The opening fire.--Affairs of the 10th and 11th February.--Combat
of Stoczek.--Disposition in consequence of that battle.--Battle of
Boimie.--Retrograde movement to Dobre.--Combat of Makowiec.--Passage
of the Orsyca.--Combat of Dobre. Attack on the right wing at Minsk.
The tenth of February, 1831, was the first day, after an interval of
fifteen years, of the encounter between the Russian and Polish arms.
Mendzyrzec (18) was the place in which the first fire was given; and
the little skirmish which took place there was of good presage. On
the morning of that day, two regiments of Cossacks showed themselves
upon the plain before the town, on which were posted two regiments
of krakus, or light cavalry, and the 4th regiment of lancers, as an
advanced guard. Our cavalry were impatient to engage with the enemy,
and begged of their commander to be allowed to attack him. When it
was seen that this body of the enemy was detached from his larger
force, permission was given to one of the two new regiments of light
cavalry, supported by a squadron of the old cavalry as a reserve, to
throw themselves upon the enemy. In a moment our cavalry were among the
ranks of the Cossacks. Both of the enemy's regiments were dispersed,
and one squadron with six officers were taken prisoners. The enemy was
not pursued, our troops being satisfied with this successful attack,
and with having excited the first consternation in the enemy's
ranks. After this skirmish, our cavalry, in obedience to previous
instructions, retired to the environs of Siedlce (2). In this town
was a little garrison consisting of a regiment of light infantry and
a detachment of riflemen, formed and commanded by Michael Kuszel. On
the 11th, at about mid-day, the whole of the advanced guard of the
Russian centre, which was commanded by Diebitsch in person, reached
the environs of Siedlce (2), and took position there. Before the night
set in, other Russian columns began to place themselves upon the same
plain. Their advanced guard then recommenced the march, throwing their
tirailleurs forward, who began a warm fire, which was answered by our
own light troops, who were placed in the faubourgs and the sides of
the town. The brave detachment of Kuszel's riflemen, who were finely
trained and equipped, caused a great loss to the enemy. The Russian
artillery, to protect their tirailleurs and the columns of infantry
which followed them, commenced a heavy fire upon the faubourgs occupied
by our infantry. This fire of the Russian artillery was ineffectual;
but our own fire, as the Russians were exposed in an open plain, was
very destructive. The action continued until dark, when our infantry
began to evacuate the town, and marched to rejoin the divisionary camp,
which was about a mile in the rear.
[Illustration:
_II Steizel._ ]
At 8 o'clock, general Zymirski, supposing that the enemy had taken
possession of the town, determined to make an attack, with two
regiments, upon the town and the Russian camp, at the point of the
bayonet. The 7th regiment of the line and the 4th regiment of light
infantry, which were designated for this object, fell with impetuosity
upon the enemy, whom they found in an wholly unprepared state. A few
hundred prisoners were the fruits of this attack, after which our
forces evacuated the town. These little advantages gained in those
two days, retarded the advance of the enemy. He remained inactive on
the 12th and 13th. On the 14th, the Russian corps under the command
of general Kreutz, composed of 15,000 men and 24 pieces of cannon,
attacked the small corps of observation on our right, under the command
of general Dwernicki.
COMBAT OF STOCZEK. [_See Plan_ II.]
General Dwernicki, although aware of the vast superiority of the
enemy's force, yet, trusting in the strength of his own position,
determined to meet his attack, and give him battle. The position
of Stoczek (_a_) was strong in several respects; first, from its
commanding elevation; secondly, from the circumstance that the town
is protected by the river Swider (_b_), which forms marshes that are
not passable but by a dyke (_m_) at a short distance from the city,
in the direction in which the Russian army was approaching. That
dyke was defended by the whole artillery of our corps, consisting
of three pieces (_e_); and the declivity descending toward the dyke
was occupied by two companies of light troops dispersed in favorable
positions as sharp-shooters, and in such a manner as to act on the
dyke. General Dwernicki divided his forces into the smallest possible
bodies, to give an appearance of extent to his line, and thus mask his
inferiority of force. Leaving a battalion of infantry (_d_) to protect
the artillery and prevent the passage of the dyke,--which passage, he
was sure that the enemy could not possibly execute rapidly, and that
this small force was sufficient, if not to prevent at least to retard
it,--he took the two battalions (_d_) which made the remainder of his
force, and throwing them upon the right bank (A) of this river, in the
forest, where an easier and safer passage was open to the enemy, he
there awaited the enemy's movements. The first step of the Russians
(_g_, _h_) was to place all their artillery (_f_) at the nearest
possible point to our position, and to commence a warm fire upon the
town. Under this fire they thought to effect the passage of the dyke.
General Dwernicki ordered his artillery not to fire, until the Russian
columns should make their appearance on the dyke, and then to open a
fire of grape upon them. In this manner some hours passed, during which
the Russian artillery kept up an ineffectual fire, and the Russian
corps executed various manoeuvres in attempting to force the passage
of the dyke, and in pushing their attack in the direction of the
forest. General Kreutz, seeing that his attempts to force the dyke were
attended with severe loss, and thinking that in the other direction,
the passage would be much more easy, decided on a general attack in
that quarter. He divided his corps, leaving one part before the dyke,
and with the remainder advanced to the attack of our right (A). Strong
columns of Russian infantry and cavalry marched against it. As soon
as this manoeuvre was observed by Dwernicki, the idea was conceived
by him of preventing the attack, by throwing himself with the utmost
impetuosity upon the enemy before he had taken a position, and while on
the march. He renewed his orders to defend with the utmost firmness the
passage of the dyke; and, taking all the cavalry with him, he passed
over towards the forest; and, with the united force of this cavalry
and the infantry who were concealed in the forest, he threw himself
upon the Russian artillery, and the cavalry which was protecting it.
In a moment both artillery and cavalry were completely overthrown
and dispersed, and seven pieces of cannon remained in our hands. The
disorder communicated itself to the columns which were on the march,
who thought no longer of following up their attack, but retreated
as fast as possible, and in fact a general and disorderly retreat
commenced. The ruin of their left wing caused a consternation in the
forces composing their right, who, not knowing what had happened,
ceased their fire, quitted their position, and joined in the general
retreat. Besides the killed and wounded, more than 1,000 prisoners,
with twenty officers, were taken, together with a great quantity of
ammunition, baggage, &c., among which were several voitures containing
the chapels of the camp.[34]
The enemy was followed a short distance only, as the inferiority of our
force would not of course admit of an extended pursuit, and it was an
important object also with general Dwernicki not to permit the enemy to
discover that inferiority. He contented himself therefore with having
destroyed nearly a third part of the enemy's corps, and with having
thrown his whole force into the greatest consternation. This brilliant
affair was the commencement of the remarkable career of general
Dwernicki; and it was a propitious opening for our campaign.
General Dwernicki resumed his former position at Stoczek, where
he awaited the orders which the commander in chief might issue on
receiving the report of what had taken place. To make this position
more strong, he ordered a barricade of trees to be made at the
termination of the dyke and at the other points where the approach was
easy, and, in order to keep a close observation upon the enemy, he sent
patrols in the direction of Kock and Zelechow. While thus occupied, he
received orders to leave his position immediately by a rapid march in
the direction of Zelechow and Macieiowice, then to pass the Vistula and
meet the Russian corps under the command of the Prince Wirtemburg, who,
after having crossed that river at Pulawa, had made a demonstration on
its left bank, and was approaching Warsaw.
On receiving these orders, general Dwernicki left Stoczek on the same
night.
In consequence of the enemy's attack upon Dwernicki's corps, which
covered our right wing, that wing was inclined and withdrawn towards
Kaluszyn, in order not to be exposed to the enemy's demonstrations upon
its flank or rear. The town of Minsk was also occupied by a detachment.
On the 15th the Russians made a simultaneous attack on Wengrow and
Kaluszyn. But the principal attack was intended to be directed against
Kaluszyn, or rather the village of Boimie adjoining it. At Wengrow
the attack was masked. By a strong attack upon our right wing, the
enemy had the design of gaining the great road to Warsaw, a plan which
it was of the utmost importance for us to defeat; for, if he should
have succeeded in forcing our right wing, he would have cut off our
communications with the corps of general Skrzynecki, and Krukowiecki,
which were in a more advanced position. Our generals saw the necessity
of the most determined defence of the position, and general Zymirski
resolved to resist to the last extremity.
BATTLE OF BOIMIE. (_See Plan_ III.)
The battle of Boimie consisted of a persevering effort on the part of
the enemy to force the passage of a dyke (_k_), under the protection
of the fire of a strong battery of artillery (_e_). On our side, every
effort was directed to the making of the passage of that dyke as
destructive as possible to the enemy. For this object our arrangements
were made as follows. On the night of the 14th, we destroyed the
bridges (_m_) over the small river of Kostrzyn, which traverses the
dyke or main road in two places. Not far from the nearest bridge, a
defence of branches of trees (_n_) was thrown together, which having
been well placed, made a good cover for our marksmen, and for a
battalion of infantry (_o_), which were concealed behind them. The fire
of grape from the enemy's artillery was rendered ineffective to a great
degree by this mass of trees. Upon the nearest elevations of ground
(B), general Zymirski placed eighteen pieces of cannon (_a_), the fire
of which was concentrated upon the dyke. By this means every attempt of
the enemy to re-construct the bridge was made to cost him a severe
loss, and was rendered ineffectual. The main body of our forces was
placed without the reach of the enemy's artillery. On the left of our
position, at the distance of about half a mile, a small road (_p_)
led to Dobre, and that road was intersected by the small river above
mentioned. The bridge which continued the road over this river was
destroyed by us, and a small detachment placed there to prevent its
reconstruction and its passage by the enemy.
[Illustration:
_Boimie_ III]
Such was the distribution of the small force which, profiting by the
strength of its position, was able to meet the attacks of the numerous
body of the enemy commanded by marshal Diebitsch in person, and which
were renewed during the whole day.
The details of the action are as follows:--At about 9 o'clock on the
morning of the 15th, the Russian force commenced debouching from the
forests which border the main road, between Mingosy and Boimie, and
deploying to the right and left, took position. In a short time the
field was covered with the enemy's masses. His force consisted of
twelve regiments of infantry (_f_), six of cavalry (_g_), and sixty
pieces of cannon. It was at about noon that the enemy placed his
artillery upon the heights (A) above the bridge and commenced his fire.
After continuing for some time this fire, which was but occasionally
answered by our artillery, the enemy sent several battalions in column,
upon the bridge, a part of which force engaged in the repair of the
bridge, and the rest attempted to make the passage. Every approach
of the enemy was met with a warm fire from behind the defence of
trees above mentioned, and our artillery at the same time opened a
destructive fire of grape upon the bridge. The attempts of the enemy
were renewed for some hours, in vain.
Finding the impossibility of forcing this passage, he directed his
efforts to that on his right (D), and sent a cloud of light infantry
and cavalry to attempt to pass the marshes, and ford the stream. But
this passage was equally impossible, and several Russian regiments,
who were engaged in the attempt, exposed themselves to a severe fire
of platoons from our troops, and several staff officers of the enemy
were killed at the head of those regiments. In these renewed and bloody
attempts, the day passed away, and as the night approached, our troops
quietly evacuated their position, and took another a few miles in the
rear.
As to the affair at Wengrow, it was only an engagement with the rear
guard of the corps of general Skrzynecki. That general, knowing his
position to be too far advanced, decided to retire as far as the
environs of Dobre. This retreat was so orderly that it seemed rather
an evolution than a retreat. All the movements were executed with
perfect coolness, and the alternate retreat and fire of the different
battalions, the displaying and closing of the columns, the change of
front, &c, were executed with such precision that it impressed the
enemy with a certain degree of respect, and though three times superior
in force he did not attempt to push his attack. In this manner the
corps arrived at the village of Makowiec, where it took position. On
the next day, with the exception of a few light skirmishes between the
outposts, nothing of importance took place. The right wing received
on that day the order to fall back as far as Minsk, some miles in the
rear of their former position. On the evening of that day the line of
operation of our army was as follows:--Our left wing was at Zegrz, the
centre in the environs of Dobre, and the right wing at Minsk.
On the 17th, the enemy attacked our centre at Dobre and our right at
Minsk. It was a day of great bloodshed along our whole line, but, like
the preceding, highly honorable to our arms.
BATTLE OF MAKOWIEC AND DOBRE. (_See Plan_ IV.)
This battle is generally known by the name of the battle of Dobre; but
as it was fought in two different positions, and with two different
plans of operation, I have given the name of the two general positions,
in speaking of the battle. General Skrzynecki was, as we have already
remarked, in a position too far in advance of our right wing; and as
the enemy on that day had attacked, as we have also stated, the right
wing and the centre simultaneously, and could have made, as will be
seen by the plan, a demonstration on Stanislawow, and thus have acted
on the rear of Skrzynecki, which was nearest to him, that general
had two objects to effect. First to make the attack of the enemy as
costly to him as possible, and next to arrange his retrograde movement
in such a manner as to be able to reach Stanislawow by night. Both
of these designs were exceedingly well executed. Upon each of his
positions he was master of his own movements, and quitted them at his
own time. This affair of the 17th of February was the occasion of
the first development of the remarkable talents of this commander.
It was then that he first awakened the high expectations and gained
the confidence of the nation, which soon after committed to him the
trust so honorably and faithfully executed by him. In regard to the
first position at Makowiec, the reader will observe, on examining the
plan, that the Polish forces were principally engaged in defending a
triangular space embraced between the two roads (_f_) which lead from
Wengrow and Kaluszyn and meet behind Makowiec (_h_). This space, over
which small elevations covered with brush-wood were scattered, afforded
good positions for artillery as well as infantry: but the principal
advantage of this peculiarity of the ground was, that it concealed the
inferiority of our forces. In this position, the village of Makowiec
was made a _point d'appui_ upon our left wing, and it was defended
by five companies (_d_), under the command of colonel Dombrowski.
Six pieces of artillery (_e_) placed in the rear of this village,
reached with their fire the village and the plain in front of it. The
Russian position was an open plain.
[Illustration:
_IV Makowiec 104._ ]
[Illustration:
V. _Dobre p. 104._ ]
The enemy commenced by an attack upon the two roads from Wengrow and
Kaluszyn; and as the attack was met with a strong resistance, he began
to deploy upon the plain between the two roads, and to take order of
battle. Nearly 30,000 Russians, with fifty or sixty pieces of cannon
(_c_), in a short time were seen upon that plain, and commenced a
terrible fire of artillery and musquetry along their whole line,
directed principally against the village and the wooded ground. Several
battalions (_a_), in column, attempted an attack upon these points.
Those attacks were witnessed by colonels Dombrowski and Boguslawski
with perfect indifference. They even ordered our artillery not to
fire. Our tirailleurs, and all the infantry in that position, formed
themselves into detached columns (_k_) of half battalions, and the
Russian columns approached. Our artillery then commenced a fire of
grape, and this fire was a signal for our columns, with the brave
colonels Boguslawski and Dombrowski at their head, to leave their cover
and to throw themselves upon the enemy. The 4th regiment immortalized
itself in that attack. One of its columns threw itself upon three of
the enemy,--the fire ceased, and a terrible carnage at the point of the
bayonet commenced. The enemy repeatedly renewed his attacking force,
but he found it impossible to move our position. At about mid-day,
having suffered so much from loss and exhaustion, he discontinued the
attack. General Skrzynecki, profiting by the cessation of the enemy's
fire, took the opportunity to pass the Liwiec, and ordered a light
fire of tirailleurs to be kept up, under cover of which his columns
commenced executing the passage. When the greater part of the corps had
passed, the tirailleurs began to make a retrograde movement, and were
undisturbed by the enemy. Six squadrons of cavalry (_e_), left as a
rear guard, protected the passage of the river by the light troops. In
this manner the position was slowly evacuated, the bridge destroyed,
and by about two o'clock the whole corps were on the march for Dobre.
The six squadrons abovenamed, to which were added nine pieces of light
artillery (_m_), prevented for a long while the reconstruction of the
bridge by the enemy, and did not quit their position until the corps
was at a safe distance, after which they followed rapidly and overtook
the corps at about four o'clock, and with it took position in order of
battle near Dobre.
BATTLE OF DOBRE. [_See Plan_ V.]
The position of Dobre was more advantageous for us than the former.
It was protected in front by two ponds of considerable size, which
lost themselves at their extremities in marshy ground. The only
passage which led between those two ponds was easy of defence, and
general Skrzynecki posted upon it twelve pieces of artillery of large
calibre (_a_). The remaining part of this position was, like the
former, covered with scattered clumps of brush-wood. The principal
circumstance, however, which made this position eligible, was the
declivity of the ground, inclining towards the marshy ponds above
mentioned.
General Skrzynecki collected all his cavalry upon his right wing, to
hinder the enemy from gaining the road that leads to Minsk (A). The
left of his position (B) he laid open to the enemy. The position in
that direction was surrounded by marshes, upon which, if the enemy
should advance, it would be impossible for him to extricate himself
without being exposed to fight on the most disadvantageous terms.
On this oblique front, general Skrzynecki awaited the approach of the
Russian force. In about half an hour after our position was taken,
the enemy arrived, and began to debouch between the two ponds, which
he was allowed to do, under a very light fire of our artillery. Every
manoeuvre, however, upon our right was met with desperate charges of
the bayonet, and the fire of our whole artillery. All his attempts in
that quarter were ineffectual. In the repulses of these attacks, two
of our bravest colonels, Boguslawski, commander of the 4th regiment of
infantry, and Ziemiecki, commander of the 2d regiment of hulans, (the
former fighting on foot with his carbine in his hand at the head of
his regiment,) were severely wounded. At last, after these ineffectual
attempts on our right, the enemy fell into the plans of general
Skrzynecki, and began to act on our left, when our commander hastened
to take all the advantage of the situation in which the enemy were
about to expose themselves, that the lateness of the day permitted.
General Skrzynecki passed down the front of our line, and addressed the
soldiers in a few animating words, to prepare them to make a general
attack on the enemy. Our forces were divided into two parts, the
smaller of which occupied, by their attack, the main body of the enemy,
while the larger threw itself upon the enemy's right wing, which was at
some distance from the rest of his forces, and was apparently intending
to act on our right wing and to turn it. In a moment this body of the
enemy's force was completely broken up. The fury of the attack was
such, that some Russian battalions were entirely destroyed. It was
only the near approach of night, and the inadequacy of our force for a
pursuit, which saved the whole of the enemy's corps from destruction;
for his entire right wing took to flight, and a general consternation
ensued. The enemy lost on that day, according to his own reports, more
than 6,000 men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. On our side the loss
amounted to about 800.
Thus ended the memorable battle of Dobre. General Skrzynecki left
his position, and arrived on the same night at Stanislawow. Marshal
Diebitsch and the Grand Duke Constantine were with the Russian forces,
in person, on that day, according to the report of the prisoners. The
former, to whom this commencement of the withering of his laurels had
led to a state of the greatest exasperation, often led the columns in
person to the fire--but all in vain.
On the same day, as we have already remarked, our right wing was
attacked at Minsk. The enemy supposed that our main force was there,
and it was for that reason that he chose to attack Dobre, being more
confident of piercing our line at that point. The Russian corps under
general Rosen, which attacked our right wing, satisfied themselves with
keeping up a fire of artillery on Minsk, and the day passed without any
attempt to force the position having been made. Our troops were in the
same position at night as in the morning, and nothing of importance
occurred, although occasionally severe losses were sustained on both
sides.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 34: It was in this battle that the celebrated Matuszka (in
Russian Mamyuika,) or the image of the Holy Mother, fell into our
hands. This image was held in great veneration by that superstitious
people. In the campaign of Turkey, many of their successes were
attributed to the Mamyuika. Its loss occasioned a general sensation
in the Russian army, and was regarded by them as a most unfavorable
presage. We often heard the prisoners whom we afterwards took,
attribute all their misfortunes to the Holy Mother having abandoned
them.]