Plan of operation against the two corps of Rosen and Kreutz.--Battle
of Iganie.--Reflections on the state of the Polish cause after the
victory of Iganie.--Review of the course of the campaign.--Condition
of the Russian army.--Discontents in Russia.--Representations of the
Senate at St Petersburgh to the Emperor.--Comparative view of the
forces of the two armies at the present stage of the conflict.
Marshal Diebitsch, as is known to the reader, was forced, by our
victories of the 31st of March and the 1st of April, to abandon his
plan of passing the Vistula opposite to Kozienice, and to think of
nothing farther at present, than of saving the two corps of Rosen and
Giesmar, and the guard. He was so far separated from them while between
Kock and Ryk, where he then was, that by a prompt diversion on our
part, by Lukow, he might have lost those corps, and it was in fear of
this, that he hastened to arrive as soon as possible to their succor at
Siedlce. Our general in chief thought to anticipate this movement, and
to throw himself upon the combined corps of Giesmar and Rosen, before
Diebitsch should reach them.[52]
[Illustration:
_XX. p 220_]
[Illustration:
_XXI. p. 224_]
BATTLE OF IGANIE. [_See Plans_ XX _and_ XXI.]
On the 9th of April, the Russian army was nearly in the same position
as we have last described them. The main body, under marshal Diebitsch,
were in the environs of Kock, and the combined corps of Rosen and
Giesmar [_Plan_ XX, (_a_)], were upon the small river Kostrzyn (_b_),
at Boimie. Our army also had not changed its position.
The following were the dispositions for the attack. The reader, on
examining the plan, will see that the two corps opposed to our forces,
which were at Latowicz (_c_), were too far advanced, which exposed
them to be turned on their left wing, and even taken in the rear, if
our forces there should succeed in driving back the forces (_e_) of
the enemy on the road (_d_) from Latowicz by Wodynie to Siedlce. To
execute this movement the order was given that when the first division
of infantry (_f_), supported by twenty-four pieces of cannon, should
commence the attack upon the great road opposite Boimie, the third
division (_g_), having with them the brigade of cavalry of Kicki,
should leave the position at Latowicz before day-break, and take the
direction of Wodynie, to attack the forces which it might find there;
but if those forces should be found greatly superior, the division
was to remain in a strong position at Jeruzalem (_h_). If it should
succeed in driving back the enemy's forces, it was to take the road on
the left, leading from Wodynie through Iganie (_i_) to Siedlce. Every
effort was to be directed to the point of arriving as soon as possible
upon the dyke (_k_) at Iganie, which leads over the marshes of the
river Sucha (_l_). By a prompt manoeuvre of this kind, the enemy could
not, as we have said, escape being turned. For the better execution
of this plan, the enemy was to be harassed on the main road, in order
that general Prondzynski, who was to command the expedition to Wodynie,
might have time to manoeuvre upon the enemy's flank.
A division of cavalry (_m_), under the command of general Stryinski,
was to leave Boimie, and take a direction on the left, towards the
village of Gruszki, to pass there the fords of the river Kostrzyn, and
in case of the retreat of the enemy, to fall upon his right wing.
Having issued these instructions, and confided the command of the
little corps which was to act upon the enemy's left wing at Wodynie,
to general Prondzynski, the general in chief left himself for Boimie,
to lead the attack in person upon the main road. As was the case
in the position at Boimie, [_Refer to Plan_ II,] we were separated
from the enemy by the marshes of the river Kostrzyn. The two ruined
bridges upon the dyke not permitting either ourselves or the enemy
to pass, general Skrzynecki contented himself with opening a fire of
artillery upon the Russian position, in order to occupy the attention
of the enemy, while preparations were making to repair the bridges
sufficiently to admit a passage.
The moment that the work of reconstructing the bridges was to be put
in execution, was to be decided by the time and the direction in
which the fire of general Prondzynski should be heard. If the latter
general should succeed on the enemy's flank, then, of course, the
bridges were to be reconstructed, if not, they were to remain in their
present state to obstruct the passage of the enemy. Several hours
were occupied by this fire of artillery, and slight manoeuvres of the
light troops, when at last, between eight and nine o'clock, the fire
of general Prondzynski was heard, who had evidently passed Wodynie,
and had begun acting on the enemy's flank. This was the signal to
commence repairing the bridges. General Skrzynecki, with his suite,
superintended the work, and several battalions were employed in
bringing together the materials. A degree of consternation was observed
in the enemy's forces, in consequence of the attack on his flank, and
his columns began a movement; but his artillery continued in their
position, and commenced a terrible fire upon our men who were engaged
in reconstructing the bridges. The presence of mind, however, of the
general in chief, who exposed himself at the most dangerous points,
encouraged the men to persevere in their labors under this destructive
fire of artillery.[53] When the fire on his flank was at its height,
the enemy began to withdraw his artillery, and commenced a retreat. By
between 10 and 11 o'clock no part of the enemy's forces were remaining
upon the plain of Boimie; but, although the work of repairing the
bridges was pressed to the utmost, it was near two o'clock before they
could be brought to such a state as to admit the passage of artillery;
and although several battalions of the infantry had passed over before
this, they were not able, without too much exposure, to overtake the
enemy, who was in rapid retreat, leaving his cavalry as a rear guard.
It was not until the last mentioned hour, that the whole division
passed the bridges, and pressed forward at a rapid pace in the pursuit,
the cavalry advancing upon the trot. While this was taking place upon
the great road to Boimie, general Prondzynski [_Plan_ XXI, (A),]
who, according to his instructions, advanced to Wodynie, found there
a division of sixteen squadrons of Russian cavalry, whom he drove
from their position: he pursued them in the direction of Siedlce, and
reached the environs of Iganie, where he saw the corps of Rosen and
Giesmar (B) in full retreat. At this moment the position of general
Prondzynski was also critical; for, as the reader is already aware,
our main army was not in a condition to follow the enemy, on account
of the obstruction from the broken bridges. If the enemy had thrown
himself upon Prondzynski, they could have crushed him, and with their
other forces could have safely passed the dyke (_a_) at Iganie, before
our main forces, retarded as they were, could have arrived. This danger
was perceived by Prondzynski, and he therefore contented himself with
driving the division of Russian cavalry (C) from a position they had
taken upon the heights of Iganie, (a task which was bravely executed by
the cavalry of Kicki, and in which the colonel Mycielski was wounded)
and occupying that position himself, placing there the brigade of
Romarino to defend it.
It was between four and five o'clock that Prondzynski first perceived
our lancers (D) advancing upon the main road. A great part of the
enemy, particularly of their cavalry, had not yet passed the dyke
(_a_), being obstructed by their artillery. Generals Prondzynski and
Romarino, dismounting from their horses, with carbines in their hands,
placed themselves at the head of their columns, and commenced a fire
of artillery, to apprize our advancing cavalry of their position. At
the sound of this fire, the cavalry of Lubinski raised the hurrah,
rushed forward, and as they approached near the brigade of Romarino,
threw themselves at the charge upon that portion of the enemy's rear
guard which had not yet passed the dyke. Our infantry and cavalry thus
fell simultaneously upon them, the enemy were terribly cut up, and
the battle was gained. Nearly five Russian battalions, amounting to
4,000 men, with their officers, amounting to near one hundred, their
standards, and eight pieces of cannon of large calibre, were taken.
Six regiments of cavalry were dispersed, many of them were lost in the
marshes of the river into which they were driven, and several hundred
men and horse were taken prisoners there. In this battle, which may be
counted one of the finest in the campaign, the circumstance that our
main force was retarded by the state of the bridges, alone saved the
enemy from total ruin. It is to be remarked that the 2d division of
cavalry of general Stryinski, did not improve its time, and effected
nothing upon the right flank of the enemy, as the instructions
contemplated. The negligence of that general was inexcusable, and
the commander in chief deprived him of his command. We lost in this
battle about five hundred men, in killed and wounded. The brave general
Prondzynski was slightly wounded. Before night the two armies were not
at the distance of a cannon-shot from each other, but all was tranquil.
The disorder and consternation of the enemy may be imagined, when it is
stated that our columns took position before their eyes, on the field
of Iganie, without being in the least disturbed by them.
The reader will permit me to fix his attention upon the epoch of
the battle of Iganie, which was indeed the brightest moment of our
war, the moment of the highest success of the Polish arms, the
moment of the most confident hopes, when every Pole in imagination
saw his country already restored to her ancient glory. Let us then,
from this point, cast a look backwards to the commencement of this
terrible contest. Two months before, an enormous Russian force had
invaded our country, defended as it was by a mere handful of her
sons; and any one who had seen that immense army enter upon our soil,
could not but have looked on Poland with commiseration, as about to
be instantaneously annihilated. In this expectation, in fact, all
Europe looked on, and at every moment the world expected to hear of
the terrible catastrophe,--to see Poland again in chains, and the
Russian arms reposing on the borders of the Rhine. Such, in fact,
were the expectations and even the promises of marshal Diebitsch.
Providence, however, willed otherwise. The first shock of the Polish
arms with the Russians taught the latter what was the moral strength of
patriotism,--what a nation can do for love of country and of liberty.
The fields of Siedlce, Dobre, and Stoczek, the first witnesses of
our triumphs, and the grave of so many of our enemies, taught them
to respect the nation which they expected to subdue, made them
repent the audacity of having passed our frontiers, and gave them a
terrible presage of how dearly they would have to pay for this unjust
invasion of our soil. Battle upon battle was given, in which the
enemy were uniformly subjected to the severest losses. The two great
roads leading from different directions to Warsaw, on which they had
followed the Poles, were covered with their dead. Thus subjected to
loss at every step, the enemy reached at last the field of Praga, and
there collecting all his forces in one body, under a tremendous fire
of artillery he thought to overpower our small forces. But he failed
to do it. The immortal day of the 25th of February was nearly the
destruction of his enormous force, and, after fifteen days of severe
fighting, that great army, which was designed to destroy Poland and to
make Europe tremble, was brought to a state of extremity. The autocrat
and his general blushed at the menaces which they had uttered. Poland
believed that the former would reflect upon those bloody struggles
and the immense losses which he had suffered, and would be unwilling
to continue such sacrifices. Nearly 50,000 Russians were already
sacrificed. How many more lives might he not still lose? The Poles,
although conquerors, held out the hand of reconciliation, as the
letters that Skrzynecki addressed to Diebitsch have proved. In those
letters, written with the utmost cordiality, frankness, and directness,
he invited the Russian commander to present the real state of things to
the monarch, and to assure him that the Poles longed to put an end to
this fraternal struggle. A word of justice, of good will, indicative of
a disposition to act for the happiness of the nation, and to observe
the privileges which the constitution granted,--a word of this nature,
from the lips of the monarch, would have disarmed the Poles, blood
would have ceased to flow, and those arms outstretched for the fight,
would have thrown away the sabre, and would have been extended towards
him as to a father,--to him, the author of a happy reconciliation. He
would have been immortalized in history, and would have taken a place
by the side of Titus.
Far, however, from that true and noble course, that proud autocrat,
as well as his servant, Diebitsch, thought little of the thousands of
human beings he was sacrificing:--far from such magnanimous conduct, he
sent for other thousands to be sacrificed, to gratify his arrogance and
ambition. He contrives new plans to pass the Vistula. It was not enough
to have covered four palatinates with ruin on one side of that river.
He determines to spread devastation and ruin upon the other also:--in
fine, to attack Warsaw, and bury in its own ruins that beautiful
capital, the residence of the successors of Piast and Jagellow, and
where he himself could have reigned in tranquillity, by only having
been just and good. In the execution of this plan of destruction, he
was arrested and justly punished upon the glorious days of the 31st
of March and the 1st of April, which, in conjunction with the recent
revolutions in Lithuania and Samogitia, and the recent battle of
Iganie, seemed to threaten the ruin of his army.
The Russian army was now in a state of the greatest disaffection,
being posted in a devastated country, and having their resources for
subsistence entirely cut off by the state of Lithuania and Samogitia.
In addition to their immense losses in action, fatigue, sickness, and
other inconveniences had reduced them to a state of extreme distress.
Besides the influence of physical evils, there was a moral influence
which impaired their strength, arising from a conviction which they
could not avoid feeling, of the justice of the Polish cause. The
Russian soldiers began also to reflect, that by thus serving the ends
of despotism, they were only securing the continuance of their own
servitude. These reflections were not made by the army alone, but,
as we were secretly advised by persons coming from the interior of
Russia, they were made there also, and were accompanied with the same
sentiments of discontent. At St Petersburgh, as well as at Moscow,
various discontents were manifested, and notices of such must have
met the eye of the reader in the journals of the day. The senate of
St Petersburgh presented to the consideration of the monarch the
continual severe losses of the preceding years, in the wars with
Persia and Turkey, and those of this campaign, (though much underrated
by them,) which they had reason to fear would be still increased, and
which might encourage revolutions in all the provinces. For these
reasons the senate took upon themselves to advise some propitiatory
measures, and some attempt by concessions to satisfy the demands
of the Poles. The party most zealous in favor of such a course was
composed of those who had relations and friends exiled to Siberia, on
account of the revolutionary movement of 1825. The Russian patriots in
general, not only thought it a favorable moment to attempt to effect an
amelioration of the fate of those individuals, but they hoped that the
restoration of their ancient constitutional privileges and nationality
to the Polish provinces attached to Russia, would authorize a claim for
equal privileges to the people of the whole Russian empire.
To these circumstances, is to be added that at this time the other
cabinets began to feel dissatisfied at the course of Russia, and
decidedly refused the requests of aid in men and money which she made
on the pretext of former treaties. Every thing, in fine, seemed to
promise a near end of the present difficulties. The Polish army, to
whom this state of things was well known, waited impatiently for the
moment of a decisive contest. One victory more, and the Russians would
not be in a state to push their attempts farther. Nothing could then
stop the progress of our arms, which would rest on the borders of the
Dnieper, the only frontier known to our ancestors. One struggle more,
and the darkness of ages, which had hung over the Polish provinces
of the North, would be dispersed. The light of civilization would
then spread its rays as far as the Ural mountains, and with that
civilization a new happiness would cheer those immense regions. Upon
the borders of the Dnieper fraternal nations would hold out their hands
towards us, and there would be made the great appeal: 'Russians! why
all this misery? The Poles wish to deprive you of nothing. Nay, they
have even sacrificed their children for your good. Russians! awake to
a sense of your condition! You, like us, are only the unhappy victims
of the relentless will of those who find their account in oppressing
you and us. Let us end this struggle, caused by despotism alone. Let it
be our common aim to rid ourselves of its cruel power. It is despotism
alone that we have any interest in fighting against. Let us mark these
frontiers, which so much fraternal blood has been shed to regain,
by monuments, that shall tell posterity, that here ended forever
the contest between brothers, which shall recall the disasters that
despotism has caused, and be a memorial of eternal friendship between
us, and of eternal warning to tyranny.'
A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE FORCE OF THE TWO ARMIES AFTER THE BATTLE OF
IGANIE.
The Russian forces, which commenced the contest on the 10th of
December, amounted, as has been before stated, to about 200,000 men and
300 pieces of cannon. That army received two reinforcements, viz. the
corps of general prince Szachowski, consisting of 20,000 men, and 36
pieces of cannon; and the corps of the imperial guard, consisting also
of 20,000 men and 36 pieces of cannon. The whole Russian force, then,
which had fought against us, amounted to 240,000 men, and 372 pieces of
cannon.
To act against this force, our army, counting the reinforcements of
6000 men which it received before the battle of Grochow, had in service
about 50,000 men, and about 100 pieces of cannon. Up to the battle
of Iganie, fifteen principal battles had been given, viz. those of
Stoczek, Dobre, Milosna, Swierza and Nowawies, Bialolenka (on the 20th
and 24th), Grochow (on the 20th and 25th), Nasielsk, Pulawy, Kurow,
Wawr (on the 18th and 31st), Dembe-Wielkie and Iganie. To these are
to be added a great number of small skirmishes, in not one of which
could it have been said that the Russians were successful. By their
own official reports,--after the battle of Grochow, more than fifty
thousand Russians were _hors du combat_. It will not, then, be an
exaggeration to say, that their whole loss, taking into the account
prisoners and those who fell under the ravages of the cholera, which
had begun to extend itself in their army, must have amounted to between
80,000 and 100,000 men.[54] From the enormous park of artillery which
the Russians had brought against us, they lost as many as sixty
pieces. It may then be presumed that the Russian army remained at
between 130,000 and 150,000 men, and about 240 pieces of cannon, not
estimating, however, which it would be impossible to do, the number
of cannon which might have been dismounted. Our army, which was
reorganized at Warsaw, after its losses, was brought to about the same
state as at the commencement of the war, that is, about 40,000 strong.
The artillery was now augmented to 140 pieces.
Although the enemy's force was still sufficiently imposing, the reader
will permit me to say, (and in fact we did reasonably calculate thus)
that as we had fought with such success against the enemy in his
unimpaired strength, we might with confidence promise ourselves a
certain issue of the conflict in our favor, when, with his forces thus
diminished in numbers, sick, discouraged, and discontented, we could
meet him with the same and even a stronger force than that with which
we had already been victorious, animated too, as we now were, by the
inspiriting influence of our past success, and aided by the terror with
which our arms had inspired the enemy.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 52: Every military reader, who shall follow, with strict
attention, the plans of our general in strategy and tactics, will be
astonished, perhaps, that after such victories as those of the 31st of
March and 1st of April, he should have abandoned the advantages which
he might have gained, in following up, immediately, his operations
upon the two corps of Rosen and Giesmar, and then throwing himself
rapidly upon the superior forces of Diebitsch, which, after those corps
were cut off, could, by a simultaneous diversion upon Zelechow and
Lukow, [_See Plan_], have been attacked on both sides, and thrown into
confusion. Although I cannot give a satisfactory explanation of this
apparent fault, it must be considered, that those subsequent events
which give a color to the imputation, could not, perhaps, have then
been reasonably anticipated by the general; and the talent so uniformly
displayed by Skrzynecki should force us to suppose that there were some
conclusive objections to such a course, occurring to his mind, which
are not now apparent to the observer.]
[Footnote 53: No terms can express the admirable conduct of our
commander and his suite, who directed the work of reconstructing these
bridges, in person. The general and his officers all labored with their
own hands at this important task. Some of them were wounded. Our brave
soldiers, witnessing the fine example of their chief, shouted their
patriotic songs, as they worked, under this destructive fire. While a
party were placing some trunks of trees, a shell fell among them. To
have left their labor in order to avoid the danger, would have delayed
the work, they therefore remained in their places, and with the noise
of the explosion was mingled the shout of 'Poland forever!' Providence
granted that in that exposed labor our loss was very inconsiderable.]
[Footnote 54: I cannot pretend to give the reader an accurate idea
of the number of prisoners which were taken during the first days of
April. From the battle of Wawr to that of Iganie, not a day passed in
which great numbers of them, with baggage and effects of all kinds,
were not brought in. They must have amounted in that interval to full
16,000. Those prisoners arrived generally without escort, and it was
often the case that old men and even women of the peasantry were seen
leading them, or rather showing them the way,--two or three peasants,
perhaps, with twenty prisoners. This continual influx of prisoners gave
a name in fact to that interval of time, which was referred to, as 'the
Period of the Prisoners.' The inhabitants of Warsaw found an amusement
in witnessing this continual arrival of the captured Russians. 'Let us
go to Praga, to see the prisoners brought in,' was a proposition often
made, as referring to an ordinary recreation which might be counted on
with perfect certainty. If, for a half day, no prisoners appeared, the
complaint would be sportively made, 'What is Mr John about, (referring
to Skrzynecki) that he sends us no prisoners to-day?'
The great number of the prisoners engaged the attention of the national
government. It was impossible to leave them all at Warsaw; and they
were at first divided into three parts, one of which remained in Warsaw
to work upon the fortifications, and every soldier was paid for his
labor. The second part being also employed upon wages, labored on the
great roads leading from Warsaw, in a direction opposite to the seat
of the war. The third part were dispersed among the farmers in the
proportion of one Russian for three farmers; and these were also paid
for their labor. At stated times, an assemblage of the prisoners was
held, in which they were addressed in such a manner as to produce a
moral effect upon them. They were instructed in the true nature of
their political rights, the real causes of the contest were exhibited
to them, and they were made to be convinced that it was for their
advantage as well as our own that we were fighting.
The greatest harmony reigned between the Poles and their prisoners;
and I am sure that those Russians will remember the days they passed
as prisoners, as the happiest in their lives. With us their prison was
a state of freedom and tranquillity, in which they received a liberal
reward for their labor, while in their own country they were the slaves
of despots, great and little, to whom obedience was enforced by the
knout.]