General Gielgud advances into Lithuania.--Allows a Russian corps
to pass within a league of him unperceived.--Operations on
Wilno.--Enumeration of our present force.--Plan of a simultaneous
attack upon Wilno on opposite sides by the corps in two
divisions.--General Dembinski engages the enemy with the smaller
part of the corps.--Being unsupported by Gielgud, is forced to
retreat.--General Gielgud attacks Wilno.--Battle of Wilno.--A retreat
is commenced.--Prodigious efforts of the Polish cavalry in protecting
this retreat.--Consequences of the repulse from Wilno.--The removal
of general Gielgud is called for.--General Chlapowski consents to
take the virtual command of the corps, in the post of chef d'etat
major.--Consideration on the state of things consequent to the battle
of Wilno.--Details of the admirable plan of operations proposed by
colonel Valentin.
The forces of general Gielgud having thus crossed the Niemen, passed
a night at Rewdany, and the next day [_Plan_ XXXIV.] marched on to
Czaykiszki (1), in the direction of Keydany. We cannot understand why
general Gielgud did not attack Malinowski (_b_), who passed at the
distance of half a league from us, at the head of 6,000 men, on his
march to Wilno. It is, we believe, a thing unheard of in the history
of military affairs, that an inferior force should be suffered to
pass, unmolested, so near a hostile army. It discovered the very last
degree of carelessness, to enter a country in the occupation of the
enemy, without sending out even the ordinary reconnoissances. General
Malinowski,[70] with his corps, which ought to have fallen into our
hands, escaped, and made the second Russian force which had owed its
safety to our negligence, and contributed a new accession to the forces
which we should have to contend with.
[Illustration:
_XXXIV._ ]
On the 10th of June, the corps arrived at Keydany (2), in which place
it was joined by general Chlapowski with his corps, which had so
successfully traversed the departments of Bialystok and Grodno.
This force, which, on quitting Xienzopol, amounted to scarce 1,000 men,
received reinforcements of cavalry and infantry, from the insurgents
of the provinces, through which it had passed.[71] From the new
forces, ten squadrons of cavalry, counting nearly 1,200 horse, and two
battalions of infantry, amounting to nearly 1,800 men, were formed.
On the 11th of June, the united corps quitted Keydany, to march to
Zeymy (3), where we arrived at night. In this little town we remained
several days, we know not for what object. From this place general
Chlapowski was sent with a detachment, consisting of the 1st regiment
of lancers and five pieces of light artillery, to make reconnoissances
in the direction of Wilno. The new forces of which we have just spoken,
were attached to the main body, under general Gielgud. A few hundred of
insurgent cavalry of Lithuania also arrived at Zeymy, which were joined
to the lancers of Poznan and the 3d regiment of lancers.
On the day of our departure, general Szymanowski received orders to
leave for Polonga with a small corps of insurgents (_c_) from the
department of Szawla. This corps consisted of 1,500 infantry, 400 light
cavalry, and two pieces of cannon.
As it was from Zeymy that we commenced our operations upon Wilno,
after having organized the new forces; and as from this point begins
an era in the history of the expedition, it may be well to give a new
enumeration of our forces. Our infantry consisted of 13 battalions of
infantry, amounting in all to nearly 8,700 men, including a body of
sappers; our cavalry of 24 squadrons, amounting to about 2,750; and
our artillery of 29 pieces of cannon. To these forces we might add a
detachment of 500 men and 100 horse, acting independently as a corps
of partizans, under colonel Zaliwski. This corps of colonel Zaliwski
was formed in the duchy of Augustow, with the destination to operate
there upon all the demonstrations of the enemy, on his communications,
his magazines, his baggage, his transportations of provisions, &c; and
when it is considered that this officer remained for four months thus
successfully employed, and exposed to the enemy's forces on all sides,
a particular acknowledgment is due to him for his meritorious services.
In the above enumeration we have, of course, excluded the force of
general Szymanowski, which, as we have stated, received another
destination.
With the forces which we have enumerated, general Gielgud left Zeymy on
the 14th of June. The operations on Wilno were planned for an attack
on two sides, and with that view general Dembinski was detached with
a small corps (_d_) of 1,200 infantry, 900 cavalry, and 4 pieces of
cannon. This general was to attack Wilno on the road from Wilkomierz to
that city, at the same time that the larger force (_e_) made the attack
on the road from Kowno, on the left bank of the river Wiliia. This plan
demanded the most exact communication between the two attacking corps.
That communication was not observed, and, in fact, as it will be seen,
the plan itself was not executed.
The corps of general Dembinski reached Wieprz (4), on the river
Swieta, on the 14th of June. On the next day it passed that river,
and arrived at Szerwinty (5). From thence, after resting for a few
hours, the corps marched to Myszogola (6), where it passed the night.
On the 16th, leaving this village, after a march of two leagues, the
corps began to meet with small detachments of the enemy's Circassian
cavalry.[72] General Dembinski gave the order to throw forward the
flankers. The Circassians commenced a retreating fire, and, thus
engaged with them, we approached within a league of Wilno, taking a
position at Karczma-biskupia (7), or The Tavern of the Bishop, a large
public house, surrounded by small dwellings, and which was in rather a
commanding situation.
On the 17th, general Dembinski sent parties of cavalry to the right as
far as the river Wiliia (W), and to the left as far as Kalwaria (8),
to make reconnoissances, and advanced with the body of the corps in
the centre, for the same object. In these reconnoissances a constant
fire of flankers was kept up, with which the whole day was occupied.
It was a great fault in general Dembinski, to have commenced this
fire, without having any intelligence of the situation of the corps of
general Gielgud, with which he was to act in concert. On the morning of
the same day, in fact, on which general Dembinski was thus employed,
the corps of general Gielgud was at the distance of thirty-six English
miles from him. By these imprudent reconnoissances, general Dembinski
laid open all his forces to the knowledge of the enemy. Of this fault
the enemy took advantage on the next day.
On the 18th, at sunrise, clouds of Circassian cavalry made their
appearance, and commenced attacks upon our flanks, endeavoring to
turn them. Several columns of Russian infantry then approached,
and manoeuvred upon our centre, on which also 12 pieces of Russian
artillery of large calibre commenced firing. Other columns of cavalry
manoeuvred upon our wings. As far as we could judge, the enemy's forces
amounted to about 8,000 men. General Dembinski, seeing the strength of
the enemy, and appreciating his own danger, gave orders for a retreat,
which was commenced under a terrible fire from the enemy's artillery,
and from his flankers, who harassed us on every side. The retreat was
executed in the greatest order, as far as Myszogola, a distance of 12
miles from our position, with the loss only of some fifty cavalry. On
arriving at Myszogola, general Dembinski, concerned at receiving no
intelligence from general Gielgud, sent an officer with a report of
what had occurred. That officer found general Gielgud with his corps,
at Oyrany, occupied in making the passage of the Wiliia, at that
place. The report of general Dembinski, as we can assert from personal
knowledge, gave a faithful description of the occurrences of the
preceding days, and contained a request, that, in case he (Dembinski)
was expected to maintain the position in which he then was, general
Gielgud must send him reinforcements of infantry and artillery. The
report finished with the suggestion, that it would be, under all
circumstances, the course most expedient, to re-unite his forces with
those of general Gielgud. Upon the receipt of this report, to which
general Gielgud gave little attention, orders were sent to general
Dembinski to depart for Podbrzeze (9), eight miles to the left of the
road which leads from Wilkomierz to Wilno. The pretext of this order
was to attack Wilno on the side of Kalwaryi, and to pass the river
Wiliia at that point. Thus, instead of being allowed to unite his corps
with that of general Gielgud, as he had proposed, general Dembinski was
ordered to remove to a still greater distance, a disposition for which
we can conceive no possible motive. On the 19th of June, the day on
which general Gielgud commenced his attack on Wilno, general Dembinski
was thus employed on his march, without an object, to Podbrzeze.
BATTLE OF WILNO. [_Plan_ XXXV.]
The battle of Wilno was, in point of tactics, simply a strong attack
upon the Russian centre (A), with the view, by forcing it, to pass on
to the occupation of the city. The adoption of such a plan supposes
an ignorance of the nature of the position of the enemy, and of the
strength of his forces.[73] Indeed any plan of attacking this city
on its strongest side, that toward Kowno, was almost impossible of
execution.
[Illustration:
_XXXV. p. 312_]
[Illustration:
_XXXIII. p. 296_]
The battle commenced on the morning of the 19th of June. The enemy
was dislodged from his first position, which was about one mile from
the city. Their retreat was caused by a spirited charge, by the 1st
regiment of lancers, upon the Russian artillery, and the columns of
infantry in the centre. The enemy, on quitting this position, took
another of great strength on the heights called Gory-Konarskie (B).
This strong position was already covered with fortifications. The
right wing of the enemy (C), composed of strong columns of infantry
(_a_), rested on the river Wiliia; the centre, (A), embracing all their
artillery, which consisted of 50 pieces of cannon (_b_), occupied the
heights above mentioned; the declivity of those heights was covered
with sharp-shooters (_d_), concealed behind small heaps of earth,
thrown up for this purpose. The left wing of the enemy (D) was entirely
composed of cavalry (_e_).
After driving the Russians from their first position, our artillery
(_f_) was brought forward and placed opposite the enemy's centre.
This is to be regarded as a great fault. At the same time that our
artillery was thus disposed, our left wing received orders to attack
the right wing of the enemy. The columns of our infantry (_g_),
composed in part from the new Lithuanian levies,[74] threw themselves
with such fury upon the enemy, that they did not give them even time
to fire, but fought them hand to hand: an immense slaughter ensued,
and the Russians began to give way before this desperate assault; but
at this very moment, our artillery, who could not sustain themselves
under the overpowering fire of the enemy from his commanding position,
began to fall back; and gave time to the Russians to send fresh bodies
of infantry to support their right wing. Our left wing, being unable
to sustain a conflict with the reinforced strength of the enemy, and
apprehensive of being cut off, to which hazard they were exposed by
the retreat of our artillery, began to give way also, and upon that a
retreat commenced along our whole line, under the protection of the
cavalry (_h_). The cavalry, both old and new, performed prodigies of
valor, in executing this duty. Single squadrons were obliged to make
charges against whole regiments of the enemy, who constantly pressed
upon us, with the object of throwing our forces into disorder. All the
efforts of the enemy were thwarted, by this determined bravery. The
Russians themselves have borne testimony to the unparalleled efforts of
our cavalry on that occasion. Our lancers seemed to feel the imminent
danger of permitting the Russian cavalry to fall upon our ranks, and
they fought with the energy of desperation. They repelled the attacks
of a cavalry three times superior in force, and which was in part
composed of regiments of the imperial guard.
The enemy having been thus foiled in his attacks, our forces repassed
in safety the bridge of Oyrany, leaving it destroyed.
The battle of Wilno, so disastrous to us, was our greatest fault in the
expedition to Lithuania; and it was the first of a series of disasters.
The evil consequences of this battle did not rest with ourselves; they
fell heavily upon the inhabitants of Wilno, whose hopes of acting in
concert with us were disappointed. At the sound of our cannon, a revolt
of the inhabitants was commenced, and after the repulse of our forces,
arrests and imprisonments of course followed. This unfortunate battle,
in fine, disorganized all the plans of the main army, and had a most
discouraging effect upon the spirits both of the army and the nation.
An attack upon Wilno, at a time when all the enemy's forces were
concentrated there, should only have been made upon the basis of the
most extensive and carefully adjusted combinations. A successful attack
on Wilno would have been a difficult achievement, even by a force
equal to that of the enemy, when the strong positions of the place are
considered. What then shall we say of an attack, with a force amounting
to but one third of that of the enemy, and made also, in broad day,
upon the most defensible point of the enemy's position?
But, as if these disadvantages were not enough, general Dembinski,
after having been compromitted at Myszggola, instead of being enabled
to aid in this attack, was, by the orders of general Gielgud, at the
very moment of the attack, marching in the direction of Podbrzeze,
[(9) _Plan_ XXXIV,] and was also by this separation exposed even to
be cut off by the enemy, who could easily have done it, by sending a
detachment for this object on the road from Wilno to Wilkomierz.
This succession of inconceivable faults arrested the attention of the
corps, and created a universal dissatisfaction. The removal of general
Gielgud, and the substitution of general Chlapowski in the chief
command, who had distinguished himself so much in the departments of
Bialystok and Grodno, was loudly called for. General Chlapowski was
unwilling to take the chief command, but, to satisfy the wishes of the
corps, he consented to take the office of chef d'etat major, a post in
which he was virtually chief, having the exclusive responsibility of
every operation. To this arrangement general Gielgud readily consented.
It took effect on the evening of the 20th. From that day general
Chlapowski was the director of all our operations.
After all these disasters, which had both morally and physically
weakened us, and with a clear knowledge of the amount of the enemy's
strength, our leaders should have been satisfied that it must be out
of the question with us to act any longer on the offensive, and that
our whole plan of operations on Samogitia ought to be abandoned. We
will give the reader an exposition of the views of a great majority
of the officers of the corps, upon this point, formed even during the
battle of Wilno.
It was near mid-day on the 19th, and when our line was commencing
their retreat, that colonel Valentin, with several other officers,
addressed themselves to general Gielgud, represented to him the
disastrous situation in which we were placed, and proposed to him a
plan of operations adapted to our new circumstances. There was, in
their opinion, but one course to pursue. This was, to abandon our whole
plan of operations between the rivers Niemen, Dwina, and Wiliia. The
space enclosed between these rivers, the Baltic Sea and the Prussian
territory, was a dangerous position for us, as it contracted our
movements, and at the same time exposed us to being surrounded by
the superior forces of the enemy. Colonel Valentin designated, as
the most eligible line of operations, the space between Kowno and
Lida. From this oblique line we could at any moment menace Wilno. He
proposed to occupy Kowno, and to fortify that town as well as Alexota
and Lida in the very strongest manner. On this line we should have
been in a situation to profit by any advantageous opportunities which
the negligence of the enemy might leave to us, of acting upon Wilno;
and if we might not be fortunate enough to surprise that city, we
should, at least, compel the Russians to keep a strong force within
its walls, as a garrison. The town of Lida touches upon the great
forest of Bialowiez. It is situated at the meeting of three great
roads, viz. those from Poland, from Volhynia, and from the province of
Black Russia, a circumstance in its position which made it a place of
great importance. The communications of the town with the neighboring
forest were extremely easy, and this forest colonel Valentin designed
a place of concentration for all the insurgent forces of Lithuania
and the other provinces. He proposed to fortify, in the strongest
manner, all the roads which concentrated here, and thus to make the
position difficult and dangerous of access to the enemy. This forest,
which is more than one hundred and twenty English miles in length, and
from thirty to sixty in breadth, reaches the great road which passes
by Bielsk, from Warsaw to St Petersburgh and Moscow, and extends
northwards to the environs of Wilno.
By means of prompt operations, according as circumstances might direct,
our forces could act upon each of these roads, and could obstruct
all the communications of the enemy with St Petersburgh and Moscow.
Colonel Valentin, in proposing this plan, also gave much weight to
the consideration that our main army under general Skrzynecki, was
victorious in the vicinity of Warsaw, and that general Chrzanowski was
with a corps in the environs of Zamosc, having been victorious over
Rudiger, and on the point of entering into Volhynia; with this latter
corps, a junction could easily be effected, and the two corps could
act in concert, for the support of the insurrections which might occur
in all the provinces between the Dnieper and the Black Sea; and even
if all these great advantages, which we should have been justified
in counting upon, had not been attained, we should, at least, have
compelled the enemy to retain a great body of forces in Lithuania, and
thus have hindered him from reinforcing his main army.[75]
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 70: This general Malinowski, as was generally understood,
was a native of Mohilew, or Little Russia, a province of ancient
Poland, and had been long in the Russian service. The Lithuanians
and Samogitians had much reason to complain of his conduct in those
provinces.]
[Footnote 71: Among the Lithuanians who hastened to join our ranks, and
aid in the restoration of their beloved country, were several of the
fair sex,--generally from the principal families of the province. There
were personally known to me the following, whose names I deem it an
honor to record;--Plater, Rasinowicz, Karwoska, Matusiewicz, Zawadzka,
and Lipinska. The countess Plater, perhaps, should receive a more
especial notice. This young heroine joined our corps with a regiment
of from five to six hundred Lithuanians, raised and equipped at her
own expense, and she was uniformly at their head in the midst of the
severest engagements. How strongly do such examples prove the sacred
nature of our cause! What claims must not their country have presented
to the minds of these females of the most exalted character, to have
induced them thus to go out of their natural position in society, and
to sacrifice domestic happiness, wealth, life itself, in the effort to
rescue that country from her degradation!]
[Footnote 72: This was a formidable force from the province of
Circassia, consisting of two regiments, amounting to about 3,000 men,
which had recently arrived at Wilno. It was a species of light cavalry,
of the most efficient character. The fleetness of their horses was
such, that they would often throw themselves in the very midst of our
flankers, and having discharged their arms, retreat in safety. They
were armed with two pistols, a long fusil, a sabre, a long knife, and a
lance.]
[Footnote 73: As we have been informed, Wilno was defended by five
corps, consisting in all, of about 30,000 men, under generals Kuruta,
Tolstoy, Saken, Malinowski, and Szyrman.]
[Footnote 74: This Lithuanian force consisted of the regiment of the
countess Plater, who accompanied them in the charge.]
[Footnote 75: This valuable officer, colonel Valentin, unfortunately
lost his life on the day after the battle of Wilno, while bathing in
the Wiliia. The regrets of his brother officers were aggravated by
their sense of the value of those wise counsels, the suggestion of
which was the last act of his life. He had every quality of heart and
intellect for the highest military station.]