the Emperor, 'bid him come to me, I want to employ him. It
is three years since he has had anything to do. I wish to send him as
Minister to Switzerland, but he must set off directly. He must go to
the Allies. He understands German well. The King of Prussia expressed
by letter satisfaction at his conduct towards the Prussians whom the
war forced to retire to Hamburg. He knows Prince Witgenstein, who is the
friend of the King of Prussia, and probably is at Lörrach. He will see
all the Germans who are there. I confidently rely on him, and believe
his journey will have a good result. Caulaincourt will give him his
instructions."
Notwithstanding my extreme surprise at this communication I replied
without hesitation that I could not accept the mission; that it was
offered too late. "It perhaps is hoped;" said I, "that the bridge
of Bale will be destroyed, and that Switzerland will preserve her
neutrality. But I do not believe any such thing; nay, more, I know
positively to the contrary. I can only repeat the offer comes much too
late."--"I am very sorry for this resolution," observed Savory, "but
Caulaincourt will perhaps persuade you. The Emperor wishes you to go to
the Duc de Vicence to-morrow at one o'clock; he will acquaint you with
all the particulars, and give you your instructions."--"He may acquaint
me with whatever he chooses, but I will not go to Lörrach."--"You know
the Emperor better than I do, he wishes you to go, and he will not
pardon your refusal."--"He may do as he pleases, but no consideration
shall induce me to go to Switzerland."--"You are wrong: but you will
reflect on the matter between this and tomorrow morning. Night will
bring good counsel, At any rate, do not fail to go to-morrow at one
o'clock to Caulaincourt, he expects you, and directions will be given to
admit you immediately."
Next morning the first thing I did was to call on M. de Talleyrand. I
told him what had taken place, and as he was intimately acquainted with
Caulaincourt, I begged him to speak to that Minister in favour of my
resolution. M. de Talleyrand approved of my determination not to go
to Switzerland, and at one o'clock precisely I proceeded to M. de
Caulaincourt's. He told me all he had been instructed to say. From the
manner in which he made the communication I concluded that he himself
considered the proposed mission a disagreeable one, and unlikely to be
attended by any useful result. I observed that he must have heard from
Savory that I had already expressed my determination to decline the
mission which the Emperor had been pleased to offer me. The Duc de
Vicence then, in a very friendly way, detailed the reasons which ought
to induce me to accept the offer, and did not disguise from me that
by persisting in my determination I ran the risk of raising Napoleon's
doubts as to my opinions and future intentions. I replied that, having
lived for three years as a private individual, unconnected with public
affairs, I should have no influence at the headquarters of the Allies,
and that whatever little ability I might be supposed to possess, that
would not counterbalance the difficulties of my situation, and the
opinion that I was out of favour. I added that I should appear at the
headquarters without any decoration, without even that of the Cordon of
the Legion of Honour to which the Emperor attached so much importance,
and the want of which would almost have the appearance of disgrace; and
I said that these trifles, however slightly valued by reasonable men,
were not, as he well knew, without their influence on the men with whom
I should have to treat. "If that be all," replied Caulaincourt, "the
obstacle will speedily be removed. I am authorised by the Emperor to
tell you that he will create you a Duke, and give you the Grand Cordon
of the Legion of Honour."
After these words I thought I was dreaming, and I was almost inclined
to believe that Caulaincourt was jesting with me. However, the offer was
serious, and I will not deny that it was tempting; yet I nevertheless
persisted in the refusal I had given. At length, after some further
conversation, and renewed, but useless, entreaties on the part of M.
de Caulaincourt, he arose, which was a signal that our interview was
terminated. I acknowledge I remained for a moment in doubt how to act,
for I felt we had come to no understanding. M. de' Caulaincourt advanced
slowly towards the door of his cabinet: If I went away without knowing
his opinion I had done nothing; addressing him, therefore, by his
surname, "Caulaincourt;" said I, "you have frequently assured me that
you would never forget the services I rendered to you and your family at
a time when I possessed some influence. I know you, and therefore speak
to you without disguise. I do not now address myself to the Emperor's
Minister, but to Caulaincourt. You are a man of honour, and I can open
my heart to you frankly. Consider the embarrassing situation of France,
which you know better than I do. I do not ask you for your secrets, but
I myself know enough. I will tell you candidly that I am convinced the
enemy will pass the Rhine in a few days. The Emperor has been deceived:
I should not have time to reach my destination, and I should be laughed
at. My correspondents in Germany have made me acquainted with every
particular. Now, Caulaincourt, tell me honestly, if you were in my
place, and I in yours, and I should make this proposition to you, what
determination would you adopt?"
I observed from the expression of Caulaincourt's countenance that my
question had made an impression on him, and affectionately pressing my
hand he said, "I would do as you do: Enough. I will arrange the business
with the Emperor." This reply seemed to remove a weight from my mind,
and I left Caulaincourt with feelings of gratitude. I felt fully assured
that he would settle the business satisfactorily, and in this conjecture
I was not deceived, for I heard no more of the matter.
I must here go forward a year to relate another occurrence in which
the Duc de Vicence and I were concerned. When, in March 1815, the
King appointed me Prefect of Police, M. de Caulaincourt sent to me a
confidential person to inquire whether he ran any risk in remaining in
Paris, or whether he had better remove. He had been told that his name
was inscribed in a list of individuals whom I had received orders to
arrest. Delighted at this proof of confidence, I returned the following
answer by the Duc de Vicence's messenger: "Tell M. de Caulaincourt that
I do not know where he lives. He need be under no apprehension: I will
answer for him."
During the campaign of 1813 the Allies, after driving the French out of
Saxony and obliging them to retreat towards the Rhine, besieged Hamburg,
where Davoust was shut up with a garrison of 30,000 men, resolutely
determined to make it a second Saragossa. From the month of September
every day augmented the number of the Allied troops, who were already
making rapid progress on the left bank of the Elbe. Davoust endeavoured
to fortify Hamburg on so extended a scale that, in the opinion of the
most experienced military men, it would have required a garrison of
60,000 men to defend it in a regular and protracted siege. At the
commencement of the siege Davoust lost Vandamme, who was killed in
a sortie at the head of a numerous corps which was inconsiderately
sacrificed.
It is but justice to admit that Davoust displayed great activity in the
defence, and began by laying in large supplies.
--[Vandamme fought under Grouchy in 1815, and died several years
afterwards. This killing him at Hamburg is one of the curious
mistakes seized on by the Bonapartists to deny the authenticity of
these Memoirs.]--
General Bertrand was directed to construct a bridge to form a
communication between Hamburg and Haarburg by joining the islands of the
Elbe to the Continent along a total distance of about two leagues.
This bridge was to be built of wood, and Davoust seized upon all the
timber-yards to supply materials for its construction. In the space of
eighty-three days the bridge was finished. It was a very magnificent
structure, its length being 2529 toises, exclusive of the lines of
junction, formed on the two islands.
The inhabitants were dreadfully oppressed, but all the cruel measures
and precautions of the French were ineffectual, for the Allies advanced
in great force and occupied Westphalia, which movement obliged the
Governor of Hamburg to recall to the town the different detachments
scattered round Hamburg.
At Lübeck the departure of the French troops was marked by blood. Before
they evacuated the town, an old man, and a butcher named Prahl, were
condemned to be shot. The butcher's crime consisted in having said, in
speaking of the French, "Der teufel hohle sie" (the devil take
them). The old man fortunately escaped his threatened fate, but,
notwithstanding the entreaties and tears of the inhabitants, the
sentence upon Prahl was carried into execution.
The garrison of Hamburg was composed of French, Italian, and Dutch
troops. Their number at first amounted to 30,000, but sickness made
great-havoc among them. From sixty to eighty perished daily in the
hospitals. When the garrison evacuated Hamburg in May 1814 it was
reduced to about 15,000 men. In the month of December provisions began
to diminish, and there was no possibility of renewing the supply.
The poor were first of all made to leave the town, and afterwards
all persons who were not usefully employed. It is no exaggeration to
estimate at 50,000 the number of persons who were thus exiled. The
colonel commanding the gendarmerie at Hamburg notified to the exiled
inhabitants that those who did not leave the town within the prescribed
time would receive fifty blows with a cane and afterwards be driven out.
But if penance may be commuted with priests so it may with gendarmes.
Delinquents contrived to purchase their escape from the bastinado by a
sum of money, and French gallantry substituted with respect to females
the birch for the cane. I saw an order directing all female servants to
be examined as to their health unless they could produce certificates
from their masters. On the 25th of December the Government granted
twenty-four hours longer to persons who were ordered to quit the town;
and two days after this indulgence an ordinance was published declaring
that those who should return to the town after once leaving it were
to be considered as rebels and accomplices of the enemy, and as such
condemned to death by a prevotal court. But this was not enough. At the
end of December people, without distinction of sex or age, were dragged
from their beds and conveyed out of the town on a cold night, when the
thermometer was between sixteen or eighteen degrees; and it was affirmed
that several old men perished in this removal. Those who survived were
left on the outside of the Altona gates. At Altona they all found refuge
and assistance. On Christmas-day 7000 of these unfortunate persons
were received in the house of M. Rainville, formerly aide de camp to
Dumouriez, and who left France together with that general. His
house, which was at Holstein, was usually the scene of brilliant
entertainments, but it was converted into the abode of misery, mourning,
and death. All possible attention was bestowed on the unfortunate
outlaws; but few profited by it, and what is worse, the inhabitants of
Altona suffered for their generosity. Many of the unfortunate persons
were affected with the epidemic disease which was raging in Hamburg, and
which in consequence broke out at Altona.
All means of raising money in Hamburg being exhausted, a seizure was
made of the funds of the Bank of that city, which yet contained from
seven to eight millions of marks. Were those who ordered this measure
not aware that to seize on the funds of some of the citizens of Hamburg
was an injury to all foreigners who had funds in the Bank? Such is a
brief statement of the vexations and cruelties which long oppressed this
unfortunate city. Napoleon accused Hamburg of Anglomania, and by ruining
her he thought to ruin England. Hamburg, feeble and bereft of her
sources, could only complain, like Jerusalem when besieged by Titus:
"Plorans, ploravit in nocte."
CHAPTER XXXII.
1813-1814.
Prince Eugène and the affairs of Italy--The army of Italy on the
frontiers of Austria--Eugène's regret at the defection of the
Bavarians--Murat's dissimulation and perfidy--His treaty with
Austria--Hostilities followed by a declaration of war--Murat
abandoned by the French generals--Proclamation from Paris--Murat's
success--Gigantic scheme of Napoleon--Napoleon advised to join the
Jacobins--His refusal--Armament of the National Guard--The Emperor's
farewell to the officers--The Congress of Chatillon--Refusal of an
armistice--Napoleon's character displayed in his negotiations--
Opening of the Congress--Discussions--Rupture of the Conferences.
I want now to proceed to notice the affairs of Italy and the principal
events of the Viceroyalty of Eugène. In order to throw together all that
I have to say about the Viceroy I must anticipate the order of time.
After the campaign of 1812, when Eugène revisited Italy, he was promptly
informed of the more than doubtful dispositions of Austria towards
France. He then made preparations for raising an army capable of
defending the country which the Emperor had committed to his safeguard.
Napoleon was fully aware how much advantage he would derive from the
presence on the northern frontiers of Italy of an army sufficiently
strong to harass Austria, in case she should draw aside the transparent
veil which still covered her policy. Eugène did all that depended on him
to meet the Emperor's wishes; but in spite of his efforts the army of
Italy was, after all; only an imaginary army to those who could compare
the number of men actually enrolled with the numbers stated in the
lists. When, in July 1813, the Viceroy was informed of the turn taken by
the negotiations at the shadow of a Congress assembled at Prague, he
had no longer any doubt of the renewal of hostilities; and foreseeing
an attack on Italy he resolved as speedily as possible to approach the
frontiers of Austria. He had succeeded in assembling an army composed of
French and Italians, and amounting to 45,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry.
On the renewal of hostilities the Viceroy's headquarters were at Udine.
Down to the month of April 1814 he succeeded in maintaining a formidable
attitude, and in defending the entrance of his kingdom by dint of that
military talent which was to be expected in a man bred in the great
school of Napoleon, and whom the army looked up to as one of its most
skillful generals.
During the great and unfortunate events of 1813 all eyes had been fixed
on Germany and the Rhine; but the defection of Murat for a time diverted
attention to Italy. That event did not so very much surprise me, for I
had not forgotten my conversation with the King of Naples in the Champs
Elysees, with which I have made the reader acquainted. At first Murat's
defection was thought incredible by every one, and it highly excited
Bonaparte's indignation. Another defection which occurred about the same
period deeply distressed Eugène, for although raised to the rank of a
prince, and almost a sovereign, he was still a man, and an excellent
man. He was united to the Princess Amelia of Bavaria, who was as amiable
and as much beloved as he, and he had the deep mortification to count
the subjects of his father-in-law among the enemies whom he would
probably have to combat. Fearing lest he should be harassed by the
Bavarians on the side of the Tyrol, Eugène commenced his retrograde
movement in the autumn of 1813. He at first fell back on the
Tagliamento, and successively on the Adige. On reaching that river the
army of Italy was considerably diminished, in spite of all Eugène's
care of his troops. About the end of November Eugène learned that
a Neapolitan corps was advancing upon Upper Italy, part taking the
direction of Rome, and part that of Ancona. The object of the King of
Naples was to take advantage of the situation of Europe, and he was
duped by the promises held out to him as the reward of his treason.
Murat seemed to have adopted the artful policy of Austria; for not only
had he determined to join the coalition, but he was even maintaining
communications with England and Austria, while at the same time he was
making protestations of fidelity to his engagements with Napoleon.
When first informed of Murat's treason by the Viceroy the Emperor
refused to believe it. "No," he exclaimed to those about him, "it cannot
be! Murat, to whom I have given my sister! Murat, to whom I have given
a throne! Eugène must be misinformed. It is impossible that Murat has
declared himself against me!" It was, however, not only possible but
true. Gradually throwing aside the dissimulation beneath which he had
concealed his designs, Murat seemed inclined to renew the policy of
Italy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the art of
deceiving was deemed by the Italian Governments the most sublime effort
of genius. Without any declaration of war, Murat ordered the Neapolitan
General who occupied Rome to assume the supreme command in the Roman
States, and to take possession of the country. General Miollis, who
commanded the French troops in Rome, could only throw himself, with
his handful of men, into the Castle of St. Angelo, the famous mole of
Adrian, in which was long preserved the treasury of Sixtus V. The French
General soon found himself blockaded by the Neapolitan troops, who also
blockaded Civita Vecchia and Ancona.
The treaty concluded between Murat and Austria was definitively signed
on the 11th of January 1814. As soon as he was informed of it
the Viceroy, certain that he should soon have to engage with the
Neapolitans, was obliged to renounce the preservation of the line of
the Adige, the Neapolitan army being in the rear of his right wing.
He accordingly ordered a retrograde movement to the other side of the
Mincio, where his army was cantoned. In this position Prince Eugène, on
the 8th of February, had to engage with the Austrians, who had come up
with him, and the victory of the Mincio arrested, for some time, the
invasion of the Austrian army and its junction with the Neapolitan
troops.
It was not until eight days after that Murat officially declared war
against the Emperor; and immediately several general and superior
officers, and many French troops, who were in his service, abandoned
him, and repaired to the headquarters of the Viceroy. Murat made
endeavours to detain them; they replied, that as he had declared war
against France, no Frenchman who loved his country could remain in his
service. "Do you think," returned he, "that my heart is less French than
yours? On the contrary, I am much to be pitied. I hear of nothing but
the disasters of the Grand Army. I have been obliged to enter into
a treaty with the Austrians, and an arrangement with the English,
commanded by Lord Bentinck, in order to save my Kingdom from a
threatened landing of the English and the Sicilians, which would
infallibly have excited an insurrection."
There could not be a more ingenuous confession of the antipathy which
Joachim knew the Neapolitans to entertain towards his person and
government. His address to the French was ineffectual. It was easy
to foresee what would ensue. The Viceroy soon received an official
communication from Napoleon's War Minister, accompanied by an Imperial
decree, recalling all the French who were in the service of Joachim,
and declaring that all who were taken with arms in their hands should be
tried by a courtmartial as traitors to their country. Murat commenced
by gaining advantages which could not be disputed. His troops almost
immediately took possession of Leghorn and the citadel of Ancona, and
the French were obliged to evacuate Tuscany.
The defection of Murat overthrew one of Bonaparte's gigantic
conceptions. He had planned that Murat and Eugène with their combined
forces should march on the rear of the Allies, while he, disputing the
soil of France with the invaders, should multiply obstacles to their
advance; the King of Naples and the Viceroy of Italy were to march upon
Vienna and make Austria tremble in the heart of her capital before the
timid million of her Allies, who measured their steps as they approached
Paris, should desecrate by their presence the capital of France. When
informed of the vast project, which, however, was but the dream of
a moment, I immediately recognised that eagle glance, that power
of discovering great resources in great calamities, so peculiar to
Bonaparte.
Napoleon was yet Emperor of France; but he who had imposed on all Europe
treaties of peace no less disastrous than the wars which had preceded
them, could not now obtain an armistice; and Caulaincourt, who was
sent to treat for one at the camp of the Allies, spent twenty days at
Luneville before he could even obtain permission to pass the advanced
posts of the invading army. In vain did Caulaincourt entreat Napoleon
to sacrifice, or at least resign temporarily, a portion of that glory
acquired in so many battles, and which nothing could efface in history.
Napoleon replied, "I will sign whatever you wish. To obtain peace I will
exact no condition; but I will not dictate my own humiliation." This
concession, of course, amounted to a determination not to sign or to
grant anything.
In the first fortnight of January 1814 one-third of France was
invaded, and it was proposed to form a new Congress, to be held at
Chatillon-sur-Seine. The situation of Napoleon grew daily worse and
worse. He was advised to seek extraordinary resources in the interior of
the Empire, and was reminded of the fourteen armies which rose, as if
by enchantment, to defend France at the commencement of the Revolution.
Finally, a reconciliation with the Jacobins, a party who had power to
call up masses to aid him, was recommended. For a moment he was inclined
to adopt this advice. He rode on horseback through the surburbs of St.
Antoine and St. Marceau, courted the populace, affectionately replied to
their acclamations, and he thought he saw the possibility of turning to
account the attachment which the people evinced for him. On his return
to the Palace some prudent persons ventured to represent to him that,
instead of courting this absurd sort of popularity it would be more
advisable to rely on the nobility and the higher classes of society.
"Gentlemen," replied he, "you may say what you please, but in the
situation in which I stand my only nobility is the rabble of the
faubourgs, and I know of no rabble but the nobility whom I have
created." This was a strange compliment to all ranks, for it was only
saying that they were all rabble together.
At this time the Jacobins were disposed to exert every effort to serve
him; but they required to have their own way, and to be allowed freely
to excite and foster revolutionary sentiments. The press, which groaned
under the most odious and intolerable censorship, was to be wholly
resigned to them. I do not state these facts from hearsay. I happened
by chance to be present at two conferences in which were set forward
projects infected with the odour of the clubs, and these projects were
supported with the more assurance because their success was regarded as
certain. Though I had not seen Napoleon since my departure for Hamburg,
yet I was sufficiently assured of his feeling towards the Jacobins to be
convinced that he would have nothing to do with them. I was not wrong.
On hearing of the price they set on their services he said, "This is too
much; I shall have a chance of deliverance in battle, but I shall have
none with these furious blockheads. There can be nothing in common
between the demagogic principles of '93 and the monarchy, between clubs
of madmen and a regular Ministry, between a Committee of Public Safety
and an Emperor, between revolutionary tribunals and established laws. If
fall I must, I will not bequeath France to the Revolution from which I
have delivered her."
These were golden words, and Napoleon thought of a more noble and truly
national mode of parrying the danger which threatened him. He ordered
the enrolment of the National Guard of Paris, which was placed under the
command of Marshal Moncey. A better choice could not have been made,
but the staff of the National Guard was a focus of hidden intrigues,
in which the defence of Paris was less thought about than the means of
taking advantage of Napoleon's overthrow. I was made a captain in
this Guard, and, like the rest of the officers, I was summoned to the
Tuileries, on the 23d of January, when the Emperor took leave of the
National Guard previously to his departure from Paris to join the army.
Napoleon entered with the Empress. He advanced with a dignified step,
leading by the hand his son, who was not yet three years old. It was
long since I had seen him. He had grown very corpulent, and I remarked
on his pale countenance an expression of melancholy and irritability.
The habitual movement of the muscles of his neck was more decided and
more frequent than formerly. I shall not attempt to describe what
were my feelings during this ceremony, when I again saw, after a long
separation, the friend of my youth, who had become master of Europe,
and was now on the point of sinking beneath the efforts of his enemies.
There was something melancholy in this solemn and impressive ceremony. I
have rarely witnessed such profound silence in so numerous an assembly.
At length Napoleon, in a voice as firm and sonorous as when he used
to harangue his troops in Italy or in Egypt, but without that air
of confidence which then beamed on his countenance, delivered to the
assembled officers an address which was published in all the journals of
the time. At the commencement of this address he said, "I set out
this night to take the command of the army. On quitting the capital I
confidently leave behind me my wife and my son, in whom so many hopes
are centred." I listened attentively to Napoleon's address, and, though
he delivered it firmly, he either felt or feigned emotion. Whether or
not the emotion was sincere on his part, it was shared by many present;
and for my own part I confess that my feelings were deeply moved when he
uttered the words, "I leave you my wife and my son." At that moment
my eyes were fixed on the young Prince, and the interest with which he
inspired me was equally unconnected with the splendour which surrounded
and the misfortunes which threatened him. I beheld in the interesting
child not the King of Rome but the son of my old friend. All day long
afterwards I could not help feeling depressed while comparing the
farewell scene of the morning with the day on which we took possession
of the Tuileries. How many centuries seemed the fourteen years which
separated the two events.
It may be worth while to remind those who are curious in comparing
dates that Napoleon, the successor of Louis XVI., and who had become
the nephew of that monarch by his marriage with the niece of Marie
Antoinette, took leave of the National Guard of Paris on the anniversary
of the fatal 21st of January, after twenty-five years of successive
terror, fear, hope, glory, and misfortune.
Meanwhile, a Congress was opened at Chatillon-sur-Seine, at which were
assembled the Duke of Vicenza on the part of France, Lords Aderdeen
and Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart as the representatives of England,
Count Razumowsky on the part of Russia, Count Stadion for Austria, and
Count Humboldt for Prussia. Before the opening of the Congress, the
Duke of Vicenza, in conformity with the Emperor's orders, demanded an
armistice, which is almost invariably granted during negotiations for
peace; but it was now too late: the Allies had long since determined
not to listen to any such demand. They therefore answered the Duke
of Vicenza's application by requiring that the propositions for peace
should be immediately signed. But these were not the propositions of
Frankfort. The Allies established as their bases the limits of the old
French monarchy. They conceived themselves authorised in so doing by
their success and by their situation.
To estimate rightly Napoleon's conduct during the negotiations for peace
which took place in the conferences at Chatillon it is necessary to bear
in mind the organisation he had received from nature and the ideas with
which that organisation had imbued him at an early period of life.
If the last negotiations of his expiring reign be examined with due
attention and impartiality it will appear evident that the causes of
his fall arose out of his character. I cannot range myself among those
adulators who have accused the persons about him with having dissuaded
him from peace. Did he not say at St. Helena, in speaking of the
negotiations at Chatillon, "A thunderbolt alone could have saved us: to
treat, to conclude, was to yield foolishly to the enemy." These words
forcibly portray Napoleon's character. It must also be borne in mind
how much he was captivated by the immortality of the great names which
history has bequeathed to our admiration, and which are perpetuated from
generation to generation. Napoleon was resolved that his name should
re-echo in ages to come, from the palace to the cottage. To live without
fame appeared to him an anticipated death. If, however, in this thirst
for glory, not for notoriety, he conceived the wish to surpass Alexander
and Caesar, he never desired the renown of Erostratus, and I will
say again what I have said before, that if he committed actions to be
condemned, it was because he considered them as steps which helped him
to place himself on the summit of immortality on which he wished to
place his name. Witness what he wrote to his brother Jerome, "Better
never, to have lived than to live without glory;" witness also what he
wrote later to his brother Louis, "It is better to die as a King than to
live as a Prince." How often in the days of my intimacy with Bonaparte
has he not said to me, "Who knows the names of those kings who have
passed from the thrones on which chance or birth seated them? They lived
and died unnoticed. The learned, perhaps, may find them mentioned in
old archives, and a medal or a coin dug from the earth may reveal to
antiquarians the existence of a sovereign of whom they had never before
heard. But, on the contrary, when we hear the names of Cyrus, Alexander,
Caesar, Mahomet, Charlemagne, Henry IV., and Louis XIV., we are
immediately among our intimate acquaintance." I must add, that when
Napoleon thus spoke to me in the gardens of Malmaison he only repeated
what had often fallen from him in his youth, for his character and his
ideas never varied; the change was in the objects to which they were
applied.
From his boyhood Napoleon was fond of reading the history of the great
men of antiquity; and what he chiefly sought to discover was the means
by which those men had become great. He remarked that military glory
secures more extended fame than the arts of peace and the noble efforts
which contribute to the happiness of mankind. History informs us that
great military talent and victory often give the power, which, in its
turn, procures the means of gratifying ambition. Napoleon was always
persuaded that that power was essential to him, in order to bend men
to his will, and to stifle all discussions on his conduct. It was his
established principle never to sign a disadvantageous peace. To him
a tarnished crown was no longer a crown. He said one day to M. de
Caulaincourt, who was pressing him to consent to sacrifices, "Courage
may defend a crown, but infamy never." In all the last acts of
Napoleon's career I can retrace the impress of his character, as I had
often recognised in the great actions of the Emperor the execution of a
thought conceived by the General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.
On the opening of the Congress the Duke of Vicenza, convinced that
he could no longer count on the natural limits of France promised
at Frankfort by the Allies, demanded new powers. Those limits were
doubtless the result of reasonable concessions, and they had been
granted even after the battle of Leipsic; but it was now necessary
that Napoleon's Minister should show himself ready to make further
concessions if he wished to be allowed to negotiate. The Congress was
opened on the 5th of February, and on the 7th the Plenipotentiaries of
the Allied powers declared themselves categorically. They inserted in
the protocol that after the successes which had favoured their armies
they insisted on France being restored to her old limits, such as they
were during the monarchy before the Revolution; and that she should
renounce all direct influence beyond her future limits.
This proposition appeared so extraordinary to M. de Caulaincourt that he
requested the sitting might be suspended, since the conditions departed
too far from his instructions to enable him to give an immediate answer.
The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied powers acceded to his request, and
the continuation of the sitting was postponed till eight in the evening.
When it was resumed the Duke of Vicenza renewed his promise to make
the greatest sacrifices for the attainment of peace. He added that
the amount of the sacrifices necessarily depended on the amount of the
compensations, and that he could not determine on any concession or
compensation without being made acquainted with the whole. He wished to
have a general plan of the views of the Allies, and he requested that
their Plenipotentiaries would explain themselves decidedly respecting
the number and description of the sacrifices and compensations to be
demanded. It must be acknowledged that the Duke of Vicenza perfectly
fulfilled the views of the Emperor in thus protracting and gaining time
by subtle subterfuges, for all that he suggested had already been done.
On the day after this sitting some advantages gained by the Allies,
who took Chatillon-sur-Marne and Troves, induced Napoleon to direct
Caulaincourt to declare to the Congress that if an armistice were
immediately agreed on he was ready to consent to France being restored
to her old limits. By securing this armistice Napoleon hoped that happy
chances might arise, and that intrigues might be set on foot; but the
Allies would not listen to any such proposition.
At the sitting of the 10th of March the Duke of Vicenza inserted in the
protocol that the last courier he had received had been arrested and
detained a considerable time by several Russian general officers,
who had obliged him to deliver up his despatches, which had not been
returned to him till thirty-six hours after at Chaumont. Caulaincourt
justly complained of this infraction of the law of nations and
established usage, which, he said, was the sole cause of the delay
in bringing the negotiations to a conclusion. After this complaint he
communicated to the Congress the ostensible instructions of Napoleon, in
which he authorised his Minister to accede to the demands of the Allies.
But in making this communication M. de Caulaincourt took care not to
explain the private and secret instructions he had also received.
The Allies rejected the armistice because it would have checked their
victorious advance; but they consented to sign the definitive peace,
which of all things was what the Emperor did not wish.
Napoleon at length determined to make sacrifices, and the Duke of
Vicenza submitted new propositions to the Congress. The Allies replied,
in the same sitting, that these propositions contained no distinct and
explicit declaration on the project presented by them on the 17th
of February; that, having on the 28th of the same month, demanded a
decisive answer within the term of ten days, they were about to break up
the negotiations Caulaincourt then declared verbally:
1st. That the Emperor Napoleon was ready to renounce all pretension or
influence whatever in countries beyond the boundaries of France.
2d. To recognise the independence of Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Germany,
and Holland, and that as to England, France would make such concessions
as might be deemed necessary in consideration of a reasonable
equivalent.
Upon this the sitting was immediately broken up without a reply. It must
be remarked that this singular declaration was verbal, and consequently
not binding, and that the limits of France were mentioned without being
specified. It cannot be doubted that Napoleon meant the limits conceded
at Frankfort, to which he was well convinced the Allies would not
consent, for circumstances were now changed. Besides, what could be
meant by the reasonable equivalent from England? Is it astonishing that
this obscurity and vagueness should have banished all confidence on the
part of the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied powers? Three days after
the sitting of the 10th of March they declared they could not even enter
into a discussion of the verbal protocol of the French Minister. They
requested that M. de Caulaincourt would declare whether he would accept
or reject the project of a treaty presented by the Allied Sovereigns, or
offer a counter-project.
The Duke of Vicenza, who was still prohibited, by secret instructions
from coming to any conclusion on the proposed basis, inserted in the
protocol of the sitting of the 13th of March a very ambiguous note. The
Plenipotentiaries of the Allies; in their reply, insisted upon receiving
another declaration from the French Plenipotentiary, which should
contain an acceptance or refusal of their project of a treaty presented
in the conference of the 7th of February, or a counter-project. After
much discussion Caulaincourt agreed to draw up a counter-project, which
he presented on the 15th, under the following title: "Project of a
definitive Treaty between France and the Allies." In this extraordinary
project, presented after so much delay, M. de Caulaincourt, to the great
astonishment of the Allies, departed in no respect from the declarations
of the 10th of March. He replied again to the ultimatum of the Allies,
or what he wished to regard as such, by defending a multitude of petty
interests, which were of no importance in so great a contest; but in
general the conditions seemed rather those of a conqueror dictating to
his enemies than of a man overwhelmed by misfortune: As may readily be
imagined, they were, for the most part, received with derision by the
Allies.
Everything tends to prove that the French Plenipotentiary had received
no positive instructions from the 5th of February, and that, after all
the delay which Napoleon constantly created, Caulaincourt never had it
in his power to answer, categorically, the propositions of the Allies.
Napoleon never intended to make peace at Chatillon on the terms
proposed. He always hoped that some fortunate event would enable him to
obtain more favourable conditions.
On the 18th of March, that is to say, three days after the presentation
of this project of a treaty, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allies
recorded in the protocol their reasons for rejecting the extraordinary
project of the French Minister. For my part, I was convinced, for the
reasons I have mentioned, that the Emperor would never agree to sign the
conditions proposed in the ultimatum of the Allies, dated the 13th of
March, and I remember having expressed that opinion to M. de Talleyrand.
I saw him on the 14th, and found him engaged in perusing some
intelligence he had just received from the Duke of Vicenza, announcing,
as beyond all doubt, the early signature of peace. Caulaincourt had
received orders to come to a conclusion. Napoleon, he said, had given
him a carte blanche to save the capital, and avoid a battle, by which
the last resources of the nation would be endangered. This seemed pretty
positive, to be sure; but even this assurance did not, for a moment,
alter my opinion. The better to convince me, M. de Talleyrand gave me
Caulaincourt's letter to read. After reading it I confidently said,
"He will never sign the conditions." M. de Talleyrand could not help
thinking me very obstinate in my opinion, for he judged of what the
Emperor would do by his situation, while I judged by his character.
I told M. de Talleyrand that Caulaincourt might have received written
orders to sign; for the sake of showing them to the Plenipotentiaries of
the Allies, but that I had no doubt he had been instructed to postpone
coming to a conclusion, and to wait for final orders. I added, that I
saw no reason to change my opinion, and that I continued to regard
the breaking up of the Congress as nearer than appearances seemed to
indicate. Accordingly, three days afterwards, the Allies grew tired of
the delay and the conferences were broken up. Thus Napoleon sacrificed
everything rather than his glory. He fell from a great height, but he
never, by his signature, consented to any dismemberment of France.
The Plenipotentiaries of the Allies, convinced that these renewed
difficulties and demands had no other object but to gain time, stated
that the Allied powers, faithful to their principles, and in conformity
with their previous declarations, regarded the negotiations at Chatillon
as terminated by the French Government. This rupture of the conferences
took place on the 19th of March, six days after the presentation of the
ultimatum of the Allied powers. The issue of these long discussions
was thus left to be decided by the chances of war, which were not very
favourable to the man who boldly contended against armed Europe. The
successes of the Allies during the conferences at Chatillon had
opened to their view the road to Paris, while Napoleon shrunk from the
necessity of signing his own disgrace. In these circumstances was to
be found the sole cause of his ruin, and he might have said, "Tout est
perdu, fors la gloire." His glory is immortal.
--[The conviviality and harmony that reigned between the Ministers
made the society and Intercourse at Chatillon most agreeable. The
diplomatists dined alternately with each other; M. de Caulaincourt
liberally passing for all the Ministers, through the French advanced
posts, convoys of all the good cheer in epicurean wises, etc., that
Paris could afford; nor was female society wanting to complete the
charm and banish ennui from the Chatillon Congress, which I am sure
will be long recollected with sensations of pleasure by all the
Plenipotentiaries there engaged (Memoirs of Lord Burghersh).]--
CHAPTER XXXIII.
1814
Curious conversation between General Reynier and the Emperor
Alexander--Napoleon repulses the Prussians--The Russians at
Fontainebleau--Battle of Brienne--Sketch of the campaign of France--
Supper after the battle of Champ Aubert--Intelligence of the arrival
of the Duc d'Angouleme and the Comte d'Artois in France--The battle
of the ravens and the eagle--Battle of Craonne--Departure of the
Pope and the Spanish Princes--Capture of a convoy--Macdonald at the
Emperor's headquarters--The inverted cipher.
I was always persuaded, and everything I have since seen has confirmed
my opinion, that the Allies entering France had no design of restoring
the House of Bourbon, or of imposing any Government whatever on the
French people. They came to destroy and not to found. That which they
wished to destroy from the commencement of their success was Napoleon's
supremacy, in order to prevent the future invasions with which they
believed Europe would still be constantly threatened. If, indeed, I had
entertained any doubt on this subject it would have been banished by
the account I heard of General Reynier's conversation with the
Emperor Alexander. That General, who was made prisoner at Leipsic, was
exchanged, and returned to France. In the beginning of February 1814
he passed through Troves, where the Emperor Alexander then was. Reynier
expressed a desire to be allowed to pay his respects to the Emperor, and
to thank him for having restored him to liberty. He was received with
that affability of manner which was sometimes affected by the Russian
monarch.
On his arrival at Paris General Reynier called at the Duc de Rovigo's,
where I had dined that day, and where he still was when I arrived. He
related in my hearing the conversation to which I have alluded, and
stated that it had all the appearance of sincerity on the Emperor's
part. Having asked Alexander whether he had any instructions for
Napoleon, as the latter, on learning that he had seen his Majesty would
not fail to ask him many questions, he replied that he had nothing
particular to communicate to him. Alexander added that he was Napoleon's
friend, but that he had, personally, much reason--to complain of his
conduct; that the Allies would have nothing more to do with him; that
they had no intention of forcing any Sovereign upon France; but that
they would no longer acknowledge Napoleon as Emperor of the French. "For
my part," said Alexander, "I can no longer place any confidence in
him. He has deceived me too often." In reply to this Reynier made
some remarks dictated by his attachment and fidelity to Bonaparte. He
observed that Napoleon was acknowledged as Sovereign of France by every
treaty. "But," added Reynier, "if you should persist in forcing him to
resign the supreme power, whom will you put in his place?"--"Did you not
choose him; why then can you not choose some one else to govern you? I
repeat that we do not intend to force any one upon you but we will have
no more to do with Napoleon."
Several Generals were then named; and after Reynier had explained
the great difficulties which would oppose any such choice, Alexander
interrupted him saying, "But, General, there is Bernadotte.' Has he
not been voluntarily chosen Prince Royal of Sweden; may he not also be
raised to the same rank in France? He is your countryman; surely then
you may choose him, since the Swedes took him, though a foreigner."
General Reynier, who was a man of firm character, started some
objections, which I thought at the time well founded; and Alexander
put an end to the conversation by saving, rather in a tone of
dissatisfaction, "Well, General, the fate of arms will decide."
The campaign of France forced Napoleon to adopt a kind of operations
quite new to him. He had been accustomed to attack; but he was now
obliged to stand on his defence, so that, instead of having to execute a
previously conceived plan, as when, in the Cabinet of the Tuileries,
he traced out to me the field of Marengo, he had now to determine his
movements according to those of his numerous enemies. When the Emperor
arrived at Chalons-sur-Marne the Prussian army was advancing by the road
of Lorraine. He drove it back beyond St. Dizier. Meanwhile the Grand
Austro-Russian army passed the Seine and the Yonne at Montereau, and
even sent forward a corps which advanced as far as Fontainebleau.
Napoleon then made a movement to the right in order to drive back the
troops which threatened to march on Paris, and by a curious chance he
came up with the troops in the very place where he passed the boyish
years in which he cherished what then seemed wild and fabulous dreams
of his future fate. What thoughts and recollections must have crowded on
his mind when he found himself an Emperor and a King, at the head of a
yet powerful army, in the chateau of the Comte de Brienne, to whom he
had so often paid his homage! It was at Brienne that he had said to
me, thirty-four years before, "I will do these Frenchman all the harm I
can." Since then he had certainly changed his mind; but it might be said
that fate persisted in forcing the man to realise the design of the
boy in spite of himself. No sooner had Napoleon revisited Brienne as
a conqueror than he was repulsed and hurried to his fall, which became
every moment more certain.
I shall not enter into any details of the campaign of France, because
the description of battles forms no part of my plan. Still, I think it
indispensable briefly to describe Napoleon's miraculous activity from
the time of his leaving Paris to the entrance of the Allies into the
capital. Few successful campaigns have enabled our Generals and the
French army to reap so much glory as they gained during this great
reverse of fortune. For it is possible to triumph without honour, and to
fall with glory. The chances of the war were not doubtful, but certainly
the numerous hosts of the Allies could never have anticipated so long
and brilliant a resistance. The theatre of the military operations soon
approached so near to Paris that the general eagerness for news from the
army was speedily satisfied, and when any advantage was gained by the
Emperor his partisans saw the enemy already repulsed from the French
territory. I was not for a moment deceived by these illusions, as I
well knew the determination and the resources of the Allied sovereigns.
Besides, events were so rapid and various in this war of extermination
that the guns of the Invalides announcing a victory were sometimes
immediately followed by the distant rolling of artillery, denoting the
enemy's near approach to the capital.
The Emperor left Paris on the 25th of January, at which time the
Emperors of Russia and Austria and the King of Prussia were assembled at
Langres. Napoleon rejoined his Guard at Vitry-le-Francais. On the second
day after his departure he drove before him the Prussian army, which
he had forced to evacuate St. Dizier. Two days after this the battle of
Brienne was fought, and on the 1st of February between 70,000 and
80,000 French and Allied troops stood face to face. On this occasion the
commanders on both sides were exposed to personal danger, for Napoleon
had a horse killed under him, and a Cossack fell dead by the side of
Marshal Blücher.
A few days after this battle Napoleon entered Troves, where he stayed
but a short time, and then advanced to Champaubert. At the latter place
was fought the battle which hears its name. The Russians were defeated,
General Alsufieff was made prisoner, and 2000 men and 30 guns fell into
the hands of the French. After this battle the Emperor was under such a
delusion as to his situation that while supping with Berthier, Marmont,
and his prisoner, General Alsufieff, the Emperor said, "Another such
victory as this, gentlemen, and I shall be on the Vistula."
Finding that no one replied, and reading in the countenances of his
Marshals that they did not share his hopes, "I see how it is," he added,
"every one is growing tired of war; there is no more enthusiasm. The
sacred fire is extinct." Then rising from the table, and stepping up
to General Drouot, with the marked intention of paying him a compliment
which should at the same time convey a censure on the Marshals,
"General," said he, patting him on the shoulder, "we only want a
hundred men like you, and we should succeed." Drouot replied, with great
presence of mind and modesty, "Rather say a hundred thousand, Sire."
This anecdote was related to me by the two principal persons who were
present on the occasion.
Napoleon soon began to have other subjects of disquietude besides the
fate of battles. He was aware that since the beginning of February the
Duc d'Angouleme had arrived at St. Jean de Luz, whence he had addressed
a proclamation to the French armies in the name of his uncle, Louis
XVIII.; and he speedily heard of the Comte d'Artois' arrival at Yesoul,
on the 21st of February, which place he did not leave until the 16th of
March following.
Meanwhile hostilities were maintained with increased vigor over a vast
line of operations. How much useless glory did not our soldiers gain
in these conflicts! In spite of prodigies of valour the enemy's masses
advanced, and gradually concentrated, so that this war might be compared
to the battles of the ravens and the eagle in the Alps. The eagle slays
hundreds of his assailants--every blow of his beak is the death of an
enemy, but still the vultures return to the charge, and press upon the
eagle until they destroy him.
As the month of February drew to its close the Allies were in retreat
on several points, but their retreat was not a rout. After experiencing
reverses they fell back without disorder, and retired behind the Aube,
where they rallied and obtained numerous reinforcements, which daily
arrived, and which soon enabled them to resume the offensive.
Still Napoleon continued astonishing Europe, leagued as it was against
him. At Craonne, on the 7th of March, he destroyed Blücher's corps in
a severe action, but the victory was attended by great loss to the
conqueror. Marshal Victor was seriously wounded, as well as Generals
Grouchy and La Ferriere.
While Napoleon was resisting the numerous enemies assembled to destroy
him it might be said that he was also his own enemy, either from
false calculation or from negligence with respect to his illustrious
prisoners, who, on his departure from Paris, had not yet been sent to
their States. The Pope was then at Fontainebleau, and the Princes of
Spain at Valencay. The Pope, however, was the first to be allowed to
depart. Surely Bonaparte could never have thought of the service which
the Pope might have rendered him at Rome, into which Murat's troops
would never have dared to march had his Holiness been present there.
With regard to the Spanish Princes Napoleon must have been greatly
blinded by confidence in his fortune to have so long believed it
possible to retain in France those useless trophies of defeated
pretensions. It was, besides, so easy to get rid of the exiles of
Valencay by sending them back to the place from whence they had been
brought! It was so natural to recall with all speed the troops from the
south when our armies in Germany began to be repulsed on the Rhine and
even driven into France! With the aid of these veteran troops Napoleon
and his genius might have again turned the scale of fortune. But
Napoleon reckoned on the nation, and he was wrong, for the nation was
tired of him. His cause had ceased to be the cause of France.
The latter days of March were filled up by a series of calamities
to Napoleon. On the 23d the rear-guard of the French army suffered
considerable loss. To hear of attacks on his rear-guard must indeed
have been mortifying to Napoleon, whose advanced guards had been so
long accustomed to open the path of victory! Prince Schwartzenberg soon
passed the Aube and marched upon Vitry and Chalons. Napoleon, counting
on the possibility of defending Paris, threw himself, with the velocity
of the eagle, on Schwartzenberg's rear by passing by Doulevant and Bar-
sur-Aube. He pushed forward his advanced guards to Chaumont, and there
saw the Austrian army make a movement which he took to be a retreat; but
it was no such thing. The movement was directed on Paris, while
Blücher, who had re-occupied Chalons-sur-Maine, marched to meet Prince
Schwartzenberg, and Napoleon, thinking to cut off their retreat, was
himself cut off from the possibility of returning to Paris. Everything
then depended on the defence of Paris, or, to speak more correctly, it
seemed possible, by sacrificing the capital, to prolong for a few days
the existence of the phantom of the Empire which was rapidly vanishing.
On the 26th was fought the battle of Fere Champenoise, where, valour
yielding to numbers, Marshals Marmont and Mortier were obliged to retire
upon Sezanne after sustaining considerable loss.
It was on the 26th of March, and I beg the reader to bear this date in
mind, that Napoleon suffered a loss which, in the circumstances in which
he stood, was irreparable. At the battle of Fere Champenoise the Allies
captured a convoy consisting of nearly all the remaining ammunition and
stores of the army, a vast quantity of arms, caissons, and equipage
of all kinds. The whole became the prey of the Allies, who published a
bulletin announcing this important capture. A copy of this order of the
day fell into the hands of Marshal Macdonald, who thought that such
news ought immediately to be communicated to the Emperor. He therefore
repaired himself to the headquarters of Napoleon, who was then preparing
to recover Vitre-le-Francais, which was occupied by the Prussians. The
Marshal, with the view of dissuading the Emperor from what he considered
a vain attempt, presented him with the bulletin.
This was on the morning of the 27th: Napoleon would not believe the
news. "No!" said he to the Marshal, "you are deceived, this cannot be
true." Then perusing the bulletin with more attention. "Here," said he,
"look yourself. This is the 27th, and the bulletin is dated the 29th.
You see the thing is impossible. The bulletin is forged!" The Marshal,
who had paid more attention to the news than to its date, was astounded.
But having afterwards shown the bulletin to Drouot, that General said,
"Alas! Marshal, the news is but too true. The error of the date is
merely a misprint, the 9 is a 6 inverted!" On what trifles sometimes
depend the most important events. An inverted cipher sufficed to flatter
Bonaparte's illusion, or at least the illusions which he wished to
maintain among his most distinguished lieutenants, and to delay the
moment when they should discover that the loss they deplored was too
certain. On that very day the Empress left Paris.
CHAPTER XXXIV.
1814.
The men of the Revolution and the men of the Empire--The Council of
Regency--Departure of the Empress from Paris--Marmont and Mortier--
Joseph's flight--Meeting at Marmont's hotel--Capitulation of Paris--
Marmont's interview with the Emperor at Fontainebleau--Colonels
Fabvier and Denys--The Royalist cavalcade--Meeting at the hotel of
the Comte de Morfontaine--M. de Chateaubriand and his pamphlet--
Deputation to the Emperor Alexander--Entrance of the Allied
sovereigns into Paris--Alexander lodged in M. Talleyrand's hotel--
Meetings held there--The Emperor Alexander's declaration--
My appointment as Postmaster-General--Composition of the Provisional
Government--Mistake respecting the conduct of the Emperor of
Austria--Caulaincourt's mission from Napoleon--His interview with
the Emperor Alexander--Alexander's address to the deputation of the
Senate--M. de Caulaincourt ordered to quit the capital.
The grandees of the Empire and the first subjects of Napoleon were
divided into two classes totally distinct from each other. Among these
patronised men were many who had been the first patrons of Bonaparte and
had favoured his accession to Consular power. This class was composed
of his old friends and former companions-in-arms. The others, who may be
called the children of the Empire, did not carry back their thoughts
to a period which they had not seen. They had never known anything but
Napoleon and the Empire, beyond which the sphere of their ideas did
not extend, while among Napoleon's old brothers-in-arms it was still
remembered that there was once a country, a France, before they had
helped to give it a master. To this class of men France was not confined
to the narrow circle of the Imperial headquarters, but extended to the
Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the two oceans.
On the other hand, numbers of ardent and adventurous young men, full of
enthusiasm for Bonaparte, had passed from the school to the camp. They
were entirely opposed to Napoleon's downfall, because with his power
would vanish those dreams of glory and fortune which had captivated
their imaginations. These young men, who belonged to the class which
I have denominated children of the Empire, were prepared to risk and
commit everything to prolong the political life of their Emperor.
The distinction I have drawn between what may be called the men of
France and the men of the Empire was not confined to the army, but was
equally marked among the high civil functionaries of the State. The old
Republicans could not possibly regard Napoleon with the same eyes as
those whose elevation dated only from Napoleon; and the members of
assemblies anterior to the 18th Brumaire could not entertain the same
ideas as those whose notions of national franchises and public rights
were derived from their seats as auditors in the Council of State.
I know not whether this distinction between the men of two different
periods has been before pointed out, but it serves to explain the
conduct of many persons of elevated rank during the events of 1814.
With regard to myself, convinced as I was of the certainty of Napoleon's
fall, I conceived that the first duty of every citizen was claimed by
his country; and although I may incur censure, I candidly avow that
Napoleon's treatment of me during the last four years of his power was
not without some influence on my prompt submission to the Government
which succeeded his. I, however, declare that this consideration was not
the sole nor the most powerful motive of my conduct. Only those who
were in Paris at the period of the capitulation can form an idea of the
violence of party feeling which prevailed there both for and against
Napoleon, but without the name of the Bourbons ever being pronounced.
They were almost unknown to the new generation, forgotten by many of
the old, and feared by the conventionalists; at that time they possessed
only the frail support of the coteries of the Faubourg St. Germain, and
some remains of the emigration. But as it is certain that the emigrants
could offer only vain demonstrations and wishes in support of the old
family of our Kings, they did little to assist the restoration of the
Bourbons. Another thing equally certain is, that they alone, by their
follies and absurd pretensions, brought about the return of Bonaparte
and the second exile of Louis XVIII. in the following year.
On the 28th of March was convoked an extraordinary Council of Regency,
at which Maria Louisa presided. The question discussed was, whether the
Empress should remain in Paris or proceed to Blois. Joseph Bonaparte
strongly urged her departure, because a letter from the Emperor had
directed that in case of Paris being threatened the Empress-Regent and
all the Council of Regency should retire to Blois. The Arch-Chancellor
and the majority of the Council were of the same opinion, but one of
the most influential members of the Council observed to Joseph that the
letter referred to had been written under circumstances very different
from those then existing, and that it was important the Empress should
remain in Paris, where she would, of course, obtain from the Emperor her
father and the Allied sovereigns, more advantageous conditions than if
she were fifty leagues from Paris. The adoption of this opinion would
only have retarded for a few days a change which had become inevitable;
nevertheless it might have given rise to great difficulties. It must be
admitted that for the interests of Napoleon it was the wisest counsel
that could be suggested. However, it was overruled by Joseph's advice.
M. de Talleyrand, as a member of the Council of Regency, also received
the order to quit Paris on the 30th of March. At this period I was
at his house every day. When I went to him that day I was told he had
started. However I went up, and remained some time in his hotel with
several of his friends who had met there. We soon saw him return, and
for my part I heard with satisfaction that they had not allowed him to
pass the barriers. It was said then, and it has been repeated since,
that M. de Talleyrand was not a stranger to the gentle violence used
towards him. The same day of this visit to M. de Talleyrand I also went
to see the Duc de Rovigo (Savary), with the friendly object of getting
him to remain, and to profit by his position to prevent disturbances. He
refused without hesitating, as he only thought of the Emperor. I found
him by his fireside, where there was a large fire, in which he was
burning all the papers which might have compromised every one who had
served his ministry (Police). I congratulated him sincerely on this
loyal occupation: fire alone could purify the mass of filth and
denunciations which encumbered the police archives.
On the departure of the Empress many persons expected a popular movement
in favour of a change of Government, but the capital remained tranquil.
Many of the inhabitants, indeed, thought of defence, not for the sake of
preserving Napoleon's government, but merely from that ardour of feeling
which belongs to our national character. Strong indignation was excited
by the thought of seeing foreigners masters of Paris--a circumstance
of which there had been no example since the reign of Charles VII.
Meanwhile the critical moment approached. On the 29th of March Marshals
Marmont and Mortier fell back to defend the approaches to Paris. During
the night the barriers were consigned to the care of the National Guard,
and not a foreigner, not even one of their agents, was allowed to enter
the capital.
At daybreak on the 30th of March the whole population of Paris was
awakened by the report of cannon, and the plain of St. Denis was soon
covered with Allied troops, who were debouching upon it from all points.
The heroic valour of our troops was unavailing against such a numerical
superiority. But the Allies paid dearly for their entrance into the
French capital. The National Guard, under the command of Marshal Moncey,
and the pupils of the Polytechnic School transformed into artillery men,
behaved in a manner worthy of veteran troops. The conduct of Marmont on
that day alone would suffice to immortalise him. The corps he commanded
was reduced to between 7000 and 8000 infantry and 800 cavalry, with
whom, for the space of twelve hours he maintained his ground against an
army of 55,000 men, of whom it is said 14,000 were killed, wounded, and
taken. Marshal Marmont put himself so forward in the heat of the battle
that a dozen of men were killed by the bayonet at his side, and his hat
was perforated by a ball. But what was to be done against overwhelming
numbers!
In this state of things the Duke of Ragusa made known his situation to
Joseph Bonaparte, who authorised him to negotiate.
Joseph's answer is so important in reference to the events which
succeeded that I will transcribe it here.
If the Dukes of Ragusa and Treviso can no longer hold out, they are
authorised to negotiate with Prince Schwartzenberg and the Emperor
of Russia, who are before them.
They will fall back on the Loire.
(Signed) JOSEPH
Montmartre, 30th March 1814, 12 oclock
It was not until a considerable time after the receipt of this formal
authority that Marmont and Mortier ceased to make a vigorous resistance
against the Allied army, for the suspension of arms was not agreed
upon until four in the afternoon. It was not waited for by Joseph; at a
quarter past twelve--that is to say, immediately after he had addressed
to Marmont the authority just alluded to Joseph repaired to the Bois de
Boulogne to regain the Versailles road, and from thence to proceed to
Rambouillet. The precipitate flight of Joseph astonished only those who
did not know him. I know for a fact that several officers attached to
his staff were much dissatisfied at his alacrity on this occasion.
In these circumstances what was to be done but to save Paris, which
there was no possibility of defending two hours longer. Methinks I still
see Marmont when, on the evening of the 30th of March, he returned from
the field of battle to his hotel in the Rue de Paradis, where I was
waiting for him, together with about twenty other persons, among
whom were MM. Perregaua and Lafitte. When he entered he was scarcely
recognisable: he had a beard of eight days' growth; the greatcoat which
covered his uniform was in tatters, and he was blackened with powder
from head to foot. We considered what was best to be done, and all
insisted on the necessity of signing a capitulation. The Marshal must
recollect that the exclamation of every one about him was, "France must
be saved." MM. Perregaus and Lafitte delivered their opinions in a
very decided way, and it will readily be conceived how great was the
influence of two men who were at the head of the financial world. They
alleged that the general wish of the Parisians, which nobody had a
better opportunity of knowing than themselves, was decidedly averse to a
protracted conflict, and that France was tired of the yoke of Bonaparte.
This last declaration gave a wider range to the business under
consideration. The question was no longer confined to the capitulation
of Paris, but a change in the government was thought of, and the name of
the Bourbons was pronounced for the first time. I do not recollect which
of us it was who, on hearing mention made of the possible recall of
the old dynasty, remarked how difficult it would be to bring about a
restoration without retrograding to the past. But I think I am perfectly
correct in stating that M. Lafitte said, "Gentlemen, we shall have
nothing to fear if we have a good constitution which will guarantee
the rights of all." The majority of the meeting concurred in this wise
opinion, which was not without its influence on Marshal Marmont.
During this painful meeting an unexpected incident occurred. One of the
Emperor's aides de camp arrived at Marmont's. Napoleon, being informed
of the advance of the Allies on Paris, had marched with the utmost speed
from the banks of the Marne on the road of Fontainebleau. In the evening
he was in person at Froidmanteau, whence he despatched his envoy to
Marshal Marmont. From the language of the aide de camp it was easy to
perceive that the state of opinion at the Imperial headquarters was very
different from that which prevailed among the population of Paris. The
officer expressed indignation at the very idea of capitulating, and
he announced with inconceivable confidence the approaching arrival of
Napoleon in Paris, which he yet hoped to save from the occupation of
the enemy. The officer informed us that Napoleon trusted to the people
rising in spite of the capitulation, and that they would unpave the
streets to stone the Allies on their entrance. I ventured to dissent
from this absurd idea of defence, and I observed that it was madness to
suppose that Paris could resist the numerous troops who were ready
to enter on the following day; that the suspension of arms had been
consented to by the Allies only to afford time for drawing up a more
regular capitulation, and that the armistice could not be broken without
trampling on all the laws of honour. I added that the thoughts of the
people were directed towards a better future; that the French were tired
of a despotic Government and of the distress to which continual war had
reduced trade and industry; "for," said I, "when a nation is sunk
to such a state of misery its hopes can only be directed towards
the future; it is natural they should be so directed, even without
reflection." Most of the individuals present concurred in my opinion,
and the decision of the meeting was unanimous. Marshal Marmont has since
said to me, "I have been blamed, my dear Bourrienne: but you were with
me on the 30th of March. You were a witness to the wishes expressed by a
portion of the principal inhabitants of Paris. I acted as I was urged to
do only because I considered the meeting to be composed of men entirely
disinterested, and who had nothing to expect from the return of the
Bourbons."
Such is a correct statement of the facts which some persons have
perverted with the view of enhancing Napoleon's glory. With respect to
those versions which differ from mine I have only one comment to offer,
which is, that I saw and heard what I describe.
The day after the capitulation of Paris--Marmont went in the evening to
see the Emperor at Fontainebleau. He supped with him. Napoleon praised
his defence of Paris.. After supper the Marshal rejoined his corps at
Essonne, and six hours after the Emperor arrived there to visit the
lines. On leaving Paris Marmont had left Colonels Fabvier and Dent's
to direct the execution of the capitulation. These officers joined the
Emperor and the Marshal as they were proceeding up the banks of the
river at Essonne. They did not disguise the effect which the entrance of
the Allies had produced in Paris. At this intelligence the Emperor was
deeply mortified, and he returned immediately to Fontainebleau, leaving
the Marshal at Essonne.
At daybreak on the 31st of March Paris presented a novel and curious
spectacle. No sooner had the French troops evacuated the capital than
the principal streets resounded with cries of "Down with Bonaparte!"--
"No conscription!"--"No consolidated duties (droits reunis)!" With these
cries were mingled that of "The Bourbons for ever!" but this latter cry
was not repeated so frequently as the others: in general I remarked
that the people gaped and listened with a sort of indifference. As I had
taken a very active part in all that had happened during some preceding
days I was particularly curious to study what might be called the
physiognomy of Paris. This was the second opportunity which had offered
itself for such a study, and I now saw the people applaud the fall of
the man whom they had received with enthusiasm after the 18th Brumaire.
The reason was, that liberty was then hoped for, as it was hoped for
in 1814. I went out early in the morning to see the numerous groups
of people who had assembled in the streets. I saw women tearing their
handkerchiefs and distributing the fragments as the emblems of the
revived lily. That same morning I met on the Boulevards, and some hours
afterwards on the Place Louis XV., a party of gentlemen who paraded the
streets of the capital proclaiming the restoration of the Bourbons
and shouting, "Vive le Roi!" and "Vive Louis XVIII!" At their head I
recognised MM. Sosthenes de la Rochefoucauld, Comte de Froissard, the
Duc de Luxembourg, the Duc de Crussol, Seymour, etc. The cavalcade
distributed white cockades in passing along, and was speedily joined by
a numerous crowd, who repaired to the Place Vendome. The scene that
was acted there is well known, and the enthusiasm of popular joy could
scarcely excuse the fury that was directed against the effigy of the
man whose misfortunes, whether merited or not, should have protected
him from such outrages. These excesses served, perhaps more than is
generally supposed, to favour the plans of the leaders of the Royalist
party, to whom M. Nesselrode had declared that before he would pledge
himself to further their views he must have proofs that they were
seconded by the population of Paris.
I was afterwards informed by an eye-witness of what took place on the
evening of the 31st of March in one of the principal meetings of the
Royalists, which was held in the hotel of the Comte de Morfontaine,
who acted as president on the occasion. Amidst a chaos of abortive
propositions and contradictory motions M. Sosthenes de la Rochefoucauld
proposed that a deputation should be immediately sent to the Emperor
Alexander to express to him the wish of the meeting. This motion was
immediately approved, and the mover was chosen to head the deputation.
On leaving the hotel the deputation met M. de Chateaubriand, who had
that very day been, as it were, the precursor of the restoration,
by publishing his admirable manifesto, entitled "Bonaparte and the
Bourbons." He was invited to join the deputation; but nothing could
overcome his diffidence and induce him to speak. On arriving at the
hotel in the Rue St. Florentin the deputation was introduced to Count
Nesselrode, to whom M. Sosthenes de la Rochefoucauld briefly explained
its object; he spoke of the wishes of the meeting and of the manifest
desire of Paris and of France. He represented the restoration of
the Bourbons as the only means of securing the peace of Europe; and
observed, in conclusion, that as the exertions of the day must have
been very fatiguing to the Emperor, the deputation would not solicit
the favour of being introduced to him, but would confidently rely on
the good faith of his Imperial Majesty. "I have just left the Emperor,"
replied M. Nesselrode, "and can pledge myself for his intentions. Return
to the meeting and announce to the French people that in compliance with
their wishes his Imperial Majesty will use all his influence to restore
the crown to the legitimate monarch: his Majesty Louis XVIII. shall
reascend the throne of France." With this gratifying intelligence the
deputation returned to the meeting in the Rue d'Anjou.
There is no question that great enthusiasm was displayed on the entrance
of the Allies into Paris. It may be praised or blamed, but the fact
cannot be denied. I closely watched all that was passing, and I observed
the expression of a sentiment which I had long anticipated when, after
his alliance with the daughter of the Caesars, the ambition of
Bonaparte increased in proportion as it was gratified: I clearly foresaw
Napoleon's fall. Whoever watched the course of events during the last
four years of the Empire must have observed, as I did, that from the
date of Napoleon's marriage with Maria Louisa the form of the French
Government became daily more and more tyrannical and oppressive. The
intolerable height which this evil had attained is evident from the
circumstance that at the end of 1813 the Legislative Body, throwing
aside the mute character which it had hitherto maintained, presumed to
give a lecture to him who had never before received a lecture from any
one. On the 31st of March it was recollected what had been the conduct
of Bonaparte on the occasion alluded to, and those of the deputies who
remained in Paris related how the gendarmes had opposed their entrance
into the hall of the Assembly. All this contributed wonderfully to
irritate the public mind against Napoleon. He had become master of
France by the sword, and the sword being sheathed, his power was at
an end, for no popular institution identified with the nation the new
dynasty which he hoped to found. The nation admired but did not love
Napoleon, for it is impossible to love what is feared, and he had done
nothing to claim the affections of France.
I was present at all the meetings and conferences which were held at
M de Talleyrand's hotel, where the Emperor Alexander had taken up his
residence. Of all the persons present at these meetings M. de Talleyrand
was most disposed to retain Napoleon at the head of the Government,
with restrictions on the exercise of his power. In the existing state
of things it was only possible to choose one of three courses: first, to
make peace with Napoleon, with the adoption of proper securities against
him; second, to establish a Regency; and third, to recall the Bourbons.
On the 13th of March I witnessed the entrance of the Allied sovereigns
into Paris, and after the procession had passed the new street of the
Luxembourg I repaired straight to M. de Talleyrand's hotel, which I
reached before the Emperor Alexander, who arrived at a quarter-past one.
When his Imperial Majesty entered M. de Talleyrand's drawing-room most
of the persons assembled, and particularly the Abbe de Pradt, the Abbe
de Montesquieu, and General Dessolles, urgently demanded the restoration
of the Bourbons. The Emperor did not come to any immediate decision.
Drawing me into the embrasure of a window, which looked upon the street,
he made some observations which enabled me to guess what would be his
determination. "M. de Bourrienne," said he, "you have been the friend
of Napoleon, and so have I. I was his sincere friend; but there is no
possibility of remaining at peace with a man of such bad faith." These
last words opened my eyes; and when the different propositions which
were made came under discussion I saw plainly that Bonaparte, in making
himself Emperor, had made up the bed for the Bourbons.
A discussion ensued on the three possible measures which I have above
mentioned, and which were proposed by the Emperor Alexander himself.
I thought, if I may so express myself, that his Majesty was playing
a part, when, pretending to doubt the possibility of recalling the
Bourbons, which he wished above all things, he asked M. de Talleyrand
what means he proposed to employ for the attainment of that object?
Besides the French, there were present at this meeting the Emperor
Alexander, the King of Prussia, Prince Schwartzenberg, M. Nesselrode,
M. Pozzo-di-Borgo, and Prince Liechtenstein. During the discussion
Alexander walked about with some appearance of agitation. "Gentlemen,"
said, he, addressing us in an elevated tone of voice, "you know that it
was not I who commenced the war; you know that Napoleon came to attack
me in my dominions. But we are not drawn here by the thirst of conquest
or the desire of revenge. You have seen the precautions I have taken
to preserve your capital, the wonder of the arts, from the horrors of
pillage, to which the chances of war would have consigned it. Neither
my Allies nor myself are engaged in a war of reprisals; and I should be
inconsolable if any violence were committed on your magnificent city. We
are not waging war against France, but against Napoleon, and the enemies
of French liberty. William, and you, Prince" (here the Emperor turned
towards the King of Prussia and Prince Schwartzenberg, who represented
the Emperor of Austria), "you can both bear testimony that the
sentiments I express are yours." Both bowed assent to this observation
of Alexander, which his Majesty several times repeated in different
words. He insisted that France should be perfectly free; and declared
that as soon as the wishes of the country were understood, he and his
Allies would support them, without seeking to favour any particular
government.
The Abbe de Pradt then declared, in a tone of conviction, that we were
all Royalists, and that the sentiments of France concurred with ours.
The Emperor Alexander, adverting to the different governments which
might be suitable to France, spoke of the maintenance of Bonaparte on
the throne, the establishment of a Regency, the choice of Bernadotte,
and the recall of the Bourbons. M. de Talleyrand next spoke, and I well
remember his saying to the Emperor of Russia, "Sire, only one of two
things is possible. We must either have Bonaparte or Louis XVIII.
Bonaparte, if you can support him; but you cannot, for you are not
alone.... We will not have another soldier in his stead. If we want a
soldier, we will keep the one we have; he is the first in the world.
After him any other who may be proposed would not have ten men to
support him. I say again, Sire, either Bonaparte or Louis XVIII.
Anything else is an intrigue." These remarkable words of the Prince de
Benevento produced on the mind of Alexander all the effect we could hope
for. Thus the question was simplified, being reduced now to only two
alternatives; and as it was evident that Alexander would have nothing
to do with either Napoleon or his family, it was reduced to the single
proposition of the restoration of the Bourbons.
On being pressed by us all, with the exception of M. de Talleyrand, who
still wished to leave the question undecided between Bonaparte and Louis
XVIII., Alexander at length declared that he would no longer treat with
Napoleon. When it was represented to him that that declaration referred
only to Napoleon personally, and did not extend to his family, he added,
"Nor with any member of his family." Thus as early as the 31st of March
the restoration of the Bourbons might be considered as decided.
I cannot omit mentioning the hurry with which Laborie, whom M. de
Talleyrand appointed Secretary to the Provisional Government, rushed out
of the apartment as soon as he got possession of the Emperor Alexander's
declaration. He got it printed with such expedition that in the space
of an hour it was posted on all the walls in Paris; and it certainly
produced an extraordinary effect. As yet nothing warranted a doubt that
Alexander would not abide by his word. The treaty of Paris could not
be anticipated; and there was reason to believe that France, with a new
Government, would obtain more advantageous conditions than if the Allies
had, treated with Napoleon. But this illusion speedily vanished.
On the evening of the 31st of March I returned to M. de Talleyrand's.
I again saw the Emperor Alexander, who, stepping up to me, said, "M.
de Bourrienne you must take the superintendence of the Post-office
department." I could not decline this precise invitation on the part of
the Czar; and besides, Lavalette having departed on the preceding day,
the business would have been for a time suspended; a circumstance which
would have been extremely prejudicial to the restoration which we wished
to favour.
I went at once to the hotel in the Rue J. J. Rousseau, where, indeed,
I found that not only was there no order to send out the post next
day, but that it had been even countermanded. I went that night to the
administrators, who yielded to my requests and, seconded by them, next
morning I got all the clerks to be at their post. I reorganised the
service, and the post went out on the 1st of April as usual. Such are my
remembrances of the 31st of March.
A Provisional Government was established, of which M. de Talleyrand was
appointed President. The other members were General Beurnonville, Comte
Francois de Jaucourt, the Duc Dalberg, who had married one of Maria
Louisa's ladies of honour, and the Abby de Montesquieu. The place of
Chancellor of the Legion of Honour was given to the Abbe de Pradt. Thus
there were two abbes among the members of the Provisional Government,
and by a singular chance they happened to be the same who had officiated
at the mass which was performed in the Champ de Mars on the day of the
first federation.
Those who were dissatisfied with the events of the 31st of March now
saw no hope but in the possibility that the Emperor of Austria would
separate from his Allies, or at least not make common cause with them
in favour of the re-establishment of the Bourbons. But that monarch had
been brought up in the old policy of his family, and was imbued with
the traditional principles of his Cabinet. I know for a fact that the
sentiments and intentions of the Emperor of Austria perfectly coincided
with those of his Allies. Anxious to ascertain the truth on this
subject, I ventured, when in conversation with the Emperor Alexander, to
hint at the reports I had heard relative to the cause of the Emperor of
Austria's absence. I do not recollect the precise words of his Majesty's
answer, but it enabled me to infer with certainty that Francis II.
was in no way averse to the overthrow of his son-in-law, and that his
absence from the scene of the discussions was only occasioned by a
feeling of delicacy natural enough in his situation.
Caulaincourt, who was sent by Napoleon to the headquarters of the
Emperor Alexander, arrived there on the night of the 30th of March.
He, however, did not obtain an interview with the Czar until after his
Majesty had received the Municipal Council of Paris, at the head of
which was M. de Chabrol. At first Alexander appeared somewhat surprised
to see the Municipal Council, which he did not receive exactly in the
way that was expected; but this coldness was merely momentary, and
he afterwards addressed the Council in a very gracious way, though he
dropped no hint of his ulterior intentions.
Alexander, who entertained a personal regard for Caulaincourt, received
him kindly in his own character, but not as the envoy of Napoleon. "You
have come too late," said the Czar. "It is all over. I can say nothing
to you at present. Go to Paris, and I will see you there." These words
perfectly enlightened Caulaincourt as to the result of his mission. His
next interview with the Emperor Alexander at M. de Talleyrand's did not
take place until after the declaration noticed in my last chapter. The
conversation they had together remained a secret, for neither Alexander
nor the Duke of Vicenza mentioned it; but there was reason to infer,
from some words which fell from the Emperor Alexander, that he had
received Caulaincourt rather as a private individual than as the
ambassador of Napoleon, whose power, indeed, he could not recognise
after his declaration. The Provisional Government was not entirely
pleased with Caulaincourt's presence in Paris, and a representation was
made to the Russian Emperor on the subject. Alexander concurred in the
opinion of the Provisional Government, which was expressed through the
medium of the Abbe de Pradt. M. de Caulaincourt, therefore, at the wish
of the Czar, returned to the Emperor, then at Fontainebleau.
CHAPTER, XXXV.
1814.
Situation of Bonaparte during the events of the 30th and 31st of
March--His arrival at Fontainebleau--Plan of attacking Paris--
Arrival of troops at Fontainebleau--The Emperor's address to the
Guard--Forfeiture pronounced by the Senate--Letters to Marmont--
Correspondence between Marmont and Schwartzenberg--Macdonald
informed of the occupation of Paris--Conversation between the
Emperor and Macdonald at Fontainebleau--Beurnonville's letter--
Abdication on condition of a Regency--Napoleon's wish to retract his
act of abdication--Macdonald Ney, and Caulaincourt sent to Paris--
Marmont released from his promise by Prince Schwartzenberg.
On the morning of the 30th of March, while the battle before the walls
of Paris was at its height, Bonaparte was still at Troyes. He quitted
that town at ten o'clock, accompanied only by Bertrand, Caulaincourt,
two aides de camp, and two orderly officers. He was not more than two
hours in traveling the first ten leagues, and he and his slender
escort performed the journey without changing horses, and without
even alighting. They arrived at Sens at one o'clock in the afternoon.
Everything was in such confusion that it was impossible to prepare a
suitable mode of conveyance for the Emperor. He was therefore obliged
to content himself with a wretched cariole, and in this equipage, about
four in the morning, he reached Froidmanteau, about four leagues from
Paris. It was there that the Emperor received from General Belliard, who
arrived at the head of a column of artillery, the first intelligence of
the battle of Paris. He heard the news with an air of composure, which
was probably affected to avoid discouraging those about him. He walked
for about a quarter of an hour on the high road, and it was after that
promenade that he sent Caulaincourt to Paris. Napoleon afterwards went
to the house of the postmaster, where he ordered his maps to be brought
to him, and, according to custom, marked the different positions of the
enemy's troops with pine, the heads of which were touched with wax of
different colours. After this description of work, which Napoleon
did every day, or sometimes several times a day, he repaired to
Fontainebleau, where he arrived at six in the morning. He did not order
the great apartments of the castle to be opened, but went up to his
favourite little apartment, where he shut himself up, and remained alone
during the whole of the 31st of March.
In the evening the Emperor sent for the Duke of Ragusa, who had just
arrived at Essonne with his troops. The Duke reached Fontainebleau
between three and four o'clock on the morning of the 1st of April.
Napoleon then received a detailed account of the events of the 30th from
Marmont, on whose gallant conduct before Paris he bestowed much praise.
All was gloom and melancholy at Fontainebleau, yet the Emperor still
retained his authority, and I have been informed that he deliberated
for some time as to whether he should retire behind the Loire, or
immediately hazard a bold stroke upon Paris, which would have been
much more to his taste than to resign himself to the chances which an
uncertain temporising might bring about. This latter thought pleased
him; and he was seriously considering his plan of attack when the news
of the 31st, and the unsuccessful issue of Caulaincourt's mission, gave
him to understand that his situation was more desperate than he had
hitherto imagined.
Meanwhile the heads of his columns, which the Emperor had left at
Troves, arrived on the 1st of April at Fontainebleau, the troops having
marched fifty leagues in less than three days, one of the most rapid
marches ever performed. On the 2d of April Napoleon communicated the
events of Paris to the Generals who were about him, recommending them
to conceal the news lest it should dispirit the troops, upon whom he yet
relied. That day, during an inspection of the troops, which took place
in the court of the Palace, Bonaparte assembled the officers of his
Guard, and harangued them as follows:
Soldiers! the enemy has stolen three marches upon us, and has made
himself master of Paris. We must drive him thence. Frenchmen,
unworthy of the name, emigrants whom we have pardoned, have mounted
the white cockade, and joined the enemy. The wretches shall receive
the reward due to this new crime. Let us swear to conquer or die,
and to enforce respect to the tri-coloured cockade, which has for
twenty years accompanied us on the path of glory and honour.
He also endeavoured to induce the Generals to second his mad designs
upon Paris, by making them believe that he had made sincere efforts to
conclude peace. He assured them that he had expressed to the Emperor
Alexander his willingness to purchase it by sacrifices; that he had
consented to resign even the conquests made during the Revolution, and
to confine himself within the old limits of France. "Alexander," added
Napoleon, "refused; and, not content with that refusal, he has leagued
himself with a party of emigrants, whom, perhaps, I was wrong in
pardoning for having borne arms against France. Through their perfidious
insinuations Alexander has permitted the white cockade to be mounted on
the capital. We will maintain ours, and in a few days we will march upon
Paris. I rely on you."
When the boundless attachment of the Guards to the Emperor is considered
it cannot appear surprising that these last words, uttered in an
impressive tone, should have produced a feeling of enthusiasm, almost
electrical, in all to whom they were addressed. The old companions of
the glory of their chief exclaimed with one voice, "Paris! Paris!" But,
fortunately, during the night, the Generals having deliberated with each
other saw the frightful abyss into which they were about to precipitate
France. They therefore resolved to intimate in discreet terms to the
Emperor that they would not expose Paris to destruction, so that on the
3d of April, prudent ideas succeeded the inconsiderate enthusiasm of the
preceding day.
The wreck of the army assembled at Fontainebleau, which was the remnant
of 1,000,000 of troops levied during fifteen months, consisted only of
the corps of the Duke of Reggio (Oudinot), Ney, Macdonald, and General
Gerard, which 'altogether did not amount to 25,000 men, and which,
joined to the remaining 7000 of the Guard, did not leave the Emperor a
disposable force of more than 32,000 men. Nothing but madness or
despair could have suggested the thought of subduing, with such scanty
resources, the foreign masses which occupied and surrounded Paris.
On the 2d of April the Senate published a 'Senatus-consulte', declaring
that Napoleon had forfeited the throne, and abolishing the right
of succession, which had been established in favour of his family.
Furnished with this set, and without awaiting the concurrence of the
Legislative Body, which was given next day, the Provisional Government
published an address to the French armies. In this address the troops
were informed that they were no longer the soldiers of Napoleon, and
that the Senate released them from their oaths. These documents were
widely circulated at the time, and inserted in all the public journals.
The address of the Senate was sent round to the Marshals, and was of
course first delivered to those who were nearest the capital; of this
latter number was Marmont, whose allegiance to the Emperor, as we have
already seen, yielded only to the sacred interests of his country.
Montessuis was directed by the Provisional Government to convey the
address to Marmont, and to use such arguments as were calculated
to strengthen those sentiments which had triumphed over his dearest
personal affections. I gave Montessuis a letter to Marmont, in which I
said:
"MY DEAR FRIEND--An old acquaintance of mine will convey to you the
remembrances of our friendship. He will, I trust, influence your
resolution: a single word will suffice to induce you to sacrifice
all for the happiness of your country. To secure that object you,
who are so good a Frenchman and so loyal a knight, will not fear
either dangers or obstacles. Your friends expect you, long for you,
and I trust will soon embrace you."
Montessuis also took one from General Dessolles, whom the Provisional
Government had appointed Governor of the National Guard in the room
of Marshal Moncey, who had left Paris on the occupation of the
Allies. General Dessolles and I did not communicate to each other our
correspondence, but when I afterwards saw the letter of Dessolles I
could not help remarking the coincidence of our appeal to Marmont's
patriotism. Prince Schwartzenberg also wrote to Marmont to induce him
to espouse a clause which had now become the cause of France. To the
Prince's letter Marmont replied, that he was disposed to concur in the
union of the army and the people, which would avert all chance of civil
war, and stop the effusion of French blood; and that he was ready with
his troops to quit the army of the Emperor Napoleon on the condition
that his troops might retire with the honours of war, and that the
safety and liberty of the Emperor were guaranteed by the Allies.
After Prince Schwartzenberg acceded to these conditions Marmont was
placed in circumstances which obliged him to request that he might be
released from his promise.
I happened to learn the manner in which Marshal Macdonald was informed
of the taking of Paris. He had been two days without any intelligence
from the Emperor, when he received an order in the handwriting of
Berthier, couched in the following terms: "The Emperor desires that you
halt wherever you may receive this order." After Berthier's signature
the following words were added as a postscript: "You, of course,
know that the enemy is in possession of Paris." When the Emperor thus
announced, with apparent negligence, an event which totally changed
the face of affairs, I am convinced his object was to make the Marshal
believe that he looked upon, that event as less important than it really
was. However, this object was not attained, for I recollect having
heard Macdonald say that Berthier's singular postscript, and the tone of
indifference in which it was expressed, filled him with mingled surprise
and alarm. Marshal Macdonald then commanded the rear-guard of the army
which occupied the environs of Montereau. Six hours after the receipt of
the order here referred to Macdonald received a second order directing
him to put his troops in motion, and he learned the Emperor's intention
of marching on Paris with all his remaining force.
On receiving the Emperor's second order Macdonald left his corps at
Montereau and repaired in haste to Fontainebleau. When he arrived there
the Emperor had already intimated to the Generals commanding divisions
in the corps assembled at Fontainebleau his design of marching on Paris.
Alarmed at this determination the Generals, most of whom had left in
the capital their wives, children, and friends, requested that Macdonald
would go with them to wait upon Napoleon and endeavour to dissuade him
from his intention. "Gentlemen," said the Marshal, "in the Emperor's
present situation such a proceeding may displease him. It must be
managed cautiously. Leave it to me, gentlemen, I will go to the
chateau."
Marshal Macdonald accordingly went to the Palace of Fontainebleau, where
the following conversation ensued between him and the Emperor, and I
beg the reader to bear in mind that it was related to me by the Marshal
himself. As soon as he entered the apartment in which Napoleon was the
latter stepped up to him and said, "Well, how are things going on?"--
"Very badly, Sire."--"How? . . . badly! . . . What then are the feelings
of your army?"--"My army, Sire, is entirely discouraged . . . appalled
by the fate of Paris."--"Will not your troops join me in an advance on
Paris?"--"Sire, do not think of such a thing. If I were to give such an
order to my troops I should run the risk of being disobeyed."--"But
what is to be done? I cannot remain as I am; I have yet resources and
partisans. It is said that the Allies will no longer treat with me.
Well! no matter. I will march on Paris. I will be revenged on the
inconstancy of the Parisians and the baseness of the Senate. Woe to the
members of the Government they have patched up for the return of their
Bourbons; that is what they are looking forward to. But to-morrow I
shall place myself at the head of my Guards, and to-morrow we shall be
in the Tuileries."
The Marshal listened in silence, and when at length Napoleon became
somewhat calm he observed, "Sire, it appears, then, that you are not
aware of what has taken place in Paris--of the establishment of a
Provisional Government, and--"--"I know it all: and what then?"--"Sire,"
added the Marshal, presenting a paper to Napoleon, "here is something
which will tell you more than I can." Macdonald then presented to him
a letter from General Beurnonville, announcing the forfeiture of the
Emperor pronounced by the Senate, and the determination of the Allied
powers not to treat with Napoleon, or any member of his family.
"Marshal," said the Emperor, before he opened the letter, "may this be
read aloud?"--"Certainly, Sire." The letter was then handed to Barre,
who read it. An individual who was present on the occasion described to
me the impression which the reading of the letter produced on Napoleon.
His countenance exhibited that violent contraction of the features which
I have often remarked when his mind was disturbed. However, he did not
lose his self-command, which indeed never forsook him when policy
or vanity required that he should retain it; and when the reading of
Beurnonville's letter was ended he affected to persist in his intention
of marching on Paris. "Sire," exclaimed Macdonald, "that plan must be
renounced. Not a sword would be unsheathed to second you in such an
enterprise." After this conversation between the Emperor and Macdonald
the question of the abdication began to be seriously thought of.
Caulaincourt had already hinted to Napoleon that in case of his
abdicating personally there was a possibility of inducing the Allies to
agree to a Council of Regency. Napoleon then determined to sign the act
of abdication, which he himself drew up in the following terms:--
The Allied powers having declared that the Emperor Napoleon is the
only obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the
Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he is ready to
descend from the throne, to leave France, and even to lay down his
life for the welfare of the country, which is inseparable from the
rights of his son, those of the Regency of the Empress, and the
maintenance of the laws of the Empire. Given at our Palace of
Fontainebleau, 2d April 1814.
(Signed) NAPOLEON.
After having written this act the Emperor presented it to the Marshals,
saying, "Here, gentlemen! are you satisfied?"
This abdication of Napoleon was certainly very useless, but in case of
anything occurring to render it a matter of importance the act might
have proved entirely illusory. Its meaning might appear unequivocal to
the generality of people, but not to me, who was so well initiated in
the cunning to which Napoleon could resort when it suited his purpose.
It is necessary to observe that Napoleon does not say that "he descends
from the throne," but that "he is ready to descend from the throne."
This was a subterfuge, by the aid of which he intended to open new
negotiations respecting the form and conditions of the Regency of his
son, in case of the Allied sovereigns acceding to that proposition. This
would have afforded the means of gaining time.
He had not yet resigned all hope, and therefore he joyfully received a
piece of intelligence communicated to him by General Allix. The General
informed the Emperor that he had met an Austrian officer who was sent
by Francis II. to Prince Schwartzenberg, and who positively assured him
that all which had taken place in Paris was contrary to the wish of the
Emperor of Austria. That this may have been the opinion of the officer
is possible, and even probable. But it is certain from the issue of a
mission of the Duc de Cadore (Champagny), of which I shall presently
speak, that the officer expressed merely his own personal opinion.
However, as soon as General Allix had communicated this good news, as
he termed it, to Napoleon, the latter exclaimed to the persons who
were about him, "I told you so, gentlemen. Francis II. cannot carry his
enmity so far as to dethrone his daughter. Vicenza, go and desire the
Marshals to return my act of abdication. I will send a courier to the
Emperor of Austria."
Thus Bonaparte in his shipwreck looked round for a saving plank,
and tried to nurse himself in illusions. The Duke of Vicenza went to
Marshals Ney and Macdonald, whom he found just stepping into a carriage
to proceed to Paris. Both positively refused to return the act to
Caulaincourt, saying, "We are sure of the concurrence of the Emperor of
Austria, and we take everything upon ourselves." The result proved that
they were better informed than General Allix.
During the conversation with Marshal Macdonald which has just been
described the Emperor was seated. When he came to the resolution of
signing the abdication he arose and walked once or twice up and down his
cabinet. After he had written and signed the act he said, "Gentlemen,
the interests of my son, the interests of the army, and above all,
the interests of France, must be defended. I therefore appoint as my
commissioners to the Allied powers the Duke of Vicenza, the Prince of
the Moskowa, and the Duke of Ragusa. . . . Are you satisfied?" added he,
after a pause. "I think these interests are consigned to good hands."
All present answered, as with one voice. "Yes, Sire." But no sooner
was this answer pronounced than the Emperor threw himself upon a small
yellow sofa, which stood near the window, and striking his thigh with
his hand with a sort of convulsive motion, he exclaimed, "No, gentlemen:
I will have no Regency! With my Guards and Marmont's corps I shall be in
Paris to-morrow." Ney and Macdonald vainly endeavoured to undeceive him
respecting this impracticable design. He rose with marked ill-humour,
and rubbing his head, as he was in the habit of doing when agitated, he
said in a loud and authoritative tone, "Retire."
The Marshals withdrew, and Napoleon was left alone with Caulaincourt.
He told the latter that what had most displeased him in the proceedings
which had just taken place was the reading of Beurnonville's letter.
"Sire," observed the Duke of Vicenza, "it was by your order that the
letter was read."--"That is true. . . . But why was it not addressed
directly to me by Macdonald?"--"Sire, the letter was at first addressed
to Marshal Macdonald, but the aide de camp who was the bearer of it
had orders to communicate its contents to Marmont on passing through
Essonne, because Beurnonville did not precisely know where Macdonald
would be found." After this brief explanation the Emperor appeared
satisfied, and he said to Caulaincourt, "Vicenza, call back Macdonald."
The Duke of Vicenza hastened after the Marshal, whom he found at the end
of the gallery of the Palace, and he brought him back to the Emperor.
When Macdonald returned to the cabinet the Emperor's warmth had entirely
subsided, and he said to him with great composure, "Well, Duke of
Tarantum, do you think that the Regency is the only possible thing?"--
"Yes, Sire."--"Then I wish you to go with Ney to the Emperor Alexander,
instead of Marmont; it is better that he should remain with his corps,
to which his presence is indispensable. You will therefore go with Ney.
I rely on you. I hope you have entirely forgotten all that has separated
us for so long a time."--"Yes, Sire, I have not thought of it since
1809."--"I am glad of it, Marshal, and I must acknowledge to you that I
was in the wrong." While speaking to the Marshal the Emperor manifested
unusual emotion. He approached him and pressed his hand in the most
affectionate way.
The Emperor's three Commissioners--that is to say, Marshals Macdonald
and Ney and the Duke of Vicenza had informed Marmont that they would
dine with him as they passed through Essonne, and would acquaint him
with all that had happened at Fontainebleau. On their arrival at Essonne
the three Imperial Commissioners explained to the Duc of Ragusa the
object of their mission, and persuaded him to accompany them to the
Emperor Alexander. This obliged the Marshal to inform them how he was
situated. The negotiations which Marmont had opened and almost concluded
with Prince Schwartzenberg were rendered void by the mission which he
had joined, and which it was necessary he should himself explain to
the Commander of the Austrian army. The three Marshals and the Duke
of Vicenza repaired to Petit Bourg, the headquarters of Prince
Schwartzenberg, and there the Prince released Marmont from the promise
he had given.
CHAPTER XXXVI.
1814.
Unexpected receipts in the Post-office Department--Arrival of
Napoleon's Commissioners at M. de Talleyrand's--Conference of the
Marshals with Alexander--Alarming news from Essonne--Marmont's
courage--The white cockade and the tri-coloured cockade--
A successful stratagem--Three Governments in France--The Duc de
Cadore sent by Maria Louisa to the Emperor of Austria--Maria
Louisa's proclamation to the French people--Interview between the
Emperor of Austria and the Duc de Cadore--The Emperor's protestation
of friendship for Napoleon--M. Metternich and M. Stadion--Maria
Louisa's departure for Orleans--Blücher's visit to me--Audience of
the King of Prussia--His Majesty's reception of Berthier, Clarke,
and myself--Bernadotte in Paris--Cross of the Polar Star presented
to me by Bernadotte.
After my nomination as Director-General of the Post office the business
of that department proceeded as regularly as before. Having learned that
a great many intercepted letters had been thrown aside I sent, on the
4th of April, an advertisement to the 'Moniteur', stating that the
letters to and from England or other foreign countries which had been
lying at the Post-office for more than three years would be forwarded to
their respective addresses. This produced to the Post-office a receipt
of nearly 300,000 francs, a fact which may afford an idea of the
enormous number of intercepted letters.
On the night after the publication of the advertisement I was awakened
by an express from the Provisional Government, by which I was requested
to proceed with all possible haste to M. de Talleyrand's hotel. I rose,
and I set off immediately, and I got there some minutes before the
arrival of the Emperor's Commissioners. I went up to the salon on the
first floor, which was one of the suite of apartments occupied by the
Emperor Alexander. The Marshals retired to confer with the monarch, and
it would be difficult to describe the anxiety--or, I may rather say,
consternation--which, during their absence, prevailed among some of the
members of the Provisional Government and other persons assembled in the
salon where I was.
While the Marshals were with Alexander, I learned that they had
previously conversed with M. de Talleyrand, who observed to them, "If
you succeed in your designs you will compromise all who have met in this
hotel since the 1st of April, and the number is not small. For my part,
take no account of me, I am willing to be compromised." I had passed
the evening of this day with M. de Talleyrand, who then observed to the
Emperor Alexander in my presence, "Will you support Bonaparte? No, you
neither can nor will. I have already had the honour to tell your Majesty
that we can have no choice but between Bonaparte and Louis XVIII.;
anything else would be an intrigue, and no intrigue can have power to
support him who may be its object. Bernadotte, Eugène, the Regency,
all those propositions result from intrigues. In present circumstances
nothing but a new principle is sufficiently strong to establish the new
order of things which must be adopted. Louis XVIII. is a principle."
None of the members of the Provisional Government were present at this
conference, for no one was willing to appear to influence in any way
the determination of the chief of the coalition upon the subject of this
important mission. General Dessolles alone, in quality of commander of
the National Guard of Paris, was requested to be present. At length the
Marshals entered the salon where we were, and their appearance created
a sensation which it is impossible to describe; but the expression
of dissatisfaction which we thought we remarked in their countenances
restored the hopes of those who for some hours had been a prey to
apprehensions. Macdonald, with his head elevated, and evidently under
the influence of strong irritation, approached Beurnonville, and thus
addressed him, in answer to a question which the latter had put to him.
"Speak not to me, sir; I have nothing to say to you. You have made me
forget a friendship of thirty years!" Then turning to Dupont, "As for
you, sir," he continued in the same tone, "your conduct towards
the Emperor is not generous. I confess that he has treated you with
severity, perhaps he may even have been unjust to you with respect to
the affair of Baylen, but how long has it been the practice to avenge a
personal wrong at the expense of one's country?"
These remarks were made with such warmth, and in so elevated a tone of
voice, that Caulaincourt thought it necessary to interfere, and said,
"Do not forget, gentlemen, that this is the residence of the Emperor
of Russia." At this moment M. de Talleyrand returned from the interview
with the Emperor which he had had after the departure of the Marshals,
and approaching the group formed round Macdonald, "Gentlemen," said
he, "if you wish to dispute and discuss, step down to my apartments."--
"That would be useless," replied Macdonald; "my comrades and I do
not acknowledge the Provisional Government." The three Marshals, Ney,
Macdonald, and Marmont, then immediately retired with Caulaincourt,
and went to Ney's hotel, there to await the answer which the Emperor
Alexander had promised to give them after consulting the King of
Prussia.
Such was this night-scene; which possessed more dramatic effect than
many which are performed on the stage. In it all was real: on its
denouement depended the political state of France, and the existence of
all those who had already declared themselves in favour of the Bourbons.
It is a remarkable fact, and one which affords a striking lesson to men
who are tempted to sacrifice themselves for any political cause, that
most of those who then demanded the restoration of the Bourbons at the
peril of their lives have successively fallen into disgrace.
When the Marshals and Caulaincourt had retired we were all anxious to
know what had passed between them and the Emperor of Russia. I learned
from Dessolles, who, as I have stated, was present at the conference in
his rank of commander of the National Guard of Paris, that the Marshals
were unanimous in urging Alexander to accede to a Regency. Macdonald
especially supported that proposition with much warmth; and among the
observations he made I recollect Dessolles mentioned the following:--
"I am not authorised to treat in any way for the fate reserved for the
Emperor. We have full powers to treat for the Regency, the army, and
France; but the Emperor has positively forbidden us to specify anything
personally regarding himself." Alexander merely replied, "That does not
astonish me." The Marshals then, resuming the conversation, dwelt much
on the respect which was due to the military glory of France. They
strongly manifested their disinclination to abandon the family of a
man who had so often led them to victory; and lastly, they reminded the
Emperor Alexander of his own declaration, in which he proclaimed, in
his own name as well as on the part of his Allies, that it was not their
intention to impose on France any government whatever.
Dessolles, who had all along declared himself in favour of the Bourbons,
in his turn entered into the discussion with as much warmth as the
partisans of the Regency. He represented to Alexander how many persons
would be compromised for merely having acted or declared their opinions
behind the shield of his promises. He repeated what Alexander had
already been told, that the Regency would, in fact, be nothing but
Bonaparte in disguise. However, Dessolles acknowledged that such was
the effect of Marshal Macdonald's powerful and persuasive eloquence
that Alexander seemed to waver; and, unwilling to give the Marshals a
positive refusal, he had recourse to a subterfuge, by which he would be
enabled to execute the design he had irrevocably formed without seeming
to take on himself alone the responsibility of a change of government.
Dessolles accordingly informed us that Alexander at last gave the
following answer to the Marshals: "Gentlemen, I am not alone; in an
affair of such importance I must consult the King of Prussia, for I have
promised to do nothing without consulting him. In a few hours you shall
know my decision." It was this decision which the Marshals went to wait
for at Ney's.
Most of the members of the Provisional Government attributed the
evasive reply of the Emperor Alexander to the influence of the speech
of Dessolles. For my part, while I do justice to the manner in which
he declared himself on this important occasion, I do not ascribe to his
eloquence the power of fixing Alexander's resolution, for I well know by
experience how easy it is to make princes appear to adopt the advice
of any one when the counsel given is precisely that which they wish
to follow. From the sentiments of Alexander at this time I had not
the slightest doubt as to the course he would finally pursue, and I
considered what he said about consulting the King of Prussia to be
merely a polite excuse, by which he avoided the disagreeable task of
giving the Marshals a direct refusal.
I therefore returned home quite satisfied as to the result of the
Emperor Alexander's visit to the King of Prussia. I knew, from the
persons about the Czar, that he cherished a hatred, which was but too
well justified, towards Bonaparte. Frederick William is of too firm a
character to have yielded to any of the considerations which might on
this subject have been pressed on him as they had been on the Emperor of
Russia. But, besides that the King of Prussia had legitimate reasons
for disliking Napoleon, policy would at that time have required that
he should appear to be his enemy, for to do so was to render himself
popular with his subjects. But the King of Prussia did not need to act
under the dictates of policy; he followed his own opinion in rejecting
the propositions of the Marshals, which he did without hesitation, and
with much energy.