Retrograde movement of the 18th of February.--Details of this
movement, and of the actions which took place.--The army reaches
the field of Praga.--Its reception at Warsaw.--Position of the
army.--Battle of Wavre and Bialolenka.--Operations of general
Dwernicki against the corps of Prince Wirtemburg.--Defeat of that
corps by general Dwernicki at Swierza.--Renewal of the enemy's attack
on the main army on the 20th.--Its successful resistance.--Review
of the events of the preceding days.--Examination of the plan of
operations of the Polish army.
On the 18th, our whole line was ordered to make a retrograde movement.
[_See Plan_ VI.] The utmost order and tranquillity was to be observed
in this movement. The several corps were required to preserve a
constant communication with each other, and to keep themselves
uniformly on the same parallel. General Zimirski, commanding the right
wing (A), and who remained on the main road, received orders to take
advantage of every good position which he should meet with between
Dembe-Wielkie (13) and Milosna (12). Three points in particular were
recommended to his attention, Dembe-Wielkie, (14), and Milosna. Nature
presents at those points commanding positions surrounded by forests.
In each of those positions, the enemy would be exposed to the fire of
our artillery, on debouching from the intervening forests; and it was
designed to make the attack of those positions as costly as possible to
the enemy.
[Illustration: _VI. p. 100_]
The centre (B), which was commanded by generals Skrzynecki and
Krukowiecki, was to retire upon the road which leads from
Stanislawow (9) to Okuniew (11). Upon this winding road, which
traverses thick forests, the means of defence was easy.
The left wing (C), commanded by Szembek and Uminski, which was in
the environs of Zegrz (4), received orders to gain Jablonna (16),
and Zombke (15), on the same night. The great bridge over the Narew
at Zegrz was to be destroyed, and a small detachment to be left at
Zagroby, for the purpose of observing the enemy.
Conformably to the above orders, our entire line commenced the
evacuation of its position, and an incessant fire was kept up
throughout the line, during the whole day. In the morning, two
squadrons of light cavalry, which were sent from Minsk to Stanislawow,
met a regiment of cossacks, who were making a reconnoisance, after
having traversed the forest of Jakubow. The cavalry threw themselves
upon them, dispersed them, and took two hundred prisoners with their
horses. Upon the position of Dembe, our cavalry threw themselves upon
some Russian artillery which appeared upon our right, and were marching
in a direction from Ruda. Six chests of ammunition were taken, and
four pieces of cannon were spiked. At Stanislaus, the 2d regiment of
hulans and the 4th of the line performed prodigies of valor, throwing
themselves continually upon superior masses of the enemy. The division
of general Zimirski repelled two successive attacks from a superior
force of the enemy at Konik, upon the road between Dembe-Wielkie and
Janowek. Twelve pieces of artillery, placed upon the elevated points
of the road, poured an incessant fire of grape upon the masses which
were advancing to the attack, and which were enclosed by forests on
both sides, as well as impeded in their progress by the trees which had
been placed across the road to obstruct them; and, although the enemy
constantly renewed his attacking columns, he was not able to force our
position, which indeed was not evacuated, until the movement of the
general line required a corresponding withdrawal of this division.
Our left wing fought with equal advantages at Nasielsk. From this town,
which was entirely in flames, the attacks of the enemy were repeatedly
repulsed. Our artillery distinguished themselves by acts of daring
valor. They drew their pieces into the midst of blazing streets, in
order to pour a more effective fire upon the masses of the enemy, who
had entered at the opposite extremities.
The first regiment of light infantry, having at their head the brave
Szembek, threw themselves upon a part of the town occupied by a whole
division of the enemy, and drove them out. Even in the midst of the
burning town, our chasseurs fell upon and destroyed the different
parties of the enemy. The enemy, on quitting the place, were exposed
to continual attacks from our cavalry, under the command of general
Uminski, who took on that day some hundred prisoners, and among them
several officers.
Our right wing in its last position at Milosna (12), held the enemy in
check before that town. General Zimirski placed his artillery upon the
heights behind the town, from which the town and the adjoining plain
was commanded. Every attempt of the enemy, every debouchment from the
forest, cost him a severe loss. The enemy in vain took positions with
his artillery to act upon us. He was not permitted to occupy Milosna
until night approached.
At Okuniew, the road passes a marshy forest for more than half a mile.
The enemy was imprudent enough to push his columns upon this road.
General Skrzynecki awaited them at a point not far distant on the
opposite side. The advanced guard of the enemy, imprudently composed of
several regiments of cossack cavalry, had already passed the dyke, when
the 4th regiment threw themselves in columns upon them.
These forces of the enemy were thrown into the utmost consternation.
Their only escape was into the marshes on either side, where some
hundreds of them were taken prisoners without resistance. The arrival
of the night terminated the scene, and saved this advanced guard of the
enemy from total destruction. Thus ended a sanguinary day, on which, in
every part of our line, our troops were victorious, and the enemy was
subjected to immense losses. Our generals had made the best choice of
their positions, and had profited by them to the utmost.
The enemy's loss on that day, in killed, wounded, and prisoners,
amounted to at least 10,000 men. On our side the loss did not exceed
1,000.[35]
On the night of the 18th our army took the following position. [_See
Plan_ VII.] Our left wing was between Jablonna (16) and Zombki (15),
and sent out its reconnoisances as far as Zagroby (4), upon the Narew
(N), the bridge over which at that place they destroyed. Our centre was
between Okuniew (11) and Zombki (15). Our right wing was at Wavre (17).
After two such bloody days, as the preceding had been for the Russians,
we cannot sufficiently express our astonishment that marshal Diebitsch
should have allowed his army no repose, but should have again pushed
his attack, without any new plan, on the 19th and 20th. These
operations of Diebitsch, without an assignable end, indicated a blind
confidence in numbers, or the headlong fury of a man inflamed by the
renown which he had acquired, and who was determined to make the event
bear out as nearly as possible, whatever sacrifice it might cost, the
rash boast which he is said to have made, that he would finish the war
in twenty-four hours. But he sacrificed his thousands in vain.
On the 19th an action took place, not only with the grand army under
the walls of Warsaw, or on the fields of Praga, but also on the left
bank of the Vistula at Swierza [(7) _Pl._ VI], forty miles from Warsaw,
where general Dwernicki beat prince Wirtemberg, who, as we have already
mentioned, had passed the Vistula at Pulawa [(6) _Pl._ VI], and was
approaching Warsaw [(1) _Pl._ VI].
BATTLE OF WAVRE AND BIALOLENKA. [_Pl._ VIII _and_ IX.]
At the break of day, upon every point, the right wing, the centre, and
the left wing, our line was attacked. We might remark in regard to the
positions of the two armies on that day, that our right wing, (A) which
was at Wavre, was unprotected, while on the other hand the left wing
(C) of the enemy, opposite to it, was very advantageously placed on
heights covered with wood, between Milosna and Wavre. Our centre (B)
was better posted at Kawenzyn. It occupied this village, (which was in
a commanding position,) and the declivity descending from it to the
plain of Zombki. Our left wing at Bialolenka was also advantageously
covered by little wooded hills, having two dykes in front leading
toward them.
The Russians on that day directed their strongest attack upon our right
wing, which occupied the weakest position. With the view of carrying
this position, they sent against it some forty battalions of infantry
and some thirty squadrons of cavalry, supported by seventy pieces
of artillery. Our position was defended by a division of about ten
battalions of infantry and fifteen squadrons of artillery, supported by
twenty-four pieces of artillery. This enormous disproportion did not
discourage our soldiers. Their energy supplied the place of numbers.
The enemy commenced his attack by a warm fire of light troops and
a fire from his artillery, which commanded the plain. The skilful
manoeuvres of general Zimirski, in displaying his front, contracting
it, dividing it into small parties, and withdrawing or advancing, as
the direction of the enemy's artillery required, and thus avoiding
the effect of his fire, prevented the loss which it would else have
occasioned. In this way several hours were occupied, when the enemy,
trusting to the impression which he supposed his fire to have made, at
about ten o'clock sent forward twelve or more battalions (D) to the
charge. General Zimirski, anticipating this movement, withdrew, in
order to lead them on to the plain between Wavre and Grokow, sending
to general Skrzynecki an aid-de-camp to inform him of this manoeuvre,
and to engage him to send a force of cavalry to act upon the enemy's
columns in flank. General Skrzynecki, who occupied, as we have stated,
the heights of Kawenzyn, was also warmly engaged with a brigade of the
enemy, and had already observed this imprudent advance of the enemy
in his attack, who had indeed gone beyond the line of Skrzynecki's
position. In a moment the order was given for the brigade of general
Kicki to throw themselves upon the enemy's flank; and as general Kicki
approached with the ten squadrons (E) which composed his command,
general Zimirski gave orders for a general charge both upon the enemy's
cavalry (F) and infantry (D). The columns of the enemy were carried
away before these charges, and their attack was wholly paralyzed.
This onset, which was so successfully made, forced the enemy (H) to
incline his position back from Kawenzyn to Milosna. That manoeuvre
was decisive of the enemy's fate, and it was well understood by our
generals. General Skrzynecki, by pushing forward the left of his
division, cut off the right wing of the enemy from all communication
with his centre, and at about mid-day our right wing and centre
occupied their former position at Wavre, including the small forest
of elders which was between the enemy's left wing and centre; and, in
fact, general Skrzynecki occupied a part also of the Great Forest.
This state of things was to be profited by, and the right wing of the
enemy, thus separated, was to be attacked before the enemy should be
able to renew his attack upon Kawenzyn, and the forest of elders, and
our right wing. To execute this plan, the two divisions of Krukowiecki
and Szembek, composing our left wing, which was fighting at Bialolenka,
[_See Plan_ IX] received orders to push a strong attack against the
enemy's front, at the same moment that a brigade (B) of Skrzynecki's
division, supported by some pieces of cannon, operated upon the road
(_a_) leading from Kawenzyn (_b_) to Zombki (_k_). By this manoeuvre
the enemy was menaced with being taken in the rear.
The left wing, as we have said, was warmly engaged with the superior
force of the Russians; who, by placing some fifty pieces of cannon
(_f_) behind the two dykes (_e_) above named, kept up a sweeping
fire of grape upon our artillery (_d_) and infantry (_c_), which
were defending the passage of the dykes. A considerable body of the
enemy had already reached the hither side of the dykes, when general
Uminski, with a brigade of cavalry (D), advanced to the charge, and
at the same time communicated the orders to the two divisions to
commence the general attack. Under a warm fire of grape, our cavalry
threw themselves upon the enemy's infantry, which had debouched over
the dykes. A general charge commenced, and our cavalry penetrated the
enemy's masses. The 2nd and 3rd regiments of chasseurs distinguished
themselves by their feats of bravery. The enemy was repulsed, and began
to fall back and crowd upon the dykes, and at this moment their rout
was effected. A brigade (B) from general Skrzynecki's division arrived,
and commenced a fire of grape upon the dykes, over which the enemy was
flying in the greatest disorder. Their ranks were in the utmost
confusion; they crowded with precipitation upon the dykes, exposed
continually to our destructive fire. By this repulse the whole of the
enemy's right wing was broken, and they commenced a general retreat,
leaving a great number of prisoners, who either had not reached the
dykes or could not get from them, amounting to perhaps a thousand men,
besides another thousand killed and wounded. The enemy also lost two
standards, four pieces of cannon, several chests of ammunition, and
many horses.
[Illustration: _VII. p. 114._]
[Illustration: _VIII. p. 116._]
[Illustration: _IX. p. 119._]
[Illustration: _X. p. 122._]
In this manner ended the attack upon that wing; and indeed the general
attack might be said to have ended here. Towards night the enemy
renewed his attacks upon our centre and right, but they were feeble.
Thus closed another day, which, like the preceding, was most propitious
to our arms.
BATTLE AT SWIERZA. [_See Plan_ X.]
On this same day, as we have mentioned, general Dwernicki, with a
detached corps, fought the enemy at Swierza. The reader is already
aware that this general, having gained a victory over the corps of
general Kreutz at Stoczek [_Plan_ VI, (18)], on the 14th of February,
received orders to pass the Vistula, in order to defend the palatinate
of Mazovie, to check the operations of the enemy there, and to obstruct
his demonstrations upon Warsaw.
On receiving this order, general Dwernicki, on the night of the same
day, quitted Stoczek, traversed Zelechow (19) and Macieiowice, and on
the 17th passed the Vistula near Ryczywol (7). On the 18th he commenced
his operations against the corps of prince Wirtemberg, which was on its
way from Radom, and the advanced guard of which begun to show itself
upon the plain of Ryczywol.[36]
General Dwernicki harassed the enemy on that day [_See Plan_ X,] by
continual charges of cavalry, in which the krakus of Krakowie were
particularly distinguished. His only plan upon that day was to keep
the enemy upon the plain of Ryczywol. During the night he intended to
pass, with the chief part of his force, the river Radomierza above
Ryczywol (_f_), and by this course to present himself to the enemy
upon the road which leads from Radom to Ryczywol, the same road in fact
upon which the enemy had advanced, and attack him both on his flank
and rear, the Vistula being on his front. In executing this movement,
general Dwernicki left two squadrons of cavalry (A), one battalion of
infantry (A), and two pieces of cannon, at the side of the river, under
the command of colonel Russyian. He then quietly left his position,
and crossed the river in its fordable places (_f_) about half a league
above. Colonel Russyian, who as we have said remained on the position
at Ryczywol, was ordered to commence a light fire of skirmishers at
break of day, but to retrograde constantly, and to allow the enemy an
easy passage over the bridge. On the 19th, the enemy (D), who had no
suspicions of the manoeuvre, commenced in the morning his debouchment
upon the bridge, having the expectation of engaging with our whole
force in a decisive battle upon the field of Ryczywol. His astonishment
may be imagined, when, as the day commenced, he found both upon his
flank and his rear a force marching against him to the attack (B). The
enemy stopped passing the bridge, and attempted to turn and meet the
attack, but this was not permitted him. Our cavalry threw themselves
with impetuosity upon that part of his forces which were attempting
to place themselves in position; and our artillery, which was boldly
brought near the enemy's columns, poured a terribly destructive fire of
grape upon them. The utmost consternation ensued, and a general and
disorderly flight was commenced in the direction of Nowawies (N), to
which place our corps continued the pursuit of the enemy (R).
This day, which may be called one of the most brilliant in our war,
cost the enemy, besides his killed and wounded, two thousand prisoners,
with more than twenty officers, four standards, ten pieces of cannon,
some hundred horses, and about thirty chests with ammunition, with
officers' baggage, &c. The prince Wirtemberg with the remains of his
corps retreated by forced marches to the small town of Granica, where
he repassed the Vistula and reached Pulawa. Thus, by a single battle,
the whole country on this side of the Vistula was cleared of the
presence of the enemy.
General Dwernicki permitted to his corps, who were really much
exhausted by fighting and marching, to repose by a slow march as far
as Kozienice, where he remained stationary, sending out, however, his
reconnoisances as far as Pulawa.
On the 20th of February our main army was engaged with the enemy the
whole day upon the same position as on the preceding. This repetition
of his attack, without a change of plan or position, was a great
weakness in the enemy. On that day, feeling sensibly the loss of a part
of the great forest opposite Kawenzyn, as well as that of the small
forest of elders, the enemy commenced his attack upon those points.
Some twenty battalions were incessantly pushed forward to the attack,
against which eight battalions on our part kept an effectual stand
for several hours. This day, although uninteresting and indecisive
in manoeuvres, was bloody. No important blow was attempted by us,
but every attack of the enemy was met with a vigorous and sanguinary
repulse. It was a day of glory for the 4th regiment--the day on which
that celebrated regiment, though already distinguished, began to take
its high place in our reports; and on which it fought with a degree
of valor that could never have been surpassed. Without even waiting
for orders, this brave regiment was seen constantly pushing itself
towards the points of the greatest danger; and its companies were often
fighting singly in the very midst of the thickest masses of the enemy.
By the unsuccessful and costly attacks of the enemy the whole day was
occupied, and at its close, after the loss of thousands of men, he had
not gained a foot of ground.
Thus ten days had passed in continual and bloody actions upon the same
position, during which the Polish army had been uniformly successful,
and at the end of which the enemy discontinued his attacks, thus giving
the most convincing proof of the extent of the losses he had suffered
on all points, during that period, amounting, in fact, in killed,
wounded and prisoners, to full 30,000 men. In this space of ten days,
the whole Russian army had been engaged, and that army amounted, as
we have already said, and as will be confirmed by all the official
reports, to more than 150,000 infantry, 50,000 cavalry, and 300 pieces
of cannon. To this force was opposed a handful, comparatively, of
Poles, consisting of 30,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and 96 pieces of
cannon; a sixth part, in fact, of the Russian force.
This memorable commencement of our war will show to the world what can
be effected by a nation fighting in defence of its liberty and to throw
off an oppressive yoke. Those bloody combats, and that enthusiasm,
to which my feeble pen cannot render justice, but which some better
historian will present to the world in their true colors, should
convince men that the immense mercenary forces which a despot may lead
on, and by which he trusts to enforce his will, may avail him little.
His enormous masses are like a heap of sand, which a little stone can
pierce. Without animating motives, and therefore without energy,--a
machine scarcely to be trusted,--that army itself, upon the slightest
change of circumstances, may become terrible to the despot, of whom and
of whose creatures it was to have been made the unhappy sacrifice.
The reader will pardon me, if I fatigue him with farther reflections
upon this stage of our affairs. I shall not exaggerate in saying that
this enormous mass of the enemy's forces would in an equal period
have been absolutely annihilated, if we had then had a commander in
chief of greater talent, and a general plan of operation differently
arranged,--for the different operations in detail were, generally
speaking, perfectly executed. The commander in chief, prince Radzivil,
was an individual of the most estimable character, but as he afterwards
himself avowed, not possessed of military talent. General Chlopicki,
who was always near him, and who in fact virtually commanded, if he
had in the early part of his life exhibited military talent, in his
present advanced age had certainly lost much of his energy, and was
unfit to undertake things which demanded the most active intellect, and
the most absolute devotedness of mind and body to the cause. We cannot
too strongly express our astonishment that general Chlopicki, who had
formed the plan, and a very judicious one it was, of drawing the enemy
on to the walls of Warsaw, to give him there a decisive battle, should
have neglected to fortify the natural positions upon his route, by
which the enemy's loss would have been doubled or even trebled. Serock
and Zagroby (4), [_See Plan_ VI], situated upon points of the greatest
importance, especially the first, were evacuated by our forces, for
the want of proper defences. Not the slightest fortification was
constructed at the different passages of the Narew (N), the Bug (B),
the Liewiec (L), and the Swider (S), nor upon the region between those
rivers, which was full of forests and impenetrable marshes, and in
which proper fortifications would have presented the most important
obstructions to the enemy's passage. No concealed passages or by-roads
through those forests were constructed, as they should have been, by
which a body of troops could be led in ambuscade and brought to act
suddenly on the enemy's flanks or otherwise, in critical moments,
and with decisive effect. Such works would have required but little
expense, and could have been made by the Jewish inhabitants, of whom
there are some millions in Poland, (twenty thousand in Warsaw alone,)
and who could have no claims for exemption, for they render no service
to the country, but on the contrary lead a life of profitable fraud
and deception, practised upon the inhabitants. The Jews, indeed, with
some very few exceptions, did not in the least aid in the war, but
often frustrated our exertions by their espionage; and there are in
fact instances of their having fought against us,--against those who
had given them an asylum upon their soil. In the towns of Nasielsk and
Makow this occurred. This part of our population, who had an equal
interest with us in the protection of the country, as far as property
was concerned, could have been thus employed with perfect justice and
propriety. If, by such arrangements, a system of fortification had been
properly united with tactics, and all the plans directed by a man of
talents and energy, of which examples were certainly to be found in
our ranks, with such troops to command, the reader will admit that the
Russian forces could have been soon driven back to the frontiers.
The succession of victories which we have described were not the
results of any general system:--they were victories of detail, executed
with energy and rapidity, and for which we were indebted to the
generals of divisions and brigades, the colonels of regiments, &c.
These successes were isolated, but, had they been made to bear upon
each other, their advantages would have been much greater. For example,
the battle of Dobre, which was so brilliantly gained by Skrzynecki,
would have caused the total ruin of the corps opposed to him, if the
11th division of Krukowiecki, which was in the environs of Jadow, had
come to the aid of Skrzynecki during that action. And indeed this
was the expectation of Skrzynecki when he remained so long upon the
position of Makowiec. But this division, instead of acting upon the
rear of the enemy, as it might have done, having no orders to this
effect, continued its retrograde march, although within the sound of
the cannon of that action.
On the 18th there was not enough of harmony in the operations of the
several divisions. On that day, if those operations had been directed
from one point as from a centre, the enemy, who had been guilty of
extreme imprudence in the advance which he had made into the marshy
and wooded region between Stanislawow (9), Okuniew (11), and the great
road, could have been completely hedged in. [_See Plan_ VI.] The
manoeuvres of general Zimirski, when the enemy made his rapid attack
on the morning of the 19th, were executed at hazard, no general order
having been given in anticipation of such an attack. These manoeuvres
were well executed by general Zimirski: but if the case had been thus
anticipated by the commander in chief, and, at the commencement of the
action, our right wing had been withdrawn to Grochow, [_See_ (A) _Plan_
VIII,] an obstinate defence of the commanding position of Kawenzyn
(B) being kept up, and the enemy had been thus allowed to follow our
right wing with his left; by the same method of operation which was in
fact executed by Skrzynecki and Zimirski, in concert, but with much
larger forces; the enemy could have been attacked on his flank, and
instead of the annihilation of his sixteen battalions, the same fate
would have attended twice or thrice that number;--for, when a force
is taken by surprise in flank and rear, numbers avail comparatively
little in resistance;--indeed, the greater the number, the greater is
the difficulty of changing position, and the greater the disorder and
consternation which follows.
The Russian army was thus early inspired with terror at the resistance
which it had experienced, and the immense losses to which it had
been subjected. It was of the utmost importance to profit by this
consternation; but the vast advantages which might have been gained
under such circumstances, by some general plan of offensive operations
of bold and decisive character, were let pass.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 35: I cannot pass over this occasion of describing the manner
in which the nation received that army, which had but a month before
left the walls of Warsaw, and had, after so many glorious actions,
returned to give there a decisive battle to the enemy, and to fall or
conquer there before the eyes of the nation. Those were moments rare in
history, and should be handed down to posterity, to demonstrate to what
a height the feelings of the nation were exalted, and what a unanimity
was felt in the great cause that warmed all hearts. The thunder of the
cannon which, during the 15th, rolled over the fields of Milosna and
Okuniew, was heard at Warsaw, and announced the approach of the army.
At nightfall, when our first detachments began to show themselves from
the forests of Milosna and Jablonna, and to deploy upon the plains of
Wavre and Bialolenka, the whole population of Warsaw began to leave
the city, and go forth to meet and hail their defenders. The senate,
whose estimable president, Czartoriski, was with the army, left the
city also. In a short time the fields were covered with an exulting
multitude. When the army took its position, and all was quiet under the
protection of night, the people drew near and entered the camp. What
a touching scene was there presented! Here a father and mother seek
their son, who meeting them, presses them to his bosom. There a wife,
leading her children, finds her husband and their father, and throws
herself into his arms, while the children cling around the knees of
their delighted parents. A melancholy contrast was presented by those
who sought in vain for son--husband--parent. But no complaint was
heard. The tears falling for those who were no more, were checked by
the thought that they had died for their country.
The senate, in the name of the nation, and in the most touching
language, thanked the commander in chief and his officers for the
services which they had rendered to their country, and requested them
to communicate these sentiments to the whole army. They finished their
address in nearly the following terms: 'Preserve, brave compatriots,
this noble energy, and in a short time the throne of despotism will
fall, and upon its ruins civilization and public happiness will rise.'
The people continued with the army, furnishing them with every comfort,
and regardless of the fire which was commenced the next day from the
enemy's artillery. Under this fire, vehicles with provisions and
ammunition were continually arriving from the city, and some of them
were destroyed by the enemy's shot. During the actions before Warsaw,
the inhabitants made it a duty to be at hand, to bear off and succor
the wounded; and among those who engaged in these offices were some of
the most distinguished ladies of Warsaw. The strangers who were then
there, and who witnessed the enthusiasm which animated the people, and
seemed to unite them into one family, exclaimed that such a nation
could never, and ought never be conquered.
The following days, the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd of February, in which no
action took place, were devoted to thanksgiving to God, for his favor
in protecting the Polish cause thus far. In all the churches the people
assembled to offer prayers for the welfare of the country; and the army
employed this period of repose in the same manner. On that field, over
which the three hundred cannon of the enemy were pointed in battle
array; while the first line was in position, the rest of the army were
engaged in these devotional exercises. At each assemblage of troops,
the ministers of religion administered patriotic oaths, and animated
the soldiers to perseverance in the holy struggle. Those sacred
ceremonies were followed by hymns, which were sung along the whole
line, and which, mingling with the solemn sounds of the bells of Warsaw
tolling for the assembly of the people in the churches, produced an
indescribably impressive effect. These exercises ended in the general
shout of 'Poland forever!'
To convince the Russians that the Poles were not blindly fighting
against them as Russians, but for that cause of civilization and
happiness which was of equal moment to themselves, several hundred
white flags were prepared with inscriptions in the Russian language,
in terms such as follows: 'Russians! brother Sarmatians! we march to
combat not as your enemies, but to fight for your welfare as well as
our own.' Each regiment received from ten to twenty of those flags,
which, during the combat, were to be distributed among the tirailleurs
and flankers. They were directed to throw them, as occasion might
offer, among the Russian ranks. Many of those volunteers, in rushing
forward to plant those flags among the Russian skirmishers, met their
death at the hands of those whom they wished to save from tyranny. Thus
the Poles had done all that their duty required of them in this holy
contest, to convince the world that the general cause of civilization
and happiness was the great end of their struggle. They sought not
their own aggrandizement by conquests from the territory of another
nation, for their ancient boundaries are wide enough for them. They
fought for that liberty which they had for ages possessed; and that
ancient liberty and those ancient limits they will sooner or later
regain.]
[Footnote 36: The prince Wirtemberg, who commanded the corps against
which general Dwernicki was sent, had served in the Polish army as
brigadier-general. He was cousin to the present king of Wirtemberg,
and nephew of the late Emperor Alexander, who married his aunt. This
prince commanded the 2d and 4th regiment of hulans, of the first
of which regiments general Dwernicki was colonel. In this way the
prince was perfectly well known to general Dwernicki, and was held
by him in very low esteem, as a man of vanity and pretension, and
a tyrant over his subalterns. The vices of his character developed
themselves sufficiently during our revolution. At the breaking out of
the revolution at Warsaw, this man was at Krasny-staw, a small town
in the palatinate of Lublin, in which his brigade was posted. On the
arrival of the news of the revolution, his first care was to secrete
himself. Afterwards, finding that it was impossible to keep concealed,
he began to tamper with the brigade, and tried to persuade his soldiers
to adhere to the service of the Grand Duke, and to refuse to join the
cause of their country. These false persuasions, coming from him, a
general in the Polish service, in open defiance of the will of the
nation, and in opposition to its holiest efforts, afforded a sufficient
ground of accusation against him, to have brought him to judgment as
a traitor. Besides all this, by his tyrannic conduct as a general, he
had deserved severe treatment. But all these offences were forgotten,
and the nation spared him, merely ordering him to quit the country.
He exhibited his gratitude for this delicate treatment, by departing
for Russia and the Polish provinces, and pointing out for arrest some
of the most respectable citizens, who were known for their patriotic
sentiments. He passed several days at Wlodawa, a small frontier town
between the Polish kingdom and the government of Grodno. There he was
guilty of the mean act of intercepting the correspondence between the
different patriotic individuals.
This was not enough. In the campaign, he took the command of a
Russian corps destined to act in the very palatinate of Lublin where
he had held his Polish command for fourteen years, and where all the
proprietors had treated him with the greatest kindness and delicacy.
Arriving there with his corps, he left at every step the traces of his
tyranny. On reaching Pulawa, the estate of the beloved Czartoriski, the
president of the national government, the residence of that family from
which he had himself received so many kindnesses, and in which every
virtue reigned, he did not scruple to give orders to burn the town;--he
did not scruple to take the name in history of 'the devastator of
Pulawa'--of that beautiful spot on which the labor of ages had been
expended, and which was so celebrated for the charms with which nature
as well as art had enriched it. His cruelties were carried to such a
height, that he actually caused to be beaten with the knout, a young
lady, a friend of the princess Czartoriski, who had manifested her
patriotic sentiments by the sacrifice of her jewels to aid the cause
of her country. Even the princess Czartoriski, who was already at an
advanced age, was not spared the insults of this gross man, who, to
put the finishing stroke to his barbarity, on his second visit to
Pulawa, directed a fire of artillery upon the palace, which he knew
was occupied only by the princess and her ladies. Even the Russians
themselves regarded these actions with abhorrence. In regard to his
military talents, they were of the lowest order. General Dwernicki
promised that in a few weeks he would despatch him; and he in fact kept
this promise to the letter.]