CHAPTER V.

The Dictator enters upon his duties.--Plans for the enrollment of

new forces.--System of officering them.--Want of energy in the

execution of his plans.--Fortifications neglected.--The people

supply the deficiencies of the administration.--Discovery of the

correspondence between the ministers Grabowski and Lubecki.--The

march of the army delayed.--Answer of the Emperor Nicholas to the

deputies. His proclamation.--Its effect on the nation.--The Diet

demand of the Dictator an account of his trust.--The result of their

investigations.--Chlopicki deprived of the Dictatorial power.--The

civil administration entrusted to Prince Adam Czartoryski, and the

command of the Army to Prince Michael Radziwil, each subordinate to

the Diet.

On the seventh of December, the new Dictator took possession of the

residence which had been prepared for him. A guard of honor was

assigned him, consisting of a company of the Academical Legion. The

twelve companies of which this legion was composed mounted guard in

succession.

The nation had conceived the highest hopes of Chlopicki; they expected,

above all, the most energetic measures in regard to the armament and

organization of the forces. These hopes were not fulfilled. At the

very commencement of his administration, it began to be seen that this

man, either from his advanced age or the original inadequacy of his

talents to the demands of such a situation, would fail to satisfy the

wants of the nation. Indeed, the union of so many different duties in

the hands of one individual demanded abilities of no ordinary strength

and compass. As might have been expected, the evident incapacity of

Chlopicki early became the occasion of dissension in the patriotic

association already referred to, accusations being preferred, as a

matter of course, against those who had been active in procuring his

investment with such high powers. The succeeding events will enable the

reader to decide for himself of the justice of such accusations.

On assuming his post, the Dictator adopted the following arrangements

in regard to the enrollments of the new forces, and other objects of

military administration. He estimated the army already in existence at

25,000 men, and sixty-two pieces of cannon. This army was constituted

as follows:--The infantry was composed of nine regiments, of two

battalions each, and a battalion of sappers, making a total of 19,000

men. The cavalry was also composed of nine regiments, each regiment

consisting of four squadrons, 7,200 men in all. The artillery was

divided into nine battalions, of eight pieces each, in all seventy-two

pieces, exclusive of the artillery in the fortresses of Modlin and

Zamosc.

This force the Dictator proposed to augment in the following

manner:--Each existing regiment was to receive a third battalion; and

he intended to form fifteen new regiments, of three battalions each.

This would have increased the total of infantry to 54,000 men, without

taking into the account the National Guard of Warsaw and the other

cities, amounting to 10,000 men. The cavalry was to be augmented by

8000, making a total of 15,200. To the artillery were to be added

twenty-four pieces of cannon, making a total of ninety-six pieces.

In this estimate the Dictator did not include the aid that might be

calculated upon from the provinces of Prussian, Austrian, and Russian

Poland, the volunteers of every kind, and the regiments raised and

equipped by the large landed proprietors.

For each of the eight palatinates into which the kingdom was divided,

an officer was appointed, whose duty it was to superintend the

organization of the military forces, of which from seven to eight

thousand infantry, and one thousand cavalry, were to be furnished by

each palatinate. These officers were subordinate to two others, who

had the supervision of four palatinates each, and bore the title of

_Regimentarz_. These last had the power of appointing all the officers

of the new forces.[23]

The augmentation of the army was to have been completed by the

twentieth of January, 1831. But all these arrangements were made on

paper only--the government did not press their execution. In fact,

such a degree of negligence existed, that in some places where the

people assembled to be enrolled, they found no officers to receive

them, and, after waiting some time, they returned to their homes.

It was, in truth, only by the energy of the nation, which supplied

the deficiencies of the administration, that our forces were ever in

any degree augmented. The volunteer force was in an especial manner

liberally furnished by the people. A similar state of things existed

with regard to the fortifications; and here again the energy of the

people atoned for the negligence of the administration. This was

especially the case at Warsaw and Praga, where all the citizens labored

on the works of defence, without distinction of age or sex.

The construction of barricades in the different streets of Warsaw,

and of mines in several parts of the city, was commenced by the

citizens. The Dictator, however, instead of occupying his attention

with these warlike preparations, devoted it to diplomatic negociations,

and despatched emissaries to the neighboring courts, charged with

propositions made without the knowledge or the wish of the nation, and

even, in some cases, incompatible with its honor, and inconsistent

with the design of the revolution. All the measures, indeed, of the

Dictator, however well intended they might have been, indicated much

weakness and indecision.

Such was the state of affairs when an event occurred that seemed

to augur well for our prospects. This was the discovery of the

correspondence between the ministers Grabowski and Lubecki, the

former being Secretary of State for Poland and a member of the cabinet

at St Petersburgh, the latter Minister of Finance at Warsaw. This

correspondence afforded the clearest evidence that Russia had intended

to declare war against France, and that she was prepared to commence

that war in December following.[24]

These letters were sent to Paris in the early part of December, by an

express, and ought to have convinced the French government of the

hostile intentions of Russia. They should have satisfied France that

our revolution, and the war that was to follow, were a part of the

great struggle in which her own existence was concerned.

The existing army was, through the activity of the general officers,

brought into such a state, by the middle of December, that it could

then have taken the field against the enemy. The soldiers were eager

for the struggle, but the delay of their march gave color to the

supposition that an answer from the Emperor was waited for. It was

even rumored that the Emperor was coming to Warsaw in person. All

this tended to damp the excitement of the moment. What, then, was

the astonishment of the nation, when it was found that the monarch,

far from admitting the severity of the oppression under which we had

suffered fifteen years,--far from giving a paternal audience to the

deputies which the nation had sent to him, and who, in its name,

had presented the most moderate demands, (limited, in fact, to the

ratification and observance of the constitution granted to us, and

the union of the Polish provinces under one government, as had been

promised by Alexander,)--far from consenting to repair to Warsaw, as

the deputies had entreated him to do, as a father among his children,

to hear their complaints and satisfy himself as to their justice,--far

from all this,--in a word, discarding all paternal feelings, he applied

the term 'infamous' to the sacred effort we had been forced to make by

the oppression under which we had so long suffered.[25]

The Russian generals Benkendorf and Diebitsch, in a conversation, of

which our revolution was the subject, and which took place in an

interview with colonel Wielezynski who was one of the deputies sent to

the emperor, spoke of a general war as impending after Poland should

be crushed.[26] Colonel Wielezynski returned from St Petersburgh in

the latter part of December, bringing with him the proclamation which

has already been given to the reader, and which, being published, was

received by the people with the utmost indignation. It was an insult

to the honor and character of the nation, which demanded vengeance.

The day of the promulgation of this document was a day of terrible

agitation. The cry of 'To battle! To battle!' was heard in every

quarter. The nation demanded to be led against the enemy at once.

The word had gone forth 'there is no hope of peace.'[27] It was with

difficulty that the people could be restrained from rushing at once

to the field and be persuaded to wait for a convocation of the Diet

fixed on the 17th of January. This delay was another error, for the

time which intervened was uselessly employed. This Diet in the opinion

of the nation could decide upon nothing short of war. Upon a just

interpretation of the spirit of the Emperor's proclamation, no other

course could be taken consistently with the national honor. It was in

consequence of this proclamation, of so criminatory, so unjust, so

insulting a character, that Nicholas Romanoff and his successors were

declared to have forfeited all claims to the throne of Poland, and that

that throne was declared vacant. The Poles could no longer submit to a

King, who, far from being willing to hear their complaints, far from

guarantying the rights secured by the constitution, went the length of

insulting that national honor to which all history has borne testimony.

To what a future must Poland, under such a king, have looked forward.

Better were it to risk the bloodiest conflict, nay, to be buried under

the ruins of our country, than to remain the vile slaves of a man,

who, relying on the force which he could control, was willing to take

advantage of his strength to be unjust.

The Diet demanded of general Chlopicki an account of his trust, in

regard to the military and civil administration generally, and in a

particular manner in regard to the preparation of the forces. The

result of this inquiry was to satisfy them that there had been a

general negligence of his duties, especially in regard to the increase

and organization of the army. On examining the military reports, it

was found that only the fifth part of the amount of force ordered

to be levied, was as yet enrolled. Two months had been wasted. The

Dictator, as has been already stated, occupied himself principally with

diplomatic affairs, and seemed to forget that the country was to be

defended. The Diet saw that general Chlopicki was hoping to finish the

war by conferences, and that his eagerness for peace was betraying him

into a forgetfulness of what was due to the national honor. In fine, a

correspondence with the Emperor Nicholas was found to have been carried

on by him.[28]

The Dictator, it was seen, had been equally neglectful of the different

fortifications. Except at the principal points, Praga, Zamosc, and

Modlin, no works of defence had been constructed. The important places

of Serock, and Zegrz, the former on the Narew, and the latter below

the confluence of the Narew and the Bug, were forgotten, as were all

the positions on the great road which leads from Warsaw to Brzese,

upon which, or in its vicinity, our principal operations were to be

executed. No point on the frontier was strengthened. The country was

left entirely open. The Diet, considering all these circumstances,

resolved to send a deputation to the Dictator, to demand of him, for

the last time, what his intentions were, and to require of him to

take the field forthwith. As the Dictator would not submit himself to

this expression of the will of the Diet, and even opened to prince

Adam Czartoriski, who was one of that deputation, propositions deemed

inconsistent with the national honor,--the Diet deprived him of his

trust.

The affairs of the civil administration were confided, as before

the dictatorship, to the senate, under the presidency of prince

Czartoriski, and the command in chief of the army was given to the

prince Michael Radzivil. All these powers were subordinate to the Diet.

In this manner ended the dictatorship of Chlopicki, who afterwards took

a place in the suite of prince Radzivil, and was admitted into the

counsels of the administration of military affairs.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 23: A very important circumstance, which either escaped the

notice of the Dictator, or was wilfully neglected by him, respected the

nomination and rank of officers. As the army was to be considerably

augmented, a proportionally greater number of officers was requisite.

All arrangements upon this subject were confided to the Regimentarz,

with whom the important power of making these appointments was

entirely left. This course soon led to trouble. The Regimentarz, not

having the power to transfer the older officers of the existing army,

excepting in cases where the offer was made by those officers, were

compelled to appoint new officers to newly formed regiments. These

newly levied soldiers were thus placed under officers who were but

learners themselves. The evil effects of this injudicious system were

indeed sensibly felt in the first actions of the campaign. Besides the

evil here alluded to, a degree of jealousy between the old and new

officers resulted from the operation of these arrangements. It was

natural for those who were old in service to see with dissatisfaction

recently commissioned officers placed above them in rank. Instead,

then, of studying to preserve the utmost harmony between those who were

going forth together to shed their blood in the cause of their common

country, that course was in fact taken, which if it had been designed

to disturb this harmony, would have been deemed the most efficacious.

Arrangements for officering the army might have been made in such a

manner as the following, to the satisfaction of all parties. After

dividing the officers into three classes, the first, consisting of

those actually in service, the second of those who had been in service,

but had given up their commissions and were in retirement, and the

third, of the newly commissioned officers; a military commission might

have been formed, who should have before them lists of officers showing

their periods of service. This commission could have designated the

rank of each upon an examination of these lists, placing the retired

officers in the grades in which they stood at the time of their

retirement. The new regiments should have been officered from the two

first classes, advancement being made in the grade of each officer. The

third class, or the new officers, should have been appointed to the

vacancies thus left in the old regiments. Besides the justice which

such an arrangement would have done to the officers of older standing,

it would have this good effect: the experienced officers would have

been more widely distributed through the army, and the new regiments

would have advanced more rapidly in organization and discipline.

General Skrzynecki clearly saw the defects of the actual arrangement;

but once made, it was difficult to reform it. He took, however, every

opportunity that offered, to transfer the older officers to advanced

grades in the new regiments.]

[Footnote 24: _Letter to Prince Lubecki, Minister of Finance at Warsaw,

dated St Petersburgh, the 18th of August, 1830._ 'My Prince,--His

Majesty the Emperor and King directs me to inform you that the Polish

troops being now in marching condition, you are requested to provide

the necessary funds, without delay, upon which the public treasury may

count as occasion may require, to support the expenses of the movement

of the army, and of the approaching campaign.'

(Signed) 'Turkul, _Secretary of State_.'

In an answer to this letter, dated the third of September, Prince

Lubecki renders an account of the means at his command. 'Poland,' he

says, 'has 8,000,000 gilders in its treasury, and 1,000,000 in the bank

of Berlin. She is then ready to undertake the necessary preparations.'

_Extract of a letter addressed to Prince Lubecki by Count Grabowski,

Secretary of State for Poland, at St Petersburgh._ 'The official

correspondence which, by the order of his Majesty, I have the honor

to communicate to you, my Prince, and which directs the placing of

the Polish army on the war establishment, was, undoubtedly, even

more unwelcome to you than to myself. I suffer, truly, in seeing the

progress of our financial arrangements thus arrested. Our treasury

would have been in the most perfect condition, but for the expenses

of this war, which will absolutely exhaust its coffers; for on this

occasion our geographical position places us in the front line.'

'Dated St Petersburgh, 15th October, 1830.

(Signed) 'Grabowski.'

From the same to the same. _Dated October 18th, 1830._

'Having been this day informed by his excellency, the aid-de-camp of

his Majesty, Czerniszew, that orders have been given to his royal

highness the Cæsarowicz, to place on the war establishment all the

troops under his command, without excepting those of the Polish

kingdom, and that these orders are to be carried into effect by the

22d of December, I have the honor, my Prince, to communicate this

information to you, by his Majesty's order, so that the necessary

funds may be furnished without delay to the Minister of War. And I

farther request you, my Prince, by the order of his Majesty, to have

the goodness to assign to his imperial highness the Cæsarowicz all the

funds for which he may have occasion in the execution of his orders.

(Signed) 'Grabowski.'

From the same to the same. _Dated 20th November, 1830._

'The return of Marshal Diebitsch will determine what measures it will

be necessary to take. He has received orders to pass through Warsaw, on

his return from Berlin, with the view to consult with the Grand Duke

Constantine, in an especial manner upon subjects connected with the

movement and subsistence of the army. The Emperor wishes that you would

see the Marshal, as soon as possible after his arrival in Warsaw, in

order to consult with him on all these subjects; and he authorizes you

to execute all the arrangements which may be determined upon by Marshal

Diebitsch and the Grand Duke, without waiting for farther orders from

his Majesty. You will conform strictly to the wishes of his imperial

Highness. His Majesty, in conclusion, orders me to invite you to repair

to St Petersburgh as soon as the army shall have commenced its movement

and the war shall have been declared, so that you may receive in person

the orders of his Majesty. We are now in the month of November, the

distances are great, our armies cannot be ready before the spring,

and events follow each other so rapidly that God only knows what may

happen before that time. The rapidity of their succession has made it

impossible to receive intelligence of events in season to influence

their course. It is this which has caused the unfortunate state of

affairs in regard to Belgium. And here, again, is opened a train of

events, in reference to which it is useless to act, for the next

courier may bring us intelligence of an entirely new state of things.']

[Footnote 25: The proclamations of the Emperor on the 17th and 24th of

December were in effect the same. There was a perfect correspondence

between them in severity of language and spirit. We will give the last.

'By the grace of God, we, Nicholas the First, Emperor and Autocrat

of all the Russias, make known to all our faithful subjects that

an infamous treason has convulsed the kingdom of Poland, which is

united to Russia. Evil-minded men, who had not been disarmed of their

bad passions by the beneficence of the immortal emperor Alexander,

the generous restorer of their country, under the protection of

the laws he had given them, have secretly concerted plots for the

subversion of the established order of things, and began to execute

their projects on the 29th of November last, by rebellion, effusion

of blood, and attempts against the life of our well beloved brother

the Cæsarowicz Grand Duke Constantine Paulowicz. Profiting by the

obscurity of the night, a furious populace, excited by these men,

precipitated themselves upon the palace of the Cæsarowicz; while,

spreading throughout the city of Warsaw the false report that the

Russian troops were massacring the peaceable inhabitants, they

collected the people about them and filled the city with all the

horrors of anarchy. The Cæsarowicz, with the Russians who were about

his person, and the Polish troops who remained faithful to their duty,

determined to take a position in the vicinity of Warsaw, and not to

act with hostility, in order that, avoiding all occasion of shedding

blood, they might prove in the clearest manner the falsehood of the

report which had been circulated, and give the authorities of the city

time and means of bringing back to their duty, in concert with the

well-intentioned citizens, those who had been misled, and to restrain

the discontented. This hope was not fulfilled. The council of the city

were unable to re-establish order. Incessantly menaced by rebels,

who had formed some illegal union among themselves, and had gained

an influence in the council by separating from it some members named

by us, and filling their places with others named by the chiefs of

the conspirators, there was no course left to it but to beseech the

Cæsarowicz to send back the Polish troops who had left Warsaw with

him, to protect the public and private property from new pillage. Soon

after this council was entirely dissolved, and all its powers were

united in the hand of one general. In the interval, the news of the

revolt was spread through all the provinces of Poland. Everywhere the

same means were employed. Imposture, menaces, falsehood were used to

inveigle the pacific inhabitants into the power of the rebels. In this

unfortunate and serious state of things, the Cæsarowicz considered it

indispensable to yield to the request of the government. He permitted

the small body of Polish troops which remained faithful to him to

return to Warsaw, in order to insure as far as possible the security

of persons and property. He himself quitted the kingdom with the

Russian troops, and entered on the 13th December the town of Wlodawa,

in the government of Volhynia.

'Thus was executed a crime which had been resolved upon, probably,

for a long time before. After so many misfortunes, and when at least

in the enjoyment of peace and prosperity under the protection of our

power, the people of the kingdom of Poland have plunged themselves

again into the abyss of revolt and misery, and multitudes of credulous

men, though already trembling in fear of the chastisement which

awaits them, dare to think, for a moment, of victory; and propose

to us the condition of being placed on an equality with ourselves!

Russians, you know that we reject them with indignation! Your hearts

burn with zeal for the throne. Already you appreciate the sentiments

we feel. At the first intelligence of the treason, your response was

a new oath of unshaken fidelity, and at this moment we see but one

movement in the whole extent of our vast empire. But one sentiment

animates all hearts; the desire to spare nothing, to sacrifice all,

even life itself, for the honor of the Emperor and the integrity of

the empire. We witness with deep emotion the strong manifestation of

the love of the people for ourselves and for their country. We might,

indeed, answer you with tranquillity, that new sacrifices and new

efforts will not be necessary. God, the protector of right, is with

us, and all-powerful Russia will be able, with a decisive blow, to

bring to order those who have dared to disturb her tranquillity. Our

faithful troops, who have so recently distinguished themselves by

new victories, are already concentrating upon the western frontier

of the empire. We are in readiness to punish the perjured; but we

wish to distinguish the innocent from the guilty, and to pardon the

weak, who, from inconsiderateness or fear have followed the current.

All the subjects of our kingdom of Poland, all the inhabitants of

Warsaw, have not taken part in the conspiracy and its melancholy

consequences. Many have proved by a glorious death, that they knew

their duty. Others, as we learn by the report of the Grand Duke, have

been forced, with tears of despair, to return to the places occupied

by the rebels. These last, together with the misguided, compose, no

doubt, a great part of the army and of the inhabitants of the kingdom

of Poland. We have addressed ourselves to them by a proclamation on

the 17th of this month, in which, manifesting our just indignation

against the perjured men who have commenced this rebellion, we gave

orders to put an end to all illegal armaments, and to restore every

thing to its former footing. They have yet time, then, to repair

the fault of their compatriots, and to save the Polish kingdom from

the pernicious consequences of a blind criminality. In pointing out

the only means of safety, we make known this manifestation of our

benevolence toward our faithful subjects. They will see in it our

wish to protect the inviolability of the throne and of the country,

as well as the firm resolution to spare misguided and penitent men.

Russians! the example of your Emperor will guide you, the example of

justice without vengeance, of perseverance in the combat for the honor

and prosperity of the empire, without hatred of adversaries, of love

and regard for the subjects of our kingdom of Poland who have remained

faithful to the oath they have made to us, and of an earnest desire

for reconciliation with all those who shall return to their duty. You

will fulfil our hopes, as you have hitherto done. Remain in peace

and quietness; full of confidence in God, the constant benefactor

of Russia, and in a monarch who appreciates the magnitude and the

sacredness of his duties, and who knows how to keep inviolable the

dignity of his empire, and the honor of the Russian people.

'Given at St Petersburgh the twenty-fourth of the month of December,

1830.

(Signed) 'Nicholas.']

[Footnote 26: The following is part of a conversation, in presence of

the Emperor, between generals field marshal Diebitsch and Benkendorf,

and colonel Wielezynski, (one of the deputies sent by the Polish

Dictator,) at the close of a short interview, which took place at a

council on the affairs of state to which those generals had been called

by the Emperor.

'Well, gentlemen of Poland,' said marshal Diebitsch, 'your revolution

has not even the merit of being well timed. You have risen at the

moment when the whole force of the empire was on the march toward your

frontiers, to bring the revolutionary spirits of France and Belgium to

order.'

When the colonel observed that Poland thought herself capable of

arresting the torrent long enough to give Europe the alarm, and to

prepare her for the struggle, marshal Diebitsch answered,

'Well, what will you gain by the result? We had calculated to make our

campaign on the Rhine; we shall now make it on the Elbe or the Oder,

having crushed you first. Consider this well.']

[Footnote 27: According to the testimony of colonel Wielezynski,

the proclamation of the Emperor was in entire contradiction to the

sentiments he expressed in the conversation above mentioned. The tone

of that conversation was anything but severe. He even conceded that

the Poles had just reason to be discontented, and admitted many of the

barbarities of his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine. He promised

colonel Wielezynski that he would act with the strictest justice, and

would consider it a duty to inquire scrupulously into, and carefully

distinguish all the circumstances of the case, in regard to which a

manifesto should shortly be published. As he took leave of the colonel,

in presence of Diebitsch and Benkendorf, he declared that he loved and

esteemed the Poles, and that these his feelings should be the basis of

his course with regard to them. How inconsistent such language with

that of the proclamation!]

[Footnote 28: Some letters of the Emperor Nicholas were found among the

papers of Chlopicki, in which the Emperor expressed his thanks to him

for having taken the Dictatorship, and for the service which he had

done to him, by the preservation of public tranquillity. The emperor

exhorted him to follow 'the conditions which had been prescribed to

him.' The conditions here referred to could not be found. The reader

will permit me to dwell, for a moment, upon the mode of conduct, on the

part of the Emperor Nicholas, which is here indicated.

What conditions could Nicholas propose to the Dictator, which the

nation should not know of? If those conditions were compatible with

justice and with the honor of the nation, why was all this secrecy

necessary? If they were incompatible with justice and our honor, the

Dictator certainly could not have it in his power to make the nation

accept of them. On the contrary, the nation who had given him its

confidence, the moment that it should have been convinced that the

Dictator had intended to compromise its honor, would have despised him

as a traitor, and he would have fallen a sacrifice to its indignation.

To wish to induce him, on his own responsibility, to commit acts

contrary to the honor of the nation, is to be willing, for selfish

ends, to induce him to do that which would render him infamous in

history.

Is this a course becoming a King? A conduct so insincere, Machiavelian,

and even malignant, is based on the system of intrigue, and is in

correspondence with the accustomed policy of the Russian cabinet,--a

policy which has always brought divisions and misery upon the nations

who have been under her power. Such a system, however, is far from

being ultimately favorable to the interests of Russia herself, for it

can never lead to a sure result. Sooner or later duplicity will be

discovered, and the more a nation has been deceived, the deeper will be

its determination of vengeance.

The letters referred to, which, I believe, are now in the hands of

some of our countrymen, will be, in the eyes of the world, a new

justification of our revolution.]

History of the Late Polish Revolution and the Events of the Campaign · 第 5 / 26 章