The Lithuanians compel two Russian corps to evacuate
Samogitia.--Operations of general Chlapowski in the department of
Bialystok.--Capture of Bielsk.--Defeat of a Russian force at Narewka
and expulsion of the enemy from the department.--Recapitulation of
the forces which had been sent into Lithuania.--Operations of the
main army.--Attempt of marshal Diebitsch to intercept Skrzynecki on
his retrograde march, by a diversion to Ostrolenka.--General Lubinski
surprises the Russian advanced guard at Czyzew.--Marshal Diebitsch
attacks the Polish rear-guard at Kleczkowo.--The rear-guard quits its
position at night, and joins the main army at Ostrolenka.--Battle of
Ostrolenka.
Quitting the main army, which had thus successfully executed the
important operation of driving the Russian imperial guard from the
kingdom, and sending a corps into Lithuania,--we will now turn to take
a view of the state of affairs in that province.
The brave Lithuanians in a series of bloody encounters had made
themselves severely felt by the enemy. In the departments of Roszyienie
and Szawla, at about the middle of the month of May, a short time
before the battle of Ostrolenka, the two Russian corps, under
Malinowski and Szyrman, were almost annihilated by the Lithuanian
insurgents, who, night and day, falling upon them from forest
ambuscades, subjected them to immense losses. Those corps literally
wandered about, for some time, and being unable to hold themselves in
any position, were forced at last to evacuate Samogitia.
In the department of Bialystok, the little corps recently sent under
the command of general Chlapowski, began its operations with great
success. In the environs of Bielsk, that small detachment, composed
of four squadrons of the 1st regiment of lancers, consisting of four
hundred and eighty horsemen, a hundred and ninety light infantry
volunteers mounted,[58] and two pieces of cannon, routed two regiments
of cossacks and two battalions of infantry, the latter being taken in
a body and the former dispersed; and, what was of much importance to
us, in Bielsk, as well as in Brainsk, several magazines of powder were
found. In the environs of Bielsk, colonel Mikotin, aid-de-camp of the
grand duke Michael, and on his way with despatches from him to the
Grand Duke Constantine, was taken prisoner.[59]
The corps of general Chlapowski left Bielsk in the direction of the
town of Orla, and entered the forest of Bialowiek, where he received
reinforcements of Lithuanian insurgents.
On the same day that our main army fought at Ostrolenka, the 26th
of May, this little corps had an engagement with the enemy in the
environs of Narewka. A considerable Russian detachment, under the
command of general Rengardt, composed of 6,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry,
and five pieces of cannon--in all, nearly 9,000 men--was posted near
Nasielsk. This considerable force was attacked by our small corps,
to which were added some hundreds of insurgents, making in all, a
force of not more than a thousand men. The Russians were completely
beaten in this action. Full a thousand prisoners were taken, and
all their artillery. An important advantage of this affair, was the
taking of a great transport of some hundred vehicles with provisions,
destined for the Russian grand army. By the dispersion and ruin of
this corps, the department of Bialystok was entirely cleared of the
Russians, and nothing interrupted the formation and organization of
the insurgent forces. The taking of Bielsk, and the affair of Narewka,
will be admitted by the reader to have been above the rank of ordinary
achievements, and should immortalize the handful of brave men which
formed this detachment. They may be pointed at, as examples, with many
others, in this war, of how much can be effected by that prompt and
energetic action which no ordinary motives will sustain.
While the affairs of Lithuania and Samogitia, and those in the
department of Bialystok, wore this favorable aspect, a new corps was
approaching to aid this propitious state of things, to protect the
insurrections, and, as might be confidently hoped, to bring them to a
sure and happy result. The new force destined for this object consisted
of the 2d division, reinforced by a squadron of cavalry, which force
quitted Lomza on the 27th for Lithuania.
Before returning to the operations of the grand army, we will give a
short recapitulation of the forces which had been sent into Lithuania
and Samogitia, at successive periods, to support the insurrections in
those provinces.
The first corps under general Chlapowski, left, on the 20th of May,
the village of Xienzopol, with this destination;--to enter the
department of Bialystok, to occupy the forest of Bialowiez, in which
were collected the forces of the revolted Lithuanians, with the view
to organize these forces; from that position to act on the Russian
communications, and, if circumstances might allow it, to make an
approach upon Wilno. This little corps, as we have seen, was composed
of 190 infantry volunteers mounted, the 1st regiment of lancers,
consisting of 480 horsemen, and two pieces of light artillery.
The second corps, under the command of colonel Sierakowski, left, a few
days before that of general Chlapowski, with the view, as we have also
seen, to follow and observe the division of general Saken, who had been
cut off by general Skrzynecki from the Russian guard, and compelled
to remain on the right bank of the Narew. This corps consisted of two
battalions of infantry of the 18th regiment, recently formed, amounting
to 1,500 men, two squadrons of horse, of Plock, also recently formed,
250 in all, and two pieces of cannon. This corps, in the execution
of its instructions, obtained several advantages over general Saken,
near Stavisk. Colonel Sierakowski then advanced to the environs of the
little town of Graiewo, where he took a strong position, and awaited
the arrival of the corps of general Gielgud.
The third corps, under the command of general Gielgud, being the second
division, left the town of Lomza on the 27th of May. It was composed
of 9 battalions of infantry, consisting of 4,500 men, 5 squadrons of
cavalry of 600 men, 160 sappers, and 24 pieces of cannon. The total
force of these three corps was then as follows:
_Artillery_, 28 pieces. _Infantry_, 6,350 men. _Cavalry_, 1,300.
Besides these forces, which were detached from the grand army, there
were formed in Lithuania, several regiments of infantry and cavalry,
which we shall designate in the sequel, but which did not commence
active service until the battle of Wilno.
To return to the main army. Such was the rapidity with which the
operations of general Skrzynecki upon the Russian guard were executed,
that, as we have said, he was on his retrograde march, after having
driven that guard beyond the frontiers, before marshal Diebitsch
received intelligence of his operations. It was then that the Russian
commander, having no hope of saving the guard, conceived the plan of
attempting, by a prompt diversion towards Ostrolenka, to cut off the
communication of our army with Warsaw. [_See Plan_ XXIX.]
With this view he evacuated his position at Sucha and Mordy (_o_),
passed by Sokolow, crossed the river Bug at Granne (16), entered into
the Russian province of Bialystok, passed through a corner of this
department on the 24th of May, and crossing the little river Nurzec
(R), at Ciechanowiec (17), entered again into the Polish territory, and
occupied the road of Czyzew (18) and Zambrowo (19). Without any delay
he pushed his advanced guard as far as Czyzew.
General Lubinski was then at Nur. This little town was at the same
distance from Ostrolenka as Czyzew, but the communications with
Ostrolenka were more difficult, Czyzew being on a principal road.
The enemy, observing this circumstance, and taking it for granted
that Lubinski was cut off from the main army, sent an aid-de-camp
with a flag of truce to summon him to surrender.[60] This summons was
rejected.
After the departure of the aid-de-camp, general Lubinski commenced his
march, and, though it was practicable for him to reach Ostrolenka by
a direct route, yet thinking it possible that Czyzew was not occupied
by a very strong force, and that he might profit by the approach of
night, he determined to march at once upon the latter place, and to
attack the Russian advanced guard there. This bold thought was executed
with perfect success. On reaching Czyzew he found two regiments of
cavalry encamped, and wholly unprepared for an attack. They had not
even an outer-guard upon the road to Nur. He made a charge which threw
them into complete disorder, and compelled them to retreat with the
loss of a great number in killed and wounded, and four to five hundred
prisoners. It was to be regretted that the necessity under which
general Lubinski was placed of reaching Ostrolenka as soon as possible,
did not permit him to profit farther by these advantages.
On the next day, (the 25th) the rear-guard of our main army, consisting
of the brigade of general Wengierski, was attacked at mid-day by the
Russians, on the side of Zambrowo, near Kleczkowo (20), a village
situated at the distance of three leagues from Ostrolenka, on the left
bank of the Narew. General Diebitsch, being under the conviction that
he had encountered the whole Polish force at Kleczkowo, consolidated
his strength there, and determined to come to action, and, by so doing,
give time for another corps to advance in the direction of Czyzew, and
occupy Ostrolenka, by which movement he trusted that our army would
be cut off from Warsaw, and forced to retire to Lomza. The Russian
commander, presuming on the celerity of his movements, was so confident
of meeting our whole army at this point, that nothing could exceed his
surprise on learning that our army had already passed the town, and
that it was only the rear-guard which was before him.[61] In order to
lose no time, he commenced an immediate attack on the rear-guard thus
posted at Kleczkowo. Our general in chief who was then at Troszyn, on
hearing the fire of the Russians at Kleczkowo, immediately repaired
thither, and profiting by the fine position of that place, which
commanded the marshy plain on the side of the enemy, passable only
by a dyke, the bridge over which had been demolished by our troops,
ordered general Wengierski to sustain himself in that position until
night. In vain the Russian cavalry and infantry attempted to pass this
dyke. At each approach they were uniformly driven back by a destructive
fire of grape from our artillery. In vain were sixteen pieces of
their artillery employed to silence this fire; our position was too
commanding to be affected by them.
The brigade of general Wengierski having held out in this position,
with the greatest determination against a vastly superior force,
for nine hours, left the place at night in the greatest order, and
followed the main army. On the next day, the 26th of May, our army
(_h_) evacuated Ostrolenka, passed the river Narew, and took, upon the
right bank of that river, opposite to Ostrolenka, a new position,[62]
leaving the bridge partly destroyed, but in such a state that the
Russian infantry might pass it slowly. Not long after we had occupied
our position, the enemy commenced debouching over this bridge.
BATTLE OF OSTROLENKA. [_See Plan_ XXX.]
The battle of Ostrolenka, which cost us the lives of two brave
generals, Kicki, and Henry Kaminski, was, in point of tactics, simply
the passage of the river. We may presume that the intention of general
Diebitsch was, by passing the Narew at this point, to send at the same
time a corps to Serock, in order to cut off our army, and place it
between two fires. At 11 o'clock, the Russian infantry (_a_) under the
protection of a most terrible fire from fifty-four pieces of artillery,
(_b_) placed in a very strong position on the left bank of the
Narew, commenced, as we have said, the passage of the river. General
Skrzynecki, not wishing absolutely to prevent this passage, placed
but sixteen cannon in advantageous positions, on slight elevations of
ground, (_d_) designed to prevent the repairing of the bridge, and the
consequent rapid passage of the enemy's infantry. The powerful Russian
artillery attempted, without success, to silence these few pieces.
Their fire was equally harmless to the main army (A); for the latter
was withdrawn to an advantageous position. Our artillery, on the other
hand, was used with great effect, being brought to bear directly upon
the bridge. During these operations, the advanced guard, with all the
baggage and ammunition of the army, received the order to take up the
march towards Warsaw.
At 3 o'clock, our artillery received orders to evacuate their position,
and the skirmishers (_e_) were ordered to advance. On the cessation of
the fire of the artillery, the light troops commenced a warm fire upon
the columns of Russian infantry, which had already passed the bridge.
The enemy, profiting by the withdrawal of our artillery, commenced
repairing the bridge, to afford a passage for large masses of infantry,
and artillery. A strong Russian column (_f_), after passing the bridge,
took a direction to the left, to throw itself into the forest which
borders on the Narew, at the distance of a quarter of a league from
the bridge; and by occupying that forest and the communications which
traverse it, they thought to commence an attack upon our right wing.
To have permitted this would have much deranged our dispositions. The
Polish commander, observing that a great body of the Russian infantry
had already passed the bridge, and that this strong column had been
sent to occupy the forest, ordered general Lubinski to send forward a
brigade of cavalry (_g_), to charge upon this column, on its march, and
at the same time ordered general Kaminski, with a division of infantry,
to make a charge upon the Russian infantry near the bridge. These
two attacks were executed with great promptness and spirit, and were
successful. The column which the cavalry attacked on its march to the
forest, was dispersed with the loss of more than a hundred men left on
the field. The attack of the division of general Kaminski was equally
fortunate. The Russian columns, on receiving his charge, fell back upon
the bridge, or concealed themselves under the banks of the river. These
two attacks cost us the lives of the two generals, Kaminski and Kicki,
who threw themselves upon the enemy, at the head of their respective
columns. Their loss was deeply regretted by the army and the nation.
Although the result of these attacks was favorable to us, yet, the
general in chief, considering the terribly destructive fire of the
Russian artillery, which commanded the whole plain near the bridge,
decided that the repetition of them would cost us too severe a loss,
and commanded both the cavalry and infantry to withdraw to their former
position, and to cease firing.
At 6 o'clock, the firing on both sides had entirely ceased. Profiting
by this interval, the Polish army pursued its route, and the Russian
infantry again commenced debouching upon the bridge. At dusk, nearly
the whole Polish army was on the march to Warsaw, and one division
only [_Plan_ XXXI, (_d_)] remained on our position. On the part of the
Russian army, we may suppose that nearly two divisions had passed the
bridge, when our general in chief, wishing to profit by the obscurity
of the night, in order to subject the enemy to still greater losses,
conceived the bold idea of advancing our artillery (_a_) so near the
Russian columns (_b_), as to pour upon them a fire of grape-shot.
General Skrzynecki himself approached colonel Boehm, and taking the
command of the twelve pieces of light artillery under him, led them
in person to the distance of within three hundred paces of the enemy,
and brought forward at the same time two regiments of cavalry for the
support of this artillery. Placing this little detachment in a very
advantageous position behind small elevations of ground, he commanded
colonel Boehm to commence firing. The Russian columns were thrown
into confusion by this unexpected and terrible fire; and it may be
imagined that their loss was immense, enclosed as they were within a
narrow space, on the bank and on the bridge. Every discharge of the
artillery was with effect, and by the testimony of the prisoners taken,
their loss must have amounted to an entire brigade, without estimating
those who left the field wounded, and those who fell into the river.
On our side, this attack cost us only the loss of two officers of the
artillery, although this detachment was exposed to the fire of the
whole Russian artillery.[63] Our battery fired but three rounds, when
the general gave the order to withdraw, and follow the main army (A) to
Warsaw.[64]
These are the details of the battle of Ostrolenka, in which the loss on
the enemy's side was from 10,000 to 15,000 men, and on our side, the
two general officers above mentioned, with about 4,000 men.
On the afternoon of the day of the battle of Ostrolenka, the division
of general Gielgud received orders to depart from the town of Lomza.
General Dembinski, on the night of the same day was ordered to join him
with two squadrons of lancers of Poznan. The latter general left the
field of battle with these squadrons, and on the next day joined the
division of general Gielgud.[65]
[Illustration:
_XXXI._]
[Illustration:
_XXXII._]
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 58: We found, on experiment, that this species of force
acting in conjunction with cavalry could be used with great advantage,
especially against a hostile cavalry. The mounted infantry were placed
in the rear of the cavalry. When the latter advanced to the charge the
former dismounted, and leaving their horses in the care of a party
detailed for the purpose, dispersed themselves as sharp-shooters, and
commenced a fire upon the enemy, who, thrown into confusion by this
unexpected attack, were open to a destructive charge from the cavalry.]
[Footnote 59: The capture of the town of Bielsk and its garrison was
marked with such singular circumstances, that I think that some of the
details will interest the reader. The small corps of general Chlapowski
arriving suddenly before this town, on the 22d of May, was informed
that it had a garrison of two battalions of infantry, and that near
the town was a body of a thousand cossacks, in camp. The advanced
guard of our small corps, with which was the general and several
of his officers, approached the barriers of the town. The Russian
sentinel observing our party, and seeing a general officer among them,
did not recognize them as enemies, but called the guard to give them
the honors of the place. General Chlapowski, on the approach of the
guard, commanded them to lay down their arms, which they did. The same
ceremony was gone through with the grand-guard in the square of the
town, and the Russians mechanically obeyed these orders, in a state of
amazement. General Chlapowski fearing that he might be surrounded by
the cossacks, left his infantry volunteers to disperse any detachments
of the enemy in the town that might rally to oppose him, and led
all the artillery and cavalry against the camp of the cossacks. The
Russian infantry who attempted to make a resistance in the town, were
dispersed at the point of the bayonet, and, with the assistance of the
inhabitants, they were all made prisoners; while by the attack of the
artillery and cavalry, the encamped cossacks were entirely dispersed,
and several of them taken prisoners. General Chlapowski left his
prisoners in the care of the inhabitants, taking with him only those
who were Poles, and who volunteered their services.]
[Footnote 60: The officer announced to general Lubinski that the
whole Russian army had occupied Ciechanowiec, that the advanced guard
was already at Czyzew, and that those circumstances ought to satisfy
him that his communications with his friends were entirely cut off,
and that therefore he would do well to lay down his arms and throw
himself upon the magnanimity of the Emperor. To this proposition
general Lubinski replied, that although such might be his situation,
he could not think of surrendering himself without a struggle; and
to satisfy the aid-de-camp that this was not his individual feeling
alone, but that it was partaken by the whole body of his soldiers,
he would present him to them, and enable him to satisfy himself
personally on this point. The aid-de-camp was then conducted to the
front of the line, and he addressed himself to the troops, exhibiting
the circumstances under which they were placed, assuring them that the
bravest resistance would be hopeless, and inviting them to surrender.
This address was interrupted by a universal shout of indignation from
the soldiery, and they commanded him to leave their presence. This
division was composed of two regiments of old light infantry, and two
recently formed regiments of Mazurs.]
[Footnote 61: Marshal Diebitsch must by this time have become satisfied
that the operations, both in strategy and tactics, of the Polish
commander, were the result of extensive and just combinations. General
Skrzynecki, in contriving this plan (with the valuable assistance of
general Prondzynski,) of surprising and defeating the Russian guard,
had satisfied himself of the practicability of returning to Ostrolenka
without being intercepted.]
[Footnote 62: The question might be asked by some, whether this battle
was necessary, and why general Skrzynecki did not pursue his route
to Warsaw, as he could have done without molestation. In the course
which he took, he had two objects in view; the one was, to cause this
destructive passage of the Narew, and thus diminish the forces of his
enemy; the other was, by thus occupying general Diebitsch to give time
to general Gielgud to leave Lomza in safety for Lithuania. (_See Plan_
XXIX.)]
[Footnote 63: This fire of the Russian artillery might almost be
compared to the terrible fire of the 25th of February, at Grochow, in
the attack on the forest of elders.]
[Footnote 64: This manoeuvre, of bringing the artillery so near the
columns of the enemy, and under the terrible fire of the Russian
artillery, was one of those bold and hazardous steps which were
necessary for the object of reducing the immense superiority of the
enemy's force. The personal agency of general Skrzynecki was demanded
for a blow like this; and in executing it he displayed equally the
qualities of the soldier and the general. The admiration of his
soldiers was excited by seeing him dismount and place himself with the
utmost coolness at the head of this battery of artillery, exposed to
the incessant fire of that of the enemy. Neither the fear of the enemy,
nor the entreaties of his officers, who begged him, on their knees,
to withdraw and to reserve his valuable life for his country, could
induce him to move from his place, until he had seen the successful
termination of this effort.]
[Footnote 65: For those who have asserted that general Gielgud was cut
off from the main body of the Polish forces and compelled to escape
into Lithuania, the sending of these two squadrons of lancers to join
him, will be a sufficient answer. The division of general Gielgud
could have even remained at Lomza for as many as three days after this
battle.]