The Russian commander resumes offensive operations.--Object of the
attack of the 25th of April.--Combat of Kuflew.--General Dembinski
evacuates the position of Kuflew and awaits the enemy at Bady.--Battle
of Minsk.--The enemy suddenly evacuates his position.--Reflections on
this stage of the conflict.--Positions of the two armies.
The Russian main army, which, since the last of March had been on the
defensive, from weakness or from indecision, on the 23d of April began
to change its position, and to take the offensive. Having received
intelligence, as we may suppose, of the disasters of Sierawski, and
also of the passage of general Dwernicki into Volhynia, general
Diebitsch gave orders to the corps of Witt and Kreutz to pass the
Wieprz at Kock, and to attack our detachment at Zelechow, which was
forced to retire. On the same day, (23d) the brigade of colonel
Dembinski was attacked at Jeruzalem, without any decisive result. Those
small attacks by the enemy served, however, as an indication of the
intention of general Diebitsch to take the offensive on a larger scale.
To meet this intention, all our detachments received orders to hold
themselves in readiness. Firstly, these detachments were to concentrate
themselves upon a line of operations, between Kaluszyn, Siennica, and
Zelechow. [_The reader can refer to Plan_ VI.] The whole line, in case
of attack, on whatever quarter it might be, was to make a retrograde
movement, upon the same plan as heretofore, as far as the field of
Wawr. General Pac, in particular, who was the farthest removed from
Zelechow, was to use the utmost vigilance, and to make this retrograde
movement in the promptest manner, when occasion required.
On the 25th of April, in fact, marshal Diebitsch commenced his attack
at two principal points, Boimie and Kuflew. Upon the last of these
two points, he threw his greatest force, intending to pierce our line
there, and by a diversion at Minsk to divide our forces. Besides the
prevention of this design, the defence of Kuflew was of the greatest
importance to us from the circumstance that along the whole course of
the river Swider, at Latowicz, Starygrod, &c, were posted various small
detachments, which would have been cut off, if we should be forced to
make a sudden evacuation of that point.
COMBAT OF KUFLEW. [_See Plan_ XXIV.]
This combat deserved to be forever held up as an example in tactics,
to show how much can be done with a small force, managed with prudence
and skill. Colonel Dembinski, who, in this battle, commanded the
inconsiderable forces that met the attack of the masses of Diebitsch,
well merited the rank of general, to which he was then advanced. Our
position was covered by the river Swider (S) and its marshes, which
secured it from being taken in flank. The enemy had one debouchment
(_a_), consisting of a kind of dyke, which led from Kolacze (1). He
could pass this dyke easily, for the bridge was entire. On our side,
not far from this dyke, were small forests, or rather brush-wood,
occupied by two battalions (_b_) of our infantry. Upon the plain
between Kuflew and the river Swider, ten squadrons of our cavalry
(_c_) manoeuvred. Near the village (II) upon a little hill, on which
was a wind-mill, our artillery (_d_), consisting of only four pieces,
were posted, and directed their fire upon the passage over which the
enemy were to debouch. The position of the enemy was commanding, for
his artillery could sweep the whole plain on each side of the Swider.
The details of this battle were as follow:--At sunrise, on the 25th,
several regiments of cossacks (_e_) appeared upon the heights of
Jeruzalem. They even several times attempted to pass the dyke, but were
repulsed by the fire of our tirailleurs from the brush-wood. It was
mid-day when strong columns of infantry (_f_) began to show themselves
in the direction of Lukowiec and Plomieniec. In a short time all the
heights of Jeruzalem were covered with columns of infantry, and they
began their descent to Kolacze. The Russian light troops (_g_) began
their debouchment, and a warm fire commenced between the Russian
infantry upon the dyke, and our own tirailleurs in the brush-wood. The
Russian artillery (_h_) which remained upon the heights on the other
side, consisting of twenty and more pieces of large calibre, poured
for several hours a heavy fire upon Kuflew, where they supposed a
large force to be placed, but where, in fact, besides the four pieces
of artillery, we had but one company of infantry. Under this terrible
fire, that village was burnt to the ground. Those attacks of the
Russian artillery and infantry continued for three successive hours,
when colonel Dembinski, being informed that the small detachments at
Latowicz, &c, above referred to, had evacuated their position and were
safe from being cut off, commenced his retreat, as his instructions
directed. By accelerating his retreat he had another object in view,
namely, to lead the enemy in the direction of the 2d division, which
was posted at Ceglow, and was prepared to receive him. Our infantry and
artillery had left their position and were on the road, when colonel
Dembinski, placing himself at the head of his cavalry, threw himself
with great boldness upon the columns of the enemy which had debouched
over the dyke, and by repeated attacks kept them off from our rear.
After having passed the first forest without molestation, between
Ceglow and Kuflew, colonel Dembinski took a position, between forests,
in the environs of Bady, where a part of the 2d division was placed
in expectation of the enemy, in a kind of ambuscade. Here our forces
waited in vain until night for the enemy, who had contented himself
with having taken Kuflew. Two squadrons of cossacks, whom he ventured
to send towards our position, to reconnoitre, were, as soon as they
were seen, fallen upon by our cavalry, and either cut down or made
prisoners, to the amount of more than a hundred men and horses, with
two officers. As the enemy attempted nothing more, our forces, during
the night, evacuated their position, agreeably to instructions, and
reached Minsk at 3, A.M. of the next day. At Kuflew, full 40,000 men,
with some twenty pieces of artillery, and commanded by Diebitsch in
person, were opposed to general Dembinski, who had not quite 4,000 men
and four pieces of artillery, with which force he stood against the
enemy for that whole day. The loss of the Russians was about a thousand
men, and on our own side it was not fifty.
[Illustration:
_XXIV._]
[Illustration:
_XXV._]
The actions which took place on the same day at Boimie, were without
any decisive result, consisting only of a continued fire of artillery.
During the night of that day, our forces in every point made a
retrograde movement. The general in chief arranged his preparations
to receive the enemy on the 26th, dividing his forces into two parts.
The second division under Gielgud, and the division of cavalry, under
Skarzynski, was to await the enemy at Minsk; while the general in
chief, with the main body, awaited him in person at Dembe-Wielke.
BATTLE OF MINSK. [_See Plan_ XXV.]
The position of Minsk may be considered as one of the strongest upon
the great road from Siedlce to Warsaw. That town is situated in a
plain, surrounded by an impenetrable forest, and traversed by a small
river, which falls into the Swider. Upon the side of Warsaw, where
our forces were placed, are heights which overlook the whole town,
and they were particularly commanding upon the right of the roads
leading to Warsaw. The fire from those heights could sweep almost every
street of the city, and they were occupied by twenty-four pieces of
artillery (_a_). Upon the side of Siedlce and Ceglow, whence the enemy
was approaching, the whole plain was exposed to the commanding fire of
this artillery. The town of Minsk was occupied by two battalions of our
light infantry, dispersed as sharp shooters (_b_).
It was mid-day when the Russians (_c_) (_d_) debouched from the forest,
commenced their advance, and deployed upon the plain under the fire
of our artillery, which was opened immediately. Some fifty pieces of
the enemy's artillery, (_e_) approached the city, took position, and
commenced their fire. As the town was occupied by so small a force,
and so distributed as not to be affected by the enemy's fire, he was
permitted to continue this fire, and our artillery reserved theirs for
the moment when he should make a general advance to storm the town.
This soon took place. An enormous mass of infantry (_f_) advanced to
the assault. Our light troops evacuated the part of the town beyond
the river, to enable our artillery to open upon it. That part was
immediately occupied by the enemy, who, crowded together in the
streets, were subjected to a fire which spread death among their ranks.
The enemy hesitated whether to advance or retire, and remained in the
utmost disorder, falling under the fire of our artillery and the torn
and burning fragments of the wooden buildings which were rent in pieces
by that fire. While the enemy remained in this horrible suspense, the
brave colonel Oborski led his regiment to the charge, and bore down
all before him. A most terrible massacre, at the point of the bayonet,
then took place in the Square of the Church (_g_), where great masses
of the enemy were crowded together. The Russians were driven out of
the town after a most severe loss. They were left at liberty to take
possession of the same part again, but they did not repeat their
attacks upon the town, satisfying themselves with concentrating a heavy
fire of artillery principally upon the heights occupied by our own.
This state of things continued till three o'clock, when general Gielgud
gave orders to evacuate the position, agreeably to the directions of
the general in chief. Sixteen squadrons of cavalry were left to cover
the movement, and in this way our division, reaching the village of
Stoiadly, two English miles distant, took a second position there.
This new position was advantageous, on account of the elevation of
the ground. Our right wing, in particular, was well supported upon a
thick marshy forest, and was pushed forward far enough to give a cross
fire to the enemy, in case he should try to force the passage of the
great road. As the enemy was so imprudent, after our evacuation, as to
commence his debouchment through the town, with his cavalry in advance,
he exposed himself to a severe loss; for our artillery, consisting
of six pieces, poured a destructive fire upon the main street of the
city, which led to the only passage over the river; and again, after
deploying under this fire upon the plain, he was subjected to vigorous
charges from our cavalry under Skarzynski, which cost him a severe
loss, and delayed his advance for more than half an hour. As the space
between Stoiadly and Minsk was a plain gently descending from our side,
moist in the lower parts, and in every way favorable for attacks by
our cavalry, their charges were continually repeated, and the combat
on this plain deserved the name of the combat of cavalry. To give the
reader an idea of these effective charges against a cavalry of much
superior force, I will merely state that each squadron of the sixteen,
was engaged some three or four successive times with the enemy. Their
horses were continually in foam. The regiment of Zamoyski, the Krakus,
and the 5th Hulans greatly distinguished themselves. The loss of the
enemy's cavalry, of which the greater part consisted of regiments of
heavy dragoons, was very great. Their horses hoofs sunk into the humid
ground, and our Krakus, on their light animals, assaulted them in the
very midst of their ranks. Many staff and other officers of the enemy
were left dead upon the field. Our advanced guard having, in this way,
fought with such advantages, against the whole Russian army, at Minsk
and Stoiadly, from mid-day until 5, P.M.; the general in chief ordered
them to evacuate their position as promptly as possible, and retire to
Dembe-Wielke, where he awaited the enemy in order of battle, and where
he was desirous of meeting his attack before night. This movement was
executed without molestation from the Russians. Our advanced guard
passed the forests between Dembe-Wielke and Stoiadly, and arrived at
the position of Dembe-Wielke, where fifty pieces of our artillery
were posted to receive the enemy, and our whole force took the order
of battle. The enemy, however, did not debouch from the forests, but
remained on the other side. This finishes the details of that day and
of the battle of Minsk, in which the early cessation of the attacks of
the enemy proved how much he had suffered. He had two generals mortally
wounded, general Pahlen and the prince Galiczyn, and lost nearly 4,000
men. On our side the loss was four or five hundred only.
For their conduct in this battle, the National Government and the
general in chief presented their thanks to the 2d division under
Gielgud and the division of cavalry under Skarzynski. General Gielgud
was advanced to the rank of general of division, and it was perhaps
owing to his skilful dispositions and brave conduct on that day, that
it was not feared to entrust him with the command of the all important
expedition to Lithuania.
On the 27th and 28th, no events took place. During the night of the
28th, the enemy, to our astonishment, evacuated his position and
retired as far as Kaluszyn, twenty-four English miles distant. We
cannot give the true cause of this sudden and unexpected retreat.
Perhaps it was on account of a failure of provisions. Another cause
might have been the rumors, which had begun to take an aspect of
importance, of the revolutions in Lithuania and Samogitia.
The reader will allow me to dwell for a moment upon this extraordinary
movement of the enemy, which must be considered an indication, either
of the extreme of physical and moral weakness to which the Russian
army was reduced, or of a great want of generalship on the part of
marshal Diebitsch. Such a course, voluntarily taken, in the eyes of the
military critic, is enough to destroy all claim to military talent on
the part of that commander. Such great objects attempted, followed up
with so little perseverance, and abandoned without an adequate cause,
would seem to indicate either the absence of any fixed plan, or a
degree of indecision inconsistent with any sound military pretensions.
Our commander in chief felt sure that when general Diebitsch attacked,
on the 25th, and 26th, it was with the view, having no longer any fear
of the corps of generals Dwernicki and Sierawski, and being reinforced
by the corps which had been opposed to the former, to follow up his
attack and compel us to a general battle. Whatever might have been the
result of that battle, it was the only course which a true general
could have followed, especially when his army was in such superiority
of strength. To one who considers these circumstances, two questions
will arise. First, what was the object of commencing the attack?
Secondly, what was, in regard to tactics, the cause of its cessation,
and of that sudden retreat? It will be very difficult to find a
satisfactory answer to either of those questions.[56]
Our army, after this retreat of the enemy, commenced anew its advance,
and, on the 30th, it occupied again its former position at Boimie, on
the river Kostrzyn. At this time, our left wing under Uminski, which,
as the reader is aware, was on the right bank of the Narew, at the
environs of Pultusk, received orders to join the main army, leaving
a detachment at Zagroby, where the generalissimo ordered a strong
bridge-head to be erected.
The position of the two armies on the 30th was as follows. [_Plans_
VI _and_ XXIX.] Our army was again concentrated between Wengrow and
Ceglow, and indeed Wengrow was occupied by a small detachment. The
centre or the greater force was on the main road at Kaluszyn. Its
advanced posts were along the banks of the river Kostrzyn at Grombkowo,
Strzebucza, and Boimie. Our right wing was again posted upon the river
Swider, between Karczew and Ceglow. The Russian army was concentrated
in the environs of Mordy and Sucha, where marshal Diebitsch entrenched
himself in a fortified camp, and took again a defensive attitude.
The corps of Kreutz and Witt were in the environs of Pulawy, and the
Russian imperial guard advanced to the environs of Pultusk.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 56: In the whole of this war, the videttes of the two armies
were at no time so near as they were after this last battle. On the
27th and 28th, those of the Russian cavalry, cossacks and hussars,
occupying the main road, were within fifty paces of the videttes of
our lancers, so near in fact that they could have conversed together.
On having this circumstance reported to him, the general in chief did
not take advantage of any attack, but ordered the utmost forbearance
to be observed, and the most friendly demonstrations to be made by our
outposts. On changing of the guard, our sentinels, as they quitted
their post, bade a friendly adieu to the opposite sentinel of the
enemy; and under the cover of night, the enemy's sentinels, and even
some of their officers, approached our videttes, gave their hands,
and entered into friendly conversation. It was touching to see those
brave soldiers deeply affected at such meetings. With tears in their
eyes, the Russians could only repeat that they had been forced to
this contest, and confessed that, even if we should be conquerors,
they would be the gainers in other respects. They also uttered their
complaints of the tyranny and the privations to which they were
subjected, and our lancers gave them all the relief which their own
means could furnish.]