Position of the two armies after the battle of Iganie.--Plan
of a simultaneous attack upon the Russian forces upon opposite
sides.--Instructions to the different corps.--Operations on the
enemy's front.--Unfortunate operations of general Sierawski, and
the _first defeat_.--Details of those operations.--Operations of
general Dwernicki.--He defeats Rudiger; but by a false operation
exposes himself to be attacked disadvantageously by two Russian
corps.--In the course of the action the Austrian frontier is passed
by the combatants.--An Austrian force interposes, and general
Dwernicki consents to go into camp.--His arms and prisoners are
taken from him, while the enemy is permitted to leave the territory
freely.--Reflections on the conduct of Austria.--Consequences of the
loss of Dwernicki's corps.--The cholera makes its appearance in the
two armies.
The positions of the two armies, [_See Plan_ XXII,] were now as
follows:--The Russian army was divided into four principal bodies,
having no communication with each other. First, their main body (_a_),
consisting of about 60,000 men and 130 pieces of cannon, were between
Lukow (1) and Cock (2). Secondly, the remains of the corps of Rosen
and Giesmar (_b_) were at Siedlce (3). They could be counted at about
20,000 men and perhaps 50 pieces of cannon. Thirdly, at Ostrolenka (4)
was the Imperial guard (_c_), consisting of 18,000 men and 36 cannon.
Fourthly, in the palatinate of Lublin, were the combined corps of Witt
and Kreutz (_d_), consisting of 30,000 men and 60 pieces of cannon.
Their different scattered detachments might be counted at 10,000 men.
This separation of their different corps invited a sudden attack on
either, before it could receive succor from the others.
[Illustration:
_XXII. p. 234_]
[Illustration:
_XXIII. p. 243._]
Our main body (_e_), composed of four divisions of infantry,
and three of cavalry, making in all about 30,000 men and 80 pieces
of cannon, was placed between Iganie (5) and Siennica (6). Our
reconnoissances were pushed along the left bank of the river Liwiec
(L), as far as its junction with the river Bug (B). On the right, those
reconnoissances reached Zelechow (7). This was nearly the same as our
first position, and it was strong. Besides this main force, was the
division of cavalry of general Uminski (_f_) upon the right bank of
the Narew, at Nasielsk (8), amounting to 3,200 horse and 24 pieces of
artillery, placed there to observe the Russian guard. In the environs
of Pulawy (9) was a small partizan corps, under the command of general
Sierawski (_g_), with 3,000 men and four pieces of cannon. The corps
of general Dwernicki (_h_) was in the environs of Zamosc, (10) and
consisted of 4500 men, and 30 pieces of cannon. This corps, though at
a distance from the rest of our forces, could not be cut off, having
the fortress of Zamosc as a _point d'appui_. If the reader will examine
a map of the country, or even the small plan in the preceding pages
[_No._ VI, _or_ XXII,] he will be satisfied that by our forces, small
as they were, the Russian army was already surrounded, and that on the
least advantage which Dwernicki, in conjunction with Sierawski, might
gain over Witt and Kreutz, that army could have been taken in the rear,
by means of a diversion upon Kock (2) and Radzyn (11). In a word, the
moment approached at which our commander had determined to give the
enemy a last decisive blow, by attacking him at the same time on every
side; and for this object, the following instructions and orders were
given.
First. The generalissimo renewed the order for strengthening the
fortifications of Warsaw and Praga, as well as those on the whole
plain of Grochow. From the first day of April, as many as 5000 Russian
prisoners were continually employed upon those fortifications.
Warsaw, which was already, as the reader is informed, defended by
a girdle of lunettes and redoubts, communicating with each other,
received the additional defence in some places of block-houses. To
strengthen the fortifications of Praga, besides the bridge-head, there
were constructed, within the distance of an English mile, a line of
circumvallation, which could hold more than twelve thousand men. Still
farther, at a distance of two miles beyond, or nearly upon the field of
Grochow, was constructed a third line of lunettes and redoubts, which
occupied the whole distance from Kawenczyn to the marshes of Goclaw,
or the entire field of battle of Grochow, as seen in the plan of that
battle. In fine, the approach to Praga was so defended, that the
enemy, before reaching it, would have to pass three different lines of
fortification. The general in chief gave instructions to the governor
of Warsaw in regard to the defence of the city, in which he placed his
chief trust upon the national guard. The guard counted it an honor to
be entrusted with this duty, and were unwilling that a single soldier
of the regular army should be detailed for the service. How admirably
they executed their noble resolutions, when the occasion came, is
probably well known to every reader.
After his plans for the defence of Warsaw were communicated to the
authorities of the city, he gave particular attention to those points
on which he intended to support all his operations, and, relying on
which, he could at any time hazard the boldest attempts. Having thus
made Warsaw an axis, upon which all his operations could revolve, he
proceeded to arrange his attack. In the first place he sent orders
to general Dwernicki (_h_) to attack immediately the combined corps
of generals Witt and Kreutz (_d_). In this attack the small corps of
general Sierawski (_g_) was to aid, and the two corps were to preserve
a constant communication with each other. For that object general
Sierawski was to pass the Vistula at Kazimierz (12), and, avoiding an
engagement with the enemy, to endeavor to join, as soon as possible,
the corps of general Dwernicki, who received orders to leave Zamosc and
approach Lublin (13). These two corps were to take such a position,
that they could at any time retire upon Zamosc or Kazimierz. General
Dwernicki was also informed that a third small corps would be sent in
the direction of Zelechow (7) and Kock (2), to act in concert with him
on the enemy's rear. If they should succeed in the attack, general
Dwernicki was to endeavor to force the enemy to take the direction of
Pulawy (9), to drive him into the angle formed by the Vistula (V) and
the Wieprz (P); in fine, so to act as to cut off those two corps from
all communication whatever with their main body. Leaving the corps
of general Sierawski to continue to observe them, and to push his
advantages over them, Dwernicki himself was to pass the Wieprz at Kock,
and from thence by forced marches to leave in the direction of Radzyn
(11) for Lukow (1) or Seroczyn (14), as circumstances might direct,
and according as he should ascertain the position of the enemy to be.
Arrived at Lukow or Seroczyn, as the case might be, he was to await
there the orders of the general in chief, to join in the attack upon
the main force of the enemy under Diebitsch (_e_), in which attack he
was to act on the enemy's left wing. The main body of the enemy, thus
taken in front and in flank, simultaneously, could not but have been
broken up. For all these operations the general in chief had destined
fourteen days only.
On the night of the battle of Iganie, the general in chief having
decided upon the above plan, sent officers in every direction with
orders and instructions. The officers sent to the corps of general
Dwernicki were enjoined to communicate their orders to him with the
utmost haste.
The generalissimo, while making his preparations for this last blow,
continued an unremitting observation upon all the movements of the
enemy, even to the minutest details, and in order that the enemy
might be constantly occupied, and diverted from suspecting our plans,
he directed small attacks to be continually made upon his front. For
this object the second division, posted at Siennica, received orders
to advance to the small town of Jeruzalem. The division, in executing
that order, fought the enemy for three successive days, the 12th,
13th and 14th of April, at Jedlina, Wodynie, and Plomieniece, and
always with advantage. In one of those attacks, at Jedlina, a small
detachment of sixteen Krakus attacked a squadron of Russian hussars,
coming from Wodynie, dispersed them, and took some twenty prisoners.
This division received also the order to communicate constantly with
the corps of general Pac at Zelechow. This last general was to send
continual reconnoissances towards Kock, to keep a constant observation
upon the Russian corps of Kreutz and Witt. Of the movements of those
two corps, the generalissimo was each day to receive the most accurate
information, in order to be ready prepared to prevent, at any moment,
a junction which might be attempted between those corps and their main
body.
General Skrzynecki, seeing that the enemy had fallen into his plan, (of
which, indeed, he could not have had the least suspicion,) and full
of the brightest hopes, waited impatiently in his strong position,
for intelligence from general Dwernicki, and the approach of the
moment for his attack upon Diebitsch. Almost sure of the successful
execution of his admirable arrangements, what can express his
disappointment on hearing of the unfortunate operations of the corps
of general Sierawski, and of the defeat of that corps at Kazimierz in
the palatinate of Lublin, _the first defeat in the whole war_. That
general, in neglecting the instructions of the commander in chief, not
to engage with the enemy, on account of the inferiority of his own
forces, (with which forces in fact he could not expect to act but in
partizan warfare,) approached Lublin, where the two corps of Kreutz and
Witt were supposed to be posted, while his orders were, by avoiding
those corps, and taking the most circuitous roads, to endeavor to
join as secretly and as soon as possible, the corps of Dwernicki. He
was probably deceived by false information as to the direction of the
enemy's corps, and led to believe that those two corps had quitted
Lublin, to attack general Dwernicki at Zamosc. He therefore probably
took the direction of Lublin, with the idea of acting upon the rear of
the enemy at the moment of his attack upon Dwernicki. In this manner
general Sierawski, quitting Kazimierz, arrived on the 16th of April at
Belzyca. To his great astonishment he found there a strong advanced
guard of the above mentioned corps. To avoid compromitting himself, he
engaged with this advanced guard, when, observing the very superior
force and the advantageous position of the enemy, he ordered a retreat,
which retreat was well executed and without much loss. This general
should have continued his march the whole night, with as little delay
as possible, in order to repass quietly the Vistula, and thus be
protected from all molestation by the enemy. But, for what cause it
is almost impossible to conjecture, he awaited the enemy in order of
battle the next day, at Serauow. Perhaps, finding himself in rather a
strong position, he thought that the corps of general Dwernicki might
arrive to his aid. The enemy approached the next day with his whole
force against Sierawski, and as warm an action commenced as the nature
of the ground would admit, it being covered by woods with patches of
open ground intervening. Some squadrons of young Kaliszian cavalry,
led by the general himself, advanced to the attack of the enemy's
artillery, which being disadvantageously posted, was exposed to be
captured. That cavalry, however, by a false direction of their charge,
fell among the concealed masses of the enemy's infantry, and their
attack failed.
This unsuccessful attack had unfortunate results. The corps of general
Sierawski was obliged to evacuate its position, and along its whole
retrograde march continual attacks of the enemy were pressed upon
it. The peculiar nature of the ground, and the extreme brevity of
general Sierawski, a veteran of between sixty and seventy, who, at
the head of the detachments of his rear guard always led the charges
against the enemy, and held him in check, was all that saved the corps
from destruction. At length the corps reached Kazimierz, the point
which it had left; and here again, instead of passing the Vistula,
Sierawski awaited another attack from the overwhelming force of the
enemy, and that too with only the half of his corps, for the other
half was sent to pass the Vistula. This course was inexplicable, and
excited much remark in the army. On the 18th, the Russians reached
Kazimierz. The town was vigorously attacked by them, and their assaults
were repeatedly repulsed by the new Kazimierz infantry, under colonel
Malachowski, who, with a scythe in his hand, marched at their head. But
the death of that brave patriot spread among the ranks of those new
soldiers a degree of disorder, and the city was taken by the enemy.
We must again thank general Sierawski for having saved the rest of
the corps from ruin; having executed the evacuation of the town with
such order that he passed the Vistula at the point of Borowa, not far
from Kazimierz, without being molested in the attempt. He then took a
position on the left bank.
Although the unfortunate affairs of those two days were not attended
by severe losses, yet they were deeply afflictive to the general in
chief. They threatened the entire disarrangement of his plans, and were
followed by the more important disasters of general Dwernicki. The
latter general, who, as is known to the reader, commenced his career
so gloriously; whose very name, indeed, was a terror to the Russians,
and who, by his successive victories over the three corps of Kreutz,
Wirtemberg, and Rudiger, had established the strongest claims upon the
gratitude of his country,--this general, I must repeat it with pain,
finished his great career in the most unfortunate manner. His case
should serve as a strong example, that it is not bravery alone which is
required in a great general, for in that it would be difficult to find
his equal, but that this bravery loses its value when not united with
circumspection.
The following are the details of the operations of general Dwernicki.
[_See Plan No._ XXIII.] We cannot well imagine the cause which
induced that general to quit Zamosc (1), and the important operations
in the palatinate of Lublin, and, neglecting all his instructions
and orders, to have crossed the Bug (B) and entered the province of
Volhynia, unless it were the reception of some certain news of a fresh
insurrection in that province, and of the collection of insurgent
forces there, who might be waiting for his approach, and who needed
his protection. He might, perhaps, have thought to be able so to
accelerate his movement as to avail himself of such new strength before
a superior Russian force should arrive in that province to crush such
insurrection, and disperse the insurgents. At the moment when Dwernicki
might have conceived such a plan, there was, in fact, only a corps of
about 12,000 men and some 20 pieces of cannon, under Rudiger, in the
province. This corps, Dwernicki perhaps intended to attack, in his
way, and crush them, and then attaching the insurgents to his corps, to
return to the palatinate, or if circumstances might make it expedient,
to follow up his blow into the heart of Volhynia. In fine, on the 15th
of April, this general quitted the environs of Zamosc, taking the
direction of Uscilog (2), where, on the evening of the 16th, he passed
the river Bug. On the 17th he continued his march in the direction of
Dubno (3), where the insurgents were perhaps supposed to be awaiting
him. On the road to that town he received information that the corps of
Rudiger had marched from Radziwilow (4) and was now in the direction of
Milatyn (5). General Dwernicki turned immediately from the direction in
which he was marching, to throw himself upon this corps, which he found
on its march, at the village of Boromel (6), where, without giving the
enemy time to take position, he attacked and overthrew him. The enemy
was routed, and lost several hundred in killed and prisoners, with
eight pieces of cannon. That in this fine, and the last fine battle
of Dwernicki, the Russian corps was not wholly destroyed, was owing
to the circumstance that a branch of the river Styr (S), over which
the bridge had been destroyed, stopped our pursuit. The Russians,
during the night of the 18th, evacuated their position, and took the
road to Beresteczko (7), where they took a new position. In regard to
tactics, the corps of general Rudiger could not have chosen a worse
direction than that of the angle formed by the river Styr, and the
frontier of Austria (F). General Dwernicki, by a passage to the right
bank of the Styr, could have cut off all the enemy's communications
with his other corps, and could have again fought him at the greatest
advantage. It was here then that our brave Dwernicki committed his
great fault, and in place of acting upon the right bank of the river,
where he would have had an open field for the most enlarged operations,
he chose to follow up the attack; and as he saw that the enemy could
not be safely assailed in front, on account of his strong position
between two small lakes, but found that this position was open towards
the frontier of Austria,--there it was that the unhappy idea occurred
to him, of marching to the environs of Kolodno (8), on the frontier
of Austria, and attacking the enemy on that side, feeling sure of
victory. But general Rudiger did not wait for this attack. Perceiving
his exposed position between the river and the frontier, he was
satisfied with being permitted to escape, and declined battle. Upon
observing that general Dwernicki was manoeuvring upon the frontiers of
Austria, general Rudiger repassed the Styr, avoided the attack by this
manoeuvre, and was in a situation to join himself with all the Russian
detachments which might come into the province from the heart of
Russia, by the different directions of Krzemieniece, Ostrog, &c, and to
act with them in surrounding Dwernicki, who was confined in this above
described angle. This is what in fact took place.
Dwernicki remained, for what reason we cannot conceive, at Kolodno
until the 23d of April, whence, following along the frontiers of
Austria, he took the direction of Wereszczaki (9). There dispersing
a Russian detachment, he arrived on the 26th at Knielce and Wielkie
(10). Knowing that the Russians were observing him, he determined to
remain there and take advantage of a strong natural position. He wished
in this position to await the enemy and give him battle, hoping by
a victory to free himself from the contracted space in which he was
confined. In fact, on the next day, the corps of general Rudiger (_b_)
made its appearance, having come in the direction of Krzemienic (11).
The battle commenced, and in the midst of the action another Russian
corps (_c_) was seen approaching in the direction of Proskirow (12)
and Stary-Konstantynow (13) under the command of general Rott, acting
thus upon the right wing and even the rear of general Dwernicki's
corps. To avoid being turned, general Dwernicki retired in such a
manner as to lean his right wing upon the Austrian frontier. The
Russians, not regarding this, passed that frontier, and proceeded to
push their attack upon his flank. This obliged general Dwernicki to
withdraw his left wing, and indeed his whole front, upon the Austrian
territory, where, in fact, the line was not distinctly marked, all
the while being engaged with the enemy. The action having continued
thus for some hours, a detachment of Austrian cavalry, under colonel
Fac, approached and threw themselves between the combatants, calling
on them to respect the neutrality of the territory. In this manner
the combat ceased. General Dwernicki gave his parole to discontinue
hostilities, and consented to advance farther into the interior, and,
placing himself in camp, waited the result of the decision of the
Austrian government upon what had occurred. The Russian corps, which
had just passed the frontier, and which had in fact entered it with
its whole force, was permitted to leave freely. The first duty which
general Dwernicki thought imposed upon him in his present situation,
was to make a full and true report of what had occurred to the National
Government and the general in chief, which he was permitted to do. He
also sent a letter to the commander in chief of the Austrian forces
in Gallicia, explaining how it was that, in a necessary manoeuvre he
had passed over a point of land on the Austrian territory without
the intention of occupying it. Having done this, he supposed that he
would be permitted to remain in camp, retaining his own arms, those
taken from the enemy, and his prisoners, until conferences between the
governments should decide respecting the course to be taken. But the
Austrian government, far from giving such a reasonable permission,
collected a strong corps in the environs of Tarnopol, and the Austrian
commander in chief demanded of general Dwernicki to surrender both his
own arms and those taken from the enemy. General Dwernicki, although
this Austrian corps was not formidable to him, yet being anxious to
avoid the serious political consequences which might possibly follow
resistance, submitted to this unjust demand, which will be an eternal
reproach to the Austrian government. The Austrians returned their arms
to the Russian prisoners, whom they liberated, and retained the arms of
the Polish troops. The whole corps was conducted into the interior, and
thus ended the career of that important body of our forces.[55]
The conduct of Austria, in regard to the corps of Dwernicki, I am sure
will excite the indignation of the reader. If general Dwernicki had
entered upon the Austrian territory, he was forced to do it by the
Russian corps, which had already passed the frontier; and that cannot
be regarded as an intentional invasion of the frontiers which was done
without design, and was a mere transition over an indistinct line,
made necessary by the position which the enemy had taken. Such a case
certainly should have formed an exception to a general rule. To the
Russian corps all the prisoners were returned, without any consent
obtained from our government, to whom they, in fact, belonged, and
should have been considered as belonging, until the end of the war.
It was in this manner that those intriguing cabinets repaid the debt
of gratitude which they owed to Poland. They had forgotten the times
of John Sobieski, who, in 1683, delivered their capital, and their
whole territory, from destruction at the hands of the Turks. They had
forgotten that they thus owe their very existence to Poland.
At present, regardless of all obligations of justice, they concert
with our enemy for our ruin. But if by this unjust treatment of their
benefactors, the Austrians may have gained some temporary advantages,
the reader will acknowledge that in reference to their ultimate good,
they have acted with a most short-sighted and mistaken policy. The
aggrandizement of Russia can never be an advantage to Austria.
There were few more melancholy events in our war than this. The
disaster of this corps grievously paralyzed all the fine plans of the
general in chief. It reinforced the Russian superior force by 40,000
men;--for the different corps of Kreutz, Witt, Rudiger and Rott, could
now rejoin their main army without obstruction.
To these disasters of the two corps of Dwernicki and Sierawski, which
were deeply felt by the nation, was now to be added the appearance of
that horrible malady, the cholera, which after the battle of Iganie
commenced its devastations in our ranks. On the night of that battle
several hundreds of our troops fell sick. This terrible disease caused
us, on the first few days, the loss of nearly 1,000 men; but if it
was terrible with us, nothing can express the suffering it produced
in the Russian camp, aided by the want of comfort in the arrangements
of that camp, and the acid food upon which the Russian soldiers were
habitually fed. Thousands of those wretched sufferers were left exposed
to the open air, and died upon the field. The Poles took even more
care of them than of their own sick. They were brought together, and
transported to Menie, where there was a large convent, which was turned
into an hospital for their use. The total number of those sufferers
may be imagined, when it is stated, that, in that hospital and village
alone, two thousand Russian sick were reported.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 55: This unfortunate and painful event should serve as an
impressive example, which cannot be too often brought to mind, of
what disastrous consequences may follow from the neglect of observing
a constant communication between corps acting together, and, above
all, the departing from orders which are given upon a general plan,
the absolute control of which should belong to the general in chief.
Had general Dwernicki, conforming to his instructions, acted only
against the corps of Kreutz and Witt, and in concert with the corps
of Sierawski, he would have been apprised of that general's quitting
Kazimierz, and both of those two corps could have joined in the attack,
in which they would have been aided by another corps which was to be
sent, as the reader is aware, to act against the enemy's rear. If those
corps of Kreutz and Witt had been defeated, immense advantages would
have followed; indeed the war would have been over, for the Russian
main army would have been taken in flank and rear, and, in fact,
completely cut off.]