Proceedings of the National Government.--Marshal Diebitsch
continues in a state of inactivity.--Negotiations are opened by
him.--His propositions are declined.--Position of the army on the
24th, and battle of Bialolenka.--Position on the 25th.--Great
battle of Grochow.--Details.--State of the Russian army after its
defeat.--Examination of the plan of the battle of Grochow.--Remarks
upon the course adopted by prince Radzivil after that victory.--The
Polish army crosses the Vistula to Warsaw.--Its reception by the
national government and the citizens.--Resignation of prince Radzivil.
Whilst the army was thus gloriously fighting, the national government
were laboring for the happiness of the people. Among other valuable
institutions, it adopted a paternal guardianship over the defenders of
the country by designating an allotment of lands for each soldier. Many
of the most wealthy families contributed of their landed property for
that object. Another act was to free the peasantry from the Corvee,
by purchasing the rights of the landholders over them. Each peasant
was made a proprietor, and for the landholders an arrangement of
compensation in the form of annual instalments for a period of years,
was made by the government. Other institutions for the public welfare,
as the establishment of schools, &c, received also the attention of the
government.
When, after so many battles, the Russian commander discontinued
his attacks, it may be supposed that besides the repose which his
army required, he had another object, viz. to wait the arrival of
new corps, consisting of 20,000 men, and 36 pieces of cannon, under
prince Sczachowski. He evidently wished to concentrate all his small
detachments and all his reserves, in order to strike, with his whole
force, a decisive blow; and the attempt was, in fact, soon made.
Our army, which in the ten preceding days had lost about six thousand
men, was reinforced by three regiments armed with pitchforks,
amounting to about the number we had lost. Our whole army, infantry
and cavalry, may have amounted to 40,000 men, and, with the pieces
taken from the enemy, 100 cannon.--The Russian army, with the new corps
of Sczachowski, amounted to 188,000 men and 316 pieces of cannon,
deducting the artillery which had been lost or dismounted.
Marshal Diebitsch, before commencing hostile operations, opened
negotiations, and, for this purpose, sent a general of division,
Witt, with a flag of truce to our head-quarters. This general was
stopped at our advanced post, whither general Krukowiecki was sent by
the commander in chief, with full powers, to meet him. General Witt
commenced with expressions of the greatest sensibility, and enlarged
much upon the friendship which ought to exist between the Poles and the
Russians as brother nations. He then spoke in very flattering terms
of the heroism of the Poles, lamenting that it was not displayed in a
better cause. After much complimentary language, he insensibly passed
to the ideas of duty and obedience to the monarch. General Krukowiecki,
who understood perfectly well all these professions, which he knew
to be insidious, answered nearly in the following laconic terms:
'General, after the sad circumstances which have taken place, after the
bloody combats to which we have been forced by the tyranny of fifteen
years, by the refusal of justice, and in fine by the violation of our
frontier, and the laying waste of our territory,--upon this territory
we can make no arrangements. You know well what are the frontiers of
Poland. Upon the banks of the Dnieper, four hundred miles hence, we may
enter into negotiations.'
Thus all was ready for the sanguinary battle of two days, which
followed, and one memorable in the annals of war. It commenced by a
combat on the 24th at Bialolenka, and ended on the 25th on the plain of
Grochow.
POSITION ON THE 24th, AND BATTLE OF BIALOLENKA
The position of the two armies, on the 24th, was as follows. The
Polish army occupied the same ground as when they ceased firing on the
20th; but the force was disposed in a different manner.--The right
wing was reinforced by the division of general Szembek; and although
Bialolenka, Kawenzyn, and Wavre composed the line of combat, there was
this difference, that, while before, the centre was at Kawenzyn, and
the left wing at Bialolenka, at present the left wing was at Kawenzyn;
the forces which were at Bialolenka were posted as a detached corps,
and the centre of the army was at the forest of elders. The right
wing occupied the space between the great road and the marshes of the
Vistula, called the marshes of Goclaw. This arrangement made our line
more concentrated. The first division under Krukowiecki, which was at
Bialolenka, with the division of cavalry under Uminski, was directed to
observe the great road from Jablonna, and all the roads leading from
Radzimin and Zombki to Warsaw. Between Kawenzyn and Bialolenka the
debouchment of the enemy was prevented by extensive marshes.
The Russian army was upon the same points as on the 20th. Their
greatest force was opposed to our right wing at Wavre.
On the afternoon of the 24th, the enemy attacked with impetuosity the
first division at Bialolenka. The corps of the enemy which made this
attack was that of the prince Sczachowski, which had recently joined
the main army, and for which marshal Diebitsch was supposed to have
waited. This corps, as was afterwards ascertained, had missed their
road, and became unintentionally engaged with our forces on that
day. The orders of that corps were to traverse the forests between
Radzimin and Zombki, and to join the army without being observed by our
forces. It was the false direction which they took that brought on the
engagement at Bialolenka.
This battle consisted, like the former actions at this place, of an
attempt by the enemy to force the passage of the dykes, which were
defended on our side by about eight battalions, protected by some
twenty pieces of cannon. This small force repulsed the enemy in three
successive attacks upon the dykes. At about 5, P.M. another Russian
corps, under general Pahlen, came to the succor of Sczachowski, and
as the first corps attempted to pass the road leading from Radzimin,
the latter attempted to force the passage of the two dykes leading
from Zombki, and at both points under the cover of a terrible fire
of artillery. If the reader will consider that our small force,
consisting of only eight battalions and fifteen squadrons, stood their
ground against two Russian corps of nearly 40,000 men and 60 pieces of
cannon, the efforts which were made on that day may be appreciated.
Our plan of action consisted chiefly in allowing a part of the enemy's
forces to pass the dykes, and then falling upon and cutting them up by
successive charges of cavalry and infantry, supported by an effective
fire of artillery. By such efforts this handful of brave men repulsed
the attacks of the enemy until night, when his attacks ceased. At
the approach of night, general Krukowiecki sent small reconnoitering
parties upon the roads from Radzimin and Zombki. These patrols, pushing
as far as, and even beyond Zombki, saw nothing of the enemy, and in
fact learnt, to their astonishment, from the marauders whom they took,
that the two Russian corps had quitted their position, and were on
their march across the forest of Kawenzyn, to join the main army. This
sudden withdrawal of the enemy's corps was an indication that they had
received orders to join the grand army, and that a general attack was
in contemplation for the next day. In expectation of this attack, a
body of men was sent, during the night, to obstruct, by defences, the
three roads leading from Radzimin and Zombki. Small detachments were
left on those roads, and the forces which were at Bialolenka quitted
their position, to reinforce the larger corps upon the plain of Wavre.
The following was the position of the two armies on the 25th, the day
of the memorable battle of Grochow. [_See Plans_ XI _and_ XII]. The
Russian army was distributed into eight divisions of combatants, and
three divisions of reserves. Those eight divisions consisted of 126,000
infantry (_a_), 42,000 cavalry (_b_), and 280 pieces of cannon (_c_).
The three divisions of reserve (E) were composed of 16,000 infantry,
4,000 cavalry, and 32 pieces of cannon. This enormous force, which
occupied the space between Kawenzyn (A) and the marshes Goclaw (B),
a distance of about three English miles, was arranged in two lines
of combatants (C, D) and a third of reserve. Their position was as
follows: Their left wing was between Wavre (_r_) and the above marshes
of the Vistula, and was composed of four divisions of infantry, of
47,000 men, four divisions of cavalry, 15,700, and 120 pieces of
cannon. The centre, opposite the forest of elders, consisted also of
four divisions of infantry of 57,000 men, three of cavalry of 10,500
men, and 108 pieces of cannon. The right wing, opposite the village of
Kawenzyn consisted of three and a half divisions of infantry of 31,000
men, four divisions of cavalry of 15,750 men, and 52 pieces of cannon.
Upon the borders of the great forest opposite the forest of elders, was
placed the reserve, commanded by the Grand Duke Constantine.
Against this force our inconsiderable army was posted in the following
manner. The right wing (G), formed by the division of Szembek,
consisting of about 7,000 infantry (_d_) and 24 pieces of cannon (_f_),
occupied the space between the road and the marshes above mentioned.
The centre (H) occupied the forest of elders, and touched upon the
great road. It was composed of two divisions commanded by Skrzynecki
and Zimirski, composed of about 15,000 infantry (_d_) and 60 pieces
of cannon (_f_). The left wing (T) occupied Kawenzyn, consisting of
the first division, commanded by Krakowiecki, composed of 6,500 men
(_d_) and 12 pieces of cannon (_f_). Four divisions of cavalry (_g_),
consisting of 9,500 men, commanded by Uminski, Lubinski, Skarzynski,
and Jankowski, were not posted on any fixed point, but stood in
readiness to act wherever occasions might offer. Besides these, was a
small reserve (K) of four battalions and eight squadrons, in all about
5,400 men, under the command of general Pac.
[Illustration:
XI. _Grochow p.139_ ]
BATTLE OF GROCHOW.
On the 25th, at break of day, the fire commenced on our left wing,
on the position of Kawenzyn. The enemy pushed forward all the forces
which were collected on his right wing, and commenced a terrible
fire of artillery and musquetry, with the apparent determination to
carry our wing by a single overpowering effort. Nearly fifty pieces
of artillery opened their fire upon Kawenzyn, and numerous columns of
infantry, under the protection of this fire, pressed forward to carry
the position. But our forces prepared to meet the attack. Small as they
were, consisting only of seven battalions with twelve pieces of cannon,
they had formed the determination to die or conquer upon that ground.
They could hope for no succor, for the whole line was in expectation of
a general attack.
The brave generals Krukowiecki and Malachowski made every effort to
sustain the perseverance of their troops, and each of them, at the head
of their columns and on foot, threw themselves upon the enemy's ranks.
Our artillery did not answer that of the Russians, but directed its
fire of grape wholly upon the columns which were approaching. By the
unparalleled bravery of our wing, of which every soldier seemed to have
formed the resolution to fall rather than yield a foot of ground, this
tremendous attack of the enemy was sustained for several hours, till at
last he was obliged to slacken it.
During the whole of this attack upon our left wing, the centre and the
right remained still in their positions, awaiting the expected attack.
It was near ten o'clock when the fields of Wavre became, as it were,
in one moment, covered with the forces of the enemy, which issued out
of the cover of the forests overhanging the plain. Looking over that
plain, between the forest of elders and the Vistula, one would have
thought it was an undivided mass of troops which was in motion; for in
that comparatively limited space, the eye could not distinguish the
different divisions from each other.
Two hundred pieces of cannon, posted upon that plain, in a single
line, commenced a fire which made the earth tremble, and which was
more terrible than the oldest officers had ever witnessed. After
having prolonged for some time this tremendous fire of artillery, the
enemy made an attempt to carry our right wing; but in a moment all our
cavalry were collected there, and fell upon and overthrew his columns,
and his efforts were as fruitless here, as they had been against our
left.
Having been unsuccessful in these two attacks on the wings, and hoping
that he had weakened our line by the terrible fire of artillery, which
he constantly kept up, the Russian commander collected the greater
part of his forces opposite the forest of elders, and it was there
that an attack was commenced which presented a scene unheard of in
the annals of war. It could with more propriety be called a massacre
of nearly four hours duration. The Russians brought together at this
point one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, posted in the rear and
on the sides of that forest. Some fifty battalions were incessantly
pushed to the attack, with the view to get possession of that forest.
Had they been able to effect this, they would have divided our army
into two parts, and thus could not but have ensured its destruction.
It was the consideration of this important fact which prompted the
horrible attack, and the desperate resistance which it met. The brave
Skrzynecki, Zimirski, Boguslawski, Czyzewski, and Rohland, defended
this forest with fourteen battalions, whose admirably executed
manoeuvres, the change of front, the arrangement of the attack in
columns and escalon, the concentration of force upon the points in
which the enemy's line seemed to waver, a fire which was never lost,
but was always reserved for the closest approach of the enemy--all were
executed with an activity, order and coolness never surpassed. It was
only by such conduct that the tremendous attack of the enemy could have
been sustained for four hours, and that, after having nine times gained
possession of the forest, he was as often repulsed with an immense loss.
Like the infantry, our artillery performed prodigies. All the
batteries, protected by cavalry which never abandoned them, pushed
themselves in advance even of the line of the skirmishers, and
approached sometimes within a hundred feet of the enemy's columns,
in order to give their fire with the most infallible execution. The
battery of the brave colonel Pientka, which defended the border of the
forest, was so far advanced that it was sometimes surrounded by the
enemy, who, in his own disorder, did not become aware of the advantage.
All the different operations indeed, of our artillery in this battle
were truly admirable. Batteries, now concentrated upon one point,
were in a moment hurried to another and distant one, where the enemy
was wholly unprepared for them, and was thrown into disorder by their
sudden attack. In the early part of the afternoon, when the enemy,
after having been several times repulsed, renewed his attack with the
greatest determination, and our 2d division began to give way, the four
batteries of artillery of the brave Adamski, Maslowski, Hilderbrand,
and Bielak, in concert with that of colonel Pientka, advanced like
cavalry to the charge, and, approaching close to the Russian columns,
opened a fire of grape, which spread destruction and disorder in their
ranks. Our infantry, thus animated to the contest, rallied, and threw
themselves again upon the enemy, who then yielded before them.
Like the artillery and infantry, our cavalry, besides the different
charges which they executed with so much bravery, was manoeuvred with
the utmost skill by our generals, and was made to fill the voids
occasioned by the inferiority of our forces, so as always to present
to the enemy an unbroken line.
By such manoeuvres of the three arms, executed with the greatest
determination, in which every commander performed his duty to the
utmost, the enemy's plans were continually disorganized, and his
enormous force, which at first sight would have been supposed capable
to have absolutely crushed the small army opposed to it, was in effect
only a great mass, making a continual oscillation, and which seemed
to trust to do every thing by a terrible fire of artillery, which was
always kept up, whether necessary or not.
Thus it was that fifty battalions of the enemy, amounting to over
40,000 men, supported by 120 pieces of artillery, in a concentrated
attack upon one point, the forest of elders, the decisive point of the
position, were nine times repulsed from that forest, which was left
literally covered with their dead.
From eleven o'clock until three, these attacks continued through
the whole line, (the most powerful being in the centre), and the
destruction of life was immense. At the last named hour, our generals,
each of whom we may remark had had their horses shot under them, and
several of whom were severely wounded, formed the plan of giving the
enemy a decisive blow. Their plan was to withdraw from the fire the
2d and 3d divisions, which had suffered most, and to make a general
retrograde movement in such a form as to have the wings considerably
in advance of the centre, which was to be drawn back as far as the
Obelisk of Iron (_k_), at which there was a position more commanding.
This plan had the following objects:--The first was, to draw the enemy
upon the open plain; the second was, to concentrate our force still
more, and to place it in two lines, the inner one to be composed of the
whole of the 2d and a part of the 3d division, which were withdrawn
for repose. A third object was, to lead the enemy to believe that a
retrograde movement was forced upon us by our losses, and that we felt
ourselves too weak to continue the defence of the forest.
To execute this manoeuvre, and to enable the 2d division to retire
without being molested, the artillery was left with some twenty
squadrons of cavalry to protect the retrograde movement. This artillery
and cavalry were ordered afterwards to evacuate their positions
gradually, and the former to take post in the centre under the
protection of the whole of the cavalry, which were in escalon, and
prepared for a general attack. The manoeuvre was as admirably executed
as it was conceived. The enemy had no suspicion of its object, but,
presuming it to be a flight, undertook to profit by it. It was at this
moment that marshal Diebitsch, as if sure of victory, saw himself
already at Warsaw, and, on the field of battle, he allowed these words
to escape him: 'Well, then, it appears that after this bloody day, I
shall take tea in the Belvidere palace.'
It was about three P.M. that our 2nd division, in conformity with the
plan adopted, began to retire by an escalon movement. To hasten the
execution of this movement, it was ordered that the columns, retiring
in succession, on reaching a considerable distance from the enemy,
should quicken their pace as they proceeded, in order to form the
second line as soon as possible, and to give space for the operations
of the artillery and cavalry. It was at this moment that general
Zimirski, who had lost several horses under him, and had just placed
himself upon a fresh horse, to superintend this movement, was struck
with a twelve pound ball in the left shoulder, which carried away his
arm, and caused his death in a few hours. The melancholy loss of this
general was most deeply felt by the whole army, and particularly by
his own division, but it did not interfere with the execution of these
orders. The brave general Czyzewski immediately took command of the
division, and continued the orderly movement of the division towards
the rear, and he received great support from generals Rohland and
Zaluski. As soon as the last columns of this force quitted the forest,
[_See Plan_ XII] the Russian troops began to debouch from it, and our
artillery commenced a terrible fire. The brave colonel Pientka, who
was still far in advance, checked the debouchement from the forest
near him. Seated with the most perfect sangfroid upon a disabled
piece of artillery, this brave officer directed an unremitting fire
from his battery. The artillery and cavalry, after having protected
the retrograde movement of the centre, still continued to keep their
ground, to enable the wings also to retire undisturbed. All our forces
were then in movement, and the enemy pressed on. The Russian columns
had already advanced beyond the position of colonel Pientka, but that
brave officer still kept up the defence.[37] By this time, however, the
2nd division had already reached their destined position, and their
battalions had commenced forming. Such was the state of things, when,
between Kawenzyn and the forest, a cloud of Russian cavalry was seen
advancing to the attack, having at their head five regiments of heavy
cuirassiers; a force in fact of some forty squadrons, or between
eight and nine thousand in all. Colonel Pientka, with his artillery,
supported only by a single regiment of Mazurs, still held his post,
to give yet another effective fire upon this advancing cavalry, which
was already between him and Skrzynecki's division; and then, to save
himself from being cut off, he quitted at full gallop a post which he
had occupied for five hours under the terrible fire of the artillery of
the enemy. This rapid movement of Pientka's battery and the regiment
of cavalry which attended him, animated the Russian cuirassiers in
their advance, and the infantry and artillery of the enemy followed
their cavalry. At this moment Chlopicki was wounded by a grenade, and
the army was without a head; but generals Skrzynecki and Czyzewski had
already formed their divisions into squares, and awaited the attack of
the enemy.
The Russian cavalry advanced upon the trot, and came in a direction
perpendicular to the line of our battery of rockets, which was posted
between the 2d and 3d divisions (A). Suddenly a discharge from this
battery was poured into their ranks, and enveloped them with flame and
noise. Their horses, galled to madness by the flakes of fire which
were showered over them, became wholly ungovernable, and, breaking
away from all control, spread disorder in every direction. The enemy's
ranks were soon in the most utter confusion, and in a short time
this enormous body of cavalry became one disordered mass, sweeping
along towards the fire of our squares. In a very few minutes that
cavalry was almost annihilated. So nearly complete, in fact, was their
destruction, that of a regiment of cuirassiers, which was at the head
of the attacking force, called the regiment of Albert, and which also
bore the designation of the 'Invincible' inscribed upon their helmets,
not a man escaped. The few who were not left dead upon the field were
taken prisoners. In fact, some hundred horse of that regiment were
whirled along through the intervals of our squares, and were left to be
taken prisoners at leisure. The wrecks of this routed cavalry, closely
pursued by our lancers, carried along in their flight the columns of
infantry which were following them, and a general retreat of all the
enemy's forces commenced. The battle was gained. The cry of 'Poland
forever!' arose along our line, and reached the walls of Warsaw, to
cheer the hearts of its anxious inhabitants. Nothing was wanting but a
skilful commander in chief to our forces, to have insured the entire
destruction of the Russian army.
Two thousand prisoners, among them twenty officers of different grades,
five pieces of cannon, and upwards of a thousand horses, were the
trophies of that immortal day, the memory of which will be forever
terrible to tyrants.
It was nearly five P.M. when the Russian army commenced a general
flight, and even evacuated its first position, which it had occupied
in the early morning. It is to be regretted that the order to
follow up the pursuit was wanting. Szembek alone threw himself, at
times, with his division, among the Russian ranks, and took a great
number prisoners, baggage and chests of ammunition. According to the
declaration of general Szembek, if, during the retreat of the enemy, a
charge of cavalry and artillery had been ordered between the left wing
and the centre of the enemy, a great part (P) of that wing, which was
considerably detached from the centre, would have been cut off. This
could have been easily done, for no part of our little reserve was
brought into action during the day, and they were eager to be permitted
to make the charge.
The prince Radzivil, after the withdrawal of general Chlopicki from the
army in consequence of his wound, found himself without council; and
not feeling himself sufficiently capable to risk any bold manoeuvre;
seeing too that the army was much exhausted by the fighting of that
day and the preceding; and fearing also that the Vistula might become
impassable, and the bridges be endangered by the melting of the ice;
in fine, being unwilling to take upon himself the great responsibility
of attempting to pursue his advantages, decided to give the army an
interval of repose, and to occupy the time in re-organizing it.
Some farther details, and remarks upon this important battle may
not be unacceptable to the reader. 1st. In regard to position: On
examining critically the position of the Polish army, we notice some
great faults. The right wing was upon a plain entirely uncovered,
and exposed to the commanding fire of the enemy's artillery. All the
talents of the brave Szembek were required to prevent this wing from
being unprofitably sacrificed. This same wing, if it had been withdrawn
a thousand paces farther to the rear, in such a manner as not to have
leant on the marshes of the Vistula, but have occupied the small wooded
hills on the right of the main road, and on a line with the village
of Grochow, would have been then in a commanding position, and safe
from the tremendous fire of the enemy. The enemy would probably have
then occupied the plain, and thus been disadvantageously exposed to
our fire. His loss would have been doubled, and all the charges of our
cavalry and infantry would have been much more effective. But what was
above all unpardonable, was that, with a full knowledge of the enemy's
intention to attack us, together with a consciousness of our own
inferiority of force, and the nature of our position, which was wanting
in strength, no fortifications whatever were erected, although four
days and five nights were passed in that position, during which the
national guard of Warsaw, and all the unenrolled population, who would
have cheerfully volunteered for the purpose, could have been employed
in the construction of works to any desired extent.
In regard to the centre, we may remark, that it was indeed covered by
the forest of elders, of which it occupied a part, but the attack of
this forest by the enemy was thus made necessary, and their repulse
cost us too great sacrifices. But besides the sacrifices which the
support of such a position required, our troops were so incessantly
occupied with repulse of the successive attacks of the enemy, that
it was impossible to attempt any decisive manoeuvre. It was not
there, in fact, as we have seen, that the battle was decided, but at
the Obelisk of Iron, and by other means. The centre, like the right
wing, should have been withdrawn so far as to have been on a line
with the village of Grochow, and in such a manner as to profit by all
the commanding positions between Targowek and Grochow, upon which
our artillery (which, as the case was, were upon a low and exposed
position opposite the forest), would have been very advantageously
posted. In general, our whole position was too extended, reaching from
Kawenzyn to the marshes of the Vistula at Goclaw. It ought to have been
from the beginning more concentrated, and supported on the outermost
circumvallations of Praga (B). It could thus have profited by the
advantageous positions which adjoin those defences. In consequence of
this too great extent of position, our forces remained in a single line
for five hours in succession, in most dangerous exposure.
In regard to the evolutions, although the details were admirably
executed, it is to be remarked that the left wing did not yield a
sufficient support to the other bodies. The communications with that
wing were not well sustained--another effect of the too great extent
of the position. The line of the enemy was encumbered with artillery,
and there were favorable moments for a general attack on that artillery
by our cavalry. Such opportunities were perceived by our generals of
cavalry, and the attack suggested by them to the commander in chief,
but nothing was done. The greatest fault of all, however, and that
which perhaps saved the Russian army from entire destruction, was the
neglect to follow up the enemy in his retreat, and by a judicious
manoeuvre to cut off his right wing, as was perfectly practicable;--by
such a manoeuvre, as it will be seen was, in fact, afterwards
successfully practised by Skrzynecki at Wavre, where a great part of
that same force were taken prisoners.
The battle of Grochow cost the enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners,
according to the reports published by the Russians themselves, 20,000
men. On our side the loss amounted to 5,000. But to give the reader an
idea of the terrible fire of that day, it may be remarked that there
was not a single general or staff officer, who had not his horse killed
or wounded under him. Full two thirds of the officers, and perhaps the
same proportion of the soldiers, had their clothes pierced with balls,
and more than a tenth part of the army were slightly wounded, though
not unfitted for service. In this battle the 2d and 3d divisions of
infantry suffered the most, and twenty of their officers were mortally
wounded with grape-shot. I would not desire to present a revolting
picture of the horrors of a battle-field, yet to impress upon the
reader how great a scourge tyranny is to mankind, I could wish to
point out to him, along the whole road from Kawenzyn to the marshes of
Goclaw, hillocks of dead at every step, especially in the forest of
elders, where rank upon rank was seen prostrate upon the earth. Indeed,
so strewed with bodies was this forest that it received from that day
the name of _the forest of the dead_.[38]
With the twilight, our whole army began to evacuate their position,
and to cross the Vistula to Warsaw. The passage of the river occupied
the whole night. On the morning of the next day, all that remained of
our forces upon the right bank, were two battalions of infantry, and
thirty-six pieces of cannon, which were at the bridge-head of Praga.
The Russians were well satisfied with our passage of the Vistula, for
they felt the need of repose. It was at first presumed that in a few
days the enemy would storm Praga. This, however, was soon found not
to be their intention; and, for what cause we cannot conjecture, they
continued in a state of complete inaction.
Such then was the end of the grand operation of marshal Diebitsch, with
his colossal forces, by which it was his purpose to put an end to the
war in a few days! The boasted Crosser of the Balkan, with from 180,000
to 200,000 men, and 316 pieces of cannon, was not only unable to crush,
as he proposed to do, an army of scarcely 40,000 men and 100 cannon,
but was beaten by that small army, and only escaped a total ruin from
the absence of a competent leader to the Polish forces. Such facts, so
rare in history, cannot be too frequently impressed upon the mind of
the reader, and they should be held up to the view of every despot,
to teach him upon what a frail foundation his confidence in numbers
may rest, and to convince him that his masses must melt away and be
dispersed, before a people, who, on their own soil, are resolved to
throw off the yoke of despotism, and who fight for liberty with the
energy of despair.[39]
The nation and the army occupied this interval of repose in giving
thanks to Providence for the successes of the preceding day. In all
the churches Te Deums were sung, as well as in the chapels of the camp
near Warsaw. The army was received by the people with solemnities. The
senate, accompanied by the inhabitants, repaired to the camp, where
patriotic addresses were delivered, and a public fete given to the
army. For three successive nights, Warsaw was illuminated, and the
inscription 'To the defenders of their Country,' was every where seen.
Unequal to the description of these moments of exultation of a people
animated with the recovery of their freedom, I can only say that they
were moments which will live forever in the heart of every Pole, and
will satisfy him that a nation so united will be always capable of
great efforts.
On the day after the religious ceremonies, the provisional government
met in the National (formerly the Royal) Palace, where all the general
officers of the army were also assembled to deliberate upon the
measures to be adopted both in regard to military and civil affairs. It
was on that occasion that the prince Michael Radziwil, actuated by the
noblest impulses, and having a single view to the good of his country,
abdicated the chief command, surrendering his trust into the hands of
the national government, with the avowal that he did not feel himself
sufficiently capable to continue to hold so responsible a post. This
step, which showed a great elevation of character, impressed the nation
with feelings of gratitude, and has given to prince Radziwil a name in
history.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 37: Admirable as was the conduct of all our artillery, every
man in which deserved a decoration, yet among this artillery, the
battery of colonel Pientka must be distinguished. Without yielding a
step of ground, that battery held its place for five hours, and it
often happened during the battle, that this single battery was left
exposed alone to the fire of thirty or forty of the enemy's pieces.
It was computed that this battery alone caused a greater loss to the
enemy than the entire loss that his whole artillery caused in our
ranks; and I do not exaggerate in saying, that the fire, chiefly of
grape, which Pientka kept up for five hours, and at the distance often
of a few hundred paces only, must have cost the Russians from one to
two thousand men. What is most remarkable, this battery itself, during
the whole of the fire, did not lose more than one officer and six men
killed, six wounded, and ten or twelve horses, two of which were killed
under colonel Pientka, whose clothes were pierced through and through
with grape, and his casque torn in pieces, while, as if providentially
preserved, his person was not in the slightest degree injured.]
[Footnote 38: Up to the 10th of March, when a reconnoisance was made,
as far as the plain of Wavre, the dead were not yet interred, and all
the confusion of a battle-field remained, proving that the enemy was
too much occupied to give the ordinary attention to these duties. On
that day several wagons filled with Russian cuirassiers were sent to
Warsaw. Many ruined caissons of ammunition, many gun-carriages, three
deserted cannons, and several hundred carbines, sabres, and pistols,
knapsacks, and helmets in considerable numbers were strewed over the
field, and indicated the disorder in which the enemy had made his
retreat. To prevent an epidemical malady, our government made a request
to general Diebitsch to send a body of his men to aid in the interment
of the dead, which was in fact done.
Contemplating these masses of Russian dead, the victims of a horrible
despotism, what reflections were awakened! Those unfortunate men
were dragged to the combat to be sacrificed. Not one of that mass of
victims could see the justice of the cause for which they were thus
sacrificed. What consolation could there be in the last agonies of
suffering incurred in such a cause? There could be none. How different
must have been the death of the Polish soldier, who felt the sacredness
and importance of the struggle on which he had entered. His last
moments were consoled with the thought that his life was sacrificed
for the good of his country. If the deaths of the Russian and the
Polish soldier were thus different, their lives are not less so. What
reward awaits the Russian soldier? Is it a service of twenty-five years
under the terror of the knout, in which service he most generally
dies, or if he survives, is too much broken down to be able to gain a
subsistence afterwards? The Russian soldier, besides the fatigues of
the general service, is subject to a private service under any one of
his superiors, the merest subaltern perhaps, who, far from rewarding
him for such services, abuses him but the more freely. The full pay of
a Russian soldier is a groat a day; and even out of this little pay his
superiors exact a profit. The consequence is, that the degree of his
misery is excessive, and he would be in extremity if the proprietors of
land where he is quartered did not succor him. What other recompense
is given to these wretched men, who are thus led to the sacrifice of
their lives for the self-will of a despot, who, while the soldier,
covered with wounds, is groaning under his sufferings, spends his time
in luxurious enjoyment, and perhaps mocks at the abjectness of men who
are thus willing instruments of his pleasure? What other recompense for
all this? Perhaps to this soldier is given a medal of brass, which, if
his commander in a moment of good humor, as he passes down the line,
may have addressed him with the title of 'Staryk' or 'old soldier,'
he receives as a token of his having been through a campaign. Compare
this with the recompense which awaited the Polish soldier on his return
from the campaign. He was received by his countrymen with the warmest
demonstrations of joy. Mothers lifted their children in their arms, and
pointed him out to them as one of the defenders of their country. No
anxiety for the future weighed upon him, for his country had made ample
provision for him. It was at his will to remain in the service, or to
go to occupy the land designated for him by the national government.
He would find there all that his wants might require. Remaining in the
military service, he enjoyed the respect of those about him. All were
his brothers, and the greatest delicacy of intercourse was observed
between him and his superiors. His service was an agreeable duty, in
which, besides gaining an honorable subsistence, he received each day
some new mark of friendship and esteem.]
[Footnote 39: The courage of our forces that day, was no doubt much
animated by the vicinity of Warsaw, for the battle was fought within
view of the inhabitants, who covered the fields about Praga. Many of
the equipages of the wealthy families attended to receive the wounded
from the field of battle, and all the inhabitants, without distinction
of rank, pressed forward to remove and succor them. Those of the
wounded who could not be led to the carriages, were carried in the arms
of the citizens, and among those who performed this office were the
highest members of the national government, ministers of religion, and
even ladies. How then could such an attachment of the nation to her
defenders, fail to be answered by an enthusiasm in her defence which
knew no bounds. The wounded soldiers, in order not to draw upon this
sympathy, conquered their sufferings, and stifled their groans; and to
check the tears of those who bore them, they even forced themselves to
raise the patriotic shout, and sing the national hymn.
To the details illustrating the courage which was displayed upon that
field, I may add the following:--In one of the attacks upon the forest
of elders, when the enemy had gained possession of it, there was an
interruption to our advance from a ditch which had been cut across
the road, and which it was necessary to pass. The Russian artillery,
observing the effect of this obstruction, poured a heavy fire of grape
upon the spot to add to the confusion. Lieutenant Czaykowski, who
commanded a platoon of grenadiers of the 7th regiment, in the attacking
columns, had passed with his platoon this small ditch, when he received
a grape shot in the leg, which threw him down. As he fell, he cried,
'Grenadiers, advance!' and continued this cry, regardless of his
suffering, as he lay prostrate on the ground. Those brave grenadiers,
animated by this noble spirit, pushed their attack with such fury that
they drove the enemy from his position.
Our artillery, which had so bravely fought, and which had to answer the
terrible fire of the numerous artillery of the enemy, as well as to
check the strong attacks of the Russian columns, were obliged often to
change their place, to concentrate, and disperse, as occasion required.
It was in one of those evolutions, that a battery, posted near that
commanded by captain Hilderbrand, was required to change its position.
The bombardier Kozieradzki was sent to give orders to this effect. He
was on his way to execute this commission, when a ball carried away his
arm. That brave man, however, continued his way, thus severely wounded,
reached the battery, executed his commission, and then fell from the
loss of blood.
The following incidents of this battle-field deserve to be mentioned,
as indicating how little of national animosity mingled with the
feelings of the combatants. It was often seen that the wounded soldiers
of the hostile forces who happened to be thrown in each other's
vicinity, would drag themselves towards each other for mutual relief,
and engage in friendly conversation. 'Why,' would a Polish soldier say
to the Russian, 'why are we shedding each other's blood? The cause for
which we have taken arms is that of your happiness, as well as our
own.' The Russian soldier could only answer, with tears of shame, 'We
have been driven to march against you.' No stronger example could be
given, of the kindest dispositions of the Poles towards the Russians,
than the treatment of the latter in our hospitals. They were nursed
and fed, like our own wounded, by the hands of those benevolent and
patriotic females who had devoted themselves to these holy duties. On
leaving those hospitals, the Russian soldiers swore never to forget the
kindness they had experienced.]