As I took the most lively interest in all that concerned the Hanse

Towns, my first care on returning to Hamburg was to collect information

from the most respectable sources concerning the influential members

of the new Government. Davoust was at its head. On his arrival he had

established in the Duchy of Mecklenburg, in Swedish Pomerania, and

in Stralsund, the capital of that province, military posts and

custom-houses, and that in a time of profound peace with those

countries, and without any previous declaration. The omnipotence of

Napoleon, and the terror inspired by the name of Davoust, overcame all

obstacles which might have opposed those iniquitous usurpations. The

weak were forced to yield to the strong.

At Hamburg a Government Committee was formed, consisting of the Prince

of Eekmuhl as President, Comte de Chaban, Councillor of State, who

superintended the departments of the Interior and Finance, and of M.

Faure, Councillor of State, who was appointed to form and regulate the

Courts of Law. I had sometimes met M. de Chaban at Malmaison. He was

distantly related to Josephine, and had formerly been an officer in the

French Guards. He was compelled to emigrate, having been subjected to

every species of persecution during the Revolution.

M. de Chaban was among the first of the emigrants who returned to France

after the 18th Brumaire. He was at first made Sub-Prefect of Vendome,

but on the union of Tuscany with France Napoleon created him a member of

the Junta appointed to regulate the affairs of Tuscany. He next became

Prefect of Coblentz and Brussels, was made a Count by Bonaparte, and was

afterwards chosen a member of the Government Committee at Hamburg. M.

de Chaban was a man of upright principles, and he discharged his various

functions in a way that commanded esteem and attachment.

--[I recollect an anecdote which but too well depicts those

disastrous times. The Comte de Chaban, being obliged to cross

France during the Reign of Terror, was compelled to assume a

disguise. He accordingly provided himself with a smockfrock; a cart

and horses, and a load of corn. In this manner he journeyed from

place to place till he reached the frontiers. He stopped at

Rochambeau, in the Vendomais, where he was recognised by the Marshal

de Rochambeau, who to guard against exciting any suspicion among

his servants, treated him as if he had really been a carman and said

to him, "You may dine in the kitchen."--Bourrienne.]--

The Hanseatic Towns, united to the Grand Empire professedly for

their welfare, soon felt the blessings of the new organisation of

a regenerating Government. They were at once presented with; the

stamp-duty, registration, the lottery, the droits reunis, the tax on

cards, and the 'octroi'. This prodigality of presents caused, as we may

be sure, the most lively gratitude; a tax for military quarters and

for warlike supplies was imposed, but this did not relieve any one from

laving not only officers and soldiers; but even all the chiefs of the

administration and their officials billeted on them: The refineries,

breweries, and manufactures of all sorts were suppressed. The cash

chests of the Admiralty, of the charity houses, of the manufactures, of

the savings-banks, of the working classes, the funds of the prisons, the

relief meant for the infirm, the chests of the refuges, orphanages; and

of the hospitals, were all seized.

More than 200,000 men, Italian, Dutch, and French soldiers came in turn

to stay there, but only to be clothed and shod; and then they left newly

clothed from head to foot. To leave nothing to be wished for, Davoust,

from 1812, established military commissions in all the thirty-second.

military division, before he entered upon the Russian campaign. To

complete these oppressive measures he established at the same time the

High Prevotal Court of the Customs. It was at this time that M. Eudes,

the director of the ordinary customs, a strict but just man, said that

the rule of the ordinary customs would be regretted, "for till now you

have only been on roses.." The professed judgments of this court were

executed without appeal and without delay. From what I have just said

the situation and the misery of the north of Germany, and the consequent

discontent, can be judged.

During my stay in Hamburg, which on this occasion was not very long,

Napoleon's attention was particularly engaged by the campaign of

Portugal, and his discussions with the Pope. At this period the

thunderbolts of Rome were not very alarming. Yet precautions were

taken to keep secret the excommunication which Pius VII. had pronounced

against Napoleon. The event, however, got reported about, and a party

in favour of the Pope speedily rose up among the clergy, and more

particularly among the fanatics. Napoleon sent to Savona the Archbishops

of Nantes, Bourges, Treves, and Tours, to endeavour to bring about

a reconciliation with His Holiness. But all their endeavours were

unavailing, and after staying a month at Savona they returned to Paris

without having done anything. But Napoleon was not discouraged by

this first disappointment, and he shortly afterwards sent a second

deputation, which experienced the same fate as the first. Cardinal

Fesch, Napoleon's uncle, took part with the Pope. For this fact I can

vouch, though I cannot for an answer which he is said to have made

to the Emperor. I have been informed that when Napoleon was one day

speaking to his uncle about the Pope's obstinacy the Cardinal made some

observations to him on his (Bonaparte's) conduct to the Holy Father,

upon which Napoleon flew into a passion, and said that the Pope and he

were two old fools. "As for the Pope," said he, "he is too obstinate to

listen to anything. No, I am determined he shall never have Rome again.

. . . He will not remain at Savona, and where does he wish I should send

him?"--"To Heaven, perhaps," replied the Cardinal.

The truth is, the Emperor was violently irritated against Pius VII.

Observing with uneasiness the differences and difficulties to which all

these dissensions gave rise, he was anxious to put a stop to them. As

the Pope would not listen to any propositions that were made to him,

Napoleon convoked a Council, which assembled in Paris, and at which

several Italian Bishops were present. The Pope insisted that the

temporal and spiritual interests should be discussed together; and,

however disposed a certain number of prelates, particularly the

Italians, might be to separate these two points of discussion, yet the

influence of the Church and well-contrived intrigues gradually gave

preponderance to the wishes of the Pope. The Emperor, having discovered

that a secret correspondence was carried on by several of the Bishops

and Archbishops who had seats in the Council, determined to get rid of

some of them, and the Bishops of Ghent, Troyes, Tournay, and Toulouse

were arrested and sent to Vincennes. They were superseded by others.

He wished to dissolve the Council, which he saw was making no advance

towards the object he had in view, and, fearing that it might adopt some

act at variance with his supreme wish, every member of the Council was

individually required to make a declaration that the proposed changes

were conformable to the laws of the Church. It was said at the time that

they were unanimous in this individual declaration, though it is certain

that in the sittings of the Council opinions were divided. I know not

what His Holiness thought of these written opinions compared with the

verbal opinions that had been delivered, but certain it is though still

a captive at Savona, he refused to adhere to the concessions granted in

the secret declarations.

The conflicts which took place in Spain during the year 1811 were

unattended by any decisive results. Some brilliant events, indeed,

attested the courage of our troops and the skill of our generals.

Such were the battle of Albufera and the taking of Tarragona, while

Wellington was obliged to raise the siege of Badajoz. These advantages,

which were attended only by glory, encouraged Napoleon in the hope of

triumphing in the Peninsula, and enabled him to enjoy the brilliant

fetes which took place at Paris in celebration of the birth of the King

of Rome.

On his return from a tour in Holland at the end of October Napoleon

clearly saw that a rupture with Russia was inevitable. In vain he sent

Lauriston as Ambassador to St. Petersburg to supersede Caulaincourt,

who would no longer remain there: all the diplomatic skill in the world

could effect nothing with a powerful Government which had already formed

its determination. All the Cabinets in Europe were now unanimous in

wishing for the overthrow of Napoleon's power, and the people no less,

ardently wished for an order of things less fatal to their trade

and industry. In the state to which Europe was reduced no one could

counteract the wish of Russia and her allies to go to war with

France--Lauriston no more than Caulaincourt.

The war for which Napoleon was now obliged to prepare forced him to

neglect Spain, and to leave his interests in that country in a state of

real danger. Indeed, his occupation of Spain and his well-known wish to

maintain himself there were additional motives for inducing the powers

of Europe to enter upon a war which would necessarily divide Napoleon's

forces. All at once the troops which were in Italy and the north of

Germany moved towards the frontiers of the Russian Empire. From March

1811 the Emperor had all the military forces of Europe at his disposal.

It was curious to see this union of nations, distinguished by difference

of manners,

--[It should be remarked that Napoleon was far from being anxious

for the war with Russia. Metternich writing on 26th March 1811,

says "Everything seems to indicate that the Emperor Napoleon is at

present still far from desiring a war with Russia. But it is not

less true that the Emperor Alexander has given himself over, 'nolens

volens', to the war party, and that he will bring about war, because

the time is approaching when he will no longer be able to resist the

reaction of the party in the internal affairs of his Empire, or the

temper of his army. The contest between Count Romanzov and the

party opposed to that Minister seems on the point of precipitating a

war between Russia and France." This, from Metternich, is strong

evidence.]--

language, religion, and interests, all ready to fight for one man

against a power who had done nothing to offend them. Prussia herself,

though she could not pardon the injuries he had inflicted upon her,

joined his alliance, but with the intention of breaking it on the first

opportunity. When the war with Russia was first spoken of Savary and I

had frequent conversations on the subject. I communicated to him all the

intelligence I received from abroad respecting that vast enterprise. The

Duc de Rovigo shared all my forebodings; and if he and those who thought

like him had been listened to, the war would probably have been avoided.

Through him I learnt who were the individuals who urged the invasion.

The eager ambition with which they looked forward to Viceroyalties,

Duchies, and endowments blinded them to the possibility of seeing the

Cossacks in Paris.

The gigantic enterprise being determined on, vast preparations were made

for carrying it into effect. Before his departure Napoleon, who was to

take with him all the disposable troops, caused a 'Senatus-consulte' to

be issued for levying the National Guards, who were divided into

three corps. He also arranged his diplomatic affairs by concluding,

in February 1812, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive,

with Prussia, by virtue of which the two contracting powers mutually

guaranteed the integrity of their own possessions, and the European

possessions of the Ottoman Porte, because that power was then at war

with Russia. A similar treaty was concluded about the beginning of March

with Austria, and about the end of the same month Napoleon renewed

the capitulation of France and Switzerland. At length, in the month of

April, there came to light an evident proof of the success which had

attended M. Czernischeff's intrigues in Paris. It was ascertained that

a clerk in the War Office, named Michel, had communicated to him the

situation of the French forces in Germany. Michel was condemned to

death, for the time was gone by when Bonaparte, confident in his genius

and good fortune, could communicate his plans to the spy of General

Melas.

In March 1812, when I saw that the approaching war would necessarily

take Napoleon from France, weary of the persecutions and even threats

by which I was every day assailed, I addressed to the Emperor a memorial

explaining my conduct and showing the folly and wickedness of my

accusers. Among them was a certain Ogier de la Saussaye, who had sent

a report to the Emperor, in which the principal charge was, that I had

carried off a box containing important papers belonging to the First

Consul. The accusation of Ogier de la Saussaye terminated thus: "I add

to my report the interrogatories of MM. Westphalen, Osy, Chapeau Rouge,

Aukscher, Thierry, and Gumprecht-Mores. The evidence of the latter

bears principally on a certain mysterious box, a secret upon which it is

impossible to throw any light, but the reality of which we are bound to

believe." These are his words. The affair of the mysterious box has

been already explained. I have already informed the reader that I put my

papers into a box, which I buried lest it should be stolen from me. But

for that precaution I should not have been able to lay before the reader

the autograph documents in my possession, and which I imagine form the

most essential part of these volumes. In my memorial to the Emperor I

said, in allusion to the passage above quoted, "This, Sire, is the most

atrocious part of Ogier's report.

"Gumprecht being questioned on this point replies that the accuser has

probably, as well as himself, seen the circumstance mentioned in an

infamous pamphlet which appeared seven or eight years, ago. It was,

I think, entitled 'Le Secret du Cabinet des Tuileries,' and was very

likely at the time of its appearance denounced by the police. In that

libel it is stated, among a thousand other calumnies equally false and

absurd, 'that when I left the First Consul I carried away a box full of

important papers, that I was in consequence sent to the Temple, where

your brother Joseph came to me and offered me my liberation, and a

million of francs, if I would restore the papers, which I refused to

do,' etc. Ogier, instead of looking for this libel in Hamburg, where I

read it, has the impudence to give credit to the charge, the truth of

which could have been ascertained immediately: and he adds, 'This secret

we are bound to believe.' Your Majesty knows whether I was ever in the

Temple, and whether Joseph ever made such an offer to me." I entreated

that the Emperor would do me the favour to bring me to trial; for

certainly I should have regarded that as a favour rather than to remain

as I was, exposed to vague accusations; yet all my solicitations were in

vain. My letter to the Emperor remained unanswered; but though Bonaparte

could not spare a few moments to reply to an old friend, I learned

through Duroc the contempt he cherished for my accusers. Duroc

advised me not to be uneasy, and that in all probability the Emperor's

prejudices against me would be speedily overcome; and I must say that if

they were not overcome it was neither the fault of Duroc nor Savary, who

knew how to rightly estimate the miserable intrigues just alluded to.

Napoleon was at length determined to extend the limits of his Empire,

or rather to avenge the injuries which Russia had committed against his

Continental system. Yet, before he departed for Germany, the resolute

refusal of the Pope to submit to any arrangement urgently claimed

his consideration. Savona did not appear to him a sufficiently secure

residence for such a prisoner. He feared that when all his strength

should be removed towards the Niemen the English might carry off the

Pope, or that the Italians, excited by the clergy, whose dissatisfaction

was general in Italy, would stir up those religious dissensions which

are always fatal and difficult to quell. With the view, therefore, of

keeping the Pope under his control he removed him to Fontainebleau, and

even at one time thought of bringing him to Paris.

The Emperor appointed M. Denon to reside with the Pope at Fontainebleau;

and to afford his illustrious prisoner the society of such a man was

certainly a delicate mark of attention on the part of Napoleon. When

speaking of his residence with Pius VII. M. Denon related to me the

following anecdote. "The Pope," said he, "was much attached to me.

He always addressed me by the appellation 'my son,' and he loved to

converse with me, especially on the subject of the Egyptian expedition.

One day he asked me for my work on Egypt, which he said he wished to

read; and as you know it is not quite orthodox, and does not perfectly

agree with the creation of the world according to Genesis, I at first

hesitated; but the Pope insisted, and at length I complied with his

wish. The Holy Father assured me that he had been much interested by the

perusal of the book. I made some allusion to the delicate points; upon

which he said, 'No matter, no matter, my son; all that is exceedingly

curious, and I must confess entirely new to me.' I then," continued M.

Denon, "told His Holiness why I hesitated to lend him the work, which,

I observed, he had excommunicated, together with its author.

'Excommunicated you, my son?' resumed the Pope in a tone of affectionate

concern. 'I am very sorry for it, and assure you I was far from being

aware of any such thing.'"

When M. Denon related to me this anecdote he told me how greatly he had

admired the virtues and resignation of the Holy Father; but he added

that it would nevertheless have been easier to make him a martyr than

to induce him to yield on any point until he should be restored to

the temporal sovereignty of Rome, of which he considered himself

the depositary, and which he would not endure the reproach of having

willingly sacrificed. After settling the place of the Pope's residence

Napoleon set off for Dresden, accompanied by Maria Louisa, who had

expressed a wish to see her father.

The Russian enterprise, the most gigantic, perhaps, that the genius

of man ever conceived since the conquest of India by Alexander, now

absorbed universal attention, and defied the calculations of reason.

The Manzanares was forgotten, and nothing was thought of but the Niemen,

already so celebrated by the raft of Tilsit. Thither, as towards a

common centre, were moving men, horses, provisions, and baggage of every

kind, from all parts of Europe. The hopes of our generals and the fears

of all prudent men were directed to Russia. The war in Spain, which was

becoming more and more unfortunate, excited but a feeble interest; and

our most distinguished officers looked upon it as a disgrace to be sent

to the Peninsula. In short, it was easy to foresee that the period

was not far distant when the French would be obliged to recross the

Pyrenees. Though the truth was concealed from the Emperor on many

subjects, yet he was not deceived as to the situation of Spain in the

spring of 1812. In February the Duke of Ragusa had frankly informed him

that the armies of Spain and Portugal could not, without considerable

reinforcements of men and money, hope for any important advantages since

Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz had fallen into the hands of the English.

Before he commenced his great operations on the Niemen and the Volga

Napoleon made a journey to Dantzic, and Rapp, who was then Governor of

that city, informed me of some curious particulars connected with the

Imperial visit. The fact is, that if Rapp's advice had been listened

to, and had been supported by men higher in rank than himself, Bonaparte

would not have braved the chances of the Russian war until those chances

turned against him. Speaking to me of the Russians Rapp said, "They will

soon be as wise as we are! Every time we go to war with them we teach

them how to beat us." I was struck with the originality and truth of

this observation, which at the time I heard it was new, though it has

been often repeated since.

"On leaving Dresden," said Rapp to me, "Napoleon came to Dantzic. I

expected a dressing; for, to tell you the truth, I had treated very

cavalierly both his custom-house and its officers, who were raising up

as many enemies to France as there were inhabitants in my Government.

I had also warned him of all that has since happened in Russia, but

I assure you I did not think myself quite so good a prophet. In

the beginning of 1812 I thus wrote to him: 'If your Majesty should

experience reverses you may depend on it that both Russians and Germans

will rise up in a mass to shake off the yoke. There will be a crusade,

and all your allies will abandon you. Even the King of Bavaria, on whom

you rely so confidently, will join the coalition. I except only the King

of Saxony. He, perhaps, might remain faithful to you; but his subjects

will force him to make common cause with your enemies. The King of

Naples," continued Rapp, "who had the command of the cavalry, had been

to Dantzic before the Emperor. He did not seem to take a more favourable

view of the approaching campaign than I did. Murat was dissatisfied that

the Emperor would not consent to his rejoining him in Dresden; and he

said that he would rather be a captain of grenadiers than a King such as

he was."

Here I interrupted Rapp to tell him what had fallen from Murat when I

met him in the Champs Elysees "Bah!" resumed Rapp, "Murat, brave as he

was, was a craven in Napoleon's presence! On the Emperor's arrival in

Dantzic the first thing of which he spoke to me was the alliance he had

just then concluded with Prussia and Austria. I could not refrain from

telling him that we did a great deal of mischief as allies; a fact of

which I was assured from the reports daily transmitted to me respecting

the conduct of our troops. Bonaparte tossed his bead, as you know he was

in the habit of doing when he was displeased. After a moment's silence,

dropping the familiar thee and thou, he said, 'Monsieur le General, this

is a torrent which must be allowed to run itself out. It will not last

long. I must first ascertain whether Alexander decidedly wishes for

war.' Then, suddenly changing the subject of conversation, he said,

'Have you not lately observed something extraordinary in Murat? I think

he is quite altered. Is he ill?'--'Sire,' replied I, 'Murat is not

ill, but he is out of spirits.'--'Out of spirits! but why? Is he not

satisfied with being a King?'--'Sire, Murat says he is no King.'--'That

is his own fault. Why does he make himself a Neapolitan? Why is he not a

Frenchman? When he is in his Kingdom he commits all sorts of follies. He

favours the trade of England; that I will not suffer.'

"When," continued Rapp, "he spoke of the favour extended by Murat to the

trade between Naples and England I thought my turn would come next; but

I was deceived. No more was said on the subject, and when I was about

to take my leave the Emperor said to me, as when in his best of humours,

'Rapp, you will sup with me this evening.' I accordingly supped that

evening with the Emperor, who had also invited the King of Naples and

Berthier. Next day the Emperor visited the fortress, and afterwards

returned to the Government Palace, where he received the civil and

military authorities. He again invited Murat, Berthier, and me to

supper. When we first sat down to table we were all very dull, for the

Emperor was silent; and, as you well know, under such circumstances

not even Murat himself dared to be the first to speak to him. At length

Napoleon, addressing me, inquired how far it was from Cadiz to Dantzic.

'Too far, Sire,' replied I. 'I understand you, Monsieur le General,

but in a few months the distance will be still greater.'--'So much the

worse, Sire!' Here there was another pause. Neither Murat nor Berthier,

on whom the Emperor fixed a scrutinising glance, uttered a word, and

Napoleon again broke silence, but without addressing any one of us in

particular: 'Gentlemen,' said he in a solemn and rather low tone of

voice, 'I see plainly that you are none of you inclined to fight again.

The King of Naples does not wish to leave the fine climate of his

dominions, Berthier wishes to enjoy the diversion of the chase at his

estate of Gros Bois, and Rapp is impatient to be back to his hotel in

Paris.' Would you believe it," pursued Rapp, "that neither Murat nor

Berthier said a word in reply? and the ball again came to me. I told him

frankly that what he said was perfectly true, and the King of Naples and

the Prince of Neufchatel complimented me on my spirit, and observed that

I was quite right in saying what I did. 'Well,' said I, 'since it was so

very right, why did you not follow my example, and why leave me to say

all?' You cannot conceive," added Rapp, "how confounded they both were,

and especially Murat, though he was very differently situated from

Berthier."

The negotiations which Bonaparte opened with Alexander, when he yet

wished to seem averse to war, resembled those oratorical paraphrases

which do not prevent us from coming to the conclusion we wish. The two

Emperors equally desired war; the one with the view of consolidating his

power, and the other in the hope of freeing himself from a yoke which

threatened to reduce him to a state of vassalage, for it was little

short of this to require a power like Russia to close her ports against

England for the mere purpose of favouring the interests of France.

At that time only two European powers were not tied to Napoleon's

fate--Sweden and Turkey. Napoleon was anxious to gain the alliance of

these two powers. With respect to Sweden his efforts were vain; and

though, in fact, Turkey was then at war with Russia, yet the Grand

Seignior was not now, as at the time of Sebastiani's embassy, subject to

the influence of France.

The peace, which was soon concluded at Bucharest, between Russia, and

Turkey increased Napoleon's embarrassment. The left of the Russian army,

secured by the neutrality of Turkey, was reinforced by Bagration's corps

from Moldavia: it subsequently occupied the right of the Beresina, and

destroyed the last hope of saving the wreck of the French army. It is

difficult to conceive how Turkey could have allowed the consideration of

injuries she had received from France to induce her to terminate the war

with Russia when France was attacking that power with immense forces.

The Turks never had a fairer opportunity for taking revenge on Russia,

and, unfortunately for Napoleon, they suffered it to escape.

Napoleon was not more successful when he sought the alliance of a Prince

whose fortune he had made, and who was allied to his family, but with

whom he had never been on terms of good understanding. The Emperor

Alexander had a considerable corps of troops in Finland destined to

protect that country against the Sweden, Napoleon having consented to

that occupation in order to gain the provisional consent of Alexander

to the invasion of Spain. What was the course pursued by Napoleon when,

being at war with Russia, he wished to detach Sweden from her

alliance with Alexander? He intimated to Bernadotte that he had a sure

opportunity of retaking Finland, a conquest which would gratify his

subjects and win their attachment to him. By this alliance Napoleon

wished to force Alexander not to withdraw the troops who were in the

north of his Empire, but rather to augment their numbers in order to

cover Finland and St. Petersburg. It was thus that Napoleon endeavoured

to draw the Prince Royal into his coalition. It was of little

consequence to Napoleon whether Bernadotte succeeded or not. The Emperor

Alexander would nevertheless have been obliged to increase his force

in Finland; that was all that Napoleon wished. In the gigantic struggle

upon which France and Russia were about to enter the most trivial

alliance was not to be neglected. In January 1812 Davoust invaded

Swedish Pomerania without any declaration of war, and without any

apparent motive. Was this inconceivable violation of territory likely

to dispose the Prince Royal of Sweden to the proposed alliance, even had

that alliance not been adverse to the interests of his country? That was

impossible; and Bernadotte took the part which was expected of him. He

rejected the offers of Napoleon, and prepared for coming events.

The Emperor Alexander wished to withdraw his force from Finland for the

purpose of more effectively opposing the immense army which threatened

his States. Unwilling to expose Finland to an attack on the part of

Sweden, he had an interview on the 28th of August 1812, at Abo, with

the Prince-Royal, to come to an arrangement with him for uniting their

interests. I know that the Emperor of Russia pledged himself, whatever

might happen, to protect Bernadotte against the fate of the new

dynasties, to guarantee the possession of his throne, and promised that

he should have Norway as a compensation for Finland. He even went so far

as to hint that Bernadotte might supersede Napoleon. Bernadotte adopted

all the propositions of Alexander, and from that moment Sweden made

common cause against Napoleon. The Prince Royal's conduct has been much

blamed, but the question resolved itself into one of mere political

interest. Could Bernadotte, a Swede by adoption, prefer the alliance

of an ambitious sovereign whose vengeance he had to fear, and who had

sanctioned the seizure of Finland to that of a powerful monarch, his

formidable neighbour, his protector in Sweden, and where hostility might

effectually support the hereditary claims of young Gustavus? Sweden,

in joining France, would thereby have declared herself the enemy of

England. Where, then, would have been her navy, her trade and even her

existence?

CHAPTER XXVII.

1812.

Changeableness of Bonaparte's plans and opinions--Articles for the

'Moniteur' dictated by the First Consul--The Protocol of the

Congress of Chatillon--Conversations with Davoust at Hamburg--

Promise of the Viceroyalty of Poland--Hope and disappointment of the

Poles--Influence of illusion on Bonaparte--The French in Moscow--

Disasters of the retreat--Mallet's conspiracy--Intelligence of the

affair communicated to Napoleon at Smolensko--Circumstances detailed

by Rapp--Real motives of Napoleon's return to Paris--Murat, Ney, and

Eugène--Power of the Italians to endure cold--Napoleon's exertions

to repair his losses--Defection of General York--Convocation of a

Privy Council--War resolved on--Wavering of the Pope--Useless

negotiations with Vienna--Maria Louisa appointed Regent.

It may now he asked whether Bonaparte, previous to entering upon the

last campaign, had resolved on restoring Poland to independence. The

fact is that Bonaparte, as Emperor, never entertained any positive wish

to reestablish the old Kingdom of Poland, though at a previous period

he was strongly inclined to that re-establishment, of which he felt the

necessity. He may have said that he would re-establish the Kingdom of

Poland, but I beg leave to say that that is no reason for believing that

he entertained any such design. He had said, and even sworn, that he

would never aggrandise the territory of the Empire! The changeableness

of Bonaparte's ideas, plans, and projects renders it difficult to master

them; but they may be best understood when it is considered that all

Napoleon's plans and conceptions varied with his fortunes. Thus, it

is not unlikely that he might at one time have considered the

reestablishment of Poland as essential to European policy, and

afterwards have regarded it as adverse to the development of his

ambition. Who can venture to guess what passed in his mind when dazzled

by his glory at Dresden, and whether in one of his dreams he might not

have regarded the Empire of the Jagellons as another gem in the Imperial

diadem? The truth is that Bonaparte, when General-in-Chief of the

army of Egypt and First Consul, had deeply at heart the avenging the

dismemberment of Poland, and I have often conversed with him on this

most interesting subject, upon which we entirely concurred in opinion.

But times and circumstances were changed since we walked together on the

terrace of Cairo and mutually deplored the death of young Sulkowski. Had

Sulkowski lived Napoleon's favourable intentions with respect to Poland

might perhaps have been confirmed. A fact which explains to me the

coolness, I may almost say the indifference, of Bonaparte to the

resurrection of Poland is that the commencement of the Consulate was the

period at which that measure particularly occupied his attention. How

often did he converse on the subject with me and other persons who may

yet recollect his sentiments! It was the topic on which he most loved

to converse, and on which he spoke with feeling and enthusiasm. In the

'Moniteur' of the period here alluded to I could point out more than one

article without signature or official character which Napoleon dictated

to me, and the insertion of which in that journal, considering the

energy of certain expressions, sufficiently proves that they could have

emanated from none but Bonaparte. It was usually in the evening that he

dictated to me these articles. Then, when the affairs of the day were

over, he would launch into the future, and give free scope to his

vast projects. Some of these articles were characterised by so little

moderation that the First Consul would very often destroy them in the

morning, smiling at the violent ebullitions of the preceding night. At

other times I took the liberty of not sending them to the 'Moniteur'

on the night on which they were dictated, and though he might earnestly

wish their insertion I adduced reasons good or bad, to account for the

delay. He would then read over the article in question, and approve of

my conduct; but he would sometimes add, "It is nevertheless true that

with an independent Kingdom of Poland, and 150,000 disposable troops in

the east of France, I should always be master of Russia, Prussia, and

Austria."--"General," I would reply, "I am entirely of your opinion; but

wherefore awaken the suspicions of the interested parties. Leave all to

time and circumstances."

The reader may have to learn, and not, perhaps, without some surprise,

that in the protocol of the sittings of the Congress of Chatillon

Napoleon put forward the spoliation of Poland by the three principal

powers allied against him as a claim to a more advantageous peace, and

to territorial indemnities for France. In policy he was right, but the

report of foreign cannon was already loud enough to drown the best of

arguments.

After the ill-timed and useless union of the Hanse Towns to France I

returned to Hamburg in the spring of 1811 to convey my family to France.

I then had some conversation with Davoust. On one occasion I said to him

that if his hopes were realised, and my sad predictions respecting

the war with Russia overthrown, I hoped to see the restoration of the

Kingdom of Poland. Davoust replied that that event was probable, since

he had Napoleon's promise of the Viceroyalty of that Kingdom, and as

several of his comrades had been promised starosties. Davoust made no

secret of this, and it was generally known throughout Hamburg and the

north of Germany.

But notwithstanding what Davoust said respecting. Napoleon's intentions

I considered that these promises had been conditional rather than

positive.

On Napoleon's arrival in Poland the Diet of Warsaw, assured, as there

seemed reason to be, of the Emperor's sentiments, declared the Kingdom

free and independent. The different treaties of dismemberment were

pronounced to be null; and certainly the Diet had a right so to act, for

it calculated upon his support. But the address of the Diet to Napoleon,

in which these principles were declared, was ill received. His answer

was full of doubt and indecision, the motive of which could not be

blamed. To secure the alliance of Austria against Russia he had just

guaranteed to his father-in-law the integrity of his dominions. Napoleon

therefore declared that he could take no part in any movement or

resolution which might disturb Austria in the possession of the Polish

provinces forming a part of her Empire. To act otherwise, he said, would

be to separate himself from his alliance with Austria, and to throw

her into the arms of Russia. But with regard to the Polish-Russian

provinces, Napoleon declared he would see what he could do, should

Providence favour the good cause. These vague and obscure expressions

did not define what he intended to do for the Poles in the event of

success crowning his vast enterprises. They excited the distrust of the

Poles, and had no other result. On this subject, however, an observation

occurs which is of some force as an apology for Napoleon. Poland was

successively divided between three powers, Russia, Austria, and Prussia,

with each of which Napoleon had been at war, but never with all three

at once. He had therefore never been able to take advantage of his

victories to re-establish Poland without injuring the interests of

neutral powers or of his allies. Hence it may be concluded not only

that he never had the positive will which would have triumphed over

all obstacles, but also that there never was a possibility of realising

those dreams and projects of revenge in which he had indulged on

the banks of the Nile, as it were to console the departed spirit of

Sulkowski.

Bonaparte's character presents many unaccountable incongruities.

Although the most positive man that perhaps ever existed, yet there

never was one who more readily yielded to the charm of illusion. In

many circumstances the wish and the reality were to him one and the same

thing. He never indulged in greater illusions than at the beginning of

the campaign of Moscow. Even before the approach of the disasters which

accompanied the most fatal retreat recorded in history, all sensible

persons concurred in the opinion that the Emperor ought to have passed

the winter of 1812-13 in Poland, and have resumed his vast enterprises

in the spring. But his natural impatience impelled him forward as

it were unconsciously, and he seemed to be under the influence of an

invisible demon stronger than even his own strong will. This demon was

ambition. He who knew so well the value of time, never sufficiently

understood its power, and how much is sometimes gained by delay. Yet

Caesar's Commentaries, which were his favourite study, ought to have

shown him that Caesar did not conquer Gaul in one campaign. Another

illusion by which Napoleon was misled during the campaign of Moscow, and

perhaps past experience rendered it very excusable, was the belief that

the Emperor Alexander would propose peace when he saw him at the head

of his army on the Russian territory. The prolonged stay of Bonaparte

at Moscow can indeed be accounted for in no other way than by supposing

that he expected the Russian Cabinet would change its opinion and

consent to treat for peace. However, whatever might have been the

reason, after his long and useless stay in Moscow Napoleon left that

city with the design of taking up his winter quarters in Poland;

but Fate now frowned upon Napoleon, and in that dreadful retreat the

elements seemed leagued with the Russians to destroy the most formidable

army ever commanded by one chief. To find a catastrophe in history

comparable to that of the Beresina we must go back to the destruction of

the legions of Varus.

Notwithstanding the general dismay which prevailed in Paris that capital

continued tranquil, when by a singular chance, on the very day on which

Napoleon evacuated the burning city of Moscow, Mallet attempted his

extraordinary enterprise. This General, who had always professed

Republican principles, and was a man of bold decided character, after

having been imprisoned for some time, obtained the permission of

Government to live in Paris in a hospital house situated near the

Barriere de Trove. Of Mallet's, conspiracy it is not necessary to say

much after the excellent account given of it in the Memoirs of the Duc

de Rovigo. Mallet's plan was to make it be believed that Bonaparte had

been killed at Moscow, and that a new Government was established under

the authority of the Senate. But what could Mallet do? Absolutely

nothing: and had his Government continued three days he would have

experienced a more favourable chance than that which he ought reasonably

to have expected than asserted that the Emperor was dead, but an

estafette from Russia would reveal the truth, resuscitate Napoleon, and

overwhelm with confusion Mallet and his proclamation. His enterprise

was that of a madman. The French were too weary of troubles to throw

themselves into the arms of, Mallet or his associate Lahorie, who had

figured so disgracefully on the trial of Moreau., Yet, in spite of the

evident impossibility of success, it must be confessed that considerable

ingenuity and address marked the commencement of the conspiracy. On

the 22d of October Mallet escaped from the hospital house and went to

Colonel Soulier, who commanded the tenth cohort of the National Guard,

whose barracks were situated exactly behind the hospital house. Mallet

was loaded with a parcel of forged orders which he had himself prepared.

He introduced himself to Soulier under the name of General La Motte, and

said that he came from General Mallet.

Colonel Soulier on hearing of the Emperor's death was affected to tears.

He immediately ordered the adjutant to assemble the cohort and obey the

orders of General La Motte, to whom he expressed his regret for being

himself too ill to leave his bed. It was then two o'clock in the

morning, and the forged documents respecting the Emperor's death slid

the new form of Government were read to the troops by lamplight. Mallet

then hastily set off with 1200 men to La Force, and liberated the Sieurs

Gudal and Laholze, who were confined there. Mallet informed them of the

Emperor's death and of the change of Government; gave them some orders,

in obedience to which the Minister and Prefect of Police were arrested

in their hotel.

I was then at Courbevoie, and I went to Paris on that very morning to

breakfast, as I frequently did, with the Minister of Police. My surprise

may be imagined when

--[General Mallet gave out that the Emperor was killed under the

walls of Moscow on the 8th of October; he could not take any other

day without incurring the risk of being contradicted by the arrival

of the regular courier. The Emperor being dead, he concluded that

the Senate ought to be invested with the supreme authority, and he

therefore resolved to address himself in the name of that body to

the nation and the army. In a proclamation to the soldiers he

deplored the death of the Emperor; in another, after announcing the

abolition of the Imperial system and the Restoration of the

Republic, he indicated the manner in which the Government was to be

reconstructed, described the branches into which public authority

was to be divided, and named the Directors. Attached to the

different documents there appeared the signatures of several

Senators whose names he recollected but with whom he had ceased to

have any intercourse for a great number of years. These

signatures were all written by Mallet, and he drew up a decree in

the name of the Senate, and signed by the same Senators, appointing

himself Governor of Paris, and commander of the troops of the first

military division. He also drew up other decrees in the same form

which purported to promote to higher ranks all the military officers

he intended to make instruments in the execution of his enterprise.

He ordered one regiment to close all the barriers of Paris, and

allow no person to pass through them. This was done: so that in all

the neighbouring towns from which assistance, in case of need, might

have been obtained, nothing was known of the transactions in Paris.

He sent the other regiments to occupy the Bank, the Treasury, and

different Ministerial offices. At the Treasury some resistance was

made. The minister of that Department was on the spot, and he

employed the guard of his household in maintaining his authority.

But in the whole of the two regiments of the Qnard not a single,

objection was started to the execution of Mallet's orders (Memoirs

of the Duc de Rivogo, tome vi. p. 20.)]--

I learned from the porter that the Duc de Rovigo had been arrested

and carried to the prison of La Force. I went into the house and was

informed, to my great astonishment, that the ephemeral Minister was

being measured for his official suit, an act which so completely denoted

the character of the conspirator that it gave me an insight into the

business.

Mallet repaired to General Hulin, who had the command of Paris. He

informed him that he had been directed by the Minister of Police to

arrest him and seal his papers. Hulin asked to see the order, and then

entered his cabinet, where Mallet followed him, and just as Hulin was

turning round to speak to him he fired a pistol in his face. Hulin

fell: the ball entered his cheek, but the wound was not mortal. The

most singular circumstance connected with the whole affair is, that the

captain whom Mallet had directed to follow him, and who accompanied him

to Hulin's, saw nothing extraordinary in all this, and did nothing to

stop it. Mallet next proceeded, very composedly, to Adjutant-General

Doucet's. It happened that one of the inspectors of the police

was there. He recognised General Mallet as being a man under his

supervision. He told him that he had no right to quit the hospital house

without leave, and ordered him to be arrested. Mallet, seeing that all

was over, was in the act of drawing a pistol from his pocket, but being

observed was seized and disarmed. Thus terminated this extraordinary

conspiracy, for which fourteen lives paid the forfeit; but, with the

exception of Mallet, Guidal, and Lahorie, all the others concerned in it

were either machines or dupes.

This affair produced but little effect in Paris, for the enterprise

and its result were make known simultaneously. But it was thought droll

enough that the Minister and Prefect of Police should be imprisoned by

the men who only the day before were their prisoners. Next day I went

to see Savary, who had not yet recovered from the stupefaction caused by

his extraordinary adventure. He was aware that his imprisonment;

though it lasted only half an hour, was a subject of merriment to the

Parisians. The Emperor, as I have already mentioned, left Moscow on

the day when Mallet made his bold attempt, that is to say, the 19th of

October. He was at Smolensko when he heard the news. Rapp, who had

been wounded before the entrance into Moscow, but who was sufficiently

recovered to return home, was with Napoleon when the latter received

the despatches containing an account of what had happened in Paris. He

informed me that Napoleon was much agitated on perusing them, and that

he launched into abuse of the inefficiency of the police. Rapp added

that he did not confine himself to complaints against the agents of his

authority. "Is, then, my power so insecure," said he, "that it may be

put in peril by a single individual, and a prisoner? It would appear

that my crown is not fixed very firmly on my head if in my own capital

the bold stroke of three adventurers can shake it. Rapp, misfortune

never comes alone; this is the complement of what is passing here. I

cannot be everywhere; but I must go back to Paris; my presence there is

indispensable to reanimate public opinion. I must have men and money.

Great successes and great victories will repair all. I must set off."

Such were the motives which induced the Emperor to leave his army. It

is not without indignation that I have heard his precipitate departure

attributed to personal cowardice. He was a stranger to such feelings,

and was never more happy than on the field of battle. I can readily

conceive that he was much alarmed on hearing of Mallet's enterprise. The

remarks which he made to Rapp were those which he knew would be made by

the public, and he well knew that the affair was calculated to banish

those illusions of power and stability with which he endeavoured to

surround his government.

On leaving Moscow Napoleon consigned the wrecks of his army to the care

of his most distinguished generals to Murat who had so ably commanded

the cavalry, but who abandoned the army to return to Naples; and to

Ney, the hero, rather than the Prince of the Moskowa, whose name will

be immortal in the annals of glory, as his death will be eternal in the

annals of party revenge. Amidst the general disorder Eugène, more than

any other chief, maintained a sort of discipline among the Italians;

and it was remarked that the troops of the south engaged in the fatal

campaign of Moscow had endured the rigour of the cold better than those

troops who were natives of less genial climates.

Napoleon's return from Moscow was not like his returns from the

campaigns of Vienna and Tilsit when he came back crowned with laurels,

and bringing peace as the reward of his triumphs. It was remarked

that Napoleon's first great disaster followed the first enterprise he

undertook after his marriage with Maria Louisa. This tended to confirm

the popular belief that the presence of Josephine was favourable to his

fortune; and superstitious as he sometimes was, I will not venture to

affirm that he himself did not adopt this ides. He now threw off even

the semblance of legality in the measures of his government: he assumed

arbitrary power, under the impression that the critical circumstances in

which he was placed would excuse everything. But, however inexplicable

were the means to which the Emperor resorted to procure resources, it is

but just to acknowledge that they were the consequence of his system of

government, and that he evinced inconceivable activity in repairing his

losses so as to place himself in a situation to resist his enemies, and

restore the triumph of the French standard.

But in spite of all Napoleon's endeavours the disasters of the campaign

of Russia were daily more and more sensibly felt. The King of Prussia

had played a part which was an acknowledgment of his weakness in joining

France, instead of openly declaring himself for the cause of Russia,

which was also his. Then took place the defection of General York,

who commanded the Prussian contingent to Napoleon's army. The King of

Prussia, though no doubt secretly satisfied with the conduct of General

York, had him tried and condemned; but shortly after that sovereign

commanded in person the troops which had turned against ours. The

defection of the Prussians produced a very ill effect, and it was easy

to perceive that other defections would follow. Napoleon, foreseeing the

fatal chances which this event was likely to draw upon him, assembled a

privy council, composed of the Ministers and some of the great officers

of his household. MM. de Talleyrand and Cambacérès, and the President

of the senate were present. Napoleon asked whether, in the complicated

difficulties of our situation, it would be more advisable to negotiate

for peace or to prepare for a new war. Cambacérès and Talleyrand gave

their opinion in favour of peace, which however, Napoleon would not

hear of after a defeat; but the Duc de Feltre,--[Clarke]--knowing how to

touch the susceptible chord in the mind of Bonaparte, said that he would

consider the Emperor dishonoured if he consented to the abandonment

of the smallest village which had been united to the Empire by a

'Senatus-consulte'. This opinion was adopted, and the war continued.

On Napoleon's return to Paris the Pope, who was still at Fontainebleau,

determined to accede to an arrangement, and to sign an act which the

Emperor conceived would terminate the differences between them. But

being influenced by some of the cardinals who had previously incurred

the Emperor's displeasure Pius VII. disavowed the new Concordat which

he had been weak enough to grant, and the Emperor, who then had more

important affairs on his hands, dismissed the Holy Father, and published

the act to which he had assented. Bonaparte had no leisure to pay

attention to the new difficulties started by Pius VII.; his thoughts

were wholly directed to the other side of the Rhine. He was unfortunate,

and the powers with whom he was most intimately allied separated from

him, as he might have expected, and Austria was not the last to imitate

the example set by Prussia. In these difficult circumstances the

Emperor, who for some time past had observed the talent and address of

the Comte Louis de Narbonne, sent him to Vienna, to supersede M. Otto;

but the pacific propositions of M. de Narbonne were not listened to.

Austria would not let slip the fair opportunity of taking revenge

without endangering herself.

Napoleon now saw clearly that since Austria had abandoned him and

refused her contingent he should soon have all Europe arrayed against

him. But this did not intimidate him.

Some of the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine still remained

faithful to him; and his preparations being completed, he proposed to

resume in person the command of the army which had been so miraculously

reproduced. But before his departure Napoleon, alarmed at the

recollection of Mallet's attempt, and anxious to guard against any

similar occurrence during his absence, did not, as on former occasions,

consign the reins of the National Government to a Council of Ministers,

presided over by the Arch-Chancellor. Napoleon placed my successor with

him, M. Meneval, near the Empress Regent as Secretaire des Commandemens

(Principal Secretary), and certainly he could not have made a better

choice. He made the Empress Maria Louisa Regent, and appointed a Council

of Regency to assist her.

--[Meneval, who had held the post of Secretary to Napoleon from the

time of Bourrienne's disgrace in 1802, had been nearly killed by the

hardships of the Russian campaign, and now received an honourable

and responsible but less onerous post. He remained with the Empress

till 7th May 1815, when, finding that she would not return to her

husband, he left her to rejoin his master.]--

CHAPTER XXVIII.

1813.

Riots in Hamburg and Lübeck--Attempted suicide of M. Konning--

Evacuation of Hamburg--Dissatisfaction at the conduct of General St.

Cyr--The Cabinets of Vienna and the Tuileries--First appearance of

the Cossacks--Colonel Tettenborn invited to occupy Hamburg--Cordial

reception of the Russians--Depredations--Levies of troops--

Testimonials of gratitude to Tettenborn--Napoleon's new army--Death

of General Morand--Remarks of Napoleon on Vandamme--Bonaparte and

Gustavus Adolphus--Junction of the corps of Davoust and Vandamme--

Reoccupation of Hamburg by the French--General Hogendorff appointed

Governor of Hamburg--Exactions and vexatious contributions levied

upon Hamburg and Lübeck--Hostages.

A considerable time before Napoleon left Paris to join the army, the

bulk of which was in Saxony, partial insurrections occurred in many

places. The interior of France proper was indeed still in a state of

tranquillity, but it was not so in the provinces annexed by force to

the extremities of the Empire, especially in the north, and in the

unfortunate Hanse Towns, for which, since my residence at Hamburg, I

have always felt the greatest interest. The intelligence I received was

derived from such unquestionable sources that I can pledge myself for

the truth of what I have to state respecting the events which occurred

in those provinces at the commencement of 1813; and subsequently

I obtained a confirmation of all the facts communicated by my

correspondence when I was sent to Hamburg by Louis XVIII. in 1815.

M. Steuve, agent from the Court of Russia, who lived at Altona

apparently as a private individual, profited by the irritation produced

by the measures adopted at Hamburg. His plans were so well arranged that

he was promptly informed of the route of the Grand Army from Moscow, and

the approach of the Allied troops. Aided by the knowledge and activity

of Sieur Hanft of Hamburg, M. Steuve profited by the discontent of

a people so tyrannically governed, and seized the opportunity for

producing an explosion. Between eight and nine o'clock on the morning

of the 24th of February 1813 an occurrence in which the people were

concerned was the signal for a revolt. An individual returning to

Hamburg by the Altona gate would not submit to be searched by a fiscal

agent, who in consequence maltreated him and wounded him severely. The

populace instantly rose, drove away the revenue guard, and set fire to

the guard-house. The people also, excited by secret agents, attacked

other French posts, where they committed the same excesses. Surprised at

this unexpected movement, the French authorities retired to the

houses in which they resided. All the respectable inhabitants who were

unconnected with the tumult likewise returned to their homes, and no

person appeared out of doors.

General Carry St. Cyr had the command of Hamburg after the Prince of

Eckmuhl's departure for the Russian campaign.

--[General Carry St. Cyr is not to be conFused with the Marshal

Gonvion de St. Cyr; he fell into disgrace for his conduct at

Hamburg at this time, and was not again employed by Napoleon. Under

the Restoration he became Governor of French Guiana.]--

At the first news of the revolt he set about packing up his papers, and

Comte de Chaban, M. Konning, the Prefect of Hamburg, and M. Daubignosc,

the Director of Police, followed his example. It was not till about four

o'clock in the afternoon that a detachment of Danish hussars arrived

at Hamburg, and the populace: was then speedily dispersed. All the

respectable citizens and men of property assembled the next morning and

adopted means for securing internal tranquillity, so that the Danish

troops were enabled to return to Altona. Search was then made for

the ringleaders of the disturbance. Many persons were arrested, and a

military commission, ad hoc; was appointed to try them. The commission,

however, condemned only one individual, who, being convicted of being

one of the most active voters, was sentenced to be shot, and the

sentence was carried into execution.

On the 26th February a similar commotion took place at Lübeck. Attempts

were made to attack the French Authorities. The respectable citizens

instantly assembled, protected them against outrage, and escorted them

in safety to Hamburg, where they arrived on the 27th. The precipitate

flight of these persons from Lübeck spread some alarm in Hamburg. The

danger was supposed to be greater than it was because the fugitives were

accompanied by a formidable body of troops.

But these were not the only attempts to throw off the yoke of French

domination, which had become insupportable. All the left bank of the

Elbe was immediately in a state of insurrection, and all the official

persons took refuge in Hamburg. During these partial insurrections

everything was neglected. Indecision, weakness, and cupidity were

manifested everywhere. Instead of endeavours to soothe the minds of

the people, which had been, long exasperated by intolerable tyranny,

recourse was had to rigorous measures. The prisons were crowded with a

host of persons declared to be suspected upon the mere representations

of the agents of the police. On the 3d of March a special military

commission condemned six householders of Hamburg and its neighbourhood

to be shot on the glacis for no other offence than having been led,

either by chance or curiosity, to a part of the town which was the

scene of one of the riots. These executions excited equal horror

and indignation, and General Carra St. Cyr was obliged to issue a

proclamation for the dissolution of the military commission by whom the

men had been sentenced.

The intelligence of the march of the Russian and Prussian troops;

who were descending the Elbe, increased the prevailing agitation in

Westphalia, Hanover, Mecklenburg, and Pomerania, and all the French

troops cantoned between Berlin and Hamburg, including those who occupied

the coast of the Baltic, fell back upon Hamburg. General Carra St. Cyr

and Baron Konning, the Prefect of Hamburg, used to go every evening to

Altona. The latter, worn out by anxiety and his unsettled state of

life, lost his reason; and on his way to Hamburg, on the 5th of May, he

attempted to cut his throat with a razor. His 'valet de chambre' saved

his life by rushing upon him before he had time to execute his design.

It was given out that he had broken a blood-vessel, and he was conveyed

to Altona, where his wound was cured, and he subsequently recovered from

his derangement. M. Konning, who was a native of Holland, was a worthy

man, but possessed no decision of character, and but little ability.

At this juncture exaggerated reports were circulated respecting the

approach of a Russian corps. A retreat was immediately ordered, and it

was executed on the 12th of March. General Carra St. Cyr having no money

for the troops, helped himself to 100,000 francs out of the municipal

treasury. He left Hamburg at the head of the troops and the enrolled men

of the custom-house service. He was escorted by the Burgher Guard, which

protected him from the insults of the populace; and the good people of

Hamburg never had any visitors of whom they were more happy to be rid.

This sudden retreat excited Napoleon's indignation. He accused General

St. Cyr of pusillanimity, in an article inserted in the 'Moniteur',

and afterwards copied by his order into all the journals. In fact, had

General St. Cyr been better informed, or less easily alarmed, he might

have kept Hamburg, and prevented its temporary occupation by the

enemy, to dislodge whom it was necessary to besiege the city two months

afterwards. St. Cyr had 3000 regular troops, and a considerable body of

men in the custom-house service. General Morand could have furnished him

with 5000 men from Mecklenburg. He might, therefore, not only have kept

possession of Hamburg two months longer, but even to the end of the war,

as General Lexnarrois retained possession of Magdeburg. Had not General

St. Cyr so hastily evacuated the Elbe he would have been promptly aided

by the corps which General Vandamme soon brought from the Wesel, and

afterwards by the very, corps with which Marshal Davoust recaptured

Hamburg.

The events just described occurred before Napoleon quitted Paris. In the

month of August all negotiation was broken off with Austria, though that

power, still adhering to her time-serving policy, continued to protest

fidelity to the cause of the Emperor Napoleon until the moment when her

preparations were completed and her resolution formed. But if there was

duplicity at Vienna was there not folly, nay, blindness, in the Cabinet

of the Tuileries? Could we reasonably rely upon Austria? She had seen

the Russian army pass the Vistula and advance as far as the Saale

without offering any remonstrance. At that moment a single movement of

her troops, a word of declaration, would have prevented everything. As,

therefore, she would not avert the evil when she might have done so with

certainty and safety, there must have been singular folly and blindness

in the Cabinet who saw this conduct and did not understand it.

I now proceed to mention the further misfortunes which occurred in the

north of Germany, and particularly at Hamburg. At fifteen leagues east

of Hamburg, but within its territory, is a village named Bergdorf. It

was in that village that the Cossacks were first seen. Twelve or fifteen

hundred of them arrived there under the command of Colonel Tettenborn.

But for the retreat of the French troops, amounting to 3000, exclusive

of men in the customhouse service, no attempt would have been made upon

Hamburg; but the very name of the Cossacks inspired a degree of terror

which must be fresh in the recollection of every one. Alarm spread in

Hamburg, which, being destitute of troops and artillery, and surrounded

with dilapidated fortifications, could offer no defence. The Senator

Bartch and Doctor Know took upon themselves to proceed to Bergdorf to

solicit Colonel Tettenborn to take possession of Hamburg, observing that

they felt sure of his sentiments of moderation, and that they trusted

they would grant protection to a city which had immense commercial

relations with Russia. Tettenborn did not place reliance on these

propositions because he could not suppose that there had been such a

precipitate evacuation; he thought they were merely a snare to entrap

him, and refused to accede to them. But a Doctor Von Hess, a Swede,

settled in Hamburg some years, and known to Tettenborn as a decided

partisan of England and Russia, persuaded the Russian Commander to

comply with the wishes of the citizens of Hamburg. However, Tettenborn

consented only on the following conditions:--That the old Government

should be instantly re-established; that a deputation of Senators in

their old costume should invite him to take possession of Hamburg, which

he would enter only as a free and Imperial Hanse Town; that if those

conditions were not complied with he would regard Hamburg as a French

town, and consequently hostile. Notwithstanding the real satisfaction

with which the Senators of Hamburg received those propositions they

were restrained by the fear of a reverse of fortune. They, however,

determined to accept them, thinking that whatever might happen they

could screen themselves by alleging that necessity had driven them to

the step they took. They therefore declared their compliance with

the conditions, and that night and the following day were occupied in

assembling the Senate, which had been so long dissolved, and in making

the preparations which Tettenborn required.

At four o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th of March a picket of

Cossacks, consisting of only forty men, took possession of a town

recently flourishing, and containing a population of 124,000, but ruined

and reduced to 80,000 inhabitants by the blessing of being united to

the French Empire. On the following day, the 18th, Colonel Tettenborn

entered Hamburg at the head of 1000 regular and 200 irregular Cossacks.

I have described the military situation of Hamburg when it was

evacuated on the 12th of March, and Napoleon's displeasure may be easily

conceived. Tettenborn was received with all the honours usually bestowed

upon a conqueror. Enthusiasm was almost universal. For several nights

the people devoted themselves to rejoicing. The Cossacks were gorged

with provisions and drink, and were not a little astonished at the

handsome reception they experienced.

It was not until the expiration of three or four days that the people

began to perceive the small number of the allied troops. Their amount

gradually diminished. On the day after the arrival of the Cossacks a

detachment was sent to Lübeck, where they were received with the same

honours as at Hamburg. Other detachments were sent upon different

places, and after four days' occupation there remained in Hamburg only

70 out of the 1200 Cossacks who had entered on the 18th March.

The first thing their commander did was to take possession of the

post-office and the treasuries of the different public offices. All the

movable effects of the French Government and its agents were seized and

sold. The officers evinced a true Cossack disregard of the rights of

private property. Counts Huhn, Buasenitz, and Venechtern, who had joined

Tettenborn's staff, rendered themselves conspicuous by plundering the

property of M. Pyonnier, the Director of the Customs, and M. Gonae,

the Postmaster, and not a bottle of wine was left in their cellars.

Tettenborn laid hands upon a sum of money, consisting of upwards of

4000 Louis in gold, belonging to M. Gonse, which had been lodged with

M. Schwartz, a respectable banker in Hamburg, who filled the office of

Prussian Consul. M. Schwartz, with whom this money had been deposited

for the sake of security, had also the care of some valuable jewels

belonging to Mesdames Carry St. Cyr and Daubignoac; Tettenborn carried

off these as well as the money. M. Schwartz remonstrated in his

character of Prussian Consul, Prussia being the ally of Russia, but

he was considered merely as a banker, and could obtain no redress.

Tettenborn, like most of the Cossack chiefs, was nothing but a man for

blows and pillage, but the agent of Russia was M. Steuve, whose name I

have already mentioned.

Orders were speedily given for a levy of troops, both in infantry and

cavalry, to be called Hanseatic volunteers. A man named Hanft, who had

formerly been a butcher, raised at his own expense a company of foot and

one of lancers, of which he took the command. This undertaking, which

cost him 130,000 francs, may afford some idea of the attachment of the

people of Hamburg to the French Government! But money, as well as men,

was wanting, and a heavy contribution was imposed to defray the expense

of enrolling a number of workmen out of employment and idlers, of

various kinds. Voluntary donations were solicited, and enthusiasm was

so general that even servant-maids gave their rings. The sums thus

collected were paid into the chest of Tettenborn's staff, and became

a prey to dishonest appropriation. With respect to this money a Sieur

Oswald was accused of not having acted with the scrupulous delicacy

which Madame de Stael attributes to his namesake in her romance of

Corinne.

Between 8000 and 10,000 men were levied in the Hanse Towns and their

environs, the population of which had been so greatly reduced within two

years. These undisciplined troops, who had been for the most part levied

from the lowest classes of society, committed so many outrages that they

soon obtained the surname of the Cossacks of the Elbe; and certainly

they well deserved it.

Such was the hatred which the French Government had inspired in Hamburg

that the occupation of Tettenborn was looked upon as a deliverance. On

the colonel's departure the Senate, anxious to give high a testimonial

of gratitude, presented him with the freedom of the city, accompanied by

5000 gold fredericks (105,000 francs), with which he was doubtless much

more gratified than with the honour of the citizenship.

The restored Senate of Hamburg did not long survive. The people of the

Hanse Towns learned, with no small alarm, that the Emperor was making

immense preparations to fall upon Germany, where his lieutenants could

not fail to take cruel revenge on those who had disavowed his authority.

Before he quitted Paris on the 15th of April Napoleon had recalled under

the banners of the army 180,000 men, exclusive of the guards of honour,

and it was evident that with such a force he might venture on a great

game, and probably win it. Yet the month of April passed away

without the occurrence of any event important to the Hanse Towns, the

inhabitants of which vacillated between hope and fear. Attacks daily

took place between parties of Russian and French troops on the territory

between Lüneburg and Bremen. In one of these encounters General Morand

was mortally wounded, and was conveyed to Lüneburg. His brother having

been taken prisoner in the same engagement, Tettenborn, into whose hands

he had fallen, gave him leave on parole to visit the General; but he

arrived in Lüneburg only in time to see him die.

The French having advanced as far as Haarburg took up their position on

the plateau of Schwartzenberg, which commands that little town and the

considerable islands situated in that part of the river between Haarburg

and Hamburg. Being masters of this elevated point they began to threaten

Hamburg and to attack Haarburg. These attacks were directed by Vandamme,

of all our generals the most redoubtable in conquered countries. He was

a native of Cassel, in Flanders, and had acquired a high reputation for

severity. At the very time when he was attacking Hamburg Napoleon said

of him at Dresden, "If I were to lose Vandamme I know not what I would

give to have him back again; but if I had two such generals I should be

obliged to shoot one of them." It must be confessed that one was quite

enough.

As soon as he arrived Vandamme sent to inform Tettenborn that if he did

not immediately liberate the brother and brother-in-law of Morand, both

of whom were his prisoners, he would burn Hamburg. Tettenborn replied

that if he resorted to that extremity he would hang them both on the

top of St. Michael's Tower, where he might have a view of them. This

energetic answer obliged Vandamme to restrain his fury, or at least to

direct it to other objects.

Meanwhile the French forces daily augmented at Haarburg. Vandamme,

profiting by the negligence of the new Hanseatic troops, who had the

defence of the great islands of the Elbe, attacked them one night in

the month of May. This happened to be the very night after the battle

of Lutzsn, where both sides claimed the victory; and Te Deum was sung in

the two hostile camps. The advance of the French turned the balance of

opinion in favour of Napoleon, who was in fact really the conqueror on

a field of battle celebrated nearly two centuries before by the victory

and death of Gustavus Adolphus. The Cossacks of the Elbe could not

sustain the shock of the French; Vandamme repulsed the troops who

defended Wilhelmsburg, the largest of the two islands, and easily took

possession of the smaller one, Fidden, of which the point nearest the

right bank of the Elbe is not half a gunshot distant from Hamburg. The

9th of May was a fatal day to the people of Hamburg; for it was then

that Davoust, having formed his junction with Vandamme, appeared at the

head of a corps of 40,000 men destined to reinforce Napoleon's Grand

Army. Hamburg could not hold out against the considerable French force

now assembled in its neighbourhood. Tettenborn had, it is true, received

a reinforcement of 800 Prussians and 2000, Swedes, but still what

resistance could he offer to Davoust's 40,000 men? Tettenborn did not

deceive himself as to the weakness of the allies on this point, or the

inutility of attempting to defend the city. He yielded to the entreaties

of the inhabitants, who represented to him that further resistance must

be attended by certain ruin. He accordingly evacuated Hamburg on the

29th of May, taking with him his Hanseatic legions, which had not held

out an hour in the islands of the Elbe, and accompanied by the Swedish

Doctor Von Hess, whose imprudent advice was the chief cause of all the

disasters to which the unfortunate city lied been exposed.

Davoust was at Haarburg, where he received the deputies from Hamburg

with an appearance of moderation; and by the conditions stipulated at

this conference on the 30th of May a strong detachment of Danish troops

occupied Hamburg in the name of the Emperor. The French made their

entrance the same evening, and occupied the posts as quietly as if they

had been merely changing guard. The inhabitants made not a shadow of

resistance. Not a drop of blood was issued; not a threat nor an

insult was interchanged. This is the truth; but the truth did not

suit Napoleon. It was necessary to getup a pretext for revenge, and

accordingly recourse was had to a bulletin, which proclaimed to France

and Europe that Hamburg had been taken by main force, with a loss

of some hundred men. But for this imaginary resistance, officially

announced, how would it have been possible to justify the spoliations

and exactions which ensued?

The Dutch General, Hogendorff, became Governor of Hamburg in lieu of

Carra St. Cyr, who had been confined at Osnabruck since his precipitate

retreat. General Hogendorff had been created one of the Emperor's

aides de camp, but he was neither a Rapp, a Lauriston, nor a Duroc. The

inhabitants were required to pay all the arrears of taxes due to the

different public offices during the seventy days that the French had

been absent; and likewise all the allowances that would have been paid

to the troops of the garrison had they remained in Hamburg. Payment was

also demanded of the arrears for the quartering of troops who were fifty

leagues off. However, some of the heads of the government departments,

who saw and understood the new situation of the French at Hamburg,

did not enforce these unjust and vexatious measures. The duties on

registrations were reduced. M. Pyonnier, Director of the Customs, aware

of the peculiar difficulty of his situation in a country where the

customs were held in abhorrence, observed great caution and moderation

in collecting the duties: Personal examination, which is so revolting

and indecorous, especially with respect to females, was suppressed. But

these modifications did not proceed from the highest quarter; they were

due to the good sense of the subordinate agents, who plainly saw that

if the Empire was to fall it would not be owing to little infractions in

the laws of proscription against coffee and rhubarb.

If the custom-house regulations became less vexatious to the inhabitants

of Hamburg it was not the same with the business of the post-office. The

old manoeuvres of that department were resumed more actively than

ever. Letters were opened without the least reserve, and all the old

post-office clerks who were initiated in these scandalous proceedings

were recalled. With the exception of the registrations and the customs

the inquisitorial system, which had so long oppressed the Hanse Towns,

was renewed; and yet the delegates of the French Government were the

first to cry out, "The people of Hamburg are traitors to Napoleon: for,

in spite of all the blessings he has conferred upon them they do not say

with the Latin poet, 'Deus nobis haec otia fecit."

But all that passed was trifling in comparison with what was to come. On

the 18th of June was published an Imperial decree, dated the 8th of

the same month, by virtue of which were to be reaped the fruits of the

official falsehood contained in the bulletin above mentioned. To expiate

the crime of rebellion Hamburg was required to pay an extraordinary

contribution of 48,000,000 francs, and Lübeck a contribution of

6,000,000. The enormous sum levied on Hamburg was to be paid in the

short space of a month, by six equal instalments, either in money,

or bills on respectable houses in Paris. In addition to this the new

Prefect of Hamburg made a requisition of grain and provisions of every

kind, wines, sailcloth, masts, pitch, hemp, iron, copper, steel, in

short, everything that could be useful for the supply of the army and

navy.

But while these exactions were made on property in Hamburg, at Dresden

the liberties of individuals and even lives were attacked. On the 15th

of June Napoleon, doubtless blinded by the false reports that were laid

before him, gave orders for making out a list of the inhabitants of

Hamburg who were absent from the city. He allowed them only a fortnight

to return home, an interval too short to enable some of them to come

from the places where they had taken refuge. They consequently remained

absent beyond the given time. Victims were indispensable but assuredly

it was not Bonaparte who conceived the idea of hostages to answer

for the men whom prudence kept absent. Of this charge I can clear his

memory. The hostages, were, however, taken, and were declared to be

also responsible for the payment of the contribution of 48,000,000. In

Hamburg they were selected from among the most respectable and wealthy

men in the city, some of them far advanced in age. They were conveyed to

the old castle of Haarburg on the left bank of the Elbe, and these men,

who had been accustomed to all the comforts of life, were deprived even

of necessaries, and had only straw to lie on. The hostages from Lübeck

were taken to, Hamburg: they were placed between decks on board an old

ship in the port: this was a worthy imitation of the prison hulks

of England. On the 24th of July there was issued a decree which

was published in the Hamburg Correspondent of the 27th. This decree

consisted merely of a proscription list, on which were inscribed the

names of some of the wealthiest men in the Hanse Towns, Hanover, and

Westphalia.

CHAPTER XXIX.

1813.

Napoleon's second visit to Dresden--Battle of Bantzen--The Congress

at Prague--Napoleon ill advised--Battle of Vittoria--General Moreau

Rupture of the conferences at Prague--Defection of Jomini--Battles

of Dresden and Leipsic--Account of the death of Duroc--An

interrupted conversation resumed a year after--Particulars

respecting Poniatowski--His extraordinary courage and death--

His monument at Leipsic and tomb in the cathedral of Warsaw.

On the 2d of May Napoleon won the battle of Lützen. A week after he was

at Dresden, not as on his departure for the Russian campaign, like the

Sovereign of the West surrounded by his mighty vassals: he was now in

the capital of the only one of the monarchs of his creation who remained

faithful to the French cause, and whose good faith eventually cost him

half his dominions. The Emperor stayed only ten days in Dresden, and

then went in pursuit of the Russian army, which he came up with on the

19th, at Bautzen. This battle, which was followed on the two succeeding

days by the battles of Wurtchen and Oclikirchen, may be said to have

lasted three days--a sufficient proof that it was obstinately disputed.

It ended in favour of Napoleon, but he and France paid dearly for it:

while General Kirschner and Duroc were talking together the former

was killed by a cannon-ball, which mortally wounded the latter in the

abdomen.

The moment had now arrived for Austria to prove whether or not she.

intended entirely to desert the cause of Napoleon.

--[There is a running attack in Erreurs (tome, ii. pp, 289-325) on

all this part of the Memoirs, but the best account of the

negotiations between France, Austria, and the Allies will be found

in Metternich, Vol. i. pp. 171-215. Metternich, with good

reason, prides himself on the skill with which he gained from

Napoleon the exact time, twenty days, necessary for the

concentration of the Austrian armies. Whether the negotiations were

consistent with good faith on the part of Austria is another matter;

but, one thing seems clear--the Austrian marriage ruined Napoleon.

He found it impossible to believe that the monarch who had given him

his daughter would strike the decisive blow against him. Without

this belief there can be no doubt that he would have attacked

Austria before she could have collected her forces, and Metternich

seems to have dreaded the result. "It was necessary, therefore to

prevent Napoleon from carrying out his usual system of leaving an

army of observation before the Allied armies, and himself turning to

Bohemia to deal a great blow at us, the effect of which it would be

impossible to foresee in the present depressed state of the great

majority of our men" (Metternich, Vol. i, p. 177). With our

knowledge of how Napoleon held his own against the three armies at

Dresden we may safely assume that he would have crushed Austria if

she had not joined him or disarmed. The conduct of Austria was

natural and politic, but it was only successful because Napoleon

believed in the good faith of the Emperor Francis, his

father-in-law. It is to be noted that Austria only succeeded in

getting Alexander to negotiate on the implied condition that the

negotiations were not to end in a peace with France. See

Metternich, Vol. i. p. 181, where, in answer to the Czar's

question as to what would become of their cause if Napoleon accepted

the Austrian mediation, he says that if Napoleon declines Austria

will join the Allies. If Napoleon accepts, "the negotiations will

most certainly show Napoleon to be neither wise nor just, and then

the result will be the same. In any case we shall have gained the

necessary time to bring our armies into such positions that we need

not again fear a separate attack on any one of them, and from which

we may ourselves take the offensive."]--

All her amicable demonstrations were limited to an offer of her

intervention in opening negotiations with Russia. Accordingly, on the

4th of June, an armistice was concluded at Pleiswitz, which was to last

till the 8th of July, and was finally prolonged to the 10th of August.

The first overtures after the conclusion of the armistice of Pleiswitz

determined the assembling of a Congress at Prague. It was reported at

the time that the Allies demanded the restoration of all they had lost

since 1805; that is to say, since the campaign of Ulm. In this demand

Holland and the Hanse Towns, which had become French provinces, were

comprehended. But we should still have retained the Rhine, Belgium,

Piedmont, Nice, and Savoy. The battle of Vittoria,

--The news of this decisive battle increased the difficulty of the

French plenipotentiaries at Prague, and raised the demands of the

Allies. It also shook the confidence of those who remained faithful

to us.--Bourrienne.]--

which placed the whole of Spain at the disposal of the English, the

retreat of Suchet upon the Ebro, the fear of seeing the army of Spin

annihilated, were enough to alter the opinions of those counsellors who

still recommended war. Notwithstanding Napoleon's opposition and his

innate disposition to acquire glory by his victories, probably he would

not have been inaccessible to the reiterated representations of sensible

men who loved their country, France, therefore, has to reproach his

advisers. At this juncture General Moreau arrived; it has been said

that he came at the solicitation of Bernadotte. This is neither true

nor probable. In the first place, there never was any intimacy between

Bernadotte and Moreau; and, in the next, how can it be imagined that

Bernadotte wished to see Moreau Emperor! But this question is at once

put at rest by the fact, that in the interview at Åbo the Emperor of

Russia hinted to Bernadotte the possibility of his succeeding Napoleon.

It was generally reported at the time, and I have since learnt that

it was true, that the French Princes of the House of Bourbon had made

overtures to Moreau through the medium of General Willot, who had been

proscribed on the 18th Fructidor; and I have since learned from an

authentic source that General Moreau, who was then at Baltimore, refused

to support the Bourbon cause. Moreau yielded only to his desire of being

revenged on Napoleon; and he found death where he could not find glory.

At the end of July the proceedings of the Congress at Prague were no.

further advanced than at the time of its assembling. Far from cheering

the French with the prospect of a peace, the Emperor made a journey

to Mayence; the Empress went there to see him, and returned to Paris

immediately after the Emperor's departure. Napoleon went back to

Dresden, and the armistice not being renewed, it died a natural death on

the 17th of August, the day appointed for its expiration. A fatal event

immediately followed the rupture of the conferences. On the 17th of

August Austria, wishing to gain by war as she had before gained by

alliances, declared that she would unite her forces with those of the

Allies. On the very opening of this disastrous campaign General Jomini

went over to the enemy. Jomini belonged to the staff of the unfortunate

Marshal Ney, who was beginning to execute with his wonted ability, the

orders he had received. There was much surprise at his eagerness to

profit by a struggle, begun under such melancholy auspices, to seek a

fresh fortune, which promised better than what he had tried under our

flag. Public opinion has pronounced judgment on Jomini.

--[It was on the 11th of August, not the 17th, that Metternich

announced to Caulaincourt, Napoleon's plenipotentiary at Prague,

that Austria had joined the Allies and declared war with France;

At midnight on 10th August Metternich had despatched the passports

for the Comte Louis de Narbonne, Napoleon's Ambassador, and the war

manifesto of the Emperor Francis; then he had the beacons lighted

which had been prepared from Prague to the Silesian frontier, as a

sign of the breech of the negotiations, and the right (i.e. power)

of the Allied armies to cross the Silesian frontier (Metternich,

vol. i, p. 199).]--

The first actions were the battle of Dresden, which took place seven

days after the rupture of the armistice, and the battle in which

Vandamme was defeated, and which rendered the victory of Dresden

unavailing. I have already mentioned that Moreau was killed at Dresden.

Bavaria was no sooner rid of the French troops than she raised the mask

and ranged herself among our enemies.

In October the loss of the battle of Leipsic decided the fate of France.

The Saxon army, which had long remained faithful to us, went over to the

enemy during the battle. Prince Poniatowski perished at the battle of

Leipsic in an attempt to pass the Aster.

I will here mention a fact which occurred before Duroc's departure for

the campaign of 1812. I used often to visit him at the Pavilion Marsan,

in the Tuileries, where he lodged. One forenoon, when I had been waiting

for him a few minutes, he came from the Emperor's apartments, where he

had been engaged in the usual business, He was in his court-dress. As

soon as he entered he pulled off his coat and hat and laid them aside.

"I have just had a conversation with the Emperor about you," said he.

"Say nothing to anybody. Have patience, and you will be--" He had, no

sooner uttered these words than a footman entered to inform him that the

Emperor, wished to see him immediately. "Well," said Duroc, "I must

go." No sooner was the servant gone than Duroc stamped violently on the

floor, and exclaimed, "That ----- ----- never leaves me a moment's rest.

If he finds I have five minutes to myself in the course of the morning

he is sure to send for me." He then put on his coat and returned to the

Emperor, saying, "Another time you shall hear what I have to tell you."

From that time I did not see Duroc until, the month of January 1813. He

was constantly absent from Paris, and did not return until the end

of 1812. He was much affected at the result of the campaign, but his

confidence in Napoleon's genius kept up his spirits. I turned the

conversation from this subject and reminded him of his promise to tell

me what had passed between the Emperor and himself relative tome. "You

shall hear," said he. "The Emperor and I had been playing at billiards,

and, between ourselves, he plays very badly. He is nothing at a game

which depends on skill. While negligently rolling his balls about he

muttered these words: 'Do you ever see Bourrienne now?'--'Yes, Sire, he

sometimes dines with me on diplomatic reception-days, and he looks so

droll in his old-fashioned court-dress, of Lyons manufacture, that

you would laugh if you saw him.'--'What does he say respecting the

new regulation for the court-dresses?'--'I confess he says it is very

ridiculous; that it will have no other result than to enable the Lyons

manufacturers to get rid of their old-fashioned goods; that forced

innovations on the customs of a nation are never successful.'--'Oh, that

is always the way with Bourrienne; he is never pleased with anything.'--

'Certainly, Sire, he is apt to grumble; but he says what he thinks.'--

'Do you know, Duroc, he served me very well at Hamburg. He raised a good

deal of money for me. He is a man who understands business. I will not

leave him unemployed. Time must hang heavily on his hands. I will see

what I can do for him. He has many enemies.'--'And who has not, Sire?'--

'Many complaints against him were transmitted to me from Hamburg, but

the letter which he wrote to me in his justification opened my eyes,

and I begin to think that Savary had good motives for defending him.

Endeavours are made to dissuade me from employing him, but I shall

nevertheless do so at last. I remember that it was he who first informed

me of the near approach of the war which we are now engaged in. I forget

all that has been said against him for the last two years, and as soon

as peace is concluded, and I am at leisure, I will think of him.'"

After relating to me this conversation Duroc said, "you must, of

course, feel assured that I said all I think of you, and I will take an

opportunity of reminding him of you. But we must we patient. Adieu, my

dear friend; we must set off speedily, and Heaven knows when we shall

be back again!" I wished him a successful campaign and a speedy return.

Alas! I was doomed to see my excellent friend only once again.

Next to the death of Duroc the loss most sincerely regretted during the

campaign of 1813 was that of Prince Poniatowski. Joseph Poniatowaki, a

nephew of Stanislas Augustus, King of Poland, was born at Warsaw on the

7th of May 1763: At an early age he was remarkable for his patriotic

spirit; but his uncle's influence gave him an apparent irresolution,

which rendered him suspected by some of the parties in Poland. After his

uncle had acceded to the Confederation of Targowitz, Poniatowski left

the service accompanied by most of his principal officers. But when, in

1794, the Poles endeavoured to repulse the Russians, he again repaired

to the Polish camp and entered the army as a volunteer. His noble

conduct obtained for him the esteem of his countrymen. Kosciusko gave

him the command of a division, with which he rendered useful services

during the two sieges of Warsaw. Immediately after the surrender of that

capital Poniatowski went to Vienna. He refused the offers of Catherine

and Paul to bear arms in the service of Russia.

Poniatowaki retired to his estate year Warsaw, where he lived like

a private gentleman until the creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw

revived the hopes of the Polish patriots. He then became War Minister.

The Archduke Ferdinand having come, in 1809, with Austrian troops to

take possession of the Duchy of Warsaw, Poniatowski, who commanded

the Polish troops, which were very inferior in numbers to the Austrian

force, obliged the latter, rather by dint of skillful maneuvering than

by fighting, to evacuate the Grand Duchy. He pursued them into Galicia

as far as Cracow.

After this honourable campaign he continued to exercise his functions

as Minister until 1812. The war against Russia again summoned him to

the head of the Polish army. After taking part in all the events of that

war, which was attended by such various chances, Poniatowaki was present

at the battle of Leipsic. That battle, which commenced on the 14th

of October, the anniversary of the famous battles of Ulm and of Jena,

lasted four days, and decided the fate of Europe. Five hundred thousand

men fought on a surface of three square leagues.

Retreat having become indispensable, Napoleon took leave at Leipsic of

the King of Saxony and his family, whom he had brought with him from

Dresden. The Emperor then exclaimed in a loud voice, "Adieu; Saxons,"

to the people who filled the market-place, where the King of Saxony

resided. With some difficulty, and after passing through many turnings

and windings, he gained the suburb of Runstadt and left Leipsic by the

outer gate of that suburb which leads to the bridge of the Elster, and

to Lindenau. The bridge was blown up shortly after he had passed it, and

that event utterly prevented the retreat of the part of the army which

was on the left bank of the Easter, and which fell into the power of

the enemy. Napoleon was at the time accused of having ordered the

destruction of the bridge immediately after he had himself passed it in

order to secure his own personal retreat, as he was threatened by the

active pursuit of the enemy. The English journals were unanimous on

this point, and to counteract this opinion, which was very general, an

article was inserted in the 'Moniteur'.

Before passing the bridge of the Elster Napoleon had directed

Poniatowski, in concert with Marshal Macdonald, to cover and protect

the retreat, and to defend that part of the suburb of Leipsic which is

nearest to the Borne road. For the execution of these orders he had only

2000 Polish infantry. He was in this desperate situation when he saw the

French columns in full retreat and the bridge so choked up with their

artillery and waggons that there was no possibility of passing it. Then

drawing his sword, and turning to the officers who were near him, he

said, "Here we must fall with honour!" At the head of a small party of

cuirassiers and Polish officers he rushed on the columns of the Allies.

In this action he received a ball in his left arm: he had already been

wounded on the 14th and 16th. He nevertheless advanced, but he found the

suburb filled with Allied troops.

--[The Allies were so numerous that they scarcely perceived the

losses they sustained. Their masses pressed down upon us in every

direction, and it was impossible that victory could fail to be with

them. Their success, however, would have been less decisive had it

not been for the defection of the Saxons. In the midst of the

battle, these troops having moved towards the enemy, as if intending

to make an attack, turned suddenly around, and opened a heavy fire

of artillery and musketry on the columns by the aids of which they

had a few moments before been fighting. I do not know to what page

of history such a transaction is recorded. This event immediately

produced a great difference in our affairs, which were before in a

bad enough train. I ought here mention that before the battle the

Emperor dismissed a Bavarian division which still remained with him.

He spoke to the officers in terms which will not soon be effaced

from their memory. He told them, that, "according to the laws of

war, they were his prisoners, since their Government had taken part

against him; but that he could not forget the services they had

rendered him, and that they were therefore at liberty to return

home." These troops left the army, where they were much esteemed,

and marched for Bavaria.]--

He fought his way through them and received another wound. He then threw

himself into the Pleisse, which was the first river he came to. Aided

by his officers, he gained the opposite bank, leaving his horse in

the river. Though greatly exhausted he mounted another, and gained the

Elster, by passing through M. Reichenbach's garden, which was situated

on the side of that river. In spite of the steepness of the banks of the

Elster at that part, the Prince plunged with his horse into the river:

both man and horse were drowned, and the same fate was shared by several

officers who followed Poniatawski's example. Marshal Macdonald was,

luckily, one of those who escaped. Five days after a fisherman drew

the body of the Prince, out of the water. On the 26th of October it

was temporarily interred at Leipsic, with all the honours due to the

illustrious deceased. A modest stone marks the spot where the body of

the Prince was dragged from the river. The Poles expressed a wish to.

erect a monument to the memory of their countryman in the garden of

M. Reichenbach, but that gentleman declared he would do it at his own

expense, which he did. The monument consists of a beautiful sarcophagus,

surrounded by weeping willows. The body of the Prince, after bring

embalmed, was sent in the following year to Warsaw, and in 1816 it was

deposited in the cathedral, among the remains of the Kings and great

men of Poland. The celebrated Thorwaldsen was commissioned to execute

a monument for his tomb. Prince Poniatowski left no issue but a

natural son, born in 1790. The royal race, therefore existed only in a

collateral branch of King Stanislas, namely, Prince Stanislas, born in

1754.

CHAPTER XXX.

1813

Amount of the Allied forces against Napoleon--Their advance towards

the Rhine--Levy of 280,000 men--Dreadful situation of the French at

Mayence--Declaration of the Allies at Frankfort--Diplomatic

correspondents--The Duc de Bassano succeeded by the Duke of Vicenza

--The conditions of the Allies vaguely accepted--Caulaincourt sent to

the headquarters of the Allies--Manifesto of the Allied powers to

the French people.--Gift of 30,000,000 from the Emperor's privy

purse--Wish to recall M. de Talleyrand--Singular advice relative to

Wellington--The French army recalled from Spain--The throne resigned

Joseph--Absurd accusation against M. Laine--Adjournment of the

Legislative Body--Napoleon's Speech to the Legislative Body--Remarks

of Napoleon reported by Cambacérès.

When the war resumed its course after the disaster of Leipsic I am

certain that the Allied sovereigns determined to treat with Napoleon

only in his own capital, as he, four years before, had refused to treat

with the Emperor of Austria except at Vienna. The latter sovereign now

completely raised the mask, and declared to the Emperor that he

would make common cause with Russia and Prussia against him. In his

declaration he made rise of the singular pretext, that the more enemies

there were against Napoleon there would be the greater chance of

speedily obliging him to accede to conditions which would at length

restore the tranquillity of which Europe stood so much in need.

This declaration on the part of Austria was an affair of no little

importance, for she had now raised an army of 260,000 men. An equal

force was enrolled beneath the Russian banners, which were advancing

towards the Rhine. Prussia had 200,000 men; the Confederation of the

Rhine 150,000: in short, including the Swedes and the Dutch, the English

troops in Spain and in the Netherlands, the Danes, who had abandoned us,

the Spaniards and Portuguese, whose courage and hopes were revived by

our reverses, Napoleon had arrayed against him upwards of a million of

armed men. Among them, too, were the Neapolitans, with Murat at their

head!

The month of November 1813 was fatal to the fortune of Napoleon. In all

parts the French armies were repulsed and driven back upon the Rhine,

while-in every direction, the Allied forces advanced towards that river.

For a considerable time I had confidently anticipated the fall of the

Empire; not because the foreign sovereigns had vowed its destruction,

but because I saw the impossibility of Napoleon defending himself

against all Europe, and because I knew that, however desperate might be

his fortune, nothing would induce him to consent to conditions which

he considered disgraceful. At this time every day was marked by a new

defection. Even the Bavarians, the natural Allies of France, they

whom the Emperor had led to victory at the commencement of the second

campaign of Vienna, they whom he had, as it were, adopted on the field

of battle, were now against us, and were the bitterest of our enemies.

Even before the battle of Leipsic, the consequences of which were so

ruinous to Napoleon, he had felt the necessity of applying to France for

a supply of troops; as if France had been inexhaustible. He directed

the Empress Regent to make this demand; and accordingly Maria Louisa

proceeded to the Senate, for the first time, in great state: but the

glories of the Empire were now on the decline. The Empress obtained a

levy of 280,000 troops, but they were no sooner enrolled than they were

sacrificed. The defection of the Bavarians considerably augmented the

difficulties which assailed the wreck of the army that had escaped from

Leipsic. The Bavarians had got before us to Hanau, a town four leagues

distant from Frankfort; there they established themselves, with the view

of cutting off our retreat; but French valour was roused, the little

town was speedily carried, and the Bavarians were repulsed with

considerable loss. The French army arrived at Mayence; if, indeed, one

may give the name of army to a few masses of men destitute, dispirited,

and exhausted by fatigue and privation. On the arrival of the troops at

Mayence no preparation had been made for receiving them: there were no

provisions, or supplies of any kind; and, as the climax of misfortune,

infectious epidemics broke out amongst the men. All the accounts I

received concurred in assuring me that their situation was dreadful:

However; without counting the wreck which escaped from the disasters of

Leipsic, and the ravages of disease; without including the 280,000 men

which had been raised by a 'Senatus-consulte, on the application of

Maria Louisa, the Emperor still possessed 120,000 good troops; but they

were in the rear, scattered along the Elbe, shut up in fortresses such

as Dantzic, Hamburg, Torgau, and Spandau. Such was the horror of our

situation that if, on the one hand, we could not resolve to abandon

them, it was at the same time impossible to aid them. In France a

universal cry was raised for peace, at whatever price it could be

purchased. In this state of things it may be said that the year 1813 was

more fatal to Napoleon than the year 1812. The disasters of Moscow were

repaired by his activity and the sacrifices of France; but the disasters

of Leipsic were irreparable.

I shall shortly speak of some negotiations in which, if I had chosen,

I might have taken a part. After the battle of Leipsic, in which France

lost, for the second time, a formidable army, all the powers allied

against Napoleon declared at Frankfort, on the 9th of November, that

they would never break the bonds which united them; that henceforth it

was not merely a Continental peace, but a general peace, that would be

demanded; and that any negotiation not having a general peace for its

object would be rejected. The Allied powers declared that France was

to be confined within her natural limits, the Rhine, the Alps, and the

Pyrenees. This was all that was to remain of the vast Empire founded by

Napoleon; but still it must be allowed it was a great deal, after the

many disasters France had experienced, and when she was menaced with

invasion by numerous and victorious armies. But Napoleon could not

accede to such proposals, for he was always ready to yield to illusion

when the truth was not satisfactory to him.

According to the proposals of the Allies at Frankfort, Germany; Italy,

and Spain were to be entirely withdrawn from the dominion of France.

England recognised the freedom of trade and navigation, and there

appeared no reason to doubt the sincerity of her professed willingness

to make great sacrifices to promote the object proposed by the Allies.

But to these offers a fatal condition was added, namely, that the

Congress should meet in a town, to be declared neutral, on the right

bank of the Rhine, where the plenipotentiaries of all the belligerent

powers were to assemble; but the course of the war was not to be impeded

by these negotiations.

--[This, system of negotiating and advancing was a realization of

Metternich's idea copying Napoleon's own former procedure. "Let us

hold always the sword in one head, and the olive branch in the

other; always ready to negotiate, but only negotiating whilst

advancing. Here is Napoleon's system: may he find enemies who will

carry on war . . . as he would carry it on himself." (Metternich

vol. ii. p. 346).]--

The Duc de Bassano (Maret), who was still Minister for Foreign Affairs,

replied, by order of Napoleon, to the overtures wade by the Allies for

a general Congress; and stated that the Emperor acceded to them, and

wished Mannheim to be chosen as the neutral town. M. Metternich replied

in a note, dated Frankfort, the 25th of November, stating that the

Allies felt no difficulty in acceding to Napoleon's choice of Mannheim

for the meeting of the Congress; but as M. de Bassano's letter contained

no mention of the general and summary bases I have just mentioned,

and which had been communicated to M. de St. Aignan at Frankfort, M.

Metternich stated that the Allies wished the Emperor Napoleon to declare

his determination respecting those bases, in order that insurmountable

difficulties might not arrest the negotiations at their very outset.

The Duke of Vicenza (Caulaincourt), who had just succeeded the Duc de

Bassano, received this letter. Trusting to the declaration of Frankfort

he thought he would be justified in treating on those bases; he

confidently relied on the consent of Napoleon. But the Allies had

now determined not to grant the limits accorded by that declaration.

Caulaincourt was therefore obliged to apply for fresh powers, which

being granted, he replied, on the 2d of December, that Napoleon accepted

the fundamental and summary bases which had been communicated by M. de

St. Aignan. To this letter M. Metternich answered that the Emperors of

Russia and Austria were gratified to find that the Emperor of France

recognised the bases judged necessary by the Allies; that the two

sovereigns would communicate without delay the official document to

their Allies, and that they were convinced that immediately on receiving

their reply the negotiations might be opened without any interruption of

the war.

We shall now see the reason why these first negotiations came to no

result. In the month of October the Allies overthrew the colossal

edifice denominated the French Empire. When led by victory to the

banks of the Rhine they declared their wish to abstain from conquest,

explained their intentions, and manifested an unalterable resolution

to abide by them. This determination of the Allies induced the French

Government to evince pacific intentions. Napoleon wished, by an apparent

desire for peace, to justify, if I may so express myself, in the eyes of

his subjects, the necessity of new sacrifices; which, according to his

proclamations, he demanded only to enable him to obtain peace on as

honourable conditions as possible. But the truth is, he was resolved not

even to listen to the offers made at Frankfort. He always represented

the limits of the Rhine as merely a compensation for the dismemberment

of Poland and the immense aggrandisement of the English possessions in

Asia. But he wanted to gain time, and, if possible, to keep the Allied

armies on the right bank of the Rhine.

The immense levies made in France, one after the other, had converted

the conscription into a sort of pressgang. Men employed in agriculture

and manufactures were dragged from their labours; and the people began

to express their dissatisfaction at the measures of Government more

loudly than they had hitherto ventured to do; yet all were willing to

make another effort, if they could have persuaded themselves that the

Emperor would henceforth confine his thoughts to France alone. Napoleon

sent Caulaincourt to the headquarters of the Allies; but that was

only for the sake of gaining time, and inducing a belief that he was

favourably disposed to peace.

The Allies having learned the immense levies of troops which Napoleon

was making, and being well acquainted with the state of feeling in

France, published the famous manifesto, addressed to the French people,

which was profusely circulated, and may be referred to as a warning to

subjects who trust to the promises of Governments.

The good faith with which the promises in the manifesto were kept may

be judged of from the Treaty of Paris. In the meantime the manifesto

did not a little contribute to alienate from Napoleon those who were

yet faithful to his cause; for, by believing in the declarations of the

Allies, they saw in him the sole obstacle to that peace which France so

ardently desired. On this point, too, the Allies were not wrong, and

I confess that I did not see without great surprise that the Duc de

Rovigo, in that part of his Memoirs where he mentions this manifesto,

reproaches those who framed it for representing the Emperor as a madman,

who replied to overtures of peace only by conscription levies: After

all, I do not intend to maintain that the declaration was entirely

sincere; with respect to the future it certainly was not. Switzerland

was already tampered with, and attempts were made to induce her to

permit the Allied troops to enter France by the bridge of Bale. Things

were going on no better in the south of France, where the Anglo-Spanish

army threatened our frontiers by the Pyrenees, and already occupied

Pampeluna; and at the same time the internal affairs of the country

were no less critical than its external position. It was in vain to levy

troops; everything essential to an army was wanting. To meet the most

pressing demands the Emperor drew out 30,000,000 from the immense

treasure which he had accumulated in the cellars and galleries of the

Pavillion Marsan, at the Tuileries. These 30,000,000 were speedily

swallowed up. Nevertheless it was an act of generosity on the part of

Napoleon, and I never could understand on what ground the Legislative

Body complained of the outlay, because, as the funds did not proceed

from the Budget, there needed no financial law to authorise their

application. Besides, why did these rigid legislators, who, while

fortune smiled on Bonaparte, dared not utter a word on the subject,

demand, previously to the gratuitous gift just mentioned, that the

350,000,000 in the Emperor's privy puree should be transferred to the

Imperial treasury and carried to the public accounts? Why did they wink

at the accumulation in the Tuileries of the contributions and exactions

levied in, conquered countries? The answer is plain: because there would

have been danger in opposing it.

Amidst the difficulties which assailed the Emperor he cast his eyes on

M. de Talleyrand. But it being required, as a condition of his receiving

the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, that he should resign his office of

Vice-Grand-Elector, M. de Talleyrand preferred a permanent post to a

portfolio, which the caprice of a moment might withdraw. I have been

informed that, in a conversation with the Emperor, M. de Talleyrand gave

him the extraordinary advice of working upon the ambition of the English

family of Wellesley, and to excite in the mind of Wellington, the lustre

of whose reputation was now dawning, ambitious projects which would

have embarrassed the coalition. Napoleon, however, did not adopt this

proposition, the issue of which he thought too uncertain, and above all,

too remote, in the urgent circumstances in which it stood. Caulaincourt

was then made Minister for Foreign Affairs, in lieu of M. Maret, who was

appointed Secretary of State, an office much better suited to him.

Meanwhile the Emperor was wholly intent on the means of repelling the

attack which was preparing against him. The critical circumstances in

which he was placed seemed to restore the energy which time had in some

measure robbed him of. He turned his eyes towards Spain, and resolved to

bring the army from that country to oppose the Allies, whose movements

indicated their intention of entering France by Switzerland. An event

occurred connected with this subject calculated to have a decided

influence on the affairs of the moment, namely, the renunciation by

Joseph, King of Spain, of all right to the crown, to be followed by the

return; as had been agreed on; of Ferdinand to his dominions. Joseph

made this sacrifice at the instigation of his brother. The treaty was

signed, but an inconceivable delay occurred in its execution, while the

torrent, which was advancing upon France, rushed forward so rapidly that

the treaty could not be carried into execution. Ferdinand, it is true,

re-ascended his throne, but from other causes.

The Emperor was deeply interested in the march of the Allies. It was

important to destroy the bridge of Bale, because the Rhine once crossed

masses of the enemy would be thrown into France. At this time I

had close relations with a foreign diplomat whom I am forbidden by

discretion to name. He told me that the enemy was advancing towards the

frontier, and that the bridge of Bale would not be destroyed, as it

had been so agreed at Berne, where the Allies had gained the day. This

astonished me, because I knew, on the other hand, from a person who

ought, to have been equally well informed,--that it was hoped the bridge

would be blown up. Being much interested in knowing the truth, I sent

on my own account, an agent to Bale who on his return told me that the

bridge would remain.

On the 19th of December the Legislative Body was convoked. It was on a

Wednesday. M. Laine was Vice-President under M. Regnier. A committee was

appointed to examine and report on the communications of the Emperor.

The report and conclusions of the committee were not satisfactory; it

was alleged that they betrayed a revolutionary tendency, of which M.

Laine was absurdly accused of having been one of the promoters; but all

who knew him must have been convinced of the falsehood of the charge.

The Emperor ordered the report to be seized, and then adjourned the

Legislative Body. Those who attentively observed the events of the time

will recollect the stupor which prevailed in Paris on the intelligence

of this seizure and of the adjournment of the Legislative Body. A

thousand conjectures were started as to what new occurrences had taken

place abroad, but nothing satisfactory was learned.

I considered this a great mistake. Who can doubt that if the Legislative

Body had taken the frank and noble step of declaring that France

accepted the conditions of Frankfort they would not have been listened

to by the Allies? But the words, "You are dishonoured if you cede a

single village acquired by a 'Senatus-consulte'," always, resounded in

Napoleon's ears: they flattered his secret thoughts, and every pacific

proposal was rejected.

The members of the adjourned Legislative Body went as usual to

take leave of the Emperor, who received them on a Sunday, and after

delivering to them the speech, which is very well known, dismissed the

rebels with great ill-humour, refusing to hear any explanation. "I

have suppressed your address," he began abruptly: "it was incendiary.

I called you round me to do good--you have done ill. Eleven-twelfths

of you are well-intentioned, the others, and above all M. Laine,

are factious intriguers, devoted to England, to all my enemies, and

corresponding through the channel of the advocate Deseze with the

Bourbons. Return to your Departments, and feel that my eye will follow

you; you have endeavoured to humble me, you may kill me, but you shall

not dishonour me. You make remonstrances; is this a time, when the

stranger invades our provinces, and 200,000 Cossacks are ready to

overflow our country? There may have been petty abuses; I never connived

at them. You, M. Raynouard, you said that. Prince Massena robbed a man

at Marseilles of his house. You lie! The General took possession of a

vacant house, and my Minister shall indemnify the proprietor. Is it thus

that you dare affront a Marshal of France who has bled for his country,

and grown gray in victory? Why did you not make your complaints in

private to me? I would have done you justice. We should wash our

dirty linen at home, and not drag it out before the world. You, call

yourselves Representatives of the Nation. It is not true; you are only

Deputies of the Departments; a small portion of the State, inferior to

the Senate, inferior even to the Council of State. The Representatives

of the People! I am alone the Representative of the People. Twice

have 24,000,000 of French called me to the throne: which of you durst

undertake such a burden? It had already overwhelmed (ecrase), your

Assemblies, and your Conventions, your Vergniauds and your Guadets,

your Jacobins and your Girondins. They are all dead! What, who are you?

nothing--all authority is in the Throne; and what is the Throne? this

wooden frame covered with velvet?--no, I am the Throne! You have added

wrong to reproaches. You have talked of concessions--concessions that

even my enemies dared not ask! I suppose if they asked Champaigne you

would have had me give them La Brie besides; but in four months I will

conquer peace, or I shall be dead! You advise! how dare you debate of

such high matters (de si graves interets)! You have put me in the front

of the battle as the cause of war--it is infamous (c'est une atrocité).

In all your committees you have excluded the friends of Government--

extraordinary commission--committee of finance--committee of the

address, all, all my enemies. M. Laine, I repeat it, is a traitor; he

is a wicked man, the others are mere intriguers. I do justice to the

eleven-twelfths; but the factions I know, and will pursue. Is it, I

ask again, is it while the enemy is in France that you should have done

this? But nature has gifted me with a determined courage--nothing can

overcome me. It cost my pride much too--I made that sacrifice; I--but I

am above your miserable declamations--I was in need of consolation, and

you would mortify me--but, no, my victories shall crush your clamours!

In three months we shall have peace, and you shall repent your folly. I

am one of those who triumph or die.

"Go back to your Departments if any one of you dare to print your

address I shall publish it in the Moniteur with notes of my own.

Go; France stands in more need of me than I do of France. I bear the

eleven-twelfths of you in my heart--I shall nominate the Deputies to the

two series which are vacant, and I shall reduce the Legislative Body

to the discharge of its proper duties. The inhabitants of Alsace and

Franche Comte have more spirit than you; they ask me for arms, I send

them, and one of my aides de camp will lead them against the enemy."

In after conversations he said of the Legislative Body that "its members

never came to Paris but to obtain some favours. They importuned the

Ministers from morning till night, and complained if they were not

immediately satisfied. When invited to dinner they burn with envy at the

splendour they see before them." I heard this from Cambacérès, who was

present when the Emperor made these remarks.

CHAPTER XXXI.

1813.

The flag of the army of Italy and the eagles of 1813--Entrance of

the Allies into Switzerland--Summons to the Minister of Police--

My refusal to accept a mission to Switzerland--Interviews with M. de

Talleyrand and the Duc de Picence--Offer of a Dukedom and the Grand

Cordon of the Legion of Honour--Definitive refusal--The Duc de

Vicence's message to me in 1815--Commencement of the siege of

Hamburg--A bridge two leagues long--Executions at Lübeck--Scarcity

of provisions in Hamburg--Banishment of the inhabitants--Men

bastinadoed and women whipped--Hospitality of the inhabitants of

Altona.