General Skrzynecki resumes the offensive.--He decides to adopt an
enlarged plan of operations, and to make the revolutionized provinces
supply the place of a corps d'armee.--The corps of Chrzanowski is sent
to occupy the Russian corps of Witt and Kreutz.--Admirable execution
of this enterprise.--Attack on Kock.--Attack of Rudiger's camp.--Plan
of operations by the main army against the Russian guard.--Forced
march from Kaluszyn by Praga to Serock.--Advanced post of the guard
attacked and defeated.--The corps of Saken is cut off.--The 2d
division under Gielgud sent into Lithuania.--The imperial guard are
driven with great loss beyond the frontier.--Retrograde movement.
As several days passed away, without any thing having been attempted
on the part of the enemy, our general in chief decided to re-commence
hostilities by small attacks, which were designed to mask the great
plan he intended to put into execution. The general view which
occupied our commander, was to continue the offensive, to follow up
the enemy constantly, and not to leave him unless some very important
occasion should call for a different course. Let us reflect upon the
difficulties of such a plan, and let us then examine how it was in fact
executed by the general in chief.
General Skrzynecki, regarding all the existing circumstances, the
actual position of the enemy, and his strength, found a great
difference between the present state of things and that which existed
after the battle of Iganie. The misfortunes of the corps of Dwernicki
and Sierawski, had made a vast change in the relative strength of the
two parties. The fate of those two corps gave a great advantage to the
enemy, leaving him free to concentrate all his forces and to act in
one mass. This advantage of the enemy was to be met, and means were to
be taken to keep his forces in detached bodies, by giving occupation
to each. To provide such means, it was next an object to give an
important character to the revolution in Lithuania, and in fact to
make that revolution supply the place of a _corps d'armee_, to send a
body of troops to aid it, and to direct and lead the partizan forces
which might be there enrolled. If then by such operation, Lithuania
and Samogitia could be kept in constant communication with the main
army, the line of operations would be enlarged, and would be based
upon Wilno and Warsaw. This line of operations would embrace also the
towns of Grodno and Lomza. To occupy the corps of Witt and Kreutz,
which were still in the palatinate of Lublin, the general in chief
detached a small corps under the command of general Chrzanowski, which
were furnished with the same instructions as its predecessor, that of
general Dwernicki, which were, in general, to act in the environs of
Zamosc.
To facilitate the execution of these plans, the general in chief
determined to give daily occupation to the enemy. On the 2d of May, the
fire was renewed along our whole line. Each following day presented
sanguinary scenes at different points. In the midst of one of these
actions, on the 7th, the small corps above mentioned, consisting of
4,000 men and eight pieces of cannon, under general Chrzanowski,
left the main body [_See Plan_ XXVI], took the direction of Stoczek
(1), Zelechow (2), and Kock (3), to reach the environs of Zamosc (4).
The reader, on examining the plan, and looking at the space which this
corps (_a_) was to pass over, in the midst of the enemy's detached
corps (_b_), and in which it was exposed every moment to be surrounded
and cut off, will acknowledge that this expedition, which was most
successfully executed, is to be ranked among the finest operations
in the campaign. It demanded a general of talent, and a soldier of
determination.
[Illustration:
_XXVI. p 265_]
[Illustration:
_XXVII. p 267_]
[Illustration:
_XXVIII. p. 266_]
When I allow myself thus to detain the attention of the reader upon
the extraordinary efforts of this war, it is only with the view to
convince him that nothing is difficult of execution which is prompted
by a resolute determination based upon high principles, and that what
would be deemed almost impossible in an ordinary war, in which despots,
to gratify their ambition or their caprices, force their subjects to
battle--an involuntary sacrifice, is far from being so, in a war like
ours. In such a war, moral impulse becomes an element, the importance
of which cannot be over-estimated.
General Chrzanowski, quitting, as we have mentioned, the main body,
took the direction of Ceglow, and threw himself into the great forest
of Plomieniec. Leaving that forest, he met, near Wodynie, a strong
detachment of the enemy, composed of infantry, cavalry, and several
pieces of artillery, belonging to their main body, and probably
detached to make a reconnoissance. By a sudden attack that detachment
was at once overthrown. The cavalry ordered for their pursuit were
instructed to return in another direction, in order to deceive the
enemy. In this manner general Chrzanowski, frequently meeting with
small detachments of the enemy and deceiving them continually,
traversed the woody plain between Stoczek and Zelechow, and arrived, on
the night of the 9th, at the environs of Kock, where he had to pass the
river Wieprz.
ATTACK OF KOCK. [_See Plan_ XXVII.]
At the moment of the arrival of the corps of general Chrzanowski, this
town was occupied by a part of the corps of general Witt, composed
of 6,000 men and 20 pieces of artillery. Besides this considerable
garrison, the place had been strengthened by several fortifications (1)
on each side of the river, to defend the passage of the bridge (2), and
without taking those fortifications it would be impossible for us to
pass the bridge. In such circumstances there was no alternative, and it
was necessary to attempt to take the town by storm. General Chrzanowski
announced his intention to the corps, and addressed a few animating
words to them. Having divided his corps into small parties (_a, a_),
he surrounded the town. He placed especial importance upon the forcing
of the avenue (3) leading to the palace, and getting possession of
the garden (4) which surrounded the palace, and bordered on the river.
If all this could be rapidly executed, the enemy would be taken in the
rear.
The signal for the attack being given, a warm fire from our skirmishers
was commenced in all points round the city, and, while the cavalry
(_b_), divided into detachments, threw themselves continually upon
the Russian infantry (_c_), our infantry, at the charge, forced the
entrance to the palace and garden, which was immediately occupied by
our tirailleurs, who opened their fire upon the fortifications (1) and
on the Russian columns in the square (_d_). In this manner the enemy
was surrounded, and forced to evacuate the city with great loss, and
to take the direction of Radzyn. General Chrzanowski passed the river
and took the direction of Lubartow. Leaving the town of Lublin on the
right, and following the banks of the river Wieprz, he reached on the
11th the environs of Piaski. In the latter place he was apprized that a
Russian corps under Rudiger was at Krasny-staw. Chrzanowski decided to
attack them.
ATTACK OF RUDIGER'S CAMP. [_See Plan_ XXVIII.]
The corps of general Rudiger, after the unfortunate disaster of general
Dwernicki, having traversed Volhynia, entered the frontiers of the
kingdom, and took the direction of Lublin, being destined probably to
reinforce the main army under Diebitsch. This corps, which was composed
of about 12,000 men, and some twenty pieces of cannon, was in camp (E)
near the town of Krasny-staw, having that town and the river Wieprz in
its rear.
General Chrzanowski, who halted with his corps in the forest between
Piaski and Krasny-staw, having sent out patrols, was perfectly informed
of the position of the enemy, and ascertained that he had not his wing
supported on the river;--indeed, he was in such a state, as satisfied
our general that he had no expectation of meeting a Polish force, and
that he might be surprised in his camp. To effect this object, general
Chrzanowski divided his corps into two parties, and giving the command
of one to the brave general Romarino, he ordered him to traverse the
forest longitudinally, as far as the road which leads from Tarnogora
to Krasny-staw, and by this road, which is wholly through forests,
to approach, as near as possible, to the left of the enemy's camp;
and also, if circumstances might permit it, to push himself even
against the enemy's rear. On arriving there, he was to commence his
fire immediately. These instructions to general Romarino being given,
general Chrzanowski (B) advanced with the other part of the corps,
through the forest, keeping the left bank of the Wieprz. He approached
so near the enemy, without being perceived, as even to be on a line
with him. Not long before evening, Romarino having reached the enemy
on the other side (C), began his attack, and his fire was a signal for
Chrzanowski to quit the forest. Thus suddenly assaulted upon his two
wings and his rear, the disorder of the enemy was unimaginable, and he
was not in a state to offer resistance. The whole camp was taken, with
all its baggage, ammunition, &c, and as many as two thousand prisoners
and six pieces of artillery fell into our hands. The remains of his
force fled along the great road (D), which was purposely left open to
him. General Chrzanowski contented himself with occupying the town, in
which he furnished himself with ammunition from the magazines, and,
remaining there but a short time, left for the environs of Zamosc, in
which fortress he deposited his prisoners.
Conformably to his instructions, he remained in camp, near this
fortress, at Labunia.[57]
The general in chief having thus accomplished his object of supplying
the place of general Dwernicki's corps, and holding in check the
corps of Witt and Kreutz, in the palatinate of Lublin, it remained to
him to complete his great plan by sending a corps into Lithuania. He
decided to remove the only obstacle to this attempt by attacking the
Russian imperial guard, which was somewhat detached from the Russian
grand army. To carry this bold purpose into effect, the following
instructions were given to the different commanders.
[Illustration:
_XXIX._]
[Illustration:
_XXX._]
OPERATIONS AGAINST THE RUSSIAN GUARD. [_Plan_ XXIX.]
On the 12th of May, general Uminski with his division of cavalry (_a_)
was ordered to quit the left wing and the position of Zimna-Woda, and
to move to the position of Kaluszyn. This traverse of the line he was
to make in full view of the enemy, and he was to give to the manoeuvre
the aspect of a reconnoissance. The object of this change of position
was, that in the new position he might mask the movements of the main
body. This important disposition general Uminski was directed to carry
into effect with the utmost prudence. The enemy was to be each day
harassed, but never to be engaged with in any decisive manner. Small
detachments were to be sent against the enemy, along his whole line,
and especially on the first days of the movement. The general in chief
instructed general Uminski to watch every movement of the enemy, and
give information of such at head-quarters. If the main body of the
Russian force should make an attack, he was to execute his retreat upon
the main road, as far as the fortifications of Praga, and there he
was to act in junction with the other detachments left there for the
defence of those fortifications. If, on the contrary, the Russian army
should make a retrograde movement, general Uminski was to endeavor,
by following them, to keep them constantly in view. If circumstances
permitted, the rear guard of the Russians might be harassed during
the night. Above all, general Uminski was to endeavor to keep up his
communications with the neighboring corps, that of general Lubinski,
and the detachments left at Siennica and Karczew. In this moderate
pursuit of the enemy, the general was to ascertain whether their
retrograde movement was a retreat or a manoeuvre, in order to avoid
every hazard.
General Lubinski (_b_), with his division of cavalry, was to pass the
right bank of the Bug (B), and leaving small detachments at Wyszkow (1)
and Brok (2), he was to advance as far as the environs of Nar (3), not
quitting the right bank of the river. All his care was to be devoted
to the observing of the enemy, and to the preventing of any sudden
passage of the river by him. In regard to his communications, the same
instructions were given to him as to general Uminski.
Having given these orders to the above mentioned corps, general
Skrzynecki, with the main force (_d_), left suddenly the position at
Kaluszyn (4), making a retrograde movement upon the great road, by
Minsk (5), traversed Praga (6), and through Jablonna (7), and Zegrz
(8), arrived on the 15th, at Serock (9). On the 16th, he passed the
Narew (N), at this place, leaving a brigade of infantry and cavalry
(_e_), under general Dembinski, upon the right bank, with orders to
advance to Ostrolenka (10), through the towns of Pultusk, Magnuszewo
and Rozany (11). This detachment was not to commence the attack on
meeting the enemy, but was only to harass him and keep him in check,
and detain him as near as possible to Serock. If the enemy should
commence the retreat, this corps was to pursue him with the greatest
activity, in order that at Ostrolenka, where the general in chief had
determined to attack him, he might be exposed between two fires.
On the 17th, this corps met the first advanced post (_f_) of the
Russian imperial guard at Modzele, which, after a slight engagement,
evacuated its position, and retired. Being pursued by the brigade of
cavalry under general Dembinski, they, on the 18th, commenced the
passage of the Narew, at Ostrolenka. In attempting this passage, the
rear-guard of the enemy was overthrown, and four regiments of the
light infantry of Finland were taken prisoners. This pursuit by the
brave Dembinski was executed with such rapidity, that the corps of
general Saken, which made a part of the grand corps of the guard, but
was a little detached, was completely cut off from the main body and
forced to take refuge in the palatinate of Augustow. It is much to be
regretted that our main force (_d_) could not reach Ostrolenka; having
to pass narrow roads, through forests, in which the artillery met with
much obstruction. Otherwise, the whole of that imperial guard would
have been surrounded.
With the arrival of our main body, on the night of the 18th, the
Russians passed the Narew, but many voitures and stragglers fell into
the hands of our cavalry in the forest of Troszyn (12). The general in
chief, having given the corps a short rest, and having despatched a
detachment, under the command of colonel Sierawski, for the pursuit of
the corps of Saken, on the same night continued his march in pursuit of
the guard, in the direction of Troszyn (12). On the morning of the next
day, arriving at Dlugie-Siodlo (13), this village was found occupied
by two regiments of infantry and two of cavalry, the latter covering
the village. Our 1st regiment of lancers, which were the leading force,
leaving the forest and finding the Russian cavalry in line before that
village, threw themselves upon them with the rapidity of lightning.
The enemy's cavalry was borne down before them, and pursued by our
lancers into the village; but his infantry, under cover of the village,
opened a terrible fire upon our cavalry, which compelled them to retire
and await the arrival of the artillery. At length, eight pieces of
light artillery, commanded by colonel Boehm, arrived, and commenced a
vigorous fire of grape upon the village, which compelled the enemy's
infantry to evacuate it, and they were pursued with such spirit, that
one battalion was taken, and the rest were dispersed in the forest. On
the same day, the enemy was again pressed upon in his retreat, in the
environs of Xienzopol (14), especially on the passage of the river and
marshes of Kamionka.
The 1st lancers, and the battery of light artillery, who did not
quit the enemy a moment, arrived simultaneously with him at the point
of the passage. The enemy was obliged to debouch under the fire of
our artillery and the charges of our cavalry, and lost again several
hundred in dead, wounded and prisoners.
I cannot give the reader a satisfactory explanation, why general
Skrzynecki did not pursue the enemy on the 20th. Perhaps he considered
the great fatigue of the army, particularly the infantry, which the
reader will, of course, presume to have been incurred by the forced
march which the distance passed over supposes. Another reason, perhaps,
was, that he had sent from this place the first detachment (_i_) for
Lithuania, wishing to be sure of its safe passage to the frontiers. The
detachment, in fact, left on that day, in the direction of Mniszew,
and passed the frontier of the kingdom at the village of Mien, between
Ciechanowiec and Suraz, opposite Brainsk.
Our army, having halted one day at Xienzopol, on the evening of the
20th, quitted this position to continue the pursuit of the guard, and
overtook them in the forest of Menzynin (15). This forest, occupied by
the Russian rear-guard, was so near the heights of the village, which
command the whole vicinity, that it was exposed to a fire of artillery
from these heights. Our generalissimo placed his artillery on the
heights, and directed a fire upon the forest; the infantry was ordered
to take the enemy in front, in case he should quit the forest, and the
cavalry was to advance in strong columns along the road, to cut off his
escape from the forest into the road. In this they were successful, and
took many prisoners. Thus continually pursued, and subject to severe
losses along the whole route, the guard (_l_) was again pressed at the
passage of the Narew at Tykocin (16). The consternation and disorder of
the enemy was such, that he did not take time to destroy the bridge.
Our lancers, commanded by the brave colonel Langerman, commenced an
attack upon the Russian cuirassiers, on the bridge itself. The regiment
of cuirassiers was almost annihilated, many being thrown from the
bridge, and a great number taken prisoners.
Having thus driven the Russian guard from the kingdom, (of which the
Narew was the boundary,) general Skrzynecki commenced a retrograde
movement, to meet the demonstration which general Diebitsch might make
upon his rear. On the night of the 22d, our army (_m_) began this
movement, having destroyed the several bridges of the Narew.
These then are the details of the operations upon the Russian guard,
which will be admitted to be among the finest in the history of modern
warfare. The operations of Napoleon, in the campaign of Italy--the
brilliant commencement of his career, in 1796,--will be always cited
as the highest examples of stratago-tactics, but I do not think that a
finer and bolder plan of operations can be found even there. In both
cases, success was owing, not more to the great military genius of the
leaders, than to those high moral impulses which must animate armies in
every contest for national existence.
Our army, evacuating on the 12th, the position at Kaluszyn, from that
date to the 26th, when the battle of Ostrolenka took place, had passed
over a distance of from 200 to 250 miles, which, deducting the six
days occupied in action, was executed in eight days, making an average
of twenty-eight English miles per day, an extraordinary and perhaps
unexampled effort. The rapidity, in fact, with which this movement
was performed, was such, that our forces were on their return before
marshal Diebitsch commenced his march to intercept them. This object
the marshal thought himself in season to effect, but the reader will
see in the sequel how completely he failed of it.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 57: The reader may be pleased with a short biographical
sketch of general Chrzanowski, who distinguished himself here so much.
This skilful officer commenced his military career in 1815, on leaving
the military school at Warsaw, as officer of the corps of engineers,
in which department he was distinguished for his skill and industry.
In the year 1828, during the war of Turkey, the Emperor Nicholas was
desirous of obtaining the aid of Polish officers of engineers, and
Chrzanowski was among the number chosen. In this campaign his talents
made themselves remarked, and marshal Diebitsch gave him great marks
of confidence, and placed him near his person. He returned from the
campaign as captain, and received several Russian decorations. In the
revolution, like a worthy son of Poland, he offered his services to
the common cause; but the dictator Chlopicki, who, among his other
faults, had that of either being unable to appreciate, or willing
to disregard the merits of the officers from among whom he was to
make his appointments, did not give any important trust to general
Chrzanowski;--perhaps it was because Chrzanowski was among the number
of those who were desirous of taking the field without delay. With
the glorious commencement of the era of the command of our estimable
Skrzynecki, this brave officer was advanced to the rank of lieutenant
colonel, and was placed in the post of chef d'etat major. While in this
post he was advanced to the rank of general. The generalissimo, who in
all his plans observed the greatest secrecy, and his example ought to
be followed by every good general, initiated, however, Chrzanowski,
and Prondzynski, who succeeded the former as chef d'etat, into all his
plans: and indeed those two brave generals were valuable counsellors
to Skrzynecki. Among other qualities necessary to a great general,
Chrzanowski was endowed with great coolness and presence of mind,
and with a spirit of system, which he carried into every thing which
he undertook. He was seen in the midst of the hottest fire, with his
plan of the battle before him, referring the movements to the plan,
and giving his orders with the greatest sangfroid imaginable. The
generalissimo could not enough regret that he had not given him the
command of the expedition to Lithuania, in place of Gielgud. If the
skill and coolness of Chrzanowski could have been united, in that
expedition, with the bold and adventurous enterprise of Dwernicki,
every thing would have been effected there in a few weeks.]