Operations of the Lithuanian corps.--Battle of Raygrod and defeat
of the Russian corps of Saken.--Importance of this first success in
Lithuania.--General Gielgud neglects to follow up his advantages.--He
loses time by passing the Niemen at Gielgudyszki, and enables the
enemy to concentrate his forces in Wilno.--Entrance into Lithuania
and reception by the inhabitants.--Position of the two main
armies.--The Russian forces remain inactive and receive supplies from
Prussia.--Death of marshal Diebitsch.
On the 27th of May, the corps of general Gielgud, attached to which
were generals Rohland, Szymanowski, Dembinski, and colonel Pientka,
left Lomza, and commenced their march into Lithuania. On the evening
of that day, they arrived at Stawisk, passing through Szczuczyn and
Graiewo. In the last town they were joined by the little corps of
general, then colonel, Sierakowski, which, as we have already remarked,
had been employed in observing general Saken, and was here occupying an
advantageous position. The force of this corps has been already stated.
BATTLE OF RAYGROD. [_Plan_ XXXII.]
I have divided this battle into two different periods, marked by the
two different positions which the enemy successively took.
On examining the plan of the first position of the Russians, it will be
at once seen that they had no knowledge of the arrival of our corps.
They supposed that they were acting against the corps of colonel
Sierakowski alone, and they had conceived the design of out-flanking
him. On the morning of the 29th, our whole corps, quitting the little
town of Graiewo, met, at the distance of about a quarter of a league,
the Russian flankers, against whom our own were immediately sent out.
The Russian cavalry began to retire. Our columns continued their
march slowly, having the forces of colonel Sierakowski in front, as
an advanced guard,[66] and we thus arrived at the lake of Raygrod,
the advanced guard meeting only small detachments of the Russian
cavalry, which retired as we approached. On reaching the lake, our
advanced guard were fired upon by the Russian skirmishers, concealed
in the woods on the opposite side of the lake, which bordered upon the
causeway. Colonel Sierakowski received orders to engage with them. He
sent forward his own light troops, and placed two cannons upon the
causeway, with which he commenced a fire upon the woods. The Russian
infantry instantly evacuated the woods, and allowed our skirmishers
to occupy them. By this manoeuvre, the Russians intended to lead on
our forces with the view to attack them on their flank, and even to
surround them, by sending detachments (_a_, _b_) to the right and left,
as will be seen on the plan. In a short time our larger force, under
general Gielgud, commenced debouching between the two lakes. A strong
column (_c_) of our infantry took a direction towards the forest, to
the left, and another column (_d_) to that on the right, to dislodge
the enemy, if he should be found to have occupied either. At the same
time our artillery (_e_), to the number of fourteen pieces, taking a
position at the side of the causeway, opposite to that of the enemy
(_f_), commenced firing. The whole of our cavalry, and the greater part
of our infantry remained in the centre, and constituted a formidable
front.
In a few moments after these dispositions were made, a brisk fire of
tirailleurs was commenced on our left wing (A). The Russian centre (B),
suffering from the fire of our artillery, and taken by surprise at the
unexpected strength of our forces, began to waver. This was a signal
for our advance. Colonel Pientka, who commanded the artillery, gave
the order. A strong column of three battalions of infantry commenced
the hurrah, and charged with the bayonet, upon the wavering columns
of the enemy. At the same time, general Dembinski gave the order to
our cavalry (_g_) to charge upon that of the enemy on the right and
left. The first squadron of the lancers of Poznan received the order
to throw themselves forward, and fall upon the breaking columns of
the enemy. The greatest consternation and disorder began to exist in
the Russian ranks. It was no longer a retreat; it was a flight. This
squadron of lancers, commanded by the brave major Mycielski, performed
prodigies of valor. They entered the town simultaneously with the
Russian columns, cutting down immense numbers of the enemy, and taking
many prisoners. This squadron courageously remained in the streets of
the city, exposed to the fire of the enemy's infantry, who had occupied
the houses, until the arrival of our own infantry. In this exposed
situation they lost their commander.[67]
These several attacks, which did not occupy two hours, caused an
immense loss to the enemy. Three entire battalions, which formed their
right wing (C), consisting of 2,000 men, were taken prisoners, with
three superior officers, and fourteen of a lower grade. By the entry
of our forces, the enemy were driven from the town, and took another
position (D) upon elevated ground, on the opposite side of a small
stream, near the town. This position was strong, and commanded the town
and the whole of the other side of the stream. General Saken would
certainly have remained long in this position, if our right wing under
colonel Koss had not, as we shall see, succeeded in passing the stream
at a higher point (_i_), and acted on his flank. The Russian general,
as soon as he had established himself in his new position, commenced
a fire upon the town, which was returned by our artillery. It was
during this fire that colonel Koss succeeded in passing the stream, at
a quarter of a league above the city, on the right. This was effected
by demolishing the buildings in the vicinity, and making a passage for
the artillery from their materials. General Saken, seeing his left wing
thus menaced, evacuated his position, in which, as we have said, but
for this attack on his flank, he could have well supported himself for
some time.
At 3 o'clock the Russians commenced their retreat upon the road to
Kowno, and thus terminated a battle of the most advantageous character
for us, and with which begins an important era in our affairs.
By this battle the Polish forces had made the acquisition of great
advantages, both in respect to strategy and tactics, and the highest
hopes might reasonably be cherished in regard to the future.
It was, as it were, a return of the state of things brought about by
the victory of Iganie, and which menaced the enemy with total ruin. Our
main army was then near to Warsaw, composed of a force of considerable
strength, and which, under the command of Skrzynecki, had been
victorious in every battle. New troops had been formed there. Neither
provisions nor forage had failed, for they were constantly sent from
Warsaw to the army, in whatever quarter it might be.
The Russian army was, in the mean while, suffering under all the
disadvantages which we have before described. Wearied and discouraged
by the disasters of the campaign, posted in regions which they had
devastated, and therefore suffering from scarcity; without hospitals
for their sick and their wounded,--for the towns which contained them
had been destroyed,--and with the cholera ravaging their ranks, that
army was in the most precarious situation. The communications between
the Russian provinces and the army were entirely cut off by the Polish
Lithuanian corps. They received their provisions exclusively from
Prussia; and, but for this assistance of Prussia, no one can doubt
that Diebitsch would have been, before this, under the necessity of
withdrawing from the country. The reader will also remember that at
this time, the brave and skilful general Chrzanowski, had obtained
repeated advantages over Rudiger, in the environs of Zamosc, and that
the little corps of general Chlapowski which had entered, on the 20th
of May, the Russian department of Bialystok, was acting with great
advantages. From the Baltic to the Black Sea, the provinces of Podolia,
Volhynia, Ukraine, as well as Lithuania and Samogitia, containing
a population of twelve millions of inhabitants, were in a state of
excitement, and would soon have risen in the holy cause. They were
waiting only the arrival of our victorious troops. It cannot but be
assumed, therefore, that if general Gielgud, at the head of the Polish
corps in Lithuania, had acted with promptness and energy, the most
happy results would have been achieved. It is, therefore, with the
deepest chagrin, that I have to record that from the moment of the
termination of the fortunate battle of Raygrod, all the operations
of general Gielgud were not only deficient in energy, but altogether
wrongly planned. The first fault which he committed, was not continuing
to press the attack upon general Saken, after he had retired from
Raygrod. Under the pretext that the soldiers were fatigued, the corps
was encamped. This pretext was groundless, for the soldiers themselves
demanded to be led in pursuit of the enemy. In this camp we passed
the whole night, and left it [_Plan_ XXXIII.] at the hour of nine the
following morning; having given fifteen hours to the retreating enemy.
We continued our march to Kowno, through the duchy of Augustow. On
the 30th of May, we arrived at Suwalki (1) its capital, and remained
there a day and a night, without any conceivable reason. The enemy,
profiting by the slowness of our movements, escaped the certain
destruction with which he had been threatened. On the 1st of June, we
arrived at Kalwaryia (2), and at that town our corps was very uselessly
divided into two parts, the larger (_a_), under general Gielgud, took
the road to Gielgudyszki (3), on the Niemen,[68] to pass the river at
that point. General Dembinski, with the remainder of the corps (_b_),
continued on the main road, and on the 3d of June arrived at Alexota
(4).
This separation of our forces into two bodies, to pass the Niemen at
Gielgudyszki, was not recommended by any conceivable advantage, and,
indeed, operated much to our injury. This plan of operations was also
in opposition to the instructions, not only of the general in chief,
but of the National Government, and obstructed the rapid execution of
the great designs of the campaign.
In any plan for the occupation of a foreign country, the first
object should be to get possession of the principal towns, for at
those points are chiefly concentrated both the moral and physical
resources of the country. Of Lithuania, the town of Wilno (5) is the
capital. Against it all our plans should have been directed; and, in
fact, the instructions of the government to general Gielgud were
all to this effect. By a prompt occupation of that city, we should
have unquestionably reaped the greatest advantages. As Wilno was the
residence of the principal officers of the government of the province,
it would have been there that all the arrangements could best be
made for a provisional administration, and for the convocation of a
conventional Diet of the people. In regard also to the formation of new
forces, Wilno was the place that presented the greatest facilities.
Taking all these circumstances into view, it must be conceded that
after the battle of Raygrod, the first object of general Gielgud
ought to have been to march upon and to occupy Wilno with the utmost
promptness. With this view, his course should have been, after masking
his movement at Kowno, to have passed the Niemen (N) at Rumszyski (6),
a village which was about sixteen English miles above Kowno (7) and
in the direction of Wilno, while Gielgudyszki, on the other hand, was
thirty-two miles below Kowno, and forty-eight from Rumszyski, and out
of the direction of Wilno. With the exception of that of general Saken,
no other Russian force was interposed between us and Wilno. Indeed the
corps of general Chlapowski (_c_), with which he had traversed the
department of Bialystok, was at that moment between Kowno and Wilno,
and had we passed at Rumszyski, we should have been within but one
day's march of him. It is evident, then, that Wilno would have fallen
into our hands without a blow. All these advantages were sacrificed
by making the passage at Gielgudyszki. General Saken, meeting with
no interruption, thus escaped a second time, and marched from Kowno
to Wilno. At the same time several other Russian corps began to
concentrate themselves at Wilno.
The corps of general Dembinski, having maintained a moderate fire upon
Kowno for two days, in order to mask our movements from the enemy,
marched for Gielgudyszki, to follow the other corps in the passage of
the river, at that point, on the 7th of June. Our troops thus entered
the province of Lithuania, an interesting day for us, thus engaged in
the effort to re-unite this dissevered portion of our country to its
ancient parent. The manner in which the inhabitants of every village
received us, expressive of the warmest satisfaction, showed that they
regarded us as brothers. This reception deeply affected both soldiers
and officers. They hailed us as their deliverers, and it is now a
mournful reflection that, owing to the misconduct of our commanders,
that enthusiasm, instead of leading to happy results, proved, in the
end, only an aggravation of their misfortunes.
* * * * *
Leaving the corps of general Gielgud upon the Niemen, we will return
again to the operations of the grand army, and of the different
detached corps. Our main body, which, after the battle of Ostrolenka,
retired towards Warsaw, was now at Praga, where the head-quarters
of the commander in chief were fixed. General Skrzynecki, during the
repose of the army, occupied himself with its re-organization.
In the environs of Zamosc, the corps of general Chrzanowski, in which
the brave general Romarino commanded a brigade, was sufficient to keep
the different Russian corps in check.
On the 3d of June, the Russian army, which, up to the present time,
continued in the environs of Ostrolenka, on the left bank of the
Narew, commenced its operations upon the right bank of that river.
A considerable corps, amounting to 20,000 men, passed that river in
the neighborhood of Prasnysz. The principal object of this corps was
not to re-ommence hostilities, but to protect the large transports
of provisions which were sent daily from Prussia. In the environs of
Brzesc was the corps of general Kreutz. The Russian army thus fed by
Prussia, remained inactive in their position at Ostrolenka, during
which interval, and while he was perhaps contriving new plans for our
subjugation, occurred the sudden death of marshal Diebitsch. He died at
Kleczkowo, not far from Ostrolenka, on the 9th of June.[69]
The provisional command of the Russian army was taken by general Toll.
If the reader should examine closely the operations of the two armies
after the battle of Ostrolenka, he will, perhaps, be astonished at
their inactivity. He will, however, acknowledge that the blame of that
inactivity cannot rest upon the Polish side. The retreat which we
made was necessary; first, for the sake of the re-organizing of the
army; secondly, for the object of leading the enemy to the environs
of Praga, which were in a state of devastation, and generally into
the region between the Bug and the Liwiec, where he would not be able
to support himself; and in this manner to force him either to attack
the fortifications of Praga, to attempt a passage of the Vistula,
or to evacuate the country. That either of the two first would be
attempted, while the insurrections in Lithuania and Samogitia, &c, were
in progress, and after our success at Raygrod, was hardly to have been
expected; for the one would cost too great a sacrifice of men, and the
other would be attended with too much hazard. If, then, the Russian
forces undertook nothing, it was a consequence of their critical
situation. We can, in fact, safely assume that it was their intention
to evacuate the country; for to have obtained sufficient supplies by
their own means was almost impracticable. When, therefore, this army
remained there, it was only because it was fed by Prussia, who did not
scruple openly to succor the enemy in his perilous position, by sending
enormous transports by the roads of Neydenburg and Mlawa. It was those
transports which saved the Russian army from the utmost extremity.
I leave to the reader to judge, then, whether it was with one enemy
alone that the Poles had to contend. The Prussian government, which
arrested all the volunteers who were passing through its territory to
augment our ranks, and which stopped all the aids of money and arms
sent to us by the generous friends of liberty in other countries, took
every occasion to aid and protect our enemy. If that government has
satisfied its own inhuman will, by this interference to injure a cause
so sacred as that of the Poles, they have unintentionally aided that
cause by raising its merit in the eyes of the present and future ages,
who will know with what difficulties we had to struggle. In return for
these good offices of the Prussian government, the Poles will only
say,--Przyidzie kryska na malyska,'--'Every one has his turn.'
If the two main armies were at rest, it was not so with the corps in
the palatinate of Lublin, where general Chrzanowski beat, on the 10th
of June, general Rudiger, between Zamosc and Uchania, and took from
him numerous prisoners. General Rudiger was forced, by this action,
to retire to Lublin, and to cease offensive operations. General
Chrzanowski then prepared to surprise this corps, with the aid of the
garrison of Zamosc.
It was on the 12th of June, that after being apprized of the continual
victories of general Chrzanowski, the general in chief concluded to
re-commence hostilities. His plan was, to act in concert with this
corps, and to crush the enemy in all the southern parts of the kingdom.
He would afterwards have to do only with the Russian main army, which
had commenced passing the Narew and entering into the palatinate of
Plock, to keep its communications open with Prussia, and where it would
have been in a manner cooped up between the Narew and the Vistula,
with insurrectionized Lithuania in its rear, and our army in its front
or flank, according as that army should operate, at Stanislawow, at
Wyskow, or at Ostrolenka.
It was here again that our commander in chief felt his hopes renewed,
confiding always in the fortunate result of the operations in
Lithuania, which had so happily commenced; but he was to be again
mournfully disappointed, by the pusillanimity of the generals to whom
the all-important expedition to Lithuania had been entrusted.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 66: This disposition was made, expressly with the view of
confirming the Russian general in the idea, that he was opposed by
colonel Sierakowski alone.]
[Footnote 67: The reader will allow me to give some details of this
charge of cavalry, which was, indeed, of an extraordinary character.
At the moment that the Russian centre began to waver;--with the view
to continue and augment the disorder of the enemy, and to break their
front, order was given to the cavalry to push their attacks, without
intermission, on the sides of the great road. With this force was the
1st squadron of the lancers of Poznan, of between 80 and 100 men. This
squadron threw themselves upon the Russian columns, and, simultaneously
with them, entered the town, which was full of the enemy's infantry.
Far from being discouraged by this overwhelming force, the brave
Poznanians penetrated the different streets, and continued their
attack on the enemy on every side. But the Russian infantry protected
themselves within the houses, and behind the walls, and commenced
a fire of musquetry, which fell like hail upon this brave handful
of lancers, so that it would have been thought that not a man would
have escaped. It was impossible for our lancers either to advance or
retire, for the streets before them were commanded by artillery, and
the enemy's columns of infantry had closed in behind them; there was
only one outlet for them, which was by a small street, issuing out of
the town to the left, and that was also occupied by the enemy. There
was no alternative but to force their way through it. Our Hulans then,
forming a phalanx of lances, opened a passage through the enemy, and
quitted the town. It was here that the brave Mycielski fell. The
brave Poznanians, leaving the town, by the side of the lake, whither
the Russian right wing had retreated and were about entering the
city, presented to the Russians the impression that the city was in
possession of our troops, and supposing themselves between two fires,
they no longer hesitated to lay down their arms to the pursuing force.]
[Footnote 68: Gielgudyszki was the paternal estate of the Polish
general.]
[Footnote 69: The reader may be curious to know some details of the
career of marshal Diebitsch. He was born in Silesia, not far from
Wroclaw, the capital of that province. His father was a major in the
Prussian service, and young Diebitsch was sent by him at an early
age to the military school at Berlin. It was, perhaps, in about the
year 1805, that he first entered the Russian military service, as
a cadet in one of the regiments of the guard, from which he was,
in 1807, transferred to the corps of engineers. In this service he
advanced rapidly, not so much by real talent, as by a certain art
which he had of exhibiting himself to the best advantage. In the place
of aid-de-camp of the late emperor Alexander, to which he was soon
advanced, he was known to have intrigued in opposition to the interest
of Poland. These intrigues, as well as those which he afterwards
practised, to supersede Wittgenstein, in the command of the army
against Turkey, degraded him in the esteem of all upright men. He was
never regarded by us as a general of talent, and the truth of our
estimate will be by this time conceded.
One cannot but be impressed with the fate which has awaited the two
greatest enemies of Poland, Diebitsch and Constantine. Arrested by
Providence, amid the persecutions which they had inflicted, and were
designing to inflict upon our country, they perished in disgrace. They
died acting the part of the enemies of humanity, and their names thus
rest, sealed with the eternal reproach of history. Here is a fate which
ought to alarm despots. The thought that in the moment that they are
most deeply engaged in contriving the oppression of their fellow-men,
a sudden death may come upon them, and thus stigmatize their names
forever, should teach them an impressive lesson.]